

*The*  
SABER AND SCROLL  
*Journal*

Volume 10, No. 1 • Summer 2021



*Ex Tenebris Lux*



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**Welcome Letter** ..... 1  
*Mike Pratt*

**Who’s in Charge: Military-Political Conflict Within France  
 During the Franco-Algerian War** ..... 7  
*Dr. Robert Young*

**Pericles’ Reckless Megarian Policy** ..... 21  
*Stan Prager*

**Gustav Badin: The Afro-Swedish Experience in Eighteenth  
 Century Sweden** ..... 45  
*Susan Danielsson*

**Sir Walter Scott and the Invention of Scotland’s Identity** ..... 63  
*Caitlin and Dilawar Khan*

**Martin Luther and the Reformation: Ninety-five Theses to  
 the Diet of Worms** ..... 77  
*Phillip Greer*

**That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert** ..... 91  
*Chris Schloemer*

**The Bund Duetscher Mädel and the Indoctrination of the  
 German Girl** ..... 111  
*Sarah Weiler*

**Book Review: Stephen Eric Bronner’s *Reclaiming the Enlightenment:  
 Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement*** ..... 121  
*Mike Pratt*

**Book Review: W.E.B. DuBois’ *Black Reconstruction in America:  
 A History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to  
 Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880*** ..... 125  
*Savannah Jackson-Cornell*

*cont’d.*



<b>Book Review: Edwards Cox's <i>Grey Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship</i> .....</b>	<b>129</b>
<i>Maj. Cody Schuette</i>	
<b>Lecture Review: Military History in the Age of COVID; A Review of the Society for Military History's 2021 Annual Conference .....</b>	<b>133</b>
<i>J. R. O. Flinchum</i>	
<b>Museum Review (Virtual): Holocaust Memorial Museum of San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas .....</b>	<b>145</b>
<i>Chris Schloemer</i>	
<b>Submission Guidelines .....</b>	<b>151</b>

## Welcome Letter

Welcome to the Summer 2021 issue of the *Saber & Scroll Journal*. This publication contains a variety of articles as well as book and historical site reviews adhering to the dual theme of European history and Holocaust remembrance. Any reader with even the slightest interest in these relatively broad topics will surely find something of interest in the following pages.

The main body of this issue is comprised of scholarly articles. One deals with the drama of the Franco-Algerian War of the 1950s and 60s, where the relationship between the French military and political body is explored. A second article reevaluates the cause of the Peloponnesian War in the 5<sup>th</sup> century, specifically focusing on the polis of Megara and its geographical importance to both Athens and Sparta. Another article intimately explores the Afro-Swede experience in 18<sup>th</sup>-century Sweden through the personal slavery-to-adoption story of Gustav Badin. The next article explores the reinvention of Scottish identity and culture after 1707 through literature, and its impact on a reshaped British identity as a byproduct. A presentation of the Protestant Reformation under Martin Luther in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century is also included in this issue. A sixth article closely analyzes the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 as a primary cause of the First Crusade. The final article is an examination of the League of German Girls as an institutional tool of the Nazi party to promulgate ideological ideals.

A number of excellent reviews populate this issue. One contributing author reviewed the 2006 book *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement* by Stephen Eric Bronner, in which they respond to Bronner's support of the Enlightenment's legacy and search to wrest it from association with the worst excesses of modernity. Another contributing author wrote a review of the book *Black Reconstruction in America: A History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* by W.E.B. Du Bois, in which they comment on Du Bois's attempt to widen the scope of the Reconstruction period and its increased relevance since the book's 1935 publication. Though discourse on American slavery is not directly part of European history, the concepts of "othering" and the violations of human rights and civil liberties are all relevant topics in European and Holocaust discourse today. A third contributor reviewed the 2011 book *Grey Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship* by Edward Cox, in which they respond to Cox's argument that Major General Fox Conner's extraordinary life and lasting impact as an American wartime general make him one of the greatest military minds of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Beyond the focus on scholarly manuscripts, another contributor reviewed the Society for Military History's annual conference in May 2021, emphasizing the nature of military historians, their work, and collaborative networking in the

age of the Coronavirus pandemic, and how this particular conference afforded the opportunity for shared academia and scholarship—as well as foreshadowed the potential functionality of conferences in the future. This issue’s final contributor submitted a poignant review of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in San Antonio, Texas, in which he describes the experience of the museum’s offerings via a robust online presence that showcases its vast array of sources and materials maintaining the history and experiences of the Holocaust of the Second World War.

Lastly, the cover art of a *Stolperstein* (“stumbling stone”) deserves some mention here. Courtesy of photographer Kadir Calep, these nearly 4-inch concrete cubes bearing brass plates with the names and life dates of victims of Nazi extermination or persecution are a work of humanitarian art that demonstrate the enduring need to not forget the boundaries of human brutality that were once thought impassible, so that we do not press our society beyond them again. The *Stolpersteine* project was initiated by the German artist Gunter Demnig in 1992, with the intention to commemorate individuals at exactly the last known place of residency or even occupation before the individual fell victim to Nazi terror in its many forms. As of December 2019, 75,000 *Stolpersteine* have been laid, making the *Stolpersteine* project the world’s largest decentralized memorial.

If you are interested in submitting an article, book review, or museum/conference review for consideration, please consult the submission guidelines included in this issue. Until the next issue, stay safe and keep reading!

Kind regards,

Mike Pratt

*AMU Alumni*

*Adjunct History Lecturer—University of Mount Union*

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## Carta de bienvenida

**B**ienvenido a la edición de verano de 2021 de *Sabre & Scroll Journal*. Esta publicación contiene una variedad de artículos, así como reseñas de libros y sitios históricos que se adhieren al tema dual de la historia europea y el recuerdo del Holocausto. Cualquier lector con el más mínimo interés en estos temas relativamente amplios seguramente encontrará algo de interés en las siguientes páginas.



El cuerpo principal de este número se compone de artículos académicos. Se trata del drama de la guerra franco-argelina de los años 50 y 60, donde se explora la relación entre el cuerpo político y militar francés. Un segundo artículo reevalúa la causa de la Guerra del Peloponeso en el siglo V, centrándose específicamente en la polis de Megara y su importancia geográfica tanto para Atenas como para Esparta. Otro artículo explora íntimamente la experiencia afro-sueca en la Suecia del siglo XVIII a través de la historia personal de la esclavitud a la adopción de Gustav Badin. El siguiente artículo explora la reinención de la identidad y la cultura escocesas después de 1707 a través de la literatura y su impacto en una identidad británica remodelada como subproducto. En este número también se incluye una presentación de la Reforma Protestante bajo Martín Lutero a principios del siglo XVI. Un sexto artículo analiza de cerca la batalla de Manzikert en 1071 como causa principal de la Primera Cruzada. El artículo final es un examen de la Liga de Chicas Alemanas como herramienta institucional del partido nazi para promulgar ideales ideológicos.

Varias críticas excelentes pueblan este tema. Un autor que contribuyó revisó el libro de 2006 *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement* de Stephen Eric Bronner, en el que responden al apoyo de Bronner al legado de la Ilustración y buscan arrancarlo de la asociación con los peores excesos de la modernidad. Otro autor colaborador escribió una reseña del libro *Reconstrucción negra en Estados Unidos: una historia del papel que desempeñó la gente negra en el intento de reconstruir la democracia en Estados Unidos, 1860-1880* de W.E.B. Du Bois, en el que comentan el intento de Du Bois de ampliar el alcance del período de la Reconstrucción y su mayor relevancia desde la publicación del libro en 1935. Aunque el discurso sobre la esclavitud estadounidense no es directamente parte de la historia europea, los conceptos de "otredad" y las violaciones de los derechos humanos y las libertades civiles son todos temas relevantes en el discurso europeo y del Holocausto actual. Un tercer colaborador revisó el libro de 2011 *Gray Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship* de Edward Cox, en el que responden al argumento de Cox de que la vida extraordinaria y el impacto duradero del mayor general Fox Conner como general estadounidense en tiempos de guerra lo convierten en uno de los militares más importantes. mentes del siglo XX.

Más allá del enfoque en los manuscritos académicos, otro colaborador revisó la conferencia anual de la Sociedad para la Historia Militar en mayo de 2021, enfatizando la naturaleza de los historiadores militares, su trabajo y las redes de colaboración en la era de la pandemia del Coronavirus, y cómo esta conferencia en particular brindó la oportunidad. para la academia y la erudición compartidas, así como presagió la funcionalidad potencial de las conferencias en el futuro. El colaborador final de este número presentó una reseña conmovedora del Museo Conmemorativo del Holocausto en San Antonio, Texas, en la que describe la experiencia de las ofertas del museo a través de una sólida presencia en línea que

muestra su amplia gama de fuentes y materiales que mantienen la historia y las experiencias del Holocausto de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Por último, la portada de un Stolperstein ("piedra de tropiezo") merece una mención aquí. Cortesía del fotógrafo Kadir Calep, estos cubos de hormigón de casi 4 pulgadas con placas de latón con los nombres y las fechas de vida de las víctimas del exterminio o la persecución nazi son una obra de arte humanitario que demuestra la necesidad permanente de no olvidar los límites de la brutalidad humana que fueron una vez pensados imposible, para que no presionemos a nuestra sociedad más allá de ellos de nuevo. El proyecto Stolpersteine fue iniciado por el artista alemán Gunter Demnig en 1992, con la intención de conmemorar a los individuos exactamente en el último lugar conocido de residencia o incluso ocupación antes de que el individuo fuera víctima del terror nazi en sus múltiples formas. A diciembre de 2019, se han colocado 75.000 Stolpersteine, lo que convierte al proyecto Stolpersteine en el monumento descentralizado más grande del mundo.

Si le interesa enviar un artículo, una reseña de un libro o una reseña de un museo / conferencia para su consideración, consulte los requisitos de presentación incluidas en este número. Hasta el próximo número, ¡cuídese y siga leyendo!

Saludos cordiales,

Mike Pratt

*Exalumno de AMU*

*Instructor adjunto de historia—University of Mount Union*

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## 编者按

欢迎阅读2021年夏季《军刀和卷轴历史期刊》。本期内容包括一系列与欧洲历史和大屠杀纪念相关的文章、书评和历史遗址评论。即使是仅对这些相对广泛主题展现微弱兴趣的读者也一定会在接下来的内容中发现兴趣所在。

本期主要内容由学术文章组成。第一篇文章研究了20世纪50和60年代阿尔及利亚战争，探究了法国军事和政治机构之间的关系。第二篇文章重新评估了公元前5世纪伯罗奔尼撒战争的起因，尤其研究了墨伽拉城邦及其对雅典和斯巴达的地理重要性。另一篇文章通过阐述古斯塔夫·巴丁从奴隶变为养子的个人故事，深入探究了非裔瑞典人在18世纪瑞典的经历。下一篇文章探究了1707年后通过文学重新建构苏格兰认同及其文化一事，并探究了这一建构对重新塑造的英国认同产生的影响。下一篇文章研究了16世纪早期由马丁·路德领导的宗教改革。第6篇文章深入分析了1071年曼齐刻尔特战役，它是第一次十字军东征的主要起因。最后一篇文章分析了德

国少女联盟作为纳粹党的制度工具来宣传其意识形态理念。

本期还收录了一系列高质量评论文。一名投稿者评论了2006年出版的由Stephen Eric Bronner撰写的著作《重申启蒙:论一种积极参与的政治》(Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement)，重点评论了Bronner对启蒙运动影响的支持，并试图将其与现代性(modernity)的最恶劣行为之间的联系相分离。另一名投稿者评论了由W. E. B. Du Bois撰写的著作《美国的黑人重建: 1860-1880年间黑人在美国重建民主之举中的历史》(Black Reconstruction in America: A History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860 - 1880)，重点评论了Du Bois试图扩大重建时期范围的举措，以及自1935年该书出版以来相关性的增加。尽管有关美国奴隶制的话语并不与欧洲历史直接相关，但“他者”的概念以及对人权和公民自由的侵犯却是当前欧洲话语和大屠杀话语中的相关主题。第三位投稿者评论了2011年出版的由Edward Cox撰写的著作《幕后操纵者、福克斯·康纳和指挥艺术》(Grey Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship)，投稿者评价了Cox的主张—福克斯·康纳少将的非凡人生和作为美国战争时期将军的持久影响让他成为20世纪最伟大的军事人物之一。

另一位投稿者评论了2021年5月军事史学会(Society for Military History)举办的年度会议，强调了新冠肺炎大流行期间军事史学家的性质、工作和协作关系网，以及该会议如何为学术界和文献共享提供机会，并预示了未来会议的潜在功能性。最后一位投稿者沉痛评论了德克萨斯州圣安东尼奥的大屠杀纪念馆，他描述了该博物馆通过网络形式呈现的展览，表现了二战时期大屠杀历史和经历的大量来源和材料。

最后，本期封面艺术图片“绊脚石”值得留意。此图是摄影师Kadir Calep的作品，这些近4英寸的混凝土立方块支撑着刻有遭受纳粹灭绝或迫害的遇难者姓名及生日的黄铜片。作为人道主义艺术作品，其证明了需要永远铭记曾感到麻木的人类暴行的界限，告诫我们不再让悲剧重演。“绊脚石”计划由德国艺术家Gunter Demnig于1992年发起，目的在于纪念纳粹受害者，并将他们以不同形式成为纳粹受害者之前的最后居住地点作为纪念。截止2019年12月，已铺下75000枚铜片，“绊脚石”计划因此成为世界最大的分散式纪念物。

如您有兴趣提交学术文章、书评或博物馆/会议评论，请查阅本期收录的投稿指南。期待下期内容再会，保持安全、保持阅读！

谨致问候，

Mike Pratt

AMU校友

客座历史讲师—蒙特优宁大学



# **Who's in Charge: Military-Political Conflict Within France During the Franco-Algerian War**

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## **ABSTRACT**

It was a war most have forgotten. One of history's first imperialistic powers fell apart in a conflict filled with errors. The Franco-Algerian War demonstrated not only the power of insurgency but the weakness of a nation trying to fight and win a war that was not supported at home. France would eventually fail to suppress the Algerian rebels. Their government would then have to suppress the French military as it sought to bypass and blatantly disregard the leaders of the nation they were sworn to protect.

**Keywords:** Franco-Algerian War, Charles de Gaulle, National Liberation Front, Evian Agreements, Setif Massacre, Guelma Massacre, Siddi Ferruch

# **Quién está a cargo: Conflicto político-militar en Francia durante la guerra franco-argelina**

## **RESUMEN**

Fue una guerra que la mayoría ha olvidado. Una de las primeras potencias imperialistas de la historia se vino abajo en un conflicto plagado de errores. La guerra franco-argelina demostró no solo el poder de la insurgencia, sino la debilidad de una nación que intentaba luchar y ganar una guerra que no contaba con el apoyo de su país. Francia finalmente no lograría reprimir a los rebeldes argelinos. Su gobierno tendría entonces que reprimir al ejército francés mientras buscaba eludir e ignorar descaradamente a los líderes de la nación que juraron proteger.

**Palabras clave:** Guerra franco-argelina, Charles de Gaulle, Frente de Liberación Nacional, Acuerdos de Evian, Masacre de Setif, Masacre de Guelma, Siddi Ferruch

## 谁的地盘—阿尔及利亚战争期间法国境内的军事-政治冲突

### 摘要

这是一场绝大多数人都遗忘的战争。历史上首批帝国强权之一在一场充满错误的冲突中瓦解。阿尔及利亚战争不仅证明了起义的力量，还证明了一个在不受本国支持的战争中试图取胜的国家的弱点。最终，法国无法镇压阿尔及利亚反叛军。反叛军政府随后将镇压法国军队，同时试图避开并公然忽视他们曾宣誓保护的民族领袖。

关键词：阿尔及利亚战争，夏尔·戴高乐，民族解放阵线，《埃维昂协议》，塞提夫大屠杀，圭马大屠杀，Siddi Ferruch

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Clausewitz called war “a violent political action.” He was absolutely right. Within that violent action are two distinct entities, the political leadership within the nation that makes the decision to go to or end the war, and the military, which fights and hopefully wins the war under the broad or specific guidance given to it by that political leadership. Generals should not do politics. Politicians should not fight wars. When these responsibilities cross, disaster is certain. Rarely in history has the government or its leaders been able to assume successfully the dual role of leader and general. Frederick the Great did it successfully. Napoleon tried but failed. Politics requires a certain manner of decision-making, more deliberate, looking at all kinds of different situations and scenarios. Military leaders see one thing, the enemy, and that is all they should see. There

may come a time when the enemy which dominates their thoughts and actions, is no longer their target. They don't make that decision, the politicians do. It may be frustrating, but it is something a military leader realizes from the time they enter the service, they are the tools of their politicians. On rare occasions they will not accept this as *fate accompli*. They will fight not only their perceived enemy, but also their political masters. It usually does not end well, for all involved.

The Cold War saw several wars that highlighted the ongoing struggle between freedom and communism. The Cold War also saw colonial wars, as former imperialist powers sought to retain a modicum of the power and influence they once possessed. Then there were wars that are difficult to categorize. The Franco-Algerian War of 1954-1962 was another example of

a powerful modern nation fighting a weaker, third-world nation. Militarily, the French, came closer to defeating the Algerians than either the United States or Soviet Union did their adversaries in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The Algerian rebels were down to a few thousand men, their morale dangerously low. Yet France lost. How? The Fourth Republic and the French army were at the same time fighting the rebels of Algeria and each other. Years of army autonomy in Algeria was threatened by the French government's desire to ensure its survivability, which to its leaders could only be achieved by ending France's second colonial war in less than a decade (the French were defeated and expelled by the Vietnamese in 1954) and granting Algeria its independence.

This situation arose because two entirely different governments existed within the same country: the Fourth Republic, in mainland France, and the French army and civilians that governed Algeria. Rather than acquiesce to the legitimate government of their country (the duty of any officer and soldier), the army decided to attempt to replace it. The Fifth Republic and a new President, Charles de Gaulle, replaced the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle, France's preeminent World War II hero, appeared to be everything the army wanted. He was one of their own—a man who had fought for France and understood the price the military pays for defending their nation. He would allow the army to finally end the Algerian War on terms that would make even the most ardent skeptics salute their efforts. They must have thought they'd

won it all. The opposite happened. De Gaulle announced the end of France's involvement and his support for Algerian independence. The army, shocked and dismayed, now saw it involved in two simultaneous battles, one against the Algerians, and the other against their country.

To understand this war, one must understand the volatile nature of French politics after World War II. The Fourth Republic was humiliated by their defeat in Indochina in 1954 and the images of America rescuing the remnants of their besieged army. Algeria was different. Unlike France's other North African colonies, Morocco and Tunisia (both granted independence in 1956), the French wanted to retain significant power and influence in Algeria. The army and the significant numbers of French citizens still living and prospering in Algeria supported this policy. It seemed like the typical post World War II mismatch of established power versus insurgent, and as with all these supposed mismatches, the insurgent would not go away. The longer the war lasted the more pressure the Fourth Republic was under to end it, even if it meant granting Algeria its independence. The Republic's goal was political survival; they announced the war would come to an end.

Within France, the government and the war had a myriad of enemies. Communists and their propaganda blamed the government for military setbacks, stoked class warfare, and incited the population over conscription. All were effective, but only so long as the war lasted. The military could nei-

ther see nor appreciate this stark reality, but that should not have mattered. A nation's army carries out policy, it does not formulate it. Further exacerbating the Fourth Republic's fragile government was the Algerian Liberation Movement. Terror became a primary weapon and in Paris, and other major French cities bombings became a common occurrence. The escalation to terrorism was the result of the brutal tactics employed by the French army in Algeria. Torture, murder, and deprivation were employed to break resistance yet as history so often demonstrates only emboldened it. The French army's brutality became public knowledge, further embarrassing the government since they had no knowledge of the military's measures. Orders to cease were ignored. France's partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for other reasons, also did not support the Algerian War.

The Cold War did not end because the French were drowning in Algeria. Several years later the United States recognized this and after them, the Soviet Union. Next to the United States, France had the largest contingent of forces defending Western Europe, theoretically. The French contribution of 8 infantry divisions, along with significant armor and air assets, comprised one quarter of the NATO alliance.<sup>1</sup> Any lessening of those numbers was seen as very dangerous given the Soviet's massive numerical advantages in conventional military forces. France also had obligations in the Middle East and in 1956, along with Great Britain and Israel, had seized the Suez Canal

from an unfriendly Egyptian government. U.S. pressure forced their withdrawal from this questionable venture, adding further humiliation to their defeat in Vietnam. The Fourth Republic could not afford another defeat.

Whatever the system of government the military is its primary tool of defending the nation and projecting power. In a democracy/republic the military is completely subordinated to the civilian political authority. It has no part in determining and formulating policy. France's military's role, in theory, did not deviate from this norm. Yet facts often deviate from theory. For decades the French army in Algeria exercised autonomous control over Algerian affairs. The Fourth Republic, encumbered by continuous domestic problems both before and after World War II, allowed the army's political power to grow. The Algerian War was not fought for France but for the army's power and prestige. The French army surrendered to the Germans in the early months of World War II, the Vietnamese drove them out of Southeast Asia. An ally, the U.S., had humiliated them by forcing its withdrawal from the Suez Canal. Algeria was their chance to redeem themselves. No compromises, with the rebels or the government, could happen.

Philip M. Williams, in *Wars, Plots and Scandals in Postwar France* writes:

The French army charged the Fourth Republic with vacillation and weakness and its society with decadence and corruption. The real accusation, however, was that both French society and



French political institutions had other goals, other desires than winning colonial wars. It was the nature of postwar statecraft, not just an inability to formulate a policy, which crystallized the army's hostility.<sup>2</sup>

Fault can be found on two sides: the French government for allowing the army to become so independent, and the army for disregarding its duty to the French nation in favor of its own position. To leave Algeria would mean to forfeit generations of power and prestige. The potential for disillusion did not rest solely with the army's senior officers. Junior officers hoped for something better and didn't see that in their government, and thus had no problem supporting their army rather than the nation they swore to protect.

The French military had essentially become local caretakers in their village posts. Once the insurrection began, in addition to their usual activities, which included building roads and schools, bringing doctors to primitive areas and teaching the Algerians to run their own local affairs, the army protected villagers from the Algerian nationalists who sought vengeance against them for cooperating with the French. As long as the French remained the average Algerian could believe themselves safe, unafraid of their more radical countrymen. As the war progressed and the rhetoric of the French government moved increasingly toward withdrawal, the loyalties of the people naturally shifted. Rebel numbers began swelling in 1956, the

year the Fourth Republic's resolve began to falter. All the army had done socially and militarily seemed in jeopardy. 1958 was the key year. Temporarily, it seemed as if both the government and the army found their savior. Charles de Gaulle, France's iconic hero of World War II (he had continued to fight even after his nation surrendered) was mentioned as the leader of a new government. To the Fourth Republic this meant political stability, a man of De Gaulle's stature and prestige could quiet calls for change and restore functionality. To the army a universal smile must have graced the faces of all involved. Surely a general, France's greatest war hero, would stand with his fellow soldiers. He would never cast aside decades of work. He would never dishonor the army by withdrawing from a war they believed they were winning. De Gaulle was a general, and generals hate politicians. No one saw that this general was a politician.<sup>3</sup>

Another Algerian group also had a stake in this internal battle—French nationals. France entered Algeria in 1830. French businessmen and civil servants were right behind the first troops, ready to exploit the new colony. The Algeria of 1830 was a typical pre-industrial society. It consisted of numerous small towns, whose primary economic activity revolved around each town's small marketplace. Its natural resources, which included iron ore, phosphates, and vast forests, had not been developed beyond the needs of local use. As did most imperialist powers, France developed Algeria's infrastructure for their own use

rather than for the good of the country or its people. David Prochaska's *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bone: 1870-1920*, gives an excellent portrayal of France's economic exploitation of Algeria. Iron ore was exported to France, where it was smelted and marketed. The first railroad was built to haul iron ore, not passengers and the ports were expanded to accommodate shipping traffic and to handle the expanding output of Algeria's natural resources. Bone, the subject of Prochaska's narrative, was typical of this manner of exploitation. It was also typical of the manner in which the French supplanted the native population by continuing to arrive in greater numbers. All important political, economic, and administrative posts were either occupied or controlled by the French, including the infant petroleum industry, which would surely be nationalized by an independent Algerian government. Years of profit and prosperity would be lost without compensation. Further, the French of Algeria were no longer true Frenchmen. They did possess the basic rights of all French citizens, but enjoyed powers and privileges in Algeria they could not hope to equal in France. It is not surprising that French nationals in Algeria were as vehement and determined in their criticism of any attempt at conciliation by the Fourth Republic as the military.<sup>4</sup>

The diverging goals and viewpoints of the Fourth Republic and the French military's hierarchy were apparent the moment Algeria initiated its insurrection. Both the government and the military fought their own type of

war. The results were predictable. Neither the government nor the army accomplished anything. A nation cannot win a war when the military employs terrorism, subversion, and deceit to bring its enemy to its knees while at the same time the government offers peace, conciliation, and hope. Such was the enigma of French politics.

The French government attempted to end the war almost immediately. The hopeless military situation of the rebels compelled them to resort to guerrilla warfare after several foolhardy attempts at facing the French in open battle. Guerrilla wars tend to have a negative effect on the aggressor nation's civilian population because they seemingly last forever. Democracies tend to have problems with protracted wars and increasing casualties (the World Wars being the exception). The Fourth Republic realized this and as criticism from the public concerning new draft quotas and the recall of reservists and from the communists and other political enemies increased, so did the efforts to end the war. The French government's willingness to negotiate soothed the nerves of the French people, the Algerians, and the international community. The new philosophy of the Fourth Republic should have ensured its longevity. The communists would be neutralized since they would be deprived of their primary target of criticism, the war, and the support of the populace reestablished. It could have happened if France's military leaders supported rather than destroyed the policy of its government.



General Charles de Gaulle speaking to a Paris politician, June 1, 1958. <https://www.history101.com/june-1-1958-charles-de-gaulle-leadership-france/>



Principle leaders of the FLN (left to right: Mohamed Khider, Mostefa Lacheraf, Hocine Aït Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Ahmed Ben Bella). Taken after their 22 October 1956 arrest by the French Army following the interception of their (Moroccan civilian) flight between Rabat and Tunis headed for Cairo. The military wing of the FLN, the ALM, created most of the chaos and actual physical destruction against the French and any suspected collaborators. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Khider\\_-\\_Lacheraf\\_-\\_A%C3%Aft\\_Ahmed\\_-\\_Boudiaf\\_-\\_Ben\\_Bella.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Khider_-_Lacheraf_-_A%C3%Aft_Ahmed_-_Boudiaf_-_Ben_Bella.jpg)



Collage made by me using screenshots from two Public Domain videos. Collage description: (first row) Muslim rebels army ALN (Algerian National Liberation Army); French Army M8 Greyhound patrol; French settlers take up arms after the August 1955 Constantinois massacres. (second row) Charles de Gaulle's famous speech of June 4 1958 "je vous ai compris"; French settlers with banners saying "De Gaulle to power" in Algiers May 13 1958; Muslim veterans gathered in Algiers' Government Building in 1958. (third row) Barricades week French settlers uprising in January 1960; French settler FAF (French Algerian Front, anti-French government) rioters throw stones to French Army M8 Greyhound armored cars; French Army soldier use metal detector to check if Muslim women wearing niqab are bomb-couriers. (fourth row) FLN Muslim rebels riot in Algiers's European quarter in December 10 1960; French Army national guard Gardes Mobiles use tear gaz riot gun; FLN Muslim supporters face to face with French paratroopers during the December 10 1960 protest.

First video (all screenshots except one) is "French President Charles De Gaulle and the Six-Year War" (1960) <https://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.649319>. Public Domain

Algerian War documentary. National Archives and Records Administration. National Security Council. Central Intelligence Agency. (09/18/1947 - 12/04/1981). ARC Identifier 649319 / Local Identifier 263.1923. This movie is part of the collection FedFlix <https://archive.org/details/FedFlix>

Second video (up-right corner screenshot only) is "Rebellion Spreads in North Africa" (1955) [https://archive.org/details/1955-08-25\\_Flood\\_Relief](https://archive.org/details/1955-08-25_Flood_Relief). Universal Newsreels. In 1976, the films' owner, MCA, made the unusual decision to turn over ownership of all of the newsreels to the National Archives. Public Domain educative material presented as a public service and freely available in [www.archive.net](http://www.archive.net).

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The moment rumors that the Fourth Republic planned to negotiate with the Algerians began to circulate, the military began to question its own loyalty to the government they were pledged to protect. The military saw its already stained reputation, tarnished by a half century of repeated failures, sinking even lower. Winning was everything, no matter how it affected the government. The French navy, without political authorization, stopped ships in international waters it suspected of carrying contraband to the rebels on the open ocean.<sup>5</sup> The government had to then rectify the diplomatic problems caused by such idiotic actions while at the same time assuring allies it was not adding to simmering Cold War tensions. Troop movements from mainland Europe to Africa, including two infantry divisions (approximately 35,000 men) after Russia's suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, continued to occur without government approval.<sup>6</sup> The military was oblivious to France's military and political obligations to NATO. Algeria consumed them.

