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Letter from the Editor

Michael Majerczyk

Because my term as Editor-In-Chief ends prior to the publication of the next issue, this is the last time I will address Journal readers in this fashion. Thanks in large part to an active membership, the Journal realized remarkable success the last two years and our authors are the ones who deserve the most recognition; well done. The dedicated volunteer content editors, proofreaders, copy editors, and the editors at the APUS Library who sacrifice their personal time also deserve recognition. And without our Academic Advisors support and help when things get tough, the Journal would surely suffer. Furthermore, Saber & Scroll officers, both past and present, have continued to support the Journal and its endeavors. A sincere thanks to all, thank you!

And now, welcome to the Winter Issue of the Saber & Scroll Journal. In her article, *New Sweden: Sweden's Failure to Colonize*, writing from Sweden, Susan Danielsson discusses Sweden's efforts to build a lasting colony in the New World. Jeff Ballard contributed two articles to this issue. For students of WWII see his article *The Second Gold Rush: How Wartime Shipbuilding Shaped the San Francisco East Bay*, and for the many Saber and Scroll members that study Thomas Jefferson, give *The Land Ordinance Act of 1784: Defining the Political Geography of a New Nation*, a read. In *Letter to the Editor—World War One Will Begin Five Years from Now: How Frederic Harrison Predicted the Onset of the Great War for Civilization*, Daniel C. Ross discusses WWI and the theoretical models used to predict war. For the medievalist, Christopher Sheline analyzes the myths surrounding Genghis Kahn in *The Lighter Side of Khan*. The Winter Issue features four book reviews. Robert Smith reviewed *The Storm before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic*, and *Blood and Steel, The Wehrmacht Archives: Volumes I Normandy 1944; Volumes II Retreat to the Reich: September to December 1944 and Volumes III The Ardennes Offensive: December 1944 to January 1945*. For those interested in the French Revolution, Jessica Lathrop reviewed *The Terror in the French Revolution*. And for those interested in the late nineteenth century British Empire, see Chris Schloemer's review of *An Episode of the Great Game*.

Lastly, the Saber and Scroll Journal received its first letter to the editor. In it Sharon Gregory discusses the role cemeteries play in our discipline and the importance in maintaining them.

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New Sweden: Sweden's Failure to Colonize

Susan Danielsson

Before the seventeenth century, Sweden was not an integral part of Europe, much less a great power, but the ascension of Gustav II Adolphus to the throne changed this. Gustav was an intelligent man who established the Swedish Empire through domestic reforms that modernized the country's economy and its military. After the establishment of the Swedish Empire, the new power had to seek new economic opportunities to pay for its professional military and domestic reforms. Sweden's inexperience with the mercantile system made it a potential investment opportunity. Dutch investors persuaded the fledgling empire to invest in a joint colonization effort with Dutch and Swedish stockholders under the new Swedish South Company. New Sweden, established in present-day Wilmington, Delaware, along the lower Delaware River, was the first colony. The organizers of the colony intended it to be self-sufficient and for it to send raw materials such as beaver pelts and tobacco back to Sweden. Sweden's inexperience with the mercantile system and underdeveloped transport system made it incapable of handling colonial demands. Without proper support and supplies, the administration of the colony had to focus on survival, causing it to ultimately fail. New Sweden's Swedish and Finnish settlers remained in North America under Dutch, then English, control and contributed new building and carpentry techniques that spread throughout the continent. Liberal policies ensured future generations of Americans could trace their heritage to the New Sweden colony. Much like the Swedish Empire, the New Sweden colony did not last long, but its Swedish and Finnish settlers made lasting contributions to America's frontier.

Political and Economic Security in Sweden

The dominant power of the Baltic region controlled trade and warships working in the area, ensuring economic and border security. In 1523, Sweden became an independent kingdom from Denmark, and its foundation created a new competitor for the Baltic region. Compared to Denmark, Poland, and Russia, Sweden was poor, underpopulated, and lacked a bureaucratic structure.¹ Sweden had powerful enemies, and its primitive state made its political and economic security uncertain. Without security on the home front, Sweden could not attempt

colonization.

As a competitor for the Baltic region, Sweden remained in a tense or warring state with Poland, Russia, and Denmark. Sweden's weakness made it insignificant in mainstream European politics. Under Charles IX, Sweden's fifth monarch, national actions and policies created a three-front war with Poland, Russia, and Denmark. He relied on mercenaries to fight these wars, but their loyalty belonged to the highest bidder and not the throne. His war efforts ended in constant failure and drained the kingdom of already limited money and resources. Sweden remained weak and vulnerable. Gustav II Adolphus assumed the throne after his father's death, and he inherited the three-front war.²

Skillful diplomacy neutralized the war fronts and created the Swedish Empire. To appease Denmark, Gustav agreed to remove his father's controversial foreign policies and pay one million *riksdalers* for Fort Älvsborg, which secured passage to and from the Baltic Sea.³ On the Russian side, Tsar Michael Romanov and Gustav signed the Treaty of Stolbova. Under the treaty, Sweden gained Livonia, Estonia, and Finland.⁴ On the Polish front, Gustav managed to broker a truce, but the relationship was fragile.⁵ Gustav's diplomatic skills secured control of the Baltic region, but he had to enact reforms to ensure the continuation of Sweden's dominance.

