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Cover Art: Oil on canvas painting by Eugenio Álvarez Dumont (1887). Depicts Spanish guerrilla Juan Malasaña exacting revenge for his daughter Manuela's murder by a French soldier on the streets of Madrid during the Dos de Mayo uprising. Source: Wikipedia



The Saber and Scroll Journal
 Volume 10, Number 2 • Winter 2021
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Welcome Letter 1
Lew Taylor, Editor-in-Chief

**The Historical Miniatures Gaming Society –
 Pacific Southwest Essay Contest
 Tim Keenon Grand Prize Winner
 The Battle of Lake George 3**
Gerald Krieger, American Military University

**The Historical Miniatures Gaming Society –
 Pacific Southwest Essay Contest
 First Prize Winner
 Greek Warfare from the Dark Age to the Macedonian Takeover 19**
Mary Jo Davies, American Military University

**The Historical Miniatures Gaming Society –
 Pacific Southwest Essay Contest
 Second Prize Winner
 The Invasion at Inchon: The Greatest Turning Point of the Korean War 37**
*Sgt. John Chambliss, United States Marine Corps
 American Military University*

**The Historical Miniatures Gaming Society –
 Pacific Southwest Essay Contest
 Honorable Mention
 The Greek Hoplite at the Battle of Thermopylae 51**
Phillip Greer, American Military University

The Guerrilla and the Peninsular War 67
*Dr. Robert Young, Associate Professor, Department of History
 and Military History, American Military University*

Clerk of Eldin and the Royal Navy’s Offensive Line 81
Michael Romero, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation

cont'd.



The “Irrepressible Conflict:” Policing in Civil War-Era New York City, 1860-1862	95
<i>Anthony James Field, Independent Historian</i>	
Connecticut and the American Revolution: British Raids on the Connecticut Shoreline Aimed to Sow Terror and Curb the Flow of Supplies to the Continental Army	113
<i>Howard Bibbins, American Public University</i>	
The MacKechnie Force’s Command Issues in the Battle of Salamaua June-September 1943	135
<i>Alisha Hamel, American Military University</i>	
To Annihilate All Armenians Living Within Turkey: Continuity and Contingency in the Origins of the Armenian Genocide, 1877-1915	157
<i>William E. Brennan, American Military University</i>	
The Battle of Bannockburn 1314: Its Legacy Then and Now	181
<i>Michael G. Stroud, American Military University</i>	
Book Review: John Richard Paul’s <i>Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, A Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution</i>	195
<i>Mary Jo Davies, American Public University</i>	
Book Review: Fred Anderson’s <i>A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War</i>	199
<i>Lewis A. Taylor II, American Military University</i>	
Book Review: Jeff Guinn’s <i>War on the Border: Villa, Pershing, the Texas Rangers, and an American Invasion</i>	201
<i>Kathleen Guler, American Military University</i>	
Museum Review of the National Museum of the United States Army	205
<i>Lt. Chris Booth, United States Coast Guard</i>	

Welcome Letter

Welcome to the Winter 2021 issue of *The Saber & Scroll Journal*. As this year comes to a close, the Editorial Staff would like to take a moment to express our gratitude to the journal's loyal readers, inspired authors and devoted editors, all dedicated to the study and preservation of history.

To say the last year-and-a-half has been a challenging time would be an understatement. I for one am very proud of our collective effort and perseverance in a time when we could have done less, and everyone would have understood why. With Volume 10 Number 2 of *The Saber & Scroll*, we continue to dedicate the final issue of the year to the study of military history.

Like the issues preceding this one, Jeff Ballard and his team have assembled a fantastic selection of articles with topics ranging from classical Greek warfare, the American Revolution, policing in New York City during the Civil War, the Armenian Genocide, the Southwest Pacific theater circa 1943, and the police action in Korea (1950-1953).

2021 also marked our second year partnering with the Historical Miniatures Gaming Society - Pacific Southwest (<https://hmgspsw.org>) to publish the Tim Keenon Grand Prize, first and second-place finalists of the HMGS-PSW Essay Contest. The three winners present a perfect cross section of military history from the classical era to the Cold War.

Also included in this issue are several excellent book reviews, as well as a review of the National Museum of the United States Army.

This issue also marks the end of my tenure as the Editor-in-Chief of this amazing publication.

In 2018, the Policy Studies Organization/Westphalia Press took over publication of the journal and the journal staff was reorganized. At that time, I was tasked with two critically important duties: (a) ensuring a smooth transition to the new publisher, and (b) assembling a team of committed proofreaders, editors, and subject matter experts dedicated to maintaining the journal's high standards.

Both tasks were accomplished earlier this year working in close collaboration with the Policy Studies Organization/Westphalia staff and convincing Jeff Ballard, Chris Schloemer, and Chelsea Tatham-Zukowski to join the team. Jeff assumed the role of Managing Editor, with Chris serving as the Senior Editor and Chelsea as Contributing Editor. Dr. Richard Hines also recruited Dr. Steven Kreis to be our American Public University faculty advisor.

Beginning with the Spring 2022 issue of the journal, Jeff will move into the Editor-in-Chief position, and I will transition into emeritus status. After ten years

working with *The Saber & Scroll Journal*, beginning as a proof-reader and moving on to other positions, it is time to turn over the reins to the next generation.

It has been a fantastic journey and I will miss working with everyone. This does not mean, however, that I am riding off into the sunset! I plan to stay actively engaged submitting articles and book reviews for the journal's consideration.

Regards,

Lew Taylor

Editor-in-Chief

The Saber & Scroll Journal

**THE HISTORICAL MINIATURES GAMING SOCIETY
PACIFIC SOUTHWEST ESSAY CONTEST
TIM KEENON GRAND PRIZE WINNER**

The Battle of Lake George

Gerald Krieger

American Military University

ABSTRACT

While many people are familiar with the French and Indian War (1754-1763), they associate the war with General Edward Braddock's disastrous expedition to capture Fort Duquesne at the Battle of the Monongahela (July 9, 1755). This battle was only one of four elements in a more extensive British campaign to reduce French forces in North America. Sir William Johnson led one overlooked segment of the campaign during The Battle of Lake George (September 8, 1755), which is significant for two reasons. The first is that it was fought exclusively with an amateur army of American provincials (only one British regular officer was present). The second is that it served as vindication for the fighting abilities of American provincial forces who were defeated during Braddock's failed battle. If Johnson had lost at Fort Edward, it would have rolled New York and New England defenses back to Albany and ceded the region to the French. Fortunately, Johnson and his men won that day. The Battle of Lake George left a mark on the fabric of the American militia, which would serve as a badge of honor as Americans rallied the colonists almost two decades later during the American Revolution.

Keywords: The Battle of Lake George, The French and Indian War, French, British, General Edward Braddock, William Johnson, Chief Hendrick, General Baron de Dieskau, Fort Saint-Frédéric

La batalla del lago George

RESUMEN

Si bien muchas personas están familiarizadas con la guerra francesa e india (1754-1763), asocian la guerra con la desastrosa expedición del general Edward Braddock para capturar Fort Duquesne en la batalla de Monongahela (9 de julio de 1755). Esta batalla fue solo uno de los cuatro elementos de una campaña británica más extensa para reducir las fuerzas francesas en América del Norte. Sir William Johnson dirigió un segmento de la campaña que se pasó por alto durante la batalla del lago George (8 de septiembre de 1755), lo cual es significativo por dos razones. La primera es que se luchó exclusivamente con un ejército aficionado de provinciales estadounidenses (solo estaba presente un oficial regular británico). La segunda es que sirvió como reivindicación de las habilidades de combate de las fuerzas provinciales estadounidenses que fueron derrotadas durante la fallida batalla de Braddock. Si Johnson hubiera perdido en Fort Edward, habría devuelto las defensas de Nueva York y Nueva Inglaterra a Albany y habría cedido la región a los franceses. Afortunadamente, Johnson y sus hombres ganaron ese día. La batalla del lago George dejó una marca en el tejido de la milicia estadounidense, que serviría como insignia de honor cuando los estadounidenses reunieran a los colonos casi dos décadas después durante la Revolución Americana.

Palabras clave: La batalla del lago George, la guerra francesa e india, franceses, británicos, general Edward Braddock, William Johnson, jefe Hendrick, general barón de Dieskau, fuerte Saint-Frédéric

乔治湖战役

摘要

尽管许多人熟悉法国印第安人战争（1754-1763），但他们联想到的是莫农加希拉之战（1755年7月9日）中英国将军爱德华·布拉多克为夺取杜肯堡而发起的损失惨重的远征战。此战仅仅是英国为减少法国在北美的势力而发动的大规模战役的四个部分之一。威廉·约翰逊爵士领导了该大规模战役中被忽视的一部分——乔治湖战役（1755年9月8日），后者的重要性体现于两个原因。第一，作战的只有美国民兵组成的军

队和一名英国正规军官。第二，乔治湖战役证明了布拉多克领导的失败战役中美国农民军的作战能力。如果约翰逊输掉了爱德华堡，纽约州和新英格兰的防御则将退回奥尔巴尼，并且该区域将让给法国。幸运的是，约翰逊及其士兵赢得了胜利。乔治湖战役给美国民兵组织结构留下了印记，这将在近20年后的美国大革命期间鼓舞美国人召集殖民者。

关键词：乔治湖战役，法国印第安人战争，法国人，英国人，将军爱德华·布拉多克，威廉·约翰逊，酋长亨德里克（Chief Hendrick），男爵Dieskau，圣弗雷德里克堡（Fort Saint-Frédéric）

In the annals of American history, many historians who specialize in the American Revolution gloss over the circumstances and events that led up to it during the French and Indian/Seven Years' War (1754-1763). Many Americans are familiar with General Edward Braddock's failed campaign to capture Fort Duquesne largely because another American, George Washington, was an active participant. Less well known is the Battle of Lake George that followed (September 8, 1755), perhaps because it was fought exclusively with an amateur army of American provincials (only one British regular officer was present). These men engaged a professional French army, which served to vindicate the abilities of provincials who were earlier denigrated and slaughtered during General Edward Braddock's expedition to capture Fort Duquesne at the Battle of the Monongahela (July 9, 1755). The Battle of Lake George was a series of three smaller skirmishes: an initial ambush along the road to Lake George, an attack at Fort

William Henry, and an engagement at the original ambush site. This battle was part of a larger British four-prong thrust into North America designed to force France to abandon its forts and settlements in the American north. The campaign centered on seizing four key French possessions: Fort Duquesne, Fort Frontenac, Fort Niagara, and Fort Saint-Frédéric, the latter led by General Sir William Johnson.¹ Together these four engagements were vital to the tide turning in Britain's favor in the War. This essay highlights the battles under Johnson that took place near Lake George and Fort Saint-Frédéric.

After the peace agreement of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, marking the cessation of hostilities during the War of Austrian Succession, English and French leaders worked through occasional disputes between French and British settlers in North America.² Many European leaders anticipated another war between the two rivals, though nobody suspected the conflict would begin in North America. Historically, French fur

traders monopolized the relationships with the Native Americans on the continent, though Indians began to prefer the superior quality of English smuggled goods from Montreal. The Natives were more accustomed to working with the French because many came over as single men, adopted Indian ways, often learned the language, lived among them and took Indian wives. In contrast, Englishman would settle with families, staking off vast tracts of land for farming. They were generally less receptive to adopting Indian mannerisms and ways of life. Many Indians took this as a sign that the English, rather than the French, threatened their land.

William Johnson was born in Ireland, coming to the Mohawk River Valley to manage a store for his uncle, Peter Warren, a Royal Navy officer.³ Johnson was amiable and became friendly with local Mohawk Indians, gradually adopting some of their culture and customs. Due to his familiarity with the Mohawks, he received a position as commissary of New York for Indian affairs in 1746.⁴ Johnson became very close to Chief Hendrick, also known as King Hendrick, who would ultimately become his father-in-law. When Johnson's mistress, Catherine Weisenberg, passed away, he married Hendrick's daughter.⁵ Johnson's Mohawk family gave him the name *Warraghiyagey*, meaning "he who undertakes great things."⁶ In 1754, Johnson was appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern Colonies; shortly after, he was commissioned a Major General to lead a campaign against the French Fort Saint-Frédéric.⁷ In 1755, the British established an al-

liance with the Mohawks, the easternmost tribe of the Iroquois Confederacy. In preparation for the upcoming campaign, Johnson held a week-long conference at his home in June to supply Indians' gifts while enlisting Iroquois support against the French.⁸ Johnson spoke eloquently, drawing a large group of Indians, though only a small force committed to the upcoming campaign against Fort Saint-Frédéric.

General Edward Braddock led an army of over 2,100 men to capture the French Fort Duquesne near modern-day Pittsburgh. At the Battle of the Monongahela (July 9, 1755), a combined French and Indian force of 637 Indians and a few hundred militias and French regulars under Captain Daniel Liénard de Beaujeu ambushed Braddock, killing him and routing his army. The British suffered a staggering 1,000 casualties.⁹ Many provincials fled without firing a shot; surprisingly, the French lost less than 100 soldiers. The event still represents one of England's worst defeats of the eighteenth century. Even more problematic, the French located Braddock's papers on the battlefield referencing British plans for attacks at Fort Frontenac in Ontario, Fort Niagara, and Fort Saint-Frédéric, near modern-day Crown Point, New York.¹⁰

Shortly after receiving Braddock's plans, French Governor-General Marquis de Vaudreuil-Cavagnial heard about Johnson's actions to raise Indian support to attack the French fort. Vaudreuil knew that Fort Saint-Frédéric was twenty years old and in a state of disrepair. Even though the fortress had



Braddocks' Retreat

Gen. Edward Braddock was dying on a caisson during his army's hasty retreat after a surprise attack by French and Indians, July 9, 1755, Pennsylvania. Engraving after Alonzo Chappel. Library of Congress.

over 60 cannons, its masonry walls were propped with wooden supports.¹¹ If the French lost the fort, the British would control Lake Champlain. This threat prompted Vaudreuil to deploy General Baron de Dieskau to intercept Johnson.¹² Dieskau is a complex figure, and the fact that he was a professional German officer serving King Louis XV of France in the War for America is an interesting story in itself (beyond the scope of this essay).¹³ Dieskau trained under a well-regarded general in French history, Maréchal de Saxe. In Europe, Dieskau also fought for France, commanding a cavalry unit in Belgium. He rose rapidly through the ranks, establishing a repu-

tation as a master strategist. Dieskau's tactics embraced irregular forces while focusing on a doctrine of rapid advance. He arrived in Canada in March 1755, quickly concluding that his adversaries were unprofessional, nothing more than provincial farmers.¹⁴ Dieskau enlisted 600 Kahnawakes and Kanesatakes Indian warriors to assist him in conducting his irregular campaign.

Unaware that the French knew of the British summer campaign, the gregarious Johnson led an army of 1,500 men up the Hudson River valley towards Lake George in August 1755. Johnson struggled to get many of the

Mohawks to join because they knew the French were allied with Kahnawakes and Kanesatakes, who were considered their relatives.¹⁵ Nevertheless, Johnson's father-in-law, Hendrick, convinced 400 Mohawk warriors to join them.¹⁶

Johnson's army moved slowly as they constructed a road through the dense forest. They stopped 50 miles north of Albany to build Fort Edward. As they completed construction, a Mohawk scouting party reported to Johnson that a large force of 8,000 French soldiers was moving to bolster the defenses of Crown Point. However, the

scouts overestimated the size of the French force under Dieskau, who only had 3,000, half of whom were highly trained French regulars.¹⁷ This overestimation caused Johnson to avoid a direct engagement and continue his mission. A few days later, Dieskau's scouts discovered Johnson's men as they completed the construction of another fort dubbed Fort Edward. The French allies continued to observe and report on the actions of the English Provincial construction crew as they began building Fort William Henry along the southern shores of Lake George. Dieskau's intelligence report was superb and thorough,



Sir William Johnson, (1715-1774) Major General of the English forces in America.
Mezzotints. T. Adams, delin.; Spooner, fecit. Library of Congress

The British devised several preemptive strikes against the French in the summer of 1755.



Theyanoguin, Hendrick Peters, 1692-1755. Print shows Hendrick Peters Theyanoguin (King Hendrick), the great Mohawk sachem, half-length portrait, facing left, wearing European style military uniform and holding a hatchet in his right hand and a wampum belt in his left. Impressions of this engraving were offered for sale in the November 1755 issue of *Gentlemen's Magazine* within months of Hendrick's death. Hendrick negotiated peace between the Six Nations and Great Britain at the Albany Conference of 1754. He was killed during the Battle of Lake George on September 8, 1755. Intaglio print. Library of Congress.


revealing that Edward, one of the first string of forts, was the most vulnerable. It lacked cannons and only partially completed protective works—an easy target. Dieskau began to organize an attack on Fort Edward to isolate Johnson's army and source of supplies.

On September 6, 1755, Dieskau left Fort Carillon with 2,000 regulars, 500 Canadians, and over 1,000 Indians making his way to Fort Edward.¹⁸ Due to the vast influence of the French, Dieskau raised a staggering number of Indians. Among his allies, histori-

an Richard Berleth noted, were “displaced Abenakis from New England, Caughnawaga Mohawks from St. Lawrence, Hurons, Ottawas, Potawatomes from the west, [and] Micmacs from the far north.”¹⁹ As the army began to move, trouble was brewing, and Dieskau noted how difficult the Indians were to control. Not far from Fort Edward, native allies demurred with Dieskau's proposal to attack the fort during a war council. The Indians thought the general's strategy was reckless. Even though Edward's defenses were not as complete

as the others, the natives did not think highly of attacking defensive positions. They preferred to raid against an unsuspecting foe, not a frontal attack against the fort's hardened earth and wooden walls. Dieskau was forced to call off his attack and revise his plans to shadow

Johnson's men and find an opportunity to ambush the traveling column. Although the Baron needed the Indians, he wrestled with deploying them because he struggled to maintain control. He expressed his frustration in a letter to Vaudreuil:



Map depicting an aerial view of the battle fought near Lake George on September 8, 1755, between 2000 English with 250 Mohawks. An English impression after an impression published in Boston six weeks earlier. Samuel Blodget, an eyewitness, depicts Sir William Johnson's victory over the French at Lake George on September 8, 1755, during the French and Indian War. William Johnson led a contingent of New Englanders, New Yorkers, and Mohawks against the French army coming south from Lake Champlain, led by Baron de Dieskau. London publisher Thomas Jefferys copied the engraving Blodget commissioned from Boston printer Richard Draper. The sheet is divided into three parts. On the left, Blodget provides a map of the Hudson River from New York to Lake George, identifying the principal communities, along with inset plans of Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, which was on Lake George. In the center is a map identified as "First Engagement," depicting the battle which took place the morning of September 8, when Johnson's forces were ambushed by the French and suffered heavy losses. On the right is a map identified as "Second Engagement," showing Johnson's victory over the French. Numbers in the image correspond to a pamphlet issued with the map, "A prospective plan of the battle near Lake George." Samuel Blodget delin; T. Jefferys sculp. Source: Library of Congress

They drive us crazy from morning till night. There is no end to their demands. They have already eaten five oxen and many hogs, without counting the kegs of brandy they have drunk. In short, one needs the patience of an angel to get on with these devils; and yet one must always force himself to seem pleased with them.²⁰

Dieskau grew increasingly frustrated with his Indian allies and their undisciplined nature.

Dieskau devised a plan to attack Fort Lyman. His objective was to cut off potential reinforcements for Johnson that might approach from Albany while trapping him along the lake.²¹ The need for a rapid advance dictated the French leave their artillery at Ticonderoga. Because of numerous Indian attacks along the 14-mile portage road between the fort and the lake, Johnson was concerned about the location being too vulnerable. He ultimately assigned 500 men to defend Lyman.²² Dieskau's Abenakis scouts provided a detailed assessment of Fort Lyman. They told the general of high walls and signs of artillery. When the other Indians learned of this, they refused to attack, insisting that the French and Canadians reduce the barriers before participating.²³ At the war council, Dieskau became incensed, struggling to suppress his fury. Shortly after this council disbanded, Caughnawagas scouts returned, telling a story that they became lost amid the dense woods and did not locate Johnson's army. Finally, Dieskau had

enough. He walked away and "swore violently in German ... he was becoming accustomed to his Indians allies and saw through their ruse."²⁴ The truth was, the scouts had located Johnson's camp, and they were intimidated by their defenses. Dieskau suspected it, though he did not have proof. Ultimately, he realized that he would be unable to shape the battle and must conduct an ambush if he was going to utilize his native allies. He concluded that he was at the mercy of his Indian allies, who were determined to dictate when and how the battle would be fought.²⁵

On the evening of September 7, Mohawk scouts told Johnson the exact location and size of the French force, moving from Fort Saint-Frédéric to attack Fort Edward. Johnson planned to dispatch a courier to warn the fort, along with 500 men as reinforcements.²⁶ Later that night at a war council, Hendrick, disagreed with Johnson about sending such a small force.²⁷ According to accounts after the battle,

He [Hendrick] picked up several arrows, and handing one of them to General Johnson, asked him to break it. This he did readily. Hendrick then put three arrows together and handed them to General Johnson, saying, 'Put them together, and you can't break them; take them one by one and you will break them easily.'²⁸

This prompted Johnson to reconsider his plan, ultimately doubling the size of his relief party. On the morning of September 8, the Fort Edward relief party led by Colonel Ephraim Williams and

Hendrick left with 1,000 Massachusetts militia and 200 Mohawk scouts.²⁹ At the same time, Dieskau's army began moving north towards Lake George. Williams did not deploy advance scouts, or skirmishers, as they moved along the road. Surprisingly, Hendrick did not advise him to do so. At 66 years old, Hendrick was a seasoned warrior with extensive experience fighting in North America. This mistake would prove costly. Dieskau's advance scouts detected the British force moving up the road miles ahead of the French. Dieskau, realizing that his Indians would only fight if they were attacking a nearly defenseless foe, set up an ambush. He made up his mind to accommodate them, though he was going to deploy his French regulars across the road, forming a U-shaped ambush.

Late in the morning, about four miles south of Lake George, Williams and his men fell into the French trap. As the men entered the kill zone, a Caughnawaga, fighting for the French, attempted to warn his fellow Mohawk to leave.³⁰ The warrior spoke out, indicating that he did not want to spill the blood of their kinsman. As they exchanged words, a shot rang out from the other side of the road. Musket fire came from each side of the road. In the ensuing mayhem, many New England men and Mohawks were killed instantly. Fortunately, most of the column was outside the kill zone because it stretched for almost a mile. Only the lead element was caught in the cross-fire. As King Hendrick and Williams were at the front of the column, they fell very early when the first shots rang out.

Within minutes, 120 men were killed or wounded; fewer than ten percent of the 1,200 men returned fire.³¹ Many retreated towards the camp. New Englanders would later call this skirmish "Bloody Morning Scout."

The provincials quickly organized a retreat towards the incomplete Fort William Henry. The men working at the fort heard the gunfire in the distance and quickened their pace as they continued to improve the defenses. Men were deployed on a hill beside the fort in anticipation of the attack. The 1,200 survivors flooded into the fort and adjacent hill. Captain William Eyre, of the Royal Engineers, the only British regular on the expedition, positioned the four cannons with grapeshot, eagerly waiting for the French and Indian assault.³² Johnson took charge, focusing on improving the earthworks of logs and dirt to protect his men.

Dieskau regained control of the Indians and attacked Fort William Henry a few hours later. The French regulars formed up in traditional European style in their stark white uniforms, approaching the fort. The men made easy targets for the cannon crews. French uniforms were spattered with blood as the cannons decimated their ranks with grapeshot. This hail of lead prompted many of the Indians and Canadians to retreat. French regulars, realizing that attacking the fort was a lost cause, shifted their attention to the militia on the hill. However, in the fort, Johnson was wounded when a musket ball struck his hip, very close to his spine, though he directed fire until

his aide, Peter Wraxall, took him into his tent.³³

Connecticut militia General Phineas Lyman took charge, directing troops for Johnson. Through the smoke, he could see the Indians and Canadians withdrawing. While organizing the regulars for a counter charge, Dieskau was shot twice in the leg. A Canadian soldier attempting to assist the general to safety was instantly killed, leaving Dieskau helpless. A British provincial soldier captured Dieskau, though he shot him in the stomach, enraging the general who was a stickler for battlefield etiquette, particularly with Dieskau's defenseless state.³⁴

Johnson and his men were exhausted. He allowed the French to retreat uncontested. Johnson's Mohawk allies were enraged at Hendrick's death. They circled Johnson's tent, determined to kill Dieskau, who was held as a prisoner inside. An officer had to intervene to stop the Indians several times as they attempted to gain access to the tent to kill Dieskau. Johnson was forced to post several guards to protect the general, ultimately escorting him back to French territory with a captain and 50 heavily-armed men.³⁵

As the Canadians and Indians retreated, they returned to the site of the earlier ambush to collect prisoners and trophies. Roughly an hour after main engagement and the French force retreated, a provincial Colonel Blanchard sent two captains, McGinnis and Folsom, with two hundred men to search the area for survivors. At roughly five in the afternoon, the men came upon the

combined Canadian and Indian group at the first ambush site. The Canadians and Indians were distracted taking scalps and war prizes.³⁶ The provincial force opened fire, killing many Indians and Canadians, though McGinnis was killed, and Folsom was injured, leading the attack. Surprisingly, many of the French casualties during the Battle of Lake George occurred during this final phase of the battle. The series of three skirmishes lasted at least eight hours; Johnson's army suffered 330 casualties, while Dieskau lost 250 men, along with all his regular officers and half of his prized grenadiers.³⁷

News of the victory at Lake George spread around the colonies quickly, serving as retribution after the dark shadow of Braddock's defeat that had suggested provincial soldiers were incapable of fighting. The fact that Johnson led a group of part-time soldiers and defeated the highly-trained French army in the wilderness was cause for celebration.³⁸ While the reality was that the French, under Dieskau, were more highly trained, his reluctant Indian allies constrained the French military operation, even though Dieskau being one of the most capable irregular tacticians in North America. Although he improvised well, allowing the Indians to fight on their terms. Dieskau realized that although the Indians could be coopted to support campaigns, it would always be on their terms and might not support European plans and methods of attack, let alone military discipline.³⁹ Dieskau was remiss because his initial victory during the ambush deceived him into a false sense of confidence. Despite the

fog of war on the battlefield and amidst the chaos, Dieskau wanted to follow up his victory by conducting a siege of a fort, a move that he knew his native allies would not support. However, had the circumstances been different and the bulk of his army a standard European army, Dieskau might have easily won decisively. The series of Battles at Lake George was the defining moment for American provincial officers who were disparaged in Europe and France in particular.

The French were eager to depict American provincial officers and soldiers as unsophisticated and raw cowards. Johnson's victory and meticulous care of Dieskau meant that the Frenchman had only positive experiences to report, much to the chagrin of the politicians in Versailles. Despite British letters requesting Johnson continue the campaign to conquer Ticonderoga before the severe northern winter to follow up the victory and seize momentum against the French, he was reluctant to do so, citing his constant pain from his injury and inflammation of this head. As historian Fred Anderson wrote, "even if Johnson and his officers had been eager to resume the expedition against Crown Point, they could not prudently have done so."⁴⁰ By then, the French fortifications at Ticonderoga and Crown Point were formidable. Rather, Johnson opted to move Fort William Henry to higher ground, focusing on building more robust defenses.⁴¹

The Battle of Lake George marked the inception of the British alliance with Native Americans in North America and the beginning of the end

of large-scale Indian support for the French, which would reach its nadir in 1757 at the "Massacre at Fort William Henry," where French General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm's efforts to retrieve British captives from the Indians, eroded his trust and undermined Indian support for future French operations.⁴² The short-term benefit was securing the Hudson valley for the British, though the long-term significance was more profound. The Battle served as a proving ground for the abilities of men who were not formally trained as soldiers in the European method of warfare. It also marked the waning influence of the French and Native American alliance. If Dieskau had defeated Johnson at Fort Edward, it would have rolled New York and New England defenses back to Albany, ceding the region to the French. As Anderson pointed out, by the following spring, the French defenses were anchored at the north end of Lake George by Fort Carillon while the English held the south via Fort William Henry.⁴³ The French and Indian war lasted until 1763, though most of the fighting in North America ended by 1760, though it continued in Europe. After September 1959 with the infamous French defeat in the battle at the Plains of Abraham in Quebec by Major General James Wolfe, the scales tipped in favor of the British. While Wolfe's actions overshadowed the significance of the battle that took place several years earlier, the Battle of Lake George left a mark on the fabric of the American militia, which would serve as a badge of honor as Americans rallied the colonists almost two decades later.

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**THE HISTORICAL MINIATURES GAMING SOCIETY
PACIFIC SOUTHWEST ESSAY CONTEST
FIRST PRIZE WINNER**

**Greek Warfare from the Dark Age
to the Macedonian Takeover**

Mary Jo Davies

American Military University

ABSTRACT

While ancient Greek weapons and military tactics changed dramatically over their long history, the one feature that remained constant was the Homeric ideal of heroic warfare. Individual heroism embodied Greek identity through 800 B.C. In the eighth century B.C., Greek military tactics evolved. The highly successful hoplite phalanx required foot soldiers to fight collectively in the service of city-states. As a result, collective heroism replaced individual heroism. However, Greek success in the Greco-Persian wars in the fifth century B.C. came at a price. Contact with the Persians would profoundly change the dynamics of hoplite warfare. The Persians employed combined-arms tactics, which for cultural pride, the Greeks never fully embraced or mastered. This gave rise to the one city that would: Macedon. King Philip II eventually conquered all of Greece and brought a definitive end to classical Greek warfare forever.

Keywords: Polis, Synoecism, Hoplite, Phalanx, Combined-Arms, Peloponnesian League, Delian League, Sarissa, Phalangites

**La guerra terrestre griega desde la Edad del Hierro
hasta la toma de poder de Macedonia**

RESUMEN

Si bien las armas y las tácticas militares de la antigua Grecia cambiaron drásticamente a lo largo de su larga historia, la única característica que permaneció constante fue el ideal homérico de la guerra heroica. El heroísmo individual encarnó la identidad griega

hasta el 800 a. C. En el siglo VIII a.C., evolucionaron las tácticas militares griegas. La falange hoplita de gran éxito requería soldados de infantería para luchar colectivamente al servicio de las ciudades-estado. Como resultado, el heroísmo colectivo reemplazó al heroísmo individual. Sin embargo, el éxito griego en las guerras greco-persas del siglo V a.C. tuvo un precio. El contacto con los persas cambiaría profundamente la dinámica de la guerra hoplita. Los persas emplearon tácticas de armas combinadas, que por orgullo cultural, los griegos nunca abrazaron o dominaron por completo. Esto dio lugar a la única ciudad que sería: Macedonia. El rey Felipe II finalmente conquistó toda Grecia y puso fin definitivo a la guerra clásica griega para siempre.

Palabras clave: Polis, Sinoecismo, Hoplita, Falange, Armas combinadas, Liga del Peloponeso, Liga de Delos, Sarissa, Falangitas

从铁器时代到马其顿接管政权时期的希腊土地战争

摘要

尽管古希腊的武器和军事战略在其悠久历史中发生过巨大变革，但一个不变的特征则是荷马式英雄战役理念。个人主义式英雄主义体现了公元前8世纪的希腊认同。在公元前8世纪，希腊军事战略得以发展。装甲步兵方阵的大获成功要求保卫城邦的步兵以集体形式发起进攻。结果则是，集体形式的英雄主义取代了个人主义式英雄主义。不过，公元前5世纪希腊-波斯战中，希腊的胜利付出了代价。与波斯人的接触将深刻改变装甲步兵战的动态。波斯人使用了联合作战策略，这是依仗文化骄傲的希腊人从未真正拥护或掌握的。一个拥护和掌握该策略的城市得以崛起：马其顿。腓力二世最终征服了整个希腊，并永久终结了古典希腊战役。

关键词：城邦，村镇联合（Synoecism），装甲步兵，方阵，联合作战，伯罗奔尼撒同盟，提洛同盟，长矛，方阵兵

While military tactics and the weapons the Greeks used changed dramatically between the end of the Mycenaean civilization around 1100 B.C. and the Classical Age (500-336 B.C.), the one overriding feature that bound the periods together and sustained the ancient Greeks was the Homeric ideal of heroic warfare. Individual heroism on the battlefield became part of Greek cultural identity through the end of the Iron Age (around 750 B.C.).¹ By the Archaic Age in the eighth century B.C., military combat had evolved to a new and very regimented style: the phalanx and hoplite system of warfare. Foot soldiers no longer sought individual honor, glory, or heroism. They fought collectively in the service of the newly established city-states. As long as the Greeks fought amongst themselves, this new heroic ideal remained indomitable. It took a formidable foreign threat in the fifth century B.C. to introduce the Greeks to a very different style of fighting: the Persians' combined-arms strategy. Although the Persian combat system proved to be no match against the Greek phalanx during the Greco-Persian wars, they laid the groundwork for radical changes in tactical warfare that the Greeks, out of cultural pride, refused to embrace, and gave rise to the one city that not only championed these changes, but improved upon them: Macedon.

While the navies of ancient Greece were an important element of defense against enemy invasions, this article focuses on land warfare to determine why the Greeks resisted modifying their land-based combat strategies,

thus paving the way for Macedon to take over. In doing so, the Macedonians brought a definitive end to Classical Greek warfare forever.

The Mycenaeans were the first characteristically Greek civilization of mainland Greece. They prospered between 1600 and 1100 B.C. An association of palace-centered states, the Mycenaeans were a wealthy, warrior elite society. The importance they placed on hegemonic rule over the Aegean is apparent in the evidence excavated at Mycenae and other surrounding locations. These include painted pottery, which illustrate battle scenes and types of weapons used, Linear B tablets² which record, among other things, the construction and use of the composite bow, and hundreds of battle armor and weapons buried with their respective warriors. This evidence offers an overwhelming impression of a fierce, warlike people.

By 1200 B.C., archaeological evidence indicates that a wave of devastation had befallen the Mycenaeans, leaving behind vacant palaces, evidence of mass migrations, and abject poverty. The details for this fall are lost to history, but the fiery destruction of the palaces precipitated the downward spiral.³ The absence of written evidence in the aftermath of this period suggests that this society had lost their technical and writing skills. Trade declined, making the natural resources necessary to create bronze scarce.⁴ This forced Greek craftsmen to cultivate the technology of iron making, since iron-ore was plentiful throughout the Mediterranean.⁵ But the complete shift to iron, which would

give rise to the Iron Age (1200—700 B.C.) in this region, would take a few hundred years. Eventually it would trigger more rapid material development in the Aegean around 900 B.C.

It was within this period of recovery that the Greeks began to look back to the glorious Mycenaean culture, redefining it as a heroic age to emulate. Small settlements began to take shape with simple governing procedures. Renewed contacts with the outside world enabled the Greeks to regain many of the skills they had lost. Most significantly, the Phoenicians provided them with a new alphabet. In all likelihood, it was around 800 B.C. that Homer composed his epics—tales of valor and glory in warfare.⁶

Although the Homeric poems represent tales of heroic warfare, they are not, by themselves, the proper source to determine what kind of armor, combat techniques, and weapons the Greeks were using at this time. The intention of these poems was to re-introduce the glory of Bronze Age warfare to the Greeks, but they seem to illustrate a rather confused combination of Bronze Age and early Iron Age weaponry and combat strategies. The poet's main objective was likely to illustrate heroic prowess, not battlefield tactics. However, historian Michael M. Sage asserts that the heroic style of the Homeric poems would have a lasting impact on Greek notions of combat. “[T]he dominant warrior on the battlefield,” he says, “was the heavily armed infantryman who was also to be the determining factor in Classical warfare.”⁷

In the meantime, scholars can more safely reconstruct warfare of the early Iron Age from painted pottery and compared with the Homeric epics to determine what kinds of weapons and battle tactics warriors were using during this period. Between 900 and 700 B.C., artistic representations on vases show an early stage of massed fighting although not necessarily a specific type of battle formation. In the *Odyssey* Homer comparably reveals that, “[m]eanwhile the Cicones went and called to other Cicones who were their neighbors, at once more numerous and braver than they—men that dwelt inland and were skilled at fighting foes from chariots, and if need were, on foot.”⁸

Iron Age weapons sometimes show contrasting evidence with the Homeric poems. Vase illustrations and Homer's epics both demonstrate the use of javelins and swords, but only vases depict the practice of archery.⁹ Homer deemed archery shameful, since the archer, being able to shoot from a distance, avoided the bravery involved in close hand to hand combat. In the *Iliad*, Homer states, “blunt is the dart of one that is a weakling and a man of naught.”¹⁰ This suggests that Homer's epics are in part responsible for the subsequent rejection of this weapon and puts Homer right at the threshold of societal change brought about by the extraordinary recovery of the Iron Age. Referred to as the Greek Renaissance, these changes brought about the heroic revival of Greece and ushered in the Archaic Age (750-480 B.C.).

Around 750 B.C. Greeks began to feel like they belonged to a shared heri-

tage of language, customs, and religion.¹¹ This cultural rebirth encouraged unity among the Greeks and led to the creation of city-states: social and political organizations known as *polis*. The Greeks referred to this kind of unity as *synoecism*. However, the city-states had no common version of *synoecism*; each had their own interpretation of unity, so cultural and political concord never fully developed. While they were economically interdependent, politically they remained independent. The political independence of the polis created much social unrest and would eventually generate the biggest change of the early Archaic Age: new military tactics and weaponry which would give rise to the hoplite soldier and the phalanx formation.

Raising an army was a costly affair that many city-states could not afford. The hoplite armor was very expensive, hence only wealthy men could afford it. To make up for the shortage of wealthy hoplite soldiers, citizen-farmers—albeit the more affluent ones—joined the ranks. The poorest citizen-farmers could not join the army since they did not have the means to pay for their own armor.¹² Once the city-states raised their armies, they took to the fields and battled each other over the plains, trade routes, and their borders.

The hoplite army clearly exemplified the polis ideology of the “citizen as slave for the common good.” Once on the battlefield, wealth and cultural ranks disappeared. The Greek poet Callinus stated: “for by no means may a man escape death, nay not if he come of immortal lineage.”¹³

Hoplite soldiers fought in tightly packed lines several rows deep called the phalanx. Protected by their shield (known as the *hoplon*), they pointed long spears (their main offensive weapon) overhead while charging toward their enemy. The objective in hoplite warfare was controlling the plains, which contained the most wealth.¹⁴ Herodotus says, “[w]hen they have declared war against each other, they come down to the fairest and most level ground that they can find and fight there.”¹⁵ Phalanx warfare made level fields necessary; the warriors could only form an unbreakable, tight line and storm an enemy on even terrain. It is probable that hoplite phalanx warfare—also called shock warfare—developed and became successful because of this. All hoplites charged their enemy in tight formation to break the opposing ranks.

While Greek culture among the city-states was not unified, their battle tactics were identical throughout most of Greece. The hoplite soldiers had to be well-trained. Any soldier who fell or mishandled his spear during a charge caused confusion and mayhem in such tight ranks. To keep up their morale, and to encourage and motivate each other, they sang war songs.¹⁶ Heroism was no longer a singular affair, the way Homer exemplified it in his epics. Warriors sought courage and valor as a group in the service of the city-states. They may have been fighting for control of the plains, but each city-state ultimately fought for the preservation of their respective culture and way of life. Indeed, the hoplite system was synonymous with citizenship. Fleeing the bat-

tle brought the contempt of the whole *polis*.¹⁷


Archery continued to be shameful since it lacked the courage demanded by the soldier to fight in close hand to hand combat. The Greeks also did not have an effective cavalry unit because their breed of horses was much smaller and less adept in battle than, for example, the Persian horses. This forced the unit to limit the armor carried by both horse and rider. These are likely the reasons heavy infantry evolved into such a formidable fighting machine. Both the breastplate and the concave wooden shield provided corporal protection. With the shield, says historian Victor Davis Hanson, the soldier effectively “became a human battering-ram.”¹⁸ The front ranks had the more dangerous position since they faced the enemy up close. Their job was to stab the foes with their spears, aiming at enemy body parts that were unprotected by armor. All ranks behind the first line shoved up against those in front of them and used their weight to disrupt the enemy ranks. While the battles were aggressive, they were usually very brief, sometimes lasting no more than an hour. Large massacres were rare because the main objective was to break and scatter the enemy line and force them to flee.¹⁹

No matter how effective the shield was at physically protecting the hoplite warrior, culturally it had a more significant meaning—it was more important than the breastplate. Socially, the Greeks did not even regard it as an element of protection for the individual warrior. In observing their collective

approach to warfare, Plutarch said they wore the breastplate “for their own sake, but the shield for the common good of the whole line.”²⁰ As such, it became unlawful to discard the shield. Indeed, they risked punishment by disenfranchisement.