Negotiations with the rebels accomplished little while the Fourth

Republic remained in power. Any guarantees or gestures made by the government's negotiators carried little appeal when the army initiated a subversive war of immense brutality against the Algerian rebels and their civilian population. Furthermore, the government guarantees for the personal safety of the Algerian leaders should they enter France to negotiate were accompanied by army statements that indicated any Algerian rebels would be arrested the moment they arrived. When deciding to fight a subversive war, the military mistakenly believed it was fighting a similar enemy to the Vietnamese and to win it had to break the will of the Algerian people.<sup>7</sup> To win meant brutality that shocked France's allies and its people. Of note, it was the French army, not Algerian nationalists that exploded the first bomb in a civilian area.<sup>8</sup> A border village between Algeria and Tunisia was bombed in the middle of a market day when the crowds were at their largest. The military leadership informed the government, after the fact, that such brutality was necessary as the town served as a "suspected" transit point for Algerians training in Tunisia to reenter their

country.<sup>9</sup> The military of course didn't consider it had ordered the bombing of a sovereign nation's territory, in this case Tunisia, and that such actions might convince neutral countries to the rebel cause. The U.S. faced a similar situation during the Vietnam War when North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas would escape to Cambodia to avoid the hammer of the U.S. military. The U.S. government ordered enemy forces not to be pursued, even though that decision infuriated the top military commanders. However, they accepted it because it was a decision over their heads. Tunisia, along with Morocco, allowed the rebels to train and receive supplies in their respective countries and provided a haven for rebels attempting to escape the French army and air force.<sup>10</sup> French brutality did not end with such blatant acts of terrorism.

To keep civilians away from rebel influence and to pacify large areas of Algeria, entire villages and regions were relocated, often forcibly. No government approval was ever sought or given. New enemies in Algeria appeared everywhere. No segment of the population escaped French brutality. The viciousness of the rebels against their own people could be forgotten far more quickly than similar acts committed by the French.<sup>11</sup>

As the war entered 1957, no end appeared in sight. The military began to seriously consider an attempt to supplant or even overthrow the government, blaming its own failures on their political leadership. Plans for an airborne descent on Paris were formulated, but

thankfully discarded as more intelligent minds prevailed.<sup>12</sup> The Fourth Republic in closed circles talked of stepping down rather than see their nation plunge into civil war or martial law and turned to their best option: Charles de Gaulle. He was popular with both the government and the military, thus he seemed like the best and most obvious choice. De Gaulle seemingly provided political stability, a clear and concise military mind, and a national hero. Both the government and the military would be immensely disappointed with what followed; they both misjudged the person they believed would help them all.

Perhaps it is only poetic justice that the bright future the French military thought it had guaranteed itself through its support of Charles de Gaulle dissolved almost immediately. They failed to investigate the man they placed in power. Charles de Gaulle was not a man to be controlled by anyone. Almost immediately upon taking control of France's fifth attempt at democratic republicanism he set to work at distancing itself from its latest colonial war, reducing the power of the military, and inserting native Algerians into important posts in their country. De Gaulle's agenda was to make France continental Europe's premiere power and he could not do that so long as France's primary military commitment was in Africa and not in Europe. He made public his commitment to granting Algeria its independence and his distaste for the methods and loyalties of the French military. Therefore, rather

than having its unusual power cemented, the military was reduced to its proper subsidiary role and its leaders retired or demoted. Furthermore, the war they fought so hard to win became an afterthought. The military further disgraced itself when it staged a fruitless coup attempt against President De Gaulle for desiring an end to the Franco-Algerian War. All remaining old leaders were either imprisoned or retired. They paid the price, a price their actions justified.

How did this happen? A lack of accountability. The French military had not earned the right to determine policy in the twentieth century, as defeat after defeat had burdened it with an aura of defeatism that they hoped Algeria would extinguish. They forgot their role, their duty as a nation's military. They owed their allegiance to

the people of France and the people of France had elected the leaders of the Fourth Republic. However, the ultimate responsibility for this disaster rests with the Fourth Republic. They did not rein in the military. Perhaps they received poor reports of what was going on in Algeria; perhaps they were incompetent, at least to a degree. Once realizing what was going on they should have relieved the top commanders, even arrested some of them, and then if need be cut off the financial support the military required to operate. Any of the above required strength within the government and the loyalty of the majority of France. Neither could be counted on. This war demonstrated a military should do what all militaries do, fight and win wars. However, they are still beholden to their political masters.



Viet Minh troops waving Vietnamese flag after defeating the French army at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. This defeat signified the weakness of French colonialism in the post-World War II world and added vigor to their determination to retain Algeria. Source: Vietnam People's Army Museum, first published in 1954 [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Victory\\_in\\_Battle\\_of\\_Dien\\_Bien\\_Phu.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Victory_in_Battle_of_Dien_Bien_Phu.jpg).

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## Notes

- 1 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_160672.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_160672.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed 6/15/2020
- 2 Philip M. Williams, *Wars, Plots and Scandals in Postwar France*, 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- 3 Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962*, 44-50. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1967.
- 4 David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French, Colonialism in Bone, 1870-1920*, 64-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- 5 O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 83.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 52.
- 7 This was the strategy employed by General William Tecumseh Sherman, a Union general, during the American Civil War. The Civil War in some ways is similar to this war, Algeria was considered a part of France by the French, though not by the Algerians. The South saw itself as its own nation and Sherman set out to break that spirit, though never with the degree of brutality employed by the French army against Algeria. Further, Sherman had the full support of the Union government and the President. The



French army acted on its own.

- 8 Germaine Tillion, *France and Algeria*, 146. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.
- 9 O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 91.
- 10 Ibid., 85.
- 11 Russia faced a similar situation in World War II. Having lived for over 15 years under Stalin and his oppression the Germans, when invading, were just as if not more brutal. An opportunity to secure a friendly Russian population was lost.
- 12 Sten Rynning, *Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic, 1958-2000*, 29. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.



## Pericles' Reckless Megarian Policy

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### ABSTRACT

The celebrated achievements of fifth century Athens in the “Age of Pericles” were forever tarnished by the disastrous Peloponnesian War, which pitted respective leagues allied with Athens and Sparta against each other in a twenty-seven-year contest for hegemony that permanently transformed the Classical Greek world. In this assessment, most historians of the era concur. But what was the cause of the war? Traditionally, interpretation has been based upon Thucydides—the Athenian historian whose magisterial chronicle, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, has served as the authoritative primary source for the conflict—but might there be greater nuance in what Thucydides reported and what he may have deliberately omitted? “Pericles' Reckless Megarian Policy Was the Central Cause of the Peloponnesian War” argues that control of Megara, a tiny polis that occupied a critically strategic geography, was the central if unacknowledged Athenian war aim that both sparked the conflict and prolonged it.

**Keywords:** Athens, Sparta, Pericles, Megara, Peloponnesian War, Greece, Classical Greece, Thucydides, Fifth Century BCE, Ancient History

## La imprudente política megariana de Pericles

### RESUMEN

Los célebres logros de la Atenas del siglo V a. C. en la “Edad de Pericles” quedaron empañados para siempre por la desastrosa Guerra del Peloponeso, que enfrentó a las respectivas ligas aliadas con Atenas y Esparta entre sí en una contienda de veintisiete años por la hegemonía que transformó permanentemente a la Mundo griego clásico. En esta evaluación, la mayoría de los historiadores de la época están de acuerdo. Pero, ¿cuál fue la causa de la guerra? Tradicionalmente, la interpretación se ha basado en Tucídides, el historiador ateniense cuya magistral crónica, *La historia de la guerra*

del Peloponeso, ha servido como fuente principal autorizada del conflicto, pero podría haber mayores matices en lo que Tucídides informó y en lo que pudo haber hecho deliberadamente. omitido? “La imprudente política megariana de Pericles fue la causa central de la guerra del Peloponeso” sostiene que el control de Megara, una pequeña polis que ocupaba una geografía críticamente estratégica, fue el objetivo central, aunque no reconocido, de la guerra ateniese que provocó el conflicto y lo prolongó.

**Palabras clave:** Atenas, Esparta, Pericles, Megara, Guerra del Peloponeso, Grecia, Grecia clásica, Tucídides, Siglo V a. C., Historia antigua

## 伯里克利对墨伽拉实行的鲁莽政策

### 摘要

雅典在公元前5世纪“伯里克利时代”所取得的著名成就永远被灾难的伯罗奔尼撒战争所玷污，这场战争让雅典联盟和斯巴达联盟陷入长达27年的霸权之争，后者永远改变了古典希腊世界。从这一点来看，当代大多数史学家是赞同该观点的。不过，造成战争的起因是什么？一般地，相关诠释基于雅典史学家修昔底德的权威编年史《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》（该书一直被视为解释该冲突的权威性主要来源），不过，修昔底德的叙述以及其可能故意省略的部分中是否可能存在更多的细微之处？《伯里克利对墨伽拉实行的鲁莽政策是伯罗奔尼撒战争的关键起因》（Pericles’ Reckless Megarian Policy Was the Central Cause of the Peloponnesian War）一文认为，对墨伽拉这一占据关键战略地形的小城邦的掌控是一个关键的、或许不被认可的雅典战争目标，该目标引起并延长了冲突。

关键词：雅典，斯巴达，伯里克利，墨伽拉，伯罗奔尼撒战争，希腊，古典希腊，修昔底德，公元前5世纪，古代史

By 425 BCE, the Peloponnesian War between the rival alliances of competing hegemon Athens and Sparta was in its sixth year. Pericles—the celebrated leader of Athens in its Golden Age—and perhaps a third of the population he once governed were dead in a devastating plague. Pericles' defensive policy of securing the Athenian population within its impenetrable walls while Sparta sacked the surrounding countryside of Attica had failed. Athens was short on cash; the war was at a stalemate.

That same year, Demosthenes, an Athenian *strategos* (an elected general), managed a surprise victory on the Peloponnesus at Pylos, and trapped hundreds of Spartans on the island of Sphacteria. Remarkably, Sparta sent a delegation to Athens to offer not only general peace terms, but an offensive and defensive alliance in exchange for a cessation of hostilities and a return of the Spartans on Sphacteria. This was an opportunity to end the war before the true horror and brutality that was to follow hardened the hearts of all concerned. Yet the Athenians turned it down.

Thucydides—the exiled general and great Athenian historian whose magisterial chronicle, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, serves as the authoritative primary source for the conflict—reports that Cleon, a leading demagogue whom the historian clearly detested, rejected the opportunity for peace in order to pursue grander goals. Yet a careful read of the text of Thucydides reveals that what Cleon actual-

ly did was to make counterproposals to Sparta that could not be honored: namely a return to the *status quo ante* in the time of Athens's greatest territorial sphere of influence during the heights of what later came to be called the First Peloponnesian War (460 BCE - 445 BCE) when Athens had control of Boeotia, north of Attica, as well as neighboring Megara. Perhaps there were negotiable points here: how much did Sparta really care about Boeotia, the Theban sphere of influence? But this would mean that the Spartans would have to abandon Megara—something that was impossible. As Donald Kagan, arguably the leading historian of the Peloponnesian War in the 21st century, puts it: “The suggestion that the Spartans might have been willing to give up Megara, or at least its harbors, however, was unrealistic . . . to have surrendered Megara would have placed the power of Athens directly on the isthmus and cut Sparta off from . . . central Greece . . . Clearly no such agreement was possible.”<sup>1</sup>

Thucydides suggested there were three direct causes of the Peloponnesian War, but insisted these were little more than pretexts. Instead, he promulgated a kind of doctrine of inevitability and boldly claimed that “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in *Lacedaemon*, made war inevitable.”<sup>2</sup> Still, he describes two of these “direct causes”—the Athenian clash with neighboring Corinth over the former Corinthian colony Corcyra, and the heavy-handed way that Athens dealt with its own ally, Potidaea, another former Corinthian colony—in some

detail. But the third cause he introduced, a kind of trade embargo issued against Megara termed the “Megarian Decree,” received only peripheral treatment, with little emphasis and almost no elucidation, as if it hardly merited discussion.

Thucydides also provided only scant detail on the First Peloponnesian War, the Spartan-Athenian conflict of a generation before, which was detonated by the defection of Megara from the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League to the Athenian-led Delian League.<sup>3</sup> The lack of focus upon the earlier war is striking and conspicuous in its absence, much as if a modern historian chronicling the rise of Hitler in the twentieth century made little reference to the defeat of Germany in the First World War.

This paper rejects Thucydides’ inevitability doctrine and demonstrates that the central cause of the Peloponnesian War can be traced to the conflict over Megara, of which the Megarian Decree was but a device. Most studies of this kind focus primarily upon the Megarian Decree itself and the attendant politics of Pericles in this period. This paper will eschew this approach—this ground has been covered exhaustively by other scholars—and instead devote itself to establishing the centrality of Megara as the vital strategic geography it represented to both sides by resurrecting its focal point in the First Peloponnesian War, where Megara’s status in the competing alliances was a dramatic pivot point. Moreover, it will demonstrate that Pericles’ Megarian policy was a reckless gamble deep-

ly carved upon the ruins of that earlier war—a gamble that was to have catastrophic consequences for Athens and ultimately for the wider Greek world.

Megara was a very small (perhaps, by one estimate, 470 kilometers, or roughly 292 square miles) *polis* located on the Isthmus of Corinth, between the poleis of Athens and Corinth, which due to its strategic geography commanded an importance well out of proportion to its size.<sup>4</sup> N.G. L. Hammond describes it as “built on a barren limestone outcrop.”<sup>5</sup> The soil was indeed poor, and Isocrates once quipped that the Megarians “farmed rocks.”<sup>6</sup> According to Kagan, “The Megarians inhabited a small, infertile plain, with mountains on both ends . . . It could not produce enough grain to feed the 25,000 to 40,000 Megarians, but the highlands had enough vegetation to feed the flocks of sheep that produced Megara’s chief export: coarse, low-priced woolen coats.”<sup>7</sup> Like Corinth but unlike Athens, Megara had ports on both the Corinthian Gulf (Pegae) and the Saronic Gulf (Nisaea), which fostered great wealth in trade relationships, although Hammond notes that Megara “had a less convenient route than Corinth for portage across the Isthmus.”<sup>8</sup> Not unsurprisingly, Megara’s economy was centered on commerce.

Megara’s small size and location between two much greater powers made its security tenuous. Once dominated by Corinth, it established its independence in a war in the seventh century BCE, although not without a crippling loss to Corinth of its southern territory

of fecund, arable land.<sup>9</sup> Historically one of the four districts of Attica, it was nevertheless populated by Dorians rather than the Ionians of neighboring Athens. There was a tradition that Megara was once a part of a kingdom of Attica, yet Megarians spoke a different dialect than the rest of Attica.<sup>10</sup> In the archaic period, Megara was “active in colonization,” a response to over-population, since the war with Corinth had “robbed [them] of territory which was rich in pasture and timber.”<sup>11</sup>

Megara once controlled the important island of Salamis, and decisively defeated the Athenians in their first attempt to seize it, but eventually lost it to Athens in war shortly after 600 BCE.<sup>12</sup> According to Plutarch, both the venerable Solon and Peisistratus (later tyrant of Athens) were involved.<sup>13</sup> Hammond notes that “by 560 Peisistratus secured lasting possession of [Salamis] which was as vital to the future of Athens as the occupation of the southern Megarid was to Corinth. Henceforth Megara remained a small but valiant state, depending for survival upon astute diplomacy.”<sup>14</sup>

Not only Corinth and Athens competed for influence with Megara; so too did Sparta. Megara seems to have joined the loose Spartan confederacy later known as the Peloponnesian League as early as 519 BCE. Sparta may have been involved in the arbitration that finally awarded legal title of Salamis to Athens in 510 BCE, but Megara itself remained well within the Spartan sphere of influence.<sup>15</sup> Notably, Megara joined both the Spartans and the Athe-

nians to combat the Persian invasion in 480 BCE, participating in a famous naval battle at the site of its former possession, the island of Salamis.<sup>16</sup>

Strategically, historians sometimes liken Megara’s geography with Belgium, as both served as a kind of open corridor for invasion.<sup>17</sup> In Megara’s case, it was the “doorway” through which a hoplite levy could pass from the Peloponnesus into Attica to threaten Athens. Hammond underscored that “Its strategic position is important. The main road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese runs through its territory, and it has ports . . . on the Saronic and Corinthian gulf.”<sup>18</sup> Tom Holland describes it as “a narrow and precipitous cornice hacked out of the flanks of coastal cliffs, and effectively the only land route that an army could follow to—or from—the Isthmus.” Holland points out that during the first part of the Persian Wars, when the Spartans contemplated abandoning the Athenians to their fate, they began “demolishing the road to Megara” to forestall Persian invasion from the north.<sup>19</sup>

That same route was also the only way for a land army to invade Athens. A friendly Megara could offer absolute security on land to Athens from this peril, as well as access to a western port on the Corinthian Gulf for both trade and military advantage over any rivals. A hostile Megara was not only a negation of those advantages, but actually an open avenue for invasion from the south. As such, Megara’s strategic location was to play a role of some significance in both the first and the second Peloponnesian

Wars—and this strategic value simply cannot be underestimated. Perhaps Ronald Legon sums it up best:

Since it was impossible to travel by land from northern and central Greece into the Peloponnese without traversing the Megarid, its commercial and strategic importance was considerable. Megara was necessarily involved in all peaceful contacts and hostilities between the Peloponnesian states and the rest of mainland Greece, including a great many situations in which her role has been entirely ignored by historians. The issue constantly before the Megarians was whether to encourage, aid, obstruct, or ignore this traffic, weighing such factors as friendship, profit and security. Conversely, states that had a particular interest in securing safe passage through the Isthmus had also to consider how best to influence the Megarians' behavior, whether through friendship, reward, intimidation, or outright coercion.<sup>20</sup>

As the era that historians have dubbed the *Pentecontaetia* dawned following the defeat of Persia in 479 BCE, Megara was an ally of both Corinth and Sparta in the Peloponnesian League. An alliance of convenience of Athens, Sparta and a limited number of other *poleis*—including Megara—confronted the massive invasion by the Persian Great King Xerxes in 480 BCE that resulted in the sack of Athens. Unlikely victories by the Greeks at Salamis, Pla-

taea and Mycale had by 479 BCE not only soundly defeated the Persians and guaranteed Greek sovereignty, but resulted in independence for most of the Ionian *poleis* on the coast of Asia Minor and left a newly confident Greece in charge of its own destiny, which included enforcing the peace with Persia. Sparta took the lead in this, but a variety of factors led to a kind of passing of the baton to Athens, which formed a wide alliance of *poleis* in the Aegean called the Delian League, although it rapidly evolved into what can only be described as an Athenian Empire, later most blatantly manifested in the arbitrary relocation of the League's treasury from Delos to Athens. Athenian hegemony, based upon sea power, came to rub up against the traditional hegemony of land-based Sparta and its Peloponnesian League, a kind of looser alliance with some history which included Thebes, Corinth—and Megara.

Despite this perhaps unavoidable chafing between the hegemonies, they were rarely in direct conflict with one another, and relations remained friendly, at least outwardly, especially while Cimon—a Spartan admirer and Athenian *strategos* who came to have a dominant political role—held primacy in Athens. This was to change when a devastating earthquake in Sparta provided an opportunity for a *helot* (Spartan state serfs/slaves) rebellion. Cimon led an Athenian contingent to aid the embattled Spartans, only to be turned away by Sparta for reasons that have prompted much speculation, and resulted in the humiliation and eventual ostracism of Cimon, and the rise to power of the



leader of the radical democracy, Ephialtes. When Ephialtes was assassinated in 461 BCE, this leadership passed to his protégé, the *strategos* Pericles, who became the preeminent leader of Athens for years to come and who, unlike Cimon, was no friend of Sparta. Soon, Sparta's insult in sending away Cimon's troops was repaid through the Athenian role in resettling of rebellious Spartan helots in a city on the Corinthian Gulf called Naupactus, where they would have their own polis, ever hostile to Sparta and its allies.<sup>21</sup> According to Thucydides, this move by Athens was a deliberate swipe at Sparta "because of their enmity towards the Spartans."<sup>22</sup>

Relations between Sparta and Athens were thus rather cool when Megara, a long-time Spartan ally and member of the Peloponnesian League, unexpectedly rebelled and joined the Delian League in order to gain advantage in a local quarrel in which Megara, embroiled "in a boundary dispute with Corinth, found themselves getting the worst of the war."<sup>23</sup> According to first century BCE historian Diodorus Siculus, Athenian entry into the conflict tipped the balance of power and was very costly to Corinth, a key Spartan ally.<sup>24</sup> It also ignited the First Peloponnesian War.<sup>25</sup>

The Athenians welcomed Megara into their alliance for both the enormous trade advantage of access to the Corinthian Gulf and the strategic coup of controlling the Megarid. As Kagan duly notes: "Control of the Megarid was of enormous strategic advantage to Athens. It made the invasion of Attica

from the Peloponnese almost impossible; the control of Pegae [the Megarian port on the Corinthian Gulf] made it possible to supply Naupactus and control the Gulf of Corinth without making the long and dangerous voyage around the Peloponnese."<sup>26</sup> Raphael Sealey further underscores that "as long as the Athenians held the Megarid, they were secure against a Peloponnesian invasion of Attica and they were in a strong position to encroach on the Corinthian or on Boeotia."<sup>27</sup> Kagan aptly concludes: "An alliance with Megara would bring security against attack and thereby provide freedom to pursue opportunities wherever they arose."<sup>28</sup> Legon goes even further: "there was hardly a more valuable prize for Athens in all of Greece than Megara."<sup>29</sup>

Athens quickly exploited the opportunities now available to her and devoted a focused effort to maximize these advantages and the strategic gains of controlling Megara. Suddenly, Athenian "troops occupied Megara and Pegae."<sup>30</sup> As classicist Kenneth Harl describes it, "Megara was remodeled as a democracy, the city was fortified, long walls were built between Megara's central city and its port Nisaea [the Megarian port on the Saronic Gulf] comparable to the long walls being built in Athens."<sup>31</sup> Now the Athenians would have control of the Isthmus by turning Megara into a "land island."<sup>32</sup> More ominous for the Spartans perhaps, the Athenians also installed a garrison to secure Nisaea.<sup>33</sup> As Kagan argues, "This could only be interpreted as an act of war against the Spartans. Athens' acceptance of a rebellious ally into the Athe-

nian alliance, her fortification of the vital route between the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece were acts that Sparta could not tolerate.”<sup>34</sup>

The First Peloponnesian War was nothing like its later and greater namesake. For one thing, as Harl observes, “the Athenians fought the Peloponnesians largely as a sideshow in comparison to other operations going on,” notably the ongoing clashes with Persia that saw Athens lending active support to several rebellions in the Persian Empire, including a significant effort to liberate grain-rich Egypt from Persian domination.<sup>35</sup> The Egyptian rebellion was nothing short of “a major commitment.”<sup>36</sup> For another, as Harl stresses, control of Megara gave the Athenians “an overwhelming strategic advantage . . . the Spartans could not invade Attica . . . so Megara’s importance comes out throughout this war.”<sup>37</sup> Thus Athens could do as she would with little fear of invasion, and only a part of her military activities involved the conflict with Sparta.

Despite Athenian focus on its wars within the Persian Empire, Sparta significantly did not do well in its engagements with Athens. Sparta launched a fleet to contest the Athenian hold on Megara, but was decisively beaten, and Athens took control of the island of Aegina, a strategic Dorian ally of Sparta. Now “... the Athenians were free to circumnavigate and raid the Peloponnesian shores.”<sup>38</sup> Later, the Athenians invaded central Greece, and installed democracies that were friendly to Athenian interests. Thus

the Athenian position was very strong, and Sparta had good reasons to worry about the ultimate outcome. Utilizing the western Megarian port at Pegae as a launch point, in 454 BCE Pericles “embarked 1,000 fighting men on 100 . . . ships” and wreaked havoc on the Peloponnese.<sup>39</sup> As Harl emphasizes, “the Peloponnesians found themselves in 457 BC in a hopeless position where they could not wage any kind of effective war . . . and it was only because the Athenians were so busy fighting the Persians that the Athenians did not exploit these advantages and put an army in the Peloponnesus . . . and march directly on Sparta. And the danger that Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies faced is “not to be underestimated.”<sup>40</sup>

A string of Athenian victories was dramatically interrupted by a tactical and strategic disaster in Egypt that doomed its commitment to confrontation with Persia in that theater while spawning a series of rebellions elsewhere: “In 454 the entire Greek force was destroyed, and Egypt was restored to Persian control . . . [which resulted in] serious unrest in the Aegean.”<sup>41</sup> In the course of the long, complicated war, Athens’ fortunes rose and fell, but perhaps the lowest point occurred when a rebellion in Megara in 447/6 BCE overthrew the democratic government friendly to Athens, “butchered” the Athenian contingent, reinstated an oligarchy and returned Megara to the Peloponnesian League—ironically with the assistance of Corinth, the source of the original conflict!<sup>42</sup> According to James McDonald, the massacre of the Athenians “was an extraordinary act

of betrayal which seems to have been contrived to win back the trust of Sparta and Corinth.”<sup>43</sup> The war that began with Megara’s defection to Athens ended with its about-face and return to the Peloponnesian League.<sup>44</sup> “The Megarian barrier blocking the road into Attica had been removed.”<sup>45</sup> Shortly thereafter, Spartan hoplites marched through the strategic Megarian mountain passes and confronted Athens.<sup>46</sup> Plutarch reported that Pericles negotiated a substantial bribe with an advisor of the Spartan king Pleistoanax to avoid hostilities; modern scholars are divided on the authenticity of this account.<sup>47</sup> Whatever the reality, battle was averted, and the treaty of the Thirty Years’ Peace followed in 445 BCE, in which both sides made concessions to end the war. The return of Megara to the Peloponnesian League was integral to that treaty.<sup>48</sup>

The Thirty Years’ Peace had something for both sides. For the Athenians, it was recognition of their position as hegemon and a license to control the poleis in their alliance with impunity. For the Spartans and their allies, it meant that Athens abandoned their budding land empire in Central Greece and returned Megara safely to the fold of the Peloponnesian League. The treaty included arbitration, so in theory future conflicts between the hegemons could be resolved without resort to war.<sup>49</sup>

The peace held for almost fifteen years, a generation of hoplite soldiers, with no serious breach. Meanwhile, the Persian threat diminished. Pericles was elected *strategos* repeatedly and came to occupy a position of prominence in

the democracy far more consequential than that military title implied. He led Athens through what has been termed its “Golden Age,” diverting much of the contributions made by members of the Delian League—ostensibly to combat the Persians—to massive building projects, including the Parthenon. Athens became wealthy and powerful, while Sparta returned to the static, conservative political culture that characterized much of its history, content to not make war far from home lest the helots have another opportunity at uprising.

Rivalries heated up, however, once Athens took some very aggressive steps in 435 - 432 BCE that put them in direct conflict with Corinth, a key Spartan ally. This included intervention in a local affair between Corinth and its former colony Corcyra, and the Athenian heavy-handed behavior towards another former Corinthian colony, Potidaea, which was a member of the Delian League. Yet the most provocative step was a Periclean policy known as the Megarian Decree.

Much has made of the Megarian Decree, yet the particular details of the decree itself are arguably unimportant; rather the decree must be measured by its consequences. Historians are not certain of the precise terms of the decree, nor even exactly when it was legislated, but it appears that it was a trade sanction directed against Megara. In “late 433 or early 432 BC . . . the Athenian assembly on the initiative of Pericles introduced” what can only be described as an economic embargo against the polis of Megara, essentially



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*Pericles' Reckless Megarian Policy*



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banning the Megarians from trading in Athenian markets and ports, as well as any ports belonging to a member of the Delian League.<sup>50</sup> Thucydides barely touched on it, noting only that at the later Spartan assembly to hear grievances against Athens in 432 BCE, “the Megarians called special attention to the fact of their exclusion from the ports of the Athenian empire and the market of Athens,” as well as a brief reference to the later Spartan willingness to back off hostilities if the Athenians revoked it.<sup>51</sup>

Since the Megarian economy was based upon trade and the Athenian Empire that controlled the Aegean would be closed to them under this decree, it would have essentially put Megara out of business, led to severe food shortages, and perhaps even starvation. In short, the decree clearly “threatened economic ruin for the Megarians.”<sup>52</sup> Ian Worthington puts this into a modern perspective, stating that “They were entirely dependant on trade for their livelihood. All of a sudden, not to be allowed to use the hundreds of ports belonging to allies in the Delian League and especially that of Athens . . . would be like closing off the whole of Asia to the USA today.”<sup>53</sup>

The various pretexts for the Megarian Decree included “the Megarians’ cultivation of sacred land claimed by the Athenians, their illegal encroachment upon borderlands, and their harboring of fugitive slaves.”<sup>54</sup> It was also alleged that they murdered an Athenian herald.<sup>55</sup> As E. Badian notes, such disputes with Megara should have been easy to resolve.<sup>56</sup> But a careful analysis

suggests that these alleged affronts were clearly a thin veil to cloak what was a punishing blow to a neighboring polis that came largely unprovoked, and represented some kind of hidden agenda.