Gustav disliked mercenaries since the terms of their agreements were open to different interpretations, and they may not follow orders. In 1620, Gustav passed the Ordinance for Military Personnel. This required males fifteen years of age and older to organize



Figure 1. *Gustavus Adolphus*, oil on panel by Jacob Hoefnagel, c. 1624. From the collection of The Royal Armoury, Sweden.

themselves into units and to rally to the king in times of war.⁶ The law served two purposes: first, it ensured a continuous flow of recruits; and second, it made military service a decree of the king. Men were fighting for their sovereign, and refusing to do so was an act of treason. Gustav's soldiers trained and fought with modern military techniques and weapons. Infantry and cavalry learned to coordinate with each other, and soldiers performed drills to act in unison. Strict discipline prevented disorder within the ranks.⁷ Gustav increased the production of lighter guns and artillery to improve mobility. He wanted his soldiers to be properly armed to ensure a strong, modernized force.⁸ Furthermore, Gustav wanted to protect Sweden's interest in the Baltic Sea and coastline, so he built a well-armed fleet. His fleet, equipped with modern guns, was trained to perform in coordinated attacks.⁹ His military reforms transformed Swedish troops into a professional fighting force that could protect Sweden's political and economic interests. On the downside, the professional military was incredibly expensive to maintain, and it forced Gustav to explore different ideas for new sources of revenue. With the homeland secured and in need of income, the Swedish Empire finally turned to colonization to meet its needs.

New Sweden and Its Problems

Charles IX's chaotic reign made it impossible for merchants from other European powers to establish commercial trade with Sweden, but new investment opportunities blossomed with the emerging imperial power. William Usselinx, a Flemish merchant who co-founded the Dutch West India Company, wanted to win the support of Gustav in establishing a trading company. Countries such as England and the Netherlands developed their economies around the mercantile system. Over time, their trading systems developed into effective networks that stimulated commercial activity. Sweden's economy had no basis for the mercantile system. Usselinx declared, "All the merchants in Sweden are not so rich as three in Holland, nor a hundred of the farmers as rich as one there."¹⁰ He understood Sweden was an emerging power that needed revenue and had no experience in the widely used mercantile system.

Gustav granted Usselinx an audience. The merchant proposed that Sweden establish a trading company that would expand its operations to North America, Asia, and Africa. He emphasized that the Delaware River region had the commercial advantages needed for a successful colony, and it would be a suitable location for a source of revenue. Intrigued, Gustav invited Swedish investors to contribute to the company based on the idea of spreading Christian doctrine and

establishing Swedish power abroad.¹¹ Investors contributed to the project, and officials crafted a charter. In the meantime, Gustav had left for war in Germany. He died in the battle of Lutzen in 1632 before he could formally sign the charter. After Gustav's death, his daughter, Kristina, ascended the throne, and like her father, she supported the colonial project. Sweden's government appointed Usselinx the commissioner and chief director of the new Swedish South Company. The Swedish and Dutch were to work together.¹² Under their agreement, the Swedes would establish a colony in North America to generate income for the empire.

Dutch merchants limited their cooperation with the Swedish government to transporting settlers to North America. Sweden had the responsibility of recruiting settlers and establishing the colony. Atlantic voyages were dangerous and difficult, which made recruitment challenging. To have their sentences lowered, Swedish criminals convicted of adultery and destruction of forests volunteered.¹³ Other settlers included soldiers, whom the government ordered to go, and Finns. Finland was a part of the Swedish Empire. Finns along the Russian border moved to Varmland in Sweden because they angered officials with their burn-beating agricultural practices. Finnish farmers in Varmland burned an acre of forest a year to increase food production. In the 1630s, the Swedish government needed the forests for mining and foraging, so they started to regulate the practice. Finns continuously acted against the policies, and the Swedish government had them imprisoned or sent to New Sweden.¹⁴ Throughout the colony's existence, Sweden recruited soldiers, criminals, and Finns to settle in New Sweden.

In 1638, the ships *Key of Kalmar* and the *Bird Griffin* set sail for North America from Gothenburg. Swedish and Finnish settlers, weapons, provisions, and gifts for the native population filled the ships' holds. When they arrived, they managed to purchase land from the Indians on the western side of the Delaware River. Later that year, Peter Minuit, the colony's first governor, built Fort Kristina in a strategic location away from the Dutch New Netherlands settlement. The New Netherlanders already competed with the English for resources, and now the Swedes were another competitor for those same resources. They protested the arrival of the new settlers, but they were not strong enough to defeat them.¹⁵ Fierce competition for valuable resources inevitably led to conflict between the Swedes, Dutch, and English.

Under the first two governors, the colony endured, but it relied on the English, Dutch, and the Indians for advice and supplies. The third governor was Johan Printz, and he spent about a decade in office. During this time, ships arrived from Sweden only three times. The first ship, the *Black Cat*, delivered ammunition

and merchandise for the Indians; the second ship, the *Swan*, brought emigrants; and finally, the *Key* and *Lamp* both arrived with supplies.¹⁶ The Indians provided the Swedes with much of their foodstuff. Settlers offered gifts to the natives to maintain good relations. Infrequent shipments from Sweden made it difficult to have an adequate number of gifts for the Indians, which weakened the colony's bargaining ability.

Printz dedicated himself to expanding and securing New Sweden's political and economic interests. The Swedish government expected the colony to send raw materials such as tobacco back to Sweden after it became self-sufficient, like the tobacco-producing English colonies. He wanted New Sweden to imitate their success. However, Printz found tobacco cultivation difficult without adequate food and supplies for the farmers. Because of this, settlers focused on trade with the Indians for supplies rather than putting energy towards cultivating tobacco. Even if the settlers cultivated and stockpiled the tobacco, Sweden's underdeveloped shipping system meant that the



Figure 2. *Johan Printz*, artist unknown, seventeenth century.

arrival of Swedish ships was unreliable and too infrequent to ensure prompt return of the raw materials to Sweden. Goods awaiting transport would remain in storage for lengthy periods, and they were easy targets for destruction by vermin.¹⁷