This approach to warfare—heavy infantry against heavy infantry—is what sustained the Greeks from the eighth century B.C. through the fifth century B.C. The developments of the fifth century B.C. ushered in the Classical Age of Greece, which refers to the period between the Greco-Persian Wars (499 B.C.-449 B.C.) and the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. The classical period was an era of war and conflict—first between the Greeks and the Persians, then between the Athenians and the Spartans—but it was also a time of extraordinary political and cultural achievements: Greek tragedy, written history, the practice of medicine, and philosophy. The Classical period also witnessed Greece’s most lasting contribution to the modern world: the system known as *demokratia*, or “rule by the people.”

The Greco-Persian Wars introduced the Greeks to a very different type of combat. The Persians made use of a combined-arms military, which included a cavalry unit and light infantry, both armed with bows and spears. Their cavalymen were experienced archers and javelin throwers. The role of the Persian cavalry was to charge the enemy. In the mad rush of horses, cavalymen and light infantry would discharge a barrage of arrows to cause confusion,



Clay tablet (PY Ub 1318) inscribed with Linear B script from the Mycenaean palace of Pylos. This piece contains information on the distribution of bovine, pig and deer hides to shoe and saddle-makers. Linear B was the earliest Greek writing, dating from 1450 B.C., an adaptation of the earlier Minoan Linear A script. The script includes of 90 syllabic signs, ideograms and numbers. This tablet is on display at the National Archaeological Museum of Athens. Licensing: This file is licensed under the Creative Commons.

after which the heavy infantry would step in for fierce hand to hand combat.²¹ Persian combined-arms tactics meant that all units had to play their part at the right time to be effective.

At the Battle of Marathon (490 B.C.), the Persians outnumbered the Greeks with an army that totaled roughly 20,000 in infantry and cavalry. On the Greek side, the Spartans were a no-show because of a law that required them to wait for the full moon. Fortunately, roughly 1,000 hoplites from Plataea joined the Athenians. This raised their total number to 9,000 or 10,000.²² Despite their sizable disadvantage, Greek tenacity and bravery in the face of a much larger adversary, helped them win the battle.

In the *Histories*, Herodotus introduces the Persian cavalry to the reader,

but subsequently neglects to give them a significant role in the actual battle, leading some scholars to believe that the Persian cavalry was only partially present—that unknown circumstances may have caused a delay. “The consequence of Herodotus’ silence,” says historian Harry C. Avery, “is that we cannot know for certain the whereabouts of the cavalry.”²³ Nevertheless, certain passages in *Histories* can provide evidence to assume that the Persian cavalry was indeed present in its entirety. Herodotus mentions that when the Persians saw the Greeks charging at them, they thought they were “absolutely crazy.”²⁴ Only a fully present Persian cavalry would watch a fast-moving wall of long spears coming at them at full human speed and feel confident enough to believe that the Greeks had lost their



Armour of an ancient Athenian Hoplite Licensing: This file is licensed under the Creative Commons.

minds. Since the Persian cavalry's role was to break the enemy line, it is unlikely that they would have left themselves so vulnerable as to arrive for battle with only a portion of their men. As historian Richard Billows states, the Persian cavalry was "very important to the Persian system of battle."²⁵ Herodotus also mentions that the Persians chose Marathon as the battleground because the earth was level and thus "most suitable for riding horses."²⁶ Neither the Persian cavalry nor the Greek phalanx could storm an enemy on uneven terrain.

The wicker shields carried by the Persian infantry were less effective than the heavy wooden ones used by the Greeks. The Persian heavy infantry's short spears were also less efficient than the Greek spears, which were six and a half to ten feet in length and which they could thrust to inflict deadly damage while preventing the enemy from getting too close. The 15-pound weight of the hoplite shield along with its double grip might have increased the burden of the wearer, especially since it was not possible to switch arms as easily as it had been with the earlier single grip shields. However, the revolutionary concave design resolved this issue—it allowed the warrior to occasionally rest the shield on his shoulder.²⁷ Deflecting the enemy arrows was more feasible since the warrior would not need to repeatedly change his shield's position, which would have left him momentarily vulnerable each time. Protected also by metal helmets the hoplites became one enormous, cohesive, well-protected and confident fighting machine that rendered the Persian cavalry nearly

useless. The frightened horses would have likely been incapable of breaking the hoplite line, since horses will not readily run into a wall of spears, particularly a charging one.


Greek victory, says historian Everett L. Wheeler, “vindicated Greek belief in heavy infantry’s superiority to mobile combat with the bow, cavalry and light infantry.”²⁸ According to Herodotus, “[i]n the battle at Marathon about six thousand four hundred men of the foreigners were killed, and one hundred and ninety-two Athenians.”²⁹ Eventually the Greeks went on to vanquish the Persians altogether.

However, it is necessary to keep in mind that Herodotus tended to exaggerate. Indeed, all throughout antiquity, ancient writers tended to fabricate and embellish their accounts—each for their own specific reasons. Anthony J. Spalinger, observes that no matter how reliable the sources are, scholars need to be wary of the “numbers of dead enemy, captured soldiers, and booty (chariots and horses in particular) unless the account appears logically reasonable.”³⁰

Herodotus’ exaggerations were two-fold in significance. The first was to teach future Greeks the value of heroic courage despite all odds. The second was to advocate democratic rule over tyranny.³¹ By mentioning that Sparta (a monarchy) set out to join Athens (a democracy) to help them fight the Persians, only to arrive *after* the Athenians won the battle, Herodotus put Sparta in an ignominious position. According to Herodotus, democracy’s anti-aristocratic arrangement promoted cooperative decision-making in the interest of the community. This freedom encouraged soldiers to become willing participants in warfare. Victory was not always in Athenian hands since the Spartans were, as Sage states, “the most fully articulated of any Greek state.”³² But to Herodotus—a staunch supporter of democracy—fighting in the interest of the community rather than for the pursuit of one self-serving monarch promoted a collective commitment to a cause.³³ No matter what the sizes of the armies were, what history does confirm is that the Greeks did, indeed, win the war against the Persians.

Greek hoplite and Persian warrior fighting each other. Depiction in ancient kylix. 5th c. B.C. National Archaeological Museum of Athens. Licensing: This work is in the public domain in its country of origin and other countries and areas where the copyright term is the author’s life plus 70 years or fewer.





Macedonian Phalanx. Licensing: As a work of the U.S. federal government, this image is in the public domain in the United States.

However, Greek success in the Greco-Persian wars came at a price. Contact with the Persians unavoidably and profoundly changed the time-honored dynamics of Greek warfare. For centuries, the Greeks had fought each other—hoplite against hoplite, phalanx against phalanx. As long as they fought each other it was easy to perfect and preserve their military tactics, which had helped them to maintain their culture and way of life for centuries. But growing Athenian wealth and supremacy in the wake of Greek victory over the Persians became a threat to Spartan hegemony. In the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides states, “the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear, necessitated the war.”³⁴ That necessity came to fruition in the Peloponnesian War (431—404 B.C.), which pitted Sparta and their allies—a confederation of city-states known as the Peloponnesian League established in the sixth century B.C.—against Athens and their

newer confederacy known as the Delian League, established in fifth century B.C.³⁵ Athens was aware of the difference in military might between them and their Spartan rivals. Sparta was a monarchy—a militaristic society with a very large slave population. To keep their slaves, the helots, under control, Sparta needed to militarize boys from a very young age, in the event of a slave revolt. Boys joined military school at around seven years of age and attended until they were twenty, at which time they joined the Spartan army where they remained active until the age of sixty. The Spartan *agoge*³⁶ trained their warriors well. In *Moralia*, Plutarch writes that when someone asked King Agesilaus why the city of Sparta had no city walls to protect against enemy invasions, the king pointed to his army and said, “[t]hese are the Spartan walls.”³⁷

The Athenian hoplite force, on the other hand, was not as specialized as that of Sparta.³⁸ Athens had been a democracy since the sixth century B.C.

and since their slave population was much smaller, the need for militaristic control was not nearly as vital. Boys went to school until eighteen years of age, at which time they could choose to go to the military for two years or pursue another career. Hence, to beef up their strength against Sparta, Athens reluctantly included a limited combined-arms infantry.

The introduction of light infantry required the need for changes in hoplite armor. Hoplite agility on the battlefield became more important than corporal protection to fight alongside (or against) the very nimble light-armed troops. Consequently, the linen corselet replaced the bronze torso guard and shin guards fell out of use. Athenian commanders began to deploy light-armed troops along with the traditional phalanx.³⁹ Special forces such as archers and slingers were among those included on the battlefield. Many of these weapons inflicted devastating damage to the enemy hoplites. One of the first recorded battles of Greek combined-arms tactics was the battle at Sphacteria in 425 B.C. An exceedingly mobile light infantry of over 1,000 warriors accompanied the Athenian hoplite army—mainly archers, slingers, and javeliners. When the Athenian forces killed the Spartan commander, the Spartan infantry abandoned their post and ran for the hilltops. The constant barrage of arrows, slings, and javelins came at them from all sides causing numerous casualties.⁴⁰ Thucydides states “the light-armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and the men of arms advanced not.”⁴¹ Since the

hill grounds were not level, the Spartan phalanx was at a serious disadvantage. Thus, they surrendered. Athenian victory at Sphacteria reinforced their belief that phalanx warfare was not the only effective military tactic.

After the battle, both leagues agreed to a truce. Thucydides writes, “[t]he peace shall endure between the Athenians with their confederates and the Lacedaemonians with their confederates for fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud and without harm-doing.”⁴² Six years later, however, Athens broke the terms of the truce. General Alcibiades convinced the Athenians to attack Syracuse in a battle known as the Sicilian Expedition (415—413 B.C.), but the destruction of statues of the *hermai* and the profanation of the *Eleusian Mysteries* resulted in charges against Alcibiades.⁴³ Hence, they removed him from his post. After fleeing to Sparta, Alcibiades requested assistance from the Persians and joined forces with the Peloponnesians against Athens. In the end, Athens was not able to vanquish the Spartans—not by land, not by sea. The crushing defeat, which incurred heavy Athenian losses, had immediate consequences on the strength of their democracy. In 405 B.C. at Aegospotami on the Hellespont, backed again by Persia, Sparta delivered a crushing blow to the Athenian fleet, thus finally bringing an end to Athenian hegemony and the Peloponnesian War.

The Spartans won the Peloponnesian War at a time when Greece was at its most vulnerable. Despite the introduction of light infantry, the Greeks

rejected the full implementation of a combined-arms tactical system. Although the Greeks began to see the strategic efficiency of combined-arms warfare, the phalanx, particularly on the Spartan side, continued to dominate.⁴⁴ Sage states, “[i]ntegrated large-scale forces of difficult arms were not to evolve until the rise of Macedonia.”⁴⁵

By the fourth century B.C. introducing further changes into Greek warfare seemed futile. Many of the city-states were gaining power and clamoring for independence from their respective leagues. Any hope for Greek solidarity faded. The cultural ties associated with hoplite warfare proved to be too strong. They were rooted in the very fiber of their being and were what made the Greeks Greek. A complete adoption of combined-arms warfare was tantamount to renouncing their citizenship. They had never really learned to separate their long-established successful phalanx tactical system from their citizenship and their culture. For centuries, they had only fought each other; only one type of system, which had given them ample time to sharpen their skills, but Persian combined-arms tactics jeopardized Greek hoplite skills. As a result, Greek morale plummeted paving the way for Macedon to take over.

The fourth century Macedonian army was the creation of King Philip II of Macedon (r. 359–336 B.C.). His art of war mixed military power with diplomacy. In his effort to maintain relationships with foreign rulers, he engaged in a string of marriages with foreign women, one of whom was Alexander’s mother, Olympia of Epirus.

Army and battle tactics under Philip combined the best features of Greek warfare with those of the Near East. These included light infantry, heavy infantry, and cavalry units. While the light infantry unit experienced few modifications, the heavy infantry would undergo a pronounced transformation. However, the most important contribution to Greek battle tactics was the heavy cavalry. These horse-mounted warriors carried nine-foot spears with a double point called a *sarissa* and a single-edged sword known as a *kopis*. Once the foot infantry had created a gap in the hoplite ranks of the enemy, the cavalry stepped in to break through. For this reason, Philip gave them a significant role in the Macedonian army. Philip also employed light cavalry as scouts and flank guards armed with javelins to aid and protect the larger, more invaluable units.

Groups of mercenaries called *phalangites* made up the foot soldiers of the heavy infantry phalanx. Protected at its flank and rear by light infantry as well as heavy and light cavalry, the heavy infantry phalanx was able to concentrate all its efforts on frontal attacks. This new approach required changes in weaponry and armor. The biggest difference with the Macedonian phalanx was the thrusting spear (also called a *sarissa*). While the spear of the Classical Greek hoplite was six to eight feet in length (and the *sarissa* of the Macedonian cavalry, was nine feet in length) the spear of the Macedonian hoplite was between fifteen and eighteen feet in length and weighed fifteen pounds. The length and weight of the spear required

the warriors to grasp it with both hands. This meant that they could not carry a shield. To keep their upper bodies protected, they suspended smaller rimless shields around their necks. Breastplates and helmets made of leather and other composite materials replaced the heavier bronze ones. Sometimes they abandoned them altogether. Thus lightened, the warriors were able to march faster and operate their weapons with greater ease. The first five ranks extended their spears past the bodies of the men in the first rank, each row holding their pikes gradually higher than those in front of them. This created a dense, jagged hedgerow of *sarissas*—difficult for the enemy to penetrate.

Philip also significantly improved the mobility of his army by replacing oxen with horses and camels as beasts of burden. Horses were more agile over all kinds of terrain and needed only half as much food as a team of oxen did. This helped them to move from one location to another more quickly and easily. Philip also put an end to the custom of allowing soldiers to take attendants, wives, and concubines with them on missions of war. He permitted only one porter for every four soldiers. Each soldier also had to carry his own weapons, personal belongings—even some of his own food and water. These changes required a great deal of training prior to engaging in war on the battlefield. Second Century CE author Polyaeus writes,

Philip accustomed the Macedonians to constant exercise, as well in peace, as in actual service: so that he would frequently make them march three hundred furlongs, carrying with them their helmets, shields, greaves, and spears; and, besides those arms, their provisions likewise, and utensils for common use.⁴⁶

Greek *synoecism* had never been singular in design and the lack of a central jurisdiction to draw the Greeks together further weakened the population. This helped King Philip as he marched south and defeated polis after polis in the mid fourth century B.C. The army that he had designed not only changed the history of Macedonia, but that of Greece as well. His military successes laid the groundwork for Macedonian supremacy over Greece that lasted almost two hundred years and would eventually allow his son Alexander the Great to conquer the Persian Empire, Africa, and parts of Asia. Phillip's conquest of Greece marked the end of Greek hoplite honor and glory. These endeavors exemplified the historic, cultural tradition of phalanx combat techniques, but the profound changes in tactical warfare that the Greeks, for cultural pride, refused to adopt cost them their freedom. The era and greatness of phalanx and hoplite warfare came to an end and when it did, so did classical Greece.

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- 1 Sarah B. Pomeroy et al., *Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 97-99.
- 2 Linear B is a syllabic script—the earliest form of Greek used by the Mycenaeans; it predates the Greek alphabet by several centuries and descends from the older Linear

A, an undeciphered script that the Minoans used for writing.

- 3 Pomeroy et al., *Ancient Greece*, 51.
- 4 Copper and tin create Bronze. While copper was plentiful in Aegean, tin was not. To complicate matters, the two metals did not exist near each other, which was why trade during the Bronze Age was so important.
- 5 Pomeroy et al., *Ancient Greece*, 60.
- 6 Although scholarship regards Homer as the *presumed* author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, for convenience sake this article will refer to him as the actual author. These poems were composed at the moment of delivery to an audience of aristocrats who already knew the summary of the stories.
- 7 Michael M. Sage, *Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 1996), 2.
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- 32 Sage, *Warfare in Ancient Greece*, 39.
- 33 Davies, "A Democratic Consideration of Herodotus's Histories," 105.
- 34 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.23.6, The Perseus Catalog, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>.
- 35 In antiquity, Sparta was known as Lacedaemon and the people as Lacedaemonians.
- 36 A rigorous education and training program mandated for all male Spartan citizens, apart from the firstborn son in the ruling houses, Eurypontid and Agiad.
- 37 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 210.29.
- 38 Carey et al., *Warfare in the Ancient World*, 52.
- 39 Sage, *Warfare in Ancient Greece*, 135-136.
- 40 Carey et al., *Warfare in the Ancient World*, 55.
- 41 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 4.33.2.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 5.18.4.
- 43 *Hermai*: statues of the heads of the god *Hermes*; the *Eleusian Mysteries*: initiations held every year for the goddesses *Demeter* and *Persephone*. The destruction and profanation of these were scandalous and illegal, and a bad omen for the mission.

- 44 Carey et al., *Warfare in the Ancient World*, 55-57.
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**THE HISTORICAL MINIATURES GAMING SOCIETY
PACIFIC SOUTHWEST ESSAY CONTEST
SECOND PRIZE WINNER**

**The Invasion at Inchon: The Greatest
Turning Point of the Korean War**

Sgt. John Chambliss, United States Marine Corps
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ABSTRACT

In August of 1950, the southeastern corner of the Korean peninsula was under siege. Here, South Korea and the United Nations were pushed into a final defensive line. This line, known as the Pusan Perimeter, was quickly being overrun while men and supplies were depleting by the day. With the North Korean Naktong Offensive beginning on 1 September, an event that marked North Korea's final assault on South Korea, the Pusan Perimeter was in serious trouble. The United States had to rescue the peninsula and protect vital United Nations interests. In order to relieve the Perimeter, an invasion of the peninsula needed to occur. Thanks to the brilliant minds and actions of all those involved, a successful invasion on the western side of the peninsula marked the first turning point of the war in favor of the United Nations.

Keywords: Inchon, Kim Il-sung, General Douglass MacDonald, Naktong, Pusan, United States Marine, Wolmi-Do Island, X-Corps

**La invasión de Inchon: el mayor punto de inflexión
de la guerra de Corea**

RESUMEN

En agosto de 1950, la esquina sureste de la península de Corea estaba sitiada. Aquí, Corea del Sur y las Naciones Unidas fueron empujadas a una línea defensiva final. Esta línea, conocida como el Perímetro de Pusan, estaba siendo invadida rápidamente mientras los hombres y los suministros se agotaban día a día. Con el comienzo

de la ofensiva de Naktong de Corea del Norte el 1 de septiembre, un evento que marcó el asalto final de Corea del Norte a Corea del Sur, el perímetro de Pusan estaba en serios problemas. Estados Unidos tuvo que rescatar la península y proteger intereses vitales de las Naciones Unidas. Para aliviar el Perímetro, era necesario que ocurriera una invasión de la península. Gracias a las mentes y acciones brillantes de todos los involucrados, una invasión exitosa en el lado occidental de la península marcó el primer punto de inflexión de la guerra a favor de las Naciones Unidas.

Palabras clave: Inchon, Kim Il-sung, General Douglass MacDonal, Naktong, Pusan, Infantería de Marina de los Estados Unidos, Isla Wolmi-Do, X-Corps

仁川侵略：朝鲜战争最大的转折点

摘要

1950年8月，朝鲜半岛东南角被包围。韩国和联合国军被推入最后一道防线。这道被称为釜山环形防御圈（Pusan Perimeter）的防线迅速被包围，同时防线内的人力和补给濒临枯竭。同年9月1日，朝鲜发起洛东江进攻，这是朝鲜对韩国发起的最后一次攻击，釜山环形防御圈局势十分恶劣。美国不得不营救朝鲜半岛并保护重要的联合国军利益。为缓解防御圈局势，入侵朝鲜半岛势在必行。在远见卓识和所有相关行动的助力下，美国成功入侵朝鲜半岛西部，这标志该战役出现了有利于联合国军的首次转折点。

关键词：仁川，金日成，General Douglass MacDonald，洛东江，釜山，美国海军陆战队，月尾岛，第10军

On 15 September 1950, Charlie Carmin, a United States Marine, sat in his Landing Vehicle Tracked and listened to the sound of bullets flying over his head. Carmin's LVT had crawled over small walls and eventually came to a stop at the Inchon

beach. Carmin and his company were ordered out of the LVT and onto the beach, where everyone had to immediately take cover as enemy fire ricocheted off of the LVT's metal hull and into unknown directions. Once covered on the beach, while enemy fire still flew

over his head, Carmin was ordered by his Sergeant to advance inland.¹ As Carmin advanced, he noted several dead bodies littering the sands of Inchon. Blood stained their white clothing and sunk deep into the sand. Visibility was low from the explosions and fire surrounding his fellow Marines as they advanced. The X Corps had officially landed after months of preparation. The Battle of Inchon and the invasion of Korea was finally underway.

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 with the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans. Throughout the summer, the North Korean People's Army held a respectable degree of success in their endeavors as they took cities, imprisoned enemies of communism, and executed all those who stood in their way. The NKPA forced members of the Republic of Korea to evacuate while also trapping most of the ROK and United Nations behind a final defensive line in the south-eastern corner of the Korean peninsula. The Pusan River was the dividing line that held much of the ROK's army along with prominent UN forces. Taking Pusan would accomplish North Korea's goal of a fully unified Korean peninsula under communism. The UN, and more specifically the United States, got involved and set to work to relieve the Pusan Perimeter and attack Korea where the NKPA was most vulnerable. Inchon, a small harbor on the north-western corner of modern-day South Korea, was chosen as the site of an American invasion by General Douglas MacArthur.

After several months of debate, MacArthur convinced his seniors and subordinates to attack at Inchon. This operation would rival Operation Overlord six years prior in complexity and sensitivity. The battle began on 15 September and would accomplish numerous goals.² However, these goals would have never been obtained if it were not for MacArthur's leadership, tenacity, and resolve. MacArthur would not micromanage, but would delegate authority to his subordinates who were primarily made up of hand-picked general officers of the United States Armed Forces.³ Even with the best men and attitude encompassing his headquarters, MacArthur had to convince his superiors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over a long period that this operation would succeed. First met with great opposition, MacArthur was eventually approved to go about his operation. Washington was briefed, and the world waited in silence as the greatest turning point of the Korean War unfolded. The Battle of Inchon was the most significant event of the Korean War due to what was at stake, the complex planning that took place, how the battle was fought, and what was gained following the conflict.

For years, the Korean peninsula was subjected to Japanese rule. Following the Portsmouth Treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan was left primarily untouched to do as they pleased throughout Korea. For nearly two generations Korea suffered and was exploited by their Japanese overlords. The Second World War finally liberated the Koreans as the Japanese Empire fell. However, creat-

ing a new Korean state caused much turmoil throughout the peninsula and the world. The United States held influence over Korea south of the 38th Parallel while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics held influence north of the Parallel. Similar to the issue of governing Europe in the post-war years, Korea felt the same stress. The United Nations recognized South Korea as a legitimate nation built on democracy while grasping at straws to convince the communist inspired government of North Korea to join the ROK. The North Koreans, who were equally devoted to convincing the South to join their republic, accepted its role with the USSR and China. North Korea received aid from the Soviets while also supporting a strong alliance with China following their involvement in the Chinese Civil War. In a move to unite South, North Korea attacked South Korea with military aid from both nations, officially initiating the Korean War in June of 1950.

For the next two and a half months, the NKPA succeeded in bringing South Korea to its knees. The UN demanded that North Korea end its assault and retreat north across the 38th Parallel. However, the NKPA ignored this order. The United States, who had their own interests in Korea, along with forces trapped in Pusan, needed a plan to invade the peninsula. MacArthur believed since June that Inchon was the perfect place to attack. Since an attack there would have caught the NKPA off guard and because of Inchon's close proximity to Seoul, 100,000 lives would be saved by focusing on Inchon versus an assault elsewhere.⁴ Through the

many months of MacArthur's planning, the NKPA believed an American assault was imminent. Following the war's conclusion in 1953, it was revealed that North Korea expected an attack by late August.⁵ As the North Koreans prefigured this assault, and with Pusan being the last line of defense, the NKPA initiated the Naktong Offensive on 1 September as their final push to break the Pusan Perimeter.

For two weeks, the NKPA unleashed a relentless barrage of soldiers, artillery, and charges at the Pusan Perimeter. The fighting was brutal and devastating. The NKPA often dressed up like allied soldiers and snuck behind UN lines.⁶ The UN destroyed Pusan bridges and struggled to hold their line. Nearly broken, the UN never gave in. Pusan needed to be relieved. Fresh troops were shipped there quickly and eventually recalled closer to 10 September for an upcoming invasion. This invasion had been in the planning stages for a long time. Only on 15 September did the Naktong Offensive finally cease. The reason was due to the landing at Inchon and the invasion of Korea that same day. Kim Il-sung quickly relocated troops throughout the peninsula to meet this western invasion. With the Naktong Offensive officially over, Pusan was finally liberated. Capturing Inchon was no easy feat. This invasion required numerous skills in strategic planning.


Since the war's inception, MacArthur believed Inchon would be an ideal place to invade. For MacArthur, the invasion could end the conflict in one month.⁷ However, many objected

to Inchon for several reasons. Other than being on the other side of the Korean peninsula, Inchon sat on an ocean-front filled with mud flaps only accessible from a tortuous channel. The tides there were also unforgiving—ranging from “31.2 feet at flood to minus .5 at ebb,” one would have to calculate a landing at the appropriate time of year and time of day.⁸ Landing in September would only allow a landing force a few hours to secure the beach for a large invasion force to take Inchon. Because of these factors, General Walker and others went to great lengths to devise plans for other potential invasion sites.⁹ Some officers also thought that Inchon should be avoided due to MacArthur’s uncomfortable obsession with Inchon; they felt it was not a good idea due to the late General Patton’s advice on avoiding plans that felt too personal: “Most American officers don’t know a damned thing about envelopments. They call any move in the enemy rear, for whatever reason, an envelopment. Too often, they make the mistake of becoming so engrossed in their own plans that they forget about the enemy.”¹⁰

For an hour-and-a-half, General Walker, Admiral Doyle, and other prominent high-ranking members of the American Armed Forces made their fears about Inchon known to MacArthur. By citing the previous issues, the two general officers also made MacArthur aware of their fears of the typhoon season, which would be at its greatest strength by mid-September when MacArthur planned to attack. Along with these complications, the physical task of taking Inchon would be even

more difficult to take if Wolmi-do Island was not secured before invading. This island rested in the waters outside of Inchon and hosted several machine-gun nests, which gave the NKPA a strong advantage in an invasion from the sea. However, even with these dangers explained, MacArthur spoke for forty-five minutes defending his stance and attacking each of their fears. By claiming the enemy had failed to fortify Inchon’s defenses, MacArthur argued Inchon could be taken if his plan was strictly followed. By using his knowledge of military history, MacArthur cited General Wolfe during the Battle of Quebec in 1759. There, General Wolfe defeated General Montcalm by invading Quebec through an unexpected location. By imitating this plan of attack, Inchon could be MacArthur’s Quebec.¹¹ Finally, MacArthur stated that attacking Inchon would bring the UN closer to Seoul, which was a vital choke point for the NKPA; taking it would dismantle the North Korean’s logistics and means of defense. MacArthur finished by saying he trusted the Navy and Marine Corps’ abilities to invade Inchon, which both would be relied upon for this phase of the invasion: “The Navy has never turned me down yet, and I know it will not now.”¹²

Many in the room trusted MacArthur more than they feared Inchon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then authorized MacArthur to invade at Inchon. Most believed that Inchon would be a gamble of 5,000 to 1—however, MacArthur would risk all as he believed the invasion would save more lives than lost.¹³ To properly plan for the assault,



Map of the Invasion of Inchon, n.d., Provided by the History Reader from the Book *American Battles and Campaigns*.

Navy Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark was entrusted with acquiring reconnaissance of the invasion site. Clark's job was to spy on the harbor and note when to invade along with dismantling any means of defense that the NKPA might use against the invaders.¹⁴ With a small team of American troops and Koreans, Clark landed at Inchon and established a perimeter on one of the small islands. Clark's team acquired reconnaissance all the way to Seoul, noting enemy defenses, key information about the tides,

while also taking Wolmi-do island in the process.¹⁵ On 10 September, Clark encountered a detail of 60 NKPA soldiers. After attacking the detail and ordering an airstrike on their forces, Clark scattered the NKPA. However, the NKPA failed to come back and attack Clark, leaving him to assume that his group was not taken seriously.¹⁶

Throughout his time at Inchon until 14 September, Clark reported all of his findings to MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo via a communica-

The Invasion at Inchon: The Greatest Turning Point of the Korean War



U.S. Navy Ships Bombard the Coast in Preparation for the Landings Two days Later that would Commence the Battle of Inchon, 1950, provided by Ben Loudermilk.



1st Lt. Baldomero Lopez Leading Troops Over a Sea Wall at Inchon, 1950, by Bill Dotterer, Provided by The Laker/Lutz News.

tions box powered by a small generator. On 14 September, Clark noticed an increase in NKPA activity and retreated his small detail to the island of Taebu. On this island was an old French oil-lit lighthouse, which Clark promised to light for the invasion.¹⁷ At 0230 on 15 September, Clark lit the lighthouse. Clark's mission had been a success. Clark established himself on Wolmi-do, Taebu, and confirmed the correct times to invade Inchon. The newly formed X Corps, a force made up of the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division, both possessing personnel recalled for this invasion from all over the world, was on their way.¹⁸ The Marines were entrusted in this invasion to carry out the most daring of the assault—taking the beach. Based off of their performance from the Pacific Campaign that had ended five years earlier, MacArthur relied on the experience the Marines had obtained. The Marines would be dropped off on the morning of 15 September, take the beach and establish a defensive perimeter. The fleet would have to retreat until later that day when the tides returned. For hours, the Marines would be alone at Inchon. Until the Marines could establish the perimeter on the beach, the army would only be “along for the ride.”¹⁹

Admiral Doyle, who had landed forces at Omaha Beach during the Normandy Campaign in 1944, led the invasion force of 270 ships with 80,000 Marines.²⁰ At 0630 on 15 September, the Marines landed after heavy naval gun fire and aerial support bombarded the harbor. Suffering seventeen 17 wounded, the Marines took the beach

while the NKPA experienced 400 casualties within an hour and twenty-five minutes.²¹ Lt. Clark's spotlight had aided the Americans while they crossed the channel. At 1733, the first landing craft of the second invasion force landed north of Wolmi-do. Compared to the brutal fighting of the Pacific Theatre, the Marines sustained minimal casualties at Inchon and met with little resistance. Nearly 2,000 NKPA soldiers were at Inchon when the Marines had landed. By 0130 on 16 September, Inchon was encircled and in American possession. The Marines suffered twenty 20 killed, 174 wounded, and 1 missing.²² The majority of these were from American Landing Ship Tank gunners as their trigger-happy fingers accidentally fired on the Marines. Once secured, the ROK was allowed into Inchon to mop up any resistance. In this phase of the battle, one can see how the NKPA viewed the Americans and ROK as savages. The ROK engulfed the city and left no man, woman, or child safe. As it would be revealed towards the latter half of the twentieth century, no side of the war was perfect.

X Corps was victorious. An unimaginable feat to most, MacArthur was ultimately correct in his assumption that Inchon could be easily taken. Now that the Americans and the ROK were within eighteen miles of Seoul, the next phase of the invasion could commence—the decimation of the NKPA logistical system and support. MacArthur then charged General Almond, the commander of X Corps, to take Seoul within five days, a request which Almond believed would take two weeks.²³

The Battle of Seoul, however, occurred just a week later on 22 September. Because of MacArthur's push towards Inchon, Seoul fell rather quickly and basically unopposed. Inchon was the key and Seoul was the door to the conquest of the Korean peninsula. The NKPA's defeat at Seoul was followed by what the NKPA regarded as the "Great Retreat."²⁴ The NKPA were pushed north past the 38th Parallel to the Chinese border at the Yalu River. The height of the American conquest of Korea had been reached and the coming stalemate of the war was only months away.

Some could speculate that the NKPA was taken completely by surprise from the Inchon campaign. However, this is far from true. Mao Zedong convinced Kim that the attack was coming soon. During Clark's mission, the 10 September aerial attack on the NKPA at Inchon convinced the NKPA to abandon any doubt that the Americans were near, causing Kim to order his troops to: "Protect and defend all liberated areas! Defend your blood and life every mountain and every river!"²⁵ Many believed that Inchon was not as fortified as it could have been due to Kim pulling most of his expendable forces north of the 38th Parallel to create a final defensive line to repel the advancing Americans.

The invasion at Inchon uncovered several atrocities happening behind NKPA lines. On their march towards Seoul, the Americans uncovered graveyards and trenches of bodies of prisoners of war that littered the Korean countryside.²⁶ Western leaders ordered

the leadership of the NKPA be tried for war crimes; the NKPA argued that it has repeatedly ordered that such killings to cease. Regardless, it was discovered that over 1,000 prisoners, some military and some political, had been executed due to a lack of ability to transport them north as the Americans approached Seoul. Many were killed "humanly" with a shot behind the ear. Graves were discovered by the thousands; the NKPA executed prisoners from "ROK police, army, and rightist youths."²⁷ The full brutality of the war had yet to be discovered.

The Battle of Inchon was a surprising success. MacArthur's ability to convince others to follow his plan speaks highly to his aptness as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. However, most regarded their trust in MacArthur as more important than their own feelings. Admiral Doyle, General Walker, and General Almond all went against their better judgement and proved MacArthur to be a master tactician. The invasion at Inchon also occurred in time to counter the Naktong Offensive. Valiantly, the UN forces trapped behind the Pusan held their deteriorating line as supplies and fresh troops became more and scarcer with the unforgivable assault from the NKPA. Fortunately, the NKPA allowed a similar mistake that General Montcalm had made almost 200 years earlier within their conquered territory. This mistake was exploited magnificently and stopped the assault of the Naktong Offensive in its tracks while NKPA troops were redistributed all over Korea.

Regarding naval superiority, the Battle of Inchon was a great example of how a “strong and coordinated sea, air, and land force” would be a decisive factor in “littoral operations.”²⁸ There was a lot of planning that had to go into play to achieve this perfect masterpiece of naval supremacy. MacArthur’s tenacious attitude convinced his peers, subordinates, and superiors that an invasion of Inchon was the most ideal plan of attack. Though met with great opposition, MacArthur used his political acumen and public speaking abilities to sway doubters. Once approved, a brilliant performance by Clark allowed MacArthur to properly plan for the coming battle ahead. Because of Clark’s reconnaissance and presence at Inchon, a landing force was possible due to his confirmation of enemy positions, tides, and weather forecasting. Along with Clark’s assault over Wolmi-do, and the conquest of Taebu, the American invasion force was able to invade Inchon along with being more prepared for a siege of Seoul in the coming weeks.

Had MacArthur invaded elsewhere, the atrocities of the NKPA might have been discovered eventually. However, Inchon allowed a closer route to

Seoul, another objective which would crush the NKPA once taken. The march to Seoul opened the eyes of the west to the brutal executions and unethical means of conquest that the NKPA executed on its southern cultural brothers and sisters. However, the South Korean army as a whole were not on a higher moral ground. The ROK pillaged Inchon, a crime which the United States has since been accused of being complicit in due to its tolerance of the ROK’s behavior following the invasion. The actions of both North and South Korea had since caused Koreans to view the war in a different light. Young Sik Kim, a North Korean who fought for the Americans at the Battle of Inchon, has since described his feelings of the war as being negative. Young felt lied to by Kim Il-sung, abused by the Soviets, and forgotten by the Americans.²⁹ The Battle of Inchon was a success. Korea was invaded, Seoul was taken, and the Great Retreat had pushed the NKPA to near destruction. Because of MacArthur’s ability as a general and commander, the Battle of Inchon is the greatest turning point of the war due to what was at stake, the planning put in place, how the battle was fought, and what was obtained for the coming weeks ahead.

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**THE HISTORICAL MINIATURES GAMING SOCIETY
PACIFIC SOUTHWEST ESSAY CONTEST
HONORABLE MENTION**

The Greek Hoplite at the Battle of Thermopylae

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ABSTRACT

In 480 BCE the combined armies of Greece, led by Sparta, confronted the Persian Army at the pass of Thermopylae. The pass at Thermopylae was an ideal location that best suited the Greek hoplites, and the pass could have been held for a significant amount of time had the Greeks not been betrayed by Ephialtes. The Greek hoplite was the primary soldier figure who was a citizen that fought in the phalanx formation. This analysis with the focus on the Greek hoplite helps place a new perspective for the conduct of ancient warfare.

Keywords: Sparta, Persia, Fifth Century BCE, Thermopylae, Greek, Hoplite, phalanx, ancient warfare, ancient tactics

El hoplita griego en la batalla de las Termópilas

RESUMEN

En 480 a. C., los ejércitos combinados de Grecia, liderados por Esparta, se enfrentaron al ejército persa en el paso de las Termópilas. El paso de las Termópilas era un lugar ideal que se adaptaba mejor a los hoplitas griegos, y el paso podría haberse mantenido durante una cantidad significativa de tiempo si Efilates no hubiera traicionado a los griegos. El hoplita griego era la figura principal del soldado que era un ciudadano que luchó en la formación de falange. Este análisis, que se centra en el hoplita griego, ayuda a establecer una nueva perspectiva para la conducción de la guerra antigua.

Palabras clave: Esparta, Persia, siglo V a. C., Termópilas, griego, hoplita, falange, guerra antigua, tácticas antiguas

温泉关战役的希腊装甲步兵

摘要

公元前480年，由斯巴达带领的希腊联军在温泉关抗击波斯军。温泉关是最适合希腊装甲步兵的理想场所，并且如果希腊人没有被厄菲阿尔特背叛的话，温泉关还能坚守住相当一段时间。希腊装甲步兵是参与装甲方阵的主要士兵。本篇文章聚焦于希腊装甲步兵，帮助为古代战争组织方式提供新的分析视角。

关键词：斯巴达，波斯，公元前5世纪，温泉关，希腊，装甲步兵，方阵，古代战争，古代战术

In 480 BCE, the Spartan-led army confronted the Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae. The Athenian general Themistocles decided the defense would be focused there in order to make the best use of numbers and terrain. Additional factors also played into the planning of the defense, such as the naval blockade at Artemisium; however, the intent was to stop the massive Persian army while the Spartan army was delayed. The pass at Thermopylae was an ideal location that best suited the Greek hoplites' fighting style and could have been held for a several days had the Greeks not been betrayed by Ephialtes.

The foundations of the Battle of Thermopylae lay with the structure of the Greek city-states, the composition of the Greek army, and the immediate history preceding the Greco-Persian War. The Greek city-states exerted influence over a region larger than the city itself and were located on the Aegean

peninsula. The two principal city-states relating to the Greco-Persian War were Athens and Sparta.¹ These two city-states had been switching from ally to enemy in the decades leading up to the Ionian Revolts and subsequent Persian invasion. Each state was governed and administered differently with different approaches to its respective militaries.

In the past, Spartans had helped the Athenians overthrow their tyrant but they had replaced it with an oligarchy in 510 BCE.² That pro-Spartan government was then overthrown in favor of democracy. Sparta saw this as undermining their authority or at the very least their power base and so they attacked Athens. However, Athens was able to repel a large assault on the city and defeat Sparta. This put the two city-states at odds with each other. Sparta on the other hand maintained its diarchy as its government with one king in charge of the administrative side of government and the other the military.

The central figures in the Greek army were the soldiers, the hoplites, and the formation in which they stood, called the phalanx. The hoplite was significantly better equipped than the Persian forces though that could be to the sheer size of the Persian army and the logistics of equipping a force of an estimated 300,000 infantry. The Greek hoplites were both citizen and soldier as they fulfilled two roles in society not unlike the modern-day military reservist.³ The hoplites would tend to their lands in the winter seasons and return to the battlefield during the campaigning months. As many hoplites returned to work their farms, which were often a reward for military service, many military campaigns often lasted for one season.⁴ Hoplites were generally free males who could afford to purchase their own equipment, such as the bronze armor.