Naturally, the Athenians were not fond of the Megarians; the first Peloponnesian War would have been within most adult Athenians’ living memory, and that memory certainly would have included the fact that Megara switched sides and murdered the Athenians garrisoned there—this while Athens was at its weakest point in the war. Megara also contributed ships to the Corinthian side in a recent clash at sea that involved the Athenian navy in the conflict that swirled around Corcyra, but so did other Peloponnesian League members.<sup>57</sup> Megara was part of the Peloponnesian League again under the terms of the Thirty Years’ Peace, and there was little context for the Athenian squeezing of Megara through this unique method of embargo, something that does not seem to appear anywhere prior to this in the ancient world.<sup>58</sup>

All scholars seem to agree that Pericles was the force behind the Megarian Decree, and he was to stubbornly cling to it as the clock ticked towards war with Sparta, but as to his motives and his strategy there has been—and remains—only speculation. Kagan, Eduard Meyer, and many other scholars have often drawn bold lines between the events of the Peloponnesian War and conflicts of the modern era, while also attempting to read “ancient minds” with confidence. As M.I. Finley brilliantly points out: “It is significant that

no two historians who study the causes of the [Peloponnesian War] in that way ever agree, yet they can all quote Thucydides and Aristophanes with equal facility.”<sup>59</sup>

One might also ask, do Pericles' intentions really matter? A minority of historians believe Pericles used the Megarian Decree to deliberately provoke war with Sparta.<sup>60</sup> Kagan represents a view diametrically opposed to this, which holds that the decree was simply a tactic and should not be accorded very much weight.<sup>61</sup> A position between these two extremes seems more likely; that Pericles was not seeking to provoke war but that indeed the Megarian Decree was most consequential in its outbreak. Given this, exactly what Pericles had in mind is not that important—only that he zealously supported the Megarian Decree and even more ardently resisted its repeal, that Sparta viewed it as an act of aggression that could not be tolerated, and what followed was the great Peloponnesian War. In this sense, how Sparta perceived the decree is far more significant than the strategy it was based upon.

Thucydides, who viewed all of the war's direct causes to be simply pretexts for its inevitability, hardly lends weight to the decree at all and barely mentioned it, although according to Harl “the rest of the surviving literary tradition . . . [makes it] . . . clear that the Megarian Decree was one of the major issues in the crisis during the summer of 432 BC which drove the Spartans to war.”<sup>62</sup> Kagan suggests that because Thucydides' thesis was that the war

was inevitable, and because he admired Pericles—and because the populace later blamed Pericles and his Megarian Decree for their wartime suffering—the historian deliberately omitted all but superficial coverage of the decree in his account.<sup>63</sup> Kagan goes so far as to accuse Thucydides of deliberate revisionism; indeed, the title of one of his more recent books is *Thucydides: The Reinvention of History*.<sup>64</sup> Harl concurs, adding that Thucydides essentially glossed over it because the decree “. . . was proposed by Pericles and was regarded as a colossal blunder on the part of Pericles.”<sup>65</sup> Kagan, who also rejects Thucydides' doctrine of inevitability, nevertheless generally admires Pericles; he views Pericles as a centrist figure in the turmoil of Athenian politics, interprets his policies in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War as essentially moderate compromises to keep the peace while protecting Athenian strategic interests, and dismisses the Megarian Decree as little more than a tactic, while acknowledging that its effect upon the Spartan audience was more dramatic.<sup>66</sup>

Other historians are not so sure. “At the very least . . . some see this action by Pericles . . . as a strong warning to Corinth to back off on Corcyra.”<sup>67</sup> Others see it for how it must have seemed at the time: a concerted effort to isolate Megara economically, rock their political world, perhaps force a change in government. Worthington argues that “everyone knew that Pericles' hidden agenda was to force Megara back into the Delian League.”<sup>68</sup> With Megarians starving, what hope would they have but to defect again from the

Spartan bloc and switch once more to an Athenian alliance? “Thus Athens might regain the strategic advantage she held during most of the First Peloponnesian War.”<sup>69</sup> Most significantly, it would put those strategic passes in the Megarid back under Athenian control. Robin Lane Fox is convinced this was indeed the goal: “The aim, surely, was to destabilize the Megarians’ ruling oligarchy indirectly, without actually declaring war. If the Megarians could be turned into a democracy, they might become allies of the Athenians. The . . . [First Peloponnesian War] had shown what a vital strategic ally they could be, as they could block their mountain-passes against Spartan invaders and close the natural route for invasions of Attica.”<sup>70</sup> Harl emphasizes:

In effect, Megara could not trade in the Athenian empire and that meant Megarian ships could not sail to the Black Sea, and this is where Megarian trade interests lay. Without access to Athenian ports, no Megarian ship could ever leave Megara. That would mean that as the spring moved into summer there would be food shortages in Megara. At the very least there would be riots, and possibly a toppling of the government, and the replacement of the oligarchy by a government more friendly to Athens.<sup>71</sup>

If Pericles’ intent was indeed to force Megara into alliance once more, his reckless strategy failed.<sup>72</sup> Predictably, all of this was quite alarming to the Spartans, who “took the precaution

of installing a garrison at Nisaea.”<sup>73</sup> This garrison underscores an earlier notion: how Sparta *perceived* the decree is far more significant than its intent. Perhaps it points to something else, as well. Russell Meiggs adds to the analysis a trenchant argument that most scholars seem to have overlooked, pointing out that “by closing the harbours of the allies to Megarian ships . . . [Athens] was also interfering with the trading interests of those who traded regularly with Megara.”<sup>74</sup> Legon further emphasizes that: “Megara was the main economic link between the Peloponnesian states and the Aegean trading area. Any Athenian action which affected trade adversely could have a major impact on nearby Peloponnesian states.”<sup>75</sup> As Kagan, often an apologist for Pericles, concedes, the Megarian Decree was “a blunder” that “. . . unlike any other Athenian action since 446/45 could be made to appear an act of aggression against a Peloponnesian state.”<sup>76</sup>

With the notable exception of Thucydides, the ancients clearly held Pericles’ promulgation of the Megarian Decree to be directly responsible for the war.<sup>77</sup> Perhaps modern efforts to flesh out the greater complexities of the conflict have moved too far afield to recognize the centrality of this event as the *casus belli*, much as modern scholarly attempts to describe the multiplicity of issues that led to the American Civil War sometimes overlook the absolute centrality of slavery to that struggle.

Thucydides by fact and omission misled his audience about the true nature of the decree, Pericles’ responsibili-



ty for it, and the perception of the Athenian population. But material intended for a different audience, the contemporary satiric comedies of Aristophanes, are often cited as clear indications that the Athenians blamed Pericles for the war, both in *Peace* and especially in *Acharnians*, which describes in some detail the suffering of the Megarian people.<sup>78</sup> Badian notes that “Aristophanes, of course, is being satirical; but the facts on which he bases his satire must be true, since they were known to his audience.”<sup>79</sup> In *Acharnians*, the Megarians are described as on the verge of starvation, and in one notable section of the play, a Megarian is so wretched that he has dressed his daughters up as piglets which he attempts to sell to the protagonist, Dicaeopolis. For perhaps the sake of both comedy and pathos, the “exchange plays on the double sense of . . . χοιρία” the ancient Greek word for piglet, “a staple meat and sacrificial animal”—as well as the vulgar slang for “hairless vulva.”<sup>80</sup> The Megarian, in other words, is beyond desperate; he is willing to sell his daughters as prostitutes in order to feed his family. The hapless Megarian is reduced to this pathetic status by the war that has cut off access to Athenian markets, the same fate the Megarian Decree would have seen him condemned to in other circumstances. It seems clear from this that had Sparta not intervened, Megara would have had little choice to avoid famine but to capitulate to the Athenians to get the decree lifted, which would only have been accomplished through abandoning its affiliation with the Peloponnesian League and joining the Delian League,

as it had in 461 BCE. This, as has been established thus far in this narrative, is something the Spartans could not and would not permit.

With aggressive Athenian behavior in Corcyra and Megara further inflamed by the now besieged Potidaea, the Spartan assembly met to consider war. There were serious grievances all around and Corinth gave these the loudest voice. Although Thucydides again barely touched upon it in his narrative, it was in the final analysis Pericles' Megarian policy that was fundamental to the eventual declaration of war.

Why was the Megarian Decree a central cause of the war? If one was to reject Thucydides' assertion that the war was simply inevitable—as Kagan and many scholars rightly do—then the immediate causes must be carefully examined. Without going into great detail over Corcyra and Potidaea, it is quite unconvincing that Sparta would go to war over these incidents, even if the Spartans were troubled and angry by evident Athenian aggression. The Athenian action in Potidaea was cause enough to bring a Spartan assembly to consider war, but there is little reason to believe Sparta would fight for Potidaea, especially since Athens was not technically violating the Thirty Years Peace; Athens could act as she pleased with her allies, however distasteful that might be. As Worthington acidly sums it up, “the Spartans were pretty much indifferent to the woes of their allies. They really didn't care about them because they weren't being affected about what Athens was doing to Corcyra or Potidaea.”<sup>81</sup>

But Megara was a different story altogether. The Spartans that sat in assembly would have all been over thirty and therefore all would have had a living memory of the First Peloponnesian War. This memory would have to have included the threat to Spartan security and the concomitant impotence Sparta endured when Athens controlled those passes in the Megarid. These Spartans would have to have recalled the frustration of their great land power's inability to invade Attica while Athens the great naval power could act with impunity on the Peloponnesians. It would not have been lost to them that in 432 BCE, Athens was both wealthier and stronger than it had been a generation before, prior to the Thirty Years' Peace, and that this Athens was not engaged in multiple conflicts with the Great King of Persia. Permitting this stronger Athens control of Megara would surely tip the balance further. The Spartans simply could not allow that to happen. With this in mind Harl forcefully concludes that:

all the other issues were secondary and Corinth could never have gotten the Spartans to fight on any of them ... but the Spartans would fight for Megara. And that's because Megara held those strategic passes that allowed the Peloponnesian army movement into Attica and central Greece and the members of the Spartan citizen body who could vote, that is men over the age of 30, remembered very clearly what happened when Sparta lost those passes back in 461 BC.<sup>82</sup>

There was to be a Spartan declaration of war, but actual combat would not break out for a full year; when it did, it was Thebes, the Boeotian ally of Sparta, which drew first blood. If Sparta was eager for war, why the delay? In fact, several attempts to forestall open hostilities with Athens are reported in the sources. One obliquely sought Pericles' exile, while another vaguely called for freedom for the Greeks. But one offer from Sparta appeared quite forthright: abandon the Megarian Decree and there would be no war. Everything else was on the table. As Kagan relates, "This proved to be the most significant grievance of the Peloponnesians, who, in the end, pronounced themselves willing to preserve the peace on the condition that the Athenians withdraw . . . [it]."<sup>83</sup>

Plutarch underscored this: "it seems likely that the Athenians might have avoided war on any of the other issues, if only they had been persuaded to lift their embargo against the Megarians."<sup>84</sup> He then goes on to relate an interesting anecdote that may be apocryphal yet managed to capture the essence of how far Sparta was willing to go to avoid war without relinquishing control of the Megarid to Athens. A Spartan diplomat was said to confront Pericles about the decree, to which Pericles replied that there was "a law which forbade the tablet on which . . . [it] . . . was inscribed to be taken down. 'Very well, then,' one of the envoys . . . suggested, 'there is no need to take it down. Just turn its face to the wall! Surely there is no law forbidding that!'"<sup>85</sup> The message seems clear—simply don't enforce the decree and there will be no war. Final-

ly, as Badian articulates so well, “in the end Sparta was not concerned with her allies interests or even with her own promises, let alone with the strict terms of the Peace, but would have been satisfied with the cessation of Athenian moves against . . . Megara.”<sup>86</sup>

Pericles was immovable. He called for arbitration, as required by the Thirty Years' Peace, but of course the legalistic Athenians through Pericles were careful to frame their provocative actions so as not to violate the letter of the treaty while certainly trampling over the spirit of it.

Pericles remained adamant; there would be no compromise over Megara. In fact, he delivered a forceful oratory that seems to draw a kind of line in the sand over Megara; “I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree” and trumpeting “the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians . . . [lest it lead to] slavery.”<sup>87</sup> This jingoistic hyperbole was effective. The Athenians voted to follow Pericles to war.

Just as scholars cannot be certain what Pericles hoped to gain with the Megarian Decree, there can only be speculation as to why he so fiercely resisted its repeal. Whether he interpreted the Spartan delay in engagement as a sign of hesitation or even weakness, whether he was full of a false confidence based upon the twelfth-hour peace he negotiated back in 446 BCE, whether he fully expected the Spartans to offer a fourth olive branch, whether he simply boxed himself into a corner he could not

emerge from—the result was the same. The Megarian Decree was dangerous to the point of recklessness. It would cost the Athenians thousands of lives, all its treasure, its entire fleet, even its empire, and the world of Classical Greece would be forever altered for the worse by the terrible conflict that it engendered.

In 425 BCE, Sparta sought a treaty with Athens. This peace treaty that never was provides a solid date on a timeline of Megara's relevance to the overall conflict. Another was 461/460 BCE, when Megara's defection from the Peloponnesian League led to the First Peloponnesian War. Still another was 447/446 BCE, marked by the Athenian loss of Megara that permitted Spartan troops to invade Attica and hastened a settlement acceptable to both sides. Finally, there was 432 BCE, when the promulgation of the Megarian Decree brought on the Peloponnesian War. These four dates plotted together seem to point to an inescapable conclusion: Megara was a non-negotiable piece of property Athens coveted and Sparta would not relinquish whatever the costs on each side. Megara was a main cause of the first conflict and its status was a big piece of its settlement. Whatever his strategy, Pericles' reckless gamble with the Megarian Decree became a combustible core that exploded into a conflict that was eventually to destroy him and the Athenian Empire he led.

As for Megara, although it retained its independence and Athens suffered eventual defeat in the war, time would not heal its scars. Fox reports: “More than 500 years later the [Roman] Emperor Hadrian still met memories

of this famous feud. On visiting Megara, he found that, only recently in his reign, the Megarians had been refusing to allow Athenians and their families, ancestral enemies, into their houses.”<sup>88</sup>

Pericles’ Megarian Decree cut quite a deep groove into the history of Hellas.

## Notes

- 1 Donald Kagan, *Thucydides: The Reinvention of History* (New York, NY: Viking, 2009), 126-29.
- 2 Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.1.23, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Free Press, 1996).
- 3 Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 92.
- 4 Ronald P. Legon, *Megara: The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 22.
- 5 N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 12.
- 6 Isocrates, *Speeches*, 8.117
- 7 Donald Kagan, *Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991), 69.
- 8 Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.*, 129.
- 9 Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.*, 135.
- 10 R.J. Hopper. *The Early Greeks* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1977), 60; Maurice Sartre. *Histoires Grecques: Snapshots from Antiquity*, trans. Catherine Porter. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 9; Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.*, 78, 106-07.
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# **Gustav Badin: The Afro-Swedish Experience in Eighteenth Century Sweden**

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## ABSTRACT

In 1760, Queen Lovisa Ulrika (1720-1782) received ten-year-old slave boy Adolf Badin (1750-1822) as a gift. Considering herself an enlightened monarch, Lovisa Ulrika released him from slavery and raised him with her four other children. Badin lived a unique life for an Afro-Swede in eighteenth-century Sweden, embracing his faith and education to find personal meaning. He faced racial discrimination as a person of African descent, but he created a socially and intellectually independent life for himself. Carl Linnaeus's classification of humans and Sweden's participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade reinforced negative rhetoric against Afro-Swedes. Most Afro-Swedes were not in proximity to the royal family, forcing them to navigate Sweden's institutions and culture alone. They faced issues such as poverty and breaking up of the family. This paper sheds light on the Afro-Swedish experience in eighteenth-century Sweden, a long-neglected topic.

*Keywords:* Afro-Swede, Eighteenth Century, African Diaspora, Sweden, Lovisa Ulrika, Enlightenment, Atlantic Slave Trade, Slavery, Learned Societies, St. Barthelemy

# **Gustav Badin: La experiencia afro-sueca en la Suecia del siglo XVIII**

## RESUMEN

En 1760, la reina Lovisa Ulrika (1720-1782) recibió como regalo al niño esclavo de diez años Adolf Badin (1750-1822). Considerándose a sí misma una monarca ilustrada, Lovisa Ulrika lo liberó de la esclavitud y lo crió con sus otros cuatro hijos. Badin vivió una vida única para un afro-sueco en la Suecia del siglo XVIII, abrazando su fe y educación para encontrar el significado de la persona. Se enfrentó a la discriminación racial como persona de ascendencia africana, pero se creó una vida social e intelectualmente indepen-

diente. La clasificación de Carl Linnaeus de los seres humanos y la participación de Suecia en el comercio atlántico de esclavos reforzó la retórica negativa contra los afro-suecos. La mayoría de los afro-suecos no estaban cerca de la familia real, lo que los obligaba a navegar solos por las instituciones y la cultura de Suecia. Se enfrentaron a problemas como la pobreza y la ruptura de la familia. Este artículo arroja luz sobre la experiencia afro-sueca en la Suecia del siglo XVIII, un tema olvidado durante mucho tiempo.

**Palabras clave:** Afro-sueco, Siglo XVIII, Diáspora africana, Suecia, Lovisa Ulrika, Ilustración, Trata atlántica de esclavos, Esclavitud, Sociedades eruditas, San Bartolomé

## 古斯塔夫·巴丁：非裔瑞典人在18世纪瑞典的经历

### 摘要

1760年，路易莎·乌尔莉卡女王（1720-1782）收到了作为礼物的10岁奴隶男孩阿道夫·巴丁（1750-1822）。作为一名受启蒙运动影响的君主，路易莎·乌尔莉卡免去了他的奴隶身份并将他和自己的四个子女一同抚养。作为一名18世纪瑞典的非裔瑞典人，巴丁的生活是独特的，他拥护他的信仰和教育去发现人的价值。他因非裔血统而遭受过种族歧视，但他为自己创造了从社会和智力上都独立的生活。卡尔·林奈对人的分类以及瑞典在大西洋奴隶贸易中的参与加强了关于非裔瑞典人的负面言论。大多数非裔瑞典人都不曾接近过皇室家庭，他们不得不独自在瑞典制度和文化中漂泊。他们面临诸如贫困和家庭分离等问题。本文阐述了一个长期被忽视的主题—非裔瑞典人在18世纪瑞典的经历。

关键词：非裔瑞典人，18世纪，非裔移民，瑞典，路易莎·乌尔莉卡，启蒙运动，大西洋奴隶贸易，奴隶制，学会，圣巴泰勒米岛

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**O**n July 4, 1775, Gustaf Lundberg, the court portrait painter, finished his painting of Adolf Ludvig Gustav Fredrik Albert Badin, known simply as Badin (1750-1822). Badin holds up a white knight to cele-

brate his win in the game of chess, expressing his intelligence. His portrait hangs in the National Museum located in Stockholm alongside paintings of the Swedish royal family and aristocracy, but he stands out as a person of Afri-

can descent. Badin's portrait expresses an African presence in eighteenth-century Sweden, a topic rarely addressed. Old and modern pieces about Badin portrayed him as a wild buffoon who required an Enlightened education to calm and civilize. These pieces perpetuate the stereotype of the African savage, fixed by European civilization, while disregarding the writings he left behind. His writings express a self-aware man who knew that his black skin placed him at the bottom of the social hierarchy, but he worked within Swedish social constraints to pursue intellectual and social independence. Nothing about eighteenth-century Swedish society promised an Afro-Swede financial or political security, but he had the advantage of having a close relationship with the royal family. Most Afro-Swedes brought to Sweden from the West Indies or Africa did not share this advantage, remaining silent voices hidden away in the state archives. Badin's writings and old records provide glimpses into Afro-Swedish experiences in the eighteenth century.

In 1750, Badin was born into slavery in the Danish colony of St. Croix with the name of Couschi after his maternal grandmother's brother. His father was named Andris, his mother Narzi, and his brother Coffi, and they belonged to the Danish Governor of St. Croix Christian Lebrecht von Pröck (1718-1780). According to Lars Wikström, Pröck returned to Europe in 1758 with the eight-year-old Badin and handed him off to the Danish businessman Gustaf De Brunck. Brunck travelled from Denmark to Stockholm with Badin,

presenting him as a gift to the Swedish Royal Court in 1760.<sup>1</sup> Queen Lovisa Ulrika of Prussia (1720-1782) considered herself an Enlightened monarch and sought to apply the new values of the time on herself and the people around her. She welcomed him as a gift, released him from slavery, and raised him along her four other children, which included the future kings Gustavus III (1746-1792) and Charles XIII (1748-1818). During his voyage to Sweden, he earned the name Badin from his playful antics, which means playful and light-hearted in French. It became his permanent name in Sweden.<sup>2</sup>

Lovisa Ulrika stayed current with European literature and in 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) published *Emile, or On Education*. Rousseau argued that formal education for small children should be avoided because it hampered them with useless knowledge. History, language, and geography taught children places and concepts useless to their current development. Instead, he advocated for an upbringing free of constraints, providing them an opportunity to learn about the world through their own experiences.<sup>3</sup> In the teenage years, he agreed that formal education was valuable if it followed the individual student's interests. Students who studied their own interests would explore related subjects, broadening their horizons.<sup>4</sup> Lovisa Ulrika applied Rousseau's teachings to Badin's upbringing, giving him complete freedom of the castle and his behavior. Most biographical accounts of Badin in the last two centuries highlighted Lovisa Ulrika's so-called Rousseauian ex-

periment on him, portraying him as a wild savage. In the Nordic Family Book of 1876, the author described Badin as an undisciplined child that lacked self-control. His absurd behavior forced the queen to instill a proper Christian education to civilize him.<sup>5</sup> Fast-forward to 2001, Edvard Matz wrote an article about Badin titled “Badin – an experiment in a free upbringing,” again highlighting him as an experiment.<sup>6</sup> Badin never went into detail about his upbringing, only acknowledging that Rousseau’s philosophy had a major impact on it.<sup>7</sup>

As a ten-year-old boy, Badin faced the challenge of learning a new country’s culture and customs without the support of his family. Moreover, he understood that he was in a position of servitude to the royal family, so he had to figure out how to survive in this foreign environment alone. Lovisa Ulrika allowed Badin to wander and act as he pleased, giving rise to a plethora of childhood antics that entertained the royal family and their guests. Anders Lindeberg described how Badin ran around the dinner table and took food from the plates, causing the guests to laugh. In another instance, Badin jumped out of a large pie on the table to everyone’s great surprise.<sup>8</sup> On the surface, Badin seemed like a wild child, but the positive attention reinforced it as an effective survival strategy. They wanted an entertainer and he performed his role to perfection. Eventually, Lovisa Ulrika decided that it was time for Badin to receive a proper Christian education, enforce discipline, and encourage politeness.

As previously mentioned, biographical accounts of Badin blamed his undisciplined nature for her decision. However, one must note that Rousseau agreed with the idea of a formal education in the teenage years, so it is possible that she thought that Badin was ready for the next stage of development. She appointed Nathanaël Thenstedt (1731-1808), a Swedish preacher, to instruct Badin in Christian doctrine, reading and writing, and basic subjects. Thenstedt tutored Badin from 1763 to 1768, with it ending in his baptism in the chapel of Drottningholm Palace on December 11, 1768. The royal family, except for Duke Karl, attended Badin’s baptism.<sup>9</sup> He received the full name of Adolf Ludvig Gustav Fredrik Albert Badin, based off the names of the royal family. As a man of eighteen, he shocked officials with his transformation, who described him as pious, friendly, and benevolent. They believed that reflection and reason showed Badin the errors of his ways, leading him to the righteous decision of reforming his behavior. With his change, he earned the complete trust and affection of Lovisa Ulrika, remaining in her favor until her death.<sup>10</sup> In reality, Badin understood that the social expectations of him changed, so he had to modify his behavior to fit the new expectations. Modifying his behavior opened opportunities for him to exert his own independence; however, those who failed in their roles faced incredible hardships.

According to records, Richard Abrahamsson was born in Boston in 1764. In 1787, he received baptism, with regimental officers and Duke Karl,

the future Charles XIII, as witnesses. It is not clear when or who he came to Sweden with, but it is assumed that he directly entered military service. Richard served under Duke Karl's Life Regiment Hussars, most likely tending to the horses.<sup>11</sup> In June 1788, Gustav III attacked Russia, starting the Gustav III's Russian War. King Gustav III wanted to regain lost territory from Russia, but the two-year long war ended without results. Richard served on the 1788 campaign. After the war he served as a trumpeter for the same regiment, but an accident ended his military career. On November 28, 1808, Richard fell off his horse during a parade and broke his leg. Officials dismissed him from the military the following year. With an uncertain future he managed to become a servant for Gerhard Lovisin, but his financial situation turned precarious, forcing him to apply for a military pension in 1817. In his application, he described his current circumstances and his prior military service. The government denied his request, citing he could not prove his age as a "negro" and was not injured in battle. Instead, he received some financial support from a charity.<sup>12</sup> In poverty, he struggled to support his family.

When he arrived to Sweden his designated social role was in the military, providing him a form of security with finances, housing, and other necessities. Through no fault of his own, his riding accident prevented him from carrying out his social expectations. At the time, there were no laws that offered Afro-Swedes or other minorities protection against discrimination or



Adolf Ludvig Gustav Albert Badin-Couschi, 1750-1822, painted by Gustaf Lundberg. National Museum in Stockholm.

guaranteed assistance in hard times. Charities offered some support to Afro-Swedes, but they were not a secure form of income. Queen Ulrika Elenora (1688-1741) supported an unnamed Afro-Swedish child living in an orphanage, but the valuable support lasted only if the benefactor wished. Without support, poverty persisted.<sup>13</sup> In France, the Afro-French had a high enough population in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to participate in French politics, exerting pressure for change. High profiled Afro-French such as Louis Houat (1809-1883) had enough influence to sway public opinion towards the abolition of slavery.<sup>14</sup> Even though the exact number is not known of how many Afro-Swedes arrived in Sweden in the eighteenth century, it

was never high enough to exert political influence to improve their conditions. Without the security of a benefactor or the military, it forced the Afro-Swede to fend for themselves, leading to poverty and an uncertain future.

In the eighteenth century, marriage was an important part in securing the wealth and future of both families. Unmarried women remained under male guardianship, who acted on her behalf in marriage negotiations. Parents of the bride paid large dowries in the form of livestock, money, land, or other items to financially secure their daughters if their husbands died. Husbands had the right to use the dowry as they saw fit, so it was vital for parents to find a responsible husband. Negotiations occurred between families, with the union sanctioned by the church. Moreover, parents sought prospective partners for their children within the same social class to grow their wealth. Landowning Swedes preferred for their children to marry into other landowning families, discouraging their children from marrying landless partners.<sup>15</sup> Outside of their benefactor or the military, most Afro-Swedes had little to no wealth to bring with them into the marriage, making them poor marriage prospects.

Without some form of wealth, their families and future generations started off with a financial disadvantage. Their vulnerable circumstances had the potential to breakup families, forcing their children into the orphanages. Originally from Jamaica, Karl Wilhelm Spirman joined the Swedish military

in 1784 and served under Dark Karl with Richard. In 1794, military officials dismissed Spirman from military service, placing his family on hard times.<sup>16</sup> His daughter Christina Wilhelmina Spirman ended up in the orphanage between 1802 and 1805, labeled as a “mulatto.”<sup>17</sup> Richard’s daughter Anna Carolina Abrahamsson entered the orphanage in 1800.<sup>18</sup> Afro-Swedish women faced similar hardships. Eva Johanna was born off the coast of Guinea in 1785, and most likely came to Sweden by Lars Reimers, a shareholder in the West Indian Company.<sup>19</sup> On July 10, 1812, she married an officer in the Life Regiment Hussars named Johan Petter Borgström. Johan’s military records indicated they had one son together named Frans Joseph in 1813, and they moved to Stockholm in 1816 after he finished his military service.<sup>20</sup> It is not clear what happened after Johan left the military, but Frans ended up in the orphanage between 1817 to 1822, labeled as a “mulatto.” In his records, the orphanage official remarked that a military officer named Gustaf Kulberg took Frans and was treating him well.<sup>21</sup> Again, it is not clear when Johan died, but Stockholm records listed Eva as a bricklayer’s widow living alone in 1830.<sup>22</sup> In stark contrast, Badin asked Gustav III for permission to marry Elizabeth Svart in 1782. Gustav III agreed to the marriage and gave him three royal farms to manage. Elizabeth died in 1798, and then Badin remarried to Magdalena Eleonora Norell in 1799. After Badin’s death, Magdalena found financial security through Badin’s work on the farms and the Masonic Order.<sup>23</sup>



Badin's only child died in infancy, but the contrasting experiences shows the significance of the family's need for a secure source of income within Swedish institutions.