Conditions in the colony deteriorated during 1643-44. An unknown

epidemic spread throughout the region, and along with food shortages, it killed many of the settlers. Researchers believe that the unknown disease may have been dysentery or yellow fever.¹⁸ Starving settlers started to hunt on the native peoples' land, and this caused skirmishes between the two sides. Food shortages, a high mortality rate, and conflict with the Indians made the settlement an unattractive destination. Printz purchased maize from the Lenape Indian tribe to address the food shortages, but he had no control over the epidemic. Some of the provisions that made it to the colony were damaged and unusable. Moths and mice damaged linen stockings because workers neglected proper care for the items in Gothenburg, a port city in Sweden.¹⁹ Supply shortages made it difficult for Printz to carry out any agenda other than survival. He worried the colony's deteriorating condition would damage its reputation and prevent further support.²⁰

Rather than cultivating tobacco, Printz focused his efforts on securing the beaver fur trade. English and Dutch colonies were close to New Sweden, and the three competed for territory along the river for beaver pelts. Whoever controlled most of the territory also controlled the beaver fur trade. The Swedes and the Dutch united to expel the English from the mouth of the Delaware River called Varkens Kill, now known as Salem Creek, in southern New Jersey. Printz turned his attention to the Dutch after the removal of the English to ensure Swedish dominance over the fur trade. He thought the New Sweden settlers could easily overrun the weakened Dutch. He was concerned, however, about how the Swedes would hold onto the territory without reinforcements. Messengers were sent back to Sweden multiple times explaining the state of affairs, but Printz received only silence. Indians were unreliable allies without adequate gifts.

Frustrated with the lack of support, Printz resigned from his position. In 1652, he returned to Sweden on a Dutch ship, and left his son-in-law John Papegoija in charge until the new governor arrived.²¹ Their heavy reliance on the fur trade put them in direct competition with the Dutch and English settlers. Competition for beaver pelts created tensions between the three, and this added to New Sweden's vulnerability. Properly supported with manpower and supplies, the Dutch and English colonies grew strong. Dominance over the beaver fur trade would have secured the colony's position and prospects.

Johan Rising became the fourth and last governor of New Sweden. He quickly assessed the poor conditions of the colony. He discovered more than half of the settlers could not feed themselves. Most of the land remained uncultivated as settlers planted few crops. The Lenape tribe provided maize, and deer meat, and the New Englanders provided bread to the New Sweden settlers.²² Many of the settlers were unskilled peasants rather than the artisans needed to make pottery,

bricks, lime, and furniture.²³ The conditions were less than ideal. The Dutch and English settlers traded finished goods for provisions from the Indians, but the Swedes were not receiving enough goods from Sweden to take part in this trade network. Rising arranged for the Swedes to enter the trade network as middlemen by “buying trade goods from other European colonists, trading them to Indians with furs to sell, and reselling furs for transport to European consumers.”²⁴ This arrangement was successful for a short time but unsustainable. In a letter to the Swedish government, Rising wrote,

I will now also humbly report concerning our present condition, namely, that everything is still in a fairly good state and especially since all here have the sure hope that a good succor from the Fatherland will soon relieve and comfort us, especially through Your Excellency and the assistance of the High Lords. If people were not animated by this hope, there would be danger that a part of them would go beyond their limits, or that indeed a large number of them would desert from here, not only because many necessaries are lacking, but also because both the savages and the Christians keep us in alarm.²⁵

Rising’s letter continued to explain the delicate relationship with the Indians. The settlers had to purchase the Lenape’s friendship with daily gifts. If the Lenape purchased anything from the settlers, they asked for half-credit and paid the rest begrudgingly. Then the Lenape took the New Sweden goods to the Minque tribe for beaver and elk-skins. The Minque then sold the skins to traders in Manhattan for a large profit.²⁶ Rising’s letter emphasized his awareness of the colony’s vulnerable state. Indians and settlers took notice of it, too.

Rising’s reliance on the Lenape for food and supplies meant he could not afford ill relations with the tribe. Furthermore, New Sweden’s deteriorating conditions put it at a disadvantage in bargaining trade deals. Conditions in the colony were less than ideal, and Sweden offered little support for the colony; consequently, colonists left for the English or Dutch settlements.²⁷ To add to their problems, the relations with the Dutch deteriorated because the Swedes built new forts and seized a Dutch settlement. The Dutch viewed this as an act of war and forced the Swedes to surrender. Swedes could either safely return home or remain as faithful subjects of the Dutch, but this marked the end of the Swedish government’s involvement in North America.²⁸

Legacy of the New Sweden Colony

Sweden ratified its first written constitution in 1634 and it incorporated Lutheranism as part of the supreme law of the land. It granted permission for the churches to act independently. Churches reinforced Swedish laws, including the prohibition of idolatry, lying, witchcraft, and fraud. The New Sweden colony adopted the homeland's regulations, and the governors ensured homeland practices were maintained.²⁹ For example, Johan Printz ordered that church services must adhere to Swedish church ceremonies and customs. He wanted to teach proper Christian faith and maintain good church discipline.³⁰ Ministers performed their sermons in Swedish with Swedish texts, which reinforced their native language and customs. In 1655, after seventeen years of neglect, New Sweden's five-hundred Swedish and Finnish settlers joined the New Netherlands colony. Already a heterogeneous population, New Netherlands tolerated Swedish and Finnish customs, allowing the newcomers to maintain their congregations and religious identity.³¹

Within thirty years, however, New Netherlands weakened and succumbed to the English. William Penn became the first English governor of the colony, and while he expected the New Sweden settlers to remain loyal to the English Crown, he continued to allow worship in their churches, which was crucial in reinforcing the Swedish traditions, religion, and language. Penn wrote,

The first planters in these parts were the Dutch, and soon after them, the Swedes and Finns. The Dutch applied themselves to traffic, the Swedes and Finns to husbandry. The Dutch have a meeting place for religious worship at Newcastle; and the Swedes three; one at Christina, one at Tinicum, and one at Wicacoa, within half a mile of this town.³²

The liberal policies of the Dutch and Penn ensured that the New Sweden settlers and their descendants continued practicing their traditions. On behalf of the original New Sweden colonists and their descendants, the settlers sent a letter asking, "The government to send Swedish priests, prayer books, and hymnals to the colony so that Swedish religion and culture would not diminish in North America."³³ In 1697, three new priests arrived to renew missionary work from Sweden. For the next century, more priests followed to minister in North America.³⁴ Long after New Sweden ceased to exist, thousands of present-day Americans can trace their heritage to the colony.