Hoplite warfare developed over time up until the Eighth or Seven Century BCE when more discipline was added to the hoplite training regimen.⁵ Even then the hoplites had no formal training. Their primary training occurred when being taught the phalanx formation. The phalanx formation was able to take advantage of the individual's strength for the greater purpose of the team. The hoplite was generally well-armed despite having to provide for their own equipment or the fact that there was no standard for the entirety of the Greek army. However, armor would have been passed down from family member to family member if possible due to the expense involved. The armor itself, or panoply, was made of bronze for the hoplite of the middle

to upper class. Those who could not afford bronze armor opted for the shield as opposed to body armor. Those who did purchase or own armor typically had a helmet modeled after the Corinthian helmet.

The Greek shield has often been referred to as a hoplon, from which we derive the name hoplite. However, the most common name of the Greek shield was aspis and it generally a large concave shield.⁶ The aspis was made of wood but usually had a thin piece of bronze over it to deflect spears and arrows. It was designed to be carried in conjunction with the Greek spear on long marches and was fitted with an inner strap for carrying either by arm or on the shoulder. The key factor about the aspis is the argive grip to the edge of the aspis. The wearer would place their arm through the strap and hold onto the grip. By doing so, the wearer had greater control of the shield and was significantly less likely to have the shield move out of position when struck by an opponent. The design of the shield allowed the hoplite to strike the middle of his opponent while the shield protected them from strikes. The shield was often decorated with a family crest as it was likely passed from father to son. These decorations gave way to a more standardized form of national symbol such as the iconic Spartan chevron also known as a lambda.

The spear was the primary weapon of the Greek hoplite and had a varying length but was generally either eight feet long or fifteen feet long.⁷ With an approximate thickness of one inch, the

spear had a spearhead on one end and a sauroter on the other. The sauroter was used to provide balance and could be used offensively if necessary. The most likely form of attack was to hold the spear with an overhead grip and strike towards the center mass of their opponent. An underhand grip could have also been used, but was more likely to be deflected by the opponent's shield or weapon. A major advantage provided by the Greek spear was that its length far exceeded that of the Persian spear. This allowed the Greeks to strike the Persians without immediate fear of reprisal strikes. The increased spear lengths also allowed for the rear ranks to provide some protection from missile or arrow attacks by holding their spears over their forward ranks.

The last weapon common among the Greek hoplite was a short sword referred to as a xiphos.⁸ It was similar to but predated the more recognizable Roman Gladius. The sword was typically around two feet long, but the Spartan swords are reported to be one third smaller. The advantage of this sword was realized when two infantrymen were shield to shield or within the range of the spear. The short sword allowed for the hoplite to attack his opponent between shields in the throat or legs where a longer sword would have been useless.

While the average Greek citizen-soldier was often untrained the male Spartan citizens underwent the Agoge which was a rigorous training program. The Agoge only applied to male citizens and not free non-citi-

zens, females, or slaves. At age seven, the males would enter the Agoge which would then last until age 30.⁹ The men of the Agoge would live together in communal groups and violence was often used to illustrate a point or as an educational tool. The second half of the Agoge involved partnering up with an older Spartan warrior that he may pass on his knowledge to the next generation. Any Spartan male who failed the Agoge was denied Spartan citizenship. Once the Agoge was completed the Spartan citizen was expected to pay for their membership into their social class. Those who could not afford to begin or sustain their membership were denied citizenship.¹⁰ The significance behind the Agoge is that the Spartan warriors, not warriors from Sparta such as perioikoi or helots, were well trained compared to their allies and their enemies. The Agoge also created a distinction from the citizen-soldiers of Athens and the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae. This distinction is one of the reasons why many believe that only 300 Spartans were holding the pass as there were only 300 fully trained and initiated Spartans present.

The training and equipment of the Greek soldiers created an individual warrior, but the organization of the phalanx provided the military machine with which Greece won its wars. The phalanx formation was rectangular comprised of heavy infantry and designed to have each member work together. The formation consisted of hoplites in rank and file similar to the modern-day squad and rank system. In this position the hoplites would have

been able to lock their shields together in order to provide maximum protection. The first few ranks of hoplites would extend their shields toward the enemy while the back ranks were able to use their spears as a makeshift overhead shield for those initial ranks. The unified front presented by the phalanx would have seemed nearly impenetrable to their opponents and it discouraged the notion of a frontal assault. The formation itself would have been easy to teach as citizen-soldiers were required to learn it quickly so as to be effective on the battlefield.

The phalanx consisted of a formation of an eight-man deep formation when shields were locked together at a distance of about two feet.¹¹ This was the standard, but exceptions were made when necessary such as recorded at the Battle of Marathon. The phalanx did not march in this formation and as such opened up to a distance of about six feet between files. The nature of the phalanx allowed for the rotation of personnel from the front ranks to the back to cycle in new troops thus preventing exhaustion from overcoming the formation. The middle ranks would have been able to strike the front line of the enemy due to the length of the Greek spear. In these ways the entirety of the Greek phalanx could engage the enemy as opposed to just the front rank. However, the phalanx only worked at 100 percent effectiveness on flat terrain. The phalanx formation was less effective on rough or rocky terrain as the hoplites would not have been able to move as one unit together or lock shields.

Another weakness of the Greek phalanx was its inability to quickly counter threats to its sides or rear. The arrangement of the spears and shields within the phalanx present a united front but did not protect the sides or rear as everything was facing forward. The length of the spear would have made it difficult, even with sufficient training, to turn and protect a different angle. Even doing this would have weakened the front of the line. This is why the Greek phalanx was vulnerable to quick moving cavalry units and why the Greeks were unable to hold their position in Thermopylae once the Persians had been informed of how to approach their position from the rear.

The Persian army was not as so well armed and armored as the Greek hoplites. The Persians typically wore light armor that was made of quilted linen and their shields were made of wicker.¹² The Persian armaments were also shorter than those of their Greek counterparts. In a one versus one matchup between the Greek and Persian soldiers, the Greek soldier would typically win due to their superior equipment. Persia did have many other military strengths over the Greeks. Persians were excellent cavalry riders that would throw projectiles or missiles and then withdraw quickly. These troops and their technique were unmatched at the time but only on an open field. The mountains surrounding the hot gates prevented the use of Persian cavalry by design. Therefore, the Persians relied on superior numbers and archery in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage.



Fifth Century Greek Hoplite BCE. Artifact in Brussels, Koninklijke musea voor kunst en geschiedenis, photo by Jona Lendering. <https://www.livius.org/pictures/a/greek-art/hoplite/>



Leonidas at the Battle of Thermopylae engraving created at bequest of Elinor Merrell in 1815. https://www.si.edu/object/leonidas-thermopylae:chndm_1995-50-363



Hoplite fight from Athens Archaeological Museum. Photo by Grant Mitchell.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/anachronism_uk/84783957/in/set-1811994/

The Greek and Persian forces had been set on a path of confrontation since the beginning of the Fifth Century BCE when the Athenians and Eretrians supported the Ionian Rebellion against Persian rule.¹³ This would have been a minor inconvenience for the Persia Empire as part of the Persian Empire's ever expanding territorial boundaries and resulting conquests. Due to the Athenian support of the Ionians, however, Darius I decided to march his army past the Hellespont and towards the Greek city-states. His generals' initial campaigns were failures and demonstrated to the Greeks that the Persians were not invincible. After the Battle of Marathon, the Persian army returned home and Darius began to build a larger army in order to return to Greece. However, the Egyptians revolted which forced the

Persians to turn their attention elsewhere. Darius died prior to marching on Egypt and the task fell to his son, Xerxes I, who suppressed the rebellion.

Xerxes was then able to turn his attention back towards the Greek city-states. He sent emissaries to request samples of food, land, and water in order to demonstrate their submission to Persian rule. Xerxes reportedly did not send ambassadors to Athens or to avoid tipping off his intentions. As such, many of the smaller city-states who opposed Persian rule flocked to Athens and Sparta. These two city-states put aside their differences in support of alliance with the coalition of other city-states who opposed the Persians. Their alliance united the region and their forces were referred to as the Greeks despite some

Greek regions aligning themselves with Persia. This set the stage for the beginning of the Persian invasion after winter ended in 480 BCE.

The Greeks had been preparing for an eventual second Persian invasion and built a fleet of triremes at the advice of Themistocles. However, the Greek city-states did not have a free-standing army that could be called upon at a moment's notice. An army would require the individual city-states of Greece to contribute the troops and said troops were often citizen-soldiers as opposed to professional military. Themistocles, an Athenian politician and general, would lead the strategic planning of the defense of the Aegean. Delegations were sent to discuss the war plans and the Thessalians suggested that the defense should focus on the Vale of Tempe. An initial force was sent to secure the Vale, but the Vale had a fatal flaw. Alexander I of Macedonia, informed the troops that there was a pass that would have completely routed the defenders. Upon hearing this news, the Greek hoplites withdrew shortly before they received the news that the Persians were able to cross the Hellespont.

The Persian army was able to make its way across the Hellespont by building two pontoon bridges at Abydos. In this manner Xerxes was able to have his army and navy travel together. It is said that Xerxes had the waters whipped out of rage because they were not cooperating with his plans. The fact that the Persian army and navy traveled together created a unique challenge for the Greeks and it was further compli-

cated by Xerxes' decision to time his arrival in Greece with the Olympic Games. The Spartans considered it to be sacrilegious to make war during the Olympics as well as during the Carneia Festival which is also why they were delayed at the Battle of Marathon.¹⁴ Themistocles had to devise a plan that would stop both the Persian army and the navy at relatively the same location without the aid of the main Spartan army. Themistocles then decided that it was best to stop the Persian's southern advance by stopping them at the "Hot Gates" of Thermopylae.

The decision to block the Persians at Thermopylae came with secondary consideration such as simultaneously blocking the Persian navy at Artemisium. Themistocles knew that the Greek hoplite in the phalanx formation could hold the pass and remove the Persian advantage of significant numbers. However, the Spartan issue could not be avoided despite them being the military leaders of the alliance. Instead of the entire army marching on Persia, the Spartans sent one of their kings, Leonidas I, with his personal bodyguard of 300 Spartans as an advance guard.

The number of troops on either side of the battle has been greatly exaggerated history and the correct number may never be known. However, Herodotus gives an accounting of the troops on the Greek side that can be broken down into various categories.¹⁵ The first myth to be dispelled is that only 300 Spartans held the pass at Thermopylae. This number is only a reflection of the Spartan hoplites that accompa-

nied Leonidas and not the full Spartan contingent. In addition, there were approximately 900 free but non-citizen Lacedaemonians who accompanied an additional approximate 2,000 troops from across the Peloponnesian peninsula. The Thespians reportedly sent a contingent of 700 while the Thebans and Phocians dispatched 400 and 1,000 men respectively. Herodotus also reported that the Locrians sent all the men they had available along with seven ships to contribute to the naval fleet.

The size of the Persian army has been a subject of debate by historians for centuries which usually list it as one million infantry. The size of the Persian army may also never fully be known, but some general assumptions can be made about its size. Herodotus asserts that there as many as 2.6 million troops on the Persian side, but that number far exceeds troop sizes of other reported battles before and after the Greco-Persian War.¹⁶ It is also possible that Xerxes left a garrison at each of the major cities he conquered along the way. It is fair to assume that the number of Persian troops far exceeded the number of troops at Thermopylae and the number was still greater than the Greek alliance had available. It would also be a fair assumption that, without the pass limiting the Persian numerical advantage, the Greeks would have been unable to defeat the Persians on an open battlefield. Themistocles was able to mitigate the Persian superior numbers by the use of terrain in opposition against the Greek phalanx.

The terrain was advantageous to the Greeks as the surrounding moun-

tains prevented the use of the powerful Persian cavalry. However, there was also one pass outside of Thermopylae that would allow the Persians to rout the Greeks. This pass was mountainous and therefore not compatible with mounted infantry. It was, however, ideally suited to the lightly armored Persian infantry who had experience in mountain warfare. The Persians arrived outside of Thermopylae and sent an emissary to seek the surrender of the Greek troops. The Spartan-led army declined the offer of surrender and, five days after arriving, the Persians attacked the Greek position. The first form attack came in the form of an archery barrage. The barrage was ineffective due to the phalanx's formation ability to counter incoming projectiles with the interlocking shield formation and overhead shield of spears. Those arrows that did get through would then have had to penetrate the Greek armor and was likely deflected. Xerxes then dispatched his first wave of troops of approximately 10,000 Medes but that too was defeated. The Persians then began to launch successive assaults in waves of approximately 10,000 infantrymen on the Greek formations. However, the length of the Greek spear would have overpowered the Persians who were unable to approach the front of the Greek line with significantly smaller swords and spears.

The Greeks were able to use the terrain and adjacent Phocian wall to use as few troops as possible as well as limited the front rank of the enemy formation. The nature of the phalanx formation allowed the Greeks to rotated front-line personnel onto and off of the

battlefield thereby preventing exhausting the formation. By lining the pass shoulder-to-shoulder, the Greeks also eliminated the threat of being routed by cavalry troops along their flanks. It is known that the Greeks were able to rotate troops out of battle while holding this front line which also means that the Greek alliance had more troops than were necessary to hold the front line. Some reports state that the initial skirmishes results in total defeat of the Persians at the cost of two or three Spartan fatalities.

Xerxes believed that the day's fighting had worn on the Greek defenders and so ordered the infamous Persian Immortal unit to attack the Greek position. This unit fared no better than the previous Persian troops. This can be attested to the fact that the Greeks were able to rotate into and out of battle. Herodotus estimated that at least 20,000 Persians were killed but the casualty rate may have been significantly higher given the effectiveness of the Greek phalanx. The second day of battle saw similar actions as the first day. Xerxes continued his assault on the Greek position by launching waves of Persian light infantry. It is reported that Xerxes believed the toll of the first day's attacks would have worn out the Greeks. However, the alliance stood firm as a result of the training and defensive position they held. It is also possible that the Greeks knew that they were defending more than a pass. The Persians had come to conquer the Greek peninsula and the Greek alliance had resisted them. The likelihood of the Persians granting mercy to their families was remote and the

major cities near Thermopylae had already been evacuated in advance of the Persian army.

Toward the end of the second day, Xerxes withdrew his troops and began to contemplate on how to proceed. It was at this moment that a local resident named Ephialtes arrived with information regarding the pass around the Greek defensive position. Ephialtes offered to guide the Persians through this pass in exchange for monetary gain. Xerxes dispatched one of his commanders to investigate the path with a force of approximately 20,000 troops which may have contained elements from the Immortals.

It was at dawn that the Phocians, who were guarding the pass, discovered the approaching Persians. The Phocians retreated to a nearby hill under the assumption that the Persians had come for them specifically. The Persians were only interested in routing the Spartans and continued towards the rear of the Greek formation. A runner had been dispatched to warn the Greeks of their impending encirclement and Leonidas subsequently called for a council of war. Leonidas decided to stay and continue to defend the pass with as many troops that were willing to stay. This included the remaining Spartan soldiers as well as up to two thousand allied troops. There is some debate as to the motivations of Leonidas' decision to remain behind.¹⁷ Some believed the decision was the result of upholding Spartan law to never retreat or surrender. However, it is equally as possible that this belief stemmed from Leonidas' decision to

remain. Spartan forces would also go on to surrender during the Peloponnesian Wars thereby undermining the belief that Spartans never surrendered. It is more likely that the decision to remain was a tactical one that provided time for fleeing troops to successfully retreat as a mass exodus would have negated the phalanx's ability to prevent cavalry attacks.

The remaining force of Spartan led troops advanced to meet the Persians in an attempt to decimate the Persian formations.¹⁸ The Spartans and its remaining allies would have been unable to hold their former position facing two fronts as the phalanx is strongest when facing only one direction. It is also unlikely that they had enough remaining personnel to defend on two fronts. It is reported that the Spartans and Thespians fought until every spear was shattered. Leonidas died in the assault and, once his body was recovered, the remaining troops retreated to a nearby hill for their last stand. Xerxes then ordered arrow barrages until the remaining defenders were dead although a large contingent of Thebans did surrender prior to the last stand. As a result of the failure to hold the pass at Thermopylae the naval blockade at Artemisium was no longer necessary and the Greek navy withdrew. Xerxes went on to sack several Greek cities until his navy was decimated at the Battle of Salamis. Xerxes feared being trapped in Greece and retreated with the bulk of his army back to the Hellespont. His general was subsequently defeated at the Battle of Plataea in 479 BCE.¹⁹

These were the events recorded by the various historians of the time and thereafter. There are some additional hypothetical questions that will help illustrate the nature of the Greek hoplite as well as the phalanx formation. All of these hypothetical situations will take into account the first two days of fighting before the betrayal of Ephialtes. These scenarios will also follow that the naval blockade at Artemisium held against the Persian navy since the blockade was only canceled due to a lack of necessity. Lastly, the scenarios will assume that Ephialtes or anyone else betrayed the pass to the Persians.

With the absence of Ephialtes betrayal, the first question is whether or not Xerxes would have continued his attack? It is highly likely that he would have continued to press on the Greek position for many days as it would have overextended his logistics to try to go around the pass at Thermopylae. A full retreat would have been unlikely at this point as well as Xerxes had already expended many resources in arriving at Thermopylae. It is likely he would have continued to press the attack. It is also likely that his scouts would have eventually found the pass around the Greek line but, for the sake of this scenario, not for several days. Herodotus places the total Persian dead at 20,000, but that somewhat counters his claim that the Persian waves were decimated upon Spartan shields. It is likely that 20,000 died on the first day and that wounded were not counted among those numbers. The initial Spartan casualties were listed as two or three, but this could have been a form of propaganda. It is

likely that the Spartan casualties were indeed very low but other non-Spartan casualties were also incurred.

The third day of battle would have continued the same as the first two, as the Spartan lines of supply were still open. The advantages of the phalanx would have remained intact as the terrain prevented the use of cavalry flanking maneuvers. The phalanx would have also allowed for the rotation of troops to prevent front line exhaustion or the collapse of the front line. The reports of the spears shattering on the final day of the charge would have likely been the result of extensive use in open terrain. The Spartan defenders would have been able to replace spears within the phalanx as long as the supply lines were open. It is also reported that the varying lengths of the hoplite's spear can be attested to the hoplites ability to create a spear in the field. It is therefore likely equipment shortages would not be a problem for either side as the Persian rear would have access to the same types of materials.

The constant fighting with minimal gains resulted in the degradation of Persian morale. Many Persian infantrymen would have remained on the battlefield out of fear of execution by their commanders. Many of the Persian-allied Greeks would have also remained as surrendering to the Greek neighbors would have likely resulted in execution as well. Conversely, the Greek forces would have been encouraged by their continued success and were motivated to protect their homes as free men. The Greek forces were unlikely to attempt

retreat for several days. However, the toll would have eventually taken effect on the Greek forces as the casualty rate would have become exponential as fewer troops would be available to rotate into battle.

The Persians would have had a sufficient reserve of personnel to continue the battle for a prolonged period of time. Herodotus estimated the strength of the Persians to over two million and the casualties inflicted by the Greeks were minimal compared to this number. Additionally, the Persians were able to sack several city-states after the fall of Thermopylae so they would have had the numbers to continue their assault. Reinforcements from Sparta were unlikely as the Spartan army would have been delayed until the end of the month.

The Persian numbers were irrelevant as they could only send so many troops into battle due to the narrow pass. However, after a total of five or six days, the Spartan line would have been unmanageable due to continuous combat and ever-increasing casualties. The hoplite and phalanx itself would be able to resist indefinitely in this situation but the sheer volume of enemy troops would have resulted in rout regardless of Ephialtes betrayal.

Additional scenarios result in similar results. The coordinated withdrawal of all Greeks would have left the Greeks exposed to Persian cavalry while retreating. These troops would have then been eliminated from being able to assist with the Battle of Plataea. A full defeat of all Greek defenders would have handed Xerxes a psychological

victory and rallied the Persian troops. The Greek troops could not have held the line after Ephialtes betrayal as the phalanx does not support fighting on two fronts. If the Spartans had enough troops for an additional line, it would still have been unlikely for them to hold any longer as they would have been cut off from their supplies. This would have resulted in spears not being able to be replenished once they broke. Any failure of the fleet at Artemisium would have resulted in the immediate withdrawal of Greek forces, which would have been decimated upon retreat. Only the reinforcement with troops of the Greek line at Thermopylae would have prevented the Persians from advancing on the Greek Peninsula.

The various aspects of the pass at Thermopylae were the most ideal sit-

uation for the Greek soldiers to make their stand. The terrain and their formation were their greatest advantage. The narrow pass prevented the Persians from using their significant numerical advantage against the Greek defenders. The relatively flat terrain between the mountainside and water was stable enough for the Greeks to maintain their shields locked together. The phalanx formation managed to keep a unified front against the Persians and the interlocked shields, as well as the rear file's spears, protected the Greeks from missile attack. The narrowness of the pass protected the Greek flank and rear from cavalry attack thus eliminating another of Xerxes advantages. The corresponding naval blockade at Artemisium made for no better location for Leonidas to make his final stand.

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The Guerrilla and the Peninsular War

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ABSTRACT

In today's world, we constantly hear of insurgencies. In recent history, the famous wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan displayed the potential effectiveness of the insurgent against the established power. During the Era of Napoleon, a similar situation existed in supposedly French occupied Spain. Spanish guerrillas continually frustrated and eventually wore down the world's foremost military power at that time. It rightfully earned the nickname "The Spanish Ulcer."

Keywords: Guerrilla, Insurgent, Peninsular War, Napoleon Bonaparte, Andre Massena, Spanish Ulcer

La guerrilla y la guerra peninsular

RESUMEN

En el mundo de hoy, escuchamos constantemente sobre insurgencias. En la historia reciente, las famosas guerras de Vietnam y Afganistán demostraron la eficacia potencial del insurgente contra el poder establecido. Durante la Era de Napoleón, existió una situación similar en la supuestamente ocupada España francesa. Las guerrillas españolas se frustraron continuamente y eventualmente desgastaron al principal poder militar del mundo en ese momento. Con razón se ganó el apodo de "La úlcera española".

Palabras clave: Guerrilla, Insurgente, Guerra Peninsular, Napoleón Bonaparte, André Massena, Úlcera española

游击队与半岛战争

摘要

当前，我们不断听到叛乱事件。近期历史中，越南和阿富汗发生的著名战争展现了叛乱者在挑战国家权力方面的潜

在有效性。在拿破仑时代，据说法国占领的西班牙地区出现过一次类似的场景。西班牙游击队在此期间不断阻止并最终挫败了当时最著名的军事力量。游击队合格地获得了“西班牙溃疡”（The Spanish Ulcer）的绰号。

关键词：游击队，叛乱者，半岛战争，拿破仑·波拿巴，安德烈·马塞纳，西班牙溃疡（Spanish Ulcer）

Few can argue that the years 1796-1815 were the Era of Napoleon. He conquered the most of Europe, installing vast political and social changes in his new possessions, changes eliminated after his fall from power, but changes, nonetheless, which laid the foundation for the numerous revolutions that occurred throughout Europe during the 19th century. However, the Napoleonic military machine that was the instrument of these changes could not subdue one region of Europe, the Peninsula. In the two countries of the Peninsula, Spain and Portugal, the Napoleonic military machine would grind to a halt while losing nearly 200,000 soldiers, scores of supplies, dozens of excellent commanders, and perhaps most importantly, its pride. One would think, quite naturally, that it would take an army superior to Napoleon's to bring about such a defeat. On the contrary, a new type of army, one that first appeared on a limited scale in the American Revolutionary War, was the instrument of this defeat. An army of insurgents, or as military historians term them, guerrillas, were, along with a small British army under the Duke

of Wellington between 1808 and 1814 became the scorn of France's Peninsular armies. They didn't fight in the conventional methods of line vs. line. They didn't offer their entire force to battle or conduct siege operations. Spanish guerrillas were poorly armed and equipped, often poorly led, and faced with summary execution if captured. Yet with groups at times as small as only a few men, they bled the French army during the years 1808-1814. They did not win the Peninsular War, but they did make it unwinnable for the French.

Guerrillas ambushed patrols and outposts, prevented commanders from talking to each other through their control of the countryside, making coordination of operations next to impossible. They were also a British intelligence asset. At the same time, they prevented any important intelligence from reaching the French. However, their greatest role was their mere presence. French military forces had to be available to counter guerrilla threats and such threats were possible anywhere in Spain. This prevented the concentration of the French army, depriving them of any chance at victory.

The term guerrilla was used only sparingly during this era. A war of resistance after an invader had already physically conquered a nation was termed an insurrection. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the famous observer and later writer and commentator on Napoleon and the art of war, laid out the following guidelines for an insurrection in his classic *On War* (1832):

1. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.
2. It must not be decided by a single stroke.
3. The theater of operations must be fairly large.
4. The national character must be suited to that type of war.
5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, marshes or the local methods of cultivation.¹

These conditions are only effective if the enemy is unable to fight a similar type of war or allows a conflict to degenerate into such a situation. The French unwillingly and unwittingly complied.

The first condition for a successful war of insurrection, fighting it in the interior of a country, was the Spanish guerrilla's calling card. French troop strength centered around towns and for ill-trained, ill-equipped guerrillas to fight an efficient army was suicidal. As long as the guerrillas existed, the French had no choice but to pursue them into Spain's interior.

The guerrillas avoided that general battle that would end their existence and the struggle against France. Avoiding battle allowed the guerrillas to cripple one of Napoleon's major military tenets, the destruction of the enemy army in one major battle: "I see only one thing, the enemy army and its destruction ... if you wage war, do it energetically and with severity. This is the only way to make it shorter, and consequently less inhuman."² His legendary victories at Jena and Austerlitz were conducted with that goal in mind. Those armies were razor sharp. The army in Spain after the initial French invasion lacked that edge; they were an army of occupation. Escorting couriers and foraging expeditions, chasing guerrilla bands often no larger than a few men, and garrisoning towns where the population hated them were their tasks.

Spain and its people were synonymous with Clausewitz's third and fourth conditions specifying that the theater of operations must be fairly large, and the national character must be suited to that type of war. Guerrillas used all of Spain other than their major population centers as a cover. The Spanish also did not embrace the ideas of the French Revolution politically, especially the elimination of the monarchy, which led to a revolt.³ The people, not the Spanish army, inspired the nationalism the French encountered. Diversity personified the Spanish guerrilla, "...the priest girded up his black robe, and stuck a pistol in his belt; the student threw aside his books, and grasped the sword; the shepherd forsook his flock: the husbandman his

home.”⁴ The Spanish people were perfect for this type of war.

Clausewitz’s fifth and final condition (the country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains or forests, or the local methods of cultivation), is noted in Spain by legendary Napoleonic historian David Chandler, who admitted that:


The terrain of the Peninsula favored the tip and run of guerilla harassing operations to a marked degree ... Much of the area is an immense plateau of between 2000-3000 ft., bordered by the Cantabrian Mountains in the north, the Ebro Valley to the east, the Sierra Morena and River Guadalquivir to the south, and the mountainous spurs running westwards into Portugal ... The barren nature of much of Spain – ‘a country where small armies are defeated and large armies starve’ (Henry IV of France) – makes only a few areas suitable for cavalry action ... In sum a ragged, barren country of few roads – ideal for waging a popular war by a proud, fierce, implacably xenophobic people, as the Spanish certainly were.⁵

A French cavalryman made a similar observation of Spanish terrain, the terrain he chased Spanish guerrillas over for three years:

The untamed character of the inhabitants of the peninsula, the mildness of the climate, which admits of living in the open air almost all the year, and thus to

abandon one’s dwelling upon occasion; the inaccessible retreats of the inland mountains; the sea which washes such extensive shores; all the great circumstances arising from the national character, the climate and local situation could not fail of procuring for the Spaniards numberless facilities for escaping from the oppression of their conquerors, and for multiplying their own forces, whether by transporting them rapidly to those points on which the French were weak, or in securing their escape from pursuit.⁶

The hopelessness of Spain’s natural features was impressed upon Marshal Andre Massena, one of the many French commanders in Spain who failed miserably after a career previously filled with glory. In 1810, Wellington’s army constructed a line of fortifications near the Spanish-Portuguese border and entrenched behind them. Massena would not attack because of a lack of numbers and other French commanders could not help; the guerrilla’s control of the countryside made them oblivious to Massena’s situation. Massena eventually withdrew back into Spain, losing men to the guerrillas and starvation along the way. Another French officer, Jean Jacques Pelet, adds: “The bands of insurgents were more bothersome for individual soldiers in our army than dangerous to the army itself. They brought delays rather than obstacles to the operations by compounding the two greatest difficulties of the war – food and communication.”⁷ Unable to forage or com-



Juan Malasaña avenging his daughter Manuela Malasaña on the streets of Madrid during the Dos de Mayo uprising. Painted by Eugenio Álvarez Dumont in 1887.



“The Surrender of Bailén”, by Casado del Alisal, 1864, Prado Museum, Madrid, Spain. Wikimedia Commons.



A painting depicting a column of Spanish troops during the [Peninsular War](#), painted by [Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau](#). Wikimedia Commons.

municate, the French army could never concentrate against a British army they massively outnumbered. The guerrillas ensured this.

Napoleon coined the famous phrase, "an army lives on its stomach." An unfed army may lack that extra effort needed at the key part of a battle if hungry. France's Peninsular armies were continuously ill fed. This permeated the French soldiers' mindset, a cavalry colonel noting: "Our soldiers never inquired what country we were leading them to; but if there were provisions where they were going, it was the only point of view in which they ever considered the geography of the earth."⁸ Supplying these Peninsular armies tormented Napoleon. Sending food and supplies from France over broken roads, endless mountains, on trips that could last over a month, whatever made it tended to be of little value. The entire route, once it reached Spain, also suffered continuous guerrilla attacks. Soldiers had to escort the convoys, taking strength away from the army's main body and consuming supplies along the way that further depleted what arrived for the French army. Foraging seemed to be the answer, but it ultimately allowed guerrillas to make an even larger impact.

Foraging created its own set of problems. Huge escorts were needed to safeguard foragers, and they often traveled many miles from French strongholds. Yet armed escorts were needed, as the following episode attests:

On October 12 (1809) Milosewitz took out 2,000 men for a cattle

hunt in the valley of the Besos. He pierced the blockading line, routing the miqueletes of milans at San Jeronimo de la Murta, and penetrated as far as Granollers, 20 miles from Barcelona, where he made an invaluable seizure, the food depot of the eastern section of the investing force. But he was now dangerously distant from his base, and as he was returning with his captures, the guerrillas fell upon him at San Culgat with men brought from all over the region. The Italians were routed with a loss of 300 men and their convoy was recaptured. After this Duhesme made no more attempts to send expeditions far afield: in spite of a growing scarcity of food, he could not afford to risk the loss of any more men by pushing his sorties into the inland.⁹

Once leaving the town foraging expeditions were harassed continuously, losing a few men in one spot, a few more at another. When an expedition traveled far enough inland help was impossible and the guerrillas could concentrate against even larger numbers of men. With foraging expeditions now too costly the only other option available was forced requisitions from the Spanish civilian population.

Forced civilian requisitions never work. It did help, temporarily, France's supply needs but also made enemies of all Spaniards as the French forcibly took food and other necessities from the Spanish peasants. Before this policy

much of Spain was already anti-French but much of the population remained ambivalent. That ended with the forced requisitions and the fury of the guerrillas, who exacted vengeance against any who helped the French, voluntarily or involuntarily.¹⁰ Cavalry commanders frequently conducted these requisitions and lamented its effects:

... Violent measures far from keeping down the inhabitants, only sharpened their hatred of the French, and, what always happens in a country where there is patriotism, violent measures led to reprisals still more violent. Squadrons, entire battalions were annihilated by the peasants in the course of a night. Seven hundred French prisoners were drowned at once in the Minho by order of Don Pedro de Barrios, Governor of Galicia for the Junta; and the fury of the inhabitants, far from diminishing, was every increased by the growing weakness of the French army.¹¹

The officers of the French army were now aware that this was an unwinnable situation.

Napoleon never thought the Peninsular War would develop into the "ulcer," as he called it, that it did.¹² After driving the British army out of Spain in 1808 he felt he could control the war from Paris, while trusting older but previously reliable commanders to garrison the country. To do so, his dispatches had to pass through guerrilla-infested territory. The guerrillas

knew this, and those dispatches were a top priority for obvious reasons. General Marcellin Marbot, Massena's deputy, commented in his memoirs that it took four months on the average for a message to leave his command post, get to Paris, if it made it there, and return to Spain.¹³ In that time the entire situation changed, rendering Napoleon's orders obsolete. When Massena advanced against Torres Verdas, he did so with 60,000 men. Marshals Soult and Ney's commands were supposed to join him, raising the army's total strength to 100,000 troops. However, Soult could not advance since his area was infested with guerrillas. Ney had no idea of his role in the campaign. The dispatches from both Napoleon and Massena never reached him because the guerrillas intercepted them. Colonel De Rocca, Soult's cavalry commander, noted his superior's predicament:

The inhabitants of Portugal had risen in mass like those of Galicia, and the Portuguese opposed the French with 12,000 soldiers of the line, and 70,000 of their militia. Marshal Soult could not with only 22,000 men keep the country in his rear and advance to Lisbon. He remained, however, more than forty days in Oporto, trying in vain to make the inhabitants submit, and to re-establish his communications; he had not received for several months either orders or reinforcements. Notwithstanding the danger of his situation, he did not make a retrograde movement fearful that by this he might injure the

operations of the other bodies of our armies, of whose positions he remained completely ignorant.¹⁴

An entire operation whose success may have been enhanced by the addition of Soult's 22,000 men was doomed. An entire corps was kept out of battle by the guerrilla's control of the countryside. This is but one example of the isolation felt by the various parts of the French Peninsular army. There were many more and each would in some way impact military operations.

Communication between units as small as battalions developed into complex operations. De Rocca recalled:

It sometimes required entire battalions to carry an order of a battalion to another distant one. The soldiers wounded, sick, or fatigued, who remained behind the French columns, were immediately murdered. Every victory produced only a new conflict. Victories had become useless, by the persevering and invincible character of the Spaniards; and the French armies were consuming themselves, for want of repose, in continual fatigues, nightly watchings and anxieties.¹⁵

A regiment comprised three battalions. To have to move an entire battalion from an assembly area to another unit just to deliver a message was time-consuming, exhausting, and depressing to soldiers and commanders. Operations were delayed or as in Marshal Ney's case, never begun. Military operations, from the simplest movement to the big-

gest battle, are complex undertakings that require preparation, coordination, and reconnaissance. A battalion not being where it was supposed to be could cause utter turmoil. Such was the case throughout the Peninsular War.

1810 saw the isolation of various French corps throughout Spain, isolation resulting from the inability to communicate with each other or receive orders from Paris. In Galicia the guerrillas for intermittent periods cut the lines of communication between two different corps and those corps communication with King Joseph Napoleon (Napoleon's brother).¹⁶ Communications had been kept open by convoys with escorts of at a minimum a few hundred men. As 1811 began, safety disappeared. Increased numbers and smarter tactics gave the guerrillas new advantages. Instead of striking these convoys in the open they now blocked roads in rocky places. In Spain, those were everywhere. The guerrillas followed French columns like vultures. They would "fire from inaccessible side-hills, attacked and detained its rearguard so as to delay its march, thus causing a gap to grow between it and the main body, and only closed when the column was beginning to get strung out into a series of isolated groups."¹⁷ The convoys sent up from Astorga, the main French supply depot in Galicia and the key to the survivability of the two army corps stationed there, were especially vulnerable to guerrilla ambushes. Should a few horses or cattle be killed, should a wagon be disabled, an entire convoy would be in danger. The two corps, the 2nd and 6th, did not participate in operations throughout 1811. Only in

1812, when they were withdrawn from Galicia to join Napoleon's army preparing to invade Russia did this ordeal end and a new one begin.

The approximately seven years of the Peninsular War produced many intermittent periods of communications blackouts, all the result of guerrillas. No information reached Massena, and none reached Paris for three critical months during the winter of 1810.¹⁸ In 1812, little significant correspondence between King Joseph and Marshal Marmont ever reached its intended destinations. The result was that Joseph and 14,000 men never reached Marmont and the Salamanca battlefield. Marmont did not wait for those men because he had no idea they were enroute.¹⁹ Spanish guerrillas intercepted all the dispatches. For twelve days before the Battle of Salamanca, every attempt to coordinate failed. King Joseph and Marmont were never more than fifty miles apart yet neither had the slightest notion where the other was located. During the early months of 1813 the main road between Madrid and Burgos was cut for five weeks and the quickest a message ever arrived from Paris, if it ever arrived, was 41 days.²⁰ Wellington glorified the guerrillas in an 1809 dispatch: "No column appeared south of the Tagus. Victor was feeling north not only for forage, but also perhaps to find out what had happened to Soult, for it was already the case that the French could not control an inch of Spain beyond musket range of a soldier: the guerrilleros had made it almost impossible for one army to talk to another."²¹ Such praise was rare from the mercurial, pompous, yet great Wel-

lington. He praised their role in 1809 but never mentioned in postwar writings the saving of his army by guerrillas after the Battle of Talavera. Wellington had won the battle and set after the retreating French army. He believed his 18,000 men would have to deal with no more than a screening force of 10,000.²² Marshall Soult was racing towards him with another 30,000 French soldiers. Disaster was averted when guerrillas informed the Spanish who informed Wellington. An immediate retreat saved the British army.

Talavera was Wellington's first decisive victory in the Peninsular campaign. The British had 20,641 troops available for battle; the French army had 288,851 men in Spain and Portugal of which only 46,138 reached the battlefield.²³ Where was the rest of the French army? 36,326 men pursued guerrillas as their primary mission, 36,018 garrisoned the province of Saragossa, and 12,000 of the Saragossa force foraged, tried to protect couriers and convoys, and pursued guerrillas.²⁴ Over 100,000 other men were scattered throughout Spain in towns or provinces like Saragossa. Soult's force in Galicia, approximately 42,000 men, all either garrisoned towns, pursued guerrillas, or scoured the countryside for supplies.²⁵ They could not aid any other French commanders in any battle. At the Battle of Busaco, on September 26, 1810, Massena faced Wellington's 52,000 British and Portuguese soldiers with 62,575 troops, a stunning number considering the French army had peaked in strength only a few months earlier at 360,603.²⁶ 300,000 men were

either garrisoning towns or chasing guerrillas.

Napoleon's commanders suffered no illusions about why they were defeated in Spain and Portugal. King Joseph's chief aide, General Bigarre, clearly stated: "The guerrillas caused more casualties to the French Armies than all the regular troops during the whole course of the war in Spain; it has been proved that they murdered a hundred of our men daily. Thus, over the period of five years they killed 180,000 French soldiers without losing more than 25,000."²⁷ De Rocca, when analyzing the guerrilla way of war, stated: "... This manner of fighting had procured them the name of mountain flies, even from the Spaniards themselves, alluding to the manner in which the obstinate insects torment living beings without ever leaving them an instant's rest."²⁸ General Jean Jacques Pelet, Massena's aide, noted: "...in the absence of guerrillas, the French armies would have acquired a unity and strength that they were never able to achieve in this country, and the Anglo-Portuguese army, unwarned of our operations and projects, would have been unable to withstand concentrated operations"²⁹ Wellington's chief intelligence officer, Edward Cocks, the man responsible for receiving and evaluating the dispatches and information provided by the guerrillas, noted:

If any arm is unopposed, can march where it will and draw

supplies from all parts, the country is militarily conquered but not civilly unless the resources of every description are at the disposal of the governor and the individuals can pass freely. The guerrillas prevent this. Individuals and even small parties are not safe, convoys required strong escorts, and the number of French required in Spain is inconceivably multiplied and Spaniards are kept out of the French service.³⁰

One of Napoleon's foremost military maxims was bringing more force to the decisive point of battle: "The art of war consists, with a numerically inferior army, in always having larger forces than the enemy at the point which is to be attacked or defended. But this art can be learned neither from books nor from practice. It is an intuitive way of acting which properly constitutes the genius of war."³¹ Napoleon possessed this genius as no other before him. His generals, who for years served under him, also had this belief. They discovered the Peninsula was not their previous campaigns. Concentration was over the horizon, impossible to achieve since the army did not control its line of communication and supply. Commanders could not assist each other. The greatest impact of the guerrilla in the Peninsula was its prevention of the mighty French army's concentration.