For the early Afro-Swedish men, the records suggest that they had to receive royal approval for their marriages. For example, Richard received royal permission from Duke Karl to marry his first wife Anna Maria Lustig in 1793. Badin asked Gustav III for permission. Even though the royal family permitted mixed marriages, these marriages were not without criticism. Peter Watkins Montese, an Afro-Swedish servant to Lovisa Ulrika, married Lovisa Sundberg with the queen's approval. Church officials acknowledged they could not dismiss the marriage based on incurable diseases or differences in religion. However, they worried that mixed marriages would produce dulled offspring, tainting future generations.<sup>24</sup>

Even though race-based sciences came to prominence towards the twentieth century, their foundation potentially stemmed from Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus's (1707-1778) classification system. By the eighteenth century, scholars moved away from religious to natural history, collecting information and specimens domestic and abroad. These scientific ventures flooded academia with new knowledge, and scholars needed a new method to universally express these ideas.<sup>25</sup> In *Systema Naturae*, Linnaeus formulated a classification system for thousands of plants and organisms based on classes and orders, with descriptions of characteristics.

His tenth edition, published in 1758, expanded the classification system to humans. He created four categories of humans: Americanus, Europaeus, Asiaticus, and Africanus, based on physical traits, behavior, clothing, and form of government. He described Europeans as intelligent and inventive, adhering to laws. On the other hand, he regarded Africans as lazy and neglectful, who governed themselves with their instincts rather than laws.<sup>26</sup> In 1807, Carl Thunberg (1743-1828), a student of Linnaeus, described Europeans as enlightened and Africans as ignorant in a speech celebrating Linnaeus's centenary birthday.<sup>27</sup> Lovisa Ulrika and Linnaeus shared a common social circle of academics and officials, who expressed these sentiments about European exceptionalism.

As a young man, Badin most likely encountered such academic discourse because of his proximity to the queen. Dated the 1760s, Jean Eric Rehn drew a picture of the French sculptor Pierre Hubert l'Archevêque sculpting Lovisa Ulrika's bust, with Jean Beylon (1717-1779) standing next to the queen. Badin peeks out behind Pierre with a mischievous expression, preparing for another one of his antics.<sup>28</sup> Rehn's portrayal of Badin expressed his unruly reputation of the time, but it also showed his wide exposure to art and academic discourse. Lovisa Ulrika devoted a large amount of her time learning and reading. She hired Jean Beylon to read books out loud and to discuss the authors' ideas with her. He sought to develop her understanding of the literature. Like Badin, he was close

to the queen, accompanying her on her travels, living on the royal estates, and eating meals with her.<sup>29</sup> Badin most likely heard parts of these readings and conversations. Despite the negative rhetoric he encountered, Badin embraced the arts and sciences throughout his life.

When Afro-Swedes travelled to Sweden, they most likely did not receive any formal education, and it is difficult to determine whether most learned basic reading and writing. Badin received a proper education, learning to read and write French and Swedish fluently, and these skills created opportunities for him. According to Shelby McCloy, some African slaves travelling from America to France aspired to learn French because it allowed them to acquire Western thought and culture. Freed Africans in France with linguistic skills were part of the political discourse, expressing their thoughts in poetry and published articles.<sup>30</sup> They had the ability to absorb information around them in the dominant language, and then express their opinions in written works, adding to the public discourse. Their work provided a voice for the Afro-French community, while highlighting independent thought. In Badin's case, his linguistic skills allowed him to take part in Swedish discourse and cultural activities such as the theater. King Adolf Fredrik (1710-1771) and Lovisa Ulrika adored the theater, so they employed a French theater company to perform for the royal court. The Royal French Troupes remained active in Stockholm from 1753 to 1771, and their records listed Badin

as one of their dancers.<sup>31</sup> In 1770, he played the main role in Delisle de la Drevetier's *Arlequin Sauvage*, a popular comedy in the eighteenth century. Badin played Arlequin, a "noble savage" brought to Europe by the wealthy Lelio. Throughout the play, Arlequin repeatedly misunderstood French customs and culture, finding them unreasonable and unnatural.<sup>32</sup> His audience applauded his performances. The royal family, his benefactors, sponsored these plays, so scholars could argue he was coerced into these performances. On the other hand, his writings and actions suggested that cultural activities were an outlet for self-expression and reflection.

After Lovisa Ulrika died in 1782, Badin married and received three royal farms from Gustav III, providing an opportunity for him to leave court life. He managed his farms, while pursuing his cultural interests. When he died in 1822, Badin left behind a rich book collection, consisting of almost 900 books in French, Swedish, Latin, and English. The books were about history, religious studies, natural history, and travelogues.<sup>33</sup> He underlined and made notes throughout his books, suggesting he was a meticulous reader. In his bible, Badin wrote, "He [Badin] was born among the slaves, walked among them, but when the Light turned on he wished to die a free death."<sup>34</sup> He wrote that statement followed up with a note about his baptism, suggesting that the Light referred to his acceptance of God. However, it should be noted that he had to complete his formal education before receiving his baptism. During his education, he honed his linguistic skills and

learned European culture and thought, providing him the skills he needed to assimilate into society. Moreover, he had the freedom to search for personal truth and meaning, a freedom that other Afro-Swedes did not enjoy. For instance, he underlined the following passage in his bible,

My tent is destroyed;  
All its ropes are snapped.  
My children are gone from me and  
are no more;  
No one is left now to pitch my tent  
Or to set up my shelter.<sup>35</sup>

Carl Forsstrand argued that this passage reflected Badin's memory of his family's hut burning down when he was a child.<sup>36</sup> Taken from his family at a young age, Badin was not there to rebuild the family home or improve their prospects. What happened to his family after he left was not known, but it seemed like he used his faith to reflect on it. As a Christian, Badin found meaning and purpose in his faith. In his journal, he wrote,

When I felt that I was a body; I wanted to know for what I was destined, I found out, that it was not for myself. I wanted to know, for whom I was destined! That was when I felt inside of me, that I was here for my God. For my king, my neighbor, and to help my enemies.<sup>37</sup>

Badin believed that he was alive to serve God's will and help others, but he also had a keen interest in intellectual pursuits. Later in life, Badin joined several

learned societies that promoted these two guiding principles.

During the eighteenth century, Enlightenment philosophes applied reason to the study of philosophy, sciences, history, and other subjects, leading to the creation of learned societies such as the Freemasons. Learned societies consisted primarily of intellectually curious men, who met to discuss topics of interest, and they had more of a social function than advancing the sciences.<sup>38</sup> Badin was a seeker of knowledge and truth, and he joined the Freemasons and Par Bricole to explore philosophical ideas with other like-minded individuals. In his journal, he wrote,

Through the mighty prevailing, controlling, the wise went to the sea = (in our hearts) that is how we can have education about land, and get knowledge, are able to guard ourselves (our outer and inner five senses) from arising reasons, and hidden reasons, which we do not spot because of self-confidence (the trust in ourselves), with the conscience, indefatigably our marches through, the humming of the world.<sup>39</sup>

Badin advocated for strong leadership within the learned societies because proper leadership pushed the boundaries of the sciences and arts, leading to new knowledge. Knowledge protected the self from harmful reasoning, while allowing individuals to self-reflect and correct faulty reasoning. In his autobiography to the Par Bricole Society, Badin wrote that his life resembled that of a wild animal between 1762 to

1771, until it was “corrected.”<sup>40</sup> After Adolf Frederik died in 1771, Lovisa Ulrika travelled to Berlin with Badin, where he planned to begin his studies in astronomy. Eventually, they returned to Sweden. It is difficult to determine what he meant by “corrected” but it is possible he meant his intellectual evolution, with his advanced studies and order memberships. Moreover, Badin deeply cared about his learned societies and their activities, donating crops and money to their causes. For instance, the Order of the Carpenters established a hospital in 1796 to celebrate Gustaf IV Adolf’s (1778-1837) coming-of-age, and Badin donated wheat and barley to the hospital.<sup>41</sup> Learned societies had a special place in Badin’s life, with the societies treating him well, but he did face discrimination from some members.

Badin joined the Order of Neptune, founded in Stockholm in 1812, but he did not remain a member long. Two members harassed him, with one hitting him in the head, thinking he was a slave. Badin reported that they took him by the arms, shouting at him to leave, and he understood the abusive treatment stemmed from his skin color. According to Lars Wikström, Badin held no personal resentment against his attackers, especially in his advanced years.<sup>42</sup> In his journal, he wrote about another incident that clearly bothered him. He wrote,

Together with my wife and my sister-in-law. We arrived at the building, that is called Drottningholmslott’s residence; I went into the room, that is on the opposite

side of the gateway, in this room, is a maid ... This maid, took from a glass of beer, beer into a bottle, in which there was for her, the drink that I got, this, I said, do not give me, this kind of drink, for I know, that it is often made on the spot. She answered; such things she does not do, I believe that, I guess, was my answer, but, I am only asking, that I am not served it. Upon which she immediately became, insolent, and gave me one word after another, which was impolite, I asked her not to be insulting; she said, that her hostess could not induce her, to be polite.<sup>43</sup>

Lovisa Ulrika raised Badin in Drottningholm’s Palace, so he had intimate knowledge of the palace’s inner workings. Eric Basir suspected the maid was young, who did not know the Afro-Swede was a noble or a former resident.<sup>44</sup> Eighteenth-century Sweden offered no protection against discrimination for Afro-Swedes, so they had to navigate through a society that placed them low on the social hierarchy. Sweden’s scientific beliefs and active role in the Atlantic Slave Trade reinforced the Afro-Swedes’ low social standing.

Compared to countries such as Portugal and the Netherlands, Sweden played a minor role in the Atlantic Slave Trade, but Swedish participation had a major impact on private Swedish opinions towards those of African descent. In 1784, Gustav III acquired St. Barthelemy from France and established the island as a freeport. By 1808, Britain

and America banned the importation of slaves to their respective territories; however, British and American slave traders continued their operations under a neutral Swedish flag.<sup>45</sup> Swedish merchants that arrived in St. Barthélemy learned of the lucrative profits of the slave trade, changing their minds on slavery when confronted with it. Herman Broberg wrote a letter to the Swedish West Indian Company in 1797, suggesting they equipped ships to transport slaves from Africa to the Caribbean. He claimed that the slaves did not want to go back to Africa, justifying that slavery improved their lives, without regarding the horror the trips entailed for the Africans.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, Swedish officials on the island owned slaves. They encouraged slavery because it stimulated other parts of the island's economy. Unlike Sweden, St. Barthélemy was multi-national, with a diverse population of slaves, freed persons, and persons of mix-heritage. Swedish officials applied the French law of *Le Code Noir* that regulated the treatment of slaves by their masters.<sup>47</sup> Merchants and officials rarely brought their wives and children to the colony because they planned to return home to Sweden.<sup>48</sup> As in the case of Broberg, his experience in the Caribbean changed his opinion in favor of slavery. They returned home with their experiences reinforcing the lower social standing of those of African descent. From personal experience, Badin was aware that as an Afro-Swede he was low in the social hierarchy, but he pursued an independent social and intellectual life to uplift himself.



Pierre Hubert l'Archevêque Sculpts Queen Lovisa Ulrika, 1760s, drawing by Jean Eric Rehn. National Museum in Stockholm.

Badin died on March 18, 1822, with his remains presumably laid to rest in Katarina's Cemetery in Stockholm. However, a survey of the graveyard in 1836 did not list his name, so the location of his grave is not known.<sup>49</sup> Born into slavery, Badin made it clear he wanted to live as a freeman, shaping his own life by his own will. As an Afro-Swede, he struggled to find an answer to his problem in a foreign culture and land, but he found his answers in his faith and education. His education opened philosophical thought and subjects he could explore and reflect upon, shaping his mind to how he wanted. After Lovisa Ulrika died, Badin moved away from court to live an independent life as a farmer, with his own family. He remained in contact with

his royal benefactors, receiving money and letters from them, but he worked hard to create a life of his own within the constraints of society. Despite racial discrimination, he broadened his horizons through reading and joined learned societies, where he discussed various subjects with other learned men. Badin was known to overzealously wear his Masonic uniform in public, suggesting a man proud to be a part of such a group.<sup>50</sup> Even with the social constraints, he managed to carve out a place for him and his family, while pursuing intellectual activities that gave him meaning and purpose. Badin lived a unique life for an Afro-Swede in eighteenth-century Sweden, but he faced

issues of racial discrimination that applied to all Afro-Swedes.

Swedish merchants and officials brought Afro-Swedes to Sweden, forcing them to learn a foreign country's language and culture, while limiting their access to a basic education of writing and reading. Their employment opportunities were limited, forcing them into poverty and relying on charities for financial support. Moreover, poverty tore families apart, with mixed children ending in orphanages. This study explored some of the issues surrounding Afro-Swedes in the eighteenth century, but more scholarly research is needed to bring out their neglected history.

## Notes

- 1 Lars Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi: Ett Sällsamt Levnadsöde," *Släkt och Hävd*, no. 1 (April 1971): 275. Most biographical accounts of Badin states that Anders von Resier brought him to Sweden, but Lars Wikström argued that Brunck did. Wikström is the only scholar to research Badin in depth, so his work was cited here.
- 2 Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi," 276.
- 3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. Barbara Foxley (Delhi: Lector House, 2019), 87-96.
- 4 Rousseau, *Emile*, 389-390.
- 5 C. Eichhorn, *Nordisk Familjebok* (Stockholm: Gernandts boktryckeri-aktiebolag, 1876), 1427-1428.
- 6 Edvard Matz, "Badin – ett experiment i fri uppfostran," *Populär Historia*, March 15, 2001, accessed April 21, 2021, <https://popularhistoria.se/sveriges-historia/1700-talet/badin-ett-experiment-i-fri-uppfostran>.
- 7 Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi," 276.
- 8 Anders Lindeberg, *Svensk National-kalender* (Stockholm: LJ Hierta, 1839), 226.

- 9 Carl Forsstrand, *Sophie och Hennes Samtida* (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1911), 125.
- 10 Lindeberg, *Svensk National-kalender*, 229.
- 11 Arvid Bergman, *Född Slav-Död Fri: Richard Abrahamsson och Tidigt Anlända Afrikaners Öde* (Stockholm: Stockholmia Förlag, 2018), 23-24.
- 12 Bergman, *Född Slav-Död Fri*, 25-27
- 13 Carl Grimberg, *Svenska Folkets Underbara Öden* (Stockholm: Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1922), 338.
- 14 Shelby McCloy, *The Negro in France* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1961), 255.
- 15 Christer Lundh, "Swedish Marriages: Customs, Legislation and Demography in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Lund Papers in Economic History* 88 (2003): 4, 21-23, accessed April 23, 2021, <https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/files/4646132/4407066.pdf>
- 16 Bergman, *Född Slav-Död Fri*, 58-59.
- 17 Allmänna barnhuset nr. 3548, 1802, <https://riksarkivet.se/allmanna-barnhusets-arkiv>, Stockholm City Archive.
- 18 Barnhus I Stockholm 1713-1802, ID 978, 1800, <https://www.rotter.se/faktabanken/barnhus/?view=listmanagerfront>, Rötter Database.
- 19 Bergman, *Född Slav-Död Fri*, 84.
- 20 "Borgström Johan Petter," <https://soldat.elektronikhuset.it/soldatregister/dbrecord.sv.aspx?id=176022>, Central Soldier Register.
- 21 Allmänna barnhuset nr. 4283, 1816, <https://riksarkivet.se/allmanna-barnhusets-arkiv>, Stockholm City Archive.
- 22 Överståthållarämbetet för uppbördsärenden, 1830, SE/SSA/0031/06/G 1 BA/G 1 BA:29/11 (1830), ID: A0057198\_00099, [https://sok.riksarkivet.se/bildvisning/A0057198\\_00099](https://sok.riksarkivet.se/bildvisning/A0057198_00099).
- 23 Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi," 306.
- 24 Bergman, *Född Slav-Död Fri*, 85-86.
- 25 Chris Evans, "Where in the World was Sweden? A Brief Guide for Foreigners," in *Sweden in the Eighteenth-Century World*, ed. Goran Ryden (London: Routledge, 2016), 52.
- 26 Carl Linnaeus, *Systema Naturae 10<sup>th</sup> Edition* (Stockholm: Impensis Direct, 1758), 20-22.
- 27 Carl Peter Thunberg, *Tal vid Invignings-Acten* (Uppsala: Johan Fredrik Edman, 1807), 38-39.

- 28 Jean Eric Rehn, *Pierre Hubert l'Archevêque porträtterar drottning Lovisa Ulrika, 1760s*, drawing, National Museum, Stockholm, <http://collection.nationalmuseum.se/eMP/eMuseumPlus?service=ExternalInterface&module=collection&objectId=181598&viewType=detailView>.
- 29 Riksarkivet, "Jean Francois Beylon," accessed April 23, 2021, <https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/Mobil/Artikel/18149>.
- 30 McCloy, *The Negro in France*, 4, 138.
- 31 Fredrik August Dahlgren, *Förteckning Öfver Svenska Skådespel Uppförda på Stockholms Theatrar 1737-1863 och Kongl. Theatrarnes Personal 1773-1863 med Flera Anteckningar* (Stockholm: Norstedt & Söner, 1866), 38-42, 572.
- 32 Kim Solga, "The Savage Ambivalence of Delisle de la Drevetière," *The Eighteenth Century* 43, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 197-198, accessed April 24, 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41467904>.
- 33 Carl Forsstrand, *Sophie Hagman och Hennes Samtida* (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1911), 137.
- 34 Forsstrand, *Sophie Hagman och Hennes Samtida*, 137.
- 35 Jeremiah 10:20 (NIV)
- 36 Forsstrand, *Sophie Hagman och Hennes Samtida*, 137.
- 37 Gustav Badin, *Badin's Diary: An English Translation*, trans. Sandra Gustafsson (Research Triangle, NC: Lulu Press, 2015), 138.
- 38 Bernard Fay, "Learned Societies in Europe and America in the Eighteenth Century," *The American Historical Review* 37, no. 2 (Jan1932): 260, accessed April 24, 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1838210>.
- 39 Badin, *Badin's Diary*, 90.
- 40 Joachim Östlund, "Playing the White Knight: Badin, Chess, and Black Self-Fashioning in Eighteenth Century Sweden," in *Migrating the Black Body: The African Diaspora and Visual Culture*, ed. Leigh Raiford and Heike Raphael-Hernandez (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017), 71-91.
- 41 Claës Lundin and August Strindberg, *Gamla Stockholm: Anteckningar ur Tryckta och Otryckta Källor* (Stockholm: Jos. Seligmann & C:is Förlag, 1882), 434.
- 42 Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi," 302-303.
- 43 Gustav Badin, *Badin's Diary: An English Translation*, 94-96.
- 44 Eric Basir, *Badin's Diary: An English Translation* (Research Triangle, NC: Lulu Press, 2015), 96.



- 45 Holger Weiss, *Slavhandel och Slaveri Under Svensk Flagg* (Helsingfors, Finland: Svenska litteratursällskapet, 2016), 209-210.
- 46 Weiss, *Slavhandel och Slaveri Under Svensk Flagg*, 124.
- 47 Herman Lindqvist, *Våra Kolonier* (Riga, Latvia: Livonia Print, 2015), 202.
- 48 Weiss, *Slavhandel och Slaveri Under Svensk Flagg*, 73.
- 49 Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi," 305-306.
- 50 Wikström, "Fredrik Adolph Ludvig Gustaf Albrecht Badin-Couschi," 300.

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# **Sir Walter Scott and the Reinvention of Scottish Identity**

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## ABSTRACT

Following the turbulent acquisition of Scotland, the new United Kingdom struggled to arrive at a unified identity. This paper analyzes the role of the romantic works of Jane Porter and Sir Walter Scott in creating a new Scottish identity and, by extension, a new English one. Considerations include the romanticizing of historical Scottish figures such as William Wallace and Rob Roy, the use of pastoral imagery to stoke the imagination, and the appeal to cultural tradition. By linking these figures of Scottish heritage to the traditions of English kingship and political thought, Romantic Literature created a more inclusive perception of the Scots. Following the works of these two authors, Scottish heritage would move from outlawed music and regalia to an official celebrated part of the British heritage.

*Keywords:* Sir Walter Scott, Jane Porter, Scotland, Romanticism, Identity, George IV, Literature, Jacobite

# **Sir Walter Scott y la reinención de la identidad escocesa**

## RESUMEN

Tras la turbulenta adquisición de Escocia, el nuevo Reino Unido luchó por llegar a una identidad unificada. Este artículo analiza el papel de las obras románticas de Jane Porter y Sir Walter Scott en la creación de una nueva identidad escocesa y, por extensión, una nueva inglesa. Las consideraciones incluyen la romantización de figuras históricas escocesas como William Wallace y Rob Roy, el uso de imágenes pastorales para avivar la imaginación y el atractivo de la tradición cultural. Al vincular estas figuras de la herencia escocesa con las tradiciones de la realeza inglesa y el pensamiento político, la literatura romántica creó una percepción más inclusiva de los escoceses. Siguiendo las obras de estos dos autores, la herencia escocesa pasaría de la música y las insignias prohibidas a una

parte oficial célebre de la herencia británica.

**Palabras clave:** Sir Walter Scott, Jane Porter, Escocia, Romanticismo, Identidad, Jorge IV, Literatura, Jacobita

## 沃尔特·斯科特爵士和苏格兰认同的重新建立

### 摘要

通过一番动荡占领苏格兰后，新英国试图建立统一认同。本文分析了在建立一个新的苏格兰认同和进一步建立一个新英国认同一事中，简·波特和沃尔特·斯科特爵士的浪漫小说所发挥的作用。相关考量因素包括对例如威廉·华莱士和罗布·罗伊等历史苏格兰人物的浪漫化、使用田园意象激发想象、以及对文化传统的吸引力。通过这些苏格兰遗产人物与英国亲属传统及政治思想相联系，浪漫文学创造了一个更具包容性的苏格兰人感知。按照这两位作家的作品思路发展，苏格兰遗产将从有关草莽英雄的音乐和特殊服饰转移为正式的不列颠著名遗产的一部分。

关键词：沃尔特·斯科特爵士，简·波特，苏格兰，浪漫主义，认同，乔治五世，文学，詹姆斯二世党人

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**I**ndependence was only the beginning of Scotland's losses to England. Following the cessation of military hostilities, the Scottish cultural identity became the subject of censure and was eventually outlawed entirely. Centuries of warring with England ill prepared Scots for becoming English. It was not until the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the historical novels and poetry of Jane Porter and Sir Walter Scott that Scots began to reinvent their heritage to coexist peacefully with England. By romanticizing Scottish history and culture, these works of literature altered public opinion of what

it meant to be a Scot. Presenting contentious history through courtly codes of conduct and romantic heroes would bring popularity to Scotland and its heritage, allowing Sir Walter Scott to transform Scottish cultural heritage from an outlawed identity into a romantic ideal.

Although Scotland and England were formally united in 1707, it was not until after the disastrous end to the final Jacobite rebellion in 1746 that all of Scotland was forced to accept the union.<sup>1</sup> Fear of inciting another rebellion led King George II of England to harshly outlaw tokens of Scottish her-

itage.<sup>2</sup> Although not the key to a Scottish identity, tartans, bagpipes, and Gaelic played important outward roles in representing what set Scotland apart from their southern neighbors.<sup>3</sup> Scotsmen keenly felt the loss of the physical representation of their heritage. Highland clans suffered the most punishment for their involvement in the rebellions; not only did they lose the right to wear tartans and speak Gaelic, but the clans were also disbanded.<sup>4</sup> The most passionately loyal to the Jacobite cause were either executed, or exiled to the British colonies.<sup>5</sup> This forced exodus of Scots left the nation to flounder, as subjects of the United Kingdom, without a national identity.

The rise in popularity of historical literature gave Scottish authors a platform for changing public perception of Scotland and an opportunity to invent a new identity for the nation. Through an emphasis on chivalrous codes of conduct in romantic Highland settings, authors engineered interest in Scottish traditions. The most famous and influential author of the genre of Scottish historical literature was Sir Walter Scott. Another author of the period who made an impact, certainly on the works of Scott, was Jane Porter. Friends during their childhood in Edinburgh, Scott and Porter maintained a casual acquaintance throughout their lives.<sup>6</sup> Although Porter's literature has been acknowledged as the inspiration for Scott's work, very little has been written about the author herself.<sup>7</sup> Enthusiasm for Scott's contribution has largely left Porter forgotten by modern historians and students of literature.<sup>8</sup>

Published in 1809, Porter's novel *The Scottish Chiefs* preceded Scott's first novel by several years. In the "Retrospective Introduction" to *The Scottish Chiefs*, Porter shared memories of a childhood amused by folktales of William Wallace and Robert the Bruce.<sup>9</sup> Porter wrote that Wallace and Bruce were remembered for heroic deeds not by scholars, but by nursery maids and kitchen servants.<sup>10</sup> These tales and songs, told for the entertainment of children, deeply impressed young Porter, inspiring her to recreate the awe and emotion she felt as a child for her readers.<sup>11</sup> The widows of fallen Jacobite rebels who lived around the area of Edinburgh also made a lasting impression on six year old Porter.<sup>12</sup> Sympathy and respect for these dignified women led Porter to write her novel's characters as she viewed the widows.<sup>13</sup> *The Scottish Chiefs* portrayed a romanticized version of William Wallace's struggle against England and the underlying theme of sympathy for the noble and heroic Scotsman is carried throughout the novel.

As the hero of *The Scottish Chiefs*, William Wallace differed greatly from his historic reality. An English account written during this period of history described Wallace as, "an outcast from pity, a robber, a sacrilegious man, an incendiary and a homicide, a man more cruel than the cruelty of Herod, and more insane than the fury of Nero."<sup>14</sup> This rather harsh description of an insane and violent Wallace may appear to be an exaggerated criticism, but it is echoed in other writings.<sup>15</sup> The *Scalacronica* described Wallace and his men

flaying the King's Treasurer and making "girths of his skin."<sup>16</sup> In contrast, the first introduction of Wallace in *The Scottish Chiefs* is of an honorable man who left fighting the English to spend a quiet life with his lifelong love, Marion.<sup>17</sup> Porter's Wallace forgave enemies and wished ill will upon no man, until the murder of his beloved wife Marion forced Wallace into action against the English.<sup>18</sup> Even in his anger and grief, Porter's Wallace remains a romantic figure of national pride, "Wallace stood on the cliff, like the newly-aroused genius of his country; his long plaid floated afar, and his glittering hair streaming on the blast, seemed to mingle with the golden fires which shot from the heavens."<sup>19</sup> This handsome and awe-inspiring man, wearing the plaid of his people, was presented as a heavenly being sent from God to save the Scots. This literary portrait is at odds with historic representations of Wallace and yet it inspired a nation to love the idea of a Scotsman who went to war over love.

The romantic perspective was not limited to the character of William Wallace. Despite the sympathy written towards the Scottish cause of this period, not all Englishmen were portrayed as callous enemies to Scots.<sup>20</sup> Lady Marion Wallace addresses her captors as "noble Englishman,"<sup>21</sup> before expressing gratitude for their generous kindness.<sup>22</sup> The murder of Marion causes the men who witnessed the vicious act to turn on their leader, declaring him an enemy of innocents and citing their noble King Edward I as the example of gracious kindness to follow.<sup>23</sup> Although unable to save Lady Wallace, the English sol-

dier Grimsby revives an elderly Scottish man. "My honest Scot," said Grimsby, "trust in me. I am a man like yourself; and though a Southron, am no enemy to age and helplessness."<sup>24</sup> This comparison of men being the same, be they Scottish or English, provides an appropriate tone for Porter's audience. Diplomatically representing gallant heroes and moral figures from both nations, rather than overwhelmingly favoring one side, allowed Porter's work to remain universally appreciated.

Although Porter may be credited with starting the literary trend towards popularizing Scotland, it was Sir Walter Scott who truly refined and expanded the genre. Scott followed Porter's example throughout his poetry and novels. Common themes throughout Scott's literature which reflect Porter's influence were the romantic Highland setting, chivalry and honor demonstrated by the heroes, and the importance of traditional heritage. Unlike Porter, Scott's protagonists were English rather than Scottish. Due to that fact, Scott's work contained a more introspective political undertone that brought English readers to question their preconceived ideas about Scotland and its people. For Scots, these literary works redefined their reality with a fresh perspective, seamlessly blending the romantic past with a united future.

Scott's first novel *Waverley: Or, Tis Sixty Years Since* was published anonymously in 1814.<sup>25</sup> *Waverley* soon became the first in a series of wildly successful novels set in Scotland in and around the Jacobite rebellions.<sup>26</sup> Speculation over the identity of the author





Sir David Wilkie, (18 November, 1785 – 1 June, 1841) “George IV in Kilt.” 1829. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:George\\_IV\\_in\\_kilt,\\_by\\_Wilkie.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:George_IV_in_kilt,_by_Wilkie.jpg)

of the series fueled book sales.<sup>27</sup> Scott did not confirm public opinion that he did in fact author the wildly popular books until 1827.<sup>28</sup> Each book within the Waverley series shares the theme of romanticism of the Scottish Highlands and clan system, and presents a portrait of Scottish traditions that should never be lost. Scott identifies Clans as an integral part of Scottish culture and therefore they play an important role within the Waverley series.