The Finns adapted to the mainstream Swedish culture and language while

continuing to practice their own distinct culture. Swedish was the official language of New Sweden, but the Finns spoke Finnish. Most learned Swedish to take part in church services. In public, they practiced Lutheranism but their religious beliefs centered around shamanism. Swedes frowned upon these practices and accused some of witchcraft.³⁵ Similar to the Swedes, the Finns hunted, fished, and raised cattle, but their burn-beating cultivation technique made them unique. This technique required the farmer to burn an area to prepare it for agriculture. Once the farmer depleted the soil's nutrients, he or she had to move to another location and repeat the process. Finns adapted this technique to grow Indian maize. It was an effective technique, but it required the Finns to move regularly.³⁶ Thus, the Finns lived a semi-nomadic lifestyle and explored the land.

Their semi-nomadic lifestyle encouraged simple, quick structures and explained why their building techniques expanded outside of New Sweden. Their log structures had distinct board roofs. This roof design existed in Finland and then carried over to American log structures. Boards, about one meter in length, supported roof beams. Each row of boards had a weighted pole to keep them in place. The weighted pole stayed in place with a piece of wood called a knee.³⁷ Another structure was the hunter's shanty. The structure "consisted of three log walls covered by a single-pitch, lean-to roof. The front tallest side of the hunter's shanty faced the campfire, and remained completely opened."³⁸ Finally, the Finnish designed the zig-zag fence, which required no posts. It gained "stability from the tripod principle."³⁹ In Finland, the fences directed game in the desired direction. American settlers as far west as Utah used the fence.⁴⁰

Both the Indians and Finns practiced shamanism and trance techniques that involved the spirit leaving the body. They utilized charms and incantations in their rituals. Shamans were leaders, healers, and sources of wisdom in both cultures.⁴¹ The Swedes considered these practices blasphemy. For the Finns, the common elements in their religions ensured friendly relations with the Indians. The Swedish government wanted the settlers to convert the Indians to Christianity,⁴² but the poor state of the colony made this a secondary concern. On the other hand, the Finns shared a bond with the Indians based on the similarities of their religious practices. Most Finns spoke Finnish, Swedish, and typically an Indian language.⁴³ Their knowledge of the land and language allowed the Finns to act as interpreters and guides for other Europeans.⁴⁴ This helped to expand European interests. The Finns had an oral tradition, which made it difficult for their descendants to hold onto the language and customs.⁴⁵ Over time, the Swedish Lutheran Church reinforced the Swedish language and culture into the Finns. The Finnish left their mark on American structures.

Conclusion

Because of its short life, research surrounding New Sweden is scarce, but this does not mean New Sweden was insignificant. The Swedish government expected it to generate income and spread Swedish influence in North America. However, Sweden lacked experience in the mercantile system. Nor did it have a developed transport system to handle the demands. Its inexperience and lack of support weakened the colony and made it vulnerable to competing settlements. The colony itself may not have contributed much to colonial America, but the people certainly did. Both the Dutch and English allowed the Swedes and Finns to remain if they pledged their allegiance to Dutch, then English rule. Religious freedom preserved the settlers' heritage. Under English rule, they established themselves and passed on techniques such as the hunter's shanty and the zig-zag fences from their homeland. These techniques spread throughout the American frontier. By establishing a life in America, they also ensured future Americans could trace their ancestry to the New Sweden colony.

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6. *Ibid.*, 114.
7. Brian Sandberg, *War and Conflict in the Early Modern World: 1500-1700* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 34.
8. Jan Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration 1521-1721: Resource Flows and Organizational Capabilities* (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2010), 545-550.
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17. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Scandinavian Colonists Confront the New World," in *New Sweden in America*, ed. Carol Hoffecker, Richard Waldron, Lorraine Williams, and Barbara Benson (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1995), 70.

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23. *Ibid.*, 104.

24. Kupperman, "Scandinavian Colonists," 72.

25. Jameson, *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware 1630-1707*, 160.

26. *Ibid.*, 161.

27. *Ibid.*, 160-162.

28. *Ibid.*, 139.

29. Frank Blomfelt, "The Lutheran Churches and Their Pastors in New Sweden, 1638-1655," in *New Sweden in America*, ed. Carol Hoffecker, Richard Waldron, Lorraine Williams, and Barbara Benson (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1995), 228.

30. *Ibid.*, 229.

31. Robert Mitchell, "The Colonial Origins of Anglo-America," in *North America: The Historical Geography of a Changing Continent*, ed. Thomas McIlwraith and Edward Muller (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 149.

32. Thomas Holm, *Description of the Province of New Sweden* (Philadelphia: M'Carty & Davis, 1834), 67.

33. Blomfelt, "The Lutheran Churches," 250.

34. Ibid., 250.

35. Juha Pentikainen, "The Forest Finns as Transmitters of Finnish Culture from Savo Via Central Scandinavia to Delaware," in *New Sweden in America*, ed. Carol Hoffecker, Richard Waldron, Lorraine Williams, and Barbara Benson (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1995), 275-276.