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Clerk of Eldin and the Royal Navy's Offensive Line

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ABSTRACT

The British Royal Navy underwent a period of tactical stagnation in the eighteenth century; the line-of-battle-ahead that had carried the day in three wars with the Dutch during the previous century gave way to stalemate after stalemate as more European powers adopted the tactic. Toward the end of the American Revolution, John Clerk of Eldin began examining inconclusive naval battles of the (then) recent past and offered alternatives to the line-ahead that might result in more decisive victory. With suggested tactics such as isolating and overpowering the rear of the enemy fleet or breaking the enemy's line entirely, Clerk's writing titillated naval commanders enough to consider breaking with accepted doctrine of the day. This paper examines the origins of the line-ahead, inconclusive battles that inspired the writing of Clerk's *Essay on Naval Tactics*, and the application and critical reception of Clerk's writing in both Britain and the United States.

Keywords: Clerk of Eldin, naval tactics, line-of-battle, Anglo-Dutch Wars, American Revolution, French Revolution, Napoleonic Wars, naval warfare, Royal Navy

Secretario de Eldin y la línea ofensiva de la Royal Navy

RESUMEN

La Royal Navy británica atravesó un período de estancamiento táctico en el siglo XVIII; la línea de batalla que había triunfado en tres guerras con los holandeses durante el siglo anterior dio paso a un punto muerto tras otro a medida que más potencias europeas adoptaron la táctica. Hacia el final de la Revolución de las Trece Colonias, John Clerk de Eldin comenzó a examinar las batallas navales inconclusas del pasado (entonces) reciente y ofreció alternativas a la línea de avance que podrían resultar en una victoria más decisiva. Con tácticas sugeridas como aislar y dominar la retaguar-

dia de la flota enemiga o romper la línea enemiga por completo, el escrito de Clerk excitó a los comandantes navales lo suficiente como para considerar romper con la doctrina aceptada del día. Este artículo examina los orígenes de las batallas inconclusas que inspiraron la redacción del Ensayo sobre tácticas navales de Clerk, y la aplicación y recepción crítica de los escritos de Clerk tanto en Gran Bretaña como en Estados Unidos.

Palabras clave: Secretario de Eldin, tácticas navales, línea de batalla, guerras anglo-holandesas, Revolución de las Trece Colonias, Revolución Francesa, guerras napoleónicas, guerra naval, Royal Navy

克拉克·奥法·埃尔丁和皇家海军的进攻线

摘要

英国皇家海军在18世纪经历了一次战术停滞时期；皇家海军的战斗纵队曾在17世纪与荷兰的3次交战中取得胜利，但却在更多欧洲强国采纳该战术后与其陷入数次僵局。美国大革命结束之前，约翰·克拉克·奥法·埃尔丁开始分析当时不分胜负的海战，并为纵队提出一系列可能导致更具决定性的胜利的替代方案。通过提出例如孤立或压制敌军舰队后部或整个击溃敌军队形等战术，克拉克撰写的方案成功让海军司令官考虑放弃当时所认可的战术原则。本文分析了纵队的起源、启发克拉克撰写《海军战术论》（*Essay on Naval Tactics*）的僵持战斗、以及英国和美国对该著作的应用及批判性接受。

关键词：克拉克·奥法·埃尔丁，海军战术，战斗队形，英荷战争，美国大革命，法国大革命，拿破仑战争，海战，皇家海军

During the mid-seventeenth century, Britannia did not “rule the waves” as it would by the pinnacle of Horatio Nelson’s career. Faced with an effective and tenacious enemy, the navy of the English Commonwealth adopted the tactic of the line-of-battle-ahead so their ships could more effectively combat those of the Dutch Republic. Unfortunately, the line-ahead offered very little offensive potential and by nature limited

the initiative that could be shown by individual captains, leading to numerous indecisive naval actions toward the end of the eighteenth century. With his 1790-1792 *Essay on Naval Tactics*, John Clerk proposed new methods of attack, including breaking the enemy's line, to end the tendency toward stalemate and bring Great Britain more decisive naval superiority. While the effectiveness of Clerk's tactics and the overall impact of his writing has been debated both by Napoleonic-era naval officers and modern historians, Royal Navy officers were fascinated enough by Clerk's ideas to occasionally depart from the accepted doctrine of the day.

The line-of-battle-ahead, or simply line-ahead, is a naval tactic in which warships form a single column, one behind the other. Such a formation allows a fleet to present their broadsides to an enemy and concentrate their firepower without having their guns obscured by friendly vessels. A fleet typically sailed with an interval of 300 feet between ships (a large fleet arranged in line-ahead could easily be several nautical miles in length) and did so close-hauled, or as far against the wind as a vessel would go. As summarized by Michael Palmer, "against ships so arranged, an opposing fleet could not gain an upwind position, although it might have begun the battle with one."¹

The line-ahead was formally codified in the *Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting* issued in March 1653; the instructions stated this was so the English ships could "take the best advantage they can to engage with

the enemy," and in the event that a ship became disabled, "the ships of the fleet . . . are to endeavor to keep up in a line as close as they can betwixt him and the enemy, having always one eye to defend him."² Palmer asserted that the line-ahead was adopted by the English in direct response to the aggressive tactics of the Dutch, who preferred to defeat enemy vessels by boarding and capturing them. Naval battles of the First Anglo-Dutch War were characterized by groups of ships "charging their enemies like cavalymen, and firing guns at opposing ships arrayed to both port and starboard."³ The line-ahead, on the other hand, allowed the English to concentrate their fire on an enemy fleet and hopefully sink it before a fleet action could degenerate into a general melee.

The defensive potential of the line-ahead made the tactic a success almost immediately. Well known for their preference for melee actions, Dutch fleets faced a massive disadvantage in closing with an English line: the Dutch could only bring their few bow weapons to bear as they approached, but withstood disproportionately large amounts of fire from multiple English broadsides simultaneously. Thus, it was rare for Dutch vessels to get close enough to grapple with and board English vessels or even get into a position where they could fire their own broadsides with effect. In fact, during the Second Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-1667, the only fleet engagement the English lost was the only one in which they did not fight in line-ahead, but the Dutch did.⁴ Soon it became apparent that the best way to counteract an enemy's line was

to fight on one of your own. While there remains some doubt as to whether the line-ahead was originally developed by the Dutch or the English,⁵ the tactic had spread to most major European navies by the time the eighteenth century was well underway.

Unfortunately, the line-ahead worked much better defensively than it did offensively. The often-spectacular naval victories of the first two Anglo-Dutch Wars gave way to an eighteenth and early nineteenth century peppered with indecisive naval actions in which parallel lines-of-battle blasted away at one another to little effect. Into this sea of stagnation sailed John Clerk, laird of Eldin. Following the indecisive performance of the British Royal Navy at the 1778 Battle of Ushant and the subsequent courts-martial, Clerk began theorizing that the common British tactics of a fleet advancing on an enemy in line-ahead from the windward position were lacking. While Clerk had almost no sailing experience, he attacked the problem rationally, and examined recent naval battles through what first-hand accounts he could collect, detailed diagrams of over a dozen recent naval battles, and frequently used small model ships to illustrate his theories.⁶

In 1782, Clerk printed fifty copies of *An Inquiry into Naval Tactics*, discussing his criticisms of current British tactics, which he shared among close friends and prominent naval officers. By 1790, he had expanded this into the first part of *An Essay on Naval Tactics*, with parts two through four (on attacking from the leeward, a history of na-

val tactics to that point, and an examination of naval battles of 1782) being released in 1792. At the root of Clerk's writing was the idea that an enemy fleet in the leeward position that did not want to give pitched battle (as was often the case with the French navy in the mid- to late-1700s) could not be forced to do so by a British fleet attacking in line-ahead from the windward. Reflecting on repeated British failures to overcome a leeward fleet, Clerk asked if the Royal Navy might "have persisted in following some old method, or instructions, which, from later improvement, ought to have been rejected?"⁷

Clerk saw four major disadvantages for a fleet in line-ahead attacking from the windward. First: in order to close to effective attack range, the windward fleet would have to turn their bows toward the enemy, taking far more fire in the process than they could give in return. Second: as the wind heeled both fleets over, the leeward fleet would have their guns elevated and their range increased while the windward fleet's guns would be depressed by the same effect. Third: as the windward fleet approached, their van (forward-most ships) would be vulnerable to fire from the whole of the leeward line, and damage sustained by the van could disorder or slow the remainder of the windward fleet. Fourth: the leeward fleet would have a greater ability to withdraw at leisure as the windward fleet moved to support any of their own vessels disabled during an attack.⁸ These disadvantages, especially the fourth, were often exacerbated by the French tendency to target sails and rigging while the British


preferred to fire into the hulls of enemy vessels.⁹ The French could simply wait for the British to make their inevitable windward attack and disable their rigging, allowing the French to break off the action with impunity.

Clerk's criticism of contemporary British naval tactics was epitomized by the Battle of the Capes. On 5 September 1781, a British fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Thomas Graves faced a larger French fleet under Vice Admiral Comte de Grasse. After forming in line-ahead, Graves ordered his fleet to bear down on the French and eventually to engage the enemy close, leaving him vulnerable to disproportionate amounts of enemy fire (Clerk's first disadvantage). An action of several hours resulted in no ships being captured or destroyed by either side, but the British van sustained such heavy damage from the French van and center (Clerk's third disadvantage) that they were unable to prevent the French fleet from bearing farther away to leeward to support their own damaged ships (Clerk's fourth disadvantage).¹⁰ The situation was exacerbated by Graves leaving the signal for line-ahead flying as the fleet bore down, obligating each ship to follow directly behind the ship ahead. As a result, the British rear swung progressively farther away from the enemy even as the van drew closer. Seven ships of the British rear under the command of Rear Admiral Samuel Hood were unable to join the action at all, a situation which Hood would later criticize vocally.¹¹ While the Battle of the Capes was tactically indecisive, the British failure to drive the French fleet from the Chesapeake Bay was a direct

cause of General Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown six weeks later.

If strategic disasters such as the one at the Capes were to be prevented in the future, Clerk asserted that "it will be required to show whether any other mode may be devised, or put in practice, that will have a better effect."¹² Clerk's first suggestion was to do away with the Royal Navy's habit of facing an enemy fleet with each ship directly abreast of their counterpart in a parallel line-ahead. Instead, he proposed dividing the fleet into three divisions, the first of which would attack the enemy rear. The enemy then had the choice of abandoning its rear or having its center and van divisions come about to support them, in which case the British admiral maintaining the windward position could then deploy subsequent divisions to counteract the enemy.¹³ Admiral John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, wrote in 1806 that "Mr. Cl[e]rk is most correct in his statement of the advantages to be derived from being to leeward of the fleet of the enemy. His mode of attack in columns when to windward has its merit."¹⁴ Merit notwithstanding, no British admiral seems to have employed Clerk's columned attack from the windward, though some of his other tactics would find occasional practice.


At the culmination of the Battle of the Saintes on 12 April 1782, Admiral de Grasse was beaten and captured by a British fleet attacking from the leeward. Throughout the battle, Admiral George Brydges Rodney had kept the British fleet in the leeward position to prevent the French from escaping and




John Clerk of Eldin, portrait by James Saxon. Wikimedia Commons.



Battle of the Capes, 5 September 1781, by V. Zveg. Wikimedia Commons.



Plan of the Battle of Trafalgar, 21 October 1805. Wikimedia Commons.



Extracts from a plate included in Clerk's 1782 An Inquiry into Naval Tactics depicting a proposed attack from the windward wherein the attacker isolates the enemy's rear to draw them into a general action. Author's personal collection.

continuing with their planned invasion to Jamaica. A sudden change of wind caused the French ships to suddenly change tacks, throwing their rear into disorder from the unexpected maneuver. In providing commentary for Clerk in 1789, Rodney wrote:

an opening appeared at the third ship astern of the enemy's Admiral, which gave an opportunity of breaking their line, and putting their rear in utmost confusion; when six of their ships falling onboard each other, in that condition the Admiral [Rodney] and division attacked them, tore them to pieces.¹⁵

Rodney was said to have broken de Grasse's line by accident,¹⁶ though it could have easily inspired Clerk to espouse doing so intentionally in the second part of his *Essay* published in 1792.

According to Clerk, if a British fleet attacking from leeward passed directly in front of an enemy warship and broke the enemy line, this would "not only stop her course in the line, but will also throw the ships astern of her into disorder."¹⁷ This was demonstrated quite decisively by Rodney at the Saintes. Clerk went on to assert that once the enemy's line had been broken, an attacking fleet should isolate and overwhelm the enemy ships that remained behind the break. After examining multiple possibilities of where to break the enemy's line, Clerk decided isolating the enemy's rear offered the greatest chance for success; the farther ahead the enemy line was broken, it became more difficult to achieve decisive isolation, as the

enemy van had less distance to travel to support the rest of the fleet.¹⁸

The Battle of Camperdown which took place on 11 October 1797 illustrated Clerk's tactics in action, though St. Vincent described the battle as "pell-mell without plan or system."¹⁹ During the battle, Admiral Adam Duncan commanding fourteen British ships-of-the-line and four frigates defeated eleven Dutch ships-of-the-line and eight frigates under Vice Admiral Jan de Winter. Inexperienced compared with the British due to stagnating under a long blockade, de Winter had planned to engage Duncan in shallow waters near the Texel, where his shallower-drafted warships would be better able to navigate shoals.²⁰ After pursuing the Dutch fleet for several hours, Duncan signaled his own fleet to cut through the enemy's line and engage them to leeward, effectively placing themselves between the Dutch and the shallows. An accidental concentration (which nonetheless validates Clerk's tactics of breaking the enemy's line and isolating a portion of their fleet) on the Dutch rear ensued, who suffered seven ships-of-the-line and four frigates captured by the British.²¹

The Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805 proved even more spectacular. In the face of fears that French forces were staging an invasion of Great Britain, Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson had chased a combined Franco-Spanish fleet under Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean. Nelson made plans from the beginning to defeat the enemy by breaking through their line. In

the memorandum he issued to his subordinate officers on 9 October, Nelson wrote, "The whole impression of the British [fleet] must be, to overpower from two or three Ships ahead of their Commander In Chief, supposed to be in the centre, to the Rear of their fleet."²² Compared with Part Two of Clerk's *Essay*, Nelson's plan was particularly ambitious, cutting the enemy line much farther ahead than Clerk thought wise. According to Clerk, breaking an enemy's line ahead of the center would keep the fleets on a relatively equal footing, making a successful attack more doubtful.²³ At Trafalgar, Nelson had less than an equal footing to begin with; he engaged thirty-three ships of the line with only twenty-seven of his own. Nelson broke the combined Franco-Spanish line with two columns in line-ahead, though wind conditions at the start made it so his ships took an exceptionally long time to join the battle.

Once the two British columns met the enemy line, the time for organized tactics ended, and the battle degenerated into a hard melee.²⁴ Twenty-two French and Spanish ships were captured or destroyed before the day was done without the loss of a single British warship, though Nelson himself was killed in action. Trafalgar remains one of the most iconic British naval victories in history, and although it bears more resemblance to a pell-mell brawl than the organized lines-of-battle that permeated (albeit indecisively) the previous century of war, it is easy to spot possible influences of Clerk. Nelson's two-columned approach bears some resemblance to Clerk's three-division sys-

tem, though Nelson used the tactic far more aggressively than simply isolating the enemy rear. Seeing Nelson's success at Trafalgar, it is also hard to argue with Clerk when it comes to breaking the enemy's line.

Even so, the tactics employed by Rodney, Duncan, and Nelson were very much in the minority, and the reason for this is clear. When Clerk asserted that a breaking of the enemy's line could be accomplished with "little additional danger,"²⁵ his lack of practical experience became apparent. Bearing down in a near-perpendicular course to the enemy as Nelson did at Trafalgar was profoundly risky; the first disadvantage Clerk lists for a fleet attacking from the windward illustrates the disproportionate amount of fire the attacking fleet must withstand, and in Nelson's case, the weakening winds only increased this vulnerable period.²⁶ Nearly one hundred years after the battle, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that "the practical effect of the mode of attack at Trafalgar . . . was to sacrifice the head of the columns in making two breaches in the enemy's line."²⁷ If Duncan or Nelson had faced more experienced and aggressive opponents at their respective battles, the British would surely have lost several ships if the attack hadn't failed entirely. Nelson was especially fortunate in that not only had the quality of the French and Spanish fleets degraded under incessant British blockade, but Revolutionary France had effectively excised most of the discipline and combat experience of her admiralty in favor of egalitarianism and blind patriotic fervor.²⁸

In his conclusion to *British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century*, John Creswell calls Clerk's ideas "fanciful," and asserted that no British admiral had attempted to implement them.²⁹ If one wants to be literal, Creswell is correct; no one attacked the rear of a leeward fleet in three columns, and while admirals such as Duncan and Nelson did intentionally break their enemy's line they did so from the windward while Clerk wrote that this attack should be made from the leeward. (Rodney broke the enemy line from the leeward, but as has been mentioned previously, this was not intentional.) Nonetheless, Clerk's writing was valuable in that it encouraged a shake up in the status quo of British naval tactics. The decisive results at the Saintes, Camperdown, and Trafalgar nevertheless demonstrated that his ideas had merit. Clerk found himself "much flattered by the decided approbation of my Essay, by Lord Duncan and other naval officers at Portsmouth."³⁰ Horatio Nelson reputedly had his chaplain read him excerpts from Clerk's *Essay*.³¹ Perhaps the greatest praise came from Admiral St. Vincent, who found Clerk's writing to be "worthy the study of all young and inexperienced Officers."³²

Clerk's *Essay* was not without its flaws and critics, however. In 1830, Royal Navy Captain Thomas White published his *Naval Researches*, examining in detail several naval actions fought toward the end of the American Revolution and challenging Clerk's interpretation thereof. Captain White accused Clerk and more so Rear Admirals Charles Ekins (who published his own

book praising Clerk in 1824) of intentionally cherry-picking from available sources to better support their conclusions. If Ekins especially had examined his sources more faithfully, White wrote, "it would have overturned the System of Tactics of which the gallant author and his *Magnus Apollo*, Mr. Clerk, appear to be so fond."³³ This practice was especially egregious in their treatment of the Battle of the Saintes, in which Clerk and Ekins asserted that a sudden change of wind led Admiral Rodney's fleet to split the French line in two. This ignored statements from several other participants (including the author himself) who wrote that both fleets were split into three divisions and their formations hopelessly disordered as a result.³⁴ Under such circumstances, attempting Clerk's proposed line-breaking from the leeward would have been extremely foolish. The disorder experienced by Rodney's fleet was, after all, at the root to prevailing objections against breaking an enemy's line.

White also suggested that as a layperson, Clerk didn't necessarily have access to other primary source materials such as logbooks regularly submitted by serving officers and held at the Admiralty, and that this lack prevented Clerk from thoroughly and accurately interpreting the battles he wrote about.³⁵ In addition, Clerk often failed to take into account how changes in wind and the tendency of cannon smoke to obscure signal flags frequently made naval battles more difficult for all concerned. With that in mind, White noted that "Mr. Clerk . . . seldom stopped to consider whether a proposition were practi-

cable or not.”³⁶ It should be noted, however, that White’s criticism was directed specifically at Clerk’s research methods. About the actual tactics Clerk suggested, White wrote that “Mr. Clerk’s work possesses much valuable matter, [and] displays much genius and persevering industry.”³⁷

Clerk’s *Essay on Naval Tactics* eventually found a receptive audience in the United States as well. In 1840, Lieutenant William Fontaine Maury referenced Clerk heavily in the third of his “Scraps from the Lucky Bag,” articles calling for widespread organizational and educational reform in the United States Navy. Maury referred to Oliver Hazard Perry breaking the British line with USS *Niagara* at Lake Erie in 1813 as a vindication of Clerk’s principles after Perry’s attempt at “preserving the line” in the traditional fashion nearly led to an American defeat. To Maury, the “secret” of Clerk’s tactics “was noth-

ing more than the introduction of the principle on the water . . . of attacking the enemy in his most vulnerable point, or of gaining the advantage by throwing him into confusion.”³⁸ Maury also touted Clerk’s writing as an example of the value to the naval profession to be found in book learning.

It is obvious that Clerk’s writing inspired discussion on both sides of the Atlantic and that Napoleonic-era naval officers occasionally adapted his tactics in battle, even if they weren’t followed to the letter. William Fontaine Maury used the successful actions of Rodney, Duncan, Nelson, and Perry as justification for calling Clerk’s writing “the best system of naval tactics that is known at this day.”³⁹ While certainly not perfect, John Clerk’s *Essay on Naval Tactics* was repeatedly employed to great effect by naval officers determined to achieve decisive victory at a time when stalemates were all too common at sea.

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The “Irrepressible Conflict:” Policing in Civil War-Era New York City, 1860-1862

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ABSTRACT

During the early 1860s, America’s largest city was a hub of socio-economic transformation and upheaval that shaped the future of its urban spaces as well as the republic at large. Race, policing, gender, and politics all intersected at physical cross streets in Manhattan and Brooklyn. The New York Police Department sought to control the “dangerous class” who engaged in violence or riotous destruction of property sowing the seeds of civil disorder. The police also served to curtail what Gotham’s high society termed “social vice,” which included the legal interracial romantic couplings within the dangerous class. This study shows how the police protected social mores by stopping what they called “Amalgamation” and how they tackled early anti-war rioters. The historical information provided by contemporary newspapers and New York literature are a wellspring for intellectual contemplation.

Keywords: Police, race, dangerous class, amalgamation, riot, Civil War, New York City, Brooklyn, vice, Gotham

El “conflicto irreprimible:” vigilancia policial en la era de la guerra civil en la ciudad de Nueva York, 1860-1862

RESUMEN

A principios de la década de 1860, la ciudad más grande de Estados Unidos fue un centro de transformación y agitación socioeconómica que dio forma al futuro de sus espacios urbanos, así como a la república en general. La raza, la policía, el género y la política se cruzaban en cruces de calles físicas en Manhattan y Brooklyn. El Departamento de Policía de Nueva York buscó controlar a la “clase peligrosa” que participaba en actos violentos o en la destrucción desenfrenada de la propiedad, sembrando las semillas del desorden civil. La policía también sirvió para restringir lo que la alta sociedad de Gotham denominó “vicio social”, que incluía las parejas románticas interraciales legales dentro de la clase peligrosa. Este

estudio muestra cómo la policía protegió las costumbres sociales al detener lo que llamaron “Fusión” y cómo abordaron a los primeros alborotadores pacifistas. La información histórica proporcionada por los periódicos contemporáneos y la literatura de Nueva York es una fuente para la contemplación intelectual.

Palabras clave: Policía, raza, clase peligrosa, fusión, disturbios, Guerra Civil, Ciudad de Nueva York, Brooklyn, vicio, Gotham

“难以抑制的冲突”：内战时期纽约市的治安（1860-1862年）

摘要

19世纪60年代早期，美国最大的城市（纽约）是社会经济转型和动荡的中心，这种转型和动荡影响了其城市空间和美利坚合众国的未来。种族、治安、性别和政治都汇聚在曼哈顿和布鲁克林的十字路口。纽约警察局试图控制“危险阶级”（dangerous class），后者参与暴力或破坏公物，洒下引起内战骚乱的种子。警方也对被哥谭（Gotham）上流社会称为“社会恶习”的行为加以限制，这包括涉及危险阶级的合法种族间浪漫关系。本研究表明了警方如何以制止被其称为“异族通婚”（amalgamation）关系的方式保护社会风俗，以及其如何应对早期的反战争暴乱者。由当代报纸和关于纽约的文献所提供的历史信息是理智思考的源泉。

关键词：警方，种族，危险阶级，异族通婚（amalgamation），暴动，内战，纽约市，布鲁克林，恶习，哥谭（Gotham）

“**A** Filthy Den!” the *Daily Brooklyn Eagle* declared in a tabloid-esque title regarding the address at number 4 York Street, where various “disreputable characters” had been making “intolerable noises . . . during the whole of the night,” thus disturbing civil order in the city of Brooklyn. Dispatched were New York policemen Crafts, Bedell, and Phelan around 3 o’clock in the morning of August 6th, 1862, to deal with the matter. “Nine persons of different sexes, lying on the floor without any regard to property whatever” were arrested and taken “to the station house . . . they

were brought before Judge Perry this morning," who charged them with vagrancy.¹ This was often how the police dispensed with perpetrators of crime or social vice in the city, by arresting and charging them with violations that they saw as appropriate to the situation. This event shed light on how police discretion tackled vagrants of possible sexual deviance within the conservative social mores that prevailed regarding love and sexuality in 1860's New York City. Unlike its modern incarnation, the mid-19th century NYPD served New York's elite by enforcing social norms like prohibition against interracial couplings and riotous behavior resulting in civil disorder and wanton destruction of property.

The New York Police Department's (NYPD) function during the early years, starting from its founding in 1845, was partially different than its present incarnation.² The NYPD can be perceived as an "administrative or judicial" body, and patrolmen acted accordingly. The patrolmen must interpret the meaning and violations of laws, to determine if a particular action is a crime for which to carry out arrests. As far as the administrative function is concerned, the NYPD served the governments of either the state or the city depending on the law in the 1850s and 1860s. Acting as a security bureaucracy, they had obligations to carry out changes in legislation, and used "positive and negative sanctions to ensure legislation . . . [got] carried out." The status quo was sustained.³

"Police discretion was part of New York's "nether side," something

everybody knew existed but did not talk about much unless it threatened to escape its informal boundaries."⁴ This discretion was an essential asset that New York policemen would employ in order to operate properly such that crimes could be prevented and the social/racial structures maintained. The police had the ability to decide what they saw as criminal or an arrestable offence based on their understanding of their work, vice suppression, and the law. Policeman George Walling mentions in his *Recollections of a New York Chief of Police* (1887) that "the police . . . are sometimes dilatory in bringing culprits to justice, or, as has happened time and time again, mete out punishment themselves."⁵ The NYPD's conception of justice during the 1860s was centered around city and state law as well as anti-vice practices. Police discretion was a key tool of the NYPD during the Civil War-era, as it still is today.

The important difference between the New York Police in the present and during the Civil War-era is the former's use of the concept of a "dangerous class" which was thought to be the sole producer of criminal behavior and conduct. The police, by dipping into this section of society, could prevent crime as well as social vice, and maintain the status quo. The "idea of preventing criminal behavior found the perfect means of implementation in the concept of... [a] crime-producing 'dangerous class'; for only by focusing on crime producers could criminal behavior be prevented."⁶ The "dangerous class," as the urban historian Eric Monkkonen postulates,

is the focus of the New York Police's function, to suppress various criminal conduct and maintain orderliness. "Respectable New Yorkers knew who the 'dangerous classes' were. They were foreign-born, largely Irish, unskilled workers who possessed ominous political influence" because of their naturalized citizenship thereby giving them the ability to vote.⁷ These Irish working-class people were not exclusively the members of the "dangerous class," for the police repressed "amalgamation" as a form of racial cohesion and suppressed racial violence in order to maintain the rule of law. What the social historian Wilbur Miller describes as the "dangerous class" acted as a catalyst for events and actions that require vice/crime-suppression, whether it is amalgamation or racial rioting.

Yet another function of the NYPD was its struggle to maintain order in the cities of Brooklyn and Manhattan from white working-class violence, and volatile race relations that would threaten society during the years 1860-1862. This function can shed light on how the New York Police during early phases of the Civil War repressed personal liberty as a form of vice and collective state violence. The police dictated black and white working-class life (i.e., control over the "dangerous class") through the use of arrests, although not exclusively, protection services, and general policing tactics. The primary sources used here are local newspapers such as the *New York Times*, the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, the *New York Herald* and Police-man George Walling's *Recollections*.

An examination of this evidence indicates that these accounts have differing perceptions on how police act within New York urban society. The political fault lines of city living divided the masses and the elite with both split roughly into the factions of Fernando Wood's Democrats and the relatively new Republican Party. These two parties were in competition for control over the NYPD and ultimately city authority. Police were obligated to uphold order and to enforce federal policy while most of the city's manpower has been diverted to the Union Army.

The nationally polarized political parties inflamed conflict and violence in the city. "The close relationship between police and local politics in the nineteenth century tended to produce a self-perpetuating culture of violence."⁸ The first main event is the fight over control of the NYPD that had sparked the Great New York Police Riot of 1857, which began when the Republican controlled New York State legislature attempted to wrestle jurisdiction of the police away from Manhattan's Mayor Fernando Wood. Mayor Wood rejected the Metropolitan Police Act since "the counties of New York [Manhattan], Kings [Brooklyn], Westchester, and Richmond were made [into] one police district, to be controlled by a board of commissioners, consisting of five members appointed by the Governor and Senate, and to hold office for five years . . . Mayor Wood denied the constitutionality of the act and retained the old police—so that there were two police departments existing at the same time in the city."⁹ Republican reformers

in the state capital at Albany created a new Metropolitan Police force and by law ended the Municipal Police as part of their effort to restrict the Wood Democrats' control over Manhattan.¹⁰ Notably, this act united all of the police offices in the listed counties under one police department.

Resistant to being halted from total control over policing, Mayor Fernando Wood and the Municipal Police Officers contested the act for a few months such that both the Metropolitan Police and Municipal Police patrolled the streets of New York County. The Republican backed Metropolitan Police had 300 officers and seven leaders who defected from the Municipal Police, but it was mostly composed of new recruits with little training. The Democratic Municipal Police were controlled expressly by Fernando Wood, and had upwards of 800 policemen and 15 leaders under his command. The gulf between the different police forces was ethnically divided with German and Irish immigrants mostly filling the ranks of the Municipal Police, and those of English or Dutch descent siding with the Metropolitan Police.¹¹

Violence exploded in mid-June when Metropolitan Policeman George Walling attempted to arrest Mayor Wood, but Walling was promptly thrown out of City Hall by the Municipal Police. He returned to again arrest the mayor with a larger number of Metropolitan Police Officers, but they were attacked by Wood supporters and the Municipal Police. They were repulsed a second time as well; on the third attempt, the State government dispatched

the Seventh Regiment, who were able to arrest Fernando Wood from office and force him to disband his police force.¹² It wouldn't be the last time the military would be used to suppress mob violence in the streets of Gotham when police were unable to. (Gotham is the name given to Manhattan by Washington Irving, the famous American short story writer in his magazine *Salmagundi* in 1807).¹³

The relief the Republicans must have felt for his removal was short lived since he was promptly re-elected in 1859. Tensions, nationally, ran high after Abraham Lincoln had been elected President and South Carolina had seceded in late 1860. With Wood in his second term (1860-1862), the Mayor and his Democrats met the political crisis head on. During his annual message in January 1861, "the mayor actually proposed . . . the secession of the metropolis from the State of New York. Declaring that the city had closer ties with the South than with an intrusive and limiting state government, Wood proposed that New York become a 'free city' that would continue to trade with the seceded states."¹⁴ He cited that by leaving the State of New York, the city could still trade with the soon-to-be Confederate States and avoid high taxation on trade from Albany.

The political situation that arose after the Battle of Fort Sumter posed a particular set of issues for the local government of New York City given the loyalties of Irish Americans in the city to its Copperhead Mayor. The New York Republicans were pretty unified with the party as it stood in Washing-

ton, D.C. The Democrats in the city, on the other hand, had their national-level party divided among various positions on a rough scale from support of the Slaveholders' rebellion to the other side of the spectrum, which was a limited degree of defense for the federal government to preserve the Union.

The struggle for order in Manhattan and Brooklyn divided the populace and the elite. Political parties were used to identified city residents and officials in the coming Civil War. New York Governor Horatio Seymour and Mayor Fernando Wood were Democrats. Superintendent of New York Police John A. Kennedy and Wood's successor in 1863, Mayor George Opdyke were Republicans. It is important to understand that generally, "republicanism found few adherents among workers," such that most of the white working class of the city broadly supported the Democrats.¹⁵ In contrast, an increasing portion of New York's wealthy saw the "contradiction between the forces unleashed by rapid capitalist development and the persistence of slavery, and they saw . . . as well . . . the attendant political power of slaveholders over the federal government, as damaging to their own interests." Eventually, they started to view their interests in line with national or Union war aims. The association between the upper economic class in New York City and the Republican Party was clear because most were "manufacturers, lawyers, and western merchants who had little to lose from a conflict with the South . . ." ¹⁶ The divide between parties was quite heavily

based on the class society of Gotham, although not exclusively.

The start of the Slaveholders' rebellion would also place African Americans directly at the center of political discord. "There was a necessary relation between New York City Blacks' situation as pariahs in North's most proslavery city and their role as creators of the new Northern national consciousness . . ." ¹⁷ Though their numbers were small, Black Manhattanites estimated 12,000 or 1.5 percent of the total population, which was 800,000 in 1860 and were the seventh largest black population in the country. "In the 1860s nearly 85% of Brooklyn's black population resided in the two black communities . . . Borough-Hall-Fort Greene section . . . and . . . in the southern portion of Williamsburg." ¹⁸ They would help to create a new northern consciousness through the Twentieth United States Colored Regiment, but they were also "pariahs" in amalgamation and race riots. It is important to point out that black New Yorkers may not have been directly involved with either political party due to lack of citizenship and disenfranchisement, but it was fairly clear that of the two, the party of Andrew Jackson and the slaveholders would not at all be aligned with their political interests. African Americans in New York City were singled out by police officers, racists, and print media.

A key phrase that the *New York Herald*, the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, and the *New York Times* frequently used was "amalgamation," which was, by definition, interracial romantic and sex-

ual relationships. "Newspaper editors . . . and . . . reformers linked interracial sex with New York's working class . . . [and] accounts of amalgamation among New York's black and white workers [that] had existed since slavery . . . the word 'amalgamation,' with its increasingly negative connotations, was used in relationship with the working classes only after the 1834 [anti-abolitionist] riots."¹⁹ From 1860-1862 in Manhattan, instances of amalgamation were broken up or prevented by New York Police through the curbing of personal liberty and directing working-class people through arrests and "vice" suppression.

White New Yorkers discussed at great length "amalgamation in the 1840s and 1850s . . . [the continuing] the anxiety over sexuality and race that . . . would be a factor in the 1863 Draft Riots. New York State never outlawed interracial marriage, but throughout the antebellum period various groups of white New Yorkers depicted amalgamation as threatening to New York City's social structure."²⁰ Various groups of white New Yorkers, such as reformers and newspaper editors, not only depicted the threat, but they also were able to influence the NYPD enough to tackle this growing social concern as a vice even if it was not technically illegal. They were doing something that was not prescribed, although, it was often practiced to uphold socio-sexual dictum of the city. The effort to suppress "amalgamation" were bipartisan, since police were under control of the Republican state government but individual policemen pursued this vice likely knowing it

was in line with the white supremacist stance of New York Democrats.

At around 10 p.m. on June 10th, 1860, NYPD Officers Sherman and Munn "made a descent upon a notoriously bad 'crib' at the foot of Leonard street [Manhattan] . . . and arrested Eliza . . . and Edward Hays," the black proprietors of the house. They soon discovered that a white woman there, named Mary Hill, was married to an African American. They also discovered "Fanny Corse, William Johnson, Benjamin Portland and M.J. Corse" in the house as well, all of whom were mixed-race individuals. The *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* report goes on to say that also in the house at the time of arrest, were six white men from Williamsburg, stating some were of high respectable connection, and "now known" to police. The report continues that "unless they are more careful in the future, they will not be unknown to fame." In this instance, the lack of police action shows they might've let the white male "amalgamators" off the hook. "They managed to escape, some of them minus portions of their clothing"; the rest of the persons were arrested and brought before Judge Walter "to be disposed of."²¹ This is an example of the NYPD patrolling and policing the vice of "amalgamation." Additionally, it is an example of police discretion because they chose to allow the white male perpetrators of the social deviance to get away but arrested the black and mixed-race perpetrators, many of whom were seemingly the more hazardous part of the "dangerous class" to these NYPD officers.

Another, more obtuse occurrence of “amalgamation” happened on August 29th of that same year and reported by the same paper. NYPD Officer Bennett, who was a detective, arrested a sixteen-year-old girl who supposedly was the only child of her widowed mother. His reason? She was married to an African American named Julius Gray, “a waiter in one of our hotels . . .” The sixteen-year-old was taken to “The Toombs” despite her supposed petition and “of-fered bribes of her . . . lover.” Judge Welsh sentenced her to the “house of refuge until she should attain years of discretion.”²² Officer Bennett here was able to prevent vice from further occurring though neither age of consent laws nor anti-interracial marriage laws existed. The policeman was preventing the continued corruption of “social values” through amalgamation with the process of arrest and relocation.

The *New York Times* reported that police from the Fourth Ward arrested “a large number of inmates, comprising persons of all colors and both sexes” finding that “negro men [occupied] the same rooms with white women and vice versa” in March 1861. It was “one of the most infamous disorderly houses in the City, located at the corner of Oak and Roosevelt streets.” The so-called “proprietor” was a 28-year-old Irish woman named Mary Fleming. The following day they were all arraigned, the black men and white men were “reprimanded and discharged, while the women were committed to Blackwell’s island as vagrants.” This shows that the Metropolitan Police would enforce social normativity and repress this threat to the social

structure so that racial purity could be maintained. The women had been misogynistically derided as “harpies” and the *New York Times* celebrated how police had made sure these individuals were separated.²³ This was the “dangerous class” in operation. They broke the rules that existed as social mores where races didn’t mix romantically and the police were sent in to maintain racial order as well as to prevent this vice.

In the *New York Herald* under the column ‘Police Intelligence’ that April, it was reported that “an Amalgamation Ball [was] Broken up by Police.” Eighth Ward Policemen prevented an interracial social dance from taking place at Constitution Hall on Wooster Street after it was learned that the ball was to involve the mixing of races. Initially, Police Captain Helmes had been requested by a black man to protect their social gathering, “believing that it was only to be a colored ball.” The Police Captain Helmes received a note after the man requesting protection had left. The note specified the “ball, which consists entirely of white women and black men – no black women being admitted” would be “dislodged” by armed “ruffians” with clubs and stones if it were to take place. The article ends with Officers Parmer and Helmes preventing entrance into the Hall, noting that “there were no less than twenty white women, accompanied by darkies.”²⁴ The implications in these two instances are clear, interracial mixing was against the mores of city society and the police would be instrumental in enforcing it even if it wasn’t illegal. This example is a tad different than the incident at the house near Oak

and Roosevelt streets because when police broke up this "amalgamation ball" their function was both to prevent the "dangerous class" from using racial violence against another portion of that same class who were violating the racial norms of the city. The police performed their function without carrying out arrests and simply sent the would-be "amalgamationists" away so they would not stir up trouble.

