devdatta akhawe  beta

hi

I received a PhD in Spring 2014 from the Computer Science division at UC Berkeley, where I was advised by the Dawn Song. I am currently the head of security at Figma. Before that, I was at Dropbox where I worked on anti-abuse, account security, application and infrastructure security and sometimes blogged. My LinkedIn has more details of my professional experience. I am also an editor of the Sub Resource Integrity (friendlier introduction) and the Suborigins specifications.

During school, I have interned at Mozilla, Microsoft (MSRC), Yahoo! Labs and Microsoft Research. I have a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science from BITS Pilani. On the web, you can find me on Twitter, Github, and LinkedIn. In my spare time, I volunteer at Asha for Education. Please consider donating! I also have a very hard to pronounce name, so most people prefer to call me Dev.

research

I am interested in security, reliability, abuse of software. Most of my research has focussed on web applications and SaaS software.

SoK: Hate, Harassment, and the Changing Landscape of Online Abuse pdf

Kurt Thomas, Devdatta Akhawe, Michael Bailey, Dan Boneh, Elie Bursztein, Sunny Consolvo, Nicola Dell, Zakir Durumeric, Patrick Gage Kelley, Deepak Kumar, Damon McCoy, Sarah Meiklejohn, Thomas Ristenpart, Gianluca Stringhini.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P; 2021).

> Abstract

We argue that existing security, privacy, and antiabuse protections fail to address the growing threat of online hate and harassment. In order for our community to understand and address this gap, we propose a taxonomy for reasoning about online hate and harassment. Our taxonomy draws on over 150 interdisciplinary research papers that cover disparate threats ranging from intimate partner violence to coordinated mobs. In the process, we identify seven classes of attacks—such as toxic content and surveillance—that each stem from different attacker capabilities and intents. We also provide longitudinal evidence from a three-year survey that hate and harassment is a pervasive, growing experience for online users, particularly for at-risk communities like young adults and people who identify as LGBTQ+. Responding to each class of hate and harassment requires a unique strategy and we highlight five such potential research directions that ultimately empower individuals, communities, and platforms to do so.

Cracking ShadowCrypt: Exploring the Limitations of Secure I/O Systems in Internet Browsers  pdf

M Freyberger, W He, D Akhawe, ML Mazurek, P Mittal
PETS 2018.

> Abstract

An important line of privacy research is investigating the design of systems for secure input and output (I/O) within Internet browsers. These systems would allow for users’ information to be encrypted and decrypted by the browser, and the specific web applications will only have access to the users’ information in encrypted form. The state-of-the-art approach for a secure I/O system within Internet browsers is a system called ShadowCrypt created by UC Berkeley researchers [23]. This paper will explore the limitations of ShadowCrypt in order to provide a foundation for the general principles that must be followed when designing a secure I/O system within Internet browsers. First, we developed a comprehensive UI attack that cannot be mitigated with popular UI defenses, and tested the efficacy of the attack through a user study administered on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Only 1 of the 59 participants who were under attack successfully noticed the UI attack, which validates the stealthiness of the attack. Second, we present multiple attack vectors against ShadowCrypt that do not rely upon UI deception. These attack vectors expose the privacy weaknesses of Shadow DOM — the key browser primitive leveraged by ShadowCrypt. Finally, we present a sketch of potential countermeasures that can enable the design of future secure I/O systems within Internet browsers.

pASSWORD tYPOS and How to Correct Them Securely   pdf

Rahul Chatterjee, Anish Athalye, Devdatta Akhawe, Ari Juels, Thomas Ristenpart
37th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Jose, CA 2016.

> Abstract

We provide the first treatment of typo-tolerant password authentication for arbitrary user-selected passwords. Such a system, rather than simply rejecting a login attempt withan incorrect password, tries to correct common typographical errors on behalf of the user. Limited forms of typo-tolerance have been used in some industry settings, but to date there has been no analysis of the utility and security of such schemes. We quantify the kinds and rates of typos made by users viastudies conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and via instrumentation of the production login infrastructure at Dropbox. The instrumentation at Dropbox did not record user passwords or otherwise change authentication policy, but recorded only the frequency of observed typos. Our experiments reveal that almost 10% of login attempts fail due to a handful of simple, easily correctable typos, such as capitalization errors. We show that correcting just a few of these typos would reduce login delays for a significant fraction of users as well as enable an additional 3% of users to achieve successful login. We introduce a framework for reasoning about typo-tolerance, and investigate the seemingly inherent tension here between security and usability of passwords. We use our framework to show that there exist typo-tolerant authentication schemes that can get corrections for “free”: we prove they are as secure as schemes that always reject mistyped passwords. Building off this theory, we detail a variety of practical strategies for securely implementing typo-tolerance.

