



Joint Doctrine Note 2-13



Commander's Communication Synchronization



16 December 2013



Unclassified

PREFACE

1. Scope


This joint doctrine note (JDN) provides fundamental principles, techniques, and discussion of processes to aid the commander in implementing communication synchronization.

2. Purpose

A JDN is a publication that is intended to facilitate information-sharing on problems and potential solutions as a supporting effort of formal joint doctrine development and revision. It provides a short term bridging solution to potential doctrine gaps. This JDN resulted from a decision at the June 2013 Joint Doctrine Planning Conference to develop a JDN on what was initially doctrinal guidance on “strategic communication” and later evolved to communication synchronization. Several principle questions were asked in the original effort and doctrinal development process. What are the best practices, tactics, techniques, and procedures that are being used to synchronize communications? Does “commander’s communication synchronization” (CCS) need to be codified in joint doctrine? Although this JDN does not necessarily describe a position of consensus across joint forces, the intent is to retain CCS-related information in a non-authoritative product for joint force commanders and staff to use as appropriate. This JDN will assist in the development of other JPs with respect to relevant CCS techniques and procedures.

3. Application

Though not authoritative, the guidance within this publication is relevant to communication synchronization activities of the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and DOD agencies in support of joint operations.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses the need for synchronized communication**
 - **Defines the terms “audience,” “public,” and “stakeholder”**
 - **Reviews communication capabilities and provides a comparison to aid understanding and planning**
 - **Provides three organizational best practices from the field**
 - **Outlines the commander’s communication synchronization (CCS) planning and how it fits within the joint operation planning process**
 - **Provides a notional CCS process map for a more deliberate and detailed staff integration view**
-

Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)

24/7 Communication and the Information Environment

It is impossible not to communicate; everything the joint force does sends a message. Joint force operations, lethal and nonlethal activities, strategies, policies, and plans communicate our national intent. Our actions send clear messages to many different groups.

The continuous and rapid flow of information, facilitated by advances in media distribution methods, requires proactive, responsive, adaptive, and agile processes and capabilities. Effective communication in the operational environment (OE) requires consideration of many factors including means, context, and established patterns of communication. Successful communication synchronization in the information environment requires a comprehensive, harmonized process.

Communication planners should consider the national communication goals and strategic objectives in the planning process to engage specific audiences and coordinate joint force actions with our interorganizational partners to achieve unity of effort.

Why Communicate?

The joint force commander (JFC) has a requirement to continuously communicate with US and international audiences, publics, and stakeholders about joint force

activities, intentions, and desired end states. Remaining silent on an issue is worse than providing information, cultural, and other factors, because it allows an adversary to exploit or monopolize the media to propagate their agenda. Inconsistent and uncoordinated communication can lead to a number of negative consequences impacting the joint force's ability to operate effectively and accomplish the mission.

Knowing Your Audience

An “audience” is a broad, roughly-defined group that contains relevant stakeholders or groups from which publics may develop. A “stakeholder” is an individual or group that is directly involved or affected by ongoing operations or the outcome, and is worthy of consideration because they are naturally motivated toward action if their interests are threatened. A “public” is a group of varying size that has organized for or against joint force efforts. As publics begin to form, the joint force may necessarily shift efforts from informing/educating them to influencing attitudes and behaviors.

The Need for Synchronized Communication and a Communication Approach

Conflict is a battle of wills, for those waging it, those supporting the effort, and even those who are undecided. The main effort for winning the battle of wills, particularly in operations characteristic of irregular warfare, will likely occur in and through the information environment. If the joint force is to compete favorably in the competitive information environment, there must be synchronization of all communication efforts with operations.

Synchronized communication focuses on the behavior of publics that can have an impact on mission success. The commander's approach to synchronizing communication emphasizes early planning, training, and guidance that enables decentralized, yet responsive action, that reflect strategic guidance. Communication planners must consider both positive and negative influences on publics' behavior. However, positive influence creates desired, long-term effects; contributes to success across the lines of effort; and engenders lasting support. Research should be prioritized up front to support behavioral change in publics intended for influence activities.

The Importance of Aligning Operations, Actions, Words, and Images

When what we do is different from what we say or the images we share, the public whose support we need cannot be sure which one to believe—the words, the images or the actions.

Establishment and preservation of trust and organizational credibility requires deliberate alignment of the military's operations, actions, words and images. Trust is the perceived alignment of the military's operations, actions, words and images. It cannot be repaired through outward demands or assurances. Credibility is supported by the literal alignment; a "say-do gap," will considerably undermine joint force credibility.

Timeliness should be considered in the context of the information, interests, and demands of relevant publics, or expectations of a partner. The relative advantage enemies gain through speed can be mitigated through deliberate planning that incorporates timely, accurate communication before, during, and immediately following operations.

*The Commander's
Communication
Synchronization and
Approach*

Developing a coherent approach to communication synchronization that is consistent with operations helps to build the trust and support necessary for successful military operations; facilitates the development of informed perceptions about the military; helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts; and contributes to the achievement of national, strategic, and operational objectives.

The JFC's communication efforts are continuous and often evolve more rapidly than the formal joint operation planning process effort in contingencies and other fast-moving operations. The CCS effort during planning helps operational planners understand what our operations and actions communicate to different audiences. The planning provides guidance necessary to integrate and, when appropriate, synchronize communication capabilities across subordinate and supporting commands.

CCS efforts support the broader United States Government (USG) effort and are closely coordinated with other USG, partner nation, and non-governmental agencies and organizations. Successful CCS during execution requires leverage of existing JFC staff resources and processes to ensure integration of the communication-related products to support order development and execution. Synchronization of operations, actions, words, and images requires JFCs and

their staffs to closely coordinate communication capabilities and their respective activities to facilitate horizontal and vertical continuity of themes, messages, images, and actions from the USG to the lowest level. The joint interagency coordination group establishes the required operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will help improve planning and coordination within the government.

Organizations and Capabilities

Introduction

It is important DOD organizations speak with a single voice in exchanges with other stakeholders, to minimize confusion.

Military Communication Capabilities and Activities

Information-related capabilities are synchronized by information operation staffs to affect the decision making of the adversary and potential adversary. However, there are a broader set of communication capabilities and activities available to the JFC that are not focused on the adversary. A comparison of the military communication capabilities and activities normally available to a JFC helps clarify the differences and should assist the JFC and planners in properly employing each to achieve mission objectives. The distinctions between activities must remain clear so as not to diminish their effectiveness and institutional credibility.

Interorganizational Communication Capabilities and Activities

History has shown, without close coordination with partners, within and outside the USG, inconsistent communication occurs. Likewise, having assistance from the host nation is vital in gaining understanding of the operational and information environments and anticipating the correct interpretation of delivered messages.

Organizing to Support the Process

JFCs have both increased senior leadership involvement in the CCS effort and have integrated CCS into planning and staffing processes. Three examples are indicative of organizational options currently used in the field, or best practices from Iraq and Afghanistan: increased command emphasis, CCS lead with small coordination staff and supporting commander's synchronization working group (CCSWG), or a communication directorate.

The CCSWG serves as the cross-functional conduit to synchronize communication efforts; coordinate support from USG-level resources/departments/agencies; and

consolidate assessments on a command-approved, communication synchronization approach designed to support operations and command objectives.

Social media enables the rapid transmission of information and disinformation to domestic and international publics and communities of interest. Friendly forces should be aware of these social media tools, be able to identify adversary influence campaigns and operations that are developing, and provide a timely response.

CCS Planning and Best Practices

Introduction

The communication synchronization approach fulfills Adaptive Planning and Execution requirements and describes how the commander and staff will coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to the lowest level to support JFC objectives.

Supporting Operational Design

At the very earliest stages of preparations for planning, preliminary work is done to understand the problem and OE, and identify the operational approach. Communication capability representatives need to ensure key operational design team members, such as the future plans directorate and the intelligence directorate, are aware of the CCS information requirements and other considerations necessary to support development of the operational approach.

Understanding adversary messages and their points of resonance with specific individuals and groups can help deepen understanding of the local culture and cognitive dimension, and provide potential vulnerabilities for exploitation to win the battle of the narrative and the battle of the will.

Supporting the Joint Operation Planning Process

The active participation of CSSWG members throughout the planning process is critical to successful integration of communication synchronization into the plan. Rapid decision making is very important and the adversary communications cycle must be understood to compete effectively. Development of the communication synchronization approach should include identification of critical support requirements.

Nesting of Narrative, Themes, and Messages

For enduring interventions, there can be a continuing struggle to define the national and international

debate/discussion on terms favorable to one side, causing a clash between the competing narratives of the actors involved. This is often what is referred to as the “battle of the narrative.” A key component of the narrative is establishing the reasons for and desired outcomes of the conflict, in terms understandable to relevant publics. These “reasons” and “outcomes” should be well-grounded in the realities of the situation, including important factors within political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems.

Messages should support the themes at their specific level. The themes should support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes, and support the enduring national narrative.

Sources of Strategic Narrative and Themes

The USG strategic narrative and themes should be included in the documents that direct planning, such as a warning order, alert order, or the *Guidance for Employment of the Force*. However, when they are not provided, communication planners can use resources such as Presidential speeches, USG agency statements, and other vetted material.

Research and Understanding the Operational Environment

An important first step is conducting sufficient research to understand the culture, language, dialect, means of communication, historical, social, religious, economic storylines, group dynamics, issues, grievances, world view, and other factors that resonate and affect how various publics get information, influence others, and are influenced.

The JFC should understand the cognitive dimension is complex, adaptive, and more difficult to understand than closed systems. Adding to the staff or utilizing reachback to subject matter experts that understand complicated factors, such as the public’s preexisting bias, cultural lens, stimulus response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of the current situation, can significantly help analysts and planners. Cognitive factors can vary significantly between locality, cultures, and operational circumstances.

From a communication standpoint, assessment involves the identification, measurement, and evaluation of those things the commander may not be able to control, but can influence through a successful communication

synchronization approach that is well-integrated into the planning process.

Legal Considerations

Employing all available communication capabilities may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review. Individual communication capabilities may operate under much different authorities and care must be taken in synchronization of capabilities to not put individual capabilities in a position to violate any individual authority.

Communication Methods

A direct dialogue with key publics, with an initial emphasis on listening to gain perspective, desires, and expectations is essential.

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CHAPTER I COMMUNICATION SYNCHRONIZATION

“We became prisoners of the TV-war, thanks primarily to CNN (Cable News Network), with its twenty-four-hour and ‘live’ coverage of Desert Shield/Storm. Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy, chief of Naval Operations, referred to CNN’s ‘War in the Gulf’ coverage by saying, ‘We had no idea how this would change our jobs and our lives’.”

**RADM Brent Baker, Desert Shield/Storm the War of Words and Images,
Naval War College Review, autumn 1991**

1. 24/7 Communication and the Information Environment

a. **It is impossible not to communicate.** In this age of interconnected global communication networks and social media platforms, **everything the joint force does sends a message.** Strategies, policies, plans, and actual **joint force operations communicate national intent** in ways that confirm or conflict with what we want the audience to believe. Many hold to the age-old tenet that “actions speak louder than words;” **our actions send clear messages to many different groups.** In messaging, what’s *meant* isn’t always what’s *perceived*, and this adds additional complexity to the communication process. Regardless of actions taken or not taken, words spoken/written or left unsaid, and images disseminated or withheld, the joint force is **always** communicating something—whether or not the consequences or effects communicate what the joint force commander (JFC) intended. Not synchronizing communication activities and operations results in conflicting messages, reduces credibility, directly impacts communication effectiveness, and allows the adversary to undermine our credibility and narrative.

Iraq, 2008, Al Anbar province: General Kelly was very vocal about pulling out of the urban areas. This theme was being pushed through local, national, and international media. This was the narrative being utilized by our forces; however, still and motion products depicting active urban operations were being released through non-PA channels. These images, running counter to our narrative, were also being utilized by the media. We were sending mixed messages. The video didn't match the audio.

Various Sources

b. **The continuous and rapid flow of information, facilitated by advances in media distribution methods, requires proactive, responsive, adaptive, and agile processes and capabilities** to preserve the desired intent of any message. Communication capabilities can set the course, timing, and delivery of messages to inform and influence domestic and international opinion and perceptions, support national strategy, and counter adversary propaganda. Effective communication in the operational environment (OE) requires consideration of many factors including means, context, and established patterns of communication. Indigenous means of communication vary widely based on availability and established cultural practices for sharing information. These capabilities span the spectrum from word-of-mouth to high speed digital means. Likewise, context varies across

different cultures, demographics, and local conditions and primary pathways of trusted communication can include filtering through social systems. **Successful communication synchronization in the information environment requires a comprehensive, harmonized process.**

c. JFCs should be mindful of the communication implications of every operation and action, just as they are of the legal implications and the operational risks involved. How the joint force will communicate through its operations, actions, words, and images must be fully integrated into planning and throughout execution to ensure consistent alignment. It is imperative communication efforts are integrated in a coherent fashion across the joint force and include other stakeholders, as practicable. The commander's communication synchronization (CCS) is the process for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communication activities. **Communication planners should consider the national communication goals and strategic objectives in the planning process.** The commander's plan will detail how to employ military forces **to engage specific audiences and coordinate joint force actions with our interorganizational partners to achieve unity of effort.** This integration ensures maximum trust and credibility with relevant audiences, stakeholders, and publics.

d. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

(1) The information environment is where humans and/or automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information and is, therefore, the principal environment of decision making. This environment impacts military activities globally and regionally, and as such, must be a key factor when planning and conducting operations. JFCs and their staffs must understand the interaction of the environment's three dimensions when planning and executing operations. Resources include the information itself and the materials and systems employed to process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information and produce information-related products.

(2) The three dimensions of the information environment are physical, informational, and cognitive:

(a) **The Physical Dimension.** The physical dimension is composed of the command and control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations in the OE. It is the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside.

(b) **The Informational Dimension.** The informational dimension is the place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of modern military forces is exercised and where the commander's intent is conveyed. Actions in this dimension affect the content and flow of information. The informational dimension links the physical and cognitive dimensions.

(c) **The Cognitive Dimension.** The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. In this dimension, people think, perceive, visualize, understand, and decide. It is affected by training, education, perceptions, experience, beliefs, values, insufficient information, stress, emotion, morale, intuition, rumor, culture, public opinion, the media, and others. This dimension constitutes the most important component of the information environment for those developing the CCS approach.

For more information on the information environment, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations.

2. Why Communicate?

a. The United States Government (USG) has an obligation to inform our citizens about the nature of its activities, consistent with national security and privacy concerns. **The JFC has a requirement to continuously communicate with US and international audiences, publics, and stakeholders about joint force activities, intentions, and desired end states.** Discussing and providing context about the joint forces' operations and actions is in the national interest and is one method of building and maintaining trust, credibility, and support. Coordinated communication may prevent escalating joint force involvement in a given situation.

“Allied Force may also be remembered as the first true ‘media war,’ in which the power of instantaneous coverage and dramatic visual images rendered strategic importance to a handful of tactical events and threatened to undermine political and military coalitions in the process.”

“The commanding power of the media—which arguably had led the United States into Somalia—now echoed the drumbeat for an American withdrawal. As Anthony Lake, former U.S. national security advisor, later noted, ‘American foreign policy is increasingly driven by where CNN points its cameras.’”

Maj Gary Pounder, Opportunity Lost: Public Affairs, Information Operations, and the Air War against Serbia, Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2000

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Planning Formats and Guidance* (For Official Use Only), requires the JFC to include communication goals and objectives in the commander's intent and to have an approach ensures unity of themes and objectives among key activities. This includes consistency in intent or effect between command operations, actions, information, and a risk assessment of the information or actions that may affect unintended audiences, create unintended consequences, or require risk mitigation measures. This APEX manual also provides a template for completion of Annex Y, “Commander's Communication Strategy,” to the JFC plan.

For more information on Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-directed planning formats and guidance, see CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Planning Formats and Guidance, 31 August 2012.

c. In some social/cultural environments, **remaining silent on an issue is worse than providing information, because it allows an adversary to exploit or monopolize the media to propagate their agenda.** As nature abhors a vacuum, so does the information environment. Someone’s message will fill the void. The JFC’s communication synchronization approach will set the conditions for how that space (information gap) is best handled. Studies, such as *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together* (RAND), show when people are inconvenienced (such as at a checkpoint or by a lack of services) and there is an absence of information, they almost always assume the worst. Additionally, the information environment has many competitors with varying agendas, including the adversary who communicates disinformation to undermine joint force credibility and public support. Therefore, the commander must constantly communicate in an integrated, coherent fashion about joint force activities, intentions, need for support, and desired end state. Following CCS efforts in support of earthquake relief efforts in Haiti, a significant increase in positive perceptions are reflected in the Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE polling results in March 2010. Figure I-1, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Polling Results,” highlights the polling results from seven different countries.

d. **Inconsistent and uncoordinated communication can lead to a number of negative consequences impacting the joint force’s ability to operate effectively and accomplish the mission.** The Department of Defense (DOD) has learned the following lessons about not releasing information or delaying its release:




Figure I-1. Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Polling Results

(1) When the joint force waits to release information, others step into the information void and fill it—shaping the story and forcing us to respond.

(2) Inertia and Momentum. The first to present information establishes the pace and tone of the communication, has better control of the perceived accuracy of information, and sets the context. The first story out is the one most referenced in subsequent stories. However, when information or a story gets out incorrectly, it will tend to remain incorrectly perceived, despite efforts to correct it. Therefore, it is imperative to get information out quickly, but with accuracy.

(3) Prompt release of information, particularly visual information (VI), about a situation may prevent similar situations elsewhere.

(4) People often respond negatively when learning of information late or from another non-authoritative source.

(5) People are more likely to overestimate risk and the severity of a situation if information is not released, or if too little information is released.

(6) Expeditiously releasing information requires significantly less work than responding to inquiries, staffing rebuttals to misinformation, adversary propaganda, and rhetoric. All of these contribute to a loss of trust, credibility and support, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and difficult to regain once lost.

3. Knowing Your Audience

a. Many audiences need to be informed and better educated about how and why the joint force is being involved. As elements of the larger population begin to form stronger opinions and organize into groups supporting or opposing joint force actions, these elements may warrant more concentrated engagement focused on influencing their actions. Concurrently, the joint force must retain some communication efforts focused on the majority elements. We should seek to shape the uninformed in order to create a majority opinion in our favor. If people are generally pragmatic (as implied by irregular war theory) then it is a favorable majority we should seek.

b. **Audience, Public, and Stakeholder.** Scholars in social science, public relations, and marketing have a variety of sometimes conflicting definitions for the terms “public,” “audience,” and “stakeholder.” For clarity, deconfliction of efforts, and prioritization of actions, we define the terms here.

(1) **Audience.** The joint force’s obligation to inform and educate may include a variety of groups referred to as audiences. For the purposes of this document, **an audience is a broad, roughly-defined group** that contains relevant stakeholders or groups from which publics may develop. An audience is not a group on which to formulate a communication approach. Defining audiences is simply the beginning of the planning process for determining stakeholders and recognizing publics. Examples of audiences include Iraqi Shia, the US primetime television audience, or the local population that lives near a military base.

(2) **Stakeholder.** Individuals or groups that are directly involved or affected by joint force operations/actions/outcomes are worthy of consideration, because they are naturally motivated toward action if their interests are threatened. Stakeholders may or may not be organized for or against joint force efforts. Although communication efforts should initially tend toward informing/educating stakeholders, close monitoring and regular engagement may aid in quickly identifying requirements for influence as the operational and informational environments change, or as stakeholders form into more active “publics.” Examples of stakeholders include Mahdi Army and Muqtada al-Sadr or Pakistani Military. The local population outside the base may be considered an “audience” during normal operations, but also a stakeholder group when the base is planning a major expansion, for example. These terms are primarily intended to help identify groups for planning purposes.

(3) **Public.** Groups of varying size may begin to organize or may be established to support or oppose joint force efforts to accomplish the mission. These groups warrant special attention because of their active endeavors to communicate with the joint force, or possibly even to support or oppose joint force operations. Consequently, audiences and stakeholders should be monitored to determine segments that may begin to organize into publics. **As publics begin to form, the joint force may necessarily shift efforts from informing/educating them to influencing attitudes and behaviors.** This depends on a variety of factors, such as legal and ethical considerations, whether the joint force is conducting international or domestic operations, etc. Publics may include key individuals as well. Publics can be segmented from the population a variety of ways, to include geographic, demographic, psychographic, covert power, position, reputation, membership, role in decision making, etc. Whatever the methodology for segmenting, the goal is to arrive at clearly defined publics that the joint force has an interest in listening to and communicating with. The more defined the public, the more tailored the communication products can be. Examples of publics include Sunni population of Baghdad, the Shia population in Karachi Pakistan, or the local mayor.

KEY TERMS

audience—A broad, roughly-defined group.

stakeholder—Individuals or groups that are directly involved or affected by ongoing operations or the outcome. May or may not be organized for or against joint force efforts.

public—Group of varying size that has organized for or against joint force efforts.

c. **American Domestic Audience.** The joint force has an obligation to inform and educate the American domestic audience on military roles, missions, and activities. This communication increases trust and support for military operations, and enhances morale and readiness of the joint force. Through active engagement, the military demonstrates that it is a community partner and a responsible steward of national resources.

d. **International.** International interest in military operations may be just as high, if not higher than American interest, especially for military operations conducted overseas. Intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) involvement can also significantly increase international interest. For coalition operations, international support is often as important as US domestic support, and partner nation support is critical to joint force missions. The DOD (in coordination with the Department of State [DOS], host, and partner nations) should keep the international community informed about joint force operations and activities within operational security constraints.

e. **Internal.** The JFC has an obligation to communicate operational intent, objectives, and desired end state to the members of the joint force, so every individual supporting the effort understands what needs to be accomplished, his/her role, and how it contributes to overall mission accomplishment. Failing to clearly communicate within the joint force adversely affects mission accomplishment because it causes confusion and misalignment of operations, actions, words, and images.

f. **Host Nation (HN)/Local Community.** Everywhere the joint force operates, it has neighbors or a local community with which its members interact, live among, and rely upon for support. A good relationship with the local community supports force protection and joint force ability to accomplish its mission. Effective, two-way communication includes an emphasis on listening which significantly enhances the joint forces' understanding and relationship with the local community.