Lastly, in a most irregular case of amalgamation was reported in the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* regarding a black New Yorker named William Parks, who was charged with "bigamy" and amalgamation after he had married "a mulatto woman named Mary Thompson." Ms. Thompson soon discovered that Mr. Parks would make long visits to his mother's place of living in Manhattan to see a white woman by the name of Ann Clarkson. The article reports that when the police asked his mother who this woman was to him, she said that Clarkson was his wife. Parks denied this and upon Judge Perry questioning of Ms. Clarkson himself in court, she stated that she wasn't his wife. She continued "he told me he loved me and asked me to live with him and I said I would . . . I was satisfied to live with him without being married. He told me to tell any person who asked that I was his wife." The case was postponed for the prosecution to bring forth the mother of the accused (William Parks) to prove that he was married to the white woman. It was likely that this case was not concluded in anyway due to the lack of illegality in an interracial marriage and that to prove the marriage

of Parks and Clarkson would do nothing legally. However, his amalgamation was a vice to suppress. This occasion of amalgamation provides an interesting twist of marital infidelity on the part of Mr. Parks and it was ultimately curbed due to the over prevailing view that it was a threat to the social structure. This is also an incident of amalgamation that crossed the lines of the twin cities Brooklyn and Manhattan.²⁵

In the twin city of Brooklyn, during August 1862 (a month before the Battle of Antietam) the NYPD would be used to enforce federal policy in order to protect black workmen, women, and children in a tobacco factory and control the "dangerous class." The T. Watson and Company Tobacco Factory on Sedgewick Street in Brooklyn came under attack by four hundred Irish men of the locality.²⁶ The *New York Times* reported that hundreds of Irishmen gathered together and were provoked by "a portion of the secession Press of this city" until they rioted.²⁷ The story of the riot is corroborated by the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* to a much greater detail noting that seventy-five workers were employed at the factory. Of this number, fifty were black workers and the other twenty-five were white. T. Watson's factory was started some eight years prior, the *Brooklyn Eagle* reported, and that some of the Black workers currently employed there were there since the founding although some were not of the locality but from Manhattan.²⁸

The *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* continued, "It is said that for some time

past, considerable ill-feeling has existed in the vicinity of the tobacco factory, most of whom are Irish.” This was a rise of racist tensions that would come to a head the day before the riot in front of “Grady’s liquor Store” where two African American men stood blocking the entrance. A fight broke out between the two Black men blocking the door and two Irishmen wishing to enter after one of the Irishmen knocked one of the Black men to the ground. The brawl was ended by quickly police, but it was enough to spark wild rumors that would stir up racial tensions and rage from the Irish people in the area.²⁹

On that Monday, August 4th, 1862, Mr. Hignet, the foreman of the adjacent Lorrillard Tobacco factory, went to Watson’s factory around 8 o’clock to warn all the black workers there that they should leave due to rumors of an attack being planned on them. The 20 workers present declined and the *Brooklyn Eagle* stated that of the 20, five were men and the rest were women and children. Around 12 o’clock the white workers departed the factory leaving the only the black workers in the building and about a half-hour later hundreds of enraged Irishmen (many intoxicated) arrived at the factory. They entered the factory’s first floor, but fortunately the black workers were on the upper floors of the building having blocked the stairwell. Policemen Oates and Byrnes of the 43rd precinct responded but were unable to prevent the mob from entering the factory.³⁰ As the “mob approached the place screaming like infuriated demons, and crying out, ‘kill the d—n n-s,’ ‘Burn the n-s,’ . .

. The factory was surrounded.”³¹ To the modern observer, this report can foreshadow the genocidal rhetoric and action that was taken up by similar Irish rioters in the July, 1863 Draft Riots. The mob-scene was motivated by racist beliefs and the portion of the “dangerous class” here were about to engage in highly criminal behavior.

One of the black workmen was taken by the mob and almost fatally assaulted prior to the police arrival. With their clubs, the policemen beat into the mob which occupied the first floor of the three-story building. Then they were stopped by the quasi-leader Patrick Keenan, a candidate for Alderman in the Sixth Ward, when he gave directions to set the building ablaze. The rioting Irishmen set afire tar and wood thereby the police’s focus was turned to extinguishing the flames. While they attempted to extinguish the fire, the policemen were repeatedly attacked with bricks and stones by the mob. Finally, the fire was put out and the riot dispersed by which point the *New York Times* said it “numbered several thousand persons.”³²

The quasi-leader Patrick Keenan was arrested afterward stating “that he was called upon by Officer Oates to assist in quelling the riot and that he had nothing whatever to do with it and knew nothing of it.”³³ The semi-leader attempted here to rid himself of fault but was to no avail since he would be tried in court over the following weeks. Though it is unknown his fate in the trial, Patrick Keenan later would appear in the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* as a delegate

of the uncontested Sixth Ward for the Union Democratic General Committee under Governor Seymour.³⁴ Racist violence, it would seem, was carried out by both the mob as well as the police. "It is stated that the officers who were first at the scene of the riot, allowed their feelings against the negroes to interfere with their duties and that instead of attacking the white rioters they struck at the negroes with their clubs."³⁵ It was likely Policemen Oates and Byrnes since they were the first to arrive at the riot. These policemen failed to carry out their function.

Surprisingly similar to the Great Police Riot no one was killed, only several policemen and free African Americans were injured. The NYPD told the black workers that they could go on working with their protection, but it was clear the women and children wished to go home. And then they were brought there under police guard.³⁶ This Brooklyn riot is vital to understanding the political society of New York City. "Many whites resented the employment of blacks in jobs that they wanted" and the two often competed for work.³⁷ The *New York Times* correctly stated that police authorities in the area neglected to respond to the impending mob and that they likely knew the results of inaction.

The police authorities had been notified that an attempt would be made by Irishmen to drive the negroes from all work in this city, and local Press had been indirectly urging such an onslaught. More than this, the police of the

Forty-third Precinct ought to have known, and probably did know, that an attack upon these factories was contemplated, and had proper precautions been used, Brooklyn might have been spared this disgraceful affair of yesterday.³⁸

This article is followed up by the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* reporting that both "Mr. Folk and Capt. Holbrook . . . [had] the charges against them dismissed." The charges against them were "for neglect of duty, in the recent negro riot at the Tobacco Factory. . ." ³⁹ These men delayed their services and with Policemen Oates and Byrnes likely participated in the mob action against the black workers (since they were the first on the scene), and only performed their function to suppress the "dangerous class" after they stopped participating in that "class." These officers were still ultimately let free in a miscarriage of justice as well as miscarriage of police function.

At the time of the Civil War, a "period of rising wages and prices, police pay for the first time fell below the wages of skilled workers." Before this "skilled workers made up most of the recruits, but in the sixties they began resigning and replacements could be obtained only from the unskilled labor force."⁴⁰ This trend can be seen as the cause for the drop in the number of New York policemen as well as in their quality. The men the NYPD had enlisted were not the top quality of patrolmen and certainly were not skilled enough to function in their most proper capacity either against the criminal element

or the oncoming mob. Police Officers Oates, Byrnes, Folk, and Captain Halbrook all exhibited the tendencies of the unskilled workers hired by the NYPD since they all in one way or another did not function in the proper way police officers were expected to given the riot situation. Folk and Halbrook delayed their police protection to the trapped black laborers and Oates and Byrnes who first arrived on the scene to stop the “dangerous class” were initially enthused to participate in the criminal behavior of the mob. This was a blurring of the thin blue line which separated the order-maintainers and the chaos of the racist mobbers.

In the days following, the *New York Herald* depicted the attack on the tobacco factory as an event that would fan the flames of racism in the city. The newspaper did this by asserting that a plan by abolitionist “capitalists” had been created to supplant white workers with black ones. “The agitators whom puff Sambo up with absurd ideas of his importance are to blame.”⁴¹ Conversely, the pro-Union papers like the *New York Times*, defended the black workers in conjunction with fresh criticisms on the Irish rioters and the anti-war advocates as the responsible parties.⁴² The *New York Times* essentially accused the *New York Herald* of spurring on the Irishmen to attack black New York workers.⁴³ This instance highlights that the police during the early phases of the Civil War were able to deal with working-class criminal behavior and their collective mob action but this particular NYPD precinct chose to delay their services. Sympathizers were highly divided with-

in the functionaries of government operation themselves.

It was noted by the *New York Times* shortly after the Brooklyn riot that the debacle “suggests anew the importance of a system of police drill in what may be called mob-tactics or street strategy . . . In Europe . . . this art is brought to a high degree of perfection, and the police will enter and segregate and scatter a mob with . . . ease.”⁴⁴ It would be many years before the NYPD would adopt these anti-mobbing tactics. Joel T. Headley in his book *The Great Riots of New York* (1873) suggests, ten years after the Draft Riots, that the police leaders should “select five hundred or more of the most . . . experienced, and efficient men . . . and form them into a separate battalion, and have them drilled in such evolutions, manoeuvres, and modes of attack or defence” to deal swiftly with riots and mob violence.⁴⁵ With the proper number of NYPD officers and “mob-tactics” training, the New York Police would have been able to function properly to maintain order and prevent crime in the city but this would be many decades away from being carried out.

The NYPD’s function in the early Civil War-era was to suppress crime, vice, patrol race relations, hold down racialized violence in the dangerous class and reduce “threats” to society. One can see clearly that political society in New York City was split along narrow party lines. New York elite Republicans and functioning policemen were on one side and the white working class as well as Democrats were on the

other. During this era, Police Officers repressed personal liberty as a vice in the cases of "amalgamation," racial violence, and dictated black and white working-class life for various political reasons whether they were Republican or Democratic in motivation.

The cases of "amalgamation" in Manhattan provide an interesting view of police function since interracial marriage wasn't illegal. These cases show that even though it was not prescribed, arrest of "amalgamationists" were often practiced to uphold socio-sexual rules of the city which separated romantic partners by race. It seems, white New York newspaper editors and reformers had enough influence in the city such that the NYPD would carry out arrests on "amalgamators." This police function was important in New York County during the early phase of the Civil War; however, it was overshadowed likely by the increase in racialized rioting.

The Brooklyn Riot of 1862 sheds a great deal of light on New York Police function as it stood in other boroughs. These policemen, though they ultimately suppressed the hundreds of rioting Irish people from committing violence against Black Americans, did so with a significant delay in protection services to prevent crime. Two policemen even participated in the attack on the factory workers before they carried out their function. As mentioned, the quality of recruits was low due to the fall in police wages. This initial failure of function is important in understanding the further

failures in the Manhattan Draft Riots of 1863 because even in the police department itself, government functionaries were highly divided by racial attitudes which can indicate political party.

The exposed race and class strains of New York City living had been "exacerbated by the war experience, [and] the draft riot haunted New York's elite long after its suppression, serving as a reminder of the threat posed by the 'dangerous class.'"⁴⁶ New York Police function was to suppress the crime of rioting which had been caused by the radical economic changes that were underway in both the state and republic as a whole. This was vital to keeping control and maintaining order in the city because if the working class could successfully resist the economic change, they'd place interests of New York's elite Republicans in danger by tacitly aiding the unrecognized Confederate States of America. New York policemen would use an arrest to prevent crime as well as vice and, in many instances, to prevent violations of social norms like amalgamation in the biracial "dangerous class." Police also functioned in preventing crime by fighting back against white rioters or by defending black Americans so that crime could not be further carried out against them. Preventing threats to the racial order of the city and holding down the riotous white portion of the "dangerous class" were the tasks the NYPD carried out in order to prevent the city from falling into chaos during wartime.

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Connecticut and the American Revolution: British Raids on the Connecticut Shoreline Aimed to Sow Terror and Curb the Flow of Supplies to the Continental Army

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ABSTRACT

In the century and a half of the British Empire's North American colonial era, before the onset of the American Revolution in 1775, Connecticut had established itself as an economic engine unparalleled in the American colonies. When war came, Connecticut mobilized itself in many ways to benefit the Continental Army. Led by Governor Jonathan Trumbull (1710-1785) and the Connecticut Committee of Safety, Connecticut sent enough food, guns, and cannons to General George Washington's Army to earn the nickname "The Provision State" as well as gain unwelcome attention from the British military command just over the border in New York. To stem the flow of these provisions, as well as to terrorize the homes of Patriot sympathizers along the Connecticut coast, the British Army, on three different occasions, undertook a strategy of sending troops to burn supplies as well as homes in Connecticut over eight years of war.

Keywords: Connecticut, American Revolution, Continental Army, Whig, Tory, Jonathan Trumbull, General Benedict Arnold, General William Tryon, General David Wooster, General Gold Selleck Silliman

Connecticut y la Revolución Americana: Incursiones británicas en la costa de Connecticut destinadas a sembrar terror y frenar el flujo de suministros al ejército continental

RESUMEN

En el siglo y medio de la era colonial norteamericana del Imperio Británico, antes del inicio de la Revolución de las Trece Colonias en

1775, Connecticut se había establecido como un motor económico sin paralelo en las colonias americanas. Cuando llegó la guerra, Connecticut se movilizó de muchas formas para beneficiar al Ejército Continental. Dirigido por el gobernador Jonathan Trumbull (1710-1785) y el Comité de Seguridad de Connecticut, Connecticut envió suficientes alimentos, armas y cañones al ejército del general George Washington para ganarse el sobrenombre de “El estado de la provisión” y atraer la atención no deseada del ejército británico. comando justo al otro lado de la frontera en Nueva York. Para detener el flujo de estas provisiones, así como para aterrorizar los hogares de los simpatizantes de Patriot a lo largo de la costa de Connecticut, el ejército británico, en tres ocasiones diferentes, emprendió una estrategia de enviar tropas para quemar suministros y hogares en Connecticut en tres ocasiones durante ocho años de guerra.

Palabras clave: Connecticut, Revolución de las Trece Colonias, Ejército Continental, Whig, Tory, Jonathan Trumbull, General Benedict Arnold, General William Tryon, General David Wooster, General Gold Selleck Silliman

康涅狄格州和美国大革命：英国突袭康涅狄格州海岸线，意图洒下恐惧并阻止大陆军获得补给

摘要

大英帝国在北美殖民的150年里，在1775年美国大革命开始之前，康涅狄格州将自身建立为美国殖民地中不可比拟的经济引擎。战争来临时，康涅狄格州从多方面动员自身，为大陆军提供支持。在州长乔纳森·特伦布尔（1710-1785）和康涅狄格州安全委员会（Connecticut Committee of Safety）的带领下，康涅狄格州为乔治·华盛顿将军的军队输送了充足的食物、枪支和大炮，并因此获得了“后勤州”的绰号，同时受到纽约省英国军事指挥的敌意关注。为阻断后勤供应流，同时震慑康涅狄格州海岸线上爱国者的居所，英国军队在8年战争期间三个不同的情况下采取战略：输送部队去焚烧康涅狄格州的补给品和爱国者居所。

关键词：康涅狄格州，美国大革命，大陆军，辉格党人，托利党人，乔纳森·特伦布尔，少将本尼迪克特·阿诺德，中将威廉·特里恩，将军大卫·伍斯特，将军戈尔德·塞莱克·西利曼

Mostly forgotten in the larger panorama that is the conflict known as the American Revolution, are three British raids on the Connecticut shoreline that had a major impact on the state's ability to maintain its place as the largest supplier of men and provisions for the Continental Army throughout the war.

Standing on the doorstep of British-occupied New York for most of the war, Connecticut's people remained ever vigilant to the constant threat from the South. As was the case in most of the colonies, Connecticut's population was split into distinct political factions. New England's Puritan founding more than a century and a half before had resulted in a statewide majority of people who identified politically with Great Britain's Protestant Whig party, and who had spent much of that period advocating for the end to the Empire's absolute monarchy. In 1661, the authorities in New Haven, Connecticut had even taken the most dangerous position of hiding from King Charles II (1630-1685) authorities, three of the regicides who had signed the death warrant for his father, King Charles I (1600-1649) during the English Civil War. It was that sentiment that had diminished little in the colony during the intervening years and had even reignited itself as the colony moved toward revolution in the 1760s.

By the same token, Great Britain's military leaders, headquartered in the American colonies on the southern tip of Manhattan Island, after expelling the Continental Army from the town in the fall of 1776, were always aware of

the threat from the North. For much of the early years of the conflict, the British military strategy was to sever troublemaking New England from the rest of the colonies by way of New York's Hudson River Valley. This precarious frontline dynamic made Long Island Sound and the shoreline villages of both Connecticut and New York a virtual no man's land. The game of cat and mouse that ensued between the two forces was the story of the Revolution for the people of this region for the duration of the long war.

To gain the upper hand, and to stop the flow of men, arms, and supplies from Connecticut to General George Washington's Continental Army, the British leadership in New York undertook a strategy of terror and harassment against the many shipping ports along Connecticut's 96-mile shoreline. The landscape on either side of Long Island Sound was littered with numerous small coves and inlets that were tailor-made for the hit and run tactics of the smugglers and privateers employed by both sides. Hidden from most history books, this obscure part of the American Revolution was vital to the survival of both armies in and around New York.

When war finally came in the spring of 1775, Connecticut had already become an agricultural and shipping engine of immense efficiency. The generations of European settlers to North America who preceded these revolutionaries had cleared the state of most of its timber for farming and were producing agricultural goods at a prodigious level. Unable to continue

to support the growing population in the long term, many farming families were beginning to look beyond Connecticut's borders for adequate land they could leave to their heirs. As was the case with some of the other British colonies, Connecticut's charter called for her western border to extend to the Pacific Ocean. Many families eventually settled in Pennsylvania and Ohio territories that they believed to be part of Connecticut.¹

As the colony grew, new roads were created out of the long-existent Indian trails throughout the region and these roads worked in conjunction with the many navigable rivers that led south to Long Island Sound. The Housatonic, Quinnipiac, Connecticut, and Thames Rivers all lead to the Sound from inland Connecticut and were uniquely suited for moving goods to the merchant ships anchored there. Many Connecticut farmers bred teams of oxen which could be used to transport their goods to market along these poorly constructed colonial roads. Eventually, these paths allowed them to expand their crop and livestock markets outside of the colony itself. People in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York became some of Connecticut's biggest customers for the surplus goods the farmers were producing, but the ships did not stop there. The colony's wares found their way to places as far away as Nova Scotia, the Caribbean, and the British West Indies where they could be traded for sugar and molasses making Connecticut one of the most economically prosperous of Britain's original colonies.²

The other area that worked hand in glove with the region's farming community was one that Connecticut was also geographically suited for. With a long shoreline that opened onto the Atlantic Ocean located between her New England neighbors to the north and England's mid-Atlantic colonies to the south, shipping easily became one of the state's largest industries. The eastern-most coastal towns like Mystic, Groton, and New London became world leaders in not only the whaling industry but also the exportation of Connecticut goods to overseas ports. As part of Great Britain's mercantilist system, the colony was required to only use the mother countries approved markets to sell her goods, but as the world's largest empire, there were more than enough places around the globe to create great wealth back home. Other towns located along Connecticut's waterways also began to prosper. Shoreline towns such as New Haven, Fairfield, Norwalk, Stamford, and Greenwich on the coast, as well as river towns like Norwich, Hartford, Wethersfield, Middletown, and Derby all began to see increased merchant activity. There was virtually no area of the small colony that was out of reach of any overseas market.³

Perhaps the most prosperous and influential of these coastal ports, was New London. Located in eastern Connecticut at the estuary of the Thames River, it connected much of the colony's shipping industry with the inland towns of Norwich and Lebanon, the latter of which was the home base of Jonathan Trumbull (1710 – 1785), Connecticut's colonial governor. A member

of the Harvard class of 1727, Trumbull's family had established a trading post in Lebanon on the road that connected the ports of New London and Norwich with inland Connecticut as well as Boston and Providence. What was true in the 18th century as much as it is today is that location is perhaps the greatest asset to a successful business, and the Trumbull's spot in Lebanon had it locked. Men moving their goods from the interior of the state to the ports in New London oftentimes stopped at the Trumbull's trading post for additional supplies as well as packaging for shipment overseas. Another of Connecticut's growing industries was known as autumn meatpacking. At harvest time, stores of recently butchered beef and pork were loaded into barrels of salt and sent to the ports downriver where they were loaded on ships for the colony's world markets. It was in this process that his family's Lebanon location paid off handsomely for Trumbull and made him one of Connecticut's most influential men.⁴

Aside from his entrepreneurship, for most of his adult life, Jonathan Trumbull was involved in Connecticut politics as a member of the Governor's Council, but in March of 1765 fate intervened. Parliament passed the Stamp Act and the first step on the road to revolution had been taken. Trumbull was among those who felt by doing so, Great Britain had stepped firmly on the rights of Connecticut's citizens but current Governor Thomas Fitch (1699 – 1774), according to Trumbull's great-great-grandson, was a man who was "careful of the rights of his colony but believing

that the rights of his king were superior, and that his mandates, whatever they might be, should be obeyed."⁵

In taking the oath to enforce the hated Stamp Act in a largely Whig colony, Fitch had secured his political fate. Seeing the writing on the wall, he retired from office the following year. The new governor was a man named William Pitkin (1694 – 1768) and Trumbull was elected his Deputy Governor. When Pitkin passed away in October 1768, the General Assembly elected Jonathan Trumbull to replace him. The citizens of Connecticut continued to put Trumbull in the office at each yearly election for the foreseeable future. It was a post that he occupied through the end of the war, making him the only colonial governor to do so. That continuity of power at the top worked to Connecticut's advantage for the duration of the war.⁶

When war finally did come to Great Britain's American colonies on the morning of April 19, 1775, Connecticut and her governor were in a unique position to do more than their part for the cause. Patriot sentiment dominated the colony in much the same way it did with her troublemaking neighbor to the north in Massachusetts. A few of the western towns tended towards the Loyalist or Tory beliefs held by many in the colony of New York, but most of the people favored the Patriot cause. For the inhabitants of the region, the conflict was very much like a colonial civil war, pitting neighbors against neighbors for the next eight years. Friendships between families that had existed for generations were suddenly

over and violence against each other was a very real possibility.

For Jonathan Trumbull and the rest of the Whig government, the issue was how he could direct the colony's war efforts within his limited powers of the governor. As a British colony with a unique charter, Connecticut's governmental power was mostly located in its legislative branch, but during a time of war, when decisions needed to be made with increasing speed and urgency, a change needed to be made. The twice a year session of the General Assembly, at a time when communication between towns was extremely slow, was just not adequate and Connecticut's leaders knew it. It is a testament to the reputation of Governor Trumbull, that the General Assembly felt obliged to pass the following Act less than a month after Lexington and Concord at their May 1775 session:

This Assembly do appoint the Hon. Matthew Griswold Esq^r, and the Hon^{ble} Eliphalet Dyer, Jabez Huntington, and Samuel Huntington Esq^r, William Williams, Nathaniel Wales jun^r, Jedidiah Elderkin, Joshua West, and Benjamin Huntington Esq^r, a committee to assist his Honor the Governor when the Assembly is not sitting, to order and direct the marches and stations of the inhabitants inlisted and assembled for the special defence of the colony, or any part or parts of them, as they shall judge necessary, and to give order from time to time for furnishing and supplying said

*inhabitants with every matter and thing that may be needful to render the defence of the colony effectual.*⁷

The creation of this advisory committee gave Governor Trumbull war powers that no colonial governor of the time enjoyed. It was also assumed, based on the proximity of the hometowns of many of these men, that Connecticut's war government was to be run out of Trumbull's Lebanon general store. Not only was it the Governor's home base, but in 1775 it was centrally located between the fighting in Boston and the New London shipping port that had been the reason for its location from the beginning. From this advantageous location, Trumbull and the advisory committee became instrumental to the American war effort.⁸

Within days after the first shots of the war were fired outside Boston, approximately 3,600 Connecticut men left their lives behind and went to the aid of the militia in the siege around the coastal town. The governor's son Joseph Trumbull (1737 – 1778), currently practicing law in Norwich, was appointed as Connecticut's Commissary General for the colony's troops now located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It was his job to ensure that the Connecticut men taking part in the siege had all the supplies and provisions they required. Eventually, there were a total of nine commissary locations for the state, all run by Connecticut merchants who had a lifetime of negotiating with farmers for the most advantageous prices as well as keeping detailed records of their transactions.⁹

“On the same day that it established the commissariat, the Assembly voted an immediate embargo on exportation by water out of the colony of wheat, rye, corn, pork, beef, live cattle, peas, beans, flour, and corn meal.”¹⁰ There was no way the colony’s commissaries could obtain the best prices for the required food stores if they had to compete with so many worldwide markets, so the governor and his committee attempted to shut off the spicket. For the most part, the embargo kept the cost of these goods firmly at 1774 prices.¹¹

As is the case with any effective embargo, this one created an equally viable smuggling industry. Ships from both sides of the conflict operated throughout Long Island Sound and beyond for the duration of the war, with little or no interference from state officials. The ever-increasing need for gunpowder and arms from the West Indies made much of this illegal trade beneficial to Connecticut’s war production, so officials mostly looked the other way.

Also operating in the Sound throughout the war were Privateers commissioned by both Governor Trumbull and the British military leadership in New York. Privateering was legalized piracy, and these vessels felt free to attack enemy ships and rob them of their cargo, with the agreement that they give 10% of whatever they captured to the government who had provided them with their letter of marque. Connecticut’s Letter of Marque began as follows, in this example of one provided to Captain Eli Rogers of a ship called the Gull.

*You may by force of arms attack, subdue and take all ships and other vessels belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, or any of the subjects thereof, on the high seas or between the high and low water marks except the ships or vessels together with their cargo belonging to any inhabitant or inhabitants of Bermuda or such other ships or vessels bringing persons with intent to reside within the United States...*¹²

The letter also included what was expected of a ship’s captain in the event he came into possession of an enemy ship. They were required to return to Connecticut where the cargo could be accurately cataloged, and settlement of payment could be finalized. Much of this activity took place out of the ports of New London and added a great deal of wealth to the state’s coffers throughout the war.¹³

At about the same time that the General Assembly created the Advisory Committee, they also called for an official ration for Connecticut’s soldiers so that the commissaries could better manage the needed procurement. Each man’s “daily ration was to include three quarters of a pound of salt or fresh pork or beef, a pound of bread or flour, and three pints of beer, plus unspecified amounts of milk, molasses, coffee, sugar, chocolate, vegetables, onions in season, vinegar, and weekly half a pint of corn meal, six ounces of butter, three pints of peas or beans.”¹⁴ For the duration of the war, at least by statute, the

state's troops remained amongst the best fed in the Continental Army.¹⁵

There was also a great need for weaponry, especially in the earliest days of the war. Connecticut looked to supply her troops with the needed requirement of guns, cannons, and to a lesser degree gun powder. The state was already a colonial leader in gun making, so when the war broke out, these craftsmen were encouraged to increase production motivated with a bounty of five shillings per gun. The increased production helped to keep Connecticut's militia as well as those serving in the Continental Army well-armed.

An even greater advantage Connecticut had over many of her sister colonies, was in cannon production. A foundry in Salisbury Connecticut on the western Massachusetts border had been owned by a man with assumed Loyalist leanings. He had abandoned it soon after the war began and fled to England, never to return. The management of this badly needed plant was taken over by Governor Trumbull and the Council of Safety and soon the state was putting out much of the heavy weaponry required by Washington's army throughout the conflict.¹⁶

Connecticut's overwhelming production in the suppling of American forces during a time of war quickly drew the attention of the British leadership in New York. Having taken the town from General Washington (1732 – 1799) and the Continental Army in the late fall of 1776, it remained a threat to the American supply line from the north for the remainder of the war. Even under the

brief American occupation, New York's Tory population was a thorn in Washington's side.

No one personified that thorn from New York more than Lieutenant General William Tryon (1729–1788), the former British Governor of the colony. When the Americans had taken control of the town, Tryon had moved his office to a ship just offshore, where he could quickly reinstate himself if the British military was able to retake the town. He was a fanatical believer in British policies, and he had more than a few willing accomplices to assist him on Staten Island which remained firmly in the hands of the Tories for the duration of the war.¹⁷

Restored to power when Washington and the Continental Army were chased out of the city in the fall of 1776, Tryon soon set his sights on the flow of provisions coming out of Connecticut. Working under the military leadership of Lord William Howe (1729 – 1814), he worked to strengthen the British supply position in any way possible. Tory spies in Connecticut had informed Howe of a large magazine of rebel guns and provisions located at Danbury, just over the state line. This location was advantageous to the Americans because it was a short distance from not only the Patriot held Hudson River Valley, but also to the militia units guarding the Connecticut shoreline near Fairfield. It was decided that should these supplies be required in either area, they could be obtained rapidly. It was also believed that the location was far enough inland to make them out of reach of the enemy.¹⁸

It was here, that now Major-General Tryon landed with approximately 2,000 men, a combined three full divisions of British regulars as well as Tory troops, on April 25, 1777. The “troops left New York in a fleet of 12 transports, three ships of wars and some small vessels, totaling approximately 26 ships, under the command of Captain Henry Duncan.”¹⁹ While a fleet of this size moving east through the Sound had not gone unnoticed by the Connecticut militia forces on shore, they had been unable to mobilize in time to fully oppose the landings on Compo Beach, east of the mouth of the Saugatuck River in today’s town of Westport. The troops were ashore by 6 PM on the 25th and only a brief skirmish ensued as the British left the beach to begin the 25-mile march to Danbury. Being greatly outnumbered, the few militia troops in the area were easily dispatched. The British proceeded northeast from the beach, eventually stopping for the night on the Redding Road at about 2:30 AM, a little more than halfway to Danbury.

General Gold Selleck Silliman (1732 – 1790) was the man in command of the patriot militia for the southwest sector of Connecticut, and he had been made aware of the British presence immediately upon the fleet being spotted off the coast. A veteran of the Battles of Long Island and White Plains the previous fall, this was not Silliman’s first contact with the enemy. As far back as the 7th of March, he had been warning Washington of the British naval activity in the Sound. On that date, he wrote the General stating “...I think it my duty to acquaint Your Excellency, that for

about 6 Weekes back the enemy Ships of Warr & Tenders have been, and still are cruising [sic] along the Sound Near Connecticut Shores....”²⁰ As soon as he was sure of the fleet’s destination, he alerted his subordinates to bring their men to Fairfield as quickly as possible. He also notified his immediate superior, General David Wooster (1711–1777), Commander of the Connecticut Militia who proceeded from his home in New Haven to cut off the British advance on Danbury. Early the next morning, as the day dawned rainy and cold, Silliman and about 500 men took out after the British on the road to Danbury.²¹

As he arrived in Redding, General Silliman and his men were joined by General Benedict Arnold (1741–1801), who had also been at his home in New Haven, taking care of some personal business. His wife had passed away while he was away with the army, and he needed to arrange for the care of his two boys. Recently passed over for a promotion he believed he was owed, by the Continental Congress in March, Arnold had taken a leave of absence from the army. His intension was to resign his commission as soon as the spring thaw allowed for safe travel south. In New Haven “he planned to comfort himself with the adoring family fellowship of his sons and sister before proceeding to Philadelphia.”²² It was there that the courier from the militia reached him, and instead of heading to the colonial capital to the south, Arnold rode north towards Danbury.

It was on the road to Danbury that Arnold met up with General Wooster.

While Wooster was the ranking militia officer in the state, Arnold was the man with the most actual fighting experience, so it was decided he should take command of the American response. The group continued to ride north until they reached the town of Bethel, just south of Danbury, where they could see the flames of Danbury burning in the distance. They now knew that they were too late to save the guns and supplies held there, so the decision was made to do what they could to stop the British from reaching their ships anchored back in Long Island Sound.²³

General Wooster took his men north towards Danbury, while Arnold and Silliman moved west toward Ridgefield to cut off the British retreat there. It was a little after midnight on the 27th of April when General Tryon was made aware of the approach of the American militia and seeing how a good portion of his men had availed themselves of the stores of rum in Danbury, determined that it might be time to leave. His men had already loaded into their few wagons as much of the American guns and supplies they could carry and set fire to the rest. Now, as his men prepared to march south, the homes of known Tories were marked with a cross, and any remaining residences were also put to the torch. Tryon later reported to General Howe that the burning of Danbury was the accidental result of the burning the stores of supplies, but that was most likely not the case. He had previously advocated for a strategy of “desolation warfare”²⁴ against the Connecticut shoreline so that rebellion was to be as painful as

possible, but he could never get his superiors to agree.

General Wooster and his men were rapidly coming up behind the enemy as they entered Ridgefield so when the British stopped to rest Wooster ordered an attack on their rear guard. The general as always led his men in that attack, but in the attempt to capture a couple of British cannons, he received a mortal wound for his efforts. His horse was shot out from under him and as he looked to mount another, he was shot in the groin and had to be carried from the field. His wound would prove fatal, and Wooster passed away on May 2nd while he rested in a house in Danbury.²⁵

Assuming the British most likely would return to their ships by the same route they had taken to Danbury, Generals Arnold and Silliman had taken up a second position on the Redding Road to confront them. Instead, Tryon headed for the coast by way of Ridgefield, so Arnold ordered his men into a forced march through the back roads to the west, trying to stay in between their adversary and their ships anchored in the Sound. A hastily built barricade along the road leading south out of town made up of whatever materials were readily available was constructed. “The site was a good choice because on the right of his position was the Benjamin Stebbins farmhouse with the land that dropped off at a sharp angle, and on the left side of the barricade was a ‘rocky ledge,’”²⁶ and it was here that the hottest fighting of the raid took place.

Wooster’s attack from behind had surprised Tryon who now became

aware that the Connecticut militia was much closer than he had realized, and he could not return to his ships unmolested. As he continued to move south out of town, he ran headlong into the barricade across the road built by Arnold and Silliman's men, whose numbers continued to increase as militias arrived from towns all over Connecticut and the Hudson River Valley. Still vastly outnumbered by the British, the Americans still put up a respectable effort against the seasoned and better-trained soldiers.

For the better part of an hour, the British tried to overrun the barricade with frontal attacks, but when they realized that these militia troops weren't going to break and run as Tryon expected, the British moved to gain an advantage on the American left around the rocky ledge. Now the enemy was able to fire on them from above and behind the barricade and the militia troops had finally had enough, and they began to retreat from this position.

Arnold, as he always did in the early days of the war, had led an active and spirited defense of the American position at the barricade. As he tried to keep some semblance of order to his men's withdrawal, his horse was shot out from under him. As he attempted to extricate himself from the fallen animal, a British officer approached to take him as his prisoner. Arnold quickly pulled the pistol he kept in his saddle holster and shot the man point-blank and retreated to the shelter of a nearby swamp as his men ran from the barricade.²⁷ Still more than 15 miles from

their ships, Tryon and his men set up camp just outside of Ridgefield, expecting to resume their march to the coast in the morning.

This concluded what has become known as the Battle of Ridgefield, but not the overall engagement between the Connecticut militia and the British invaders, who continued to move south towards their ships. Once again Arnold and Silliman looked to cut off the enemy's escape and on the morning of April 28th, they took up a position at a bridge over the Saugatuck River two miles north of the town of Norwalk. "Unfortunately for Arnold, Tryon learned from his spies where he was making his stand and maneuvered around the American position by crossing the river at a little-known ford."²⁸ Having been outflanked again, the Americans were now reduced to a hit and run action from the woods as their adversaries marched double-time back to Compo Beach and the safety of their ships.

Not unlike their brethren from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, who had harassed the British during their retreat to Boston from Lexington and Concord in April 1775, the Connecticut men kept up a sniping running battle with Tryon and his men alongside their march the remaining few miles back to the shore. Once they reached the hill overlooking Compo Beach, the British guns mounted on their transport ships in the harbor, chased off the remaining Patriot pursuers and the Red Coats boarded the ships with their stolen booty relatively unscathed.²⁹

From a British standpoint, there is no way that General Tryon's foray into Connecticut at the end of April 1777 could be considered anything but a success. Setting aside the terrifying message sent to the citizens of the area with the burning of Danbury and parts of Ridgefield, the number of stores that were either destroyed or ownership was transferred from the Americans to the British had to have had an impact on the coming summer campaigns of 1777.

In all, the British had destroyed or stolen "a quantity of ordinance stores, with iron, etc.; 4000 barrels of beef and pork; 100 large tierces of biscuits; 89 barrels of rice; 120 puncheons of rum; several large stores of wheat, oats and Indian corn, in bulk, the quantity hereof could not possibly be ascertained; 30 pipes of wine; 100 hogsheads of sugar; 50 ditto of molasses; 20 casks of coffee; 15 large casks filled with medicines of all kinds; 100 barrels of saltpeter; 1020 tents and marquees; a number of iron boilers; a large quantity of hospital bedding; engineers', pioneers' and carpenters' tools; a printing press complete; tar; tallow, etc.; 5000 pairs of shoes and stockings."³⁰ In the coming year, the momentum of the war in the north drastically changed in favor of the Americans, but the winter of 1777 saw the beginnings of the internal strife caused by an insufficient supply of troops that threatened the fragile cohesion of the Continental Army before the war was over.

It also stands to reason, that if the raid on Danbury had not resulted in some hardship to the American cause, then General Tryon would not have

come back again in the summer of 1779, this time setting his sights on the centrally located port of New Haven. Connecticut Colonel Jeremiah Wadsworth (1743 – 1804) had been made Commissary of the Continental Army in 1778 and as a result, much of the provisions for the American army were now stored within the state's borders until they could be shipped off to the various Patriot encampments. Also, during the intervening years, there had been a steady increase in the activities of the Connecticut-based privateers working on Long Island Sound, as they perfected their craft. These men were well versed in the use of whaleboats that, because of their speed and dexterity could be used to great advantage when attacking much larger vessels. Connecticut's seamen had become a major thorn in the side of the British leadership in New York, and General Tryon once again wanted to terrorize the people that supported them into submission.³¹

New Haven sits at the bottom of an upside-down "U" shaped harbor with the town proper in the middle flanked on the sides by the West, Mill, and Quinnipiac Rivers. The towns of East and West Haven sit across these rivers on either side of the harbor. As the British fleet moved east through the Sound they came first to West Haven, and it was here that they began to come ashore when they anchored a place called Southwest Ledge. The town was in the process of holding its first Fourth of July celebration when the British warships left Huntington Long Island with a force of approximately 5,000 men and made their way up the sound.

As was the case the last time, the shoreline militia lookouts marked the fleet's progress up the Sound.³²

High tide was at about 5 o'clock on the morning of July 5th, so it was then that the First division of 1,500 men began to come ashore. Hauling four field cannons, this contingent led by Brigadier General Thomas Garth (1744 – 1829) quickly move inland to the West Haven green virtually unmolested. They rested there while the fleet moved across the mouth of the harbor to East Haven, where they deposited another division of 1,500 men, under the command of General Tryon himself. Taking fire from Black Rock Fort at the very tip of the harbor, the approaching boats were forced to split with half coming ashore at Morris Cove and the rest moving east to the land beyond the rocky point and out of range of the three rebel guns in the fort. It was here that the Connecticut militia put up the most resistance as the British attempted to move north to New Haven. By now the countryside was aware of the landings in West and East Haven, and additional militiamen were gathering from many of the nearby towns, like Derby, Milford, Shelton, and Branford.³³

This time the British advance was marked by the burning of many of the farms and crops they encountered as they progressed around the mouth of the harbor toward New Haven. The guns on board the British ships in the harbor covered the advance as the army tried to gain a foothold on the beaches. Eighteen members of the Connecticut militia housed in Black Rock Fort did

what they could to make the enemy uncomfortable in their endeavor, but they were eventually forced to withdraw, spiking the guns as they departed their position.³⁴

In defense of their homes, the Americans again engaged in the same type of running sniping battle that had taken place on the road back to Boston from Lexington and Concord in 1775 and at Danbury in 1777. Eventually, the Americans were forced to fall back to a spot called Beacon Hill, about three miles from where the enemy had landed. At the high point of the area, the Connecticut militia in 1775 had established a small signal fort and gun battery for just this type of occasion. On this day it was the sight of the final stand of any kind of organized militia resistance. The British eventually advanced up the hill and took this spot as well, forcing the Americans to retreat to the hills surrounding nearby Lake Saltonstall, while the enemy moved into the town of New Haven itself and took up temporary residence on the campus of Yale College.³⁵

As nightfall came on the night of July 5th, the occupying British troops had once again found the stores of rum in both private residences as well on the Yale campus. Connecticut militia troops continued to arrive from all over the state and it became apparent to Generals Tryon and Garth that they might soon be surrounded by men much soberer than their own. Garth had also burned some of the farms he had encountered on his trek through West Haven and into New Haven, and

this combined with the proclamation that Tryon had made upon his arrival in town had done much to inflame the citizenry of the area. Whether he intended to threaten the people of Connecticut into submission or was himself drunk on power is unclear. He wrote:

The ungenerous and wanton insurrection against the sovereignty of Great Britain, into which this colony has been deluded by the artifices of designing men, for private purposes, might well justify in you every dear which a conscious guilt could form, respecting the intentions of the present armament.