*Waverley: Or, Tis Sixty Years Since* tells the compelling story of Edward Waverley, an unconventional English soldier, stationed in the Scottish Highlands at the onset of the 1745 rebellion.<sup>29</sup> The poetic soul of Waverley, which echoes that of his author, finds some commonality in Scotland and with its passionate people.<sup>30</sup> Despite being an Englishman, encounters with Jacobite supporters prompt a new understanding and sympathy of their cause.<sup>31</sup> Although the English and Scottish are on opposing sides of the dispute, each demonstrates nobility and honor in fighting for their beliefs.<sup>32</sup> “If the cause I have undertaken be perilous, there would be the greater disgrace in abandoning it.”<sup>33</sup> In joining the Jacobite cause, even knowing it will likely fail, Edward fights to honorably preserve a way of life rather than making a political statement against the King of England.<sup>34</sup> Scott’s presentation of a moderate Scotsman’s interpretation for this revolt brings to light a different perspective for his English readers.

This theme of nobility and honor is continued in *Rob Roy*, the third book in the Waverley series, which was pub-

lished in 1817. Taking place during the 1715 Jacobite revolt, *Rob Roy* is the story of another young Englishman who leaves England and is changed by his experiences in Scotland.<sup>35</sup> Honor is displayed by both the young Englishman as well as the character of Rob Roy, a fictionalized version of a historic figure.<sup>36</sup> In this book, Scott emphasizes the significance of language as a tangible link to history through his usage of colloquial dialect when writing Scottish dialogue.<sup>37</sup>

The works of Walter Scott in the period since the war had provided a new genre of historical novels deeply grounded in the real life of his own country. They had been widely successful: the vision might be of the past, but it was of a past understood with strong sympathies for different points of view and supported by the full repertoire of Scottish speech and wide historical knowledge.<sup>38</sup>

Tying Scottish history with the romance of courtly behavior, Scott brought popularity to a language all but forgotten. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century when Scott wrote *Rob Roy*, the Gaelic speaking population was quickly decreasing after English encouragement of English only educations.<sup>39</sup>

Scott would even build upon the earlier experience of the English themselves. His novel *Ivanhoe* details the struggle of the Crusader Wilfred of Ivanhoe, who is disowned by his staunchly Saxon father for absorbing the Norman tradition of mounted combat and following Richard II to the Cru-

sades. Language once again makes its mark on the national identity, as Scott considers the possible interactions between French and Saxon etymology in daily life,

“swine is good Saxon,” said the Jester; “but how call you the sow when she is flayed, and drawn, and quartered, and hung up by the heels, like a traitor?”

“Pork,” answered the swine-herd.

“I am very glad every fool knows that too,” said Wamba, “and pork, I think, is good Norman-French; and so when the brute lives, and is in the charge of a Saxon slave, she goes by her Saxon name; but becomes a Norman, and is called pork, when she is carried to the Castle-hall to feast among the nobles.”<sup>40</sup>

This sort of quibbling paints the English-Saxons as the one-time recipients of a similar kind of cultural conquest. The clear implication is that the Saxons and Normans eventually unified under the single identity of Englishmen. One sees hints of a possible future where the English and Scots could enjoy a similar standard of unification.

The rugged and romantic land also played a significant role in Scott's works. The Scotland of Scott's literature invited exploration, “little lonely valleys, which opening on the road from time to time, seemed to invite the traveler to explore their recesses,”<sup>41</sup> as seen in *Rob Roy*. The scenery alternated between mysterious and inspiring, through streams and mountains and the trees

between.<sup>42</sup> The theme of vivid romantic imagery is continued throughout Scott's novels and poetry, observable in *Ivanhoe*, where the beauty of the English forest is used to romanticize one of their folk heroes, Robin Hood.

“The Lady of the Lake” is perhaps the most well-known of Scott's poems. The significance of scenery played a large role within the poem, which is set around the romantic Loch Katrine,<sup>43</sup> “The summer heaven's delicious blue; So wonderous wild, the whole might seem the scenery of a fairy dream.”<sup>44</sup> Associating gorgeous and magical scenery with this romantic tale set in the time of King James V not only invites readers to experience a piece of living history through a place, but it also connects the time with a location of magic and wonder. The importance of Gaelic, as well as clan relationships, is emphasized in “The Lady of the Lake;” not only as a family unit that protects and provides, but as if a miniature kingdom under the ultimate authority of the King.<sup>45</sup> The King himself plays an important role in this poem. Initially perceived as a fearsome unknown royal figure, James V is finally revealed to have been the handsome wanderer who aided a fair maiden.<sup>46</sup> This theme would also be applied to the English King Richard II, revealed to the Black Knight of *Ivanhoe*. Again, Scott's usage of a romanticized version of historical figures presents links to history Scott believed should not be forgotten.

Sir Walter Scott not only dedicated his career to reinventing Scotland's image, he also gave the nation back



Frank E. Schoonover, August 19, 1877 – September 1, 1972, *Ivanhoe* illustrations.

a piece of its lost heritage.<sup>47</sup> The right of kingship over Scotland remained a source of tension and political conflict between Scotland and England for centuries. King Edward I of England's theft of the Scottish royal coronation tokens at Scone taught the Scots to hide royal artifacts.<sup>48</sup> After the 1707 Act of the Union, in which Scotland and England were united as the United Kingdom, the royal Scottish Crown Jewels, known as the Regalia were hidden.<sup>49</sup> In 1818, Sir Walter Scott petitioned the Prince Regent for permission to search for the lost Crown Jewels.<sup>50</sup> The royal approval granted, due to the Prince's appreciation for Scott's literature, led Scott to find the jewels in Edinburgh Castle where they had been hidden for over one hundred

years.<sup>51</sup> In 1822, following his ascension to the throne of England, King George IV arrived in Edinburgh, making him the first English king to do so in over two hundred years.<sup>52</sup> The visit was arranged by Scott, who ensured the King was greeted with proper Scottish pagentry.<sup>53</sup> King George IV wore a tartan for the occasion in honor of his Scottish subjects.<sup>54</sup> Without Scott's literary popularity and dedication to Scotland, this celebration of Scottish heritage would not have been possible.

Similar application to the theme of the good king can be found echoed throughout the English cultural identity. From the opening lines of *Beowulf* capturing the Anglo-Danish ideal of a "god cynning" to the multiple iterations of Arthur's mythical Camelot, the English demonstrated a keen sensitivity to strong governance.<sup>55</sup> By tying the plot of *Ivanhoe* to a fictional return of Richard the Lionheart, Scott pressed down on the English memory of his erstwhile brother Bad King John. It was this same John that led the English to pass their Magna Carta to limit the powers of the English monarchy over their subjects and frame that "to no-one will we sell or deny of delay right of justice."<sup>56</sup> One sees Scott's work pressing the issue from the ground up until George IV's appearance at Edinburgh completes it from the top down.

Through transforming the rebellious Scots into a passionate, romantic and courtly nation, the literary works of Sir Walter Scott and Jane Porter altered public opinion of the past and allowed Scotland to embrace their culture in a

new manner. Through the literary appeal to common identity and the incorporation of multiple English characters, Scott drew a broader boundary around what it meant to be English as well. Scott's literary works and personal efforts in particular brought items of Scottish heritage back to political legitimacy after the 1822 royal visit of King George IV. Although tartans and bagpipes were banned in 1747, Scott piqued cultural interest to the level where a visit from an English king meant these formally outlawed Scottish cultural items were

legally celebrated. Porter's portrayal of Scotland was vibrant and romantic. Formerly viewed as traitors, the historic figures of William Wallace, Rob Roy, and others, were so heroically written that many modern audiences only recall the positive and fictional accounts of these men. Whether one considers the broader United Kingdom, the individual identities of the English kingdoms, or Scotland itself, Scott wrote about a country of which every one of his readers desired to be a citizen.

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# **Martin Luther and the Reformation: Ninety-five Thesis to the Diet of Worms**

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## ABSTRACT

Martin Luther is one of the most pivotal individuals in human history especially regarding Christianity. His action and Theses led to a schism between the Catholic and Protestant religions and became known as the Reformation. The Reformation began with Luther and the first few years after the posting of his *Ninety-five Theses*. The Holy See did not approve of Luther's challenge to their authority and directed charges of heresy against Luther that culminated in the Diet of Worms. It is there that Luther had a trial regarding his actions from the posting of the *Ninety-five Theses* to the Diet of Worms.

**Keywords:** Martin Luther, Reformation, *Ninety-five Theses*, Diet of Worms, Pope Leo X, *On the Freedom of a Christian*, indulgences, Protestantism, Holy Roman Empire, Charles V

# **Martín Lutero y la reforma: noventa y cinco tesis sobre la dieta de Worms**

## RESUMEN

Martín Lutero es una de las personas más fundamentales en la historia de la humanidad, especialmente en lo que respecta al cristianismo. Su acción y tesis llevaron a un cisma entre las religiones católica y protestante y se conoció como la Reforma. La Reforma comenzó con Lutero y los primeros años después de la publicación de sus Noventa y cinco Tesis. La Santa Sede no aprobó el desafío de Lutero a su autoridad y dirigió cargos de herejía contra Lutero que culminaron en la Dieta de Worms. Es allí donde Lutero tuvo un juicio con respecto a sus acciones desde la publicación de las Noventa y cinco Tesis a la Dieta de Worms.

**Palabras clave:** Martín Lutero, Reforma, Noventa y cinco tesis, Dieta de Worms, Papa León X, Sobre la libertad de un cristiano, indulgencias, Protestantismo, Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico, Carlos V

## 马丁·路德和宗教改革：从《九十五条论纲》到沃尔姆斯议会

### 摘要

马丁·路德是人类历史上最重要的人物之一，尤其是在基督教方面。他的行动和论纲导致天主教和新教分离，被称为宗教改革。马丁·路德在公布其《九十五条论纲》的几年后发起了宗教改革。圣座并未批准路德对其权威发起的挑战，并在沃尔姆斯议会强烈指控路德为异教徒。路德因其在该议会中公布《九十五条论纲》的行为而接受审判。

关键词：马丁·路德，宗教改革，《九十五条论纲》，沃尔姆斯议会，教皇利奥十世，《论基督徒的自由》，赎罪券，新教，神圣罗马帝国，查尔斯五世

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The Reformation is one of the most pivotal periods in human history, which had ramifications in politics, religion, and culture. Unlike the Renaissance, the start of the Reformation can be traced back to a singular event. History marks the posting of *Ninety-five Theses* by Martin Luther as that starting point. While this event is an excellent mark to begin the Reformation, the events the immediately followed should be considered and included as part of that beginning. Europe did not begin to accept Protestantism once the *Ninety-five Theses* was posted, but

instead were largely divided by it. The Church, referred to afterwards as the Catholic Church, saw this as an affront to their authority while others took up arms to defend a new way of thinking. However, initially no one really knew what to do about Luther, and those first few years after posting his theses truly reveal the type of world Europe was in the early sixteenth century.

The Reformation is generally considered to have started with the posting of Martin Luther's *Ninety-five Theses* to the door of the castle church

in Wittenberg, within the Holy Roman Empire, on October 31, 1517.<sup>1</sup> However there were several events that were key to preparing the world for the start of the Reformation. As early as the fourteenth century, people began to oppose the apparent corruption of the Church and clergymen. We know that Petrarch sent a letter to a friend indicating how repulsed he was at the extravagance of a church in France, which was in contrast to his idea of what a church should look like.<sup>2</sup> As dissent grew, some became more vocal—John Wycliff was one of these individuals. In many ways, John Wycliff was the spiritual predecessor to Martin Luther. Wycliff condemned the excesses of the church by the lavish lifestyle lived by many clergymen.<sup>3</sup> He also advocated for a translation of the Bible into English or other local languages, as the Bible had until that time been exclusively reproduced in Latin. This brought him in conflict with Rome, and specifically with Pope Gregory XI. Gregory rebuked Wycliff, claiming that what Wycliff said amounted to heresy.<sup>4</sup> Though he died in 1384, the Council of Constance declared Wycliff a heretic in 1415 and banned the various ideas he espoused along with all his writings. This foreshadowed the politics Martin Luther faced 150 years later.

Jan Hus was another early reformer who opposed church authority over the same reasoning as Wycliff and Luther. Hus was accused by the same council that denounced Wycliff but, as Hus was still alive, the Council condemned Hus to be burned at the stake. This sentence was carried out almost immediately and set a deadly prece-

dence for opposing the Church. Both Wycliff and Hus died believing that they were supporting the Church instead of disregarding it.<sup>5</sup> Martin Luther felt the same way—that he was trying to save the Church, not divide it into factions.

There were also some technological developments that aided in the dissemination of Luther's ideas. Specifically, the printing press became a critical asset in the Reformation that allowed Luther's messages to reach the general populace in ways that Wycliff and Hus could not. The printing press made it easy for Luther to disseminate his sermons to a wide variety of audiences. This was accomplished because he could have his sermons printed in both Latin and German. Furthermore, printers throughout the Holy Roman Empire reproduced his sermons and spread his message even further. The reproductions were possible due to the relatively lax printing laws in the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>6</sup> Other nations had more stringent laws that held printers accountable for the information they produced, which limited the spread of Reformation information in areas such as France.

Martin Luther was a theologian and priest in the Holy Roman Empire whose disillusion with the Church began in the early sixteenth century. In 1516, Johann Tetzel arrived in the Holy Roman Empire, in what is now Germany, to sell indulgences in order to raise funds for the rebuilding of Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome.<sup>7</sup> Indulgences were penances were performed by Christians in order to receive forgiveness of a par-

ticular sin, thereby reducing the amount of punishment in the afterlife. These indulgences were initially the commission of a good work, but evolved into a cash donation to absolve oneself of sin. Pope Leo X had granted the use of indulgences to fund the rebuilding of the Basilica and, in so doing, made the selling of redemption a church policy.<sup>8</sup>

Martin Luther saw the sale of indulgences as immoral and a sign of corruption within the church's administration. To protest, he wrote a letter to Archbishop Albrecht in which he enclosed a copy of his sermon "Disputation on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences" which later became known as the *Ninety-five Theses*. Legend states that Luther nailed the *Ninety-five Theses* to the door of the Church. Luther believed that the selling of indulgences prevented Christians from experiencing the meaning behind true repentance.

The letter itself was not meant as a secession from the Church, but rather a beginning to scholarly debate with a wide variety of scholars—not just the Archbishop or the Pope. Luther begins the theses by declaring that he is willing to defend his theses and invites others to dispute him.<sup>9</sup> He makes the initial statements of disputing what the meaning behind repentance is and should be. Luther then takes the issue of the relationship between punishment and guilt. The Pope was only responsible for releasing parishioners from the punishments of the Church but not absolve them from the guilt of sin. He believed that the concept of providing a letter absolving one of sin without knowing if

the person was repentant or not was a dangerous concept.

He concludes the *Ninety-five Theses* with noting the contrary nature of selling indulgences in that it will only create greed and not salvation.<sup>10</sup> He supports his total argument with a number of questions he claims were asked of him by those who attended his church. The *Ninety-five Theses* would appear to be more of an open invitation to public debate than a revolutionary declaration. Even the act of supposedly posting the theses would not have necessarily been taboo as it was common to do so in order to hold a disputation.

The *Ninety-five Theses* was then translated into German and widely reproduced using the printing press. The more copies purchased, the more printers eagerly awaited printing more material for Luther. This essentially turned Luther into a celebrity, as peoples from all over Europe descended on Wittenberg to hear him preach. Galvanized churchgoers listened to Luther and passed on his messages, which ran contrary to some of what church officials had dictated.

However, the Archbishop who initially received Luther's letter was not impressed. He immediately reviewed the document for heresy and forwarded his findings to Pope Leo X. The Pope began a series of criticisms against Luther instead of directly attacking him at first. Then, in 1518, Luther was summoned to Rome on charges of heresy, but the Pope was convinced to allow his hearing in Augsburg. The hearing devolved into a shouting match between Martin Luther

and Cardinal Cajetan. Though the *Ninety-five Theses* was at the center of the debate on heresy, Cardinal Cajetan and Luther focused their speeches on the matter of the Pope selling indulgences.

Eventually the Cardinal concluded that Luther was guilty of heresy and ordered his arrest. Fortunately for Luther, the Imperial Diet did not have him arrested and Luther was able to escape Augsburg.<sup>11</sup> The following year others began to pursue Luther to discredit or capture him. One such person was Johann Eck, who baited Luther into debates to gain evidence of heresy that he could bring to Pope Leo. Eck eventually got his opportunity in Leipzig when Luther asserted that the Pope was not the sole authority on the Bible, and church officials could err on matters of Christianity.<sup>12</sup> The fact that so many within the church were trying to discredit Luther indicates that they believed his teachings were a genuine threat to the Church as an institution and its authority.

After the Leipzig incident, Luther refocused himself on creating several new theological writings. He was able complete his commentary on the Psalms as well as begin a book of sermons.<sup>13</sup> During this time he also retained his professorship and priesthood, indicating that his efforts were fully focused on the dissemination of his message. During the Winter of 1519, Luther published a treatise called *On Good Works*, which reemphasized that the primacy of the Christian faith and transforming that into good works. Despite the significantly large number of publi-

cations Luther produced, those loyal to the Pope or simply Luther's opponents continued to view Luther as a threat to the Church. Some of those opponents felt that it was Luther's disrespectful attitude to the Church, and especially the Pope, that made him dangerous.

Some theologians of the time did attempt to defend the Church in the same manner as Luther's condemnation of it. Coincidentally, this was precisely what Luther had originally requested—a written dissent of his *Ninety-five Theses*. One theologian out of Leipzig, Augustin von Alveld, wrote a book in May 1520 defending the Pope's authority within the Church and therefore over the Christian world. This text gained Luther's attention as it had angered him. He immediately responded with the pamphlet *On the Papacy at Rome*, which denounced the Pope usurping Christian values and challenged the belief that the Church of God could only be the Church of Rome.<sup>14</sup> The important aspect of this text was its departure from civil tones that Luther had used communicating with the Pope. There were no attempts to find a middle ground, and *On the Papacy at Rome* marks an increase in aggressive posturing and speech.

During the summer of 1520 Martin Luther wrote three additional treatises that would come to summarize not only his position, but that of the future Reformation movement. *Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation for the Reform of the Christian* was the first of three, in which Luther sounded a call to arms in opposition

to Rome. Its strong tone follows that of *On the Papacy of Rome* and continues the escalation of words between Luther and papal authority. It is believed that this text took this tone as, at this point, Martin Luther no longer believed that the Pope or Church would reverse its position.<sup>15</sup> In total, *Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation for the Reform of the Christian Church* denounced the Pope's exclusive claim to summon a general council, denied the Pope's authority of a nation's ruler, and renounced the Pope's position as the sole authority on the scripture. The denunciation of the Pope's authority of a secular ruler would give a justification, though not the primary justification, in King Henry VIII's split from Rome and the start of the Anglican Church.

The treatise was also important as a rallying cry for the German people that energized support throughout the Holy Roman Empire. In this region there was already a large support for the idea of denouncing corruption within the Church, but these treatises helped focus that sentiment.<sup>16</sup> The people of Germany were looking for someone to rally behind in their desire to eliminate corruption within the church and found that person in Martin Luther. Between these desires, the distribution of his sermons, and the ideals he espoused Luther became a sixteenth-century celebrity in a relatively short period of time.

Martin Luther's second treatise during the summer of 1520 was called *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church* and it was released shortly after the previous one. While the pre-

vious treatise addressed many aspects of church corruption *On the Babylonian Captivity* was a direct assault on the clerical system of the church. In it, Luther strips the Roman Church of its sacramental system and ecclesiastical structure.<sup>17</sup> The Reformation is generally considered to have started with the publications of *Ninety-five Theses*, but there was no real schism between Luther and the Church initially. The Pope had dealt with challenges before and there was still a note of civility between the two. However, the publishing of these treatises cemented the schism between the Holy See and the growing Reformation Movement.

The final of the three treatises is a book called *On the Freedom of a Christian*, which summarized and solidified Luther's biblical theology. This text is central to the theological beliefs of Protestants and its effects are evident in today's Protestant religions. *On the Freedom of a Christian* declares that a Christian is rendered free by faith which is the sole justification for salvation.<sup>18</sup> While the previous two treatises were more overt in their attacks on papal authority, this treatise was designed to be read by a wider audience and is more in line with that of a sermon. It is in this treatise that Luther declares "A Christian man is the most free of all, and subject to none; a Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, and subject to everyone."<sup>19</sup> Though Luther acknowledges that this statement is contradictory, he is able to provide justification of his claim while using corroborating proof that supports the position of the treatise.




Previous treatises and theses' outlined a rudimentary support base for the opposition of church practices, specifically the practice of indulgences. In *On the Freedoms of a Christian*, Luther finally is able to fully explain his opposition. The Roman Church believed that a person would have to perform a great work in order to absolve themselves of a sin. However, Luther was advocating the belief that faith in Jesus Christ was the only prerequisite for salvation much less completing an earthly task. Luther also makes the statement that God's law is the only law that matters in relation to spiritual salvation. Therefore, man's laws can do nothing to ensure the absolution of sin to God.

*On the Freedoms of a Christian* did have one significant difference compared to the other two treatises he released that summer. This one took a completely different tone and became much more formal. The previous two were direct attacks on Rome and the church while this one only attacked the practices—not the institution per se. *On the Freedoms of a Christian* was also sent by Martin Luther directly to Pope Leo X, accompanied by a letter.<sup>20</sup> In the letter Luther claims that his treatises are directed at his critics and not the Pope himself. Luther repeatedly conveys that he bears no ill-will to the Pope and only wishes to help him see his position, which he defines as being in opposition to enemies of the Church, or within the Church.

This indicates that Luther only viewed himself as a friend to the Pope and, by attacking the Church institution,

he was in fact defending the Church. There are also some other possibilities such as that he was trying to repair his relationship with the Pope as he had become overly aggressive. Another possibility was that he was attempting to address the Pope in a manner befitting his position as he had previously treated clergymen with very high respect. This can be seen three years prior in his initial letter to Archbishop Albrecht.<sup>21</sup> However the letter also directs a large amount of criticism at Cardinal Cajetan and call his character into question.



*German Translation of the Old Testament*  
<https://www.loc.gov/item/00650809/>

While Luther was writing his treatises, the Church was preparing to counter the growing Reformation influence. Despite the correspondence between Pope Leo X and Martin Luther, Leo knew very little about Lu-

ther, therefore Leo summoned Eck for more information. Given Eck's previous challenge to Luther, he was more than willing to assist the Pope. In addition, the Roman Consistory renewed their case against Luther. A new commission was established and this one would be headed by Cardinal Cajetan with Eck serving as a member. Eck's drive to oust Luther would overshadow Cajetan's approach for compromise making the confrontation between Rome and Luther inevitable.<sup>22</sup>

Their first step was to draft a papal bull which denounced Martin Luther and his teachings. This bull, called *Exsurge Domine*, was delivered by Eck in July of 1520. The bull was more warning than action in that it warned Luther that if he continued down his current course of action he would be excommunicated. *Exsurge Domine* demanded that Luther recant his *Ninety-five Theses*, which was presented by Leo in the bull as forty-one theses.<sup>23</sup> Each theses details why the Pope believed Martin Luther was in error. In the end, Pope Leo gave Luther sixty days to recant or face excommunication. Luther did not seem disturbed by the letter once he received it, but rather seemed to be encouraged by it in conjunction with the support he was receiving from the German people.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, Luther did not intend to recant his *Ninety-five Theses*.

Luther instead wrote a dissension for the papal bull called *Against the Accursed Bull of the Antichrist*, which thoroughly responded to each of Leo's forty-one theses. Luther returned the threat of excommunication with a threat of his own to the Pope. He

claimed that if the Pope did not alter the Church's practices, he would claim that the antichrist was in possession of the Holy See. This would have been tantamount to treason and the beginning of a Christian uprising against Rome. At the sixty-day mark Luther burned the papal bull he received along with some books written by Eck. These acts cemented Luther's position against papal authority. Despite attempts to be civil in *On the Freedoms of a Christian*, Luther would no longer be cordial as he was fixed in an antagonistic role against Rome. On January 3, 1521, Pope Leo X issued a papal cull of excommunication named *Decet Romanum*, which was considered the Pope's final word on the matter.<sup>25</sup>

The confrontation with Pope Leo was not the only confrontation that Martin Luther would have to face. His conflict with the Church eventually drew in the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V. Charles V was a close ally of Leo's and enjoyed the support of Rome. When Luther was excommunicated, Charles convened an Imperial Diet to confront Luther on his teachings. The location chosen was Worms, Germany, giving the name of the event the Diet of Worms. Prince Frederick III, also known as Frederick the Wise, acted as Luther's protector and ensured that Luther would have safe passage both to and from the Diet of Worms. This was agreed to by both sides, as it ensured that Luther would attend and that a repeat of Jan Hus' execution did not occur.

The Diet of Worms began on April 16, 1521, with Johann Eck acting as the spokesman for Emperor Charles

V and Jerome Schurff as the defendant's lawyer. Martin Luther was ordered to recant his *Ninety-five Theses* and pledge his fidelity to the Roman Church.<sup>26</sup> Eck began the *de facto* trial by demanding that Luther denounce all his writings, but Schurff insisted on Eck reading out all the titles that Luther had authored. In the three years since Luther published *Ninety-five Theses*, he drafted an additional twenty-four texts that ran counter to church policies. However, once complete, Luther requested a delay so that he could properly meditate on what his answer should be. The following day Luther answered Eck's question, though not directly.


Luther went on to say that not all of his writings could be grouped together in one answer. He then divided his works into three categories, which he then provided answers for. He claimed one group of writings was well received by everybody, including his critics, and therefore would not renounce these texts. The next group were books which directed criticism at the Church and Pope, which he felt he could not renounce as it would not be safe and would encourage various abuse of authority to continue or worsen. The final group of books were those that had directed attacks on specific individuals, which he also refused to recant. He did apologize if some took offense to the harsh tones within and offered to renounce them if it could be proven through scripture that they were in error. Martin Luther concluded his testimony by saying, "I cannot and will not retract anything, since to act against one's conscience is neither

safe nor right. God help me, Amen!"<sup>27</sup> No materials researched in this article proved a common belief that Luther stated, "Here I stand, I can do no other."

Eck attempted to respond that his conscience was leading him astray and that he was behaving like a heretic. Eck claimed that Luther was unable to prove any of what he said or claimed, but Luther was reported to have shouted back that he could via scripture. The speeches from Eck and Luther were ultimately at the mercy of Charles, who faced a political decision as much as it was a religious decision. Charles' position as emperor was not absolute and he needed the support of powerful people, whether that was the German nobles or the Pope. The princes would have looked favorably on siding with Luther due to the rising popularity of the Reformation movement. However, Charles' religious conviction overruled the potential political benefit.

Charles responded by reinforcing his already strong devotion to the Church. He wrote a short judgement stating that one would have to be wrong if he were standing in opposition to the Church since the Church could not be wrong, otherwise the church would have been wrong its entire existence.<sup>28</sup> The Emperor decided against Luther and ordered that he be allowed to safely return to Wittenberg per his agreement. However, Charles demanded that he no longer be allowed to preach, and he could no longer espouse his heretical ideas. The electoral commission then voted to enforce Luther's ban. In the aftermath of the trial, a group of learned

men attempted to reason with Luther to help reconcile him with the Church. Their attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, as Luther refused to change his position due to his belief that the opposing argument was not supported by scripture.<sup>29</sup>



*Martin Luther lithograph*  
<https://www.loc.gov/item/00650809/>

The Edict of Worms was finalized on May 8, 1521 after only a week of debate.<sup>30</sup> It cautioned about the dangers of heresy and falsehoods which would split the church. To defend itself from criticism, the edict outlined the various steps the Church took to make Luther see the error of his ways and teachings. It described Martin Luther as an evil and rebellious man no longer worthy to be considered a Christian. His books were banned outright in that they could no longer be sold, bought, or read, and all existing copies as well were to be burned.<sup>31</sup> Punishment for breaking the edict would result in the forfeit of all worldly goods with half going to the

church and the other half to whomever reported the transgression. This would have been a blow to the print industry in Germany, as Luther's sermons had been a source of profit for several years.

Charles V did not immediately sign the edict, fearing that the populace would turn against him.<sup>32</sup> He first ensured that he had the support of the nobility at least in respects to a forthcoming war with France. An immediate enforcement of the punishments in the edict would have resulted in a significant portion of his subjects becoming destitute or jailed, thereby reducing the available manpower for the war with France. An additional problem with instituting it came from the papal bull on Luther's excommunication, as it had not been formally delivered. As such, there were many of the council that still supported Luther, at least partially. However, an outbreak of the plague caused many of the members to flee Worms, which dwindled the number of members present to vote. By May 23, there were few members left but the ones who remained sided with the emperor.

On May 25, 1521, the final meeting took place and an agreement on the Edict was formalized. Charles V signed the Edict of Worms the following day in both Latin and German.<sup>33</sup> From there it was disseminated throughout the Holy Roman Empire with an imperial letter that provided the necessary legality of the Edict. It was to be publicly read upon threat of the same penalty as owning a copy of Luther's sermon. So much emphasis was placed on the Edict that distribution of it began before

Charles could affix his seal to the original document. The following month it was translated into both French and Flemish.<sup>34</sup>

Though Luther was now a criminal, he was able to escape capture by remaining at Wartburg Castle in central Germany for several months thanks to Frederick III. It is there Luther continued his translation of the bible into German as well as several other treatises. He left Wartburg Castle for Wittenberg in March of 1522, where he began to refine Protestant practices in the wake of social unrest. He also married Katharina von Bora in 1523 while retaining his priesthood.<sup>35</sup> This set the precedence for clergymen to be married, which was forbidden in the Catholic Church. However, Luther found himself pulled into a popular revolt amongst the German peoples in what became known as the German Peasants' War, which took place from 1524 to 1526. One of the primary leaders of the revolt was a German preacher and theologian, Thomas Muntzer, who stood in opposition of both the church and Martin Luther. The Reformation had heavily influenced the peasantry who incorporated some of the Reformation ideals but added some more radical ideas to their demands. Muntzer reportedly helped the peasants refine their demands. Luther, as well as the majority of reformers, condemned the revolt and sided with the nobility.