NOT UNDERSTANDING THE AUDIENCE EXAMPLE

The following is excerpted from a 13 October 2009 Night Watch commentary on the PBS [Public Broadcasting Services] Frontline one-hour special report on Afghanistan. It shows how a say-do gap can be generated, despite well intentioned hard working young leaders trying to deliver approved messages to local populations. Some of the possible causes include lack of cultural training, not understanding tribal perspectives, lack of observation, socially unacceptable behaviors brought about by yielding to stress, inadequate interpreters, and not adapting a higher-level message to better resonate locally.

The one-hour special is important more for its visual images than for any words in the script or from interviews. The script is about protecting people and establishing local support. The interviews with generals reinforce those messages. Very young American men ... preach about survival to Afghans old enough to be their grandfathers. There is no respect for age shown in any of the local encounters PBS filmed. The most startling segment of the telecast was a scene in which an officer tried to persuade locals that the village was not safe. They wanted the locals to help them. The Afghans challenged how could the Afghans help the coalition force (CF)? They did not even own a sword. The setting was a village that was empty of inhabitants who fled when they learned the CF was coming to save them from the Taliban. The CF officer was interrogating a dozen or so Afghan men, using an interrogator who did not speak the local dialect. The CF officer got impatient with the Afghans because they were not being

cooperative, the script indicated. He could not speak the language and his interpreter was not qualified but he directed his anger at the Afghans...and the insanity of the situation, no doubt. The video showed him to be arrogant and disrespectful of the residents and especially of the elders in the group. Neither PBS nor the CF officer noticed that a significant portion of the men wore black turbans, the signature headdress of the Taliban. Who can know for sure, but experience suggests any men found in a Helmand village without children or women are Taliban. These facts raise a significant probability that the CF officer was issuing orders to and expressing frustrations with the actual rulers of the village, which were Taliban or Taliban sympathizers and apparently was not aware. Note: this comment is not a criticism of the CF soldiers; it is a criticism of those who prepared them, or rather failed to prepare them. Watching US helicopters sweep across the broad expanses of Helmand Province, the words from officials in Kabul about progress, protecting people, development and governance seemed otherworldly.

13 October 2009 Night Watch

g. **Adversaries.** When there is an adversary to a military operation, communicating joint force intent and activities to all audiences can deter adversary action and counter misinformation, disinformation and propaganda. Typically, information operations (IO) are conducted to have a negative effect upon adversary decision making and undermine local support for the adversary.

4. The Need for Synchronized Communication and a Communication Approach

a. **Conflict is a battle of wills, for those waging it, those supporting the effort, and even those who are undecided.** Commanders and their staffs should identify adversary support and bring every capability to bear in an effort to affect, undermine, and erode that support and the adversary's will. Such efforts can include engagement of actual combatants, their political leadership, the civilian populations the adversary operates in and around, and international opinion. Although lethal effects in the physical domains can create significant effects in the cognitive dimension of the information environment, nonlethal ways and means to inform and influence can prove valuable. Communication capabilities, such as military information support operations (MISO), can affect the will of the adversary's supporters who can even potentially override the will of the combatants. While commanders seek to influence the adversary and its supporters, they should also coordinate these efforts with informing activities, primarily public affairs (PA), which releases cleared credible public information that becomes immediately available to all publics including adversaries. Communication synchronization entails focused efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. Such synchronization improves the alignment of multiple lines of operation and lines of effort over time and space, which aligns the overall message with our actions and activities. **The main effort for winning the battle of wills, particularly in operations characteristic of irregular warfare (IW), will likely occur in and through the information environment.**

b. Adversaries may be unconstrained in the information environment, unencumbered by hierarchical processes, and unhindered with regard to the ethical, moral, or legal tenets by which the US and partner nations operate. Adversaries have successfully used the information environment to advance their objectives and undermine our ability to do the same. The struggle is for credibility and influence with relevant populations; any external force (such as US and multinational forces) may be at a disadvantage operating in an environment where the adversary has a communication advantage, such as cultural, social, or ideological commonalities, and may already have the support of certain segments of the population. To overcome this disadvantage, JFCs require unity of effort with interorganizational partners to ensure consistency in words and actions, a comprehensive understanding of the information environment, and a coherent and integrated approach to engaging publics within the information environment that impact the OE. Commanders should be reminded, persuading publics to adopt a certain perspective or behavior is complex and time consuming work, involving many factors, including cultural, social, and ideological. Those who seem friendly and receptive may feel exactly the opposite. The following shocking attack described in a New York Times article illustrates this point.

HOW TO READ AFGHANISTAN

On a sunny, crisp November day in 2008, three American civilians joined a platoon of United States soldiers on a foot patrol in Maiwand District, a flat, yellow patch of earth crowned by black-rock mountains in southern Afghanistan. The civilians were part of the Human Terrain System, an ambitious, troubled Army program that sends social scientists into conflict zones to help soldiers understand local culture, politics and economics.

That day, the team planned to interview shoppers coming and going from a nearby bazaar. Afghans had complained about the high price of flour, so the Human Terrain Team members were creating a consumer price index. They also wanted to find out whether Afghan officials were asking shopkeepers for bribes, and how merchants protected themselves and their goods in a place where insurgents and local security forces threatened civilians in equal measure.

The team's social scientist that day was Paula Loyd, a 36-year-old Wellesley graduate and Army veteran with degrees in anthropology and diplomacy and years of experience as a development worker in Afghanistan. Through her interpreter, she struck up a conversation with an Afghan man who was carrying a jug of fuel, asking how much he had paid for it. They talked genially until her interpreter was called away. Suddenly, the man doused Ms. Loyd with gas from his jug and lit her on fire.

Paula Loyd died of her injuries a few months after the attack, in January 2009.

**Vanessa M. Gezari
New York Times
10 August 2013**

c. The information environment is a very active and competitive venue, especially when trying to create effects in the cognitive dimension. Adversaries are normally very motivated and aggressive in selling their agenda. Likewise, local cultural and social communication has quite a powerful influence on local populations. Therefore, **if the joint force is to compete favorably in this environment, there must be synchronization of all communication efforts with operations.** Without this synchronized effort, communication effectiveness is significantly diminished and in unfortunate cases can result in information fratricide. An example was when MISO efforts were underway to undermine local support for a local leader thought to be part of an adversary support network. MISO messaging attempted to cast the leader in a negative light as corrupt, inept, and not acceptable in light of local customs. However, the joint force community engagement staff element was unaware of this effort, scheduled a key leader engagement (KLE) between this local leader and the JFC, and ensured it was well-publicized. The resulting effects were undesirable from multiple perspectives, especially as the adversary used it to undermine the joint force narrative for quite some time. In the following story, Afghans did not distinguish between ignorance and malice of US service members. While there were certainly attempts by US forces to communicate cultural sensitivity and respect, inadequate cultural and social factor training led to an opposing (and destructive) message.

ANALYSIS: QURAN CRISIS REVEALS LACK OF AWARENESS

KABUL—Afghans seethed for a sixth day over the burning of Qurans at a U.S. base, and as the violence persists and the death toll rises, an unanswered question pulses at the heart of the crisis.

How could this happen?

The question pertains less to the specific decisions that led soldiers at Bagram Air Field to burn copies of the Quran than to why they even considered doing so, given the book’s sacredness to Muslims.

Davood Moradian, a former adviser to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, offered a pointed explanation. “They have been here for more than 10 years and they still fail to understand the sensitivities of Afghanistan,” said Moradian, an assistant professor of political science at The American University in Kabul. “For Afghans, [burning the Quran] is an unacceptable, unforgivable incompetence.”

More than 30 people have been killed and hundreds injured across the country since reports emerged Tuesday that soldiers at Bagram burned several copies of the Muslim holy book.

“For Muslims, destroying the Quran is worse than civilian casualties.”

Fury over the burning of the holy texts has mushroomed despite Afghans acknowledging the soldiers might have acted out of ignorance rather than malice.

“Destroying the Quran shows disrespect to our religion and to Muslims,”

Kaushal Hotak, 24, said as he marched in a protest last week in Kabul. “We want to stop having such insults in our country because this is not the first or second time that [foreign troops] have disrespected us. It is time for them to leave.”

**Martin Kuz
Stars and Stripes
26 February 2012**

d. A favorite tactic adversaries attempt is to seek greater distribution and influence of their activities and messaging by eliciting sensational news or coverage that has a high potential to be rapidly publicized and distributed through mainstream and social media—creating a disproportionately large impact in the information domain than would normally occur for such an event (i.e., “gone viral”). This can be a complex problem for the JFC as a balance is necessary between discrediting adversary propaganda and not amplifying the adversary’s story. The adversary may use disinformation to leverage joint force counterpropaganda efforts. The relative advantage enemies gain through speed of distribution can be mitigated through rapid decision-making and deliberate planning that incorporates timely, accurate, communication-related activities before, during, and immediately following operations. The optimum mix of speed and timeliness depends upon cultural norms and locally accepted means of trusted communication. The communication effort must be flexible and agile enough to incorporate these considerations within deliberate and crisis action planning and execution processes.

IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION

Al-Qaeda and its allies appear to have adapted to this new environment early in the decade. Given that they do not possess an advanced and immense military, they focused on the instrument of power they could wield as their “big stick”: information. Inversely, as this decade of war began, the US appeared to have forgotten the lessons from the Cold War and ignored the significance of information in this new environment, instead relying on its military might, and the assumption that the Cold War mantra of “America equals freedom” still resonated around the world. Unfortunately, that assumption did not hold. Without an adequate communications strategy and lacking information, initial messages from US forces were focused solely on the enemy, excluding the numerous other actors in the environment. Finally, initial efforts in the battle of the narrative were characterized by ineffective and uncoordinated efforts between Services, other agencies, and coalition partners. However, once the US acknowledged the importance of information in this new context, US forces developed a coherent narrative that was integrated into both strategy and operations and could be tailored to a myriad of friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences. Senior leaders made strategic communication a main effort in both policy and personal actions. In addition, significant resources were applied to information activities, providing the ability to sustain those efforts. After a slow start in the battle for the narrative, the US fully embraced the importance of information in this new context. Actions and policies reflected the new paradigm of tactical actions having the potential for strategic affects; the imperative for words and actions to match; and the need for a comprehensive

narrative for all phases of operations that is effectively aligned to strategic goals and desired end states. The US also learned the importance of the unity of effort in strategic communications, especially as it related to the host-nation government.

**Decade of War Volume One:
Enduring Lessons from the
Past Decade of Operations
Joint and Coalition
Operational Analysis
27 June 2012**

e. **Synchronized communication focuses on the behavior of publics that can have an impact on mission success.** The commander's approach to synchronizing communication emphasizes early planning, training, and guidance that **enables decentralized, yet responsive action that reflect strategic guidance.** According to the *Situational Theory of Publics*, communication planners must consider a public's awareness, motivation level, and ability and likeliness to act. The approach can create both positive and negative influences on publics' behavior. However, positive influence creates desired long-term effects, contributes to success across the lines of effort, and engenders lasting support. Therefore, research should be prioritized up front to support behavioral change in audiences intended for influence activities. Research considerations should include, but are not limited to: local US embassy perspectives, what information publics may have, social norms, how and when to intervene to effect genuine behavioral change, how much change is actually possible, and how change will support joint force operations and/or activities. Likewise, communication activities should focus on important decision points of key publics to achieve the commander's objectives. The integration of operations, actions, words, and images is vital in this endeavor. Figure I-2 shows the progression from informing and educating audiences to persuading and influencing specific publics and stakeholders. It also shows the typical capabilities that dominate each effort, their purposes, and example targeted publics. This does not imply certain capabilities are only used for specific effects, but simply different capabilities are more useful in creating different effects, all of which need to be integrated to achieve the commander's objectives.

5. The Importance of Aligning Operations, Actions, Words, and Images

a. **When what we do is different from what we say or the images we share, the public whose support we need cannot be sure which one to believe—the words, the images, or the actions.** It reduces the public's trust. Conversely, when what we do matches what we say and the images we share consistently, it increases our credibility and enhances the public's trust.

EXAMPLES OF MISMATCHED COMMUNICATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

The ongoing theme in theater of “We pledge our enduring support to Afghanistan” was dramatically undercut by seemingly conflicting statements that the US will be out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Publicizing a US Special Operations Force unit successfully killing some bad guys undermined the theme “We are not leading military operations in Afghanistan.”

“We are winning—so remember what winning looks like” vs. “The Taliban have killed upwards of 2,000 civilian Afghans so far this year.”

“COIN is not about seizing and holding ground” vs. “We successfully prevented the Taliban from seizing that checkpoint.”

Various Sources

b. **Trust, Credibility, and Timeliness in Communication.** Establishment and preservation of **trust** and organizational **credibility** requires deliberate alignment of the military’s operations, actions, words, and images. Attempts to strengthen trust and credibility will quickly backfire if people believe they are being manipulated or deceived. Likewise, lack of **timeliness** can result in a communication vacuum that is often filled by adversary propaganda or publics assuming unfavorable joint force intentions.




Figure I-2. Inform, Educate, Persuade, and Influence Integration

c. **Trust.** Trust in joint force communications is most likely to occur when those **communications are perceived to align** with the military’s operations, actions, words, and images, and vice versa, that we do as we say. Trust is subject to numerous influences, including culture, history, education, language, and others. Perhaps most important, trust must be given freely—it cannot be coerced. While trust-building may be a desired outcome of communication efforts it should not be the operational goal because, when trust shifts or weakens, **it cannot be repaired through outward demands or assurances**, but through deliberate and consistent alignment between the joint force’s operations, actions, words, and images over time.

d. **Credibility**

(1) **Credibility is supported by the literal alignment** of the military’s operations, actions, words, and images. Unlike trust, which is perceptual and must be freely given, credibility can be preserved and protected through deliberate actions. For example, ruthless criminals using threats of violence to intimidate local victims must establish and maintain credibility, by doing what they say they will do (i.e., carry out those threats). However, not many people put their trust in them. Conversely, people wanting to believe a politician will make things better, put their trust in them initially. Nevertheless, as their promises go unfulfilled, credibility is undermined and trust lost. While people cannot be forced to trust the military, deliberate actions can be taken to preserve credibility by aligning actions, words, and images. Allowing a significant inconsistency to develop between what we say and what we do, often referred to as a **“say-do gap,” will considerably undermine joint force credibility.**

(2) Trust is nurtured through credibility-building actions. If the military lacks credibility it will not likely be trusted, but lack of trust does not prevent or restrict the military from initiating credibility-building actions. An example of how inadequate communication associated with the release of a Guantanamo detainee image, without context or third party verification on the treatment of detainees, instantly lent credibility to a widespread belief the US was torturing detainees at Guantanamo Bay and became a symbol used to rally Jihadists. In this case, the problem was not being diligent in establishing the truth early through supporting words and images and the validation of third parties, such as the media and International Red Cross. Then, if undesirable words or images circulated, the adversary would have less credibility to establish a contrary story line.

e. **Timeliness**

“Be first with the truth. Communicate accurate information—good or bad—to the chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the public as soon as possible. Pre-empt rumors and beat insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy and context. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies’ extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.”

**“Who We Are”
Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
General Raymond T. Odierno, USA
16 September 2008**

(1) Timeliness **should be considered in the context of the information interests and demands of relevant publics or expectations of a partner.** Timeliness should not be confused with speed, a characteristic of information delivery mechanisms, which is often emphasized at the expense of accuracy. For example, adversaries may consistently distribute false or inaccurate information more quickly than the US military is able to communicate. However, this activity should be considered in context of accuracy and establishing long-term credibility and trust. The relative advantage enemies gain through speed can be mitigated through **deliberate planning that incorporates timely, accurate communication before, during, and immediately following operations.** The optimum mix of speed and timeliness will be dependent upon cultural norms and locally-accepted means of trusted communication, and may vary widely due to the information environment and circumstances of military operations. Communication activities must be flexible enough to incorporate these considerations within deliberate and crisis planning and execution processes.

(2) Some would argue a more important aspect is the timeliness in decision making about communication, vice the communication dissemination itself. Protracted decision-making processes may result in missed opportunities to communicate most effectively, giving an adversary an information advantage. Conversely, too quickly deciding to communicate, before adequately understanding the information environment, can also produce undesirable effects. For example, the adversary sometimes communicates very quickly, but creates unintended undesirable consequences, which may not require communication on our part. Likewise, timeliness can be a driver for assessment, to support rapid decision making.

6. The Commander's Communication Synchronization and Approach

a. Although lead interagency communication efforts within a specific area of responsibility (AOR) are normally outside the JFC's authority, the JFC supports these efforts by following national-level and DOD narratives and themes, coordinating with interagency organizations and other stakeholders, and **developing a coherent approach to communication synchronizing that is consistent with operations.** Interagency coordination may require creating shared information spaces and overcoming communication and information flow barriers across the federal government to achieve unified action. Sharing information in context and seeking opportunities for partnerships **help to build the trust and support necessary for successful military operations, facilitate the development of informed perceptions about the military, help undermine adversarial propaganda efforts, and contribute to the achievement of national, strategic and operational objectives.** However, the combatant commander (CCDR) should ensure the combatant command (CCMD) does not get ahead of USG strategic guidance development. CCS provides the JFC a process to support USG strategic guidance using organic military communication capabilities. Although called "strategic communication" at United States Forces Korea (USFK), Figure I-3 provides a current visualization of communication capability orchestration to advance the commander's agenda. This product and others were developed during the strategic communication working group (SCWG), which follows individual communication capabilities' working groups (WGs) in the battle rhythm. Many commands use a WG of various names, similar to this one, to synchronize and coordinate communication activities outside of the IO cell. In this publication, we call it




Figure I-3. USFK Strategic Communications Visualized

the commander's communication synchronization working group (CCSWG) and discuss it in more detail below. USFK typically takes output from the SCWG and feeds it into the Policy WG and Targeting WG, which develops much more detailed actions touching specific entities, and ultimately gets integrated into a fragmentary order (FRAGORD). Concerning the "Private Communications" box in the graphic below, no one should assume because a conversation or communication takes place outside of the public eye, the conversation or communication will not become public.

b. Geographic combatant commanders implement USG strategic guidance in their AOR. Through the joint operation planning process (JOPP), commanders and staff apply operational art and operational design to provide the conceptual framework that underpins theater campaign plans (TCPs) to achieve the national security objectives stated in the *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The TCP is the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and setting conditions for contingency and crisis operations and unified action in a region. **CCDRs maintain responsibility to synchronize military communication in support of the DOD's contribution to USG strategic guidance development and execution.**

c. To complicate matters, regardless of where the JFC and staff are in the planning and execution process, the White House, DOS, Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]), PA offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CCMDs are all potentially communicating with US and international audiences and relevant publics about the joint forces' intent and activities. Engaging the news media and the public about impending military operations may pull PA personnel away from full participation in staff planning

activities at times. However, this does not mean planning for communication is separate from the JOPP—the JFC’s communication efforts are continuous and often evolve more rapidly than the formal JOPP effort in contingencies and other fast-moving operations. These communication efforts must be synchronized with early joint force planning, preparation, and movement. Likewise, developing and refining the communication effort to support peacetime shaping (Phase 0) activities is continuous. Overarching communication guidance should be provided through the TCP and initiating directives for contingencies.

d. The CCS facilitates coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to implement higher-level communication guidance. JFCs provide guidance and their staffs develop the approach for achieving information-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes, messages, images, and actions to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of relevant communication activities. In particular, the **CCS effort during planning helps operational planners understand what our operations and actions communicate to different audiences** and synchronize operations with supporting words and images to create desired effects to help achieve JFC objectives.

e. CCS, in concert with other lines of operation and lines of effort, synchronizes operations, actions, themes, messages, and images to support the JFC’s objectives to inform audiences and influence key publics. This synchronization planning, an integral part of JOPP that begins in the future plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), facilitates communication-related actions focused on important audiences, publics, and key leaders. These include adversary, neutral, friendly, international, government, nongovernment, and domestic audiences and publics. **The planning provides guidance necessary to integrate and, when appropriate, synchronize communication capabilities across subordinate and supporting commands.** It also addresses appropriate interaction with interorganizational partners. As the plan is adjusted and adapted in the future operations (J-35), the communication synchronization approach is adjusted as well. The handoff for execution of the JFC plan is in the current operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). Responsibility for execution and assessment resides with the individual communication capabilities and entities executing other activities designed to send specific messages to specific publics. Assessment results must be fed into the assessment cell for consolidation and evaluation against the overall campaign assessment effort, creation of desired effects, and achievement of JFC objectives. All three planning horizons (future plans, J-35, and current operations) should incorporate all communication capability participation and considerations. Figure I-4 provides an example of synchronized communication efforts of multiple communication capabilities during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in support of earthquake relief efforts in Haiti.

f. CCS refinement in support of Phase 0 activities is continuous. The JFC has a requirement to continuously communicate with US and international audiences, publics, and stakeholders about joint force activities, intentions, and desired end states in all phases, to include Phase 0 activities. However, depending on the commander’s intent, CCS to support a specific operation may begin with an initiation event, such as a planning directive or warning order (WARNORD). Overarching communication guidance should be provided

Communication Synchronization and Integration




Figure I-4. Communication Synchronization and Integration

through the WARNORD or other initiating directives, such as planning orders and execute orders. CCS implementation requires research, analysis of higher-level guidance, understanding the OE, supporting planning, and leveraging existing staff processes, to include collection and assessment. Some specific considerations include:

(1) The supported command leads the JOPP from initiation through assessment. This includes identification of publics; integration of themes, activities, and objectives; and development of measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that support desired effects, objectives, and goals within the plan.

(2) Communication synchronization efforts should be consistent with USG and DOD guidance and policy, to include ensuring themes, messages, images, and actions are not intended to influence US citizens. Communication synchronization should, however, include efforts to inform and educate US audiences, stakeholders, and publics.

(3) During planning and execution, commanders, planners, and operators should consider second- and third-order effects of proposed themes, messages, and actions. It is useful to include undesired effects, indicators to identify when they are occurring, and appropriate mitigation means/measures. The Red Team can assist the staff by helping understand how proposed themes are likely to be perceived by stakeholders, by exploring a wider range of potential second- and third-order effects and unintended consequences, and by helping the staff counter their own perceptual biases.

(4) During certain missions, the JFC's **CCS efforts support the broader USG effort and are closely coordinated with other USG, partner nation, non-governmental agencies and organizations.** During foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), homeland defense (HD), and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions, the commander will support a lead federal agency and HN, as appropriate, that has overall communication responsibility. In all of these events, the commander synchronizes his communication efforts with the broader USG efforts and nests his themes and messages with the communication efforts of the lead federal agency.