*Your town, your property, yourselves, lie within the grasp of the power whose forbearance you have ungenerously construed into fear; but whose lenity has persisted in its mild and noble efforts, even though branded with the most unworthy imputation.*³⁶

Whatever his intentions, Tryon and his men now found themselves in a growing beehive of militia activity just outside the city limits. A council of war with his officers held in the old Connecticut State House confirmed this fact and the decision was made to evacuate the town immediately. They had taken heavy losses during the raid, with some estimates as high as 200 men, and it was now time to leave. Tryon's men left New Haven by way of the eastern side of the harbor and by the afternoon of July 6th, all were back aboard the transport ships. The militia had now reoccupied Black Rock Fort as well as Beacon Hill, so as the British ships passed by, they

sent a full broadside volley in the direction of both forts. One of the cannonballs severed the head from the body of Isaac Pardee as he ascended Beacon Hill with another man.³⁷

Despite the losses his army had taken in New Haven, General Tryon was not yet done terrorizing Connecticut. As the British fleet passed by Fairfield on their way back to New York, they once again came ashore. This time their intention was simply the destruction of a town that had led the rebellion against British authority. They also knew that this time General Silliman would not be at home in Fairfield to coordinate any resistance, having been kidnapped by Tories from his home, along with his oldest son, back in February. The general was still being held in New York awaiting an exchange of prisoners that did not come until the following April when Connecticut privateers reciprocated by capturing a Tory judge from his home on Long Island.³⁸

Tryon's intention was solely the destruction of the town and the stores that were being held there. Still believing in a strategy of desolation against any towns and their citizens who remained in rebellion, he was now putting that idea into brutal effect. Any homes, barns, and churches within easy reach of the shoreline were burned to the ground, as the army moved into town. Most people had fled as the army approached up Beach Road, but some, who were determined to stay were shot for resisting. This raid was once again a message to the Connecticut people that resistance to the power of Great Britain

was a deadly mistake and that continued support of the Continental Army could only bring more destruction.³⁹

That additional destruction came again sooner than anyone in Connecticut anticipated. After a brief trip back to Huntington, General Tryon returned to the area in a matter of days, this time only a few miles from the New York border at Norwalk. It was here that the largest military engagement of the war within Connecticut's borders took place on July 11th. By now the entire state was alarmed by what had already taken place at New Haven and Fairfield, so when the enemy returned, a militia force larger than any during the previous raids was waiting for them. Even with the growing force, the Americans were still greatly outnumbered, and the result was the wholesale burning of most of the town as well the ships in the harbor before the fleet finally returned to New York for good. The destruction of Norwalk was witnessed by General Washington's head of intelligence Major Benjamin Tallmadge (1754–1835) who was nearby with his body of Continental light infantry. Tallmadge and his men were too late to impede the enemy in their task, but in his memoirs, he described "the scene as awful – to see the inhabitants – men, women, and children – leaving their houses, and fleeing before the enemy, while our troops were endeavoring to protect them."⁴⁰

Motivated more by a need to terrorize his neighbors to the north, than the destruction of Connecticut arms and provisions, General Tryon managed to accomplish a little of both

during his July expedition up the shoreline. When it was over, Governor Trumbull attempted to assess the total damage done to his state. According to his calculations, the towns of New Haven, East Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk had 240 homes, 158 barns, 36 stores, 40 shops, 12 vessels consumed by the fires set by Tryon's men. Also burned was an estimated 2,000 bushels of wheat to be used to feed the American army. It was also reported that there were 23 Americans killed, 15 wounded and another 12 captured. General Tryon reported British losses at 26 killed, 90 wounded and 32 missing. Among the latter figure was included several Hessian mercenaries who simply deserted the British army and had stayed in New Haven to become respected members of the community.⁴¹

The third and final time that the armies of Great Britain came to attack Connecticut's shores during the war, it came at the hands of the man who had done so much to repel the first raid in April of 1777. At that time, the seeds of discontent were already germinating in the mind of Benedict Arnold, but the remnants of his remaining loyalty to the American cause won out on that day. Now it was more than four years later, and he had spent most of the previous year as a general in the employ of the British army, having betrayed the cause for which he had done so much during the early days of the conflict. His treason in September of 1780 had filled many of his life-long friends in southeast Connecticut with understandable anger. Now he returned to the area of his childhood to set a torch to that anger and the town.

As a young adult, Arnold had spent many months in and around the port of New London as he slowly built his own export business. He knew the area and the people there very well, but now, he had spent much of the past year, begging his new commanders to allow him to lead a British force in the field. In January of 1781, he had led a Loyalist force known as the American Legion to Virginia, having burned the town of Richmond and coming within a whisker of capturing the state's governor Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826). By the following fall, the privateering business operating out of New London had become too lucrative to suit Sir Henry Clinton (1730 – 1795) and the British leadership in New York, so Arnold was sent “home” to put a stop to it.⁴²

While much of Connecticut was beginning to show the strains of six years of war, New London seemed to be thriving. Not only was much of the bounty the privateers had captured throughout Long Island Sound and the Atlantic Ocean, brought home through New London, but there was also a brisk business of smuggling with the enemy being carried out in the area. Whale-boats could easily slip in and out of the numerous coves and inlets around New London and Groton, to find more than a few willing Loyalist trading partners on the far eastern end of Long Island, only a few short miles away. Lieutenant Colonel William Ledyard (1738 – 1781), the man in command of the militia in the area, was aware of this illicit trade but lacked the resources to do much about it.⁴³

On the early morning of September 6th, 1781, Arnold approached New London harbor, with a force of over 1,700 officers and men, transported by a fleet of 24 vessels, including four heavily armed warships. The militia force stationed in Fort Griswold, on the eastern shore of the harbor, sounded the prearranged alarm of two cannon shots to alert the militia in the neighboring towns, but Arnold of course was aware of this signal and followed the two initial shots with one of his own. Three cannon shots meant that a prized ship was arriving, and consequently, the militia units in the area were slow to react to the threat.⁴⁴

Unlike the raid on New Haven two full summers before, Arnold attacked the two sides of the harbor simultaneously. Deploying approximately 800 men towards Fort Trumbull on the western or New London side while an equal contingent of loyalists' troops came ashore below Fort Griswold on the Groton side, the limited American militia troops were unable to concentrate their forces on any one side of the harbor. The third alarm signal combined with a reticence to face down British guns on the part of some members of the militia kept the total number combined in both forts at only about 50 men. Many busied themselves in getting their homes and their families out of way of the advancing enemy, before manning the forts. There was also a very short supply of gunpowder and shot available in the area, making any kind of lengthy defense impossible. Colonel Ledyard, in charge of the defense of Fort Griswold, did what he could to quickly requisition

needed supplies, but with limited time and provisions available, he found himself extremely short on both.⁴⁵

The enemy force moving on Fort Trumbull quickly overwhelmed the approximately twenty-three men defending her with a constant barrage from the ship-bound British guns in the harbor. Attempting to hold off a much larger force with cannonballs flying over their heads was not something these unseasoned troops were prepared to deal with, and the fort surrendered within minutes. Another smaller battery called Town Hill Fort sat behind Fort Trumbull closer to town, but that was also improperly manned and many of the militia in Fort Trumbull found themselves fired upon from both sides until that battery also surrendered. Arnold and his men easily moved beyond these forts and into the town of New London, where it was subsequently put to the flames.⁴⁶

Fort Griswold on the opposite side of the Thames River put up a slightly more rigid defense, but it too was soon in British hands. Colonel Ledyard found himself leading a battery of inexperienced and in some cases, very young troops in a fort badly in need of repair. As troops abandoned Fort Trumbull, many crossed the river to assist in the defense of Fort Griswold, giving Ledyard approximately 165 men when the British arrived at the fort. However, the biggest problem the colonel had was not limited to the number of men, but the lack of prepared ammunition for the cannons. Loading each shot with gunpowder was a time-consuming process and not one that was typically done

while under fire as the smallest spark could set off a catastrophe.⁴⁷

Fort Griswold also surrendered after a battle lasting less than an hour. Once the British had forced themselves inside the walls of Fort Griswold, Colonel Ledyard and his men looked for quarter from an enemy now clearly among them. What happened next has been a matter of some controversy ever since. It was reported in the years immediately following the battle that, as Ledyard attempted to surrender his sword to a British officer standing in front of him, it was taken and immediately used against him, as the officer ran him through with it. This act set off a carnage of reprisals by the British as many of the fort's defenders were also murdered as they looked to surrender. However, the facts of this account have been called into question in subsequent years due to the lack of reliable eyewitness accounts. What cannot be denied, is that American casualties were high in Fort Griswold after the militia attempted to surrender.⁴⁸

According to General Arnold's figures, the raid on New London and Groton resulted in 48 British soldiers killed and 145 wounded. Arnold estimated that 85% of the eventual 300 defenders in Fort Griswold were also killed, but he neglects to report on just how such a high casualty rate was obtained. Much of the towns of New London and Groton were burned to the ground as well as the destruction of approximately 50 cannons and the stores of gunpowder that was supposed to go to the Continental Army, now working its way towards Yorktown, Virginia. It

has also been reported that some of the American troops from Connecticut helped win what became the decisive battle of the war at the Virginia port town, while under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette (1757–1834) who instructed them to “Remember New London,” but this cannot be definitively confirmed.⁴⁹

What can be confirmed is that no state contributed more of its wealth and treasure towards winning the American War for Independence than Connecticut, making it a target of British reprisals throughout the war. While exact total figures can be elusive, it can be accepted as fact that it was because of men like Jeremiah Wadsworth in his position as Commissary General of the Continental Army as well Governor Jonathan Trumbull and his son Joseph who held the position before Wadsworth, that the army was able to survive at all. There can be no dispute that

the destruction of many of these stores of food and weapons in Connecticut resulting from General William Tryon’s raids in 1777 and again in 1779, along with the desolation wrought by the Connecticut traitor Benedict Arnold in 1781, contributed to the almost constant hardship that American forces endured throughout the conflict. Many times, as the war progressed, General Washington was put in the position of begging the Continental Congress for long-promised weapons and supplies, some of which never arrived because they had been destroyed during these raids before ever leaving Connecticut. For an army that was forced to survive with so little for almost eight years of war, the loss of any number of provisions was an extreme hardship and it is for that reason the British military saw fit to continue raiding Connecticut, right up to the final surrender at Yorktown.

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The MacKechnie Force's Command Issues in the Battle of Salamaua June-September 1943

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ABSTRACT

Salamaua was part of Operation Postern which was intended to recapture the Huon Peninsula from the Japanese to isolate the Japanese at Rabaul, an important chokepoint in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II. The Battle of Salamaua was intended to distract the Japanese at Lae to allow the 9th Australian Division to take Lae and secure the New Guinea side of the Vitiaz Straits as part of Operation Cartwheel. This article tells the story of the American involvement in the Battle of Salamaua. The Battle of Salamaua was the last time that Americans fought under Australian command during World War II.

Keywords: WWII, Australia, Southwest Pacific Theater, Roosevelt, MacKechnie, Salamaua, Lae, MacArthur, Infantry, New Guinea, Rabaul, Huon Peninsula

Problemas de mando de la fuerza MacKechnie en la batalla de Salamaua, junio-septiembre de 1943

RESUMEN

Salamaua era parte de la Operación Postern, que tenía la intención de recuperar la península de Huon de los japoneses para aislar a los japoneses en Rabaul, un importante punto de estrangulamiento en el Teatro del Sudoeste del Pacífico durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La Batalla de Salamaua tenía la intención de distraer a los japoneses en Lae para permitir que la 9.^a División Australiana tomara Lae y asegurara el lado de Nueva Guinea del Estrecho de Vitiaz como parte de la Operación Cartwheel. Este artículo cuenta la historia de la participación estadounidense en la batalla de Salamaua. La batalla de Salamaua fue la última vez que los estadounidenses lucharon bajo el mando de Australia durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Palabras clave: Segunda Guerra Mundial, Australia, Frente del Pacífico Sudoeste, Roosevelt, MacKechnie, Salamaua, Lae, MacArthur, Infantería, Nueva Guinea, Rabaul, Península de Huon

1943年6月至9月间萨拉马瓦战役 中麦凯奇尼军的指挥问题

摘要

萨拉马瓦曾是后门行动（Operation Postern）的一部分，后者旨在从日军处夺回休恩半岛，进而将日军孤立拉包尔（二战期间西南太平洋战区的一个重要枢纽点）。萨拉马瓦战役旨在转移莱城日军的注意力，让澳大利亚第9师占领莱城并确保勇士号海峡靠近新几内亚的那一侧成为车轮行动（Operation Cartwheel）的一部分。本文讲述了美国在萨拉马瓦战役中的介入。萨拉马瓦战役是二战期间美军最后一次在澳洲指挥下参战。

关键词：二战，澳大利亚，西南太平洋战区，罗斯福，麦凯奇尼（MacKechnie），萨拉马瓦，莱城，麦克阿瑟，步兵，新几内亚，拉包尔，休恩半岛

There is little research on an important battle of the Southwest Pacific. The last battle in which Americans fought under Australian command, an important push forward against the Japanese and one of the first chances to apply the lessons learned from Milne Bay, Buna, Gona, and Sananada about fighting the Japanese in the jungles of Papua New Guinea happened during Operation Postern, an operation to recapture the Huon Peninsula and isolate the Japanese base at Rabaul. The Battle at Salamaua, as part of that operation, was a ruse to lure the Japanese away from Lae. The miscommunication about the ruse with the

ground troops resulted in the Allies capturing Salamaua too quickly. This article is about the ability of the Australians and Americans to work together, how it was supposed to work, and how it was badly misinterpreted at the command level.

The first phase of Postern called for an amphibious operation at Nassau Bay to create a base of operations at Salamaua to enable the Australian 9th Division to take Lae. This base of operations shortened the overland line of communications from Wau and freed aircraft and logistical support for the assault on Lae.¹ The amphibious opera-

tion was assigned to MacKechnie Force, pulled from the U.S. 41st Infantry Division's 162nd Infantry Regiment.

MacKechnie Force landed at Nassau Bay with orders to strike inland to clear Bitoi Ridge after 17th Australian Brigade had cleared the landing area at Nassau Bay. Brigadier General Murray Moten, the commander of the 17th Australian Brigade, ordered MacKechnie Force to move 10 miles inland to attack the Japanese, but with the great loss of landing craft and supplies, Colonel A.R. MacKechnie could see no possibility of being able to go on the attack. The Battle for Salamaua started on June 29, 1943, and the objective was gained on September 12, 1943. The 162nd Regiment fought in arguably the longest siege of sustained combat in the Pacific area. "A general feeling was expressed that this battalion had climbed more higher and muddier hills than any U.S. outfit known to history. Seventy-six days of continued contact with wide dispersion, serious supply difficulties and varied enemy tracks and position had made the 41st Bn, 162nd Infantry, a battle-wise outfit and all felt that any rest period had been well earned."² The 162nd Regiment's seventy-six days of continuous combat held the record in the Southwest Pacific Area until the end of the war against the Japanese and resulted in a Presidential Unit Citation. In the Australian historical record and in popular commemoration, the Battle of Salamaua is frequently subsumed into the larger two-divisional assault on Lae, if it is mentioned at all. Lae, however, could not have been captured so quickly had the Salamaua Magnet not

worked and ultimately worked exceedingly well.

The 41st Infantry Division, an Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana National Guard Infantry Division was the first American infantry division to arrive in Australia assigned to fight under General MacArthur's command in the Southwest Pacific Theater. The 41st Infantry Division had been put on mobilization orders on September 16, 1940, one of the first four National Guard Infantry divisions activated for World War II. The 41st had a well-connected commander, Major General George Ared White, who had served as the 41st Infantry Division commander before and after World War I. Additionally, he served on General John "Black Jack" Pershing's staff during World War I where he knew the importance of training when a unit went to war. Because of this commander, the 41st Infantry Division trained and trained well during the interwar years. The 41st Infantry Division had participated in many war games before the United States entered the war and had won every game resulting in Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the Chief of Staff of GHQ (General Headquarters), stating that the 41st Infantry Division was the top-ranked National Guard infantry division in the United States and one of the three top divisions in the United States Army.³ Unfortunately Major General White would die before the 41st went to war. Major General Horace Fuller would take command.

Australia had been fighting for the British Empire since World War II

started. Australia itself was attacked in February 1942 at Darwin by the Japanese, and Australia scrambled to get its troops home. Most of Australia's military were in North Africa, so when Japan started the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, there were few Australian troops available to protect the homeland. "After the bombing of Darwin, all RAN [Royal Australian Navy] ships in the Mediterranean theatre, as well as the 6th and 7th Divisions returned to defend Australia."⁴

The Australians asked for help from the United States and Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, ordered the 41st Infantry Division to transfer to Australia from Oregon and Washington coastline defense on February 17, 1942, with the mission to protect Australia's ports and air bases and provide garrisons for the defense of Australia's eastern and northeastern coastal cities.⁵

The 41st Infantry Division arrived in Sydney and Melbourne in March and April of 1942, consolidated in Melbourne and moved by rail to Rockhampton, where it undertook jungle training in preparation to fight the Japanese in New Guinea. The 41st fought for the first time in December 1942 at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda with the deployment of the 163rd Infantry Regiment commanded by Brigadier General Jens Doe to fight under I Corps' Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger. The 163rd Regiment quickly cleaned up the fighting and returned to Rockhampton, Australia to prepare for its next mission. Next in line to fight was

the 41st's 162nd Regiment under the command of Colonel A.R. MacKechnie.

Americans fought for the last time under Australian command when the 162nd Regiment was ordered to fight in the 3rd Australian Division's area of operation in Papua New Guinea to divert the Japanese from the main objective of Lae by feinting the recapture of Salamaua. MacKechnie Force initially consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 162nd Regiment, a regiment detached from the 41st US Infantry Division, assigned to the 17th Australian Brigade for the Battle of Salamaua, and named for Colonel A.R. MacKechnie, the commander of the 162nd Regiment. A Company from 2nd Battalion reinforced MacKechnie Force and 3rd Battalion was assigned later, but under the Task Force name of Coane Force came the start of the most problematic of Australian and American leadership difficulties during the Battle of Salamaua. The 1st Battalion of the 162nd Regiment was the first unit to land at Nassau Bay on the night of June 29-30, 1943, in one of the first amphibious landings in the Pacific theater.

In 1993, Jon Hoffman wrote an article in *The Marine Corps Gazette* comparing the amphibious landings done by the Marines in the Central Pacific Theater to the amphibious landings done by the Army in the Southwest Pacific Theater. He specifically mentions the landing at Nassau Bay noting that even though it was a tough amphibious landing it was generally more successful than most Marine landings, since there were dramatic differences in the

size of the land masses and the ability to maneuver with the larger land mass based on the location of the Japanese. General Douglas MacArthur had an innate ability to see the opportunity for maneuver if his troops could be landed in locations away from the mass of the enemy so his fighting units could gain a firm footing before having to fight against them. Generally, leaders focus on the final objective and forget to look at all the potential options of taking that objective including the option of using a large land mass for maneuver warfare. Salamaua was one of the first examples of this ability; when MacArthur ordered the MacKechnie Force to land at Nassau Bay 20 miles away from Salamaua, he provided the MacKechnie Force with a relatively protected anchorage allowing them to land artillery and supplies with comparatively light enemy interference.⁶

Unfortunately, the reconnaissance of the beach was inadequate and the surf on the beach selected for the landing force was too high (12 feet) which proved to be difficult to get landing craft through it. The beach also had only about 300-400 yards cleared and ready for the landing force. During the landing, MacKechnie Force lost 18 out of its 22 landing craft, which severely affected the ability to reinforce and resupply the initial landing force. In addition, the troops in the first wave had been scared with “bear” stories about how tricky and clever the Japanese were, which resulted in hesitation to move away from the beach.⁷

A personal journal kept by Captain James Gray, the commander of A

Company, the first company to land at Nassau Bay, documents the landing. “God, it’s cold and wet – we’ve been bouncing around like a cork for hours. It’s blacker than hell. Then it happens! First a couple of boats off our port side collide. Another goes haywire and drops back. The next thing we know; the waves of boats are all separated. Get the picture? About thirty small boats bobbing around in the pitch black with the ocean as rough as all get out and we don’t know where each other are.”⁸ This was the first amphibious landing for the 41st Infantry Division and it had been determined that it would be safer to land during the darkest part of the night. “The ramp goes down and out we go into waist deep water with the high breakers washing all over us. Some of the guys go under and come up spittin and cussin. Now to find our outfit. Are you kidding! You can’t see your hand in front of you. We’re supposed to go 50 yds inland strike a road and organize on it. I’ve got all my guys together and start in. God, its black, but I lead ‘em in.”⁹ Captain Gray tells that eight Australians were at the landing beach to assist the regiment once they landed. One was particularly helpful in having A Company gather together and take cover before the Japanese started spraying the beach with machine gun fire.

The geographical obstacles that were encountered by the 162nd Regiment as they disembarked at Nassau Bay to fight against the Japanese at Salamaua were harsh with sharp ridges separated by deep canyons. The maps used in the landing at Nassau Bay were inaccurate resulting in orders given to take a

ridge without realizing that a deep canyon needed to be traversed over several days before it could be taken. With man-eating crocodiles and natives, snakes, leeches, and a great variety of native diseases, the battle at Salamaua and other locations in New Guinea would make it one of the worst locations to fight during World War II. The 162nd Regiment landed at Nassau Bay south of Salamaua in its first battle of World War II and encountered not only that difficult terrain, but also a strong Japanese defense, a wide front and conflicting command instructions which resulted in slow progress through July and into August.¹⁰

Conflicting command instructions frustrated and bedeviled Colonel MacKechnie for the entire operation. "When Col. A.R. MacKechnie, with 162's 1/Bn [1st Battalion], charged in through heavy surf that black midnight at Nassau Bay, he faced the strangest campaign the 41st ever fought. For Col. Mack had more than Japs to fight. He fought the problem of divided command."¹¹ Colonel MacKechnie not only reported to General Fuller, commander of the 41st Infantry Division, but was also under the direct control of the 17th Australian Brigade. Only two days after the landing, MacKechnie wrote back to General Fuller that he hoped to never serve under dual command again.¹²

MacKechnie Force landed at Nassau Bay with orders to strike inland to clear Bitoi Ridge after 17th Australian Brigade had cleared the landing area at Nassau Bay. The 17th then attacked north to capture Mubo and continued to Komiatum and Lokanu along the

coastline. The 17th Australian Brigade's mission was to clear the approaches to Salamaua in order that the Australian 3rd Division could attack Salamaua itself.¹³

After the "shipwreck landing" at Nassau Bay, Brigadier General M.J. Moten, the 17th Australian Brigade's commander, sent orders to MacKechnie Force to advance to Napier through 10 miles of jungle swamp and to attack the Japanese.¹⁴ Colonel MacKechnie had no native carriers or artillery guns yet and replied in a report about the great loss of landing craft and the distance from the landing site to the battle resulting in the need to leave Company C at the supply location to guard it. "Due to the loss of over half our landing craft and my inability to get my troops, guns and supplies in as originally scheduled, I am naturally delayed in every way due entirely to the unfortunate water transport position."¹⁵ Colonel MacKechnie also remarked, in a bit of criticism on the role of the Australians in the Nassau Bay landing, that a small group of Australians were supposed to be at the landing site to insure that the landing craft came in to the right landing beaches, but only a couple of Australians had made it to the beach in time for the landing: one reason for the loss of landing craft. MacKechnie continued with "construction of a road which will permit moving artillery to the assembly area will require approximately three weeks rather than the two days estimated by your reconnaissance officer."¹⁶

Colonel MacKechnie was concerned about the need to transport rations to the men who were fighting and




James Gray and John Uppinghouse pose with an unidentified Soldier.
James Gray private collection

the lack of personnel for the transport. These issues forced MacKechnie Force to delay its ability to strike inland to take Bitoi Ridge. MacKechnie was understandably frustrated, but the 17th Australian Brigade had done all it could to make the landing at Nassau Bay successful based on their limited experience with amphibious landings. Since May, they had done aerial reconnaissance, patrols, and interrogation of local indigenous people to determine the feasibility of landing at Nassau Bay.¹⁷

Brigadier General Moten continued to order the MacKechnie Force to push forward— “[j]ust 5 days after the wrecked landing, Moten expected Nassau Bay beaches cleared of Japs, a supply base set up, a 10-mile road over swamps to Napier, and all Yank fighters into the high jungle.”¹⁸ There is proof of con-

flicting orders when MacKechnie notes, “I might say, in passing, that General Fuller, CG [Commanding General] 41 Division, has advised me not to embark on any offensive operation with my rifle troops unless they could be adequately supported by artillery and heavy weapons.”¹⁹ MacKechnie Force was capable of completing the initial mission, but without artillery support, Colonel MacKechnie was hesitant to unnecessarily risk American lives. Moving without artillery and heavy weapons meant close contact fighting and dealing with Japanese banzai attacks. The Australians fought in those conditions with submachine guns, four-second grenades or as a last resort with a bayonet charge, but the Americans did not see a need for this type of close contact fighting when they had mortars and



Salamaua locality map of known enemy defenses as of June 28, 1943. Information derived from aerial photo interpretations, observation point reports and native sources. Compiled and reproduced by 2/1 Australian, Army Topo, Survey Company. Australian War Memorial


artillery support. The order to move without artillery support was not considered reasonable.²⁰

Colonel MacKechnie asked for additional time, but Brigadier General Moten found an alternate solution. Moten ordered the airlift of supplies direct to Napier instead of moving supplies in by limited water assets and brought in L Company with the mission to garrison Nassau Bay. Once the supplies could be delivered and MacKechnie Force was released from guarding the assets at Nassau Bay, it could finally move in force into the high jungle. First battalion had started to fight, but third battalion was arriving to fight at Salamau and landed at Nassau Bay. More command issues arose quickly with the establishment of the Coane Force under the command of Brigadier General Ralph W. Coane and the commander of Third Battalion, Major Archibald Roosevelt, the son of a past American president. "Then Mack really got involved in a wild farce of divided command—with 3 Aussie generals, 2 Yank generals—and even Maj. Archie Roosevelt."²¹

General MacArthur had offered the Australian 3rd Division the additional asset of the American 3rd Battalion of the 162nd Regiment because he wanted Salamaua taken "as early as possible."²² Major General Stanley Savige, commander of 3rd Division, accepted the additional troops without realizing the strings attached to their use. The strings attached to Coane Force were that it would be left under the command of the 41st U.S. Infantry Division with the expectation that it would cooperate with 3rd Australian Division.

Coane Force was created when Lieutenant General Edmund Herring, commander of New Guinea Force, decided that to protect Yankee morale he would put an American in charge of operations once a supply base had been set up at Tambu Bay. He wanted the American Howitzer 105 guns to blast the Japanese before the attack on Salamaua, which was only five miles from Tambu Bay. "In compliance with telephonic instructions of GOC New Guinea Force on July 7 directing that a senior officer of the 41st US Division be placed in command of all 41st US Division and attached units in the NASSAU BAY-MAGERI POINT-MOROBE areas exclusive of MACKECHNIE Force, Brigadier General Ralph Coane will assume command that area on or about July 12."²³ It is important to note that 3rd Battalion of 162nd Regiment was specifically assigned to Brigadier General Coane's command. Some units in MacKechnie Force now became part of the Coane Force and Colonel MacKechnie temporarily became the S-3, Operations Officer, filling a very important mission in an artillery heavy headquarters with infantry expertise, but with the loss of the troops assigned to MacKechnie Force.²⁴

Lieutenant General Herring had sought to maintain smooth relations with the Americans by leaving Coane Force under the 41st command, but this did not work out as well as Herring had anticipated. Brigadier General Coane outranked Colonel MacKechnie, which caused problems when units of MacKechnie Force were placed under Coane Force without informing




Drawing of a "T" perimeter as part of the "Colvert Force" The "T" perimeter covered both the connecting ridges and the withdrawal. National Archives, Silver Springs, MD, I Company files.

MacKechnie. Lieutenant Colonel John Wilton, General Staff Officer Grade 1 in the Australian 3rd Division, stated, "We were getting on well with MacKechnie, then Coane came on the scene and he couldn't stomach the thought that he wasn't in supreme command himself. He was the one who caused the trouble-MacKechnie was all right, he was a decent guy and understood what was going on."²⁵

To alleviate the command issues that had resulted with the assignment of Coane Force, the Australian 3rd Division staff attended a meeting at the New Guinea Force headquarters with the American 41st Division staff on July 15, 1943. "From the tangled mass of information in NGF 07971 of 15 July,

I arrive at the following interpretation of the intention of HQ NGF. (a) All US troops within 3 Aust Div area of responsibility are placed under command 3 AUST DIV by HQ NGF. (b) US troops now under command 3 Aust Div are: 1 Bn 162 US Regt, 3 Bn 162 Regt, one Coy 2 Bn 162 US Regt plus supporting troops attached to Regimental Group now within area."²⁶ New Guinea Force followed up with a telegram to both 3rd Australian Division and 41st U.S. Division stating, "With a view to straightening out control U.S.A. forces have held conference at HQ with Sweeney. 41 U.S. Div desires that MACKECHNIE retain control of American troops moving inland and agree that this force should operate under operational control of



A drawing by an unknown artist details a combat field of fire during the Battle at Salamaua. National Archives, Silver Springs, MD, I Company files.

MOTEN as in the past. 41 U.S. Div has sent BRIG. GEN COANE to control the coast operations. In view rapid changing situation this force forthwith comes under operational control of 3 Div.”²⁷ Now both the 3rd Australian Division and 41st U.S. Division knew the command situation, but there was some lag time before Coane, Roosevelt, MacKechnie, and 17th Australian Brigade found out.

During that time, Major Archibald Roosevelt, 3rd Battalion Commander, became so frustrated by the conflicting orders coming from three different commands that he used his name, as well as MacArthur’s personal interest in his actions, and hopped a flight back to Australia to visit personally with General MacArthur about the confusing command situation. In addition, he sent a letter to General MacArthur stating, “The combination of two foreign groups and the ill-organized control produced is now producing contradictory orders and no rigid chain of command has or can be established . . . the situation has been brought about by the intermingling of the two armies-Australian and American-and will steadily become worse to the detriment of the American Army.”²⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig, deputy commander of the 162nd, tried to keep Roosevelt’s focus on fighting the Japanese and to let the higher commands work out their command differences, but Roosevelt was upset and urged MacArthur to “get all American ground forces out of New Guinea as quickly as possible.”²⁹


The 162nd Report of Operations states in note 65, “During the period

July 13 to 16 conflicting orders and instructions from 17th Brigade, 3rd Aust. Div. and 41st Inf. Div. regarding composition of forces, command authority and responsibility for execution of the mission north to TAMBU Bay LOKANU RIDGE were received by the C.G. Coane Force, C.O. MacKechnie Force and C.O. 3d Bn. 162d Inf.”³⁰ Third Battalion found itself in the middle and the bottom of the command chain of these conflicting reports. Major Roosevelt would not follow the orders issued from the Australian higher headquarters from July 10-14 because 3rd Battalion was still officially under the command of the 41st Infantry Division. “Also at this time there had been no provision made for supply and evacuation and no advance reconnaissance had been made. The Coane Force was activated on July 12 and the 3d Bn assigned as part of that Force.”³¹ The 17th Australian Brigade’s commander, Moten, was not informed about the creation of the Coane Force, so he continued to issue orders directly to the 3rd Battalion, including an order to send one company with a maximum strength of 138 men to fight a Japanese force that had just been reinforced with 200 men. This order showed the lack of good intelligence at 17th Australian Brigade’s headquarters.³²

Brigadier General Coane did not take kindly to those orders and was very specific in discussions with Major Roosevelt that 3rd Battalion was not part of the 3rd Australian Division or of the 17th Australian Brigade and that Roosevelt was to not follow any orders issued by them. Roosevelt sent a handwritten note to 17th Australian Brigade



The cartoon is from the Polk County Itemizer-Observer in Dallas, Oregon. Dated Thursday, April 6, 1944. The 162nd Regiment held the record for longest number of days in combat at the time of the cartoon.



The Komiatum G-3 Operations Area map is from the MacArthur Archives in Norfolk, VA. It shows where the 162nd landed in Tambu Bay and the village of Boisi. It also shows where the units were located during the operation in July.

stating, "Repeat cannot comply your request through MAC Force dated July 14. I have no such orders from my C.O. As a piece of friendly advice your plan shows lack of recc [reconnaissance] and lack of logical understanding. Suggest you send a competent officer as liaison officer to my HQ as soon as possible to study the situation."³³ Colonel MacKechnie found that Roosevelt would not even take orders from him, insisting that he only took orders from Brigadier General Coane. MacKechnie apologized to Moten for Roosevelt's messages saying that "the confused situation had put Roosevelt in a difficult position."³⁴ Coane Force had been assembled rather hastily and was put into action without informing either the Australians or Colonel MacKechnie.

Colonel MacKechnie was a very patient man and a good leader, but even he started to get angry. The number of messages coming from the different commands became very frustrating. He had been given the plan for taking Tambu Bay with 3rd Battalion from Moten, but when he returned to Nassau Bay to execute the plan, he discovered that General Coane had the mission and the unit that he thought he had. MacKechnie radioed General Fuller, the commander of the 41st U.S. Division and confronted him. Colonel MacKechnie stated that if General Fuller had such little confidence in him that he should be relieved of command or issued a second set of scissors so that he could continue cutting up paper dolls.³⁵ General Fuller promptly relieved Colonel MacKechnie of command and brought

him back to the 41st Infantry Division headquarters.³⁶

General Savige appealed to General Herring to put Coane Force under direct command of the 3rd Australian Division and that Colonel MacKechnie be put back in command of the 162nd Regiment. Herring agreed with Savige's appeal and immediately changed Coane Force to MacKechnie Force, arranged with the 41st Infantry Division to have Colonel MacKechnie return to command of the 162nd Regiment, and put it under Savige's command. General MacArthur confirmed the operational name change and change of command on 23 July. Brigadier General Coane and Major Roosevelt continued to be uncooperative even after Coane Force was officially put under the 3rd Division's command and were relieved for incompetency and lack of aggression on 11 August.³⁷ "ROOSEVELT moves to position approx. 50 yards of ridge each day. (b) He withdraws all troops to beach at night. 6. MOTEN strongly recommends for consideration the immediate removal of ROOSEVELT."³⁸

Colonel MacKechnie was once again in charge of all American forces for the Battle of Salamaua, taking Salamaua by September 12, 1943. The men under his command soon earned a new nickname for the 41st Infantry Division; the "Jungleers" or "MacArthur's Jungleers." "This nickname stuck always is a reminder of those early days when each bit of offensive action in those heretofore little-known, stinking hell holes brought much encouragement to a victory-hungry American people."³⁹

Colonel MacKechnie also received the British Distinguished Service Order for his efforts. The 162nd had been under Australian control for the entire battle and according to MacKechnie, "there has, on account of fatigue, been an increasing tendency among many officers and men of the regiment to criticize the Australian Command for short rations, lack of equipment, and the increasingly difficult task of the Regiment in relation to its strength."⁴⁰ Colonel MacKechnie requested an immediate withdrawal of the 162nd from New Guinea to be returned to the command of the 41st Infantry Division in Australia to be refitted and reorganized, and he requested to not have the unit put under Australian command again.

At Salamaua there had still been a learning curve in fighting against the Japanese. The 162nd Infantry Regiment of the 41st Infantry Division under Colonel A.R. MacKechnie was the main attacking force at Salamaua. MacKechnie Force would land at Nassau Bay and attack through Salamaua in coordination with the Australian forces.

Throughout this operation the regiment was attached to and under the operational control of the Australian 3rd and 5th Divisions, which operated under the command of GOC New Guinea Forces. Differences in operational methods, expressions and customs sometimes caused misunderstandings between the Yanks and Aussies. Several changes in command occurred and questions of command authority arose during the operations, which, added to the natural difficulties of communica-

tion, terrain, climate, and tactical situation, caused no small amount of confusion at times.⁴¹ This confusion resulted in conflicting orders and inefficient use of the forces assigned to fight at Salamaua. The 162nd Regiment's seventy-six days of continuous combat held the record in the Southwest Pacific Theater until the end of the war against the Japanese and resulted in this Presidential Unit Citation.

The Presidential Unit Citation:

The 1st Battalion, 162nd Infantry Regiment, is cited for outstanding performance of duty against the enemy near Salamaua, New Guinea, from 29 June to 12 September 1943, this battalion landed at Nassau Bay, New Guinea, in one of the first amphibious operations by American forces in the Southwest Pacific area, on a beach held by the enemy, and during a severe storm which destroyed 90 percent of the landing craft able to reach the beach. Moving inland through deep swamps, crossing swift rivers, cutting its way through dense jungle, over steep ridges, carrying by hand all weapons, ammunition and food, assisted by only a limited number of natives, this battalion was in contact with the enemy for 76 consecutive days without rest or relief. All operations after the initial landing were far inland. Living conditions were most severe because of constant rain, mud, absence of any shelter, tenacious enemy,

and a mountainous terrain. The supply of rations, ammunition, and equipment was meager. For 5 weeks all personnel lived on rations dropped by airplane, for days at a time on half rations. Individual cooking was necessary throughout the period. Malaria and battle casualties greatly depleted their ranks, but at no time was there a let-up in morale or in determination to destroy the enemy. Each officer and enlisted man was called upon to give his utmost of courage and stamina. The battalion killed 584 Japanese during this period, while suffering casualties of 11 officers and 176 enlisted men. Cutting the Japanese supply line near Mubo, exerting constant pressure on his flank, the valiant and sustained efforts of this battalion were in large part instrumental in breaking enemy resistance and forcing his withdrawal from Salamaua on 12 September 1943. The 1st Battalion, 162 Infantry Regiment has established a worthy combat

record, in keeping with the high traditions of the United States Army.

General Orders 91,
Headquarters 41st Infantry
Division, 18
December 1944, as
approved by Commanding
General, United States
Army Forces in Far East. ⁴²

The command problems at the Battle at Salamaua had ended, but MacArthur would not have Australians and Americans fight together again. Was MacArthur influenced by the president's son, Archibald Roosevelt? The battles of 1944 would be notable in that the Americans never did again serve under Australian command and if Australians did serve with American forces, they were to use American supplies and equipment.⁴³ This would influence the use of the Australians from this point. The Australians were relegated primarily to clean up operations or used for what were arguable unnecessary operations to regain control of British territory.

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To Annihilate All Armenians Living Within Turkey: Continuity and Contingency in the Origins of the Armenian Genocide, 1877-1915

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ABSTRACT

Debates regarding the Armenian genocide center on the extent to which decision-making for the genocide was contingent on the specific circumstances of the onset of World War One, or reflected longer-term continuities with the late 19th-century Hamidian massacres and genocidal planning by the Ottoman political leadership before the war. These debates present a false dichotomy regarding decision-making for the genocide, which was simultaneously a function of the specific contingencies of the war, and at the same time represented a culmination of a process of escalating hostility towards Armenians by Muslims at multiple levels of Ottoman society initiated in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. This structural anti-Armenian radicalization was in turn driven by the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, resulting from Russian imperialism and the growth of internal ethnic nationalism, anti-Muslim violence in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and the Ottoman political leadership's attempts to violently suppress perceived internal revolts.

Keywords: Armenian Genocide, Balkan Wars 1912-13, Battle of Sarikamish, Committee for Union and Progress, Hamidian Massacres, Ottoman Empire, Russo-Turkish War 1877-78, World War One, Young Turk Revolution

Aniquilar a todos los armenios que viven en Turquía: continuidad y contingencia en los orígenes del genocidio armenio, 1877-1915

RESUMEN

Los debates sobre el genocidio armenio se centran en la medida en que la toma de decisiones para el genocidio dependía de las circunstancias específicas del inicio de la Primera Guerra Mundial,

o reflejaban continuidades a más largo plazo con las masacres de Hamidian de finales del siglo XIX y la planificación genocida realizada por el gobierno. Liderazgo político otomano antes de la guerra. Estos debates representan una falsa dicotomía con respecto a la toma de decisiones para el genocidio, que fue simultáneamente una función de las contingencias específicas de la guerra, y al mismo tiempo representó la culminación de un proceso de creciente hostilidad hacia los armenios por parte de los musulmanes en múltiples niveles del Imperio Otomano. sociedad iniciada a raíz de la guerra ruso-turca de 1877-78. Esta radicalización estructural anti-armenia fue impulsada a su vez por la fragmentación del Imperio Otomano resultante del imperialismo ruso y el crecimiento del nacionalismo étnico interno, la violencia anti-musulmana en los Balcanes y el Cáucaso, y los intentos del liderazgo político otomano de reprimir violentamente la percepción revueltas internas.