In response Luther wrote *Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants*, in which he denounced the violence occurring. In it he claimed that the peasants had abandoned their oath

of allegiance that violence was contrary to the Christian faith, and that violence committed in the name of God was blasphemous. Luther's support of the nobility reinforced the belief in the divine right of kings. However, Luther also includes in the text a minor portion in which it showed he was concerned that he might have played a part in instigating the revolt.

The events that ranged from the posting of Martin Luther's *Ninety-five Theses* to the Diet of Worms, as well as the events shortly after, became a significant turning point in human history. The schism that developed between Luther and the Church evolved into a schism that would divide Christianity into two sects: Catholic and Protestant. Protestantism also split into several different denominations whose origin can be traced back to Luther's questioning of papal authority. His actions defined a new religion and sparked a series of conflicts across Europe as people fled to support this new religion mainly due to the corruption seen within the church. The Reformation set the precedence for King Henry VIII to split from Rome and founded the Anglican Church, and smaller denominations facing persecution would seek to start their own communities in the newly discovered North America. Martin Luther's end came due to illness in 1546, and he was buried in Wittenberg. Shortly after Charles V retook Wittenberg, but as a testament to the influence Martin Luther had in his lifetime, Charles ordered that Luther's grave remain undisturbed.

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## **“That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert**

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### ABSTRACT

The Battle of Manzikert in 1071 resulted in a period of decline for the Byzantine Empire (although it would last in some shape or form for almost 400 years). This “dreadful day,” as the Byzantines called it, was one of the most influential battles in history.<sup>1</sup> The result changed the entire region, sending shockwaves through both the Christian and Islamic worlds and opening the floodgates to Turkish incursion into the most strategically important region of the empire.<sup>2</sup> It could have been mitigated, but the battle and its aftermath was a disaster for the Byzantines and had great ramifications for not only the Byzantine Empire, but for the course of history in this region of the world. It, and the decade of civil war that followed, resulted in the Byzantine request for aid from the Pope, precipitating the First Crusade.

*Keywords:* Byzantine, Seljuk Turks, Turcoman, Anatolia, Romanus, Alp Arslan, Shi’ite, Sunni

## **“Ese día terrible”: La batalla de Manzikert**

### RESUMEN

La batalla de Manzikert en 1071 resultó en un período de declive para el Imperio Bizantino (aunque duraría de alguna forma durante casi 400 años). Este “día terrible”, como lo llamaron los bizantinos, fue una de las batallas más influyentes de la historia. El resultado cambió toda la región, provocando ondas de choque en los mundos cristiano e islámico y abriendo las compuertas a la incursión turca en la región más estratégicamente importante del imperio. Podría haberse mitigado, pero la batalla y sus consecuencias fueron un desastre para los bizantinos y tuvieron grandes ramificaciones no solo para el Imperio bizantino, sino para el curso de la historia en esta región del mundo. Esto, y la década de guerra civil que siguió, resultó en la solicitud bizantina de ayuda del Papa, lo que precipitó la Primera Cruzada.

**Palabras clave:** Bizantinos, turcos selyúcidas, turcomanos, Anato-  
lia, romanos, Alp Arslan, chiítas, sunitas

## “可怕的那天”——曼齐刻尔特战役

### 摘要

1071年曼齐刻尔特战役导致拜占庭帝国一段时间的衰落（尽管该帝国会在某种形式上持续近四百年之久）。这一被拜占庭人称为“可怕的一天”，是史上最具影响力的战役之一。战役结果改变了整个地区，对基督教和伊斯兰教带来了冲击，同时为土耳其人的入侵打开大门，进入该帝国最具战略重要性的区域。此战本可以得以缓解，然而战役及其后果对拜占庭人而言是一场灾难，并对拜占庭帝国以及该地区的历史进程造成了巨大影响。该战役以及随之而来的十年内战导致拜占庭帝国向教皇寻求援助，加速了第一次十字军东征。

关键词：拜占庭人，塞尔柱土耳其人，土库曼人，安纳托利亚，罗曼努斯四世，阿尔普·阿尔斯兰，什叶派，逊尼派

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**T**he Emperor Romanus Diogenes, surrounded by his Varangian Guard, stood his ground and fought. However, the Seljuks had his group surrounded and his reserves left the field without fighting. He fought well until his horse was killed from underneath him, and his sword hand was wounded.<sup>3</sup> Finally, he surrendered. Thus the Battle of Manzikert of 1071 ended, and a period of decline for the Byzantine Empire began (although it would last in some shape or form for almost 400 years). This “dreadful day,” as the Byzantines called it, was one of the most influential in history.<sup>4</sup> The defeat changed the entire region. It sent

shockwaves through both the Christian and Islamic worlds and opened the floodgates to Turkish incursion into the most strategically important region of the empire.<sup>5</sup> The results could have been mitigated, but the battle and its aftermath were a disaster for the Byzantines and had great ramifications for not only the Byzantine Empire, but for the course of history in this region of the world.

The Seljuk Turks were a nomadic steppe-warrior group that had great success in establishing themselves to the east of the Byzantine Empire. They had seceded from the Oghuz tribe, and

led by their namesake leader Seljuk, moved into Transoxiana and eastern Persia about 1000 B.C.<sup>6</sup> By this time, the Persian Umayyads had been divided into sub-states and local dynasties. Later, the Islamic Abbasids of Persia had taken power, but fought ruinous civil wars with one another and were not as powerful as they had been.<sup>7</sup> They hired the Seljuk Turks as mercenaries and the Seljuks soon took over. They considered themselves the protectors of Sunni Islam.<sup>8</sup> By 1055, the Seljuk Turks were at the outskirts of Baghdad.<sup>9</sup> Seljuk's grandson, Tughril Bey, took over without opposition.<sup>10</sup> The Sunni Abbasid caliphs remained spiritual leaders, but the Seljuk Turks ruled the empire.<sup>11</sup> Tughril Bey died in 1063 and Alp Arslan, his nephew, succeeded him.<sup>12</sup> He was a strong warrior, and devoted to the Sunni religion.

Alp Arslan came to power in his early thirties and continued the expansion of the Turkish domain to the west and south.<sup>13</sup> There were two reasons for this. First, as a Sunni, he despised the Shiite Fatimids of Egypt who ruled Syria and Palestine as subject states.<sup>14</sup> Second, although the Seljuk Turks had become a little less nomadic for the most part, their kinsmen, the Turcomans, had not.<sup>15</sup> These nomads were not interested in the glory of the Sunni religion, but wanted land for their herds of ponies and sheep. The Seljuks liked to push the Turcomans to the periphery of their empire to soften up enemies, and also because they were undisciplined and hard to control.<sup>16</sup> The vast plateau of Anatolia was perfect for them. By keeping them busy on cam-

paigns, the Seljuks kept them from creating chaos and diverting Alp Arslan from his planned campaigns against the Fatimids.

Although the Byzantines and Seljuks made a treaty in 1055, this did not stop the Turcomans, and eventually Alp Arslan, from raiding into Asia Minor.<sup>17</sup> He led a huge expedition into Armenia and captured its capital, Ani, in 1064.<sup>18</sup> He burned all of its churches to the ground and massacred or carried off much of its population to be sold into slavery.<sup>19</sup> Alp Arslan wanted to secure the Armenian meadow lands for the Turcomans and then turn his attention to the Fatimids.<sup>20</sup> He drove into Anatolia unopposed and sacked Cappadocian Caesarea, which was far from the eastern frontier; they pillaged Caesarea and desecrated its cathedral of St. Basil.<sup>21</sup> Turcoman raiders plundered far into Anatolia, pillaging Cappadocia and Cilicia, where no attacks had happened for over a century.<sup>22</sup> This was one of the reasons Romanus eventually campaigned eastwards.

At about the time Romanus was moving towards him in 1071, Alp Arslan was trying to solidify his border so he could focus on the heretic Shi'ite Fatimids, the number one priority for the devout Sunni.<sup>23</sup> He passed through western Armenia, taking Manzikert and Khelat, and captured or received tribute from the border towns of Edessa, Aleppo, and Antioch.<sup>24</sup> Alp Arslan was shoring up his defenses on the western border of his territory (the eastern edge of Byzantium) so he could drive south. At this point, the Seljuk Turks were at

their strongest and Alp Arslan's army was mobile and effective.

The Seljuk army was a typical light cavalry army of the steppe who were masters of the hit-and-run tactic.<sup>25</sup> They wore little, if any, body armor and carried a saber and possibly a javelin, but relied mainly on a short composite bow.<sup>26</sup> This short recurve bow was very powerful and allowed the Turk to shoot quickly in any direction from horseback, firing up to 12 arrows per minute.<sup>27</sup> Their short stirrup, or "forward seat," positioned the warrior over the shoulder of the horse instead of square on the horse's back, which greatly facilitated archery from horseback.<sup>28</sup> Their horses, or "steppe ponies," were strong and highly trained for warfare.<sup>29</sup> The Seljuk Turks liked to use their mobility to hover just within bowshot of their enemy—striking from a distance with their powerful bows and then fleeing when the enemy offered a pitched battle, twisting their torsos and firing backwards at their pursuers, a maneuver called the "Parthian shot."<sup>30</sup> They also excelled in the "feigned retreat," sometimes retreating for days to draw their enemies into a trap of a larger body of warriors or just tiring them out and waiting until the enemy formation became scattered, and then wheeling and striking when the opportunity presented itself.<sup>31</sup> If a pursuer seemed vulnerable in any way, the Turks would counterattack and swarm over their enemy, killing both men and horses.<sup>32</sup> The Seljuk Turks were very strong in 1071, but the Byzantine Empire was in a completely different situation.

The Byzantines, of course, had a long history as the Eastern Roman Empire, but the Byzantine government and army had come upon difficult times in controlling the empire by the time of the battle. Emperor Basil II had expanded the empire, and the army was stronger than any neighboring force.<sup>33</sup> He had taken over Armenia and Antioch, threatening the local Muslim leaders of Damascus and Aleppo so much that they had agreed to pay tribute in order to be left alone.<sup>34</sup> However, after Basil II died in 1025, the Byzantine army had declined, mostly due to neglect and a reliance on mercenaries. His brother, who succeeded him, was incompetent and the throne passed on to aristocratic families like the Monomachus and the Ducas.<sup>35</sup> These rulers were more interested in their own interests than in protecting the frontiers. In addition, they were afraid of revolt by popular military leaders. They neglected the army and changed Basil's practice of protecting the peasantry against the powerful landowners who wanted to expand their estates. They became extremely wealthy, but the thematic armies, based on citizen-soldiers that came from the landholding peasants, dried up.<sup>36</sup>

The reign of Constantine IX Monomachus between 1042 and 1055 caused extreme discontent and decay in the army.<sup>37</sup> His massive luxury building projects were expensive and ended up debasing the currency. For a long time, the Byzantine gold coin was considered "the Dollar of the Middle Ages."<sup>38</sup> However, he decreased its gold content. Part of this was intentional, to pay for war against the Pechenegs in the east after

they crossed the Danube.<sup>39</sup> However, it effectively lowered army pay by about one-fifth.<sup>40</sup> He then reduced the size of the army, feeling it to be too large and costly and a threat to rebel.

Constantine IX did not seem to be able to tell which of the troops were necessary and which were not. He allowed even the best of the thematic troops to become ineffective, decommissioning 50,000 troops from the Armenian theme on the northeast frontier. This was exactly where the Seljuk Turks began raiding a few years later.<sup>41</sup> These same troops had defeated the Seljuks in battle as late as 1048.<sup>42</sup> His successor, Michael VI Stratioticus, indulged the civilian aristocracy and victimized the military aristocracy.<sup>43</sup>

The military revolted in 1057, and under the general Isaac Comnenus, defeated Michael VI. Emperor Isaac I Comnenus immediately worked to rebuild the empire, but he contracted a fever and died after only two years on the throne.<sup>44</sup> His successor, Constantine X Ducas, was even worse than his most recent namesake—the themes were further disbanded, the treasury was squandered, and the military made even poorer. He also began a bloody persecution of the Monophysite Armenians.<sup>45</sup> This helped widen a severe rift between the Byzantines and the resentful Armenians, which manifested at Manzikert.

By this time, the civil aristocracy had little to fear from the military any longer, but neither did their many outside military threats. The Normans were taking Byzantine Italy, tribes were

invading the Balkans, and the Seljuk Turks were threatening the east. When Constantine X Ducas died, the Ducas aristocratic family lined up to be the next emperor. However, his wife, the Empress Eudocia, tricked them all and married a young military aristocrat, Romanus IV Diogenes, in 1068.<sup>46</sup> Although he had capability, his rule was short-lived.

An experienced and brave military leader, Romanus IV Diogenes had distinguished himself in war against the Patzinaks and had a high reputation among the military.<sup>47</sup> He also had a good reputation as an administrator, but when he became emperor in 1068, he faced many obstacles, which ultimately he could not overcome. The civil aristocracy resented him, especially the Ducas family, who thought they had been robbed of their rightful throne. He had a demoralized army made up mostly of mercenaries, which was frequently on the brink of mutiny.<sup>48</sup> Inadequate pay and lack of supplies had crippled the army. The soldiers were often simply unwilling to fight.<sup>49</sup>

When Romanus came to power, the empire’s eastern frontier was collapsing. However, he recognized the threat of the Turks and tried to get the army into fighting shape. There had been no large imperial army campaigning in the eastern regions for 20 years. He knew he had to reassert imperial presence there and if possible, thoroughly defeat the enemy.<sup>50</sup> Armenia was in danger of collapsing and the Turks were still raiding into Cappadocia and threatening Anatolia.<sup>51</sup> During the first two years

of his rule, he ranged throughout Anatolia with his mostly mercenary army, trying to find and fight bands of Seljuk Turks.<sup>52</sup> He had a few successes against small bands of Seljuks. The expedition of 1068 was very successful, plugging the hole in defense of Syria and showing the Turks there were consequences for raiding.<sup>53</sup> However, his position was still dire.

Comnenus was still under a lot of pressure and trying to consolidate his position. His critics in Constantinople lamented the losses in Byzantine Italy. In the meantime, paying this army was expensive and he strong-armed the aristocracy to get the money to pay for it, which increased unrest.<sup>54</sup> Every time he left Constantinople, he feared intrigues behind his back. He needed a great victory to consolidate his position and prestige. He wanted to secure his throne and intimidate the Turks through military defeat, and so he put together a large army consisting of some natives and a horde of mercenary troops, including Normans, and Eurasian steppe warriors, Bulgars, Pechenegs, and Uzes.<sup>55</sup> He took along a prominent member of the Ducas family, Andronicus, nephew of the former emperor, in part as leverage against intrigues back at the capital while he was gone.<sup>56</sup> Finally, with an army of around 48,000 men, he crossed the Bosphorus and marched towards Alp Arslan.<sup>57</sup> This army was very different from the Seljuk Turk army.

The Byzantine army was also dependent on cavalry, but they preferred a heavily armored soldier who was both a mounted lancer and an archer

(although by the time of Manzikert, many of the mercenaries did not have this skill), fusing the strengths of heavy and light cavalry into one.<sup>58</sup> They also relied on light infantry, which wore little armor and carried a composite bow or javelin, a shield, and an axe for close combat.<sup>59</sup> The third part of a typical Byzantine army consisted of heavy infantry, which wore mail armor, helmets, and carried a large shield, a long spear, and a sword, and fought in a phalanx.<sup>60</sup> The heavy infantry normally formed up behind the heavy cavalry to take advantage of the confusion caused by the cavalry charge. They used the light infantry to protect the heavy troops from light cavalry, as they could fire their arrows further from a more stable platform (the ground).<sup>61</sup> Theoretically, this army could stand up to any other army, and the situation at hand was ripe for these leaders and armies to collide—they did so at Manzikert.

Romanus had bad luck and made bad decisions from the start. He had started out with the largest Byzantine army of the entire 11<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>62</sup> During the course of the campaign, Romanus split his army. He sent a large part, led by general Joseph Trachaneiotes, to Kheilat, north of Lake Van, while he went towards Manzikert.<sup>63</sup> Trachaneiotes never joined the battle at Manzikert. We do not know why. Trachaneiotes was a respected general who had about 25,000 men, probably as many as the entire Seljuk army, including many of the most experienced, best soldiers in the army.<sup>64</sup> Byzantine historian Michael Attaleiates (who was present during the campaign) hints that Trachaneiotes was

scared off when the entire Seljuk Army showed up, saying:

when their commander learned of the attack of the sultan against the emperor himself he took all the men around him and fled ignobly through Mesopotamia to the land of the Romans, giving no thought to his lord nor to what is seemly, the coward.<sup>65</sup>

Muslim historians say Trachaneiotes was taken by surprise by Alp Arslan and defeated, although there is no mention of any engagement by Byzantine sources.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps he was a traitor controlled by the Ducas family. Interestingly, after Romanus' death in 1072, Trachaneiotes was awarded the coveted governorship of Antioch by the Ducas. Was this a reward for betraying Romanus?<sup>67</sup> In any case, no word was sent to Romanus, thirty miles away.<sup>68</sup> Also, Romanus had sent much of his light infantry away with Trachaneiotes.<sup>69</sup> This left the heavy cavalry and infantry without light infantry protection. Romanus had to fight the battle of Manzikert with less than half of his army, and without the piece which was most effective against steppe warriors. However, he still had more troops than the Seljuks, and Alp Arslan did not even want to fight the Byzantine army.

Romanus captured the largely undefended town of Manzikert but did not have long to savor the victory, as his army was soon harassed by Seljuk bowmen.<sup>70</sup> A contingent of Turkish Uze mercenaries crossed over to the Seljuk side.<sup>71</sup> Even though Michael had administered oaths to the Uze mercenaries to ensure their loyalty, they were

still Turkish.<sup>72</sup> This showed the loyalty problem with some mercenaries, and caused distrust in the army. Alp Arslan, knowing he was still outnumbered and wanting to conserve his forces for the attack on the Fatimids, offered a peace treaty to Romanus. The Seljuks did not prefer pitched battles and the only quarrel they really had with the Byzantines was over Armenia, which they could possibly divide.<sup>73</sup> However, Romanus refused. Romanus wanted a decisive military victory to not only remove the Seljuk threat, but also to consolidate his political power. He knew that it would be difficult to keep this army together if he marched back without fighting. He also knew that the campaign had been very expensive, and he probably would not be able to afford to raise another large army in the future.<sup>74</sup> Finally, in light of his lack of political support in Constantinople, he probably wondered if he could even save his throne if he did not fight.<sup>75</sup> The next day, in August 1071 (the exact date is disputed), Romanus advanced with his main army.

During the decisive battle, Romanus ignored normal strategy used against steppe warriors and, eager for a decisive victory, pressed an attack. He commanded the center, the general Alyattes took the right and the general Bryennius was on the left.<sup>76</sup> For some reason, Romanus gave Andronicus Ducas charge of the reserves, which would attack when needed to protect breaks in the line. As was their norm, the Seljuks withdrew in the face of this force in a wide crescent.<sup>77</sup> They set traps and ambushes to isolate and destroy portions on the Byzantines who lost

discipline.<sup>78</sup> Some of his cavalry detachments took the bait and chased groups of Turks into the hills, to be ambushed and slaughtered, but most marched on.<sup>79</sup> The Seljuk mounted light infantry rode up and down the flanks of the army, showering them with arrows, but the frustrated Byzantine army continued on with no opposition in front of them.<sup>80</sup> However, Romanus, so desperate for a victory, kept the army moving.

Finally, Romanus, knowing that the sun would set soon, gave the signal to turn around and go back. He feared the Seljuks would attack his camp which was lightly defended. The majority of his force was untouched. The signal was to face the imperial banner in the other direction, but it could easily have been a misinterpretation as a signal to retreat because the emperor had fallen.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, Attaleiates said that the soldiers far from the front line thought that the emperor had suffered a defeat.<sup>82</sup> Attaleiates points out that the commander of the rear guard, Andronicus, spread the rumor that Romanus was dead and his force defeated, and the rear guard retreated, leaving Romanus behind.<sup>83</sup> Confused units nearby saw the rearguard retreat and followed. Additionally, it would have taken time for all four wings of the army to recognize the order to retreat, causing inevitable gaps between sections of the army for the Seljuk cavalry to take advantage of.<sup>84</sup>

At that point, Alp Arslan, who viewed the whole affair, sprung his attack. The main force of the Seljuk army in the center of the crescent charged into Byzantine army as it turned to go back, and thousands of Seljuk warriors

streamed down the hills onto the Byzantine flanks.<sup>85</sup> Seljuks who had been hiding farther north came out and the main Byzantine force was effectively surrounded.<sup>86</sup> Many of Romanus' mercenary troops fled, including a large contingent of Armenians, who had been conscripted and hated the Byzantines anyway.<sup>87</sup>

This was the point in the battle when the rearguard should have fallen on the Seljuks and crushed them between themselves and Romanus' force. Surrounded, the right wing tried to face both ways and fight, but it was destroyed. The left wing, cut off from the center, fought to reach the emperor, but it was also routed.<sup>88</sup> Romanus and his Varangian Guard (Swedo-Slavic warriors from the Ukraine who had served the Eastern Roman emperor since the reign of Basil II<sup>89</sup>) fought on until they were overpowered and Romanus was captured.<sup>90</sup> Romanus did not give up until his horse was killed out from under him and his sword hand was wounded, preventing him using his sword.<sup>91</sup> The Seljuk Turks had won a great victory against a larger force.

The Byzantines heavily outnumbered the Turks, so why did the Turks win? The answer is in the difference in the states of the armies, the difference in the applicability of the tactics used, and treachery. Although Romanus had made progress in whipping the once proud Byzantine army into shape, there had not been enough time to undo the harm done to the military by previous emperors. The army was ill-equipped, ill-paid, and morale was low. Byzantine intelligence was poor. Romanus




had no idea Arslan was coming to Manzikert to fight.<sup>92</sup> There were divisive elements in the Byzantine Empire and also in the army.<sup>93</sup> The lack of an indigenous professional army had dire consequences—the army was entirely too dependent on mercenaries. These mercenaries were often of limited loyalty (except for the Varangian Guard), as shown by the defection of the Uzes. Additionally, even those who did not defect did not stand and fight—they ran to save themselves once the rearguard retreated. Some spoke different languages and were loyal only to their own captains. In the end, between defections and the abandonment by the rearguard, a large part of Romanus’s army did not even participate in the battle. In contrast, although the Seljuk Turk army was smaller, it was highly trained, heavily armed, and totally devoted to Alp Arslan.<sup>94</sup> To be defeated, his army would have had to be crushed to the last man—they were not a mercenary force. However, the Byzantines still should have had enough of a force there to beat the Turks, or at least to not be defeated, but there was a big difference in how they were used tactically.

The Byzantines were well aware of the importance of using cooperative combined arms tactics for fighting light cavalry, especially steppe cavalry. They had fought the Huns, Khazars, Bulgars, Magyars, and Pechenegs. However, although he was an experienced and respected general who had defeated the Turks previously, Romanus ignored 500 years of Byzantine doctrine, going back to Leo VI’s *Taktika*.<sup>95</sup> He had committed most of his light infantry elsewhere, but

still attacked, violating this doctrine, and proving the point that heavy cavalry could not defeat light cavalry without light infantry support.<sup>96</sup> Romanus was so intent on defeating the Seljuks in a pitched battle, he continued to pursue the Turks further and further, for hours and hours, causing his numerically superior army to become spread out, disorganized, and tired. This played right into the normal steppe warrior tactics, which Alp Arslan used to perfection. He knew the strengths and weaknesses of his forces and used them optimally, exploiting Byzantine weakness and keeping his forces out of danger. Then, at the perfect moment, he unleashed them to great effect. However, the Byzantine army could still have been saved if not for treachery.

Romanus had made a great error by allowing a member of the rival Ducas family to command the reserves and this sealed the Byzantine army’s fate. It is a mystery as to why he did this. After all, he had exiled Andronicus’ father.<sup>97</sup> Perhaps he was trying to mend bridges with the Ducas family and thought the rear guard was where he could do the least harm. In any case, this decision cost him dearly. If the rear guard had advanced, it could have smashed the Turks surrounding Romanus’ contingent. If it had not inflicted a large defeat upon them, it could at least have saved Romanus and his contingent. Andronicus Ducas’ betrayal handed Alp Arslan and the Seljuk Turks victory, and although it furthered the circumstances of the Ducas family in the short term, it had disastrous consequences for the empire.



Map showing the incursion of the Seljuk Turks into the Byzantine Empire. The empire extended to the dark line east of the Battle of Manzikert. By 1194, the Seljuks controlled much of Anatolia in what is now Turkey. [https://about-history.com/the-battle-of-manzikert-1071-and-the-beginning-of-seljuk-dominance/?fbclid=IwAR3gaa59yWxhvJ9KQ\\_eTN6zJvMZX1Rv3sQ5GcePChRU6XxfZYS3P89U8ZnK](https://about-history.com/the-battle-of-manzikert-1071-and-the-beginning-of-seljuk-dominance/?fbclid=IwAR3gaa59yWxhvJ9KQ_eTN6zJvMZX1Rv3sQ5GcePChRU6XxfZYS3P89U8ZnK)

The results of this battle were a shock to the Christian and Islamic worlds. The psychological impact of this battle to the Islamic world was dramatic. For a long time, the Byzantine Empire had been considered “a permanent, stable and unshakeable, element of the political universe of the era.”<sup>98</sup> The Islamic world now began to see the Byzantine Empire in a totally different light. Byzantium was on the decline. Instead of a power, they were a weakening empire, vulnerable and unable to defend itself in many areas, and with wealth and lands available to be taken.<sup>99</sup> This battle, and especially the civil war that followed, led to permanent invasion and conquest during

the next decade.<sup>100</sup> “It dispersed the imperial armies in full view of the Seljuks, opened the eastern frontier, and sent a signal of Roman weakness.”<sup>101</sup> However, even as all of this played out, in spite of the great defeat, strong leadership after the battle could have mitigated this disaster; unfortunately, the Byzantine Empire did not have any at this time.

Manzikert did not have to be a disaster—the Seljuks offered merciful and generous terms as Alp Arslan still wanted to focus on war with the Shiite Fatimids.<sup>102</sup> The Turks were not interested in conquering the Byzantine Empire. Alp Arslan did not follow up his victory—he immediately went east to

Central Asia to deal with a revolt and was killed two years later without ever returning to Anatolia. His son, who succeeded him, also never campaigned in Anatolia.<sup>103</sup> For centuries the Persians, Byzantines, and Turks had raided and campaigned along this fluctuating border. It was business as usual. Additionally, returning a defeated and grateful Romanus to the throne would be much more useful than having to deal with another emperor bent on revenge.

The defeat at Manzikert brought on a civil war in the decade between the battle and the accession of Alexios I Comnenus in 1081, which in turn shaped decades of political and military events. Romanus’s return to the throne probably would have been best for the em-

pire, as he would have honored the treaty with Alp Arslan, bringing peace and a period in which to recover the empire’s strength. The army had been left leaderless as the high-ranking officers rushed back to Constantinople to play politics. The Ducas family acted before he returned and Michael VII Ducas was proclaimed emperor by the Patriarch.<sup>104</sup> Romanus tried to collect remnants of his armies and march on Constantinople, but he was defeated in battle twice and agreed to give up the throne and retire to a monastery.<sup>105</sup> However, he was betrayed, brutally blinded, and died from his wounds.

The aristocratic families were more interested in their own power and wealth than protecting the eastern borders—they refused Alp Arslan’s deal.



A painting depicting the aftermath of the Battle of Manzikert (Mantzikert) in August, 1071 C.E. The battle, in Armenia, was one of the greatest defeats suffered by the Byzantine Empire. The victorious Seljuk army captured the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes. (Diorama at the Istanbul Military Museum, Public Domain) [https://about-history.com/the-battle-of-manzikert-1071-and-the-beginning-of-seljuk-ominance/?fbclid=IwAR3gaa59yWxhvJ9KQ\\_eTN6zJvMZX1Rv3sQ5GcePChRU6XxfZYS3P89U8Znk](https://about-history.com/the-battle-of-manzikert-1071-and-the-beginning-of-seljuk-ominance/?fbclid=IwAR3gaa59yWxhvJ9KQ_eTN6zJvMZX1Rv3sQ5GcePChRU6XxfZYS3P89U8Znk)

Chaos reigned. After Romanus' downfall, his general Philaretus Brachamius rebelled and briefly held a fiefdom from Cilicia and Armenia.<sup>106</sup> General Bryennius revolted at Adrianople, and Roussel of Bailleul, once Michael VII's Norman mercenary general, tried to set up an independent Norman state in Anatolia.<sup>107</sup> Michael VII was continuously faced with revolts and was deposed in 1078 by Nicephoras III Botaneiates, who himself was deposed three years later by Alexius Comnenus.<sup>108</sup> Byzantine leaders such as Nicephoras III, lacking their own strong armies, often asked Seljuk emirs and troops to help in advancing emperors to the throne—increasing their influence.<sup>109</sup> While the Byzantine leaders were occupied with all of this in-fighting, the Byzantine Empire's strategic position changed.