(5) The ability to effectively communicate during FHA can be critical to operational success. Keeping domestic and international audiences informed of US support for FHA can also assist in strategic and security cooperation goals; however, publicizing assistance efforts should not impede relief operations. Coordination with the HN, via the country team or lead federal agency, is critical to ensure public information activities do not undermine or conflict with the efforts of the HN.

(6) During HD and DSCA operations, military PA activities, military civil authority information support element (CAISE) activities, public information actions, and news media access to the DSCA operational area (OA) are subject to approval by the lead federal agency. The primary agency may establish a joint information center to coordinate PA, CAISE, and public information actions.

For additional guidance on PA and IO support to the CCS, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-13, Information Operations. Also see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for more information on planning.

g. **Successful CCS during execution requires leverage of existing JFC staff resources and processes to ensure integration of the communication-related products to support order development and execution.** These principle staff processes include the JOPP, battle rhythm events, collection, and assessment. The process map in Appendix B, “Notional Commander’s Communication Synchronization Process Map,” focuses on the JOPP to show a notional sequence of communication activities to support planning, collection, execution, and assessment. Communication synchronization must be flexible enough to incorporate communication considerations within deliberate and crisis planning, execution, and assessment.

h. Synchronization of operations, actions, words, and images requires JFCs and their staffs to **closely coordinate communication capabilities and their respective activities to facilitate horizontal and vertical continuity of themes, messages, images, and actions from the USG to the lowest level.** When the staff is preparing the theater security plan or a specific mission-related plan, communication synchronization is a key component of the overall plan and detailed in Annex Y. Interagency coordination can be facilitated by the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) or similar staff function. **The JIACG establishes the required operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government.** JIACGs complement interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the National Security Staff. JIACG members participate in planning and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of other USG departments and agencies. For example, JIACG coordination is vital in DSCA missions.

CHAPTER II ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

“The single biggest problem with communication is the illusion that it has taken place.”

George Bernard Shaw
(Irish literary critic, playwright and essayist, 1856-1950)

1. Introduction

a. For effective interorganizational coordination, it is important to understand the roles and relationships of relevant stakeholders, as well as their interests and equities. Such common understandings are essential to enable stakeholders to operate effectively in the same space, identifying opportunities for cooperation, and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

b. **It is important DOD organizations speak with a single voice in exchanges with other stakeholders to minimize confusion.** In order to facilitate increased interagency coordination at all levels, JFCs should work with and through the appropriate CCMD, Joint Staff (JS), and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) counterparts (e.g., JS J-5, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [USD(P)], Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD[PA]), and others), establishing an ongoing dialogue on issues of interest. The OSD and JS involvement helps to ensure engagement with other stakeholders is consistent with existing policy and priorities. Greater visibility of DOD-wide engagement with other USG agencies will enable the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to better balance competing global requirements and ensure the DOD presents a unified position.

2. Military Communication Capabilities and Activities

a. Information-related capabilities (IRCs) are synchronized by IO staffs to affect the decision making of the adversary and potential adversary. However, there are a broader set of communication capabilities and activities available to the JFC that are not focused on the adversary. Some will be resident within the joint force; others must be requested using a request for forces (RFF). Not all capabilities will be required for every mission. The mission, objectives, desired effects, and supporting communication effort will determine which capabilities should be employed. All communication capabilities should be considered and incorporated, as needed. For example, a short duration FHA mission will use PA as the predominant communication capability. However, if HN communication infrastructure is severely damaged, some MISO capability may be useful, such as Commando Solo and leaflet drops for public dissemination of relief information. For more extended relief and reconstruction efforts, civil-military operations (CMO) may be extensively involved in the reconstruction effort. Civil affairs (CA) capabilities will always be useful in interacting with the local populace and determining their needs.

b. PA and Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)

(1) PA. Official information released in a timely manner can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies, as well as mitigate unofficial information, misinformation, and propaganda. Providing timely and truthful unclassified information to US and foreign audiences is PA's mission; is essential to both domestic and international understanding and resolve in times of crisis. PA activities are divided into public information, command information, and community engagement activities, supported by research, planning, execution, and assessment to support the commander's intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). The public affairs officer (PAO) serves as a member of the JFC's personal staff as the primary coordinator of public information. While the PAO reports directly to the JFC, PAOs at all levels participate in operational planning, provide counsel to leaders and key staff members on the possible outcomes of military activities, and identify the potential impact on domestic and international perceptions.

(2) JPASE. Assigned to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, a subordinate command of the US Transportation Command, the JPASE serves as a standing joint PA capability for JFCs and can be rapidly deployed to support a variety of operational requirements through the RFF process. JPASE is the DOD's only joint PA unit and deploys globally to support JFC's requirements. Unfortunately, JPASE does not have organic combat camera (COMCAM) or VI capabilities. These capabilities must be provided by the supported CCMD. JPASE teams are cohesive joint units that fit easily into force deployment packages, but require logistical and sustainment support from the requesting command. JPASE capabilities include planning and operations: media operations, publicly-accessible websites, command information, embassy liaison, VI, community engagement, and counsel to the JFC.

(3) US military bands are a PA resource that often opens doors for relationship building, operations, and military to military contacts. Bands meet and reach audiences in ways and means that other assets cannot, breaking down barriers, assisting diplomacy, and paving the way for other dialogs and opportunities for cooperation.

For more information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

c. VI and COMCAM

(1) The VI function represents a broad spectrum of images and graphics derived from a variety of sources, including unmanned aerial systems, military photojournalists, intelligence assets, and weapon systems cameras. VI products delivered by many of these sources support competing mission requirements. Therefore, VI resources must be planned, prioritized, and deconflicted. Imagery requirements need to directly support operational plans so VI can be used to strengthen communication. Appendix A, "Visual Information Planning," provides some detail on VI planning.

For more information on VI, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5040.02, Visual Information.

(2) COMCAM provides VI in the form of photography and videography support to the JFC's operational and planning requirements. The deployment of joint COMCAM teams offers the JFC the ability to enhance operational decision making and communication with all audiences, stakeholders, and publics. COMCAM teams often have access to events and areas unavailable to PA or news media representatives. Furthermore, COMCAM teams have a technological capability for the timely acquisition, processing, and distribution of classified and unclassified still and motion imagery during fast-moving operations and when operating from austere environments. COMCAM teams are uniquely organized, trained (including fully certified/qualified aircrew members), and equipped for rapid global response to provide documentation of operations and provide visual products for use by IRCs.

For more information on COMCAM, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3205.01B, Joint Combat Camera; DODI 5040.04, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program; and Field Manual [FM] 3-55.12/Marine Corps Reference Publication [MCRP] 3-33.7A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [NTTP] 3-61.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Publication [AFTTP] 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera Operations.

d. CMO. CA officers, staffs, and organizations conduct CMO to help coordinate military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency (COIN), and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats. The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile OA to facilitate military operations are nested in support of the overall US objectives. CMO may include military forces having to perform activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. At all levels, CA officers use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-building to create conditions for success.

For more information on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

e. IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of specific IRCs, in concert with other lines of operation, **to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries** while protecting our own. Planning for detailed integration of specified IRC activities against the adversary (and population elements identified as potential adversaries) during J-35 planning and current operations planning, as well as synchronization during execution, typically occurs in the IO cell. A method to deconflict and integrate JOPP support efforts between IO and CCS may involve conducting a CCSWG to develop the communication synchronization guidance early in the planning process to support early mission analysis, operational design, and individual communication capability planning efforts. As needed, the CCSWG can be reconvened to coordinate efforts and refine the communication synchronization effort. This facilitates JOPP support and integration, especially when individual communication capability resources are insufficient to support representation on all planning teams.

For more information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

f. MISO plays an important role in DOD communication synchronization efforts through the planned use of approved programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign publics to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Military information support (MIS) units follow a deliberate process that aligns commander's objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant specific publics; develops focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employs sophisticated message delivery means; and produces observable, measurable behavioral responses. MIS forces can provide a CAISE for civil support missions within the US and its territories.

For more information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

g. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). DSPD includes DOD activities and measures to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG. This can include activities to understand and engage key foreign publics in order to inform them of US policies while influencing behavior that advances US interests and shapes the OE. Efforts that support building partnerships like medical and dental civic action programs are examples of DSPD activities which support both broader USG diplomacy efforts and communication-related objectives. KLE, MIS team support of embassy efforts, and other theater engagement activities may also serve as examples of DSPD.

h. Engagement. Traditionally, engagement has only focused on the key leader, but recent operations have shown engagement at all levels and all times can have an impact on behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions. All engagements should be characterized by the following; they should be consistent, culturally aware, credible, adaptive, balanced, and pragmatic. Engagement can be broadly categorized as follows:

(1) KLEs are engagements between joint force military leaders and the leaders of approved audiences that have defined goals, such as a change in policy or supporting the JFC's objectives. These engagements can be used to shape and influence local leaders within the OA and may also be directed toward specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders, and tribal leaders to solidify trust and confidence in joint force activities. Intelligence requirements are developed to support these engagements by identifying all key actors and their inter-relationships. Having detailed knowledge of key leaders' personalities, leadership styles, ambitions, motivations, objectives (short and long term), current position on issues, dependencies, psychological profiles, and personal histories will be essential to provide the context to plan appropriate communication activities. A vital component in all plans will be to recognize the complex, adaptive relationships and dependencies that exist between actors. The KLE cell will coordinate KLE efforts, that include information on the situational context (planning milestones), critical events, planned contacts of the command group, and special staff (key leaders) with relevant actors, objectives, main themes or issues to be addressed, desired effects, and MOEs.

(2) Soldier Engagement. The contemporary operating environment recognizes operations are conducted among the local population; consequently, soldier engagement is

likely to comprise the majority of engagements with the local population. It can occur as an opportunity, a face to face encounter on the street, or a scheduled meeting, and can help close the gap between the aims and ambitions of local audiences and the joint force. In order to best exploit this potential opportunity, all soldiers should be trained on how to engage with the local population and given a simple narrative around which they can construct their engagement activities.

(3) Categories of Engagement. Key leader and soldier engagements fall into two main categories that differ in their planning and execution:

(a) Deliberate. A deliberate engagement is a planned and anticipated personal interaction designed to create a specific effect. These engagements may be face to face interactions or interactions by other means, such as telephone or video conference.

(b) Dynamic. Dynamic engagements are unanticipated or impromptu encounters for which neither soldiers nor leaders have conducted specific planning. Such encounters can occur frequently and in many circumstances; a soldier's or leader's ability to exploit them will depend heavily on training, experience, and an understanding of the mission narrative.

i. Capability Comparison. Figure II-1, "Military Communication Capabilities and Activities Comparison," below provides a comparison of the military communication capabilities and activities normally available to a JFC. Clarifying these differences should assist the JFC and planners in properly employing each to achieve mission objectives. The distinctions between activities must remain clear so as not to diminish their effectiveness and institutional credibility.

3. Interorganizational Communication Capabilities and Activities

a. There is a diversity of interorganizational capabilities and activities. Without close collaboration and coordination, the communication of these disparate entities becomes, at best, competing and, at worst, conflicting. **History has shown, without close coordination with partners, within and outside the USG, inconsistent communication occurs.** The differing requirements for collaboration are especially pronounced between domestic and foreign operations, which are governed by different authorities and have considerably different governing structures and stakeholders.

COMMUNICATING WITH THE COALITION

"Conducting operations with both NATO and non-NATO partners magnified difficulties in information sharing. Many of the US products did not meet releasability requirements for sharing with coalition partners. At the start of the operation, it was unclear exactly which nations would be in the coalition, and because many US participants did not understand the requirements to classify for releasability, they tended to either over classify or not write for release to coalition partners."

**Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis
Libya: Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD)
A Case Study in Command and Control
4 October 2011**

Military Communication Capabilities and Activities Comparison

	Purpose	Function	Audience	Effect	Dimension	Supporting Capabilities or Activities
CCS	Synchronized operations, actions, words, and images	Synchronize and integrate	Key audiences, publics, stakeholders, and individuals	Inform and/or influence	Physical, cognitive, informational	Communications capabilities and activities
CMO	Establish, maintain, and influence relations	Facilitate military operations	Governments, NGOs, and civilian populace	Influence	Physical and informational	Civil affairs
CO	Achieve objectives in/through cyberspace	Facilitate mission objectives	Cyberspace users	Educate, influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp	Physical and informational	Cyberspace capabilities
DSPD	Support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts	Support foreign policy objectives	Foreign audiences and opinion makers	Understand, inform, and influence	Cognitive	DOD activities
IO	Influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary and potential adversary decision-making	Integrate	Adversary and potential adversary decision-making	Influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp	Physical, cognitive, informational	IO Staff IRCs as needed to affect decision-making of adversary and potential adversary
KLE	Educate, influence, and persuade key leaders	Gain support	Key leaders	Influence	Cognitive	Joint force leaders
MISO	Influence foreign audience emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior	Convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences	Foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals	Influence	Physical, cognitive, informational	MIS units
PA	Educate and inform domestic/international audiences, and deter adversaries	Communicate timely and truthful, unclassified information about DOD activities	Domestic and international audiences	Inform and deter	Cognitive, informational	PA Staff JPASE COMCAM

Legend

CCS	commander's communication synchronization	JPASE	joint public affairs support element
CMO	civil-military operations	KLE	key leader engagement
CO	cyberspace operations	MIS	military information support
COMCAM	combat camera	MISO	military information support operations
DOD	Department of Defense	NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
DSPD	Defense support to public diplomacy	PA	public affairs
IO	information operations	USG	United States Government
IRCs	information-related capabilities		

Figure II-1. Military Communication Capabilities and Activities Comparison

b. The JIACG or similar staff function can facilitate interagency coordination. The JIACG establishes the required operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government. JIACGs complement interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic

level through the National Security Staff. JIACG members participate in planning and provide links back to their parent agencies to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of other USG departments and agencies.

c. Embassy/Consulate. The chief of mission is responsible for the synchronization and coordination of US efforts within their assigned country. Country teams can provide unique capability, non-military venues for coordination, established HN relationships, and an in-depth understanding of the HN and situation. Joint and multinational communication-related activities to support operations should be integrated and coordinated with the activities of participating USG departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, HN agencies, and the private sector to achieve common objectives. Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent dialogue and messaging that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.

d. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes the lead during domestic emergencies and in coordinating with other federal, state, local, and private entities to ensure the most effective response during DSCA. Central to this is disseminating information to the American domestic audience, to state and local governments, and to the private sector. When executing DSCA, the US military is in support of another USG department or agency that is coordinating the federal response. The President can direct the DOD to be the lead for the federal response; however, this would only happen in extraordinary situations and would involve other DOD core mission areas. USG federal and state National Guard forces may also be conducting support at the state, local, or tribal levels. The operation plan (OPLAN) should include methodology/means of close coordination with DHS and state government agencies, and synchronizing efforts to assist in integrating available capability. Likewise, the JFC should consider the legal prohibitions on influencing American audiences, but planners should not ignore available MISO capabilities. Although care will typically have to be taken to address sensitivities regarding the employment of MISO forces during domestic operations, it is legal to use their production, distribution, and dissemination capabilities in support of a lead federal agency's information efforts, as long as there is no attempt to influence.

For more information on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. For more information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

e. HN

(1) When attempting to communicate effectively with any public, a solid grasp of the local language, culture, social norms and taboos, current situation and concerns, and expectations is needed. Likewise, understanding the local information environment, trusted information conduits, key influencers, points of resonance, emotionally charged topics, and established cognitive pathways typically requires a deep active immersion in the environment over time. **Having assistance from the HN is vital in gaining this understanding and the correct interpretation of delivered messages.** For example, early communication efforts in Afghanistan attempted to brand the adversary as “religious extremists.” The problem was, when translated into the local dialects, the title became

“religious fundamentalists,” which is laudable in Afghan religious culture. Once discovered, communicators found a better translation in the term “evildoers,” which aided the branding effort. Nuanced translational and cultural understanding will almost certainly require HN assistance. However, care must be taken to also research and understand insurgent grievances, which may reveal HN bias, misunderstanding, or mischaracterization of important issues.

AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN ISAF PERSPECTIVE

“Collectively, NATO’s lessons from Afghanistan point to the fact that contemporary conflict is constantly changing its face and multinational forces conducting operations in this sort of environment must constantly learn and adapt. At the tactical level, unit commanders must have a complete understanding of their operational environment and adopt a flexible posture and approach to all operational and tactical problems because issues will overlap either reinforcing or negating each other. A priority for the mission leadership is to establish and maintain the “legitimacy” of the mission. ... Proper cultural understanding will inform and be a guide to developing the right rules of engagement, develop situational awareness and serve to minimize civilian casualties.”

Robert Beljan
Small Wars Journal
30 May 2013

(2) The JFC may augment Service-provided language and cultural awareness training and tailor these to the OA and mission. This also requires intelligence and engagement actions that provide a continuously updated picture of relevant information. HN participation in communication synchronization, planning, communication product testing, execution, and assessment often requires some adjustments in venue, methods, time required, training, social interaction, and allocation of interpreters due to HN capabilities and sensitivities.

f. IGOs and NGOs. Some of the most significant requirements for handling coordination with IGOs and NGOs differ in lead agency, agendas, and the ability to work as part of a larger group.

(1) IGOs. Key IGOs include North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN), European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Economic Community of West African States, and the Organization of American States. IGOs the USG regularly work with typically have a similar agenda, can come to agreement on working as part of a group, and establish at least an informal lead agency. This allows for more closely synchronized communication efforts focused on common objectives. Additionally, NATO members should follow agreed doctrine on PA, IO, DSPD, and other communication activities. Most non-military IGOs are focused on informing and educating audiences, not influencing them. Therefore, a large part of the interaction with them will typically be through established PA protocols and channels, and/or CMO. This coordination is an important part of the overall effort to synchronize communication.

(2) NGOs. NGOs frequently have very different agendas from the joint force and each other. Unfortunately, they often cannot or will not want to be overtly associated with military forces. Similarly, they normally do not want to submit to a group decision about their operations or communication efforts. Therefore, communication coordination efforts may have to focus on looking for areas of common interest, dealing with each NGO separately, and not publicizing the relationship. There may be some neutral venues that may be useful for NGO coordination, such as the embassy or umbrella/common-interest organizational meetings set up in the area of operations for NGO coordination.

(3) Joint and Interagency Information Center (JIIC). Standing up a JIIC is one method to coordinate information with the interagency, HN, interorganizational entities (like the UN), NGOs, and other interested stakeholders. An example where this worked well was during a crisis response, FHA mission, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, in Haiti, in support of earthquake relief efforts. Figure II-2, “Joint and Interagency Information Center,” outlines the participants, interaction, and benefits of the JIIC.




Figure II-2. Joint and Interagency Information Center—Haiti Earthquake

4. Organizing to Support the Process

JFCs have both increased senior leadership involvement in the CCS effort and have integrated CCS into planning and staffing processes. Three examples are indicative of organizational options currently used in the field, or best practices from Iraq and Afghanistan:

a. Increased Command Emphasis. Leaders maintain traditional headquarters staff structures and processes, as well as increase command emphasis on CCS through promulgation of commanders' intent, guidance, and increased oversight. Examples include designation of the chief of staff (COS) or deputy commander as the overall CCS integrator (as an additional duty). The principal advantages of this model are that it places emphasis on unity of effort, requires the least additional manpower, and the COS or deputy commander already have direct access to the JFC.

b. CCS lead with small coordination staff and supporting CCSWG. Details vary among CCMDs, but the primary components of organization, process, and output include the following:

(1) A CCS lead who has immediate access and reports to the COS and/or JFC. This facilitates JFC involvement in the CCS process and the ability to coordinate the wide variety of communication capabilities from across the command on behalf of the JFC.

(2) While communication capabilities conduct their own assessments, a small CCS staff may assist in monitoring and integrating communication activity assessments and managing the CCSWG. While this staff manages the CCS efforts, it does not supplant communication capability functional expertise or their direct support to operational planning teams (OPTs). Staff responsibilities typically include:

(a) Organize and lead CCSWG meetings, including communication synchronization integration and coordination of communication-related products.

(b) If a board is utilized in the approval process, assist the CCS lead in presenting the communication synchronization guidance to the board and gaining approval.

(c) Present the CCSWG recommendations to the OPTs for incorporation into planning and execution.

(d) Assist in communication-related activity assessment results being included in the assessment cell consolidation efforts to assess overall joint force operations.

(e) Ensure CCSWG representatives assist, as needed, in writing applicable portions of the operations plan, to include Annex Y.

(3) The CCSWG lead should provide WG participants a short briefing showing the CCSWG purpose, inputs, outputs, key tasks, required membership, how the CCSWG fits into the battle rhythm, and what other events the CCSWG output should feed. This enables CCSWG participants to ensure the right expertise and inputs are provided. Inputs should include pertinent information from each of the functional area estimates of the situation or desired activities in support of the communication synchronization.

(4) Staff integration mechanisms can include an action officer-level WG, a directorate-level steering group, or an approval board. A board allows senior decision makers to provide guidance on communication-related objectives, themes, establish planning priorities, assign resources, and approve inputs to planning.

(5) CCSWG typically provides inputs to plans in support of theater security cooperation activities, KLE and outreach activities, OPLANs and concept plans, and planning and execution synchronization matrices for inclusion in operation orders (OPORDs) and FRAGORDs. The CCSWG is also a good forum for coordination of synchronization and execution matrices and APEX system-required products.

(6) The CCSWG serves as the cross-functional conduit to coordinate support from USG-level resources, departments, and agencies.

(7) This organizational construct typically has a **central repository (linked to the CCMD main website/portal) for CCS-relevant guidance and products**. This facilitates collaborative planning and information sharing for CCS supporting activities.

**THE UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND SENIOR LEADER
ENGAGEMENT PORTAL**

This site provides commander's communication synchronization-specific information for current events and detailed country plans for countries in their area of responsibility (AOR). In 2008 they had plans posted for 89 of the 92 countries. The site displays engagement activities in a current operational picture linked to their theater campaign plan information management database. Any portal user (including US Embassy country teams) can instantly view the full set of communication-related activities in the AOR by type of activity or by country. This has proven extremely useful as both a resource for functional planners and a preparation tool for senior leaders, the broader staff, and subordinates.