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42. Ibid., 278.

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The Second Gold Rush: How Wartime Shipbuilding Shaped the San Francisco East Bay

Jeff Ballard

The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized America and destroyed any illusion that the United States could remain neutral in this Second World War. At no time before, or since, has American society organized to such a degree. The American population mobilized on an unprecedented scale for a common purpose—victory over fascism in Germany, Italy, and Japan. The attack on the Hawaiian Islands brought the war to American shores and proved that the United States mainland was not beyond the reach of our enemy. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans, which had once cushioned the United States from the ever-expanding conflict, were now an obstacle to American men and material entering the fight in Europe and Asia.

Enter industrialist and construction magnate Henry J. Kaiser and his revolutionary prefabricated shipbuilding techniques; with it, Kaiser could build ships in weeks instead of years, as the task had previously taken. By 1945, Kaiser, with partner Todd-California Shipyards, had built 1,490 ships at its California, Oregon, and Washington shipyards from a budget of \$4 billion, or \$55.4 billion 2018 dollars.¹ Kaiser's manufacturing innovation coupled with vastly improved antisubmarine warfare techniques meant that in the fall of 1943, the tonnage of new ships built each month exceeded allied losses.² This feat is undoubtedly the ultimate achievement of the American war effort on the "Home Front."³

World War II was a powerful agent of geographical, economic, and social change in the San Francisco East Bay communities of Richmond and Oakland. As one of the primary shipbuilding regions in the nation, its wartime experience permanently transformed the East Bay. War migration changed the racial demographics of the East Bay making it younger, more racially diverse and, for the period under study, female-dominated. Prefabricated shipbuilding techniques shifted the demand from skilled to unskilled workers and caused a fundamental reorganization of labor unions like the colossal American Federation of Labor (AFL). Finally, the corporate welfare programs, intended to raise morale and increase wartime production, resulted in a legacy of enduring social institutions that Americans take for granted today.

Nearly 25 million Americans moved to another county or state in search of a defense job between 1940 and 1947.⁴ The West Coast cities of Seattle, San

Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego experienced spectacular population growth rates of 30.5, 39.9, 17.8 and 110.5 percent respectively, as a result of the prominence of military installations, shipbuilding, and aircraft production facilities located there.⁵ The 1948 Census observed that “Probably never before in the history of the United States has there been internal population movement of such magnitude as in the past seven eventful years.”⁶

Between 1940 and 1944, approximately 1.5 million people migrated to California’s Pacific coast.⁷ This influx of people in search of industrial jobs had many similarities to the “Okie Migration” that occurred in California less than a decade earlier as fictionalized by John Steinbeck’s *Grapes of Wrath*. Farmers residing in the agricultural center of California made up uncounted thousands of the early migrants, but the demand for labor was much higher.

The War Manpower Commission and private defense contractors established a network of recruiters that targeted midwestern and southern cities, with excess steel-industry labor, like Detroit, Michigan; Gary, Indiana; and Mobile, Alabama for work in their East Bay shipyards and factories.⁸ Government and industry recruiters supplied train tickets and promised jobs. They obscured the myriad of problems with an idyllic view of California living. By war’s end, Kaiser’s ventures alone had brought 37,852 workers to the East Bay, while another 60,000 came at the invitation of government and other private industry recruiters.⁹

Bay area host communities universally despised these war migrants as they overwhelmed civil services, transportation, and medical care. The housing shortage was particularly acute. Despite the construction of barracks-type company dormitories and federal government housing projects, supply did not satisfy demand. According to the National Parks Service, who maintains the Rosie the Riveter/WWII Home Front Memorial Park, “Workers arriving in these rapidly expanding urban centers were forced to find what [housing] they could. They slept in all night movie houses, shared ‘hotbeds’ [where three people used one bed, each getting an eight-hour stretch], or just camped out.”¹⁰

Thousands of war migrants returned to their homes after the jobs recruiters promised them did not live up to recruiters’ promises. Men from the South complained that the shipyards employed minorities, and this forced them to mingle with “all races, creeds, and colors.”¹¹ Amendments to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which allowed for agricultural draft deferments, prompted thousands more war migrants to return to their Midwest farms and families.¹²

Despite the exodus, the San Francisco Bay Area became the second fastest growing urban center on the West Coast. War migration permanently

transformed the racial and regional composition of the East Bay.¹³ The area between the San Francisco Bay's eastern shore with San Pablo in the north and San




Figure 1. Victory cargo ships are lined up at a US West Coast shipyard for final outfitting before they are loaded with supplies for Navy depots and advance bases in the Pacific. National Archives ID: 520918.

Leandro in the south included the shipyard boomtowns of Richmond, Oakland, and Alameda. Richmond had been a refinery and storage facility for the Standard Oil Company but was largely marsh and pastureland. Dating to the Sierra Gold Rush of 1849, Oakland had been the dominant metropolitan area before the completion of the San Francisco to Oakland Bay Bridge in 1936.¹⁴ By war's end, Oakland would become, for all practical purposes, a Kaiser company town.¹⁵ Oakland was also home to the Moore Shipbuilding Company, second only to Kaiser, which moved from San Francisco to Oakland in 1906.¹⁶ Midway down the Pacific Coast and the terminus of three transcontinental railroads, Oakland was the logical supply and distribution point for the Pacific war basin. In 1938, the federal government selected Alameda for the site of the Naval Supply Base and Naval Air Station Alameda, the latter remaining active until 1997.¹⁷