The defeat at Manzikert and the political strife immediately following combined with the failure to focus on the external threats were a devastating combination that undermined the power of the Byzantine Empire forever. It was a "death blow to Byzantine domination in Asia Minor."<sup>110</sup> The campaign had almost bankrupted the state. Romanus himself said "I have used up the monies of the Romans . . . in the reorganization of the armies and in wars, and I have impoverished the nation."<sup>111</sup> Thus began the slow steady decline of Byzantine influence and Christianity in Anatolia.<sup>112</sup> The Turks used the refusal of the treaty made by Alp Arslan with Romanus as an excuse for their incursions into Anatolia.<sup>113</sup> Turcomans poured over the border. The southern

and eastern borders of Byzantium were effectively defenseless and the Byzantines often fled west. Turkish warriors filled the gap in the central and eastern regions and settled there. The neglect of the frontiers opened up the entire Anatolia region to Turkish raids and settlement and during all of this internal turmoil, independent bands of Turks were able to invade Asia Minor and occupy land unopposed.<sup>114</sup> However, it wasn't until two years after the battle that the Seljuk Turks began to systematically occupy Anatolia and migrated into Anatolia in force.<sup>115</sup> Instead of acting against them, the Byzantines let their internal struggles actually strengthen the Turkish position. Soon the Turks had won control of almost all of Anatolia—by 1080 much of Anatolia was incorporated into the Sultanate of Rum.<sup>116</sup>

As a result of the Battle of Manzikert and the ensuing rebellion, the Byzantine Empire had lost its major recruiting region, which provided over half of its military manpower, its largest grain producing region, and its vital trade route between Constantinople and the east.<sup>117</sup> The Byzantine Empire had lost the greatest part of its internal resources and the real source of its strength, which had previously enabled it to recover from setbacks. Anatolia was "defensible, rich, and populous," but fell because nobody would defend it.<sup>118</sup> By the time of the Crusades, Byzantium only held the Anatolian coasts. A movement was instigated that changed people and ideas decisively—Christianity in the region began to be replaced by Islam, and the people of Anatolia changed identities.<sup>119</sup> Even the Comne-

nian recovery later was really limited to the coastal regions and could not sustain itself long-term.<sup>120</sup> However, this situation had effects which would not only change the Byzantine Empire, but would have a great impact on the entire region.

The Battle of Manzikert is often cited as the *casus belli* for the Crusades.<sup>121</sup> The beleaguered Byzantines had sent many requests for military assistance during Pope Urban II's reign, and in March 1095 Emperor Alexios I Comnenus made another appeal for help in fighting off the Turkish invaders to the Pope at the Council of Piacenza.<sup>122</sup> This fell right into the Pope's plans. There had long been a rift between the Eastern and Western churches, and the papacy hoped to reunite them. After the defeat of the Byzantines at Manzikert and the fall of Jerusalem in the same year, Damascus and Antioch also fell, and it was easy to fan the fears of Christians.<sup>123</sup> Just ten months after Emperor Alexius's request, the Pope made his famous speech at Clermont. Although no record of what he said exists, according to one account, he chastised his knights and said, “[I]f you want to take counsel for your souls . . . go forward boldly as knights of Christ, hurrying swiftly to defend the Eastern church.”<sup>124</sup> Although Alexius expected mercenary warriors to help, he had opened up the proverbial Pandora's Box. The first Crusade was the response to these appeals for help to repel those who held the lands of the Christians, and the Franks soon traveled *en mass* into Byzantium on their way to the Holy Land. Often crusaders carved out their own fiefdoms

or refused to return cities to Byzantine control, and sometimes were very harsh traveling through Byzantine territory.

The Battle of Manzikert was definitely one of the most influential events in history. It marked the beginning of the end for the Byzantines. It sent shockwaves through both the Christian and Islamic worlds and opened the floodgates to Turkish incursion into the most strategically important region of the empire.<sup>125</sup> The two armies and their leaders were very different. The Seljuk Turks were nomadic steppe warriors, experts at using light infantry on hit-and-run attacks. Their leader, Alp Arslan, was a strong Sunni warrior who really wanted no war with the Byzantines—he wanted to make war on the heretical Shiite Fatimids. They had taken over the Persian Empire and were in a very strong position. The Byzantines were in a very different position. Decades of mismanagement had turned the strong Byzantine military into an underpaid, mostly mercenary force with low morale. The Byzantine leader at Manzikert, Romanus, was insecure in his position as emperor with many political enemies, leading a large, but inefficient force. Romanus' campaign towards the Seljuk Turks was filled with errors. He split his army in half and then ignored Byzantine tactics versus steppe warriors, finally betrayed by his own generals. Although the Byzantines lost this battle, it might not have been a disaster if followed by good leadership. In the end, however, the battle and subsequent civil war were a disaster for the Byzantines because of poor leadership, internal struggles, and neglect of

the borders that resulted in the loss of Anatolia, a strategically important area they could hardly afford to lose. The result of the battle had great ramifications for not only the Byzantine Empire, but for the course of history in this region of the world. The battle so changed the strategic position of the Byzantines that soon the Turks had overrun Anatolia and their requests for assistance led to the first Crusade—a seminal event in world history.

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# The Bund Deutscher Mädel and the Indoctrination of the German Girl

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## ABSTRACT

As the Nazi government took hold, one of the key elements to retaining their power was influencing the younger generations to perpetuate the party ideology—nationalism, patriotism, and Aryan pride. Outside of the family, this was accomplished by the Hitler Youth, divided into two gender-specific organizations, the Hitlerjugend for boys and the Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM) for girls. From the ages of 10 to 21, young women were programmed to be the perfect Nazi bride, concerned only with Kinder, Küche, and Kirch (children, kitchen, and church). The BDM used a combination of physical activities and social conditioning to train these young women to raise future generations of the Reich.

**Keywords:** Propaganda, Nazis, Indoctrination, *Glaube und Schönheit* (Faith and Beauty Society), *Bund Deutscher Mädel*, Hitler Youth, Elvira Bauer, *Landfrauenjahr* (Year of Land Service)

## El Bund Deutscher Mädel y el adoctrinamiento de la niña alemana

### RESUMEN

A medida que el gobierno nazi se afianzaba, uno de los elementos clave para retener su poder fue influir en las generaciones más jóvenes para perpetuar la ideología del partido: el nacionalismo, el patriotismo y el orgullo ario. Fuera de la familia, esto fue logrado por las Juventudes Hitlerianas, divididas en dos organizaciones específicas de género, Hitlerjugend para niños y Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM) para niñas. Desde los 10 hasta los 21 años, las mujeres jóvenes fueron programadas para ser la novia nazi perfecta, preocupadas solo por Kinder, Küche y Kirch (niños, cocina e iglesia). El BDM utilizó una combinación de actividades físicas y acondicionamiento social para capacitar a estas jóvenes para criar a las generaciones futuras del Reich.

**Palabras clave:** Propaganda, Nazis, Adoctrinamiento, *Glaube und Schönheit* (Sociedad de Fe y Belleza), *Bund Deutscher Mädel*, Juventudes Hitlerianas, Elvira Bauer, *Landfrauenjahr* (Año del Servicio Terrestre)

## 德国少女联盟和及其思想灌输

### 摘要

随着纳粹政府掌权，保持其权力的关键之一则是影响年轻一代，进而延续党派意识形态—民族主义、爱国主义和雅利安人的骄傲。这发生在家庭之外，由希特勒青年团完成，后者被划分为两个性别组织—男孩加入希特勒青年团，女孩加入德国少女联盟（BDM）。10-21岁的少女被设定成为完美的纳粹新娘，她们只关心孩子、厨房和教堂。BDM通过体力活动和社会熏陶来训练这些少女为纳粹德国养育后代。

关键词：政治宣传，纳粹，思想灌输，“信仰与美丽”组织，德国少女联盟，希特勒青年团，埃尔维拉·鲍尔（Elvira Bauer），一年土地劳动（Landfrauenjahr）

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**A**s the 1930s progressed, Hitler youth organizations developed into the largest single purpose organization within the Nazi party.<sup>1</sup> Youths and young adults between the ages of 10 and 18 spent their free time organized social gatherings with an emphasis on spreading the National Socialist agenda. In the early days of the *Bund Deutscher Mädel*, the League of German Girls, the girls would participate in similar activities as the boys leagues—war games, field exercises, and marksmanship.<sup>2</sup> This proved to be wildly unsuccessful in terms of recruitment, and towards the end of the de-

cade the BDM became more focused on turning young women into ideal Nazi housewives.<sup>3</sup> While the Hitler Youth programs were instrumental in the indoctrination of both young women and men, there remains a woefully limited amount of English literature regarding the BDM, and many of the writings on the organization are filled with exaggeration in terms of the size of the organization.<sup>4</sup>

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the Hitler-Jugend, and specifically the role that the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* played in solidifying the support for Hitler and the party

for the younger generations of women. The group's origins stem from the early years of Hitler's attempt at power in the 1920s as a social organization for young women, giving them opportunities to discuss and expose themselves to the rhetoric of the party—nationalism, patriotism, and the superiority of the Aryan race. Before Hitler gained control of the Reichstag in 1932, membership in the organization was optional; afterwards, it became compulsory.

The League was not simply a social organization, though many activities that the young women participated in were social in nature—it was an indoctrination machine. Joseph Goebbels and his propaganda machine understood the importance of controlling the narrative—especially with the youth, to ensure that the message of Nazi superiority was driven home. The Ministry of Propaganda exploited the fact that the brain does not fully develop until the age of 25, leaving the young women of the BDM vulnerable at the hands of the adults who were ultimately supposed to be their protectors.

The conditioning of children started young, typically around the age that they could read. One of the Nazi party's favorite children's books, *Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud auf seinem Eid* (Trust No Fox on His Green Heath and No Jew on His Oath) was written by Elvira Bauer, who was a schoolteacher for young children, in 1936. The primary goal of that book (and others) was to spread anti-Semitic sentiment amongst children. The plan was insidious and ef-

fective. Along with Bauer's work, the youth of the nation were repeatedly exposed to anti-Semitic books like "The Poisonous Mushroom" as well as vile and inhumane toys and games.<sup>5</sup> The hate, anti-Semitism, and obedience that formed the core of the Nazi's indoctrination was intentionally directed at the ones who were the most vulnerable.<sup>6</sup> Goebbels and Hitler understood the vulnerability of the youth, the party made membership in the Hitler Youth mandatory in 1939.<sup>7</sup> These tactics were taken a step further once these young women moved from the school yards into the ranks of the BDM.

It is important to note just how limited the study of the Bund Deutscher Mädel has been over the past 80 years. Discussion of the BDM was typically done as a side examination or an offshoot in the discussion of the Hitler Youth in general. The reasons behind that were widely varied, including but not limited to the lack of access to primary sources until the reunification of Germany in 1990 and an overall lack of interest in the involvement of young girls in the Nazi movement. This harkens back to the amount of astonishment that the outside world had when finding out just what percentage of women voted for Hitler in spite of his apparent misogynistic values.

The overwhelming majority of the young women who joined the BDM before it became compulsory were either true believers themselves, or the daughters of true believers. These young women wanted to matter to the Party, to the Volk, and to the Vaterland.

Just like every other teenage girl, they wanted to be a part of something great, something that mattered.<sup>8</sup> They fell victim to Hitler's honey-coated promises of a revitalized, lavish, and prosperous Germany, with the economic and political power that it had before the defeat in 1918.<sup>9</sup> Too young to work and too old to play, these girls were nothing more than empty vessels waiting to be filled with the party line.

The party leaders utilized physical, emotional, and psychological manipulation to wear down these girls and further indoctrinate them into the Nazi way of life. The goal began with creating a new, Nazi femininity—a sharp contrast to how the Weimar woman were perceived—the Nazi woman was simple, restrained, and knew her place in society, subjugated first to her father and then her husband. Gone was the cosmopolitan woman of the Weimar who drank, smoked, painted her face, and dressed in the style of the French. German women were to be subdued in their beauty, with simple clothes and humble plaits, the human embodiment of Nordic simplicity.<sup>10</sup> These dictates were especially obvious in the uniform of the BDM—a shapeless white shirt, simple tie, and navy skirt that hit below the knee.<sup>11</sup> By creating an environment of *Gleichschaltung*, or forced uniformity, the BDM and the party stripped away the individual identities of these young women.<sup>12</sup> This left them pliable, and as evident in other incidents of brainwashing and indoctrination since, such as the Branch Davidians in 1993, created a mindset that enabled them to comfortably commit and support the

atrocities that the Nazi party would undertake over the subsequent six years.

Once the BDM took away their individuality by forcing a uniformity of appearance, they started to work on the physical indoctrination. The main group activities for the BDM included hiking and other organized sports, outwardly to stress physical fitness amongst the members. On the surface, those motivations seemed genuine, but that genuineness was shallow. In forcing the body into a constant state of high adrenaline, the mind becomes even more susceptible to influence.<sup>13</sup> The more physical exertion that these young women underwent, along with the limited access to food due to the economic state of the nation, the easier they were to indoctrinate and control.

The emotional manipulation was going on the whole time. It was nefarious and systemic throughout Germany during Hitler's time in power. From teaching children to hate Jews with the books geared to young readers to the somber pomp of a Hitler speech, the party worked very hard to condition the German youth to support the policies of the Reich. Upon seizing control of the media, the Nazis mass produced their message of racial superiority in sequentially more obvious ways, not the least of which was the poster depicting a young girl, dressed in BDM uniform emblazoned with the phrase, "*Auch Du gehörst dem Führer* (You too belong to the Führer)."<sup>14</sup>

When examining the overall structure of the BDM, one finds that it closely resembled a paramilitary or-





*You too belong to the Führer.* 1937. Image. Accessed July 19, 2021. <https://www.ushmm.org/propaganda/archive/poster-you-belong-fuhrer/>. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Plak 003-011-009)



Young Girls Saluting. Photograph. The New Yorker. May 29, 2013. Accessed July 19, 2021. <https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/i-was-a-nazi-and-heres-why>.

ganization. The physical activities and training, even the shooting competitions that these teens would participate in, reinforced the rabid nationalism that these girls were getting from the propaganda. The regimented design of the organization helped further the militarization. In 1933, with a membership of 375,000, the structure included individual groups of fifteen, which each had a troop leader who reported to her higherups, all the way up to the *Reichsregerentin des Bundes Deutscher Mädel* (Reich representative of the League of German Girls).<sup>14</sup> With compulsory membership in 1939, suitable mid-level leadership in rural areas became a problem. The requirements required leaders to be close in age to the troop members, but not enough new adult women were available to step into the role, so party had to rely on women who were themselves not fully homogenized into Reich politics. This was especially true

in more rural areas, where women filled the more traditional roles of wife and mother rather than the more radicalized women in the urban areas.<sup>15</sup>

As the League became less of a revolutionary construct and more of a social training organization, Hitler wrested full control by declaring himself dictator. The BDM's focus moved toward creating ideal Nazi wives and mothers. The activities changed—rather than having the girls physically training with airsoft rifles, they worked on calisthenics to prepare them for the physical rigors of pregnancy and childrearing. They were still required to be physically active, since being unable to run, jump, and throw meant that the girl was of substandard body and ill fit for motherhood. Instead, they focused their training on being adept at the womanly virtues of keeping house, cooking, and childrearing.<sup>16</sup>

Once the girls started to age out of the program, between the ages of 17 and 18—this was before the *Glaube und Schönheit* (Faith and Beauty Society) was formed in 1938—these young women were required to undergo a year of service work for the nation. This was mandated of both groups of the Hitler Youth, male and female.<sup>17</sup> For the girls, this year was typically served either on a farm, where they lived in Spartan barracks and worked the land to pay for their room and board, as well as a pittance of spending money, or they worked in domestic roles, serving as housekeepers or nannies for a young married couple in a larger city. The purpose of this year of work was twofold: the first was to help bolster the economy, and the second was to keep women out of the universities. According to numbers from the Reich statistical office, between 1938 and 1939 the number of young women registered for their *Pflichtjahr* (the official name for the year of duty) increased from under 80,000 to almost 220,000.<sup>18</sup> The program was ultimately less than successful, as the leadership shortage within the BDM created a power vacuum in the middle levels of the organization—the faster the organization grew, the fewer people who were capable of leading the smaller units there were—and from a finance standpoint, it became impossible to support the girls during their service year.<sup>19</sup>

An unintended consequence of the BDM was an increase of promiscuity amongst teens and young women. During the Weimar era, the population of Germany stagnated slightly. Birth rates peaked in the 1870s after the first

unification of Germany under the Empire. They fell significantly during the First World War and afterwards under the Weimar Republic—from 5.35 births per 1,000 in 1875 down to 1.75 in 1935 at the height of Nazi power.<sup>20</sup> This posed a big problem for Hitler and his ilk. How can one lead the thousand-year Reich if the population of the country is on a decline? The reasons for the decline were widespread, including the industrialization of Germany as a nation, which decreased the need for child farm labor, and families moving from farms into cities where the living spaces were smaller and better suited for small family groups. Hitler and the Nazis also feared the ready availability of birth control amongst Weimar women.<sup>21</sup> The Nazis were not the only group concerned with the falling birthrate—it troubled even the feminists of the period.<sup>22</sup> Promiscuity amongst the BDM was such a rampant concern that the League gained the nickname “League of German Mattresses.” While counterintuitive, the Party encouraged this behavior through the *Lebensborn*. The end goal was to rebuild the German population and correct the declining birthrates—to do that, young women were encouraged to engage in premarital sex and keep the children that were the result.

As the conflict grew, less political energy was spent on the BDM and the indoctrination of young women. The programs still ran, and membership remained compulsory until Germany's surrender in 1945, but the zeal was not the same. By the early part of the 1940s, many of the young women who had

joined the BDM had either aged out of disillusioned with what the BDM had the program or had become completely become.

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
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## Book Review: Stephen Eric Bronner's *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement*

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Stephen Eric Bronner, *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 224 pp. ISBN: 9780231126090.

Stephen Eric Bronner, a Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University, attempts to reclaim the spirit of the Enlightenment from the dialectical clutches of those who attribute to the movement the worst excesses of modernity in the subsequent centuries after the 1700s. Specifically, Bronner is critical of Horkheimer and Adorno's 1947 work *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, in which the co-authors attack the Age of Reason as the root cause of modern issues such as imperialist ambitions, totalitarianism, and mass globalization. I found this re-interpretive work to be a very sobering read, mostly because I feel that it gave me a clearer understanding of the causal relationship between the Enlightenment and the positive evolution of its tenets and ideals. Western

and non-western nations alike are faced with problems of modernity that can be explained by reason and logic, many of which resulted from the tension of Counter-Enlightenment efforts to subvert the Enlightenment spirit. Bronner touched on a number of major concepts that are still salient today, most of which are waiting for the “ideological willingness” of nations to act on them and thus revive the spirit of the Enlightenment in our own time (xi).

The first major concept revolves around the notion of progress and the application of Enlightenment ideals to characterize progressive modernity. The term “Enlightenment ideals” refers to theories and notions fleshed out and debated by the philosophes that challenged the status quo—things like

freedom of thought, individualism, and social contract theory. These and many others were abstract manifestations of the period's philosophical thought. Bronner characterizes progress as "an attack on the 'illusion of finality': closure, certainty, and utopia," and implies that progress does not equate to the absolute end form of an idea, but that it is ever changing to "better the condition of humanity" (18).

This excerpt really speaks to Bronner's idea of the substance of progress:

The Enlightenment envisioned progress as the process of bringing what had once been shrouded in darkness into the light. This meant not simply recognizing existing differences among people of different cultures as morally legitimate, but also what is institutionally required in order that people may safely exercise their differences. The crucial issue was, for this reason, never the 'subjectivity of the subject.' Advocates of the Enlightenment instead sought to foster the moral autonomy of the individual over established traditions and the critical use of rationality against what Ernst Cassirer termed 'mytho-poetical thinking.' This enabled them to link progress with the extension of freedom and the exercise of the intellect (19-20).

The philosophes aimed to use the notion of progress in the name of the individual and his rights to critique, and

to challenge the dogmatic traditions and institutions that helped monarchs and clergy retain their power and influence. Confronting that tradition and questioning that authority "rendered the Enlightenment notion of progress unique and highlights its contemporary salience." Due to the fact that the philosophes of the eighteenth century longed for an emancipated future for all . . . progress would "never be complete" (21).

A second major concept relates to the political, social, economic, and even religious tensions derived from the Enlightenment/Counter-Enlightenment dichotomy. The vanguard of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution attempted to liberate themselves from Catholic theological dogma taking place at universities by instead championing more secular institutions, like the Royal Society in London or the Academy of Science in Paris. They paved the way for the eighteenth-century philosophes to do much the same, thus creating a new context for the exercise of equality, discourse, tolerance, and common sense. "It constituted a 'bourgeois public sphere' that would serve as the infrastructure for the democratic revolutions" of the long nineteenth century. Bronner argues that this inherently ties the Enlightenment philosophes to the left end of the political spectrum; therefore, "*all* movements of the right ultimately are grounded in a politics of *reaction*, and the Counter-Enlightenment was no different" (61-62).

Those who espoused ideas of Counter-Enlightenment, such as the advocacy of an organic sense of nation,



patriarchal authority, and the spirit of religion, were resistant to change and therefore skeptical of the philosophes' work. This resistance created a great divide between educated contemporaries, placing the tenets over which they conflicted on a pedestal of morality. On the one hand, Enlightenment philosophes sought to "project an eradication of what is brutal and unjust in the name of a better society with a new set of human relations," while those in the Counter-Enlightenment camp "stood for obedience, coercive authority, and tradition" when it came to civil society. What Kant argues, and Bronner echoes, was that summoning the courage to exercise one's own intellect would become easier with "the existence of liberal institutions and a 'public' animated by civil interests." Despite the Counter-Enlightenment's arguments (which in my opinion bore little credence) and the fact that few prejudices associated with the philosophes existed (e.g., support of slavery by some or issue with religion by others), the primary principles that characterized progress at the time derived from the Enlightenment camp. "Enlightenment intellectuals subordinated national customs and prejudices to the universal assumptions underpinning the critical exercise of the intellect and this the Counter-Enlightenment could not forgive" (63-68).

A third major concept contends the need for a cosmopolitan sensibility in order to revive the Enlightenment. Simply put: there is still a political struggle over individual rights, two very different outlooks "grounded in the assumptions of the Enlightenment

and the Counter-Enlightenment." For the latter, it is a matter of sticking to tradition and keeping minorities in line because such an action underpins their position in this world. For the Enlightenment philosophes and their intent Bronner references the words of A. Belton Fields, which illustrates the notion of a cosmopolitan sensibility well:

It is both 'an intellectual mistake and an affront to those outside the western tradition to look back at any one of these [western] thinkers as the historical point of authority for how we should think about human rights. We should, rather, look at them as illustrating how human rights can be seen from a variety of angles and the problems that arise when we approach the subject from each of these angles.' (Fields, *Rethinking Human Rights for the New Millennium*, 21)

The eighteenth-century philosophes got the discourse rolling, but in contemporary cases where issues surrounding cosmopolitanism (e.g., gender, race, cultural practices) exist, we need to take the view of the philosophes further and apply a critical outlook to traditional thought (136).


Bronner's book contributes to European historiography in positive ways. On the one hand, many of the points in the book target the arguments of another book, rendering the whole process a result of academic discourse. On the other hand, Bronner uses this discourse to reveal that the Enlightenment of 300 years ago still has salience

for today's society. The most significant motive for analyzing and discussing historical events and phenomena is to in turn apply the concepts to better understand our present circumstances; society must rely on applying the philosophical message of the Enlightenment as it projects the "type of world that ev-

ery decent person wishes to see" (167). Combating "oppressive institutions, unjustifiable privileges, and anachronistic cultural practices" is what Enlightenment thinkers have equipped us to do in the here and now (xii). That is the purpose of reclaiming the Enlightenment.

# Book Review: W.E.B. DuBois' *Black Reconstruction in America: A History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880*

Savannah Jackson-Cornell



W.E.B. DuBois' *Black Reconstruction in America: A History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880*. Routledge, 2013. 686 pp. ISBN: 9781412846202.

W.E.B. DuBois published *Black Reconstruction in America: A History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880* in 1935. At the time of the book's publication, America was in the fallout of the Great Depression and experiencing a capitalist crisis. Following the crash of the Stock Market in October 1929, America faced the largest economic fallout in industrial, economic history. In his work, DuBois sought to expand the period recognized as Reconstruction from twelve years to twenty, and although it was criticized at the time, the book has grown in relevance since its publication. *Black Reconstruction* revised the narrative of Reconstruction, identified propa- ganda and misinterpretation in historiog-

raphy, and drew connections between slavery and America's capitalist society.

*Black Reconstruction* was criticized at the time it was published, but pushed to change the historical context surrounding Reconstruction. According to historian Claire Parfait, W.E.B. DuBois changed the rhetoric being used by historians in the 1930s on the Reconstruction Era (266). Parfait alludes to the fact that prior to the publication of this work, African-American history was not studied inside mainstream history the way it should have been. The effect of W.E.B. DuBois' *Black Reconstruction* was a change in the rhetoric of contemporary Reconstruction historiography. In the book, Reconstruction is defined as a twenty-year period, from 1860-1880. Most historians, even current historians, still recognize Recon-

struction as the twelve years following the Civil War. DuBois makes it clear in his book that history has been misinterpreted by white, male historians, and even propagandized. Culture and race were major themes of Reconstruction, but to Dubois, privilege and property played a larger role. He wrote, "It was not, then, race and culture calling out of the South in 1876; it was property and privilege, shrieking to its own kind, and privilege and property heard and recognized the voice of its own" (39). For example, the movie *Birth of a Nation* and the book series *The Clansman*, published around the same time, were both racially charged and produced false assumptions of reconstruction. Public consumption of the film *Birth of a Nation* grew rapidly after it was screened at the White House during the Wilson administration. The film's negative depiction of African Americans influenced public opinion throughout America.

DuBois intended to revise this historical argument. This is the main reason *Black Reconstruction* is still widely studied among historians—to understand African-American history and Reconstruction. Dubois worked to decontaminate textbooks that were riddled with incorrect assumptions and unfair accusations about African Americans as a whole. The three main myths that DuBois wanted to end were as follows: "Negroes are ignorant;" Negroes are lazy, dishonest, and extravagant; and finally, Negroes bear the responsibility for poor government during reconstruction (267). This is an issue that goes deeper than the fact that white historians were producing historical

works. University presses and publication companies needed to appeal to the country as a whole, not just part of it. This led to many misconceptions and interpretations in the field of history.

W.E.B. DuBois was the first African American to receive a PhD in History from Harvard (269-270). As Claire Parfait pointed out, in the year 1935, over two thousand PhDs in History were awarded in America, but only six of them to African Americans. These overwhelming issues of the moment, inequality in higher education, racism in the American South, and inequality in scholarly publication encouraged the misinterpretations that DuBois denounces in his writings. DuBois' *Black Reconstruction* was criticized at the time of its publication; however, it was still recognized as an important work in the historical community. *The Journal of American History* and *The American Historical Review* featured excerpts of his book, and did not publish another African-American author for almost seventy years.

Historian Cedric Robinson summarizes DuBois' written work best by calling it a contradiction. At the time of its publishing, *Black Reconstruction* was in a lane of its own. In 1935, the other published literature on reconstruction was swayed and filled with white-bias. As Robinson notes, DuBois had a keen sense for noticing and researching propaganda within history and historiography, and was not afraid to label it as such (44). This book was published during the fallout of the Great Depression and of a capitalist crisis, and as Robinson

put it, DuBois seized the historical moment. Certain texts and publications thrive in various economies and culture changes, and DuBois met this moment with *Black Reconstruction*.

Perhaps W.E.B. DuBois' *Black Reconstruction* became popular because it tied slavery directly to capitalism, and it was published during a capitalist crisis. The beginning of the book is focused on addressing the issue of slavery and the economy. DuBois makes the effort to show that American society was built on the backs of slaves (45). He wrote, "How the Civil War meant emancipation and how the black worker won the war by a general strike which transferred his labor from the Confederate planter to the Northern invader, in whose army lines workers began to be organized as a new labor force" (27). DuBois explained how African Americans developed the South, helped the North win the war, and continued to shape America after Reconstruction ended.

W.E.B. DuBois' opinion was in the minority when he addressed the

topic of Reconstruction in the 1930s. At this time of *Black Reconstruction's* publication, most historical texts were written by white historians who viewed issues surrounding race relations through a different lens. Almost a century later, DuBois' *Black Reconstruction* has grown in popularity and relevance. Historians like Claire Parfait and Cedric Robinson have credited the publication with revising the public view on Reconstruction. In addition, DuBois exposed propaganda and misinterpretation in the historical profession. At the time, most historians were white men, who were influenced by films like *The Birth of a Nation* in their research. DuBois recognized these misinterpretations and the ways in which African Americans were portrayed. DuBois linked slavery to capitalist American society and fought to debunk myths that African Americans were lazy, among other misconstrued opinions about his race. As the first African-American, History PhD graduate from Harvard, W.E.B. D.Bois rewrote history, as his relevance to historians increases as time passes.