Various Sources

(8) The typical communication synchronization guidance should contain the narrative, specific audiences, overarching communication objectives, and approach for communication that identifies communication lines of effort. That helps to visualize and describe the major programs each communication capability should use to create desired effects for the designated audiences. Individual capabilities should use these products to develop the themes, messages, and engagements specific to their capability. These elements, in conjunction with specific tasks in the plan or order, help ensure members of the joint force act in a manner consistent with national guidance.

(9) The JFC is responsible for maintaining the strategic perspective and the CCS lead aids in managing integration and synchronization of communication efforts consistent with JFC guidance throughout planning and execution, during peacetime and contingency operations. This access is not meant to replace any direct access to the commander held by other communication staff members in the course of their normal duties, such as PA.

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for additional information on planning during execution.

(10) The involvement of communication capabilities will vary with the communication-related objectives, desired effects, and the associated audience. Close collaboration during development of the communication synchronization approach and its execution is essential. This normally includes communication capability coordination or integration for synchronization of operations, actions, words, and images, facilitated by a combination of the cross-functional organizations (i.e., cells, WGs, boards). The CCSWG (Figure II-3) is a cross-functional WG which fulfills the requirement to synchronize communication of these disparate capabilities. The CCSWG can provide a venue to plan for communication synchronization in support of the JOPP, other staff processes, and review policy guidance. While the IO cell coordinates efforts focused on the adversary, the CCSWG provides a neutral venue for coordination and synchronization of the wider communication effort.

(11) **The CCSWG serves as the cross-functional conduit to develop, synchronize, implement, and consolidate assessments on a command-approved, communication**




Figure II-3. Commander's Communication Synchronization Working Group

synchronization approach designed to support operations and command objectives. The themes, messages, and actions are coordinated with various staff organizations, agencies, and units that will execute the plan, once approved by the commander. The CCS process is not a separate or additional process, but outlines sequences of tasks and activities that are already part of extant staff processes (such as planning, collection, assessment), and identifies communication-related actions that can be taken to facilitate communication synchronization or may add value in supporting the JOPP. Appendix B, “Notional Commander’s Communication Synchronization Process Map,” of this document provides some details of a more deliberate process that can be used.

For additional guidance on PA and IO support to the CCS, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-13, Information Operations. Also see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for more information on planning.

c. Communication Directorate. During large operations involving multinational forces (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan), some commands have centralized all communication capabilities, activities, and integrators under a separate directorate. One important ingredient for success was the director was equal in rank to the other major staff directorates, such as the J-3 and J-5. In this case, the synchronization effort included a CCSWG and board, chaired by the communication directorate head or the COS. In exercising this organizational model, care must be taken to ensure communication synchronization efforts do not result in parallel planning efforts separate or duplicative of the JOPP or normal J-5, J-35, or J-3 functions. CCS efforts must be fully integrated into and support traditional staff processes, just as the logistics staff function conducts detailed coordination and parallel support planning in support of the JOPP.

“The whole thing could fall apart like a house of cards, for one reason and one reason only. Unless you’ve got a credible senior member of the staff, coequal (rank) amongst the other influential directorate leads, you will subordinate communications back to a purely afterthought staff function, which is historically what we have seen. Whether it was IO or Public Affairs, it mattered not. To be honest with you, very few J-3s ever gave much focus or time on different information operations responsibilities, and certainly did not understand, necessarily, how to integrate that into the broader strategic function of the headquarters.”

Greg Smith, RADM USN (ret)
Communications Director in Iraq and Afghanistan
Interview 22 Aug 2013

d. Social Media. Social media describes the different means by which people, enabled by digital communication technologies, connect with one another to share information and engage in conversations on topics of mutual interest. Social media is an umbrella term describing a variety of communication mediums and platforms, social networking being the most well-known of them. While specific mediums, platforms, and technologies may change over time, the overall trend of people connecting with other people using technology only increases. **Social media enables the rapid transmission of information and misinformation to domestic and international publics and communities of interest.** Many of the communication capabilities will have an interest in issues emerging in social media, may be interested in engaging in this arena, and could benefit from synchronization

of these efforts. **Friendly forces should be aware of these social media tools, be able to identify adversary influence campaigns and operations that are developing, and provide a timely response.** Engaging effectively in social media events requires speed, agility, and attention as context rapidly changes. Monitoring and responding quickly to social media activities of interest can require dedicated and specialized resources. Pre-planned and approved response options for predictable events can aid in shortening response time, but monitoring and effectively engaging in unpredicted events takes manpower. Simply posting factual information on military social networking sites is not an effective model, and when monitoring and engaging in local and regional social media channels a staff that is fluent in the native language and culture is essential. Planning considerations should include identifying a core element of personnel with a nuanced understanding of social media, authentic HN sources to respond to social media opportunities, and legal constraints on the use of social media to influence domestic publics. There are several staff resourcing best practices, with varied risk and cost:

(1) Monitor a majority of the social media forums that impact the OE, analyze activity, responding in a timely fashion, adapt to have a positive impact, and stay engaged through the duration of a significant event or counterpropaganda campaign. This method would require significant resources.

(2) Train key staff members to take on the task as a collateral duty and assign them to specific social media channels and forums. This would involve taking on the risk of potentially having gaps in coverage, unless overlapping time periods are also assigned and absences covered. It would also add another responsibility to over-tasked staff officers and may tend to be gradually supplanted over time by seemingly higher-priority tasks.

(3) Leverage the entire joint force to communicate for the command in social media. Ways to mitigate risk and achieve the highest probability of success include ensuring the force understands the strategic narrative, themes, messages, and desired effects; keeping the force informed of ongoing operations and specific messaging; providing engagement guidance, commander's intent, and current trends; and encouraging/rewarding successful social media engagement.

(4) Combination of the above options.

(5) Since it is impossible to restrict communication on social media to only adversary publics, care must be taken to ensure information posted is truthful and not misleading.

(6) Social media constitutes public information and public communication. Command use of social media requires PA coordination and involvement.

(7) If monitoring of social media activities is desired, a potentially useful approach may be to develop software that tracks keywords and alerts a small team when specific flags are triggered. It also may be worthwhile to look into what advertising firms and news agencies are doing today to stay ahead of "social gossip."

CHAPTER III COMMANDER'S COMMUNICATION SYNCHRONIZATION PLANNING AND BEST PRACTICES

“And our ability to synchronize our actions while communicating effectively with foreign publics must be enhanced to sustain global support.”

National Security Strategy, May 2010

1. Introduction

a. CJCSM 3130.03 requires the JFC to include communication goals and objectives in the commander’s intent and to have a communication approach that ensures unity of themes, objectives, and messages among key activities; consistency in intent or effect between command operations, actions, and information; and a risk assessment of the information that may reach unintended audiences, create unintended consequences, and require risk mitigation measures. To facilitate this, the DOD should provide the strategic narrative and themes in the documents that direct planning, such as a WARNORD, alert order (ALERTORD), or the *Guidance for Employment of the Force*.

b. The communication strategy approach fulfills APEX requirements and describes how the commander and staff will coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to the lowest level to support JFC objectives. Developing this approach can occur during *deliberate planning* that produces a contingency plan for future execution or in time-constrained *crisis action planning* that develops an OPORD in response to a situation that may result in near-term military operations. The CCS process is not a separate or additional process, but outlines sequences of tasks and activities that are already part of existing staff processes (such as planning, collection, and assessment), and identifies communication-related actions that can be taken to facilitate communication synchronization or may add value in supporting the JOPP (such as research and analysis).

c. A CCDR’s TCP provides the key interface with USG strategic guidance relative to the command’s major combat operations, steady-state peacetime engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. JFCs execute communication synchronization in the CCMD’s supporting contingency plans in the context of the TCP’s strategic and military end states, but also tailor their supporting plans to the specific nature and objectives of the operation. The CCS approach published as part of a JFC’s supporting OPLAN or OPORD Annex Y is a key communication synchronization document for a specific operation.

d. The remainder of this chapter provides some best practices that may be useful in synchronizing the commander’s communication efforts.

2. Supporting Operational Design

a. At the very earliest stages of preparations for planning, preliminary work is done to understand the problem and OE, and identify the operational approach. This effort gathers as much relevant information as possible, reviews the situation, assesses the actors, considers

the desired end state, and makes some suggestions through the chain of command to the USD(P) for (or to) SecDef, and leads to input to the commander's initial planning guidance. The communication synchronization guidance should include the overarching narrative, main themes, constraints/restraints, selected publics, goals and objectives, and desired end state. The communication synchronization effort should also encourage communication planners to consider varied means to promulgate the overarching narrative and key themes, including third-party advocates, and disseminate guidance throughout the entire force on specific messages and desired effects to help provide consistent communication to external publics and consistency with operations/actions.

b. Just like products developed by the logistics directorate of a joint staff, the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), and others, the development of CCS-related products should occur within the JOPP because the communication synchronization effort should support the OPLAN or OPORD. The JFC's approved plan needs to incorporate the communication synchronization approach, preserve the integrity of national-level and DOD communication themes, and help provide unified action in concert with other instruments of national power. Appendix B, "Notional Commander's Communication Synchronization Process Map," provides a more deliberate, focused methodology for support of planning, execution, assessment, and feedback into the process. Details include notional steps, tasks, flow of inputs and outputs, important products, key participants, and which entity may have primary responsibility for each step.

c. Integrating CCS into the Operational Design

(1) **CCS begins early in the JOPP, during planning initiation.** The JFC's emphasis at this point is on *operational design*, the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major OPLAN, and its subsequent execution. Operational design requires the commander to apply critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-defined problems and develop approaches to solve them. Communication capability representatives should participate in operational design to advise the JFC and staff on aspects of the proposed operational approach that are necessary to inform and influence selected publics, and identify those aspects under consideration that could adversely affect the narrative, strategic themes, and other communication efforts. The operational design lead should confirm with the JFC existing national communication guidance is both sufficient and appropriate for the operation based on the understanding of the problem, or the guidance is insufficient or inappropriate and should be adjusted. The latter will require the JFC to discuss recommended changes with higher authority. In addition, the CCS contribution to operational design should be to ensure operational desired end states, objectives, and the operational approach adequately address CCS considerations.

(a) **Communication capability representatives need to ensure key operational design team members, such as J-5 and the J-2, are aware of the CCS information requirements and other considerations** necessary to support development of the operational approach. In particular, the J-2 can factor the requirements into early joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) analysis to fill critical information gaps.

(b) **The CCSWG is an integrated group composed of members from a variety of functional areas** such as PA, IO, MISO, KLE, and CA. Additional recommended participants are J-35 and J-5 to ensure integrated and synchronized planning efforts. Thus, the CCSWG representative can provide an integrated, communication-related perspective to the JFC and staff during operational design, in addition to advice submitted independently along staff functional lines.

(c) The CCSWG lead should ensure the initial communication synchronization effort, and later detailed communication synchronization approach for Annex Y, is provided to the operational design and operation planning teams and other important staff process venues. Typical operational design support activities include:

1. Identify and analyze audiences, publics and/or stakeholders, including key communicators, credible voices, potentials, and tendencies.
2. Identify, analyze, and segment specific audiences.
3. Analyze cognitive dimension of the information environment, including cultural, historical, and social drivers.
4. Analyze significant narrative and themes affecting the OE, and develop initial assessment methodologies.

(2) The transition from operational design to detailed JOPP usually occurs when the JFC approves the operational approach. The JFC should repeat the strategic narrative and describe the communication themes and objectives, as appropriate, either in the planning guidance or as part of the operational approach. At this point in the planning process, the CCS lead should confirm with the JFC the full set of themes, messages, images, and actions that will provide the basis for subsequent detailed communication synchronization approach development in Annex Y. This set includes those directed by higher authority and new themes, messages, images, operations, and actions developed by the various communication capabilities to support the operational approach.

(3) **Communication synchronization brings together many communication capabilities, which have different inherent authorities.** These authorities depend on the nature of the capability in question. They may be further affected by the type of operation or whether it takes place in the US or on foreign soil. For example, MISO is conducted under a different set of authorities than PA. MISO authorities to support operations can be significantly different depending on whether the operations take place on foreign soil or are oriented towards foreign audiences. Various capabilities, such as PA, are often coordinated closely with the DOS or other lead federal agency to accommodate political concerns associated with our operations. In all operational phases, and especially in Campaign Design, commanders and their staffs need to be cognizant of the different authorities they have been granted for a particular mission. Identifying an audience or emerging public isn't enough to begin communicating. Once the command understands how it is authorized to communicate with an audience or public, it can then begin to design effective communication synchronization within the JOPP.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for more information on operational design.

d. Communication Perspective of the OE

(1) The various communication capabilities, in concert with the J-2, can develop a graphical perspective of the factors affecting the cognitive dimension, just as others can depict the nodes (actors) and links (relationships) in and between the various political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems and subsystems. However, effectively mapping nodes and links in the cognitive system requires including nodes and links in the physical and informational dimensions as well. The cognitive system depiction could include indigenous communication means, methods, cognitive patterns, cultural norms, and trusted sources. A systems perspective helps planners understand how communication occurs in the OE and how best to create desired results. In particular, the JFC and staff, assisted by the Red Team, should attempt to understand local populace preconceptions, how they perceive the OE, and why. It may require research of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeate the local social, political, economic, and information systems. It may also require sociocultural analysis of specific individuals and groups. Additionally, the JFC should understand the cognitive dimension is complex, adaptive, and more difficult to understand than closed systems. This is a complex undertaking, complicated by factors such as the public's preexisting bias, cultural lens, stimulus response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of the current situation. Adding to the staff or utilizing reachback to subject matter experts (SMEs) that understand these factors can significantly help analysts and planners.

(2) Cognitive factors can vary significantly between locality, cultures, and operational circumstances. The communication ways and means that worked in one situation might not work in another.

(3) Planners can use a map of the human environment distilled from PMESII analysis and communication-relevant JIPOE analysis of information, political, or social systems to develop understanding of the OE. Additional information could include cultural studies, individual perceptions of the situation, motivations, expectations, and attitudes derived from polling data, focus groups, interviews/discussions with key leaders, and observed behavior. This helps identify perceptions, attitudes, or behavior the commander desires to change, and help communicators and planners to tailor messages, operations, actions, and images more affectively. Finally, results of communication-related activities can be depicted on the map to begin to determine what messages and actions resonated with which publics in specific locations.

For more information on understanding the OE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. Intelligence Support. All communication capabilities require information to develop products, including an understanding of how the joint force operates in this environment and how other relevant groups, agencies, and organizations do the same. It is imperative the JFC be able to translate national communication goals and objectives into something that will be applicable to the local situation. This will involve staff actions, along with study of specific

JIPOE products. At this early stage, it is important to conduct a thorough study of the local situation. Communication planners assist in development of communication-related intelligence support requirements and inclusion of communication-specific needs in the JIPOE development. The commander's planning guidance provides areas of focus for the JIPOE development effort. Appendix B, "Notional Commander's Communication Synchronization Process Map," paragraph 4, *Intelligence Support Requirements*, discusses the intelligence support requirements for communication synchronization in some detail.

f. Adversary and Competitor Messages. Several USG and headquarters directorates focused on the adversary can provide insight into adversary messaging, important information that can be gleaned from it, and potential areas of opportunity for consideration in communication synchronization. **Understanding adversary messages and their points of resonance with specific individuals and groups can help deepen understanding** of the local culture and cognitive dimension, and provide potential vulnerabilities for exploitation to win the battle of the narrative and the battle of the will. These overarching battles in the cognitive dimension go beyond the adversary and potential adversary, and will necessarily be of interest to all communication capabilities. For example, if the adversary messages and actions do not match, there may be an opportunity to exploit their "say-do gap." Considerations for exploiting these adversary gaps include:

- (1) How does the adversary frame and explain his ideology?
- (2) Have we adopted a posture of careful listening, to facilitate our understanding and adapt to adversary and environmental changes?
- (3) How does the adversary make their ideology appear enduring and natural to the local culture?
 - (a) Do we challenge their assumptions, beliefs, and meanings?
 - (b) Can we leverage the local culture/society goals that are also acceptable to the international community?
- (4) What are the inconsistencies in the adversary narrative?
 - (a) How does the adversary obscure the inconsistencies to smooth their narrative?
 - (b) Do we target these inconsistencies?
- (5) What is the structure of the narrative?
 - (a) How can we breach their structure?
 - (b) How can we influence, alter, manipulate, or confound them from within?

g. Reviewing all competing messaging efforts may provide similar value and improve communication synchronization approach development.

3. Supporting the Joint Operation Planning Process

a. CCS Relationship to the JOPP. The **active participation of CSS members throughout the planning process is critical to successful integration of communication synchronization into the plan.** Throughout planning, most functional area staffs meet to conduct mission analysis, develop or refine staff estimates, provide input to the planning process, and develop their detailed pieces of the plan or order. The IO cell performs this function for efforts focused on the decision-making of the adversary. The CCSWG can perform the larger iterative functional coordination process for the overarching communication synchronization. The JFC battle rhythm should include CCSWG meetings following and informed by information from communication capability WGs (such as the IO WG and CMO WG) to minimize duplication of work and synchronize efforts. The CCSWG should coordinate and consolidate communication inputs from communication capabilities to provide a coherent comprehensive communication synchronization input to the planning process at each of the appropriate planning steps. Some of the products the various communication capabilities and CCSWG develop for the plan include: communication synchronization approach, synchronization matrix, staff estimates, key public identification and segmentation, theme/action alignment, stakeholder analysis, KLE priorities and guidance, desired effects, desired communication means/conduits, highly influential individuals, risk assessment, decision points, assessment measures and means, and Annex Y. The CCSWG typically provides the communication synchronization approach and coordinated perspective to OPTs across the staff, via communication capability representatives assigned to the teams, which can be an IO, PA, KLE cell, or CA representative. The CCS-related efforts to support each step of the JOPP are detailed in Appendix B.

b. Interagency and Intergovernmental Communication Synchronization Development and Planning Techniques. Just as simultaneous joint planning efforts are conducted during execution along three planning timeframes (current operations, J-35, and future plans), interagency and IGO planning normally focuses on three timeframes: short-, medium-, and long-term. Although the techniques and considerations along these timeframes can be quite different, CCS efforts should be simultaneously coordinated across all three time frames to be successful. For example, communication-related activities should be immediately planned for short-term crisis response situations, while medium-term programs also need to be started, and relationships begun to produce long-term results. Due to unit rotation cycles and political pressure, short-term impacts are often prioritized over medium- and long-term development efforts. These three sets of activities should be integrated and complimentary, or the medium- and long-term outcomes may be in jeopardy. This can put joint force efforts at cross purposes with other USG departments and agencies and international organizations.

(1) Short-term Planning Considerations. Identify crisis topic, spokesperson, response type, required speed of response, and mitigating the effects of rumor and disinformation.

(a) Consider spokesperson preparedness and training, credibility, appearance or presence, and ethnicity. Publics are more positively affected by a spokesperson similar to themselves.

(b) **Rapid decision making is very important and the adversary communications cycle must be understood to compete effectively.** Beating adversary cycle time with accurate information may require commanders to take risk by pushing release authority down to the lowest level. Similarly, the command can facilitate embeds at all levels to rapidly get out their story as third-party witness to action, because they are perceived as more credible than self-reported data.

(c) If there is a need to counter rumors and adversary disinformation, it can be countered most effectively by third-party advocates. If that is not available, it can be countered effectively by attacking general uncertainty about the issue, high personal anxiety, and adversary credibility (lack of factual, verified, or corroborated information). This can be accomplished by providing accurate information to the public, attacking source credibility, and using a spokesperson perceived as honest, knowledgeable, and/or high status. Achieving the desired perception in the selected individual or group is vital. Discrediting the source as having something to gain from the disinformation is also effective.

(2) **Medium-Term Planning Considerations.** Determine attitude or behavior to change, logical relationship between communication and change, required steps, alternatives, and time required.

(a) **Publics Segmentation.** The intelligence, PA, and IO (to include MISO) staff sections can provide public segmentation that is useful to all communication capabilities. They can define the intended public and segment them along lines that are relevant, such as attitudes about the behavior to be changed. For example, personal attitude about the acceptability of suicide bombing (religious, social, and moral) would be a segmentation factor if the desired behavior change was to cause them to stop supporting suicide bombings. Another segmentation factor could be “hot button” or “turn off” issues. Others could include their viewpoint toward joining a terrorist group or reporting suspicious activity. Care should be taken if tailoring a message for different publics, as any message which is transmitted has the potential to reach unintended publics. Thus all messages must support a particular theme, and tailored messages must not conflict with each other.

(b) Identify the most credible delivery means, potential points of influence, or motivator for each segment.

(c) Understand the environment, to include: cultural or language barriers, key leader relationships, political constraints, staff communication skill levels, stakeholders and their interests, media means/methods/bias, and public attention to media sources.

(d) Validate messages to discover mistaken cultural, social, or political assumptions about message interpretation.

(e) Identify messages to avoid during public engagement.

(f) Include as much community involvement as possible.

(g) Determine most effective message content type and delivery method.

(h) Determine an appropriate communication approach. A few examples of communication approaches include:

1. One- versus two-sided communication involves whether or not to include the opposing argument. Two-sided communication is the most effective choice when the public is knowledgeable about the issue or is opposed to the position of the message.

2. Gain versus loss framing involves encouraging the public to make a choice, framed as either a gain or loss to them. For example, the choice could be to stop supporting suicide bombers framed as either a choice that could save lives or as a choice to honor the lives already unnecessarily lost. Loss-framed messages are more persuasive to a public that is aggressive toward outsiders and submissive to local or tribal authority. Conversely, gain-framed messages are more influential for those less supportive of authoritarianism.

3. Positive versus negative emotions have a significant effect in that positive emotions increase the effect of logically weak arguments, but decrease logically strong arguments. However, if the public is predisposed to disagree, a positive tone is ineffective. A negative or fearful message should be supplemented with the public's options to avoid the negative outcome.

(3) Long-Term Planning Techniques. Long-term communication is separated into two categories: building relationships and engaging in a dialogue of ideas.

(a) **Building Relationships.** With typical troop rotations, establishing long-term relationships can be difficult. Establishing good relationships with other stakeholders is important. These could include NGOs, interagency representatives working in the area, intergovernmental and international organization representatives, and the media. There are four key elements of a successful relationship, in priority order: control mutuality (acceptance of the balance of control or that one party has a right to influence the other), mutual trust, commitment to the relationship, and relationship satisfaction.