Palabras clave: Genocidio armenio; Guerras de los Balcanes 1912-13; Batalla de Sarikamish; Comité de Unión y Progreso; Masacres de Hamidian; Imperio Otomano; Guerra Ruso-Turca 1877-78; Primera Guerra Mundial; Revolución de los jóvenes turcos

消灭所有居住在土耳其的亚美尼亚人：1877-1915 年间亚美尼亚种族灭绝起源中的连续性和偶然性

摘要

关于亚美尼亚种族灭绝的辩论聚焦于种族灭绝决策在多大程度上取决于一战开端的具体情况，或反映了与“19世纪末期哈米德大屠杀以及战前奥斯曼政治领导所作的种族灭绝计划”相关的长期连续性。这些辩论代表了关于种族灭绝决策的错误二分法，因为种族灭绝计划同时也与战争的特殊偶然性相关，同时还代表了1877至1878年俄土战争结束后引起的、奥斯曼社会不同层面的穆斯林对亚美尼亚人仇恨加深过程的顶点。这一结构性的反亚美尼亚人的极端化过程反过来受奥斯曼帝国的碎片化所驱动，后者归因于俄国帝国主义和内部的族裔种族主义情绪上升、巴尔干和高加索地区的反穆斯林暴力、以及奥斯曼政治领导者为暴力镇压感知的内部叛乱所作的尝试。

关键词：亚美尼亚种族灭绝；巴尔干战争（1912-1913）；萨利卡米什战役；团结与进步委员会；哈米德大屠杀，奥斯曼帝国，俄土战争（1877-1878）；一战，青年土耳其革命



Syria - Aleppo - Armenian woman kneeling beside dead child in field “within sight of help and safety at Aleppo” Library of Congress, Washington DC, accessed October 31, 2021, <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/pnp/cph/3a40000/3a48000/3a48200/3a48241r.jpg>

Between 1915 and 1919, the Ottoman government, directed by the political leadership of the Committee for Union and Progress Party, used the pretext of suppressing an internal uprising during World War One and deliberately murdered approximately 1.5 million Armenian Ottoman citizens, in what historians consider one of the first instances of genocide in the 20th century. How and why did the Ottoman political leadership make the decision to initiate the genocide of the Armenian people in 1915? To what extent did the Ottoman leadership’s per-

ceptions of the conditions before and during the war, both inside and outside Ottoman territory, contribute to this decision-making process? The proximate cause of the Armenian genocide was the decision taken by the ruling Committee for Union and Progress in the spring of 1915 to annihilate the Armenian people based on a perception of Armenians as an internal security threat. This belief developed in the wake of Armenian participation in the Russian Caucasus campaign of 1914-15 and localized Armenian resistance activities within the Empire at the outset of World War One.

However, this decision reflected a longer-term structural dynamic of escalating hostility and violence directed against Armenians by Ottoman political leaders and local Muslims which developed in the wake of the territorial losses and anti-Muslim violence of the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war. This dynamic was predicated on a belief that Armenian demands for civil and political rights within the Empire were precursors to Great Power intervention, Armenian independence, and increased Ottoman territorial loss and violence against Ottoman Muslims. Despite a brief period in which Armenians succeeded in achieving increased political representation following the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the further territorial fragmentation and violence of Balkan Wars of 1912-13 served to radicalize and escalate preexisting views of Armenians as alien and hostile elements to an Empire which had grown proportionately more Muslim in the wake of population transfers in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.

The historiography of the Armenian genocide can broadly be divided into the official Turkish stance on the genocide and the debate among scholars outside of Turkey. The official Turkish position today is one of strict genocide denial. According to this view, the Ottoman government did not deliberately engage in large scale mass killings of the Armenian minority during World War One, and to the extent there was violence directed against Armenians it occurred within the legitimate context of attempting to suppress a large scale Armenian revolt.¹ However, the major-

ity of scholars outside of Turkey reject this official view, and instead argue that the Ottoman government deliberately carried out a genocide of the Armenian people during the war based on the analysis of extensive primary sources. Debates among scholars of the Armenian genocide outside of Turkey have instead hinged on issues related to continuity and contingency regarding the CUP's initiation of the genocide.

Scholars emphasizing continuity such as Vakhn Dadrian have argued for a structural relationship between the Armenian genocide and earlier outbreaks of mass violence directed against the Armenian minority, specifically the 1894-96 Hamidian massacres that occurred during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. In Dadrian's view, both the Sultan and the CUP were able to take advantage of an Ottoman political culture rooted in Islam that allowed for the use of mass violence against non-Muslims in a situation that viewed the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Armenians as a challenge to Islamic supremacy.² Another element of the continuity claim is that the CUP developed genocidal intentions toward the Armenians before the outbreak of World War One. Dadrian argues that this genocidal intent can be seen as early as 1910 during a secret speech by Interior Minister Mehmed Talaat, in which he called for "Ottomanizing" the Empire, which in Dadrian's view required the "liquidation" and "violent elimination" of Armenians and other Christians.³ According to this argument, the outbreak of the war created a pretext for the CUP to enact its pre-existing genocidal in-

tent.⁴ Tanner Akcam also argues that the CUP developed genocidal plans in response to the 1914 Armenian reform agreement which demanded the CUP “eliminate” the Armenian issue “in a comprehensive and absolute manner.”⁵

In contrast to the continuity thesis, historians emphasizing contingency in explaining the Armenian genocide such as Ronald Suny and Donald Bloxham have specifically rejected claims of genocidal plans developed before the war. Instead, these historians argue that the genocide was the result of CUP policies enacted in response to specific wartime developments. As Bloxham has stated, “there was no a priori blueprint for genocide, and that it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures in a process of cumulative policy radicalization . . . only by the early summer of 1915 may we speak of a crystallized policy of empire-wide killing and death-by-attrition.”⁶ Suny rejects arguments that Islam and Ottoman political culture explain the Armenian genocide, pointing out that genocide was not a regular feature of Ottoman history.⁷

Norman Naimark has pointed out that genocide as a historical phenomenon occurs at multiple levels of society, including political leaders and other decision makers, regional and local leaders or military and police officers who interpret and carry out orders, and local individuals who may participate in or witness the killings.⁸ Explaining the Armenian genocide necessitates accounting for all levels of Ottoman society that were participants in the genocide. The fragmentation

of the Empire as a result of the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War and the Balkan Wars initiated and escalated a long-term process of increasing hostility and suspicion by political leaders and local Muslims directed towards Armenians, whose growing calls for increased civil and political rights and protection from violence within the Empire were seen as precursors to European intervention. Ottoman Muslims at multiple levels of society believed this intervention would result not only in further territorial loss but also increased violence against Muslims. This anti-Armenian radicalization developed in stages, and led to systematic violence at identifiable points, beginning with the Hamidian massacres and culminating in the CUP’s decision to initiate the genocide in response to the specific contingencies of the war.

In 1877, the Russian government took advantage of Ottoman anti-Christian violence in the Balkans to launch an attack on the Ottoman Empire in order to achieve the long-standing goal of control over the Black Sea Straits. Since the late 18th century, Russia had engaged in a drive towards the Balkans and the Caucasus in order to secure access to and control over the warm-water port of the Black Sea. This process inevitably brought Russia into conflict with the Ottoman Empire, whose capital in Istanbul lay on the strategic waterways of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles controlling the passageway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia also had ideological justifications for this expansion, seeing itself as inheriting the legacy of the Byzantine Empire as the “Third Rome” with the mission

of liberating Istanbul and returning it as the center of Orthodox Christianity, and in the later 19th century as the leader of Slavic nationalist movements in the Balkans.⁹ Taking advantage of this Balkan pan-Slavism, Russia used the pretext of the violent Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian revolt in 1876 to declare war on the Ottoman Empire, seizing control of large swaths of territory in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

European rejection of Armenian appeals for greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire led some Armenians to consider more radical means for independence. In the ensuing 1878 Congress of Berlin, called by the European powers to resolve territorial issues of both of the war and in Balkans, the Ottoman Empire lost forty percent of its total territory, including Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans, and the eastern Anatolian provinces of Ardahan, Kars and Batum to Russia.¹⁰ During the war Kurds in Van and Diyarbakır in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Persia, killed thousands of Armenians and destroyed multiple villages, fearing Russia would support Armenian separatist claims. Ottoman Armenians sent a representative, Khrimian Hayrik, to the Congress of Berlin to appeal for European support for Armenian political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire and guarantees of Armenian rights and safety. At the Congress Khrimian called for political autonomy within the Empire for what he claimed were two million Armenian inhabitants in six provinces in Eastern Anatolia, with Christian governors appointed by the Sultan assisted by coun-

cils comprised of equal measures Muslim and Armenian representatives.¹¹ The European powers rejected Khrimian's calls for extensive Armenian political autonomy and instead called for simple reforms regarding the safety and security of Armenians within the Empire. Upon his return from Berlin, Khrimian began to urge Armenians to turn to an armed revolutionary struggle for independence, pointing to the success of the Balkan insurrections against the Ottoman Empire in comparison with unsuccessful attempts by Armenians at peaceful advocacy for political and social autonomy.¹²

In the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin Armenian nationalist groups promoted revolutionary activity in the Ottoman Empire in support of Armenian autonomy. In 1886, Armenian socialists formed the Hunchak Party, which called for a violent uprising in Ottoman eastern Anatolia in support of an independent Armenia. The Hunchak program specifically advocated the use of terror to undermine Ottoman authority and inspire in the Ottoman Empire:

The purpose of terror is to protect the people, when it is subject to persecution, to raise its spirit, to inspire and elevate a revolutionary disposition among them, to show daring on behalf of the people protesting against the government, and thus to maintain the faith of the people toward the task on hand, to shake the power of the government, to abase its reputation of being powerful, to create extreme

fear [in its ranks]. The means to achieve these goals are: to annihilate the worst Turkish and Armenian personalities within the government, to annihilate the spies and the traitors.¹³

In 1890, a second group of Armenian nationalists established the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnaks, which supported Armenian political and social autonomy but not the creation of an independent state. In the mid-1890s, members of both groups sent agents into the Ottoman Empire to coordinate revolutionary activity, smuggle weapons, and engage in acts of terror against the Ottoman state such as attacking soldiers, police outposts, and groups of Kurds who were thought to have committed violence against Armenians. The Armenian revolutionaries believed such attacks would attract the support of European powers, following the example of Bulgarian revolutionaries.¹⁴

Territorial loss and the formation of Armenian nationalist revolutionary groups in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin contributed to Ottoman fears of Armenian independence movements and led to the development of specialized Ottoman border control units in Armenian territory. After the Russo-Turkish War the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhamid, increasingly turned to an ideology of conservative Islam to help unify the disparate Muslim ethnic groups in the Empire in the face of territorial encroachment by Christian European powers. In 1890 Abdulhamid established the Hamidiye regiments in

eastern Anatolia, which consisted of 30,000 Kurdish tribesmen on the border with Russia, as a way of strengthening their loyalty to the Ottoman state. The Sultan also established these units in areas with high concentrations of Armenians in response to the revolutionary activity by nationalist groups, and Hamidiye units exploited their immunity from prosecution to engage in attacks and acts of extortion of local Armenians, further inflaming local hostilities.¹⁵

Between 1894 to 1896, fears of local Armenian revolutionary activity and the potential for further territorial loss led Ottoman authorities and local Muslims to initiate a wave of massacres of Armenians in eastern Anatolia. In 1894, Armenians in the Sasun region, encouraged by Hunchak activists, rebelled against attacks by local Kurdish warlords and demands for the payment of tribute in addition to taxation by local Ottoman authorities. In August, fighting erupted between the Armenians and Kurds, and the Ottomans sent in Hamidiye units and regular military forces to reinforce the Kurds, killing approximately 3,000 Armenian men, women and children.¹⁶ Local Turks saw the Armenian rebellion as evidence of a conspiracy against Turks and the Empire itself, believing that Armenians “were plotting against the Empire and the Turkish element in the population.”¹⁷ Reacting to the massacre of Christian Armenians, the European powers proposed a series of reforms and protections for Armenians in the six Ottoman provinces in eastern Anatolia with high concentrations of Armenians, Erzurum, Bitlis, Diyarbakır,

Harput, Sivas, and Van. The Great Powers' plan envisioned European commissioners overseeing the implementation of reforms and European approval of the appointment of local Ottoman governors. Ottoman authorities viewed these reforms as a prelude to Armenian independence and they were rejected by the Sultan.¹⁸

In September 1895, the Hunchaks organized a protest in Istanbul to demand increased political and civil rights for Armenians. Muslim counter-protestors, backed by the army and police, attacked the Armenians, killing sixty, followed by further attacks by Muslims on Armenians in Trabzon in which hundreds died. To forestall further European interference the Sultan finally agreed to the European reform proposals to provide protections and increased political representation to Armenians, under European oversight.¹⁹ Local Muslims, fearful the European reforms would lead to an independent Christian Armenian state in which they would be a minority or forced to leave as had thousands of Muslims from the former Ottoman territory in the Balkans, unleashed a wave of violence that killed between 37,000 and up to 300,000 in some estimates in central and eastern Anatolia. In Diyarbakır, anger over the potential for Armenian independence as well as local economic resentment of Armenians contributed to Muslim attacks. In the aftermath of the massacres there, local Muslim notables wrote to the Sultan, in an attempt to explain the local violence: "It is clear that the Armenians live under much happier conditions than the Muslims and are

not as destitute and pitiful as they claim but, in reality, in this area own many places of work and have capital. Feeling discontented with their current advantages they will surely strive passionately to acquire still more privileges and to realize other unnecessary benefits that are contrary to Islamic law."²⁰

The third wave of violence began in August 1896 when a group of Dashnaks took hostages and threatened to blow up a bank in Istanbul, demanding reforms in the six provinces and an end to the wave of violence against the Armenians. Local mobs began attacking Armenians in Istanbul and surrounded the bank, attempting to break in. The Dashnaks dropped explosives on the crowd, killing several people. The European powers successfully negotiated an end to the hostage crisis, promising to ensure reforms, and escorted the Dashnaks to a waiting British ship. The incident led to another wave of violence by local Muslims angered by the bank attack, who killed approximately 8,000 Armenians in Istanbul as a result.²¹ The overall wave of violence directed against Armenians between 1894-96 shows the extent to which both the government, as well as local Muslims, increasingly saw Armenian demands for increased rights backed by European powers, and the potential for further territorial loss, as a threat to be suppressed with overwhelming violence.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 contributed to a period of optimism among Armenians and other ethnic and religious minorities for full political and civil rights within a constitutional Ottoman government. Since

the beginning of the 20th century, the increasingly autocratic rule of Sultan Abdulhamid resulted in the development of multiple opposition groups who sought the return of the constitutional government the Sultan had promised but abandoned in the wake of 1877 Russo-Turkish war. The most significant opposition group was the Committee for Union and Progress, which included intellectuals, bureaucrats and military officers committed to secularism, Turkish nationalism, economic modernization, and political reform who were willing to accept a liberal constitutional framework that allowed for an inclusive multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman citizenship and representative government. The CUP collaborated with Dashnaks who had abandoned the idea of Armenian independence and sought Armenian autonomy within a constitutional Ottoman state.²² The CUP coup against Abdulhamid in July 1908 began after the Sultan's agents arrested CUP officers in a cell in Macedonia and the officers faced a court-martial. Instead, CUP officers in Macedonia led a revolt against the Sultan in support of the reinstatement of the 1876 constitution which gained widespread support throughout Macedonia, and members of the Third Ottoman Army threatened to march on the Sublime Porte to demand restoration of the constitution. In response, on July 23rd, the Sultan summoned the cabinet and announced the restoration of the constitution. The CUP made the political decision to leave the Sultan and his government in power, given the extent to which he retained the broad political and religious

support of Muslims in the Empire, and established an oversight committee to ensure full compliance with a ruling constitution. With the reinstatement of the constitution many members of the Empire, which included a diverse array of ethnicities such as Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, and religions including Jews and Christians, celebrated a moment of shared Ottoman patriotism and citizenship.²³ In the ensuing November parliamentary elections, in which all taxpaying Ottoman men over the age of 25 had the right to vote with no religious or ethnic limitation, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, and other ethnic and religious minorities won seats, with Turks winning the majority and the CUP being the predominant political party.²⁴

However, the apparent triumph of secularism and liberalism by the victory of the Young Turks contributed to a severe backlash by conservative forces supporting the Sultan, and resulted in renewed large-scale attacks against Armenians. Conservative political opposition against the CUP centered in the Society for Islamic Unity, which by the spring of 1915 was calling for abandonment of liberal reforms and the full restitution of Islamic law. They were joined in opposition to the CUP by younger non-commissioned officers in the First Army who remained loyal to the Sultan, and liberal members of Parliament concerned by what they saw as the centralization of power by the CUP. On April 12, 1915, approximately three thousand Islamic theological students and soldiers from the First Army launched a counter-coup to restore the

Sultan and depose the CUP, attacking and invading the Parliament building and killing two legislators in the process. In response members of the CUP fled Istanbul, supporters of the Sultan took control of the army and navy, and the Sultan resumed his traditional authority. The government sent orders for the resumption of traditional Islamic law to governors throughout the Empire.²⁵ In Adana, a town of approximately 60,000 inhabitants where approximately half were Armenian, fears of violence between Christians and Muslims had been developing since the 1908 CUP coup, in part resulting from local Muslim resentment of visible Armenian and Greek economic success and ownership of local textile factories. When news of the counter-coup against the CUP arrived in Adana, Muslims joined by a local army unit supporting the Sultan attacked Armenians, killing approximately 20,000 in Adana and the surrounding area.²⁶ Although the CUP itself had not directed the killings, some locally appointed CUP leaders who had been involved in massacres of Armenians prior to the 1908 CUP ascension to power were responsible for ordering attacks.²⁷ Similar to many of the 1894-96 attacks, violence directed against Armenians was driven as much or more by local fears and resentments and issues than by orders emanating from Istanbul. The counter-coup in Istanbul was ultimately thwarted when CUP loyalists from the Third Army in Macedonia formed an Action Army, which marched on Istanbul and retook the capital from the conservative supporters of the Sultan on 24 April. Three

days later, the Parliament voted to depose Abdulhamid, replacing him with his brother, Sultan Mehmed V, and the CUP returned to power.²⁸

The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 led to an almost complete loss of Ottoman territory in Europe, provoking a demographic crisis as a result of the ensuing influx of Muslim refugees fleeing former Ottoman territory. European countries had taken advantage of the period of political upheaval surrounding the CUP's rise to power in 1908 to seize more territory from the Ottoman Empire. In October of that year in rapid succession Bulgaria declared complete independence from the Empire, Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Crete unified with Greece.²⁹ In 1911 Italy, a relative latecomer to European imperialism in Africa, declared war on the Ottomans and invaded its remaining North African territories of Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya. Although the Sultan's government wanted to abandon the territory, the CUP made an independent decision to support a guerilla campaign against the Italians in Libya. Multiple CUP officers, including the future head of the Ottoman secret police Ismail Enver, traveled to Libya to fight alongside local Arab Muslims opposing Italy. Although Enver's political orientation was secular, he came to see the value of Islam as a force to unite various Muslim groups against enemies of the Empire. Taking advantage of the war between Italy and the Empire, in October 1912 the former Ottoman Balkan states of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia declared war on the Empire, using local overwhelming military ad-

vantage to defeat the Ottoman forces.³⁰ By the end of the second Balkan War the Ottoman Empire had lost almost all of its former territory in Europe, comprising sixty thousand square miles and four million inhabitants.³¹ The Balkan Wars resulted in the deaths of 200,000 people, including massacres inflicted by both sides in the combat and the destruction of Christian and Muslim villages. Approximately one and a half million Muslim refugees fled the devastation in the Balkans and streamed into Anatolia, where they joined the thousands of other Muslim refugees who had been forcibly uprooted as a result of the Russo-Turkish War, needing to be resettled.³² The refugees told stories of violence and displacement at the hands of Christians, and increasingly Turks spoke of vengeance. In 1913, Ismail Enver wrote to his wife, lamenting “the savagery the enemy has inflicted . . . a stone’s throw from Istanbul . . . But our anger is strengthening; revenge, revenge, revenge; there is no other word.”³³

In the wake of the devastating loss of 40% of Ottoman territory between 1908 and 1913, the CUP turned to increasingly authoritarian governance and embraced a vision of Turkish nationalism as a means of combating the centrifugal loss of territory and increasing demands for ethnic autonomy. In 1913, taking advantage of the domestic political turmoil surrounding the Balkan Wars, the CUP staged a second coup and seized control of the government. In the aftermath of the 1913 coup, three members of the Committee for Union and Progress attained

the rank of “Pasha,” the highest level in civil and military service, and rose to supreme ruling authority within the Ottoman Empire, the triumvirate of Minister of the Interior Mehmed Talaat, Minister of War Ismail Enver, and the governor of Istanbul and later Minister of the Navy, Ahmed Djemal.³⁴ Following the Balkan Wars, the CUP became increasingly authoritarian in its effort to consolidate power in the fragmenting Empire, reducing the power of the Parliament, imposing censorship, and installing CUP members to all important positions within the government. In 1913, the German Ambassador to the Empire approvingly compared the actions of the CUP to those of the Kaiser’s government, describing it as a shift “from a true parliamentary system to a monarchical-constitutional system of governance.”³⁵ After 1910 the CUP had adopted a policy of cultural Turkification as a way of centralizing authority within a multi-ethnic empire, adopting Turkish as the official state language and requiring its use in schools and in official documents.³⁶ In the wake of the Balkan Wars, members of the CUP became more stridently ethno-nationalistic in their views of governmental authority, abandoning the more inclusive vision of multi-ethnic Ottomanism. A senior member of the CUP, Dr. Mehmed Nazim was quoted in a French paper in 1913 as saying:

The pretensions of the various nationalities are a capital source of annoyance for us. We hold linguistic, historical and ethnic aspirations in abhorrence. This and that group will have to disappear.

There should be only one nation on our soil, the Ottoman nation, and only one language, Turkish [...] The first Christian to move a muscle will see his family, house and village smashed to smithereens.³⁷

The Ottoman internal weakness demonstrated by the Balkan wars led Russia to initiate plans to seize control of the Black Sea straits, and it worked to establish a dominant sphere of influence in the eastern Anatolian area populated by Armenians. By 1911 Russia shipped approximately 50% of all exports and 90% of grain exports through the straits controlled by the Ottoman Empire.³⁸ These exports were key to Russian efforts at financing its efforts at industrialization. In 1912, when the Empire temporarily closed the straits as part of its naval campaign against Italy, Russian exports dropped 45%, creating an unacceptable threat to Russian economic interests. In November of that year, as Bulgarian forces came close to taking control of Istanbul, Russia prepared an intervention force with plans to occupy and take control of the territory around the straits to prevent its seizure by the Bulgarians. Russia had already initiated a naval buildup in 1911 of eighteen ships including three dreadnoughts to counter the Empire's purchase of two dreadnoughts, and to prevent Ottoman or an outside power's uncontested control over the straits. Convinced that the Ottoman Empire would soon collapse, the Russian Naval Ministry developed plans to take control of the straits after the anticipated naval build up was complete,

estimated to take place between 1917 to 1919.³⁹ Russia also took up the cause of Armenian reform in eastern Anatolia, in part to establish a sphere of influence in the fragmenting Ottoman Empire and to prevent other powers such as Germany from expanding their influence, which had constructed part of the Baghdad railway in Eastern Anatolia.⁴⁰ Taking advantage of Armenian appeals for protection in the face of a renewed wave of violence by Kurdish tribes in eastern Anatolia, Russia proposed a reform agreement which by 1913 took the form of two Armenian provinces, each governed by an inspector appointed by the European powers and with a local council comprised of half Armenian and half Muslim deputies. Although the Ottomans and the European powers were both concerned this would ultimately lead to the Russian annexation of eastern Anatolia, the Ottomans reluctantly agreed after Russia proposed to send troops into the Ottoman city of Ezurum, allegedly to protect Armenians. The Ottomans signed the agreement on February 8, 1914. That same month Russian ministers reviewed the plans for seizing the straits, which they realized needed to be strengthened with improvements in transportation and weapons. The ministers came to the conclusion that the general conditions of the anticipated war would provide the ideal opportunity to attack and seize both Istanbul and the Black Sea Straits. Emperor Nicholas II approved the final plans for military preparation for the operation on April 5, 1914.⁴¹

Before the onset of the war, Russia initiated efforts to arm Arme-

nians as part of a military strategy to exploit Armenian anti-Ottoman sentiment. In August 1914, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov and Governor-General of the Caucasus Illarion Vorotkov-Dashkov decided to take advantage of Armenian pro-Russian sympathies and established four Armenian volunteer battalions to fight on the Russian side in the impending war with the Ottoman Empire.⁴² Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war, thousands of Armenian deserters fled the Empire into Russian territory, assisted by Dashnak guerillas, including 50,000 from Ezurum alone. In August Sazonov ordered the Russian army to begin arming Ottoman Armenians and Assyrians to support Russian operations against the Empire. General Nikolay Yudenich, Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army, also argued for the need to arm Armenians in anticipation of likely Ottoman reprisals against Armenians for their military support to Russia.⁴³

Despite the participation of some Armenians in Russia's efforts to build an insurrection capacity, most Armenians remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁴ In a desperate attempt to forestall Armenian collaboration with the Russian army, a senior member of the CUP, Bahaeddin Shakir, met with Dashnak leaders in August 1914, offering to establish an autonomous Armenian territory in combination with any Armenian territory seized from Russia in the war in return for Armenian support against the Russians. Although the Armenian political leadership declared their loyalty to the Empire and stated Ottoman Armenians would fight on its behalf,

they refused the CUP's offers, stating Armenians should remain loyal to their respective governments. The Armenian refusal deepened Ottoman suspicions of Armenians in the Empire, and Talat ordered his intelligence agency to begin following the Armenian political leadership in September.⁴⁵ Many Armenians in the summer of 1914 remained ambivalent whether they should support Russia or if their interests would be better served by remaining loyal to the Ottoman government; most chose the latter. The governor of Van, Tahsin Bey, sent a telegram to Istanbul on 25 August stating that "Among the local Armenians there are neither thoughts of revolt or even opposition to the government . . . On the contrary, among the Dashnaks one can see [an attitude of] vocal support for and assistance vis-à-vis the government in regard to the general mobilization and the war." The same day the governor of Bitlis also reported that the Dashnaks, Hunchaks and the Armenian church were supporting the Ottoman order for general mobilization.⁴⁶ Despite developing suspicions of Armenian disloyalty, CUP leaders still showed a willingness to collaborate with the Armenian leadership even shortly before the Ottoman entry into the war.

Armenian participation in the Russian military campaigns, combined with devastating Ottoman loss at Sarikamish, strengthened the CUP's suspicion of Armenians as a dangerous internal enemy. The Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in November, issuing the declaration to holy war, or "jihad," designed to unite

Muslims against the Christian Entente and in hopes of fomenting Muslim uprising living in Russia and in British and French colonies. Between November and December of 1914, Armenian volunteer units fought alongside the Russian Army during initial Russian incursions into the Ottoman Empire in the area near Van and Ardahan; after their withdrawal in December Ottoman units engaged in extensive massacres of Armenian civilians and the destruction of villages in reprisals against Armenians for collaboration.⁴⁷ Ottoman massacres of Armenians remained localized at this point and were not extended to other parts of the Empire. In December, the Ottoman Third Army launched an offensive against Russia in the Caucasus hoping to recapture the provinces of Ardahan, Kars and Batum, which the Ottoman Empire lost to Russia in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8. By January the Third Army had suffered a complete rout as a result of extreme winter weather conditions, aggressive tactics, and overextended supply lines; of the 100,000 soldiers committed approximately 82,000 died over the course of the campaign. The defeat of the Ottoman Army in eastern Anatolia and its inability to defend against a Russian assault contributed to the Allied decision to launch an attack on Istanbul from the straits and made the existence of pro-Russian Armenian groups in the area appear to be an even greater threat to the CUP.⁴⁸

In the aftermath of the loss at Sarikamish, the Ottomans took steps to segregate and remove Armenians from Allied invasion routes and from Otto-

man combat units. In December 1914, the British ship HMS *Doris* fired on Ottoman railway lines off the coast of Cilicia, and Ottoman authorities suspected the Armenians of collaborating with the Allies in support of the attack. Beginning in February, Talaat ordered the forcible deportation of Armenians from the villages of Dortyol and Alexandretta to Adana. Villagers in nearby Zeytun planned an uprising in response to the deportations, which local Armenian officials informed the Ottoman authorities about as a demonstration of loyalty. Prompted by a local attack by Armenians on an Ottoman military unit, the government deported the entire population of 22,000 beginning in April, first to Koyna and ultimately into Syria. Although thousands ultimately died from disease and starvation as a result of this initial wave of deportations, the decision to forcibly remove the residents of the villages was not taken as part of a large-scale attempt to annihilate Armenians but instead made in response to the immediate circumstances of a potential Allied invasion.⁴⁹ On February 25, 1915, shortly after the rout of Ottoman forces at Sarikamish, the Ottoman General Staff issued Directive 8682, ordering all Armenians and non-Muslims serving in the Ottoman military disarmed and relegated to labor battalions, reflecting the CUP political leadership's view of all Armenians as a potential internal security threat.⁵⁰ Ottoman authorities later separated and killed the Armenians in the labor battalions after the genocide was initiated sometime in March or April.

In the spring of 1915, senior members of the Committee of Union

and Progress made the explicit decision to annihilate the Ottoman Armenians after high level consultations. At the end of February Bahaeddin Shakir, the commander of the Ottoman security service the Special Organization and senior member of the Central Committee of the CUP, traveled to Istanbul and met with Taalat and Dr. Mehmed Nazim. Shakir's view was that "it was as necessary to be afraid of the enemy within as with those outside the borders" due to "the oppositional stance that the Armenians had taken toward Turkey and the assistance that they were affording to the Russian army."⁵¹ While there are no records of the specific details of this meeting, the timing of this meeting corresponds to the period in which the overall decision to annihilate the Armenians was taken at the highest level within the CUP.⁵² On March 3, 1915, Shakir wrote to the CUP Plenipotentiary in Adana, Cemal Bey, stating the CUP had come to its final solution:

the Committee [of Union and Progress], as the bearer of the nation's honor, has decided to free the homeland from the inordinate ambitions of this accursed nation and to assume

the responsibility for the blemish that will stain Ottoman history in this regard. The Committee, which cannot forget [the country's] bitter and unhappy history and whose cup runneth over with the unrelenting desire for revenge, has decided to annihilate all of Armenians living within Turkey, not to allow a single

one to remain, and has given the government broad authority in this regard. On the question of how this killing and massacring will be carried out, the [central] government will give the necessary instructions to the provincial governors and army commanders. All of the Unionist regional representatives would concern themselves with following up on the matter in all of the places where they were found, and would ensure that not a single Armenian would receive protection or assistance.⁵³

Shakir reiterated the decision to annihilate the Armenians taken by the CUP in a subsequent letter to Cemal Bey on 7 April.

The process to annihilate the Armenians was taken through a combination of massacres directed by senior military and political officials throughout the Empire and large-scale deportations into the interior of the country, which gathered momentum throughout the spring and summer of 1915. As the Allies initiated the attack on Gallipoli in March 1915, the Ottomans deported the Armenians living on the peninsula. On 15 March the CUP replaced Tahsin Bey, the governor of Van who had reported the relative calm among Armenians in August, with Cevdet Bey, Ismail Enver's brother-in-law. Cevdet, who had just participated in large-scale massacres of Armenians and Assyrians in Persia, stated "we must do the same with the Armenians of Van." Given his status as a senior member of the CUP

and closeness to the leading triumvirate it's likely he would have been fully informed of the annihilation order. Cevdet demanded 4000 Armenians report for military service in the labor battalions, but the ARF only provided 500. On 17 April Cevdet ordered his units, nicknamed "butcher battalions," to massacre Armenians in the surrounding area. A Venezuelan mercenary, Rafael de Nogales, wrote in his account of service in the area that he had spoken with a local official who had engaged in massacres. The official reported that he was carrying out the specific directives of the governor ". . . to exterminate all Armenian males of twelve years of age and over." The Armenians mounted a defense against the attacks in the city of Van, and Cevdet's forces massacred Armenians in surrounding villages. When Russian forces relieved the surviving Armenians in May, they reported finding 55,000 bodies, with 50 percent of the Armenians in the area killed by Ottoman forces.⁵⁴

The CUP used a "two-track approach" of official orders and communications regarding the deportations and arrests, as well as a secret communication system to regional authorities to direct the mass killing.⁵⁵ On 24 April Talaat sent a telegram to the Ottoman High Command announcing the new Ottoman policy regarding Armenians. Using Armenian participation in the Russian volunteer units, the uprisings in Zeytun, Van and other locations as justification, he declared that the Armenians were now a fundamental threat to the internal security of the Ottoman Empire. He announced the clo-

sure of all Armenian political organizations and seizure of all documents, and he directed that all Armenian political officials and notables "judged harmful" be arrested. Overnight on 23-24 April, as the Allies were preparing the ground assault on the Dardanelles, Ottoman authorities arrested 240 Armenian Parliamentary officials, journalists, lawyers, doctors, and church officials in Istanbul consistent with Talaat's new policy. Talaat also ordered the convoys of Armenians whom the Ottomans had already deported from Zeytun, Dortyol, Alexandretta and other areas be sent south into the interior of the Empire into the Syrian deserts of Aleppo, Deir Zor and Urfa.⁵⁶ On 26 May Enver sent Talaat a note relaying the decision that Armenians were to be deported south but that they should constitute no more than ten percent of the population in any part of the Empire; by implication this would entail mass killing on a wide scale.⁵⁷ That day Talaat submitted his deportation bill to the Council of Ministers, which announced the "Deportation Law," ordering the forced relocation of all Armenians in eastern Anatolia. The CUP also issued secret directives to governors regarding the mass murder of deportees. The governors were assisted in these efforts by officials in Enver's Special Organization, which recruited released convicts, Kurdish tribesmen, and refugees from the Balkans and the Russian Caucasus to carry out a campaign of mass killing.⁵⁸ The heavy representation of refugees and their descendants among the irregular forces and the Ottoman mountain police forces involved in the

killing, who had lost their homes and were themselves violently deported by Christian nations, underscores the extent to which the genocide reflected larger patterns of long-term anti-Christian radicalization in Ottoman society in addition to the decisions made by the CUP in response to the contingencies of the war.⁵⁹

Most of the Ottoman killing of deportees was conducted in a similar pattern. After making official announcements regarding deportations, Ottoman officials forced Armenians from their homes and killed all males ages twelve and up in orders that were similar to those de Nogales had heard near Van. The remaining elderly, women and children were forced onto extended marches on foot, primarily in the direction of the Syrian deserts, with minimal food and water, over the course of which they were expected to die in large numbers. Survivors of the deportations also reported facing massacres along the deportation routes.⁶⁰ Khanum Palootzian, an Armenian woman from the village of Darman in the Anatolian province of Erzurum, was twenty-one years old at the time of the deportation and described her own experience which was characteristic of so many Armenians:

It was in May 1915 that the Turkish Government uprooted us from all our villages and tried to destroy us all. Our houses, farms, sheep, cows, fuel, horses, donkeys, chickens, our furniture, beds, foods, and all belongings were collected and

forcefully confiscated. They didn't even give us one piastre as payment for all they took. My stepfather, when they were going to kill him, pleaded that they let him pray before dying. As he knelt and prayed, they took a sword and cut off his head. They marched us into the mountains, fields and gorges to die of hunger. All the Armenian men and boys were killed with axes and swords. And all the women and girls were killed through thirst, hunger and an even worse fate that I don't wish to say. Pregnant women were eviscerated, their stomachs cut open with swords and their babies ripped out, thrown against the rocks. These I saw with my own eyes . . . Darman consisted of a group of seven villages. All were uprooted— that's several thousand people. By the time we reached Harput, weeks later, some 45 miles away, there remained only a few hundred.⁶¹

By mid-summer it was clear to both the U.S. and German governments that the massacres and deportations of the Armenians were not simply localized actions but were part of a larger strategy designed to annihilate the Armenians. On 17 June, German Ambassador Wangenheim reported to Berlin that Talaat told him “. . . that the Porte is intent on taking advantage of the World War in order to make a clean sweep of internal enemies—the indigenous Christians—without being hindered

in doing so by diplomatic intervention from other countries.”⁶² And the following month, U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr., who was in frequent contact with both Talaat and with U.S. consuls stationed throughout the Empire who had relayed a steady stream of reports of attacks on Armenians, sent a telegram to the U.S. State Department on 29 July and reported that “(d)eporation of and excesses against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from harrowing reports of eye witnesses it appears that a campaign of race extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion.”⁶³ Although there is no exact number for the total number of Armenians murdered between 1915-18, Armenian historians estimate that between one and one-and-a-half million Armenians were killed as a result of the intentional actions of the Ottoman Empire during the Armenian genocide.⁶⁴

The Armenian genocide was the result of a long-term dynamic of escalation in hostility and violence directed against the Armenian people by both the leaders and local populations in the Ottoman Empire, exacerbated by the fragmentation of the Empire and violence directed against Muslims in the former territories of the Empire seized by European nations, in particular since the Ottoman losses in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Hopes of political and civil equality for Armenians and all religious and ethnic minorities were destroyed by the centralizing ethnonationalist policies of the Committee for Union and Progress in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. At the same time,

these policies did not turn genocidal until after the war began and the contingent circumstances surrounding the devastating losses by the Empire at the hands of Russia, which exploited Armenian antagonisms and hopes for autonomy resulting from Ottoman violence and discrimination in its recruitment of volunteer units and supply of arms to Armenians in the Empire. Although the Ottomans briefly sought Armenian collaboration against Russia before the outbreak of the war, the Russian use of Armenian units, in combination with localized Armenian resistance to Ottoman violence in winter and spring of 1915, led the senior members to make the decision to annihilate the Armenians in the Empire, believing them to be an internal threat to the Empire. This determination to kill the Armenians was carried out by Turks and Kurds who had also come to share this view of Armenians as, in the words of Bahaeddin Shakir, an “enemy within.” The Armenian genocide, while being a unique historical event, also shares common deep structural features with other modern genocides in the 20th century such as the Holocaust, the Holodomor, and the genocides in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other locations. Understanding the causes of Armenian genocide not only in its uniqueness but also in its shared structures with other genocides contributes not only the possibility for recognition of and justice for the victims of the genocide, which the government of Turkey to this day refuses to recognize, but also allows for contemporary political leaders to recognize when the structural features for geno-

cide are being reproduced and to take preventative action to halt genocides before they occur, thus making real the vision of a world in which genocide is something that happens “never again.”

Endnotes

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- 2 Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (New York: Berghahn Books 2004), 173.
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- 5 Tanner Akcam, “When was the Decision to Annihilate the Armenians Taken?” *The Journal of Genocide Research* 21, no. 4 (2019): 461-2; *The Young Turks Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2012), Kindle Edition 3411-3495.
- 6 Bloxham, “The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy,” 143.
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- 11 Ronald Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else*”: *A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2015), 95.
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- 14 Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of its Christian Minorities, 1894-1924* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2019), 39-40; Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, 50.
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- 17 Quoted in Suny, "They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else": *A History of the Armenian Genocide*, 109.
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- 19 Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, 52.
- 20 Quoted in Suny, "They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else": *A History of the Armenian Genocide*, 117.
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- 24 Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923* (New York: Penguin Books 2015), 42.
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- 32 Morris and Zèevi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of its Christian Minorities, 1894-1924*, 142; Bloxham cites a lower number for Balkan refugees of 400,000. See Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, 62.
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- 40 Tanner Akcam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2006), Kindle Edition 1925-1939; Suny, *"They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else": A History of the Armenian Genocide*, 200.
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- 47 Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, 75-6.
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- 50 Suny, *“They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else”*: A History of the Armenian Genocide, 243-4.
- 51 Quoted in Akcam, *The Young Turks Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*, Kindle Edition 4331.
- 52 Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 164.
- 53 Quoted in Akcam, “When was the Decision to Annihilate the Armenians Taken?” 465. In this essay Akcam also addresses arguments regarding the authenticity of this letter and the Shakir letter of 7 April, and explains why he believes these letters are authentic. While Akcam interprets Shakir’s letter as a final decision to initiate a broad-based genocide, he maintains that the planning for the annihilation of the Armenians began in the aftermath of the Armenian Reform Agreement in 1914.
- 54 Suny, *“They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else”*: A History of the Armenian Genocide, 256-9; Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, 77.
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- 56 Suny, *“They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else”*: A History of the Armenian Genocide, 272-4.
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The Battle of Bannockburn 1314: Its Legacy Then and Now

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ABSTRACT

Popular culture has provided the world with the exploits of William Wallace as in the 1995 Mel Gibson film *Braveheart* and his band of rugged Scots in their struggle for freedom from the English in the late 13th century to early 14th century. It was, however, the leadership, resolve and fortitude of its warrior-king Robert the Bruce that saw this struggle brought to fruition. This study examines the military prowess that Robert the Bruce utilized at the tactical level to overcome both the numerical and more heavily armed English on the grounds near the stream of Bannockburn in 1314. The use of primary sources of the battle help to relay the sequence of events, while reflecting the politicization of the actual events. This study concludes with the legacy of the battle in both military lessons and tactics as well as its symbolism to the people of Scotland and for the cause of freedom and independence.