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
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## Book Review: Edwards Cox's *Grey Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship*

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Edwards Cox. *Grey Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship*. Stillwater, Oklahoma: New Forums Press, 2011. 120 pp. ISBN: 9781581072037.

Inspired by Civil War stories to serve, indispensable to General Pershing during the Great War, and immensely influential on the prominent American generals of World War II, Major General (MG) Fox Conner is largely considered “one of the greatest military minds of the 20<sup>th</sup> century,” yet he is nearly forgotten to history (xv). *Grey Eminence, Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship* by Edward Cox details MG Conner’s remarkable story, from birth in post-Confederate Mississippi to his influence on each World War, and his successful approach to mentoring subordinates. Despite MG Conner ordering all his papers and journals burned late in life, Cox retrieves “long-forgotten references and unpublished original sources” to illuminate MG Conner’s extraordinary life and lasting impact (xvii). Cox relies on his experiences as

an Army officer to augment this historical account with lessons for developing contemporary leaders.

As mentioned, the book has a two-fold purpose. First, as this is one of only two books written exclusively on MG Conner, it supplements the historical files by providing a detailed yet concise biography of his life. The majority of the book is dedicated to learning about MG Conner’s personal and professional journey, allowing the reader to understand how he became the “master of his craft” (xvii). The second purpose expands upon his leadership style, providing a guide for military professionals. Cox focuses on the mentorship aspect of MG Conner’s servant leadership approach and further consolidates his successful techniques as “recognizing talent and developing it” and “be prepared to break the rules” (xix-xxi).

Cox begins by narrating Fox Conner's humble beginnings and connecting how his father's tall tales of service in the Confederacy inspired him, at the age of 8, to seek out an appointment to the United States Military Academy. Eleven years later, an illness would delay his time as a cadet, but Conner took advantage of that year to augment his public schooling in preparation for the upcoming academic demands. This is one of many cases highlighted by Cox in which Conner dedicated his time and energy to overcome personal shortfalls.

Cadet Conner eventually graduated 17 of 59 in his class and entered service in 1898, just on the cusp of the Spanish-American War. Conner ambitiously sought a commission in the infantry or cavalry to fulfill his lifelong desire for battlefield glory. However, circumstance led him to initial service at the Cuban garrison as an artillery officer.

Lacking opportunities for war heroics, Conner began cementing his professional habit of "persistent self-study" (xviii). Cox makes clear that this approach ensured he passed his Captain's promotion board with "flying colors" and was one of the first three artillery officers to attend the General Service and Staff College (GSSC) (27). Despite his background, Conner continued this momentum and excelled academically in the infantry and cavalry dense curriculum.

Cox then details how Conner's next assignments were paramount to his later success. After a few years in

tactical assignments, Conner attended and then instructed at the Army War College. His faculty duties gave him opportunities to coach students and showcase his mastery of artillery and tactics, even to students who were multiple ranks superior to his. Overall, the experiences during these consequential five years allowed Conner to combine his creativity, passion, and wisdom as a burgeoning leader and mentor.

Through inescapable fate, Conner was next assigned as an exchange officer to a French Artillery Regiment in 1911. This seminal time enabled him to master the French language, terrain, and military. However, his time in France was cut short and he later supported General John "Black Jack" Pershing's expeditions along the Southwest border. Much like Pershing and the frontier Army, Conner's experience would provide invaluable lessons that would soon be relied upon in the European theater.

In 1917, Conner's unmatched portfolio was tapped by General Pershing as he assembled the American Expeditionary Force in France. To assist him, Conner wittingly enlisted the bright military mind of George Marshall. Although Cox provides few details on their relationship, it is made clear that Marshall gained crucial experience working for Conner.

After the Great War, Conner took command in Panama and selected Major Dwight Eisenhower as his executive officer. To facilitate this personnel move, however, Conner had to "break the rules" by calling in a personal favor



to release Eisenhower from his current position. Conner repeated this tactic years later to ensure Eisenhower also attended GSSC, education required for senior level promotions. Cox notes that although effective, this mentoring trait is even more controversial in contemporary settings. Notwithstanding, Eisenhower was appreciative and called Conner the person that most shaped his career and the "the ablest man he ever knew" (94).

In 1928, Conner would again "break the rules" for a different officer, to ensure his ascension. George Patton's aggressive approach as a staff officer led to a positional demotion. As fate would have it, though, Conner assumed command of Patton's division, transferred him to a new position, and issued a well-timed evaluation that rescued his career. From that point and throughout his time in WWII, Patton kept in close contact with Conner, seeking his advice on a broad range of military topics.

Conner's approach to mentoring Eisenhower and Patton was quite similar. Through detailed accounts, Cox describes how Conner cultivated a mutually-trusting personal relationship around similar interests, took an active role in their professional development, and provided positive reinforcement and advice. In both cases, Conner was reassured that each had potential and were worth the risk to develop.

Conner maintained an active retirement by lecturing at the Army War College and keeping in contact with his three protégés. Incredibly, Eisenhower and Marshall used secret carriers

to transfer war plans, to include those of operations Torch and Overlord, for Conner's feedback. Conner passed away in 1951, but was fortunate enough to see Patton's tanks defeat the Panzers, Eisenhower successfully lead the Allies, and the Marshall Plan begin to rebuild Europe.

Although a great historical account of a lesser-known military figure, Cox could have emphasized and expanded upon Conner's "art of mentorship." Conner's leadership techniques (recognize talent, develop it, and be prepared to break the rules) are only directly discussed briefly, once, in the introduction. Throughout the chapters, Cox details how Conner mentored and assisted his subordinates, but the reader is left to make the direct connection back to Conner's techniques. A more pointed discussion throughout the book and accentuation of other common practices used by Conner (e.g., building a relationship based on shared interests) would ensure the reader does not overlook the important leadership lessons that remain relevant for contemporary leaders.

Nonetheless, *Grey Eminence* is deserving of the Military Writers Society of America – Silver Award, as it provides a personal and historical overview of Fox Conner and his leadership traits that developed three great American generals. Through a chronological account of Conner's life and his influence on his protégés, the reader is informed on this overlooked American figure. Cox clearly shows how and why Fox Conner was the enigmatic influence or

“grey eminence” of their lives. A short and concise read, suitable for those interested in military history or anyone searching for a leader to emulate.

# **Lecture Review: Military History in the Age of COVID: A Review of the Society for Military History's 2021 Annual Meeting**

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## ABSTRACT

The Society for Military History held its 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting in Norfolk, Virginia in May 2021, titled “Turning the Tide: Revolutionary Moments in Military History.” Conference planners blended in-person and virtual attendance and presentation to provide a hybrid experience. The hybrid experience provided reasonable accommodations in the not-quite-post-coronavirus environment of late spring 2021, when the Center for Disease Control had only recently eased their guidance for mask-wearing by vaccinated individuals, but attendees encountered some expected technical difficulties throughout the conference. In spite of said difficulties, the Society for Military History succeeded in resuscitating the tradition of academic conferences and providing a forum in which scholars could exchange ideas and network, just in a modified format which may portend the role of conferences in the future.

*Keywords:* history conference; military history; Norfolk; COVID-19; virtual panels; hybrid panels; revolution; remote learning; conference review; Society for Military History

# **Revisión de la conferencia: Historia militar en la era de COVID: Revisión de la reunión anual de 2021 de la Sociedad de Historia Militar**

## RESUMEN

La Sociedad de Historia Militar celebró su 87a reunión anual en Norfolk, Virginia en mayo de 2021, titulada “Cambiano el rumbo: Momentos revolucionarios en la historia militar”. Los planificadores de conferencias combinaron la asistencia y la presentación en persona y virtual para brindar una experiencia híbrida. La expe-

riencia híbrida brindó adaptaciones razonables en el entorno no del todo posterior al coronavirus de fines de la primavera de 2021, cuando el Centro para el Control de Enfermedades había facilitado recientemente su orientación para el uso de máscaras por parte de las personas vacunadas, pero los asistentes encontraron algunas dificultades técnicas esperadas durante todo el período. conferencia. A pesar de dichas dificultades, la Sociedad de Historia Militar logró resucitar la tradición de las conferencias académicas y proporcionar un foro en el que los académicos pudieron intercambiar ideas y establecer contactos, solo en un formato modificado que puede presagiar el papel de las conferencias en el futuro.

**Palabras clave:** conferencia de historia; historia militar; Norfolk; COVID-19; paneles virtuales; paneles híbridos; revolución; aprendizaje a distancia; revisión de la conferencia; Sociedad de Historia Militar

## 课程回顾：新冠肺炎时期的军事史： 军事史学会2021年会回顾

### 摘要

军事史学会于2021年5月在弗吉尼亚州诺福克市举办了第87届名为“扭转形势：军事史上的革命时刻”的年会。会议规划者结合了线上和线下研讨会及演示文稿。这一混合式体验在2021年晚春这一大流行后期情境下提供了合理安排，此时美国疾病控制与预防中心刚宣布已接种疫苗的人士不必佩戴口罩，不过，与会者在会议中面临了一些预期的技术故障。尽管如此，军事史学会成功延续了学术会议传统并为学者提供一个能交流想法和关系网的论坛，鉴于当前情境，未来可能继续使用这种会议形式。

关键词：历史会议；军事史；诺福克市；2019冠状病毒病；网络研讨会；线上及线下研讨会；革命；远程学习；会议回顾；军事史学会

For a first-time attendee to the world of academic conferences, one might first feel dwarfed upon entering the Hilton Norfolk's ("The Main") front lobby in downtown Norfolk, Virginia. The Main's all-glass street-facing walls are filled with a view of Main Street and the Owen B. Pickett Custom House, with its white columns and brass railings. Nearby, just around the corner, the decommissioned battleship-turned-naval museum the USS *Wisconsin* dominates downtown Norfolk as a fixture in local military history.

In May 2021, the hotel seemed hushed and empty at first glance. The rest of the high walls enclosing the Main's lobby stretched for at least three stories, punctuated by the crisscross of conspicuously empty escalators. The Center for Disease Control had only recently relaxed their recommendations on the public use of masks by vaccinated individuals, but the specter of COVID-19 still lingered. No one lingered in the halls, and masked hotel staff spoke from behind glass panels. Yet this first impression belied the reality ongoing behind the tall, closed doors of the Main's meeting rooms. Inside, military historians from across the world were reviving the academic discourse that had been stalled an unfortunate pause the year before—not just by exchanging ideas in person, but from afar via Zoom. The conference was orchestrated by the dedicated volunteers supporting the Society for Military History's 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, titled "Turning the Tide: Revolutionary Moments in Military History."

In-person attendees were invited to advertise their vaccination status as well as their comfort level with social distancing via color coded dots on their conference badges. To a newcomer to the world of academic conferences, the 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting proved to be an interesting experience. Academic panels utilized any kind of combination of in-person and remote presentation. Sometimes the panel chairs were remote while the presenters were in person, or vice versa, or even a mismatch of all the above. Likewise, in-person attendees sat politely in chairs perfectly spaced apart in six- by-six-foot blocks, while remote attendees tuned in via Zoom and dropped questions or comments into chat boxes managed by conference volunteers via a computer workstation paired with a projector.

This was Saturday, May 22nd, but the first panels for the 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting began the day before, and the conference festivities that Thursday evening. Various social groups arranged happy hours with open invitations, but in embracing the "hybrid" environment, out-of-state participants found new ways to come together. Of note, the online women's happy hour was arranged using a facilitating platform called Gather Town (<https://www.gather.town/>), which allowed participants to utilize a personal avatar and virtual environment reminiscent of the 8-bit Nintendo days. Throughout the rest of the conference, however, the growing role of social media and the unique character of online academia in the conference's survival became clear even to in-person attendees.



Meeting reception area in The Main hotel in Norfolk, Virginia, site of the Society of Military History's 87th Annual Meeting, May 22, 2021. Author's personal collection.

In addition to the Zoom interface, with its now easily recognizable “Hollywood Squares” display of participants, panelists regularly included their Twitter handles on their cover slides, which in turn could draw participants into some fascinating Twitter threads (hint: search for the hashtag #SMH2021) between panels or after hours. Literate discourse filled these threads, varying between such topics as the apparent academic rivalry between the military and political science fields, sales pitches for the latest in history books, near-real-time commentary on ongoing panels, and candid photo snaps of new friends and scholars posing with their beer or Norfolk landmark of choice.

However, the hybrid experience was not all sunshine and rainbows, and the virtual experience suffered the expected shortcomings. Consistently—more so in the first day—the volunteers manning the cameras and computers struggled to coordinate prerecorded lectures or PowerPoint presentations that accompanied live readings with multiple screens in a way that the virtual audience could enjoy fully. Sometimes the videos failed, or the audio hiccupped. Sometimes the questions from the live audience failed to make it to the virtual audience, who were then forced to deduce the question by means of the panelists’ answers—though by the end, volunteers knew to type these questions into the chat box to keep everyone en-

Photo of the USS *Wisconsin* (BB-64) taken from Boushe Street, Norfolk, Virginia, May 23, 2021. The *Wisconsin* was the fourth of six planned Iowa-class battleship of 61,000 tons full displacement and nine 16-inch guns in three, triple mounts. Commissioned in April 1944, *Wisconsin* participated in the bombardment of Japan during the final months of WWII. Nicknamed “Whisky” the battleship and its crew earned six battle-stars and served the U.S. Navy in World War II, Korea and the Gulf War before being converted to the museum ship it is today. Author’s personal collection.



gaged and the conversations flowing. Sometimes panelists, for inexplicable reasons, never dialed in to present their research.

The theme of the Society for Military History’s 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting was “Revolutionary Moments in History.” What springs to a casual historian’s mind might first be the more well-studied chapters in Western military history: the American, French, or Bolshevik Revolutions, to touch broadly upon a few topics. However, the lecturers brought insight and analysis into a far broader swath of history that delved into the interesting, the minute, the ground-breaking, and the unexpected—and often bridged similar but interesting research topics under one umbrella. Historians who applied to present their research during the an-

nual meeting had the option of forming their own panel with like-minded academics or submitting their proposals and allowing the Society staff build the panels for them.

The simplicity of the phrase “revolutionary moments” belies its broadness, yet amazingly, covers all eighty-five panels delivered over four days. Likewise, the academic pedigrees of the panelists covered a broad range, from career professors of military history, many of whom were faculty at many of the U.S. military’s service schools such as the National War College or the Command General Staff College, to graduate students embarking on their culminating research projects or even just taking their first stab at research and networking.

For example, one of the first panels presented was titled “Germany and the East in World War II,” but covered a breadth of topics including OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the Polish communist resistance, and views on the German intra-military “opposition” during World War II. Robert Kirchubel of Purdue University, a retired lieutenant colonel and specialist [professor] of German military history, provided over 79,000 bits of information which he described entering by hand into a massive Excel spreadsheet for statistical analysis. He then presented his analysis of the demographics of those German military personnel killed in action during BARBAROSSA with graphs, pie charts, maps, and a narrative which laid out a devastating reality in which the German armed forces lost an overwhelming majority of their tactical experience and strategic competence.

According to Kirchubel, over 90 percent of the German casualties (nearly 775,000) were lieutenants. By the latter half of the operation, ten percent of company commanders who became casualties (whether injured or killed) were in fact second lieutenants as most of the more senior officers had been killed at the very beginning of the operation.<sup>1</sup> This had devastating downstream effects on the rest of the Germans’ war effort, as Kirchubel describes, given the war continued for another three or four years, but not with the “same Germans that defeated Britain or France, or made it to Moscow.”<sup>2</sup>

The lecture which followed, presented by Dr. Keith Hann (University

of Calgary) discussed a very different topic in World War II history and took a different approach in relation to his work on his PhD thesis on the Communist Polish armed forces.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Hann utilized a prerecorded lecture which streamed simultaneously over Zoom to remote and in-person attendees of the conference. Although it felt a bit like listening to a podcast at points, Hann’s narrator voice was well suited to laying out the story of the Polish Worker’s Party and the multi-pronged struggle between the Communist Poles and the greater Soviet leadership.<sup>4</sup> Then, somehow bridging Kirchubel and Hann’s two disparate topics and bringing the panel as a whole together, an independent historian named Matthew Olex-Szczytowski tackled the concept of resistance within Germany’s self-image and as a psychological counterweight to the criminal identity of German war history.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Olex-Szczytowski focused upon WWII-era German military officers’ resistance activities in coordinating (admittedly unsuccessful) military uprisings against the Nazi military apparatus, and how that narrative overlooks their own participation in terrible war crimes. However, the larger takeaway from Olex-Szczytowski’s research and analysis lies in how new scholarly understanding can trigger change, even as scholars—whether deliberately or unconsciously—try to control the narrative of the past.

This theme of scholarly historical narrative and its shape and influence in the present continued across various other panels throughout the weekend. Another of the most interesting pan-





Society of Military History literature, May 22, 2021. Unfortunately, the Society did not record any of the panels for later preservation and viewing, **with the exception of** Yale University professor Paul Kennedy’s keynote address (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W62rgTtFac>). Author’s personal collection.

els at the entire conference was titled “World War One as an Avenue for Social Change.” The papers presented at this panel examined the role of British “womanhood” in army during the First World War, the propaganda effect of the “black doughboy,” and the Great War and Irish rebellion’s role in the Irish independence movement.

Kaitlyn Ross, a PhD candidate from Texas A&M University, provided an interesting and statistically thorough overview of British women’s participation in the war effort. Illustrating her research with period artwork from the World War I. Ms. Ross highlighted

the similarities between the male and female servicemembers’ experiences, while emphasizing how the women’s role was marginalized and/or criticized by the military establishment—especially as that related to the disparity of treatment for post-traumatic stress between male and female veterans.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. John Lewis, another PhD of history candidate from Texas A&M University, addressed a comparable disparity of treatment towards the African American veterans of World War I in the controversial depictions of the “black doughboys” in wartime propaganda and recruiting advertisements.

Depending on who produced the image and who was the intended audience, these doughboys were presented as hypersexualized and devious to dim-witted or silly, sometimes sympathetic, and even “every inch young and strong but made boyish by his mother.”<sup>7</sup> The differences between black and white producers were stark, according to Lewis, as black producers created a deified image, whereas white producers created a marginalized and sometimes androgynous depiction.

Despite the breadth of topics covered across the different panels, one of the takeaways from the conference writ large (also mentioned by various participants across the so-called Twitterspace) was a general lack of diversity in panel topics and participants. “Revolutionary Concepts in Masculinity, Femininity, Sexuality, and Power” also stood out from the rest and brought together historians from three different universities, chaired by Dr. John M. Curatola, a professor of history with the U. S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, and included commentator Dr. Janet Valentine, associate professor at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College. On the subject of gender, Auburn University PhD candidate and recipient of the SMH’s Graduate Student Prize in Applied Military History Heather M. M. Haley lectured on the U.S. Navy’s internal war against homosexuality, or “the Lavender Scare.”<sup>8</sup> Co-panelist Dr. Bridget Keown, a lecturer at the University of Pittsburgh and co-chair of the Gender and Memory Working Group of the Memory Studies Association examined post-traumatic stress among

World War I nurses and other women on or impacted by the front lines, their traumas hitherto overshadowed by the experiences of their male colleagues.<sup>9, 10</sup> Jacksonville University PhD candidate Danielle Wirsansky closed up with a beautiful PowerPoint presentation illustrating several vignettes of British women spies whose successes in World War I directly enabled “female agency” in World War II.<sup>11</sup>

Presentations such as those presented by Dr. Keown and Mr. Lewis also illustrated how much of history can be lost forever as well, simply because it was recorded incorrectly—or never recorded at all. Since physicians in the early twentieth century believed that women did not and could not suffer from post-traumatic stress, the phenomenon was simply never studied. Now that the public eye is more finely attuned to the role of female warfighters, a recognition of the unique effects of post-traumatic effect upon women veterans of the modern age means more scholarly research, discussion, and ultimately treatment.<sup>12</sup> Yet as Dr. Keown’s research so tragically implies, the ramifications of entire generations of female veterans and their trauma vanishing into the historical ether may never be truly realized. Likewise, while the topic of African American participation in military history is gaining traction in modern scholarship, what was lost could be lost forever, though historians search for clues in the propaganda art which survives.

Many panels focused on the two World Wars, the U.S. Civil War, and the

Cold War, but very few looked further back to the ancient times or on battles or engagements which did not in some way involve the Western world. Most panelists spoke or recorded their lectures from notes, and some relied on PowerPoint to illustrate the stories they wished to tell. A collection of geospatial analytic teams from the U.S. Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency presented their research in a highly unique panel, which was steeped in imagery analysis and use of such tools like ArcGIS, but otherwise the majority of panels approached traditional topics of personal interest to each researcher. An entire book could be written trying to review every panel attended, and even then, only so much time exists within the day; and a hopeful historian can only attend one panel at a time.

Unfortunately, the Society for Military History did not record any of the panels for later preservation and viewing except for the keynote speaker's address, delivered by the renowned Dr. Phil Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History, Director of International Security Studies at Yale, and author or editor of nineteen books (now available on YouTube). However, these conferences are as much an opportunity to present analysis and engender outside interest in one's research endeavors as they are a networking opportunity for both professional academics and students alike. In addition to social media handles under the author's byline, business cards are exchanged, names and research titles hastily written in pocket-sized notebooks, and cell phones are raised to snap photos of the

PowerPoint presentations projected on the big screen.

At the end of the annual meeting's in-person event and following the keynote speaker's address, the Society for Military History invited attendees to a delicious buffet spread which belied the gloom of the coronavirus pandemic. Attendees also enjoyed complimentary tickets for beer, wine, or cocktails of choice from the bar. New cliques formed between historians and researchers who bonded over shared interests, while others came together with well-known colleagues to reflect on the return to "almost normalcy" after a year of conference-less isolation. Around the dining room table covered in a white cloth, one such attendee who was new to the scene asked the other, a long-time member, "Is this turnout pretty typical for this conference?" gesturing to the rest of Hilton Norfolk's artfully dim-lit main salon.

"Not at all," the other declared. According to him, the in-person population constituted at best fifty percent of previous attendance.

Only time will tell if academic conferences of this fashion will return to their former pre-pandemic glory. All the same, despite expected technical difficulties and the uncertainty of the return to "normalcy," the Society for Military History certainly succeeded in resuscitating the tradition of academic conferences. The Society provided a respectful forum where scholars could once again engage in the time-honored tradition of academic exchange and network, just in a modified format which

will almost certainly portend the role of conferences in the future. This may in fact pave the way for more diverse participation, as an increasingly hybrid approach will invite more remote participation, boding well for the less affluent and the less physical able to accommodate time-consuming and costly travel. If this remains the case, then interested parties would do well to take advantage of any opportunity to participate and observe in future annual meetings.

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## Notes

- 1 Robert Kirchubel, “Remorseless Accounting: An Analysis of Army Group Center’s Officer Losses During the First Three Months of Operation Barbarossa,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 The Military History Group, “Congratulations are due to one of our students, Keith Hann...” Facebook, June 19, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/MHGUofC/posts/congratulationscongratulations-are-due-to-one-of-our-students-keith-hann-who-yes/1208569742830007>.
- 4 Keith Hann, “‘The enemy must be attacked today, not tomorrow’: The Polish Communist Resistance in the Second World War,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 5 Matthew Olex-Szczytowski, “Revolutions in Views on the German Military Opposition, 1939-44,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 6 Kaitlyn Nicole Ross, “‘The Supreme Test of British Womanhood’: Women in the Army during the First World War,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 7 John Lewis, “They’ll Be Mighty Proud in Dixie of Their Old Black Joe,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 8 Heather M. M. Haley, “An Age of Intolerance: The U.S. Navy Engages in the Lavender Scare,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.

- 9 “Bridget Keown | Gender, Sexuality, & Women’s Studies Program,” University of Pittsburgh, last modified July 19, 2021, <https://www.gsws.pitt.edu/people/ant-6>.
- 10 Bridget Keown, “She was sure she was in Hell’: Reconstructing Gender and Trauma in the History of the First World War,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87th Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 11 Danielle Wirsansky, “Desert Queen and the White Mouse: How the Successes of British Women Spies in WWI Paved the Way for Female Agency in WWII,” paper presented at the Society for Military History 87th Annual Meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2021.
- 12 A. E. Street, D. Vogt, and L. Dutra, “A new generation of women veterans: stressors faced by women deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan,” *Clinical Psychology Review* 29, no. 8 (2009): 692-693, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2009.08.007>.

## Museum Review (Virtual): Holocaust Memorial Museum of San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas

Chris Schloemer

*American Military University*



San Antonio is full of history, including the Alamo, the missions, and numerous museums. Most of it definitely has a western theme. However, I recently discovered a historical gem in San Antonio that I had no idea existed: The Holocaust Memorial Museum of San Antonio (HMMSA). My wife told me about the museum and I had to check it out. Unfortunately, the museum is closed to visitors due to the pandemic. However, it has a robust on-

line presence. This museum has many resources for historians, educators, and the general public that allow for a fantastic learning experience.

There are three main ways to go through the museum. First, the museum offers a personal touch. Groups of 200 or more can schedule a docent to come to their location for a presentation. Additionally, docents can meet with a group of any size for a zoom question and answer session. Another

option is to meet with a “second generation” speaker (the child of a survivor). This would be great for a class or other group interested in the Holocaust. Finally, one can simply go through to the site and navigate through the information @<https://www.hmmsa.org/>. This is the method I used.

The site has virtual tours, beginning with *The Permanent Exhibit: The Holocaust*. This virtual walk-through of the exhibits was very interesting, with lots of written information. There is also a video walk-through that lasts about 17 minutes. However, I could not get the sound to work, even when I went to YouTube. I am not sure if it is my computer, or the walk-through has no narration. Narration would definitely be a huge help—without it, it is difficult to get context for the displays. There are other sections in the virtual walk-through that are not on video. These sections include *In America 1933-1945: Response to the Holocaust*, which traces American reaction and involvement (both good and bad) in events unfolding in Europe. There are five subsections, one of which shows how the San Antonio community reacted and helped during the Holocaust.

Other sections include: *Times of Betrayal & Defiance*, “the story of one man who risked his life to help his Jewish employers, and how he was betrayed by those closest to him”; *Seeking Justice: the Real Nazi Hunters*, highlighting the real-life stories of people tracking down Nazi war criminals; and *Isolation*, the story of how Nazis used propaganda and censorship to isolate groups from



Max Reiter (1905-1950) founded the San Antonio Symphony in 1939, the first Jewish symphony conductor in San Antonio, and served as its conductor until his death. From the Holocaust Memorial Museum of San Antonio.

society—ultimately culminating with ghettos, and finally death camps; and *the Czech Memorial Scroll*, one of the 1564 Czech Memorial Torahs which were saved from destroyed Jewish communities during Nazi occupation. It is on permanent loan from the Westminster Synagogue in London, England.

The “Learn and Remember” online exhibit contains panels on themes such as isolation, intimidation, exclusion, separation, loss, survival, and the aftermath of the Holocaust. It is actually a series meant for educators and schoolchildren as an online event, but





Czech Memorial Scroll: The Torah scroll on display here, which was copied onto parchment by a pious scribe in 1830, was removed from a synagogue in Slaný, Czechoslovakia. Because it is badly damaged, it can no longer be used for worship services. The scroll, numbered 534, is one of the 1564 Czech Memorial Torahs which were saved from destroyed Jewish communities during Nazi occupation. It is on permanent loan from the Westminster Synagogue in London, England. From the Holocaust Memorial Museum of San Antonio.

since the event is over, one can peruse the site. There are worksheets and links to the *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, as well as online conversations. Each theme is full of personal snapshots, discussions of the themes (including how they persist today), and recordings of holocaust survivors talking about these issues. It is very interesting, insightful, and educational.

The museum site has resources for students and educators with links to numerous interesting sites for those interested in the Holocaust, including the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Anne Frank Center, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the Texas Holocaust and Genocide Commission, just to name a few.

There also is an events link. From there one can see upcoming events as well as recordings of past events, such as the Texas Holocaust Remembrance Week events that occurred from Jan 25-29, 2021. This event link provides recordings of teacher workshops and presentations, as well as lesson plans and other educational activities and links.

There is a TON of information on this website, with pictures and explanations of documents in the museum. A visitor can spend hours going through it all. If what you are looking for is not there, you can easily link to other sites covering the Holocaust. There is also a section that allows one to get involved, through volunteering, internships, and docent training.

In conclusion, the Holocaust information and research. I can't wait to Memorial Museum of San Antonio is visit it in person. truly a wonderful source for Holocaust

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The museum is now open now, by appointment only, Monday thru Friday between the hours of 9AM - 3PM, but recently announced it will reopen on Monday, October 4th with unspecified hours. Perhaps it will return to its pre-pandemic hours of Monday - Friday, 9AM - 3PM, and Sunday 1PM - 4PM.


Holocaust Memorial Museum San Antonio  
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# Saber & Scroll Historical Journal

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
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


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
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

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



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