(b) **Engaging in a Dialogue of Ideas.** If the exchange is to be a dialogue that influences, instead of a debate, it has to be in a context of respect, transparency, and honesty. There should be evident active listening, consideration for the other viewpoint, and a perceived benefit for changing perspective (such as peace, prosperity, dignity, etc.)

c. **Critical support requirements** could include collection and assessment requirements, logistics, deployment priorities, reachback to centers of excellence, communication assets and networks, HN contracting, multinational support, etc. The purpose of support planning is to determine the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) sequencing of the personnel, logistic, and other support necessary to provide mission support in accordance with the CONOPS. Support planning is primarily conducted by individual communication capability planners and traditionally encompasses such essential factors as IO, PA, media embed transportation requirements, communications and network support, and sequencing of forward elements.

4. Nesting of Narrative, Themes, and Messages

a. The Narrative. Strategic documents, like the NSS, provide a USG communication, set within a contextual background, and help identify the USG ultimate goal or end state. This enduring communication, with context and end state, is often called a “narrative.” For example, the NSS reads: “America will not impose any system of government on another country, but our long-term security and prosperity depends on our steady support for universal values, which sets us apart from our enemies, adversarial governments, and many potential competitors for influence. We will do so through a variety of means—by speaking out for universal rights, supporting fragile democracies and civil society, and supporting the dignity that comes with development.”

KEY TERMS

narrative—Overarching expression of the context and desired results.

theme—Unifying idea(s) or intention(s) that supports the narrative and is/are designed to provide guidance and continuity for messaging and related products.

message—A tailored communication directed at a specific public, aligned with a specific theme, in support of a specific objective.

b. For every military engagement, the President or National Security Staff may create the strategic narrative and provide national-level communication guidance. This narrative and supporting themes should be provided or referenced in the WARNORD or other strategic guidance sent down through the DOD. If not, this guidance may have to be extracted from publicized statements by senior officials (e.g., from the daily DOS document *Rapid Response* on the DOS INFOCENTRAL website). All operations, actions, words, and images of the joint force should support and reinforce the narrative. Likewise, joint force operations, actions, words, and images should be perceived as consistent with the overarching narrative, because an adversary will quickly use undesired effects (such as excessive collateral damage and atrocities committed by multinational force members) as evidence to counter the narrative and weaken the support of key publics. Consistency and synchronization of operations, actions, words, and images will help commanders establish and maintain necessary credibility, legitimacy, and trust.

c. Battle of the Narrative. For enduring interventions, there can be a **continuing struggle to define the national and international debate/discussion on terms favorable to one side**, causing a clash between the competing narratives of the actors involved. This is often what is referred to as the “**battle of the narrative.**” Succeeding in this battle is critical to both long-term and operational success. The goal of the battle of the narrative is to gain superiority over the adversary’s narrative, to diminish its appeal and followership, and, when possible, to supplant it or make it irrelevant. Although the battle of the narrative is fought in the information environment, success or failure may be measured in the cognitive dimension (perceptions/attitudes) and the physical domains (behavioral changes). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare, is to shape the OE such that the contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to our advantage. Likewise, a key component of the “battle of the

narrative” is establishing the reasons for and desired outcomes of the conflict, in terms understandable to relevant publics (such as the relevant population in a COIN). **These “reasons” and “outcomes” should be well-grounded in the realities of the situation,** including important factors within PMESII systems. The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis *Decade of War* study highlights some of the lessons learned in the battle of the narrative during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and potential improvements.

BATTLE OF THE NARRATIVE LESSON LEARNED

Observation:

We were slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle of the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; we were often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states

Why it Happened:

—Because we lacked a holistic understanding of information’s role in operations, our communications strategy was often inadequate

—We were slow to account for and interact with the modern information domain, characterized by information saturation due to instant, 24/7 access and pervasive social media

—An enemy unconstrained by our moral standards outpaced friendly information activity efforts

—We initially failed to resource information activities for around-the-clock operations

—Effective consequence management did not emerge until after tactical events repeatedly brought strategic consequences

—Over time and through experience, the message evolved from being enemy-centric to encompassing broad aspects of the environment, tailored to various audiences

—Effective communications strategies required coordinated joint, interagency, and partnered efforts

Way Ahead:

—Assess our ability to use information. Conduct a comprehensive examination and assessment of force structure, actors, and tools with regard to communications strategy

—Update policy and doctrine. Expand policy and doctrine to encompass best practices and recent challenges, including an approach that leverages technology and new advances in social media

—Tailor the communication strategy. Ensure communication strategy considers all relevant actors’ instruments of power; cultural, religious, and other demographic factors; and employs innovative, non-traditional methods and sources

—Increase transparency. While observing necessary OPSEC, aggressively share information with host nations, NGOs, and others to increase transparency and understanding of US positions

—Coordinated approach. Develop and execute a communication strategy with interagency, coalition, and when possible, host-nation participants—Anticipate consequence management. Develop the communication strategy at each level for the plan, branches, and sequels, anticipating the requirement to mitigate actual and alleged negative incidents

—Resource the IO effort. Ensure the right equipment and experienced, trained personnel are available to conduct information activities

—Proactive messaging. Develop innovative, non-traditional sources to “keep a finger on the pulse” of the operating environment and maintain an aggressive information assessment and analysis cycle—Build partner capacity. Help partners develop the capability to report responsibly in the media and provide key enablers to help them execute this mission

—Be fast but not wrong. Be “first with the truth” by using pre-planned messages and streamlined authorities for communication; at the same time, only report confirmed details to avoid retractions and a loss of credibility

—Reinforce words with deeds. Include a rigorous treatment of Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), ethics, civilian casualty mitigation, and cultural awareness as part of the “profession of arms” in training and leadership development

—Involve commanders. Ensure commanders at all levels know that the battle for the narrative is “commanders’ business” in which they must both monitor for early warning indicators to potential issues that could negatively affect the narrative, look for and good-news stories that reinforce the narrative

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d. Nesting of Themes and Messages

(1) Strategic themes developed through the collaboration of DOS, DOD, and other USG departments and agencies can be very broad and typically do not change during a limited operation. Commanders should create supporting themes that are appropriate for their level of command and facilitate accomplishing specific objectives. Figure III-1, “Strategic Narrative Linkage,” provides an example of USFK establishing an enduring theater-strategic narrative, and linking long-term campaign plan themes to support it. Themes at each level should be nested underneath the themes of the next higher level and support the strategic themes. Messages are subordinate to themes and deliver precise information to a specific public to create desired effects while supporting




Figure III-1. Strategic Narrative Linkage to Campaign Plan Enduring Themes

a specific theme. Messages are tailored for a specific time, place, delivery mechanism, and public. Messages are necessarily more dynamic, but must always support the themes. Themes are more enduring and should be synchronized up and down the chain of command. However, the more dynamic nature and leeway inherent in messages provide joint force communicators and planners the maneuver space in the cognitive dimension of the information environment to create more nuanced effects.

(2) Even though operational-level themes are more enduring, they are typically created for each operation or phase-specific objectives within a specific cultural framework. Themes, that are not closely coordinated, when transmitted to a global public, can potentially have lasting and sometimes conflicting impacts on unintended publics across multiple operations or campaigns. Therefore, in the absence of higher specific guidance, planners must consider nesting themes under an approved strategic theme or the more enduring national narrative.

(3) In summary, **messages should support the themes at their specific level. The themes should support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes and support the enduring national narrative.** This ensures consistent communications to local and global publics over time and supports strategic objectives.

AN EXAMPLE OF NESTING

The National Security Strategy provides a strategic theme: *“we must recognize that no one nation—no matter how powerful—can meet global challenges alone. As we did after World War II, America must prepare for the future, while forging cooperative approaches among nations that can yield results.”*

US European Command established a theater-strategic theme that nests underneath the above *National Security Strategy* theme: *“Teaming U.S. European Command's Ready Forces with our long-time allies and newfound partners in the region provides cooperative solutions to a mutual security challenge. Continuing to build these enduring regional partnerships ensures we are ‘Stronger Together.’”*

5. Sources of Strategic Narrative and Themes

a. The USG strategic narrative and themes should be included in the documents that direct planning, such as a WARNORD, ALERTORD, or the Guidance for Employment of the Force. However, when they are not provided, communication planners can use resources such as Presidential speeches, USG agency statements, and other vetted material. There are specific resources that focus on communication in emergent events, which can be used early in the planning effort:

(1) The DOS INFOCENTRAL website (<https://infocentral.state.gov>) serves as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, talking points, research, analysis, and other products for use by interagency partners at all levels. Also available on INFOCENTRAL is the DOS Counterterrorism Communications Alert, which reviews media treatment of terrorist actions, messages, and efforts to counter them.

(2) Within the DOS PA, the DOS rapid response unit (RRU) addresses high-profile, urgent issues by providing approved strategic-level statements by senior US officials. RRU products can be accessed through the INFOCENTRAL website, under the Public Diplomacy link.

(3) Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center (<https://www.opensource.gov>) provides media reports and broadcasts from specific countries and regions.

b. Another method of confirming USG strategic narrative and themes, and ensuring a coherent consistent communication effort at the operational level across USG agencies during a US operation could include standing up a JIIC. This center could include representatives from across the interagency and other stakeholders in the OA, such as the UN, NGOs, and HN. An example where this worked well was during the crisis response FHA mission, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti, in support of earthquake relief efforts. Figure II-2, page II-10, outlines the participants, interaction, and benefits of the JIIC.

c. The Defense Press Office (DPO) can also provide assistance in obtaining relevant strategic guidance. The DPO routinely works with the NSS and the interagency in coordinating DOD communications. The DPO can be reached commercially at (703) 697-5131/5132 or, Defense Switched Network [DSN] 227-5131/5132. The DPO duty officer can be reached after hours at (703) 678-6162.

6. Research and Understanding the Operational Environment

a. An important first step is conducting sufficient research to understand the culture, language, dialect, means of communication, historical, social, religious, economic storylines, group dynamics, issues, grievances, world view, and other factors that resonate and affect how various publics get information, influence others, and are influenced. Some resources include intelligence products, MISO studies, special operations forces area studies, Red Team products, USG sources such as the DOS country books, other open-source material, anthropological and sociological studies, US academic blogs, local in-country academic blogs, and US and international think tanks. These resources can provide profiles of the salient features of a country or its people; analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assessment of attitudes; identified vulnerabilities; and suggested ways and means to influence people. Careful consideration of what we say and do, and what that communicates to key publics, is fundamental. Academic sources of information such as existing field work from anthropology, linguistics, archeology, sociology, political science, history, and social psychology can help protect against bias, misperceptions, or misrepresentation.

“History has taught us that most insurgent fighters are men. But, in traditional societies, women are extremely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermines the insurgents. To do this effectively requires your own female counterinsurgents.”

David J. Kilcullen
Twenty-Eight Articles

b. The JFC should understand the cognitive dimension is complex, adaptive, and more difficult to understand than closed systems. This is a complex undertaking, complicated by factors such as the public’s preexisting bias, cultural lens, stimulus response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of the current situation. **Adding to the staff or utilizing reachback to SMEs that understand these factors can significantly help analysts and planners.** Examples of such expertise include the following:

- (1) Anthropology or sociology (understanding the local culture).
- (2) Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/interest in the local population and venues for communication).

(3) Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communication processes and products, translation of specific messages, and themes/messages to avoid).

(4) Local and regional communication expertise (understanding the means, methods, relative impact of local and regional communication).

(5) Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts).

(6) US embassy/DOS/United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expertise (understanding local coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy).

(7) Religious affairs expertise (may advise on various religious dynamics within the OA; or on occasion, may also be tasked with accomplishing certain liaison functions, particularly with indigenous religious leaders and faith-based NGOs operating in the OA).

c. **Cognitive factors can vary significantly between locality, cultures, and operational circumstances.** The CCS ways and means that worked in one situation might not work in another.

d. Planners can use a map of the human environment distilled from PMESII analysis and communication-relevant JIPOE analysis of information, political, or social systems to develop understanding of the OE. Additional information could include cultural studies, individual perceptions of the situation, motivations, expectations, and attitudes derived from polling data, focus groups, interviews/discussions with key leaders, and observed behavior. This helps identify perceptions, attitudes, or behavior that the commander desires to change, and help communication capability planners to tailor messages, actions, and images more effectively. Finally, results of communication-related activities can be depicted on the map to begin to determine what messages and actions resonated with which publics in specific locations.

For more information on understanding the OE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. **Communication synchronization to support Phase 0 activities is continuous and should not be a separate or additional process.** It should identify actions to facilitate communication as part of the JOPP (such as research and analysis). Overarching communication guidance should be provided through the TCP and initiating directives for contingencies. The *Decade of War* study cites some lessons learned in understanding the OE, impacts, and potential solutions.

LESSON LEARNED CONCERNING ACCURATELY DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Observation:

Failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals

Why it Happened:

—US civil and military approaches did not reflect the actual operational environment

—Strategic guidance and military plans did not adjust to the challenges encountered when conditions on the ground deviated from optimistic planning assumptions

—Intelligence collection and analysis focused on traditional adversary information and actions

—There was a lack of understanding and a failure to prioritize collection of essential elements of information (e.g., cultural, religious, and societal factors)

—Flawed assumptions and planning led to shortfalls in forces and specific capabilities that impacted the ability to counter insurgencies, develop host-nation security forces, and build foreign civil capacity

—Innovative, non-traditional organizations and means were required to overcome the lack of preparation for environments other than major combat

—Effectiveness required the fusion of operations and intelligence at all echelons

Way Ahead:

—Plan Comprehensively. Conduct, refine, and update campaign planning, applying operational design that reflects an understanding of the environment, describes the problem, and outlines an approach to accomplishing strategic objectives

—Improve assessments. Educate leaders on the importance of conducting assessments based on information, intelligence, and insights drawn from a wide variety of sources (KLEs, interagency SMEs, academia/think-tanks, battlefield circulation, etc.)

—Develop future requirements. Develop a strategy for best meeting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and information requirements for military forces given the increasing decentralized and joint nature of operations

—Promote fusion. Pursue policies and IT [information technology] solutions to promote information fusion in support of operations and reduce compartmentalization/stove-piping of intelligence and information across the interagency and among partner nations

—Improve ISR support to operations. Increase access to expeditionary ISR platforms and improve training of personnel on available ISR capabilities to operations

—Improve language and cultural literacy. Expand and incentivize language and cultural training across the force

—Revisit classification policies. Re-examine classification policies to preserve necessary OPSEC but reduce unnecessary classification of information to promote information sharing and common understanding of the operational environment

—Build relationships. Bring in experts from all backgrounds—military, other interagency, NGOs, think-tanks, academia, and private sector—and leverage their insights and expertise to inform and tailor approaches

—Leverage forward presence. Cultivate and leverage relationships and expertise on the operating environment that result from the forward presence of military and other interagency elements

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f. The assessment portion of the planning and execution cycle drives follow-on planning and J-35. Assessment measures the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment and the achievement of the military end state. From a communication standpoint, **assessment involves the identification, measurement, and evaluation of those things the commander may not be able to control, but can influence through a successful communication synchronization approach that is well-integrated into the planning process.** This often means, to synchronize our communication, we need to look at the information environment and periodically assess the communication efforts of others that may be affecting our own mission accomplishment. Assessing the communication efforts of others can prevent designing complex, but ultimately unnecessary or even counter-productive, communication efforts of our own. To counter competing communication, sometimes the best action may be to take no action. This may be because the communication efforts of others are ineffective by themselves, or that third parties may be countering those efforts. Even if no action is taken, assessment of others' communication efforts continues because the assessment may become important at a later date.

ASSESSMENT—SAVING COUNTER-MESSAGING EFFORTS

Shortly after the start of the “Arab Spring”, Farsi-language bloggers began claiming the Arab Spring was the natural outgrowth of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Director of the CENTCOM Communication Integration (CCCI) Directorate was told to develop a counter narrative emphasizing that the Arab Spring was more in keeping with Persian ideals of Cyrus the Great than of the 1979 Revolution and the Ayatollahs.

While CCCI planners began developing the counter narrative, members of the CCCI’s Digital Engagement Team (DET) began assessing the Farsi-language bloggers’ messaging effectiveness. The DET members saw that Farsi blogging communities quickly ridiculed any attempt to claim Iranian credit for the Arab Spring, no matter the discussion forum. Simultaneously, CCCI planners held discussions with Open Source members of the J2 community, members of the other Information Related Capabilities such as IO, and other cultural experts to discuss the likely effectiveness of CENTCOM involvement in these discussions. This was critical to understand as all DET social media engagements are openly attributable to CENTCOM. After several discussions, the participants felt that CENTCOM’s involvement might actually be counterproductive. The team felt that CENTCOM involvement could likely direct the conversation into tangents concerning Persian history or other topics. This would deflect the focus from the fallacy of the original Farsi blogger claims.

Although well prepared to conduct the counter narrative, CCCI’s early assessment of the Farsi-language messaging effectiveness helped CENTCOM understand that the ridicule of the Farsi blogging communities more effectively defeated the original narrative than any counter narrative might have. The DET continued to monitor the information environment for any change in the effectiveness of the Farsi language bloggers. The assessment and key staff member discussions saved CENTCOM time and effort and this is a good example of how early and effective assessment can prevent wasted or counterproductive communication efforts.

Various Sources

g. Solid assessment, coordinating across the staff, and anticipating the impact of our own efforts is critical to achieving true communication synchronization. Assessment tools and techniques can include perception and polling research, engagements, partnerships, behavioral analysis, content and data analysis, and other more technical means focused on the information environment.

7. Legal Considerations

a. **Employing all available communication capabilities may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review.** Beyond strict compliance with legalities, US MIS activities are conducted as a matter of policy based on respect for fundamental human rights. US forces, whether operating physically from bases or locations overseas or from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, are required by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the law of war. **Individual communication capabilities may operate under much different authorities and care must be taken in synchronization of capabilities to not put individual capabilities in**

a position to violate any individual authority. For example, IO can utilize capabilities that can assume false personas on social media sites to influence conversations, while PA cannot. Similarly, a JFC may have authority to conduct a missile strike, but the communication capabilities may not have authority to talk about it.

b. During initial planning, communication activities should be coordinated across the joint force and with other USG departments and agencies, as necessary. Authorities to plan, integrate, approve, and disseminate appropriate information and imagery should be clearly established. Legal considerations regarding release of information on investigations in the joint operations area (including those regarding alleged law of war violations) should be addressed in the public affairs guidance (PAG) and included in the plan or order's Annexes F and Y. Planners should understand, in any stage of an operation, the DOD may not be the lead agency and, therefore, may be subject to additional legal limits, which may also affect communication activities.

8. Communication Methods

a. **A direct dialogue with key publics, with an initial emphasis on listening to gain perspective, desires, and expectations is essential.** This engagement, if executed properly, may align the perception with the reality that we respect them and care about their needs. Careful consideration of what we say and do, and what that communicates to key publics, is fundamental.

b. A variety of communication methods are available to convey words and images to intended publics. These include earned media, owned media, and through interpersonal communication. *Earned media* is the media coverage resulting from interactions with the news media that results in stories broadcast on the radio or television, printed in newspapers, distributed through wire services, and posted on Internet websites or blogs in a one-to-many fashion. *Owned media* results from the DOD sharing its message directly to the public through media it owns, including websites, presences on social media platforms, broadcasts, leaflets, etc. in a one-to-many fashion. *Interpersonal communication* occurs person to person, via word of mouth, in person or via technology such as text messaging enabled by mobile phones, or real-time Internet chat enabled by computers and network connectivity. Interpersonal communication normally contains personal dialogue and nonverbal communication, which often makes it one of the most powerful means of communicating because it conveys trust, along with a sense of mutual concern and sharing.

c. One best practice used by the United Service Organizations (USO) to assist their personnel in communicating more effectively during interviews or public engagements is a "message map." The message map is a graphic which provides the organizational narrative in the center, key themes branching out, then specific messages and facts supporting and branching out further from the themes. It provides a quick reference to speak, discuss, and answer questions about who they are, what they are currently doing, how they do it, why, and specific facts to support the messaging. The USO message map, provided in Appendix C, "Message Maps," could be adapted for joint force use. As

an example, two very basic message maps are also provided in Appendix C for two separate missions: FHA and COIN.

d. One of the consequences of not synchronizing operations, actions, words, and images is **we often inadvertently create a mismatch between what we say and do, commonly called the “say-do gap.”** This gap causes a loss of credibility and trust, and gives the adversary unnecessary opportunities to undermine our themes and narrative. The joint force should be diligent in assessing and identifying any say-do gaps and closing them as quickly as possible.

SAY-DO GAP EXAMPLE: ABU GHRAIB

“Senator Joe Biden, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee and a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq, characterized the revelations of abuse as the single most significant blow to U.S. prestige in the Arab world over the past decade. Anthony Cordesman, the widely respected defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies was equally forthright: ‘Those Americans who mistreated the prisoners may not have realized it, but they acted in the direct interests of al-Qaeda, the insurgents, and the enemies of the U.S.,’ he said. The reason is that they came at a point when U.S. standing in the Arab world was already at an all-time low. Says Cordesman, ‘These negative images validate all other negative images and interact with them.’ In other words, they function as a multiplier by providing photographic ‘proof’ of the demonic picture of the U.S. painted by anti-American propagandists.

Like a well-targeted attack-ad in a U.S. election campaign, the Abu Ghraib images make a visceral connection with an Arab audience, that no amount of contextualizing, apologies, reprimands or school-painting can reverse. No ad agency could have produced a more effective al-Qaeda recruitment tool: Bin Laden's movement presents its goal as the redemption of Muslim honor which has been ‘prostituted’ before the West by ‘apostate’ pro-U.S. regimes. Scenes of graphic humiliation of Muslims by American soldiers—women mocking the genitalia of naked men—will reinforce the appeal among the shamed young men of the Arab world of the extremists' message that violence against America as the path of Muslim redemption. And it's worth noting that even before the pictures—and the fighting at Fallujah—some 52 percent of Iraqis told Gallup's pollsters that attacks on U.S. forces could sometimes be justified.”