ShadowCrypt : Encrypted Web Applications for Everyone   pdf   slides

Warren He, Devdatta Akhawe, Sumeet Jain, Elaine Shi, Dawn Song
21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Scottsdale, 2014.

> Abstract

A number of recent research and industry proposals discussed using encrypted data in web applications. We first present a systematization of the design space of web applications and highlight the advantages and limitations of current proposals. Next, we present ShadowCrypt, a previously unexplored design point that enables encrypted input/output without trusting any part of the web applications. ShadowCrypt allows users to transparently switch to encrypted input/output for text-based web applications. ShadowCrypt runs as a browser extension, replacing input elements in a page with secure, isolated shadow inputs and encrypted text with secure, isolated cleartext. ShadowCrypt’s key innovation is the use of Shadow DOM, an upcoming primitive that allows low-overhead isolation of DOM trees. Evaluation results indicate that ShadowCrypt has low overhead and of practical use today. Finally, based on our experience with ShadowCrypt, we present a study of 17 popular web applications, across different domains, and the functionality impact and security advantages of encrypting the data they handle.

Clickjacking Revisited: A Perceptual View of UI Security   pdf

Devdatta Akhawe, Warren He, Zhiwei Li, Reza Moazzezi, Dawn Song
8th Usenix Workshop on Offensive Technologies, San Diego, 2014.

> Abstract

Clickjacking is a powerful attack against modern web applications. While browser primitives like X-Frame-Options provide a rigorous defense for simple applications, mashups such as social media widgets require secure user interaction while embedded in an untrusted webpage. Motivated by these application scenarios, the W3C UI safety specification proposes new browser primitives to provide a strong defense against clickjacking attacks on embedded widgets. We investigate whether these proposed primitives provide requisite security against clickjacking. We observe that UI security attacks such as clickjacking are fundamentally attacks on human perception. Revisiting clickjacking from a perceptual perspective, we develop five novel attacks that completely bypass the proposed UI safety specification. Our attacks are powerful with success rates ranging from 20% to 99%. However, they only scratch the surface of possible perceptual attacks on UI security. We discuss possible defenses against our perceptual attacks and find that most defenses either have an unacceptable usability cost or do not provide a comprehensive defense. Finally, we posit that a number of attacks are possible with a more comprehensive study of human perception.

The Emperor's New Password Manager: Security Analysis of Web-based Password Managers   pdf

Zhiwei Li, Warren He, Devdatta Akhawe, Dawn Song
Usenix Security Symposium, San Diego, 2014.

> Abstract

We conduct a security analysis of five popular web-based password managers. Unlike ``local'' password managers, web-based password managers run in the browser. We identify four key security concerns for web-based password managers and, for each, identify representative vulnerabilities through our case studies. Our attacks are severe: in four out of the five password managers we studied, an attacker can learn a user's credentials for arbitrary websites. We find vulnerabilities in diverse features like one-time passwords, bookmarklets, and shared passwords. The root-causes of the vulnerabilities are also diverse: ranging from logic and authorization mistakes to misunderstandings about the web security model, in addition to the typical vulnerabilities like CSRF and XSS. Our study suggests that it remains to be a challenge for the password managers to be secure. To guide future development of password managers, we provide guidance for password managers. Given the diversity of vulnerabilities we identified, we advocate a defense-in-depth approach to ensure security of password managers.

Data-confined HTML5 Applications   pdf

Devdatta Akhawe, Frank Li, Warren He, Prateek Saxena, Dawn Song
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), London, 2013.

> Abstract

Rich client-side applications written in HTML5 proliferate on diverse platforms, access sensitive data, and need to maintain data- confinement invariants. Applications currently enforce these invariants using implicit, ad-hoc mechanisms. We propose a new primitive called a data-confined sandbox or DCS. A DCS enables complete mediation of communication channels with a small TCB. Our primitive extends currently standardized primitives and has negligible performance over- head and a modest compatibility cost. We retrofit our design on four real-world HTML5 applications and demonstrate that a small amount of effort enables strong data-confinement guarantees.

Alice in Warningland:
A Large-Scale Field Study of Browser Security Warning Effectiveness   pdf   slides

Devdatta Akhawe, Adrienne Porter Felt
Usenix Security Symposium, Washington DC, 2013.

> Abstract

We empirically assess whether browser security warnings are as ineffective as suggested by popular opinion and previous literature. We used Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome's in-browser telemetry to observe over 25 million warning impressions in situ. During our field study, users continued through a tenth of Mozilla Firefox's malware and phishing warnings, a quarter of Google Chrome's malware and phishing warnings, and a third of Mozilla Firefox's SSL warnings. This demonstrates that security warnings can be effective in practice; security experts and system architects should not dismiss the goal of communicating security information to end users. We also find that user behavior varies across warnings. In contrast to the other warnings, users continued through 70.2% of Google Chrome's SSL warnings. This indicates that the user experience of a warning can have a significant impact on user behavior. Based on our findings, we make recommendations for warning designers and researchers.