On a broader scale, war migration to the East Bay was a microcosm of the national shift from rural counties to urban centers. From 1940 to 1947, United States farm communities lost nearly three million inhabitants or one in every eight individuals who had been living on a farm in 1940.¹⁸ The 1944 Census showed the largest number of these out-of-state migrants came from the west-south-central states of Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana.¹⁹ The second largest regional contributor was the western-north-central states of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, and the Dakotas.²⁰

The influx of agricultural workers and Kaiser's prefabrication techniques shifted the demand from skilled to unskilled workers and caused a fundamental reorganization of local labor unions. The ship construction process was revolutionary because workers assembled huge hull sections manufactured elsewhere in the Bay Area, in California, or outside the state entirely. The railroad transported the nearly finished hulls to San Francisco's Bay Area for final welding and launching. In all, Kaiser-Todd's facilities built 821 Liberty-class, 219 Victory-class (a larger version of the Liberty ship), 50 Kaiser-class escort aircraft carriers, and other assorted ships. The output of Kaiser-Todd made them the model of shipbuilding efficiency.²¹

Almost miraculously, workers built the SS *Robert E. Peary*, a small, fast, 10,000-ton freighter of the Liberty-class at Kaiser's No. 2 Yard in four days, 15 hours and 26 minutes.²² Fourteen days from the laying of the keel, the *Peary* sailed under the Golden Gate Bridge with a full load of war supplies bound for the Pacific.²³ In total, Kaiser constructed 747 ships at his four Richmond shipyards.²⁴ By 1945, Kaiser-Todd had built 30 percent of America's wartime shipping at its combined yards.

Nevertheless, there existed a long tradition of shipbuilding in the Bay

Area. During World War I, Oakland received the moniker “Glasgow of the West.” Moore’s Shipbuilding Company employed thousands of highly skilled Scottish shipwrights in the construction of 30 warships between 1917 and 1920. This effort consolidated the strength of unions like the American Federation of Labor’s Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Brotherhood of Carpenters and Shipwrights, and the International Association of Machinists and Aircraft Workers.²⁵ The traditionally exclusive and conservative AFL craft unions initially opposed Kaiser’s mass production techniques, arguing that prefabrication “de-skilled” workers in the shipbuilding trades.²⁶ These unions further argued that tens of thousands of ship fitters, welders, burners, riggers, and so on, eroded the traditional Apprenticeship and



Figure 2. A view of the offices of the auxiliary Boilermakers A-36 Union, a segregated union hall for African American shipyard workers in Richmond, California. Photograph by E. F. Joseph, RORI 686, National Park Service.

Journeyman system.

When FDR’s “Emergency Shipbuilding Program Act” was approved (3 January 1941) requiring prefabrication shipbuilding methods, however, the unions cooperated, at least outwardly. Eventually, the Brotherhood of Boilermakers represented 65-70 percent of all West Coast shipyard workers. Membership in several East Bay Locals exceeded 35,000 and some Locals conducted three initiations a day admitting between 200 and 300 members at a time. The

Boilermakers Union expanded from 28,609 in 1938 to 352,000 in 1943.²⁷ Despite this juxtaposition, labor unrest and racial bigotry in the workplace were a disappointing feature of the war on the Home Front and clouded its positive accomplishments.

Corporate welfare programs, intended to raise morale and increase wartime production, resulted in enduring social institutions Americans take for granted today. For example, women and minorities in industrial jobs, employer-subsidized healthcare, and daycare for children of working mothers are enduring legacies of all East Bay shipbuilding. With the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and the subsequent draft of millions of Caucasian American males into the armed services, the traditional labor pool for heavy industry began to shrink. As such, women and minorities played a significant and nationally recognized role in jobs previously denied them.

Kaiser employed the largest number of women and minorities, in shifts running around the clock. Company statistics showed that, on average, during the war years from 1940-1944, for every one hundred male workers Kaiser employed, there were ninety-four female employees.²⁸ America recognized women working in the war industry collectively as “Rosie the Riveter.” Recognized as shipbuilders in the Bay Area, Rosies filled jobs in all facets of arms production in America’s “Arsenal of Democracy.” Rosie was not a single person, but many thousands of women of different races and very different from her portrayal by propagandists as a white, middle-class and urban woman. In fact, many women left the rural countryside and migrated to urban areas to take jobs in factories.

Most of these women had never worked outside of their homes and farms or worked for wages before. Being primarily from agricultural regions in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma, these war migrants were mostly African American. Shipyard records show that 80 percent of the non-white workforce were blacks from the South.²⁹ Several decades before the era of civil rights, Rosie and her male minority co-workers found themselves united against oppression abroad but forced to deal with their country’s hypocrisy at home. In addition to day-to-day prejudice and bigotry in the workplace, they had to deal with unequal pay and working conditions. During the war, there were labor strikes, sit-down work stoppages, and organized protests, some of which led to better conditions for many workers. Nevertheless, minorities received little union support or benefits after having been shunted off into “auxiliary” unions like the Independent Welder, Burners and Helpers Union.