***How the Prison Scandal
Sabotages the U.S. in Iraq
Time World
May 04, 2004***

APPENDIX A VISUAL INFORMATION PLANNING

VI is often overlooked as a determining factor in opinion-making. Often, the JFC and other staff sections sense the need to ensure many operational personnel are deployed early in a crisis, not understanding the power of still and motion imagery to affect public first impressions. For this reason, it is critical to ensure imagery personnel are “first responders” to any initial situation. VI requirements need to be understood by joint force planners and the JFC needs to address VI as part of the initial intent and planning guidance. Requirements for imagery should also be identified as part of the communication synchronization. VI is very important to many aspects of operations, from determining which elements of a target system to attack, to finding where crowds are gathering to hear a local hero and determine if any of the suggestions are implemented. Planning for the use of VI capabilities in operations need to address the following topics: requirements, coordination, preparation, transmission, management, and release. COMCAM and VI planners can help in defining VI requirements, masking, drafting RFFs, establishing release authority, determining best transmission methods, and potential usage. Other publications can be useful in providing specific guidance on requesting service and planning considerations. For example, CJCSI 3205.01C, *Joint Combat Camera*, contains planning considerations and procedures to request COMCAM services. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, contains guidance on how to request various intelligence products and plan for collection requirements, analysis, and use.

1. Requirements

Specific requirement details on the type of imagery needed can help drive the RFF, based on the capabilities needed to provide specific kinds of imagery. If there is a requirement for VI by unit type code already established in deliberate plans (when appropriate) using TPFDD, it will assist deployment planning and facilitate movement during plan execution. Requirements for imagery should be identified early in the planning process.

a. **Specific Requirements.** Identify the imagery needed to support messages outlined in the CCS by asking the following questions: What is the command mission? What are the key themes and messages for the operation/exercise? What images can best communicate those messages visually? How will the images be used?

b. Contact Defense Media Activity’s Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (DIMOC) Imagery Operations and Coordination Center for assistance, which may include:

- (1) Writing VI-related requirements and guidance into appropriate annexes.
- (2) Reachback capability for JFCs.
- (3) Locating and coordinating VI and JFC resources.
- (4) Transmission recommendations.

- (5) Coordination of strategic imagery requirements.
- (6) Establishment and management of the VI professional's database.

c. RFF Considerations. VI is a deployable force multiplier of which COMCAM is a specialized subset. The key is to focus on the requirement, which may include COMCAM, PA, and/or other support requirements, which should then drive the request for the right type of VI team. Realistic requests for COMCAM and VI professionals should be based on tactical, operational, and strategic requirements and coordinated to leverage the VI assets assigned.

2. Coordination

a. Proactive coordination between the requestor and DIMOC facilitates a clear understanding of VI requirements, assignment of optimum capabilities, and the process is expedited, as appropriate. The coordination is especially important when dealing with foreign VI assets and the need to hire civilian contractors. Establishing a proactive relationship with the DIMOC liaison officer assigned to the joint force can assist in these coordination tasks. It's important to establish visual information identification numbers (VISION IDs) for use for each product when using foreign assets and when dealing with contractors. VISION IDs should be based on the DOD VISION ID guidelines. DIMOC must have legal documentation stating the USG has unlimited rights to the contractor imagery before it can be submitted to DIMOC. Early coordination with the joint force COMCAM program officer can also help ensure the right VI assets are on the scene expeditiously during execution.

b. Preparation. The following preparation tasks can facilitate efficient execution:

- (1) Confirm assigned VI assets have contacted DIMOC regarding imagery requirements.
- (2) Test equipment and software to minimize any issues prior to the start of execution.
- (3) Annex F should provide clear direction regarding the imagery process once documentation begins, and clearly document imagery transmission procedures. Confirm the process and procedures are understood by VI assets.
- (4) The CCS and PAG should clearly define the process for release of imagery. Verify contact information for release authority and understanding by VI assets.
- (5) Confirm with the DIMOC and VI assets metadata requirements, VISION IDs, etc. are clearly established and understood.
- (6) The CCS and PAG should clearly articulate the themes being supported by VI requirements.

(7) Follow up once VI assets are in place and validate understanding of procedures by the photographers. Periodically check with the DIMOC to ensure expectations are being met.

c. **Transmission.** Working with the unit communications and information technology leadership/technicians will assist in establishing imagery transmission requirements. Planners need to answer two important questions: where the imagery will be sent and to whom. Also required are the time frame for distribution, priority level, and any special requirements. The DIMOC can assist and answer questions, via E-mail or through the webpage: www.defenseimagery.mil.

d. **Management and Release.** The PAG will include the designated release authority for imagery produced during the operation, normally the PAO. Release authorities conduct a thorough review of imagery prior to submitting or establishing higher standards for the review process prior to imagery reaching the release authority. Contact the release authority and coordinate as many details as possible (such as pre-staging caption information) prior to the release of imagery. Unmanned aerial vehicle and weapons system video (WSV) should also be factored into the CCS. Masking WSV is required and the element responsible should clearly be assigned. Hardware and software must be functioning on a secret platform to perform these tasks. The DIMOC is set up to handle classified imagery and imagery not for release, so commands can send all imagery to the DIMOC, released, not released, not reviewed, or classified. Contact the DIMOC directly for guidance on the best transmission means. To provide consistently high-quality VI, communication capability planners should include metrics and assessment methods. Assessment should include feedback from each event, after action reports, and capturing and sharing lessons learned.

e. The use of a template similar to Figure A-1, “Visual Information Planning Template Example,” will assist in production of well-planned VI. At the top of the form, important information about theater objectives, desired effects, and the intent of the operation are provided. The template also provides specific requirements, release authority, transmission means, assets, and assessment. Points of contact can also be included and used as feedback avenues for possible improvements.

f. **VI Planning Considerations.** A template and information, like the below example, can be used in a FRAGORD, PAG, annexes of an OPLAN, etc. Note COMCAM and VI assets can provide imagery for all the different lines of operation based on the requestor/customer requirements. Some of these planning considerations include anticipated use, classification, and specific skills required to obtain the imagery. Some examples:

(1) PA—imagery needed for public release to the media, posted on public websites, used in briefings, publications, etc.

(2) MISO—imagery generated for a foreign public, sometimes specifically targeting adversaries such as in handbills, leaflets, television, flyers, pamphlets, or websites.




Figure A-1. Visual Information Planning Template Example

(3) Special Operations—imagery that may be classified and photographers who would require special training and qualification in skills such as night photography, aerials, underwater, or combat.

(4) CA—imagery may include specialized requirements such as underwater photography (such as in disaster areas or when piers are destroyed by an earthquake).

COMCAM dive-qualified photographers can provide images to document damage and progress of repairs.

(5) J-2—imagery to support intelligence collection efforts.

g. Examples of imagery requirements:

(1) Imagery depicting more than one military Service or government organization working together.

(2) US military interacting with other agencies, such as USAID, UN forces, members of the international community, or NGOs.

(3) Deployment of military in support of the operation.

(4) US military engineer activity.

(5) US military deliveries of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief supplies.

(6) US military medical teams in action.

(7) US military forces providing direct assistance to the residents, local, and regional populations.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX B

NOTIONAL COMMANDER'S COMMUNICATION SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS MAP

1. Introduction

a. **The notional CCS process map shows a more deliberate way to leverage and support extant staff processes** to translate national communication goals and strategic objectives into an actionable communication effort for the JFC. In the process detailed below, communication is addressed in a more deliberate fashion in that specific audiences, publics, or individuals are selected for focused communication, resources are prioritized, effects are assessed, and results fed back into the “focused engagement” effort to confirm desired effects are created and undesired effects are mitigated.

b. **Commanders synchronize operations, actions, words, and images through coordinated communication capability activities to engage specific audiences, publics, and stakeholders, and coordinate joint force actions with other USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort.** Although communication activities are ongoing, support of the JOPP is used in this process map to demonstrate specific sequences of communication-related activities that may facilitate communication synchronization. Figure B-1, “Notional Commander’s Communication Synchronization Process Map,” depicts an overview of the process. Follow-on sections provide a more detailed description of activities that communication capabilities can use to develop the communication-related products, within extant staff processes, such as the JOPP and JIPOE. This appendix provides a way to conduct communication synchronization and preserve the integrity of national-level and DOD communication themes, and help provide unified action in concert with other instruments of national power.

2. Planning Initiation

a. **Communication synchronization should involve all communication capabilities and integrators (IO, PA, DSPD, CMO, MISO, KLE, etc.) and support the JOPP from the beginning.** This facilitates CCS integration throughout joint force planning and execution. The notional CCS process map is one way to outline communication synchronization and leverage extant staff processes, such as joint operation planning, collection, and assessment. These steps and tasks are the minimum requirements for focusing efforts, prioritizing resources, and synchronizing words and images with operations and actions across the force. Individual stages are broken out, with some detail provided about specific steps, tasks, flow of inputs and outputs, important products, key participants, and which entity may have primary responsibility for each step (in parenthesis). The dark thick arrow shows the commander’s decision-making critical path through normal staff processes, with diamond shapes showing decision points. The numbered irregular pentagons link actions from one stage to another. This notional process map helps depict the flow of communication synchronization in support of the JOPP. Figure B-2, “Planning Initiation,” outlines these steps for planning initiation, showing the commander’s decision-making critical path through the initiation of planning and identification of the theater engagement objectives.




Figure B-1. Notional Commander's Communication Synchronization Process Map

b. Strategic objectives originate from the National Security Staff and are passed through the DOD, typically by the USD(P) and the ASD(PA). These strategic objectives provide USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core themes under which the DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities.

c. At the highest level, the office of the President of the United States provides direction to the National Security Council and National Security Staff. Each agency provides input to and takes guidance from the National Security Staff and relays that guidance to their respective agencies. The individual agencies also conduct ongoing coordination between themselves. The OSD and JS provide guidance to the CCMDs for development of the TCP, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan contingency planning tasking, or a WARNORD that directs crisis action planning. These products trigger the first step, "Initiation," of the JOPP.

d. Typical CCS-related tasks to support initiation include:

- (1) Develop an initial understanding of the OE.




Figure B-2. Planning Initiation

(2) Review guidance: national strategic guidance, higher headquarters planning directive, initial JFC intent, etc.

(3) Review the current status of intelligence products that support communication synchronization and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation.

(4) Recommend initial CCS inputs for inclusion in the JFC initial planning guidance based upon current understanding of the OE, the problem, and the initial

communication synchronization approach for the campaign or operation. It could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, restate strategic themes and narrative, or recommend movement of key communication capabilities within the JFC's authority.

(5) Often, communication and engagement activities are required before, during, and after planning to shape the OE. Therefore, it is necessary to quickly identify immediate communication capability requirements and coordinate activities to create a coherent effort. The communication synchronization approach should be developed in enough time to provide useful input into the initial planning guidance.

3. Mission Analysis

a. Once the JFC initial planning guidance is issued, detailed mission analysis begins. Figure B-3, "Mission Analysis," outlines the process of developing the initial communication synchronization approach, from the JFC initial planning guidance through a board approval of key effects, objectives, audiences/publics/stakeholders, and themes that feed into the JFC planning guidance. In later stages, the communication synchronization approach continues to be refined, detailed, and becomes more comprehensive. This includes focused engagement, continuous efforts to "get the truth out" concerning specific events or operations, and actions to generally inform and educate national and international audiences and publics. Communication synchronization requires the inputs of all communication capabilities and the CCSWG to combine disparate communication capability inputs into an integrated effective coherent communication effort. The process map does concentrate primarily on communication activities in support of the JOPP. However, continuous efforts to inform and educate various audiences should not be overlooked and should be addressed in the communication synchronization effort, as well.

b. Communication capability representatives' support to mission analysis is critical, because all operations deal, to some degree, with conflict in the cognitive dimension of the information environment. In IW, being seen as legitimate and gaining influence with the local population is the center of gravity (COG), making this battle in the cognitive dimension the main effort. Communication capability input could include providing an understanding of communication means within the OE, cultural and historical communication patterns and sense-making, key themes that resonate, sensitive issues, key influencers, extant narratives, stresses, opportunities, means of dialogue, and feedback.

c. Conducting initial staff estimates precludes pursuit of an inappropriate or unrealistic approach. Once the operational approach is approved, mission analysis continues and communication-related support should include a general review to determine entities that will need to be leveraged, engaged, or influenced. This preliminary work may involve all of the communication capabilities, intelligence, the political advisor, chaplain, and others, as appropriate.




Figure B-3. Mission Analysis

d. The CCSWG should provide a venue for coordinating inputs on key segments, nodes, and individuals within the public; identify stand-alone nodes and relationships between nodes, and the audience/public, and the highly-influential individual or public. Mass markets that cut across large segments of the society and the OE should also be identified. Likewise, which mass media directly accesses each of the markets should be distinguished.

Social and cultural factors should be considered in all communication and action. Questions that may need to be answered may include:

(1) Who are the key stakeholders and publics affecting the mission success? What are their interests, motivations, fears, biases, and attitudes? How do they acquire and process information and make decisions?

(2) What are other stakeholder's interests, objectives, level of influence with the key audiences/publics, capabilities, and current activities?

(3) What communication capabilities are available for this operation or already operate in the OA?

(4) How does the joint force collect in-depth information on the perceptions, attitudes, motivations, and behavior of a variety of stakeholders/publics with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds?

(5) Has the joint force oriented the intelligence capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate human environment information?

(6) How does the joint force identify and analyze who else (other than the adversary) is communicating with designated stakeholders/publics—what they are communicating, why, intent, methods, capabilities, etc.?

(7) Who are the key leaders, SMEs, most credible sources, and why?

(8) What are the constraints, restraints, and barriers that affect CCS?

(9) How does the joint force perform and integrate CCS in a comprehensive process to seize and maintain the initiative?

(10) How does the joint force plan, reach back to, and execute CCS with various USG departments and agencies, organizations, and partners?

(11) How does the joint force synchronize lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts?

(12) How does the joint force anticipate and preempt competitor/adversary communication actions?

e. Significant stakeholder/public segments are identified that may impact stakeholder/public reception, methodology, or resonance. This includes significant sub-groups or differences among various parts that should be taken into consideration, such as political faction, religion, tribe, etc. Based on the segmentation, general techniques are recommended to reach those segments. Broad capabilities are then identified that can leverage extant means or access potentially new conduits.

f. This information and proposals are distilled, coordinated, and synchronized. Foremost of these would be the desired overarching effects and objectives that would

support the approved operational approach. The recommended general publics/nodes should be prioritized and proposed capabilities/actions considered, such as PA, MISO, CMO, or KLE. These WG efforts result in the development of the initial communication synchronization approach, which is presented to a board for approval, if required. If the board disapproves the proposal, the project goes back to analysis of publics and starts over; responding to the guidance the board has given. If approved, the CCS lead presents the input to the commander for inclusion of appropriate content into the JFC's planning guidance, which drives the remainder of the JOPP.

g. Typical CCS-related tasks to support mission analysis include:

(1) Review understanding of the communication aspects of the OE, problem, operational approach, and cognitive dimension of the information environment.

(2) Analyze national strategic guidance, national communication activities, higher headquarters planning directive, initial JFC intent, etc.

(3) Identify communication-related issues within specified, implied, and essential tasks.

(4) Identify facts, assumptions, and operational limitations that impact the communication synchronization approach.

(5) Provide input to JFC operational objectives, effects, assessment measures, and mission success criteria.

(6) Develop risk assessment.

(7) Identify intelligence requirements to support communication planning, including commander's critical information requirements.

(8) Include communication-related concerns in JIPOE analysis, such as the information environment, communications conduits, key leaders, impact of the information environment on military operations, etc.

(9) Recommend key themes be included in the JFC's updated intent statement and planning guidance, and propose other appropriate communication-related text, as required.

(10) Understand communication philosophy from commander's intent:

(a) Restrictive and risk averse: nobody communicates unless authorized, reviewed, and absolutely correct.

(b) Agile, responsive, but higher risk: everyone informed and authorized to communicate, because speed and broad continuous engagement are very important.

(c) Something in-between.

(11) Engage and integrate other stakeholders in planning, such as other USG departments and agencies.

4. Intelligence Support Requirements

a. Communication synchronization may require some unique intelligence support, such as the current state of the information environment, local communication means and methods, trusted sources, key influencers, established cognitive patterns, cultural norms, perspectives, historical narrative, system of opposition, adversary, and HN communication capabilities. Ongoing intelligence support is critical to normal staff processes and the communication synchronization effort. Knowledge, such as information on taboos, traditions, venerated figures, myths, and current attitudes, can assist in communication product development, as well as developing assessment criteria for MOEs. Each command should evaluate its assigned missions and OAs and identify specific intelligence needs to facilitate the collection of intelligence to enable relevant intelligence products. Development of communication-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan, with specific collection requirements to exploit available sources and techniques. Experience in the field has shown having an experienced communication capability SME assisting the J-2 in initial data analysis can facilitate focused intelligence collection and analysis efforts.

b. JIPOE. Communication capability planners ensure JIPOE-based analysis and assessment support CCS efforts. Direct liaison with the J-2 before and throughout the JIPOE process will facilitate the quality of the JIPOE product or products. JIPOE products should include the cognitive dimension, populace, leadership, and the impact of the information environment on military operations. Examples of JIPOE products include the impact of the information environment on military operations, Figure B-4, “Analysis of Communication in the Information Environment,” and the combined information overlay, Figure B-5, “Combined Information Overlay,” below.

(1) The Cognitive Dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, group cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors may affect cognition. The analysis of the cognitive dimension of the people within the OA is a two-step process that:

(a) Identifies and assesses human characteristics that may have an impact on the behavior of the populace as a whole, the military forces, and senior military and civil leaders.

(b) Evaluates the influence these human characteristics have on military operations.




Figure B-4. Analysis of Communication in the Information Environment

(2) The Populace. JIPOE populace products should consider civilian, government, and military populations, especially in countries where government/military institutions may have an adversarial or oppressive relationship with all or portions of the civil populace. The degree to which the attitudes, beliefs, and backgrounds of the government/military forces either reflect or conflict with core values held by the populace as a whole is extremely important. Additional significant factors to consider include population segments patterns, living conditions, ethnic conflicts and rivalries, languages and dialects, cultural and class distinctions, political attitudes, religious beliefs, education levels, and any existing or potential refugee situations.




Figure B-5. Combined Information Overlay

(3) **The Leadership.** Biographical background data on key adversary, military, and political leaders, both ruling and opposition, should be compiled. This data should include information regarding the leader’s ethnic, class, and family background; education, experience, and training; and core beliefs and values. Character trait data such as a leader’s core beliefs and values, perceptual biases, and decision making style should be combined with a historical track record of that leader’s past decisions. Such information may be used to construct a psychological profile for the leader that may assist in predicting how that leader may respond in a given situation. Depending on the amount of data available, it may be possible to construct a psychological profile for the leadership as a whole, as well as for specific individuals. CCS interaction may be able to encourage development of similar

information for other non-adversary key leaders in the OA. This information could be very beneficial to KLE efforts. Post-engagement debrief and entering data into a database is critical to keeping this information current. This information can be also useful in developing key nodes in mapping the human environment.

(4) The Impact of the Information Environment on Military Operations. The impact of the information environment should be analyzed to consider how significant characteristics affect friendly, neutral, and adversary capabilities and broad courses of action (COAs). Significant characteristics, further analyzed within the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions, can be graphically represented on a combined information overlay as it relates to communication efforts.

c. Intelligence Support

(1) CCS has two specific properties that directly affect the gathering of supporting intelligence information. The first is communication synchronization combines operations, actions, words, and images to influence key stakeholders/publics; and secondly, cultural understanding and knowledge of the key local influencers within the OA are essential. These two properties require a great deal of study, knowledge of the area of interest, and understanding of key influencers and groups. Determining key influencers can be a major undertaking. It requires a thorough understanding of multiple dynamic systems and dependencies, which may or may not be more influential, and how they are intertwined.

(2) Intelligence support requirements for communication synchronization typically fall into three basic categories, which align with the dimensions of the information environment: physical, informational, and cognitive.

(a) Physical aspects of competitor's communications means is important for understanding their physical means of communication, communication capabilities, infrastructure, vulnerabilities, planning, decision making, execution process, feedback, and information sources. This information helps communication capability planners include ways to exploit, co-opt, or diminish competitor's effectiveness in the information environment.

(b) Informational properties may be electronic or human-to-human or a combination of both. They describe the formal and informal communications infrastructure and networks, kinship and descent relationships, licit and illicit commercial relationships, and social affiliations and contacts that collectively create, process, manipulate, transmit, and share information in an OA and among different groups. Some intelligence support requirements include the need for mapping the networks of human-to-human contact used for the transmission of information, social and commercial networks that process and share information, and influence, content, and context. This enables communication capability planners to understand adversary processes, co-opt those established means/methods (as appropriate), and disrupt adversary efforts.

(c) Cognitive properties of the information environment are the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence the interpretation of

information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization. Intelligence support to determine cognitive properties may include:

1. Cultural and societal factors affecting attitudes, perceptions, and behavior such as language, education, social norms, history, religion, law, myths, personal experience, and family structure.

2. Identity of key individuals and groups affecting attitudes, perceptions, and behavior, whether in the same or a different country as those they influence.

3. Identity and psychological profile of key decision makers, their advisors, key associates, and/or family members who influence them.

4. Credibility of key individuals or groups and specification of their sphere of influence.

5. Laws, regulations, and procedures relevant to information and decision making, decision making processes, capability employment doctrine, timeliness, and information content.

6. How leaders think, perceive, plan, execute, and assess outcomes of their results and actions from their perspectives.

7. Identify key historical events between the country of interest and the US, which may affect an individual or groups attitudes and perceptions of the US, whether in the same or different country as those they influence. For example, media coverage and HN government narrative on the US involvement in the Palestinian situation often affects Middle Eastern perceptions of America.

(3) Intelligence Considerations in Communication Synchronization

(a) Information Environment Impact on Intelligence Support. The nature of the information environment has profound implications for intelligence support to the CCS. Members of the operational community and the intelligence community (IC) should understand these implications to efficiently request and provide quality intelligence support to the CCS. These implications include:

1. Intelligence Resources are Limited. Commanders and their intelligence and operations directorates should work together to identify intelligence requirements to support communication and ensure they are properly prioritized to receive the appropriate level of resourcing.

2. Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The nature of the information environment complicates compliance with legal constraints and restraints. The IC implements technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally, intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or other sources. Especially in the area of cyberspace operations (CO), where

the application of domestic and international laws may be complex, close coordination among the operational, legal, and law enforcement communities is essential.