Keywords: Bannockburn, Schiltrons, Pikeman, Stirling Castle, Wars for Scottish Independence, Knights, Cavalry, Infantry, Archers, Geography

La batalla de Bannockburn 1314: su legado antes y ahora

RESUMEN

La cultura popular ha proporcionado al mundo las hazañas de William Wallace, como en la película de Mel Gibson de 1995 *Braveheart* (Corazón Valiente) y su banda de escoceses rudos en su lucha por liberarse de los ingleses a finales del siglo XIII y principios del siglo XIV. Sin embargo, fue el liderazgo, la determinación y la fortaleza de su rey guerrero Robert the Bruce los que vieron cómo esta lucha fructificó. Este estudio examina la destreza militar que Robert the Bruce utilizó a nivel táctico para superar tanto el inglés numérico como el más fuertemente armado en los terrenos cerca del arroyo de Bannockburn en 1314. El uso de fuentes primarias de la batalla ayuda a transmitir la secuencia de eventos, al tiempo que

refleja la politización de los eventos reales. Este estudio concluye con el legado de la batalla tanto en lecciones como en tácticas militares, así como su simbolismo para el pueblo de Escocia y por la causa de la libertad y la independencia.

Palabras clave: Bannockburn, Schiltrons, Pikeman, Castillo de Stirling, Guerras por la Independencia de Escocia, Caballeros, Caballería, Infantería, Arqueros, Geografía

1314年班诺克本战役：过去和现在的影响

摘要

流行文化向全世界传播了威廉·华莱士的壮举，正如1995年梅尔·吉布森导演的电影《勇敢的心》所展现的那样，13世纪末至14世纪初一帮苏格兰人为获得自由、摆脱英国控制而奋斗。不过，让这次奋斗得以成功实现的却是勇士之王罗伯特·布鲁斯的领导力、决心和勇气。本研究分析了1314年罗伯特·布鲁斯为战胜班诺克本河畔附近数量更多、武装更强的英国人而使用的战术军事才能。使用关于这场战斗的第一手资料，以期帮助梳理事件次序，同时反映真实事件的政治化。本研究的结论描述了这场战斗对军事经验和战术的影响，以及其对苏格兰人、以及自由和独立事业的象征。

关键词：班诺克本，长矛阵，长矛兵，斯特灵城堡，苏格兰独立战争，骑士，骑兵，步兵，弓箭手，地理

The shocking Scottish victory at the Battle of Bannockburn over the 23rd and 24th of June in 1314 was a demonstration of Scottish King Robert I's (r. 1306-1329) adaptability, acute understanding of the capabilities of both his troops and those of his enemy, as well as masterful use of the local topography. The English, who were in turn led by Edward II (r. 1307-1327), sought to maintain their stranglehold and claim to the Scottish throne.¹ They

would collide in the shadow of Stirling Castle—the Battle of Bannockburn was the most decisive engagement of the First War of Scottish Independence (c.1296-1328). The Scots' brilliant use of geography, and the defensive and offensive use of pike formations to defeat the largest English army to have ever invaded Scotland, secured Scotland's independence from England.

This unforeseen victory, by leveraging the cohesive strength of pike-

armed *schiltrons* in conjunction with the carefully chosen and restricted ground of the area, allowed Robert the Bruce to engage and defeat a much larger English army on his terms. The best sources of information for the improbable Scottish victory of infantry over the full might of the English are those from an unknown English author and *The Chronicle of Lanercost, 1272-1346*.

The Chronicle of Lanercost is believed to have been written by a number of authors during the actual events. Its most prominent translator, Sir Herbert Maxwell, has become synonymous and representative of the most widely used translation of it. The *Chronicle* covers the Wars for Scottish Independence from 1272 to 1346 in their breadth, along with key persons of the time, and serves as the main resource of the battle of Bannockburn from the English perspective.

Robert the Bruce, who was crowned king of Scotland at Scone on 25 March 1306, proved to be the catalyst that forced the elderly Edward I to take action and quell the Scots.² The frail English King at the head of his army with his son, Edward II, led a force north to personally subdue the Scots once and for all. King Edward fell prey to “A seiknes [that] tuk him in the way” and died on 7 July 1307 at Burgh-on-Sands, thus making his son, Edward II, king with the expectation to pursue the war against Robert the Bruce and the Scots.³

Edward was believed to have displayed little of the martial talents or skills of his father, though new research is challenging those assumptions. The

King’s return to the safety of England, for instance, was very much an acceptable course of action for the period. After Edward’s return to his noble surroundings, Robert surmised that to break England’s stranglehold on Scotland, various English castles would have to fall.⁴ To achieve this, Robert planned on taking these castles using “blockade[s], and partly through unorthodox tactics such as stealth and surprise, the English castles began to fall like ripe fruit.”⁵ These asymmetrical tactics used by the Scots included feigned retreats followed by stealthy incursions through freezing moats, hay carts being used to keep a portcullis gates open for Scottish troops, and even subterfuge by Scotsmen disguised as cows to get near a castle’s walls to scale them.

By midsummer 1313, all English castles of consequence were now under Scottish control save one—Stirling Castle. The capture of Stirling Castle was critical to the Bruce’s entire endeavor as it was the key to control of Scotland. The problem was that the castle was nigh impregnable, especially for a Scottish army severely deficient of siege equipment and materials. Robert the Bruce struck a deal with the castle’s governor, Sir Philip Mowbray (d. 1318), for the castle to surrender if they were not relieved by the English by June 24, 1314.⁶

Edward “had made up his mind to strike a blow which should not merely relieve Stirling but finally crush the Scottish insurrection.”⁷ There is debate as to the actual size of the English army, but it was likely a force that consisted

of between 2,000–3,000 heavy cavalry and knights, roughly 10,000 English and Welsh foot soldiers, with around 1,000 longbowmen and a relative handful of crossbowmen, for a rough total of 20,000 men.⁸

Scotland was at a serious manpower disadvantage as it had a population of only one fifth that of England at the time. Robert the Bruce and his Scots could only field an infantry driven force of *schiltrons* of around 7,000, with minimal archers and cavalry support of no more than five hundred.⁹ These *schiltrons*, similar to the ancient Greek phalanx, were deployed in three divisions that contained two *schiltrons* in each division, with the small force of cavalry positioned to the right and rear of the army.¹⁰ Undeterred by the numerical disadvantage, Robert placed his faith not in the quantity of men he had in his charge, but rather in their heart to fight as he declared that he only wanted me who would “wyn all or die with honour.”¹¹

Robert chose a position roughly two miles from Stirling Castle where “massed cavalry charges—always a favorite English ploy—could be blunted, if not stopped altogether.”¹² In the firm spots of the ground, Robert had his men dig pits with sharpened spikes at their base, then cover them up with brush. Additionally, the Scots sowed “caltrops (four-pronged metal devices arranged in such a way that one spike was always pointed upward)” over the land in between the pits, which would injure any man or animal that stepped on them.¹³

The vanguard of the English

army came into view late in the afternoon on June 23, 1314. Having marched the roughly 14 miles to beat the June 24 deadline, the force was tired and exhausted, but the sight of the Scottish army seemed to light a spark in the young English knights who nearly immediately charged the Scots. They were astonished to find themselves rebuffed by the stalwart Scots, as their impromptu charge proved ineffective.

The English vanguard and the subsequent engagement on day one of the battle is outlined in the *Chronicle*:

Thus before the feast of the Nativity of S. John the Baptist, the king, having massed his army, advanced with the aforesaid pomp towards Stirling Castle, to relieve it from siege and to engage the Scots, who were assembled there in all their strength. On the vigil of the aforesaid Nativity the king's army arrived after dinner near Torwood; and, upon information that there were Scots in the wood, the king's advanced guard, commanded by Lord de Clifford, began to make a circuit of the wood to prevent the Scots escaping by flight. The Scots did not interfere until [the English] were far ahead of the main body, when they showed themselves, and, cutting off the king's advanced guard from the middle and rear columns, they charged and killed some of them and put the rest to flight. From that moment a panic among the English and the Scots grew bolder.¹⁴




Robert the Bruce, King of Scots, circa 1684-1686, painted by Jacob de Wet II. Wikimedia Commons.

This passage of the arrival of the English vanguard near Torwood suggests a careful choosing of words by the author(s). This is so, in that there is no mention of the ill-conceived charging of the English knights against the Scots once they got sight of them. The author merely relays how the cavalry under Lord Clifford positioned his force in such a way as to prevent the Scots from escaping or to

“take the Carse road and enter the castle,” as another version contests.¹⁵ Additionally, the *Chronicle* notes the English force being cut off from the main body, which was representative of the trap Robert the Bruce set for them. The political spin of the *Chronicle*, however, is that it fails to mention the hundreds of English knights that were trapped and killed. This would include the death of



King Edward II of England, 19th century. Wikimedia Commons.



Battle of Bannockburn map, January 20, 2008. Wikimedia Commons.

Sir Clifford, which was a crushing blow to English morale early on.

Elsewhere on the field, an English cavalry force of around 700 found their way between a gap that had opened in the Scottish formations.¹⁶ Having lured the English force in to exploit the gap in his lines, Robert ordered the trap closed. In short order, the Scottish *schiltrons* on the right flank went on the offensive and engaged the English cavalry. Robert Clifford, commander of the English cavalry, was killed along with most of his force in the engagement.

On the following day, June 24, Edward II ordered his cavalry to charge the Scottish *schiltrons*. The prepared and marshy ground, in conjunction with the bristling pikes of the Scots, proved deadly to the English cavalry who were soon beaten and impaled. At the same time, Edward had failed to forward deploy his archers, so they were rendered ineffective.

The Scots pressed the English, who were caught between 12-foot pikes and the prepared muddied ground of the area. English archers began to rain arrows on the packed Scottish formations. Robert the Bruce saw what was occurring and ordered his small cavalry to ride around and hit them from the rear, decimating them. Recognizing the moment, Robert the Bruce ordered his hidden reserve forward.¹⁷ This broke the English, as “panic set in and ‘the men in the English rear fell back on the Bannock Burn ditch, falling one over another.’”¹⁸

The calamity of day two of the battle, including the English archer at-

tack as well as the full engagement with the Scottish *schiltrons*, is described in the *Chronicle*:

On the morrow—an evil, miserable and calamitous day for the English—when both sides had made themselves ready for battle, the English archers were thrown forward before the line, and the Scottish archers engaged them, a few being killed and wounded on either side; but the King of England’s archers quickly put the others to flight. Now when the two armies had approached very near each other, all the Scots fell on their knees to repeat *Pater noster*, commending themselves to God and seeking help from heaven; after which they advanced boldly against the English. They had so arranged their army that two columns went abreast in advance of the third, so that neither should be in advance of the other; and the third followed, in which was Robert. Of a truth, when both armies engaged each other, and the great horses of the English charged the pikes of the Scots, as it were into a dense forest, there arose a great and terrible crash of spears broken and of destriers wounded to the death; and so they remained without movement for a while. Now the English in the rear could not reach the Scots because the leading division in the way, nor could they do anything to help themselves, wherefore there was nothing for it but to take to flight.

This account I heard from a trustworthy person who was present as eyewitness.¹⁹

The disastrous second day of the battle for the English is carefully parlayed in the *Chronicle* to minimize the political, religious, and military damage to the crown. The military ineptitude of Edward II is presented here by the author in his placement of the rear English forces. Additionally, the mention of the Scots and their call to God before their advance lends itself to a holy sanctioning of the Scots in their victory over the English. The discussion of English archers being positioned forward and in turn engaging their Scottish counterparts, who were soon put to flight according to the text, is not backed up with any evidence. David Cornell believes that if this happened at all that it was “merely a preliminary to battle which was to be of no significance.”²⁰

The ensuing description of the clash of the Scottish *schiltrons* with the disorganized English force correctly gives the reader an accurate description of the tangled mess of man, horse, mud, and death. The *Chronicle*'s mention of the English infantry in the rear not being able to deploy is important in reconstructing the narrative of the battle. The ground carefully chosen by the Bruce had restrictions, which created a funnel that did not allow for the English infantry to come into play, thus negating them and their potential impact.²¹

The final key passage from the *Chronicle* addresses the toll in lives that the battle took on the English.

In the leading division were killed the Earl of Gloucester, Sir John Comyn, Sir Pagan de Typtoft, Sir Edmund de Mauley and many other nobles, besides foot soldiers who fell in great numbers. Another calamity which befell the English was that, whereas they had shortly before crossed a great ditch called Bannockburn, into which the tide flows, and now wanted to recross it in confusion, many nobles and others fell into it with their horses in the crush while others escaped with much difficulty, and many were never able to extricate themselves from the ditch; thus Bannockburn was spoken about for many years in English throats.²²

This passage is important as to the consequences of Edward II's reckless approach to Bannockburn, as it relates to England's greatest loss since the Battle of Hastings in 1066. The loss of so many noblemen, especially the defeat of armored knights by the Scots who were looked down upon by many of English nobility, was profound. For Edward, his escape from the battlefield and subsequent “political fallout of the catastrophic defeat threatened to engulf him.”²³

The fact that the *Chronicle of Lanercost* is primarily an English text must be viewed critically in its descriptions, especially of those at Bannockburn. The English were notoriously protective of their image of supremacy. As such, even the debacle at Bannock-

burn, with the key faults being laid at the feet of Edward II, was accordingly massaged to mitigate its negative impact as much as possible. This is typified in the *Chronicle* when:

The king [Edward II] and Sir Hugh le Despenser (who, after Piers de Gaveston, was as his right eye) and Sir Henry de Beaumont (whom he had promoted to an earldom in Scotland), with many others mount on foot, to their perpetual sham fled like miserable wretches to Dunbar Castle, guided by a certain knight of Scotland who knew through what districts they could escape.²⁴

While critical of Edward, the *Chronicle* still withheld the fact that the king was rebuffed entry into Stirling Castle after escaping the battlefield and was forced on to Dunbar Castle. This careful phrasing accordingly protects the position and sanctity of the king as a position, not the man himself.

A major point of contention between *The Chronicle of Lanercost* and historians is that of the actual numbers of troops present at Bannockburn. Both the English and Scottish accounts of the forces present have been debated and contested for hundreds of years, as contemporary sources of the time from *The Lanercost Chronicle* to John Barbour's *The Bruce* suggest unrealistic numbers of troops present. For instance, taking multiple contemporary sources into account from the time, including *The Chronicle*, speak to the English fielding up to 100,000 troops against the Scots

at Bannockburn.²⁵ This has been determined unrealistic based on numerous factors such as available knights, population and the like, which brings the realistic number down to approximately 20,000-25,000 including knights, infantry and archers.²⁶ This accounting for the Scottish army must also similarly be scrutinized. The Scottish poem *The Bruce* by John Barbour states Robert the Bruce as fielding an army of roughly 30,000 at Bannockburn, which would have been a "huge proportion of the Scottish population of that time."²⁷ Realistically, based on Robert's fractured available pool of manpower due to many clans not yet supporting him, as well as their meager population base to begin with, the Scots were believed to have fielded a more viable force of around 6,000 infantry, possibly up to 1,500 archers, and around 500 light cavalry in the end.²⁸

The use of *The Chronicles of Lanercost* is important to the study of the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314 and to the history of both England and Scotland. Understanding and putting into perspective the likely English-leaning author(s) of the text in conjunction with the works from Barbour, modern scholarship, and ongoing archaeological discoveries, will provide a more realistic and accurate reconstruction of the study of the Battle of Bannockburn.

The battlefield of Bannockburn is located two miles south of the city of Sterling, which is centrally located in Scotland. The entire battlefield area is maintained by the National Trust for

Scotland and is one of the country's most important historical sites. The battlefield site complex contains commemorative monuments, a state-of-the-art visitor center, and an immersive Battle of Bannockburn experience to immerse visitors into the story of the battle.

The battlefield beyond the fully modern visitor center contains the rotunda that wraps around the memorial cairn with a flagpole that is topped by a battle-axe weathervane. A pathway from the rotunda leads visitors to the iconic bronze Robert the Bruce monument that was fully restored in 2014. Additionally, a new poem was commissioned and added to the rotunda by Scottish writer Kathleen Jamie, in which the last lines address the importance of the location: "Come all ye, the country says You win me, who take me most to heart."²⁹

The battlefield site is as preserved as possible, with centuries of growth of both buildings and the natural environment; however, the overall integrity of the general site is well protected as it is seen as a national treasure to the people of Scotland. There has been contention as to the exact location of the engagement between the two forces on the second day of the battle, as the *Lanercost* did not specify. The debate seems to be whether the Scots engaged the English at the Dryfield of Balquhikerock or the Carse of Balquhiderock. This is made ever more difficult by the changes in natural environment. These changes include less woodlands now than in 1314, more pervasive bogs and marshes than there were then, and well-tend-

ed farmland now that dominates large swaths of the broad battlefield. Ongoing archaeological digs at the site by the National Trust for Scotland hope to finally answer this question.

The site overall is critically important to the people of Scotland, but also serves as an inspiration for the desire for freedom to people the world over. In 2018, the Netflix film *Outlaw King* was released, which showcased actor Chris Pine as Robert the Bruce. The film was made in consultation with the National Trust for Scotland and made use of the surrounding area in its portrayal of Robert and his time up to and including the Battle of Loudoun Hill in 1307. The inspiring story of Bannockburn and Robert the Bruce, and its resulting desire of a people to fight for their freedom and to control their own destiny, continues to ring true for both the people of Scotland to this day, as well as millions of others throughout the world.

The Battle of Bannockburn in 1314 and its documentation in *The Chronicles of Lanercost* provide valuable insight into the conflict between the monarchically power of England and the resurgent people of Scotland under their king, Robert the Bruce. As in most writings of the medieval period, troop numbers (often exaggerated), casualties (underplayed for the English typically and overplayed for the Scots), and acts of heroism (such as that by the knight Sir Henry de Bohun who Robert killed in combat) must always be taken with caution.

As to the military lessons learned, Robert's victory at Bannockburn show-

cased that well-trained pikeman in formation could stand up to and defeat heavily armed knights and cavalry. Additionally, the skill demonstrated by Robert in the careful choosing then shaping of the battlefield to negate the enemies numerical and tactical advantages cannot be understated. These principles of warfare would be studied by commanders and students to gain insight and understanding of how to use carefully chosen ground, to drive the enemy to them at a time and a place of their choosing while mitigating their advantages while maximizing their own. The study of Bannockburn is a study in the seizing of victory from what on paper, should have been certain defeat.

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
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Book Review: John Richard Paul's *Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, A Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution*

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Joel Richard Paul. *Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, A Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution*. New York: Riverhead Books, 2009. 405pp.

Much of Joel Richard Paul's *Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, A Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution* is riveting and entertaining; it chronicles history in the form of an entertaining fiction novel, embellished with details designed to reinforce drama and captivate the reader. Paul's book is a prime example of popular history— an avenue within the discipline of history that takes on a reader-friendly approach; it often involves a moral slant by exposing past human errors to promote a more ethically responsible present. But when Paul refers to the established historical record as one that has been influenced by societies that “bred hypocrisy and corruption,” he creates a roadblock to

the importance of understanding history (p. 345).

Paul is an author and professor of law at the University of California Hastings Law School in San Francisco. Although he has no academic affiliation within the discipline of history, he is knowledgeable of the historical events he covered. His style corresponds to his artistic talents as an author, using creativity typically reserved for fiction. For example, there is no historical record of Benjamin Franklin's bathing habits that supports how he “leaned his long stringy hair back into the warm water and stared up at the swaying ceiling” (p. 224). The following passage offers another example: “The men warmed themselves around a table set near a

fireplace. Their faces were half cast in shadow, and candlelight reflected off the glass cabinets, adding to the sense of intrigue” (p. 123).

Although popular history might be conducive to fostering a potential interest in academic history, it is essential for the average reader to understand the difference between them. Paul referred to established history as “popular judgment” (p. 346). However, established history relies on an investigative evaluation of the validity, reliability, and relevance of sources. More importantly, it obliges the modern researcher to understand the people of the past from *their* time and place—the *emic* approach. In contrast, the *etic* approach gives latitude to modern theoretical frameworks as an interpretive guide. With this method, historical researchers do not integrate themselves into the cultural period they are observing. They are outsiders looking in and interpreting the past through a modern lens. Although researchers often use the *etic* approach in a historical investigation, they should not make it exclusive. Readers need to understand people of the past from the cultural perspective of *their* historical period.

Paul’s writing style is very engaging, entertaining, and convincingly told. While popular history often dispenses with the source citations and bibliographies involved in scholarly research, Paul does provide both, hence his knowledge of the historical events he is covering seems thorough and solid. However, he does not separate the facts he is narrating from the modern-day lens through which he in-

terprets them. He does this presumably to explain why so many readers will have never heard of the role his three main characters played in the American Revolution. While this is valid, he also tends to make judgments about the historical actors of established history and minimizes their role.

Paul’s three main characters are Silas Deane, the merchant; Caron de Beaumarchais, the playwright; and Chevalier d’Eon, the spy. He states that these men obtained arms and forged alliances with France long before Franklin had. Because of Deane’s emissarial precedence in France, Paul acknowledged him as the true “hero of this story” (p. 3). Beaumarchais “accelerated the decision to arm the Americans by a few months, if not years” (p. 346), so his role was “critical for the American Revolution” (p. 346). D’Eon was the one who “persuaded Louis XVI to arm the Americans against the British” (p. 2).

However, these men engaged in espionage, collusion, and covert diplomatic activities in ways that were socially unacceptable for the time. D’Eon had been cross-dressing as a woman for many years by the time he became “involved in the secret diplomacy of the American Revolution” as a woman (p. 342); it was only after he died that the surgeon who signed his death certificate confirmed that he was, indeed, a man. (p. 342). Beaumarchais engaged in an apparent homosexual relationship with Pâris-Duverney so that he could regain his position in government and continue participating in the revolutionary cause. Congress accused Deane of many

crimes, including financial improprieties. While congress was never able to prove any of these accusations, his behavior forever tarnished his reputation.


Paul states that it was the unconventional ways in which these individuals conducted their diplomatic activities that made it impossible for history to celebrate (or even consider) their contributions to the revolutionary cause. In his effort to highlight the unfortunate actors which history had long ignored, Paul essentially dispenses with the moral-ethical standards of the past to re-evaluate history. In his estimation, history unfairly targeted Deane, Beaumarchais, and d'Eon as corrupt individuals even though they played a significant and important role in the Revolution. In contrast, Paul referred to Benjamin Franklin's diplomatic activities in France—conducted in support of the Revolution—as an “accessory after the fact” (p. 3). But this is an unfair

assessment. Although ignoring Deane, Beaumarchais, and D'Eon might have created an incomplete interpretation of history, this does not mean that Franklin did not play a key role in the success of the Revolution; it was, in fact, the actions and decisions made by all parties involved on both sides of the Atlantic that made the success of the American Revolution possible. By downplaying Franklin's contributions, Paul seems to be swapping one imperfect, incomplete interpretation of history for another. But the end goal of historical research must be a fuller picture of history, not an alternative one. It would be more appropriate for contemporary history writers, both popular and academic, to highlight these forgotten people as agents of cultural and historical evolution *alongside* their (traditionally) more illustrious predecessors rather than substituting one set of heroes or protagonists for another.

Book Review: Fred Anderson's *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War*

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A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War. Fred Anderson, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984, pp274. Appendices and index.

The Seven Years' War is, for the most part, not a period of American history that people are very familiar with. However, if the discussion mentions The French and Indian War, it will be more familiar to most people. (3) In *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War*, Fred Anderson, a historian and author of many books on early colonial and military history, shows that by looking at the experiences of the provincial soldiers from the Massachusetts Colony, especially their rights and interactions with the regular military of Great Britain, the Seven Years' War, "the last and greatest of America's colonial wars," (vii) is an essential moment in the

history of the United States. Anderson's argument that "the war gave the provincials a sense, at a crucial point in their lives, of their identity as a distinct people" (223) and this experience allowed these provincial warriors the ability to see themselves as Americans. This experience was not unique to the militia of Massachusetts. Militiamen from other colonies, especially those whose borders touched on the areas claimed by both England and France, most notably Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia, had a similar experience.

A People's Army is not limited to discussions of battles and troop movements. Instead, it is divided into three categories: "The Context of War," "The

Experience of War,” and “The Meaning of War.” Also included are four Appendixes that back up Anderson’s arguments in the three categories, making this not only military history but also social history.

Who were these men who served in the provincial army? What were their background, their family, and their social status? “What was it that motivated provincials to go into battle in the first place?” (155) Through the judicious use of diaries and muster roles located in the Massachusetts Archives, Anderson has brought a new perspective into the study of the military in 18th century Massachusetts.

From Anderson’s research, we learn in the first category, “The Context of War,” that the average provincial soldier was approximately twenty-five years old, and about forty percent were craftsmen, and that most, at some point, had worked on farms. (35-37) Anderson also points out that from the “private’s perspective, military service was a reasonably lucrative proposition.” (39)

The second category of *A People’s Army*, “The Experience of War,” examines everyday life in the provincial army, the interaction between the provincials and the British regulars, and the effects of battle. Anderson writes that we know about the feelings of many of the provincials from the diaries that they kept while “deployed.” For example, Gibson Clough from Salem wrote that he volunteered “in the service of my king and

country in the intended expedition against Canada.” (65). Other feelings, like such as the shortage of foods and the need to forage, were expressed. Most notably those of Obadiah Harris in poems called “Fourteeners.” (86). These diaries also expressed feelings about morale, sanitation, mortality, and morality. (99).


Finally, the third category of *A People’s Army*, “The Meaning of War,” explores the relationship between the provincials and the Regulars overrank and precedence, provisioning, and the contracts made by the provincials. According to Anderson, “[a]bout two-thirds of the soldiers whose diaries survive were content simply to set down the mundane details of camp life; the other third, in varying degrees, commented reflectively” (196). One diary, kept by Private Seth Metcalf, from Rutland, “seldom made entries longer than a score of words.” (197). Based on Metcalf’s diary, it is easy to see the part religion played, especially that “the Almighty was responsible for delivering the New Englanders from the ‘hand of the enemy.’” (197)

A People’s Army is an excellent book for those interested in the individual soldier and the life he led as a member of the provincial army. By looking at the realities of being a soldier—its discipline, work, combat, diet, etc.—the reader is exposed to information that is usually passed over in other works about The Seven Years’ War.

Book Review: Jeff Guinn's *War on the Border: Villa, Pershing, the Texas Rangers, and an American Invasion*

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War on the Border: Villa, Pershing, the Texas Rangers, and an American Invasion. Norman: Simon & Schuster, 2021. ISBN 978-1-9821-2886-9. Soft-cover, \$17.0

In *War on the Border: Villa, Pershing, the Texas Rangers, and an American Invasion*, former investigative journalist Jeff Guinn focuses on the border relationship between Mexico and the United States, leading up to and including the Mexican Revolution (1910–20).

The major players of this era included General John J. Pershing, a sequence of Mexican presidents, Mexican federal army generals and revolutionary leaders, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, and the notorious Texas Rangers.

Guinn provides important context for how the border conflict developed, which goes back as far as 1825, four years after Mexico won independence from Spain in 1821. Mexican

leadership hoped the U.S. would offer to assist the fledgling nation in creating a constitutional government and thereby stabilizing it. Instead, U.S. President John Quincy Adams offered to buy part or all of Mexico, a tactic to gain land and resources similar to the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Mexico was stunned.

Guinn notes that as a Mexican colony, Texas made a great prize with its crops, herds, and potential tax income. The large number of American settlers in Texas skirmished with the local Mexicans who had long lived there, known as Tejanos, that escalated into battles, climaxing with those at the Alamo (March 6, 1836) and San Jacinto (April 21, 1836). Texas declared itself a republic

lic in 1836, then became a U.S. state in 1847. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1847) settled the Texas border along the Rio Grande River and also gave the U.S. all or part of what would become California, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming in return for cash and cancelled business claims. The Gadsden Purchase of 1854 further expanded the U.S. territory southward into Mexican lands. Mexicans who abruptly found themselves living in the United States were allowed to cross into Mexico; others were allowed to stay but became liable for U.S. taxes, causing many to reluctantly uproot and move south.


Guinn wades through the complex series of Mexican regimes and rebels, switching of allegiances, and the reasons behind the country's internal conflicts. He begins with Porfirio Diaz (ousted and exiled in 1911 after 31 years in power), follows with Francisco Madero (elected 1911, assassinated 1913) and Victoriano Huerta (ousted in 1914), and ends with Venustiano Carranza, who came to power with the aid of General Álvaro Obregón and Pancho Villa after he promised to champion the common people. Guinn focuses on Carranza's period more fully, which became more significant when Villa shifted his allegiance away from Carranza after he failed to fulfill his promises of helping the peasantry.

Of the rebel leaders, Guinn covers both Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, with a particular emphasis on Villa, portraying him as a man who rose up to help the poor and downtrod-

den, protecting their interests against a greedy and uncaring government. Perceived as an invincible revolutionary leader, his popularity soared with the poor. However, his capabilities waned and he began to lose battles, which cost him much of his militia and resources. As a result, he began ransacking the very people whom he vowed to protect and became increasingly bloodthirsty, all of which turned public opinion against him.

General John J. Pershing (1860-1948) is best known for his leadership of the American Expedition Forces during American involvement in World War I. Lesser known is his leadership of the "Punitive Expedition" into Mexico (March 14, 1916 to February 7, 1917), a retaliatory offensive against Pancho Villa following Villa's March 9, 1916, attack on Columbus, New Mexico. Until this attack, President Wilson had absolutely refused to allow any U.S. forces to cross into Mexico for any reason. Pershing's objective was to capture Villa, but his forces merely defeated the rebel's militia while Villa escaped. The expedition remained mostly idle for months afterward due to a diplomatic stalemate between Wilson and Carranza.

The Texas Rangers began as a small group meant to protect American property in Mexican Texas after the country's independence (1821). By the time of the Revolution, they had grown into a much larger militia that became known for their invincibility and ruthlessness. Guinn highlights their extreme prejudice and brutality against any and all Mexicans, murdering them at will.



Pancho Villa displays his "Gasoline Charger" Indian motorcycle in Juarez, Mexico, 1914.

Three important points emerge from Guinn's narrative. First, the book's opening context portrays the deep roots of today's immigration issues and how they began in the 1800s. Prejudice and violence against Mexicans intensified with the establishment of the border after the various treaties and land purchases. It grew even worse with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910.

Second, Guinn sheds light on a shadowy plot against the U.S. called the *Plan de San Diego*, which originated in the town of San Diego, Texas, in 1915. It called for an armed conquest of several southwestern U.S. states, a mandate to kill all white males from age sixteen and older within those states, and the creation of an independent Hispanic state that might partially rejoin Mexico. An-

other portion would be given to Blacks and Native Americans in reparation for slavery and loss of lands. Due to the rumors, racial tensions increased in the Rio Grande Valley, especially around Brownsville. Raids and skirmishes ensued, arrests and executions followed, with most of the resulting dead being Mexicans. Although attacks continued, the *Plan de San Diego* never fully took root.

The third point Guinn bubbles up is the little known but important factor playing into the border war stemming from President Wilson's decision on whether to enter WWI. Germany did not want the U.S. to enter the war, despite their belief that the U.S. Army would be "woefully inadequate" against the German army. The Germans continually manipulated Mexican govern-

ment forces (*federales*), the rebels, and the U.S. Army, fomenting conflicts to keep them busy sniping at each other. Germany believed as long as these factions remained preoccupied, the U.S. would be distracted and have negligible forces to send to Europe.

Guinn uses Pancho Villa's name as the book's main draw due to the rebel's popular notoriety. In the narrative, however, Villa's story is well balanced within the period's back story, the suc-

cession of Mexican presidents, Pershing's punitive expedition, and the Texas Rangers' brutality, as well as Wilson's waffling regarding German involvement and the European war. Guinn also makes note that the legendary Buffalo Soldiers were included in the troops under Pershing's command. Although not an academic book, it is well written, entertaining, and an appealing treatment for readers interested in this historical period and region.

Museum Review of the National Museum of the United States Army

Lt. Chris Booth

United States Coast Guard



Entrance to the National Museum of the United States Army, photo by author.

As far as reviews go, this one will be exceedingly positive, as the National Museum of the United States Army stands as a remarkable testament to what a service's flagship museum should be. The museum's stated objectives to "Educate and engage, Preserve, Honor, Pay Tribute, Inspire, and Stimulate" are each overwhelmingly achieved, as guests will be impressed by the size and quality of numerous dioramas, interactive nature of the exhibits, and the incredible memorabilia

on display from every period of the U.S. Army's history. Located on over eighty acres near Fort Belvoir, Virginia, this newly opened facility (fall 2021) is situated perfectly near Washington D.C. The fact that free admission does not require access to a military facility (only an online ticket reservation is needed) makes it a solid addition to any travel itinerary for someone sightseeing in the nation's capital.

Immediately upon arrival visitors will be impressed with the striking new-

ness of the facility, as everything about this museum reinforces how this building has only been open to the public for a short time. From the freshly painted lines in the incredibly spacious parking lot to the unchipped walkway leading into the building, the lack of scratches or dings on any surfaces or walls, and the meticulous attention to cleanliness fostered by the staff, guests here will feel as if they are the first to tour this museum. Once inside the museum, visitors have three floors to explore, and while

the main exhibits and attractions are on the first floor, it would be a mistake to neglect the second and third floors on their tour. After checking in it will be impossible for attention to not be drawn to the enormous campaign wall, a façade which lists every campaign and corresponding service streamer that the U.S. Army obtained through its involvement. This impressive piece sets the tone for the hundreds of years of conflict that are further explored throughout the entirety of the museum.



Campaign wall located in main entrance that outlines every conflict that the U.S. Army has participated in along with corresponding service streamer, photo by author.

After viewing the campaign wall, visitors will proceed through the Soldiers' Stories Gallery, a stirring series of almost thirty vignettes from soldiers

throughout various conflicts that depict the bravery, heroism, and selflessness that characterize what it means to be a member of the armed forces. Although

processing each of these stories is time consuming, reading just a few will leave the lasting impression that the museum is striving for with this exhibit before moving on to the heart of the facility. Following this gallery, visitors transit through a series of rooms that detail the U.S. Army and its actions throughout every period of its existence. Each room is named for the overall theme of that period, the first titled “Founding the Nation,” which properly covers the colonial period up to the War of 1812. The rooms proceed in that timeline manner up to modern times, culminating in the “Changing World” room which details U.S. Army efforts in the Global War on Terror.

However, before entering these rooms there is one large chamber that must be explored—the “Army and Society Gallery.” This room is dedicated to depicting how the U.S. Army has played an enormous role in the growth and development of countless areas of United States culture outside of waging war. This room is arguably where most visitors will learn the most, as many will probably already know of the army’s exploits in combat but might not be so aware of the army’s contributions to enhancements in medicine, public works, communications, and engineering, just to name a few. This room details those areas above and many more, with dioramas ranging from the U.S. Army’s efforts to improve the first flying machines to its assistance with National Park management. Information is also provided on the U.S. Army’s influence on society, women in the military, issues facing military families, racial

integration, and various war opposition movements. Historians and visitors well versed in the U.S. Army and its past will still find something new to them in this gallery, as this exhibit is incredibly well researched and effectively demonstrates how the U.S. Army has influenced the nation in manners other than war.

After leaving the “Army and Society Gallery,” visitors will begin their tour of the aforementioned timeline period rooms starting with “Founding the Nation.” This room contains a plethora of interesting artifacts, particularly the weaponry which ranges from halberds to muskets and their corresponding bayonets. An item in this room that immediately grabs the attention is a miniature replica of General Knox crossing the Hudson River during the American Revolution (pictured below). This replica is hugely popular with guests and is historically accurate, as it even includes a tiny cannon that cracked through the ice and took teams of men three days to recover. Transiting out of this room, however, is where one of the most intriguing items in the entire museum is displayed—the air-rifle that was carried by Captain Meriwether Lewis during the famous Lewis and Clark Expedition. This weapon was used on multiple occasions throughout the expedition to impress potentially hostile Native American tribes and dissuade them from overwhelming the small band of travelers, and generally a volunteer docent is nearby this signature piece to answer any questions or provide further detail if desired.




Located in the “Founding the Nation” room, this miniature replica of General Knox’s crossing of the Hudson River during the American Revolution is a popular item for guests of all ages, photo by author.

It must be stated that up to this point the tour throughout the museum has been rather quiet and subdued, with only a few small theaters playing videos on loop in the galleries for visitors who may be interested in sitting down and observing. However, that changes rather dramatically upon entrance to the “Nation Overseas” room, which chronicles the U.S. Army’s exploits in the Spanish-American War and World War I. This room is filled with incredible pieces from that time period, ranging from elaborately carved swords and kris from the Philippines to decorated American soldier Alvin York’s trench helmet. Nevertheless, visitors will be

drawn by the booms of artillery and whizzes of machine gun fire to enter deeper into the room, which transforms into a mock battlefield from the European front. This incredible design is immersive, and the sandbags, barbed wire, bullet pocked walls along with life sized soldiers and weaponry truly leave the visitor with a better sense of the brutality of that conflict. It must be noted that this room, with its realistic sound effects and mock soldiers in battle, could potentially act as triggers for someone who suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder or who may have a propensity for sensory overload.

The next room to be visited will also leave visitors impressed by not only the detail of the artifacts but also the sheer size of the dioramas on display. Titled “Global War,” this room is primarily devoted to U.S. Army actions in World War II. While there are intriguing pieces on display such as the sword that belonged to the Nazi leader Hermann Göring, the life size replicas in this room are truly what grab the attention. This room is complete with three tremendous replicas from that period, including an anti-aircraft artillery piece, a landing craft, and a Sherman

Cobra King tank. These pieces are very true to their origins and do an excellent job at demonstrating the size and scale of this equipment that was used so often throughout this conflict. The remaining two rooms of the main exhibit, “Cold War” and “Changing World,” complete the timeline of U.S. Army efforts during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War, with a surprising amount of detail also paid to smaller conflicts and actions that are often glossed over such as Operation Just Cause and Operation Urgent Fury.



Life size replica of a landing craft used during World War II, with faux soldiers manning the helm and machine gun while the rest of their platoon finishes embarking, photo by author.

The remaining exhibits to visit on the first floor include the Army Theater, which plays a comprehensive

video every thirty minutes on the history of the U.S. Army and what it means to be a soldier. The other exhibits are

much more interactive, with two virtual reality experiences and an Army Action Pod simulator all housed in the Army Action Center. Visitors should note that there are entry guidelines for these exhibits and also require an additional fee to enjoy. The final items of note on the first floor are the café, the well-stocked museum store, and the Experiential Learning Center, the latter being an enjoyable experience for visitors of all ages that aims to build an immersive learning space.

As mentioned earlier, however, visitors would be remiss if the second and third floors were not explored prior to departure. The second floor is home to special exhibits and of course is subject to change, but as of now houses an incredible gallery entitled “The Art of Soldiering.” This exhibit displays selected pieces from the U.S. Army’s Art Collection, with pieces created by soldiers from almost every conflict in America’s history dating back to the Civil War. This exhibit is different from the rest of the museum in that it is rather quiet and solemn, as a great many of the pieces highlight the plethora of emotions that are wrought from war and strike a res-

onance in the viewers, creating a very somber atmosphere. Finally, the third floor houses another temporary exhibit space (currently displaying a collection on the Nisei Soldier Experience) as well as the Medal of Honor Garden and Experience. This exhibit outlines the recommendation process for this esteemed award, and the rooftop garden is a beautiful space that honors many Army recipients of this medal.

In summation, the National Museum of the United States Army is undoubtedly a museum that should be added to the already crowded list of destinations in the Washington D.C. area. This facility is at a distinguished level in its design and visual appeal, and the painstaking efforts that were employed to make the exhibits not only historically accurate but also interesting to a variety of age groups are appreciated by all guests. As the flagship museum for a branch of the United States Armed Forces, this museum is a worthy tribute for the U.S. Army and is thoroughly recommended to anyone who has even a semblance of interest in the efforts, bravery, victories, and sacrifices of this service.

Contact Information:

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
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


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
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
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
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
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