Henry Kaiser was President Roosevelt’s model of a “New Deal” entrepreneur. Kaiser believed every worker should have access to prepaid medical

insurance and this is his most enduring legacy. Until the invasion of Normandy, industrial accidents killed more Home Front workers than soldiers in combat.³⁰ According to National Parks Service literature, “Kaiser realized that only a healthy workforce could meet the deadlines and construction needs of wartime America.”³¹

He began offering medical insurance to his employees three decades earlier when Kaiser construction crews built the Los Angeles Aqueduct across the Mojave Desert, where there was no access to medical care. Kaiser established a clinic for his workers and paid the salaries of the doctors by deducting 50 cents from every worker’s weekly paycheck. For many workers, this was the first time they had ever seen a doctor. When an influenza and pneumonia epidemic broke out in the East Bay, he established the Permanente Health Plan in 1942.³² The plan instituted a revolutionary idea, pre-paid medical care for workers, which, after the war was expanded to include their families as well. Today, Kaiser’s industrial empire has disappeared, except for Kaiser Permanente, which is among the nation’s largest and most influential health maintenance organizations.³³

In addition to health care for his workers, Kaiser also instituted childcare, which became a significant issue as Richmond’s population quadrupled from 24,000 to 100,000 between 1941 and 1944.³⁴ This growth quickly overwhelmed Richmond’s housing, roads, community services and, for the first time in the nation’s history, its childcare organizations. Newspaper articles about child abuse and neglect by defense-worker parents expressed growing anxiety about the new role of working parents.³⁵ Local authorities refused to take responsibility for childcare because they were afraid that it would become their permanent function.³⁶ Frustrated by the lack of local programs, Kaiser, with the help of the federal government, established day care centers for his workers.

The Maritime Commission developed the Ruth Powers Child Development Centers staffed by child welfare experts from the University of California at Berkeley.³⁷ The centers were revolutionary in that they provided 24-hour service. Notices on breakroom bulletin boards, company newsletters, and the local newspaper trumpeted these centers and their convenient locations near the shipyards. Between 1943 and 1944, more than 700 children participated in the program that included well-balanced hot meals, healthcare, and optional family counseling.³⁸ Although the Ruth Powers Center fulfilled a wartime need and closed before war’s end, its legacy lives on in the hundreds of day-care centers and preschools operating in the East Bay today.

World War II was the driving force of geographic, economic, and social restructuring of the East Bay in the twentieth century. War mobilization created new defense industries with massive labor requirements that the pre-war natives of

the Bay Area could not fill. Industrialists looked to the rural and urban areas of the upper Midwest and South as a source of unskilled labor. The unprecedented movement of war migrants, primarily women and minorities, to the East Bay, permanently changed the racial and cultural make-up of the area. The prefabrication manufacturing techniques of Henry Kaiser initially opposed by the conservative craft unions ultimately magnified their membership in such a way that the unions realized political influence on the national level. Meanwhile, attempts by the defense industry to improve morale and boost wartime production resulted in corporate welfare initiatives that American families depend upon today. These are the enduring legacies of shipbuilding during World War II not only in the San Francisco East Bay but of the United States as a whole.

Notes

1. Kevin Starr, *Embattled Dreams: California in War and Peace, 1940-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 146.

2. "The Liberty Ships of World War Two," *The MAST Magazine* (October 1944), republished in USN Armed Guard WWII Veterans, *The Pointer* (August 1998): 2.

3. *Ibid.*, 2.

4. Marilyn S. Johnson, *Oakland and the East Bay in World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 2.

5. *Ibid.*, 8.

6. *Ibid.*, 2.

7. *Ibid.*, 8.

8. *Ibid.*, 48.

9. *Ibid.*, 41.

10. Department of Interior, *The Rosie the Riveter / WWII Home Front National Historical Park: Self-Guided Auto Tour*, National Parks Service (Washington DC, 2010), 3.

11. Johnson, 41.

12. *Ibid.*, 45.

13. *Ibid.*, 4.

14. Ibid., 8.
15. Starr, 145.
16. Johnson, 18.
17. Ibid., 18.
18. Ibid., 6.
19. Ibid., 41-42.
20. Ibid., 42.
21. "Liberty Ships," 2.
22. Starr, 146.
23. "Liberty Ships," 3.
24. Starr, 147.
25. Ibid., 18.
26. Ibid., 68.
27. Ibid., 69.
28. Ibid., 33.
29. Ibid., 52.
30. "Liberty Ships," 17.
31. Department of Interior, 5.
32. Johnson, 79.
33. Ibid., 193-194.
34. Ibid., 10.
35. Ibid., 125.
36. Ibid., 126.
37. Ibid., 127.

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Letter to the Editor—World War One Will Begin Five Years from Now: How Frederic Harrison Predicted the Onset of the Great War for Civilization

Daniel C. Ross

The centenary of the armistice agreement of the War to End All Wars ironically arrives after a century of ceaseless conflict. At no time during this one hundred year period has there been worldwide peace. However, World War I was the first of a two-part series of world wars that effectively ended warfare among European nations. Many policymakers for the past century—Winston Churchill and Harry Truman among many others—took extraordinary measures to prevent another world war from transpiring. The formation of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) served to help reduce the likelihood of member nations declaring war on each other. However, these member nations continue to participate in foreign military engagements and many military and policy leaders still devise strategies to reduce and eventually end these conflicts.¹

But, WWI also inspired military theorists Quincy Wright and Lewis F. Richardson to launch a new discipline aimed at scientifically predicting new wars before they begin.² This endeavor is valuable to the peace process, because the predictability of war tends to increase the opportunity for states to avoid it.³ Two recent products of this discipline include the Steps-to-War model and the Risk Barometer for War thesis.⁴ The Steps-to-War model utilizes the scientific method to identify independent variables—such as territorial disputes, alliances, and arms races—predicating the dependent variable of interstate armed conflict.⁵ The Risk Barometer for War model is based on the Steps-to-War thesis by extrapolating five independent variables from the latter—territorial disputes between nation pairs, arms races, alliances, rivalry, and hardliner political leaders—and assigning an additive numerical value to each variable.⁶ The model subsequently adds the values corresponding with each nation pair under examination. Therefore, as the thesis maintains, the nation pairs featuring higher corresponding scores on the Risk Barometer are more likely to engage in war. This model accurately predicted a high probability of a Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict occurring in Crimea within five years of its first publication.⁷ Its authors released the findings in 2012—two years before the Russian Federation initiated an armed annexation of the Black Sea

peninsula in 2014. The study further suggested that a Russo-Georgian War II was “likely,”⁸ but not *as probable* as a Crimean-related conflict.