3. Intelligence to Support CCS Often Requires Long Lead Times. The intelligence on adversary, intended stakeholders/publics, or networks often requires specific sources and methods be positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conduct analyses required for communication product development. Commanders and their staffs should be aware of the relative lead times required to develop different types of intelligence, both for initial planning and for feedback during operations. To deal with these long lead times, the commander should provide detailed initial guidance to the staff during mission analysis and planners should submit requests for information as soon as possible.

4. The Information Environment is Dynamic. The information environment changes over time according to different factors. Changes in the physical dimension may occur more slowly and may be easier to detect than in the informational or cognitive dimensions. Commanders and their staffs should understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentials for change in the dimensions of the information environment. The implication is we should have agile intellects, intelligence systems, and organizational processes to operate effectively in this dynamic environment.

5. Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence. Collection of physical and electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity. While identification of key individuals and groups of interest may be a relatively straightforward challenge, the relative importance of various individuals and groups, their psychological profiles, and how they interact is not easily agreed upon nor quantified. Commanders and their staffs should have an appreciation for the subjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature. They should also continue to pursue effective means of trying to measure subjective elements using MOEs and other applicable techniques.

(b) Coordination of CCS with Intelligence. Coordination should occur among intelligence, targeting, communication, and collection management personnel. The CCS should support and be supported by operations. During operations using both lethal and nonlethal capabilities, the requirement for accurate intelligence gain/loss and political/military assessments, when determining entities to engage and means of employment, is central to communication synchronization. Likewise, the use of nonlethal capabilities to influence key individuals and groups should be well-coordinated with other activities, including the use of lethal capabilities.

(c) Local Perceptions and Sociocultural Analysis. Sociocultural analysis, in conjunction with an understanding of the cultural environment, is important in avoiding projection of US cultural bias on intended stakeholders/publics (mirror imaging). Intelligence resources contribute to assessing local populations through human factors analysis, influence net modeling, foreign media analysis, media mapping, polling/focus group analysis, and analysis of key communicators/sources of influence. This is, for the

most part, open-source intelligence and should be interpreted and synthesized by country/cultural intelligence SMEs.

(4) Intelligence support products will vary depending upon the situation, mission, and OE. Some open-source examples are included in Figure B-6, “Open Source Information Sources,” for planning consideration.

5. Course of Action Development

a. **Representation from the CCSWG should participate in OPTs, to deliver the consolidated communication concerns on relevant planning issues.** Figure B-7, “Planning,” briefly outlines the JOPP, key CCS-support requirements, and the actions immediately following. COA development starts with the military end state, found in the commander’s intent, developed during mission analysis. The CCS representative needs to ensure, for each COA, communication-related factors are identified, such as communication-related effects, objectives, COGs, critical factors, desired effects, undesired effects and assessment measures. Likewise, the major themes for the operation need to be included to support the objectives and overarching narrative. The CCS representative can provide these from the communication synchronization guidance and previously-developed analysis of audiences, publics, and stakeholders.

(1) **To work most effectively and efficiently, the highly-influential individuals/publics should be identified.** This does not mean broader audiences are ignored; ongoing general actions are still taken to inform and educate them, such as PA broadcast and international media engagements. However, highly-influential individuals/publics are specifically identified for focused engagement. During this




Figure B-6. Open-Source Information Sources

investigation, the critical factors (capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities) for each COG should be reviewed and how influencing each particular public assists in affecting the COG(s). Some of the preliminary work of public and key leader/node identification should have been done in the previous stages; now it is time to determine details of how they will be important in creating effects, affecting the COG, and achieving JFC objectives. A more thorough examination of the public will reveal key links/nodes that exist in the population and points of entry that will facilitate communication. Many of these key nodes may be points of dialogue to gain immediate feedback (e.g., verify effects of messages/themes/operations/actions), more rapidly develop an understanding of dynamic situations, and more quickly adapt to the changing environment.

(2) After the highly-influential individuals/publics have been identified, the major themes are refined. The themes should also be a significant consideration in




Figure B-7. Planning

determining actions during COA development, to ensure operations, actions, words, and images are synchronized.

(3) Communication capability planners should determine undesired effects to determine acceptable risk and alternate COAs, if required. This requires a thorough understanding of the stakeholder/public. Collaboration with interagency and other partners (i.e., ambassador, country team, NGOs, IGOs, and other stakeholders), who have been immersed in the culture and interacting with the stakeholders/publics for some time, can greatly improve our understanding. An understanding of the culture will help minimize joint force actions that may be contrary to deeply held social and cultural mores. This is an area of high risk, especially in the early phases of an operation, where understanding of the local stakeholder/public and culture may be lacking.

(4) In order to determine if we are doing things right, as well as doing the right things, MOPs and MOEs should be developed. These measures are crafted while developing desired/undesired effects. This is to ensure chosen effects (or conditions) are measurable. Crafting of accurate MOEs and MOPs during COA development are critical to the assessment process.

b. CCS-related tasks to support COA development include:

(1) Make recommendations, when appropriate, for making the battle in the cognitive dimension the main effort.

(2) Assist in analysis of highly-influential individual/stakeholder/public: who, interests, relationship to multinational force, history, perspective of the situation, and view of truth.

(3) Make recommendations for sequencing, synchronizing, and integrating communication synchronization within the developing COA; focus inputs on friendly, undecided, and adversary COG.

(4) Identify key communications focused on high-priority stakeholders/publics to create specific effects.

(5) As communication synchronization is incorporated into the COA and adjusted with ongoing development, avoid discernible communication/engagement patterns, timing, and tempo that can be exploited by the adversary.

(6) Provide input to the COA that visualizes the campaign in terms of the communication-related objectives, effects, themes, activities, and communication capabilities.

(7) As the COA is modified during development, adjust the communication synchronization effort as required to ensure the JFC's communication-related objectives and effects support those of the next higher command and other organizations, as necessary.

(8) Provide recommendations for organizational constructs and tentative task organizations that facilitate integration of themes, messages, images, operations, and actions.

(9) Integrate communication synchronization activities to optimize the deployment concept and rapidly employ communication capabilities.

(10) Confirm revision of the individual communication capability staff estimates.

6. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming

a. CCS representative participation in this process is very important, because analysis and wargaming should be realistic, manifest audience/stakeholder/public reactions, and include CCS concerns. Wargaming-generated outcomes often result in COA alterations, branches, and sequels. CCS representative participation should include, as a minimum:

(1) Provide expected audience/stakeholder/public perceptions, responses, and effects caused by significant events in each COA.

(2) As wargaming progresses, identify unexpected, highly-influential stakeholder/public/nodes for communication capability engagement or leverage.

(3) Confirm refinement of individual communication capability risk assessments.

(4) Identify potential decision points for key communication activities, shifts required in the communication synchronization effort, focused messaging, or engagement to support specific lines of effort.

(5) Provide input for potential branches and sequels, based on key stakeholder/public perspectives, probable reactions, and effects.

(6) Provide input to COA refinement to better support objects and effects through themes, messages, media engagement, KLE, and other communication-related activities.

(7) Confirm revision of the individual communication capability staff estimates:

(a) Identify how the COA mitigates risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level, such as inconsistent communication and the ability to get the messages out faster than the adversary.

(b) Identify how the COA places the force in the best posture for J-35, such as the impact on strategic themes, theater strategic themes, and narrative.

(c) Identify how the COA provides the maximum latitude for initiative of subordinates in communication and engagement.

(8) Provide data for use in synchronization matrices.

b. Some considerations for COA analysis and wargaming include:

(1) Does the plan include creation of sufficient assessment and feedback mechanisms? Is there a process in place to confirm creation of desired effects before moving on to a different public or message? Are MOPs and MOEs relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced?

(2) Are current authorities sufficient, and how can we get more if needed?

(3) Does the plan include a continuous engagement program with specific key publics? Is written and oral conversation maximized?

(4) How will the joint force conduct culturally reliable translation? Will this be sufficient to meet demand?

(5) How will the joint force train personnel to a working proficiency in important languages and cultural norms?

(6) How will the joint force exploit unplanned physical and other engagement opportunities with key individuals/publics?

(7) What publics behaviors is the joint force and partners planning to reinforce, change, or eliminate?

(8) Are delivery means, timing, and tempo optimized to influence important publics?

(9) Is the use of third-party advocates considered and utilized to the greatest extent possible?

(10) Are the numbers of themes and messages small enough to be realistically executable and assessable over a significant period? Three to four themes with around three supporting messages each are typically the upper limit.

7. Course of Action Comparison

The CCS representative should provide input to the COA comparison criteria, identification of advantages and disadvantages of each COA, and data for use in the COA selection decision matrix. Considerations include:

a. How effectively does the COA utilize operations and actions to send messages to purposefully influence key publics to create desired effects/outcomes and achieve objectives?

b. How effectively does the COA synchronize operations, actions, words, and images, to provide coherent and consistent communication?

c. Are all joint force communication capabilities employed when applicable?

d. Are operations conducted in a manner that considers cultural sensitivities?

e. Does the COA organizational construct facilitate development of a learning organization that continues to develop a deeper understanding of the environment, audiences, stakeholders, and publics during operations?

f. Does the COA maximize opportunities for dialogue with key leaders, audiences, stakeholders, and publics?

g. Does the COA focus on the friendly and adversary COG?

8. Course of Action Approval

Typical CCS actions to support COA approval include assisting in refinement of the selected COA and providing input for final acceptability check.

9. Plan or Order Development

a. CCS representatives need to ensure the communication synchronization guidance is outlined in the CONOPS, the main body, and detailed in Annex Y of the final OPLAN or OPORD. Prior work to identify significant audiences/stakeholders/publics in the OE can be captured by the CCS lead, supported, as needed, by the J-2. This information can help facilitate research and also serve as a tool to minimize duplication of effort by various communication capabilities.

b. The number of publics in the OE that require focused efforts to achieve the desired results typically exceeds the communication capability resources available. This becomes most apparent when considering effects in the cognitive dimension often take time to manifest in measurable ways, such as changes in perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. This requires communication capabilities to be focused against the highest priority publics to create required effects to support the plan. CCSWG coordination can help communication capabilities deconflict and focus limited resources on the highest priorities. Later, when the detailed JFC plan/order is issued and execution begins, communication capability assessment is conducted and the results are fed back into individual communication capability planning and communication synchronization refinement.

10. Planning During Execution, and Reporting

a. During execution, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping time frames: future plans, J-35, and current operations. The communication synchronization guidance should be developed in concert with, and in support of, the planning efforts of each planning timeframe. The J-5 planning efforts use the JOPP to develop their plans, which are passed to the J-3 for execution. As such, communication capabilities should support these planning timeframes and ensure the communication synchronization is properly integrated and executed. The tasks to support the JOPP directly apply to these planning efforts. However, there are a few unique considerations:

(1) J-5 Future Plans. Future plans focus on longer-term issues and conducting research and analysis in support of the long-term planning effort. A key input to this research and analysis is the feedback and assessment obtained during execution to help adjust the plans to meet the changing OE.

DEVELOPING AN ENDURING COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Some years ago some key members of the U.S. Northern Command's communication enterprise, appreciating the importance of a clear, foundational narrative, studied the command's tasks. From those tasks they developed, and subsequently had approved by the commander, what was referred to as "Most Valued Outcomes." Having identified these valued outcomes, a deliberate communication strategy was developed for each that would facilitate the integration of words and actions to support them. Systematic and deliberate communication planning ensured a nested narrative, outlined relevant themes, identified target audiences and partners, and even performance indicators. This proactive process provided a theater communication strategy for use in planning the command's actions from steady state theater security cooperation to crisis action. The work that went into analyzing the command's mission, identifying the most desired effects, through the lens of communication enabled it to become core. From the process, a viable strategic communication model evolved.

Various Sources

(2) J-3 J-35. Planning is often on a relatively shortened timeline (compared to the J-5), typically resulting in updating and finalizing details of a plan handed off from the J-5. CCS representatives should refine the communication synchronization effort to adapt to changes in the situation and OE. Special technical operations staff (Joint Cyberspace Centers for CCMD staffs) work with the J-3 and provide unique skills serving a vital role, as required. Significant changes should be coordinated with all communication capabilities to maintain a coherent effort.

OPERATIONAL PLANS WITH A COMMUNICATION FOCUS

In support of the command's overall communication and tactical objectives the command develops communication focused plans with a specific objective aimed at a specific event or audience. Once the need for a plan is identified, the strategic communication WG or similar WG develops a concept. The concept identifies the objectives, the audience, the time frame, and the event. The SCWG develops a narrative and supporting themes for the plan that are nested with the commander's overarching narrative. After the concept is developed and approved, it moves to the targeting WG for assignment of duties and responsibilities with IO, PA, POLAD/Public Diplomacy, CMO, operational elements, and any other staff section that can support the plan. The targeting WG takes the results of the meeting and prepares a fragmentary order for issuance. This type of plan may be used for specific events such as key leader engagements, mil-mil engagements, to conduct shaping events, or to achieve specific effects on the battle field.

Example: A major command identified the need for a plan to help keep civilians from leaving their homes and impacting maneuver during offensive operations. The plan developed included a clear objective, target audiences, potential messengers, and the narrative and themes for the plan. During the targeting meeting different staff sections identified actions they could take in support of the plan. PA conducted media operations; MISO conducted leaflet and other PSYOP operations with stay at home messages; the POLAD coordinated with USG entities for coordinated messaging and with other coalition government representatives for third party messaging; CMO planned for civilian relief operations and coordinated with NGOs and PVOs for the establishment of dislocated civilian camps away from the primary lines of communication; and the maneuver and fires elements established fire control measures to reduce the impact of combat operations on the civilian populace. The actions identified were published in a FRAGORD.

Various Sources

(3) J-3. Rapid response options are often required during execution, such as PA crisis communication in response to civilian casualties. Execution of standard operating procedures, pre-planned options, and rapid response is the norm, so previous effort spent determining communication-related undesired effects, their indicators, and mitigation efforts pays off here. Individual communication capabilities will normally respond to the event, so prior coordination and understanding of the communication synchronization approach should enable coherent messaging, operations, and actions.

RAPID SYNCHRONIZATION DURING EMERGENT EVENTS

Communication synchronization as a member of a staff often depends, as does much successful staff work, on the personal relationships staff members build before a crisis or other high-interest incident occurs. It is important that staff members across the communication capabilities discuss how they will work through these incidents before they occur. During an incident, access to senior leadership and full understanding of commander's intent are critical, but staff members must also realize that commander's intent may not be fully formed yet. Staff members should be prepared to bypass normal battle rhythm timelines and products in a time constrained environment. This does not preclude them from synchronizing their efforts with each other. In fact, most of the information environment will often form within 24-48 hours after a high-interest event occurs, drastically increasing both the necessity of synchronization across communication capabilities as well as the need for increased touch points with senior leaders, such as the commander or chief of staff. In addition, synchronization may also have to occur as part of a whole-of-government approach.

Example: The USCENTCOM staff realized that in the next few hours they would experience a high-interest event likely to gather international attention. The USCENTCOM Chief of Staff quickly issued guidance to the director of the USCENTCOM Communication Integration Directorate (CCCI) along with key staff from the Public Affairs, Information Operations, and Key Leader Engagement\Public Diplomacy sections. Within two hours, the staff

produced a one-page slide for the Chief of Staff showing the coordination of the various communication capabilities, both with their government counterparts and higher (White House, OSD, etc.) This document also laid out initial pre- and post-event themes, key audiences and actions to be taken during the first 48 hours after the event. The key to success however, was the successive touch points during those 48 hours between the Chief of Staff, the CCCI Director, and the various communication capability key staff members to ensure a continual flow of commander's guidance and staff assessments of the unfolding situation.

Various Sources

(4) CCS representatives should interface with those staff functions that will be leveraged to support the communication synchronization, such as intelligence and assessment. Because of the unique requirements in collecting information and assessing data that provides measures of outcomes from effects created in the cognitive dimension, CCS representatives may need to stay engaged with relevant staff sections until they are comfortable with providing the necessary support.

For a more detailed discussion of planning during execution, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. As plan revisions progress through these three planning timelines, communication-related information is also used to revise and finalize JFC plans and orders for JFC approval. Examples of directly-affected parts of the plan/order are shown in Figure B-8, "Plan Issue and Execution," which outlines the remaining CCS support to extant staff processes through execution.

c. CCS representatives on the OPTs need to ensure communication-related issues are addressed throughout detailed planning. Specifically, areas of primary interest should include the commander's intent statement; list of objectives, effects, and tasks to subordinates; scheme of maneuver (messages sent through operations and actions); KLE tasks/list/schedule; IO; CO; CA; and PA annexes; and Annex Y. Depending on the time frame and whether this is a crisis action plan, approval time for Annex Y development may be problematic. Therefore, early informal coordination across the communication capabilities is important for expediting the process.

d. Component (and other partner) planning is typically done in parallel and in concert with JFC planning efforts, the approved JFC plan/order is used to provide updates to the component (or other partner) plans.




Figure B-8. Plan Issue and Execution

e. Reporting. Useful reporting includes, not only completion of activities, but feedback to the assessment process. Individual communication capabilities have their own reporting processes. However, the combined results of individual communication capability actions can reveal unexpected insights. This collection of reporting and analysis is normally done by individual communication capabilities, but then may best be consolidated and integrated in the assessment cell, with support from a CCS representative. In this venue, individual assessments are compared with each other and to other operational outcomes, resulting in a consolidated campaign assessment.

11. Execution and Assessment

a. During execution, there is a cyclic iteration of stakeholders/publics selection, prioritization, and assessment. As assessment feeds back into planning, the effort is adjusted, executed, and reassessed. This continual cycle enables the joint force to adapt to changing conditions in the OE.

b. Publics Selection. Any of the staff sections, components, or other partners can nominate publics or key nodes for focused engagement. Figure B-9, “Audience Selection,” outlines this stage of the process down through inclusion on the nonlethal list for focused engagement. The most appropriate and effective means of delivery (input) may be shaped by physical access, traditional and trusted means of communication by the specific public, their receptivity, and desired engagement method (blanket, simultaneous, or viral). Communication planners should consider how the communication will propagate beyond the desired public, because the interconnected global information environment often picks up limited/discrete communications and multiplies their impact around the world.




Figure B-9. Public Selection

(1) Determining desired and undesired effects typically involves continuing refinement of the CONOPS/plan effects (outcomes or conditions) and objectives that can be supported by communication-related activity. Likewise, it involves reviewing CONOPS operations/activities that may need reinforcement or mitigation through communication-related means. However, these activities should not be considered in isolation, but should be viewed from a holistic perspective and the impacts they will make together. Most significant operations should have shaping communications preceding execution, focused communications during execution, and mitigation/shaping communications following. In IW, support of the local population is the COG, and communication activities may, in fact, be the main effort.

(2) Required Points of Entry. Because there are many places and situations to inject communication-related products or conduct engagement activities, the specific point of entry is important. If the entry is selected incorrectly, the product might never meet with the intended individual(s), or the engagement may not have the correct context. Likewise, if the stakeholder/public sees the product beyond the point of last usefulness, the engagement is conducted within an unfavorable context, or there is not enough time for the public/stakeholder to react in a desired manner, a negative result can be created. Creation of the desired effects may also require a specific combination of multiple entry points, such as the need to have simultaneous or sequential reinforcing inputs.

(3) If nomination of publics requires collection of additional information, the requirement can be added to the J-2 collection and exploitation requirements, and considered for the component prioritized collection list. Likewise, publics can be nominated for inclusion on other important lists, like the highly-influential node list, or for further detailed product development, as needed.

(4) The CCSWG can provide a venue for consolidating and reviewing desired effects to remove redundancy, combine multiple desired effects for the same public, eliminate conflicts, and help create a list of publics for recommended inclusion in the nonlethal targeting effort. Each of the nominated publics are then vetted and validated prior to inclusion in the nonlethal list for focused engagement.

c. Prioritization. Because nominations of publics/nodes for focused engagement typically exceed available resources, the difficult process of prioritization is now required. Figure B-10, "Prioritization," outlines the steps in prioritization.

(1) Engagement Selections and Solutions. The communication-related staff sections, components, and other partners review, not only the joint force CONOPS and communication synchronization, but their individual component scheme of maneuver, engagement actions, and other pertinent documents/schemes to select specific publics/nodes that require focused engagement to create desired effects during a finite period. During detailed plan development, this may include groupings of specific publics/nodes by phase. During execution, a precise period will be selected for the engagement cycle. Some prefer to run the cycle daily, some weekly or semiweekly, depending on the operation. These engagement selections should be tied directly and explicitly to creation of desired effects (or conditions) to achieve objectives in support of the plan. They should provide distinctive




Figure B-10. Prioritization

solutions to identified challenges. These selections are consolidated by the CCS lead into the engagement nomination list for nonlethal focused engagement.

(2) This prioritization affects not only engagements, but collection and assessment as well. As some selected publics/nodes may overlap or be leveraged for creation of multiple precise effects/conditions, this effort should include consolidation of proposals. The final outcome of the engagement prioritization process is a proposed joint prioritized engagement list (JPTEL). The lead provides the list to the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) for final adjustments of selections and the cut line.

(3) The JPTEL is then forwarded to the JFC for final approval. If there were significant disagreements from one of the components or partners that could not be worked out by the JTCB, those concerns should be forwarded along with the list for JFC consideration. Once approved, the JTCB lead finalizes the JPTEL and disseminates the list. If the list is not approved by the JFC, it goes back (with guidance) for readjustment

at the engagement selections and solutions step. The list then cycles back through the integration and prioritization steps as normal.

(4) The JTCB lead sends the approved JPEL to the J-2 for inclusion in the joint force prioritized collection requirements, and the component prioritized collection list. The collection requirements generated by the JPEL compete with other collection requirements, at the joint collection management board (if established), to clear their cut line and be included in the collection plan. Those collection requirements that do not make the cut line are then returned to the collection and exploitation requirement board and, if required, go through the process again.