An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs   pdf   slides

Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe, David Wagner
Usenix Security Symposium, Washington DC, 2013.

> Abstract

We perform an empirical study to better understand two well-known vulnerability rewards programs, or VRPs, which software vendors use to encourage community participation in finding and responsibly disclosing software vulnerabilities. The Chrome VRP has cost approximately $580,000 over 3 years and has resulted in 501 bounties paid for the identification of security vulnerabilities. The Firefox VRP has cost approximately $570,000 over the last 3 years and has yielded 190 bounties. 28% of Chrome.s patched vulnerabilities appearing in security advisories over this period, and 24% of Firefox.s, are the result of VRP contributions. Both programs appear economically efficient, comparing favorably to the cost of hiring full-time security researchers. The Chrome VRP features low expected payouts accompanied by high potential payouts, while the Firefox VRP features fixed payouts. Finding vulnerabilities for VRPs typically does not yield a salary comparable to a full-time job; the common case for recipients of rewards in either program is that they have received only one reward. Firefox has far more critical-severity vulnerabilities than Chrome, which we believe is attributable to an architectural difference between the two browsers.

Here's My Cert, So Trust Me, Maybe? Understanding TLS Errors on the Web   pdf   slides

Devdatta Akhawe, Johanna Amann, Matthias Vallentin, Robin Sommer
World Wide Web Conference (WWW), Rio De Janerio, 2013.

> Abstract

When browsers report TLS errors, they cannot distinguish between attacks and harmless server misconfigurations; hence they leave it to the user to decide whether continuing is safe. However, actual attacks remain rare. As a result, users quickly become used to ``false positives'' that deplete their attention span, making it unlikely that they will pay sufficient scrutiny when a real attack comes along. Consequently, browser vendors should aim to minimize the number of low-risk warnings they report. To guide that process, we perform a large-scale measurement study of common TLS warnings. Using a set of passive network monitors located at different sites, we identify the prevalence of warnings for a total population of about 300,000 users over a nine-month period. We identify low-risk scenarios that consume a large chunk of the user attention budget and make concrete recommendations to browser vendors that will help maintain user attention in high-risk situations. We study the impact on end users with a data set much larger in scale than the data sets used in previous TLS measurement studies. A key novelty of our approach involves the use of internal browser code instead of generic TLS libraries for analysis, providing more accurate and representative results.

How to Ask for Permission   pdf   slides

Adrienne Porter Felt, Serge Egelman, Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe, David Wagner
Hot Topics in Security (HotSec), Bellevue 2012.

> Abstract

Application platforms provide third-party applications with access to hardware (e.g., GPS and cameras) and personal data. Many platforms use permission systems to protect access to these resources. The nature of these permission systems vary widely across platforms. Some platforms obtain user consent as part of installation, while others display runtime consent dialogs. We propose a set of guidelines to aid platform designers in determining the most appropriate permission-granting mechanism for a given permission. We apply our proposal to a smartphone platform. A preliminary evaluation indicates that our model will reduce the number of warnings presented to users, thereby reducing habituation effects.

Privilege Separation for HTML5 Applications   pdf   slides

Devdatta Akhawe, Prateek Saxena, Dawn Song
21st Usenix Security Symposium, Bellevue 2012.

> Abstract

The standard approach for privilege separation in web applications is to execute application components in different web origins. This limits the practicality of privilege separation since each web origin has financial and administrative cost. In this paper, we propose a new design for achieving effective privilege separation in HTML5 applications that shows how applications can cheaply create arbitrary number of components. Our approach utilizes standardized abstractions already implemented in modern browsers. We do not advocate any changes to the underlying browser or require learning new high-level languages, which contrasts prior approaches. We empirically show that we can retrofit our design to real-world HTML5 applications (browser extensions and rich client-side applications) and achieve reduction of 6x to 10000x in TCB for our case studies. Our mechanism requires less than 13 lines of application-specific code changes and considerably improves auditability.

Product Labels for Mobile Application Markets   pdf   slides

Devdatta Akhawe, Matthew Finifter
Mobile Security Technologies, San Francisco 2012.

> Abstract

Mobile application markets thrive, yet they are heldback from their full potential by the information asymmetrybetween application developers and application consumers. AConsumer has no way to gauge the security or reliability of anapplication, and a developer has no way to differentiate hisapplication from that of the competition on the basis of thesefactors. We argue that the centralized nature of mobileapplication markets, such as Android Market and the iOS App Store,afford them a unique opportunity to gather and present information. We discuss a number of ideas to leverage thisopportunity to eliminate information asymmetry, includingthirdparty certifications, qualitative descriptions of attacksurface, and aggregated usage data.