12. Assessment

In assessment, in support of communication synchronization, the temptation is to assume, once the product or action has been executed, the full effect will be experienced at some point in the future. In fact, there are at least three potential outcomes. First, the product is not seen/heard/experienced by the designated recipient. Second, the desired recipient disregards the product. Third, the recipient internalizes, to one degree or another, the message. Outcome variability requires the assessment process to both determine results and to feed back into the iterative process of re-engagement until the desired effect or outcome is created.

a. Four events occur in the assessment stage of the process, outlined in Figure B-11, "Assessment." The first is verification the communication product has been delivered to the intended public/node. MOPs are typically used for this purpose. If the effort to deliver the product or engage the public/node did not succeed, the engagement should be assessed for re-tasking.

b. The second event is confirmation of public/node reception of the product or engagement. Many communication efforts fail through lack of attention to this step, because transmission alone does not guarantee public/node reception. There are multiple not-obvious reasons for lack of public/node reception: poor timing, distracting environmental conditions, information fratricide, competing observables (say-do gap), and others. If reception is unsuccessful, the engagement may need to be re-tasked. Again, timing is very important here from both an intended recipient and resourcing standpoint. If resources are an issue, the nomination for re-engagement may have to go back to the prioritization stage to re-compete for limited resources.

c. Thirdly, the results of a completed engagement should be gathered and analyzed. Although there is typically only one "assessment cell" on the joint force staff, assessment activities occur in many staff sections (such as in PA, IO, CA, logistics, and intelligence). Likewise, other organizations and partners conduct assessment activities, with often significantly overlapping efforts. Not coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing these assessment efforts causes multiple problems. First, the local population gets "survey weary" from having the same subjects surveyed multiple times. Second, it opens the assessment efforts to manipulation, because, as the population continues to receive multiple queries for similar information, but does not see rapid changes in conditions commented on, they can get




Figure B-11. Assessment

apathetic or hostile to future assessment efforts and purposefully provide bad data. Third, too-often assessment information is not shared effectively, unless a conscious effort to do so is developed. Finally, overlapping efforts are extremely wasteful of resources. Gathering together partners and developing a federated assessment effort is much more efficient, effective, and produces much better data than is typically available alone. Often, the HN, UN, World Bank, or NGOs have data that precedes the military intervention and can provide a very good baseline, which may help in anticipating potential outcomes. If sufficient trust is developed among partners over time, not only can data collection be federated, but assessment and evaluation of the data can be federated as well.

d. Finally, the short-, mid-, and long-term impact of the engagement should be determined. If the desired immediate impact is created, longer-term impacts need to be determined. If the single engagement is also part of creating a larger effect, this engagement contribution needs to be evaluated in context. For example, a KLE with the local political leader, could have followed a town hall meeting, and preceded a meeting with local tribal leaders, then religious leaders. This sequence may have been during a simultaneous period of broadcast messaging in favor of supporting multinational efforts. If

desired impacts are not created, assets may need to be reprioritized for re-engagement, if available. If resources are not available for immediate re-engagement, the public/node may need to be nominated into the process again, for the following cycle. In like manner, mid- and long-term impacts are evaluated to answer these type questions:

- (1) Have the desired effects or conditions for this engagement been created?
- (2) If desired effects or conditions have been partially created, would reengagement using the same means, methods, and products result in completion?
- (3) What alterations in the means, methods, or products would be necessary for creating the desired effects or conditions?
- (4) Would re-engagement be time-sensitive, due to the need for immediate reinforcement of the partial effect, looming changes in the OE or cognitive dimension, or because adversary momentum is building for counter-messages that need to be opposed?
- (5) If effects/conditions have been created and are expected to last for a period of time, can this public be removed from the list?
- (6) Will there be more potential need for influencing this public in the future?
- (7) Have the relevant databases, including the intelligence database, been updated with the assessment information?

e. If the immediate-, mid-, and long-term desired effects have been created for the particular public/node, then it should be removed from the focused engagement cycle. This does not mean the public/node is ignored at this point, it still receives information as part of the broad and general “inform” and “educate” effort for all audiences.

f. Updating relevant databases is an important, ongoing effort. As assessment is completed and the /node is public removed from the focused engagement cycle, the modern, integrated database can also be updated. This is important for current, mid-term and J-35.

g. Measuring Effectiveness. Developing substantive and reliable MOEs to determine outcomes in the cognitive dimension may be more difficult than measuring results from operations and actions taken in the air, land, maritime, and space domains. Some example MOEs include: attitude/opinion/behavioral changes in selected populations, changes in media portrayal of events, change in insurgent activity/organization, insurgent supporter shifts, or changes in international response. Measuring effectiveness is often referred to by other departments, agencies, and organizations as measuring outcomes or results. Figure B-12, “Relationships Between Measures of Effectiveness and Performance,” shows an example of the difference between MOPs and MOEs for communication-related activities.

(1) There are two standard methods to assess communication activities: qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative data refers to things that can be quantified, measured, or counted. Within each method there are many techniques for measuring effectiveness. We will briefly discuss some considerations for using content analysis, expert knowledge, and

survey/polling data. Content analysis and survey/polling data are two examples of qualitative methods. Content analysis involves searching readily available publications on specific topics. The process may be labor intensive and choosing which publication to monitor may be a challenge. Expert knowledge involves interviewing subject matter and/or local experts either individually or in groups. Experts, although very experienced, may have positions or agendas that bias their opinion. Expert knowledge is not an assessment method, but can be used to interpret the qualitative and quantitative methods used. Surveys and polling data are used to assess public opinions and attitudes. Combining results from these methodologies allows assessment analysts to use both quantitative and qualitative data, and tailor collection means to obtain optimum data for the desired measures.

(2) **Polling is an excellent method to gauge local perceptions.** Although attempting to determine causality by linking an increase or decrease in perception to any specific event is difficult, polling is an important tool for assessing progress on creating




Figure B-12. Relationships Between Measures of Effectiveness and Performance

desired effects (outcomes). Opinion polling provides the best means to gauge local perceptions on numerous and various topics to perform trend analysis. If the polling sampling is sufficiently large and representative of the national population, results can be projected to the larger population.

(3) A **focus group is a qualitative research tool** that uses open-ended questions to explore attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of 8-12 individuals in a small group setting. Focus groups explore new ideas to gain an in-depth understanding of the participants' opinions on a particular topic. While the results from focus groups are usually not projected to the larger population due to small sample size, they are useful for testing proposed communication content, means, and approaches.

(4) Commercial Tools. Use of commercially available assessment tools designed to review consumer attitudes and desires can be tailored to assess similar MOEs.

h. Complexity. Assessing adaptive systems, such as insurgent recruiting or attitudes of a certain segment of the population, requires the commitment of extensive resources due to the number of variables involved. The need for constant assessment and the difficulty in keeping the assessment current may require using a federated approach. It is important the military, interagency, HN, and other stakeholders develop a federated approach to data collection. This approach can be useful in determining what data is already available, who is most efficient and/or effective at collecting specific types of data, organizational assessment needs and priorities, agreeing upon data sharing, establishing consistent reporting methods, and reducing redundant efforts.

i. Causality. In order to predict future outcomes reliably (what will happen) based on assessment results (what has happened), the analyst should determine causality (what caused it to happen). Determining causality is often possible for a closed system, but such a determination of causality in an open system requires significant effort, if causality can be determined at all. Having experienced analysts (like operations research and systems analysis or behavioral scientists) on the assessment team would be helpful. However, **establishing causality in complex adaptive systems is extremely difficult due to the number of variables involved.**

(1) Determining causality is difficult **and may be unnecessary.** For example, based on shared experience, we can agree, if you stand on the top of a building, lean over the side, ensure the pathway remains clear, and then drop a ball, it will fall to the ground. However, if we come outside the building on another day and see a ball on the ground, we cannot assume it was dropped from the top of the building. Determining specific, direct causality requires the control of all but the one independent variable. Because, in military operations, many variables usually cannot be controlled, we are actually only determining correlation between our action and changes in the environment. Adding more resources and methodologies to assessment, to rule the influence of confounding variables, may provide for more valid conclusions about the relationships between variables of interest, but still not allow for causal explanations. **Assessment can be used to confirm joint force operations and actions have contributed to the change (correlation), which typically is sufficient.** As we are able to confirm correlation of more operations and actions to favorable outcomes

in specific environments over time, confidence in them resulting in favorable consequences in similar environments increases.

(2) **Selecting measures, and combining, weighting, and interpreting data are at the heart of assessment.** Common mistakes are found in each of these areas, such as selecting measures that are not relevant or properly adapted to the culture or area. Similarly, small mistakes in weighting can skew data significantly. Likewise, not understanding some of the cultural or social factors can cause misinterpretations of data. Many areas or cultures do not think or make decisions like we do. Understanding their perception of their available options can be enlightening, because they may not perceive options we believe are available to them.

(a) **Assessment analysts should recognize differing levels of reliability and validity in data and results.** For example, “what people make” is a more solid measure than “what they do,” which is a much more valid and reliable measure than “what they say.” Moreover, the accuracy of HN polling and survey data collection can be influenced by biased responses. Factors affecting validity and reliability include translation, development of questions so they cannot be misunderstood and can be answered truthfully and safely, participation inequalities by tribe or gender, and the relationship between the surveyor and the survey participant. Planners can significantly increase the validity and reliability of data/results by reaching out/back to cultural/social experts and those experienced in data gathering in a high-risk environment.

(b) Another way to increase validity is to evaluate relationships between metrics to verify metrics, which theoretically should be, are in fact related.

(c) Finally, using tools that can provide network visualizations on geospatial maps can increase validity by correlating data interpretations with results or changes in specific areas.

j. Federation. Often, the need for data collection and analysis to support the communication synchronization outstrips available resources. Therefore, **consideration should be given to leverage existing data sources** (such as the UN, World Bank, etc.) **and federating the assessment process.** Early establishment of the federation requires the building of trust, so will most likely start with a sharing of data collected. As the relationships mature, analysis can also be federated and optimized to each organization’s areas of expertise. This type of federation can reveal innovative methods and practices to provide leaders with timely media situational awareness, analysis of other areas of the information environment, and assessment from varied perspectives.

(1) **Understanding the Local Media.** Ethnic and sectarian divisions in some countries can make a detailed understanding of the identity-group alliance of each media outlet essential. Local nationals and cultural experts can assist in assessing the level of bias to prevent an overtly western view. Many media tools may not exist for extensive media cataloging in the OA. A media monitoring enterprise may be necessary to identify multinational organizations conducting monitoring; how they are capturing, storing, and using information; and reduce redundancy. After collaboration, consensus can be achieved

as to which organizations could monitor which media best. A common, searchable database can be created to assist monitoring agencies.

(2) **Media and Key Themes.** Based on the situation and the OA, specific primary themes or threads may be used, such as political, economic, diplomatic, and security. The stories in the databases can be categorized under the appropriate headings to assess trends in salience over time.

(3) **Alignment of Key Messages.** Message alignment or coordination, coupled with the requirement for accuracy is central to the shaping of the media information environment. It is important to have a strong message alignment and to not contradict each other's message. This can be facilitated by higher guidance to the appropriate senior leaders. Additionally, each major organization may have to dedicate military PAOs to assist their leaders by preparing talking points based upon this guidance. The essential element to this is communication has to be top-driven so subordinates can reinforce the same messaging.

(4) **Local Perceptions.** Messaging that is unsupported by actual conditions is counterproductive. At the conclusion of predetermined time periods, analysis can be done to examine the key themes and messages that have appeared in the local media. Compare the messaging to facts on the ground, and examine local perception from existing polling information. However, in order for these trends to have meaning, it is important the methodology and questions remain stable. If the methodology or question-set vary from survey to survey, then gaining meaningful insights is severely jeopardized. Numerically determining the contribution of a message/action to a shift in perception will continue to be an inexact science, but identifying when a shift in perception occurs remains an important consideration.

(5) **Managing Erroneous Stories, Mitigating Propaganda, and Correcting Misinformation.** Through monitoring enterprise efforts, there may be real-time situational awareness to permit, not only the identification of an erroneous story, but to then immediately contact the source and provide clarifying information. The second method of reducing erroneous stories and their effect is the use of timely and accurate press releases. These two methods can be critical to affecting the communication effort. Taking action on an erroneous story needs to be evaluated. Taking action against an erroneous story may draw more attention to it than desired. For example, if the story got buried in the rest of the day's activities, calling it out may bring it from page 10 to page 1 the next day.

(6) **Resonance of Key Themes and Messages.** An analysis of media coverage of monthly press conferences can be done to not only examine the number of references to previous press conferences, but to determine which themes and messages resonated across multiple media outlets.

(7) **Effect of Embedded Media.** Embedded media may be an excellent way to give a "boots-on-the-ground" perspective. Although not all of the material is flattering, it does offer an on-the-ground perspective, which is crucial in framing the context of events for both domestic and international audiences, stakeholders, and publics. Regardless of whether the embedded media provide an account which reaches international, regional, or domestic

audiences, their coverage provides the transparency and accountability required to inform or build consensus through a free flow of information.

For a more detailed discussion of planning for media embeds, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

k. Adapting is typically viewed as a refining of communication-related activities, in light of changes in the OE; the problem facing the JFC; or for better resonance with the specific stakeholder/public. However, **adapting should include adjusting the entire communication synchronization effort, including engagement means and methods, resources, support for key influencers, and diminishing systems of opposition.** Some important considerations include:

(1) How does the joint force monitor, measure, and assess the effects (outcomes) of friendly messages on intended and unintended stakeholders/publics?

(2) Is there a particular issue that needs more attention or focus of effort?

(3) What new information has surfaced that should cause a re-evaluation of the approach?

(4) Who else needs to be involved now in the communication effort?

(5) What new opportunities are developing for the joint force and partners?

(6) What joint force or partner organizational changes could improve conduct of communication-related activities?

(7) What is the truth on key issues from the primary stakeholder/public perspective?

(8) What is the truth on key issues from the adversary/competitor perspective?

APPENDIX C MESSAGE MAPS

One best practice used by the USO to assist their personnel in communicating more effectively during interviews or public engagements is a “message map.” The message map is a graphic which provides the organizational narrative in the center, key themes branching out, then specific messages and facts supporting and branching out further from the themes. It provides a quick reference to speak, discuss, and answer questions about who they are, what they are currently doing, how they do it, why, and specific facts to support the messaging. The USO message map, Figure C-1, could be adapted for joint force use. As an example, three very basic message maps are also provided in Figures C-2 through C-4 for three separate missions: FHA, COIN, and personnel recovery.




Figure C-1. United Service Organizations Message Map




Figure C-2. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Mission Message Map




Figure C-3. Counterinsurgency Mission Message Map




Figure C-4. Personnel Recovery Mission Message Map

APPENDIX D PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMUNICATION PLANNING PROCESS

1. Public Relations Communication Planning Process

a. The public communication planning process is used for establishing a communication plan to achieve a communication goal and supporting objectives, and is known to most professional communicators as research, plan, implement and evaluate (RPIE). The methodology behind it is to start with research to determine the root issue, the publics, and the desired end state to be addressed instead of rushing to specific actions or tactics.

b. Research. Research helps define the problem and the publics to be addressed. This phase may include informal and formal research. It should gather as much information as possible about the situation and all of the parties involved. Questions to consider include:

- (1) Who do we want to reach?
- (2) What do we want them to know, feel, or do (knowledge, attitude, and/or behavior outcomes)?
- (3) What do they currently know or feel?
- (4) What messages do we want to communicate to each public that will encourage desired behavior, increase knowledge, and change attitudes?

c. Plan. During this step, communicators support goals, objectives, strategies, and tasks.

- (1) Goals articulate a future state of being, such as the desired end state for a military operation. They are longer-term, broad, and measurable.
- (2) Objectives articulate what knowledge, attitude, and/or behavior outcomes the JFC wants to achieve from a specific public; how much change; and by what deadline. Objectives should be specific, measurable and attainable, and support the overall mission.
- (3) Strategies provide the roadmap of how to achieve objectives. Strategies should include message content (what message do we want to send) and message delivery (how do we reach the public with this message).
- (4) Tactics are specific actions taken in support of a strategy.

d. Implementation. Implementation should include milestones/implementation schedule, coordinators, and resources required to execute.

e. Evaluation. During the evaluation phase, results are measured to determine the success in achieving the goal and objectives set in the planning phase to determine the effectiveness of the communication effort. Evaluation can serve as research for the next communication effort. Figure D-1, “Public Communication Planning Process,” provides more detail on the public communication planning process (RPIE).

Public Relations Communication Planning Process

Public Relations is a management function that establishes and maintains open communication mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the publics on whom its success or failure depends. Key roles of **PR** counselor: **An2Ad2**: Analyze – Anticipate – Advise – Adjust

R Research

Determine Important Publics Issues Problems Opportunities Trends	INFORMAL RESEARCH Focus groups Interview political & opinion leaders Trend Analysis / Communications Audit Observation Complaint Review	FORMAL RESEARCH Surveys Intercept Interviews	ASSESS Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats Force Fields†
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Benchmark/baseline data gathering and analysis, to determine "Where are we now?"

P Planning/Strategy

GOAL – define: Publics Objectives Strategies Tactics/Transitions (TBC/RAM)	Publics (MAGBECCS: Media, Activists, Government, Businesses, Employees, Churches, Customers, Schools) Identify important segments Profiles (why each is important) Priorities — desired outcomes on road to goal — milestones to measure progress Information/Education Customers	Face-to-face meetings Ads Media Information/Education Customers	Time – long and short term Behavior – Knowledge – Attitude Change from ___ to ___ Realistic Attainable/Obtainable Measurable
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I Implementation

Tactics/Tools Amount Schedule/Timetable Coordinators	Salaries \$\$ Research \$\$ Tools \$\$ Evaluation \$\$ — responsible for achieving specific objectives w/specific publics by specific time	Link to Strategies Select 1-2 for each public Media Speakers PSAs and VNRS Tours Annual Reports Testimonials Internet Newsletters News Releases	7 Cs: COALHORO Context Capability Clarity Channels Content Credibility Continuity/Consistency
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E Evaluation

Periodic evaluations to determine if we met objectives listed under Planning and GOALPOST LINDERMAN Output OutGROWTH OutCOME	MEASUREMENT Time – long and short Behavior – Knowledge – Attitude Change from ___ to ___	INFORMAL: Focus groups Interview Influentials Trend Analysis Observation Complaint Review	FORMAL: Surveys Intercept Interviews Content Analysis
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Figure D-1. Public Relations Communication Planning Process

2. Communication Planning Models

A number of communication planning models are used by civilian communication professionals. They all incorporate each element of RPIE, but the individual steps differ slightly. *Strategic Planning for Public Relations*, by Ronald D. Smith, a commonly used PA textbook, recommends the following approach:

- a. Phase 1: Formative Research (Research in the RPIE model)
 - (1) Step 1: Analyzing the Situation
 - (2) Step 2: Analyzing the Organization (internal/external environments, public perception)
 - (3) Step 3: Analyzing the Publics
- b. Phase 2: Strategy (Planning in the RPIE model)
 - (1) Step 4: Establishing Goals and Objectives
 - (2) Step 5: Formulating Action and Response Strategies
 - (3) Step 6: Developing the Message Strategy
- c. Phase 3: Tactics (Planning/Implementation in the RPIE model)
 - (1) Step 7: Selecting Communication Tactics
 - (2) Step 8: Implementing the Strategic Plan
- d. Phase 4: Evaluation Research (Evaluation in the RPIE model). Step 9: Evaluating the Strategic Plan

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APPENDIX E REFERENCES

The development of this JDN is based upon the following primary references.

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- b. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
- c. *United States Freedom of Information Act*.
- d. *United States Privacy Act of 1974*.

2. Department of Defense Issuances

- a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3600.01, *Information Operations*.
- b. DODI, 5040.02, *Visual Information*.
- c. DODI 5400.13, *Public Affairs Operations*.
- d. DODI 5400.14, *Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
- e. *National Defense Strategy*.
- f. *National Military Strategy*.
- g. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives

- a. CJCSI 8010.01B, *Joint Community Chief Information Officer*.
- b. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*.
- c. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*.

4. Joint Publications

- a. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- b. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- c. JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*.

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- f. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.
- g. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- h. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- i. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.
- j. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- k. JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*.
- l. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- m. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*.
- n. JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*.
- o. JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*.
- p. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- q. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- r. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- s. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- t. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- u. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

5. Combatant Command Documents

United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, version 3.0, 24 June 2010.

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d. Luck, Gary, GEN (ret), JWFC, Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices, 2nd Edition, JFCOM, June 2008.

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GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ALERTORD	alert order
AOR	area of responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
ASD(PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAISE	civil authority information support element
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CCS	commander's communication synchronization
CCSWG	commander's communication synchronization working group
CF	CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CO	cyberspace operations
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMCAM	combat camera
CONOPS	concept of operations
COS	chief of staff
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIMOC	Defense Imagery Management Operations Center
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DPO	Defense Press Office
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
HD	homeland defense
HN	host nation
IC	intelligence community
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IO	information operations

IRC	information-related capability
IW	irregular warfare
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-35	future operations
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIIC	Joint and Interagency Information Center
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JPEL	joint prioritized engagement list
JS	Joint Staff
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
KLE	key leader engagement
MIS	military information support
MISO	military information support operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
OA	operational area
OE	operational environment
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPT	operational planning team
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAG	public affairs guidance
PAO	public affairs officer
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
RFF	request for forces
RPIE	research, plan, implement, evaluate

RRU	rapid response unit
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SCWG	strategic communication working group
SME	subject matter expert
TCP	theater campaign plan
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USG	United States Government
USO	United Service Organizations
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VI	visual information
VISION ID	visual information identification number
WARNORD	warning order
WG	working group
WSV	weapons system video

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

audience. A broad, roughly-defined group.

commander's communication synchronization. A joint force commander's process for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communication activities.

defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called **DSPD**.

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

imagery. A likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity, and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness representation was acquired, including: products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and likeness and presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (except that such term does not include handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations). (JP 2-03)

information operations. The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. See also electronic warfare; military deception; military information support operations; operations security. (JP 3-13)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called **IGO**. (JP 3-08)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0)

joint planning group. A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called **JPG**. (JP 5-0)

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called **MOE**. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (JP 3-0)

message. A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme. (JP 3-61)

narrative. Overarching expression of context and desired results.

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (JP 3-08)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called **OE**. (JP 3-0)

public. Group of varying size that has organized for or against joint force efforts.

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 3-61)

stakeholder. Individual or group that is directly involved or affected by ongoing operations or the outcome.

theme. Unifying idea or intention that supports the narrative and is designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives.

visual information. Various visual media with or without sound. Generally, visual information includes still and motion photography, audio video recording, graphic arts, visual aids, models, display, and visual presentations. Also called **VI**. (JP 3-61)

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