A Systematic Analysis of XSS Sanitization in Web Application Frameworks   pdf   slides

Joel Weinberger, Prateek Saxena, Devdatta Akhawe, Matthew Finifter, Dawn Song
16th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), Leuven 2011.

> Abstract

While most research on XSS defense has focused on techniques for securing existing applications and re-architecting browser mechanisms, sanitization remains the industry-standard defense mechanism. By streamlining and automating XSS sanitization, web application frameworks stand in a good position to stop XSS but have received little research attention. In order to drive research on web frameworks, we systematically study the security of the XSS sanitization abstractions frameworks provide. We develop a novel model of the web browser and characterize the challenges of XSS sanitization. Based on the model, we systematically evaluate the XSS abstractions in 14 major commercially-used web frameworks. We find that frameworks often do not address critical parts of the XSS conundrum. We perform an empirical analysis of 8 large web applications to extract the requirements of sanitization primitives from the perspective of real-world applications. Our study shows that there is a wide gap between the abstractions provided by frameworks and the requirements of applications.

Do You Know Where Your Data Are?
Secure Data Capsules for Deployable Data Protection   pdf   slides

Petros Maniatis, Devdatta Akhawe, Kevin Fall, Elaine Shi, Stephen McCamant, Dawn Song
13th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS), Napa 2011.

Towards a Formal Foundation of Web Security   pdf   slides

Devdatta Akhawe, Adam Barth, Peifung Eric Lam, John Mitchell, Dawn Song
23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), Edinburgh 2010.

> Abstract

We propose a formal model of web security based on an abstraction of the web platform and use this model to analyze the security of several sample web mechanisms and applications. We identify multiple distinct threat models that can be used to analyze web applications, ranging from a web attacker who controls malicious web sites and clients, to stronger attackers who can control the network and/or leverage sites designed to display user-supplied content. We propose two broadly applicable security goals and study five security mechanisms. In our case studies, which include HTML5 forms, Referer validation, and a single sign-on solution, we use a SAT-based model-checking tool to fid two previously known vulnerabilities and three new vulnerabilities. The case study of a Kerberos-based single sign-on system illustrates key differences between network protocols and web protocols and finds a vulnerability that arises because of the way cookies, redirects, and embedded links are used.

A Symbolic Execution Framework for JavaScript   pdf   slides

Prateek Saxena, Devdatta Akhawe, Steve Hanna, Stephen McCamant, Feng Mao, Dawn Song
31st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland 2010.
Winner of AT&T; Best Applied Security Research Paper award at CSAW

> Abstract

As AJAX applications gain popularity, client-side JavaScript code is becoming increasingly complex. However, few automated vulnerability analysis tools for JavaScript exist. In this paper, we describe the first system for exploring the execution space of JavaScript code using symbolic execution. To handle JavaScript code’s complex use of string operations, we design a new language of string constraints and implement a solver for it. We build an automatic end-to-end tool, Kudzu, and apply it to the problem of finding client-side code injection vulnerabilities. In experiments on 18 live web applications, Kudzu automatically discovers 2 previously unknown vulnerabilities and 9 more than that were previously found only with a manually-constructed test suite.

The Emperor’s New API: On the (In)Secure Usage of New Client Side Primitives   pdf   slides

Steve Hanna, Richard Shin, Devdatta Akhawe, Prateek Saxena, Arman Boehm, Dawn Song
4th Web 2.0 Security and Privacy Workshop, Oakland 2010.

> Abstract

Several new browser primitives have been proposed to meet the demands of application interactivity while enabling security. To investigate whether applications consistently use these primitives safely and adequately in practice, we study the real-world usage of two client-side primitives, namely postMessage and HTML5’s client-side database storage. We examine new purely client-side communication protocols layered on postMessage (Facebook Connect, Google Friend Connect) and several real-world web applications (including Gmail, Buzz, Maps and others) which use client-side storage abstractions. We find that, in practice, these abstractions are widely used insecurely, which leads to severe vulnerabilities and can increase the attack surface for web applications in unexpected ways. We conclude the paper by offering insights into why these abstractions can be hard to use safely, and propose the economy of liabilities principle for designing future abstractions. The principle recommends that a good design for a primitive should minimize the liability that the user undertakes to ensure application security. We suggest enhancements to the existing browser primitives to make their secure use more practical.

etc

I have been hacking over a simple tool to check for common errors in academic writing. If you use it, I would appreciate feedback/comments/patches.

I was czaring the Security Reading Group at Berkeley. Kevin is now in charge.

The Web Security model project I worked on is now opensource.

Kaluza, a tool I worked on, is now available to play with online. During this work, I also wrote a tool to convert Perl compatible regular expressions to the Hampi string solver input format. It is now part of the Hampi codebase.