Research that aims to refine these war-predicting tests may benefit from Frederic Harrison’s analysis, which prophesied the First World War five years before it began—decades before scientific peace-modeling emerged as a formal discipline. The past five years of modern centenary historiography commemorating WWI features very little of Harrison’s March 18, 1909 letter to the editor of *The Times*—a British newspaper covering contemporary national panic arising from the pre-war Anglo-German naval arms race.

This study seeks to help fill this information gap by examining the content and context of this letter, how it predicted the Great War for Civilization,



Figure 1. Frederic Harrison. Photo by William Downey and Daniel Downey, ca. 1872-95.

and how these circumstances parallel contemporary geopolitics. There is much that WWI may have to inform modern scientific peace-modeling methods, and Harrison may have possessed much insight on how to forecast war.

The Harrisonian Model

On St. Patrick's Day—five years before the outbreak of WWI—German leaders scrambled in response to the frantic display of “foul and disgusting language”⁹ issuing forth from the United Kingdom Parliament. The Irish Nationalist Party Member, John Dillon, denounced such rhetoric as “the first mutterings of a storm between two great nations”¹⁰—the British and German Empires. Britain's Parliament was distressing over a national naval estimate, which predicted that the German Navy would outgrow Britain's within a two-year timeframe. Publicity of this estimate contributed to fears growing in the UK that another nation would challenge the empire's long-standing status as the world's “mistress of the ocean.”¹¹

This March 17, 1909 display of Parliamentary paranoia provoked Harrison, a forty-year-long pacifist, to declare his need to “modify the anti-militarist policy which [he had] consistently maintained”¹² for most of his adult life and philosophical career. Not to be confused with Sir Frederic Harrison—business mogul of the same era, bearing the same name and spelling—the Positivist public figure wrote an alarmist letter to the editor of *The Times*, which published it the next day.¹³ His article featured a model that accurately predicted some of the causal circumstances of the Great War that would transpire half a decade later.

His paradigm consisted of three broad categories of antecedent variables of an unprecedented, European-wide conflagration. These were *German ambition*, *German naval expansion*, and an *Anglo-German power conflict*. All three variables existed interdependently of each other so that removal of one could theoretically have reduced or eliminated the likelihood of the impending Great War.

German Ambition

Harrison's letter also featured a profound disclaimer warning all readers to preclude him from charges of any “anti-German”¹⁴ motivations for his “alarmist”¹⁵ paradigm. He emphatically declared that his findings were irrelevant to race, nationalism, or prejudice. Rather, he praised Germany as a cherished

destination of his to which he had frequently traveled for his entire adult life—a period of nearly sixty years:

I have nothing but admiration for the high qualities of the German intellect and character. . . . I have good German friends; and two of my sons in their professional careers have been trained in Germany and have made Germany their home. I have known Berlin 50 years ago in its early provincial state, as well as recently in its triumphal state; and I do honour to the grand patriotism and the administrative genius which have given the empire its proud position in the world.¹⁶

However, in his lifetime, the Positivist had also witnessed Germany transform from a confederacy to an empire at the conclusion of an aggressive military campaign masterminded by Otto von Bismarck—“The aspirations of the German people . . . , given the general situation and the history of the new German Empire . . . is an obvious result of the European situation and of the history of Germany since the rise of Bismarck in 1864.”¹⁷ This precipitous emergence of a civilization in European international relations signified to Harrison that German ambition would function as an antecedent variable of future European warfare—“There is no doubt about the domineering ambition of German diplomacy, for this is the key that explains the course of history in Europe for the last twenty years.”¹⁸



Figure 2. Otto von Bismarck, ca. 1870s -80s.

Many historians classify this period as the *Second Reich*—the time from Bismarck’s declaration of his king, Wilhelm I, as *emperor* of a new *German Empire* to the government’s collapse at the end of WWI forty-seven years later.¹⁹ The *First Reich* was the Holy Roman Empire, a multi-ethnic, central-European political system that lasted for several centuries.²⁰ The Nazis intended for their

Third Reich to continue in this vein of historical heritage and promised a “Thousand-Year Reich”²¹ starting in 1933.

Though *reich* in this context can mean empire, the term can also mean *realm*.²² Before the German Empire there was no *Germany* in the sense of a nation, kingdom, or other form of unified political construct. The Ancient Romans knew of a *Germania* located in North-Central Europe, but Tacitus described this land as a vast king-less realm populated with predominately, if not exclusively, German-speaking tribes.²³ *German*, then, denoted a distinct European language, race, and culture but not a unified national identity. This *German Realm* concept may have been the context in which German-speakers used *reich* before the advent of German imperialism—before the language required a term for *empire*.

Harrison recognized a “Pan-Germanic movement” that “Radical and Labour politicians do not study” but “all who study the German Press . . . must recognize as real.”²⁴ He deduced that this would mean “the eventual amalgamation . . . of the entire German-speaking people of Central Europe.”²⁵ Combining this ethno-linguistic variable with German imperial ambitions, Harrison predicted, “Within a few years Europe will be face to face with a hundred millions of Germans trained to war and practically under one military headship. . . . a single war lord . . . Then Europe will see a power which she has not known since Napoleon and Louis XIV.”²⁶

Compellingly, at least one other modern nation has invoked similar justification for militaristic aggression based on ethno-linguistic homogeneity as Second Reich Germany once practiced.²⁷ The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin has used military force in two sovereign states within the past decade to ostensibly protect the target nations’ citizens of Russian descent from perceived threats.²⁸ This “Russian World” paradigm, like the early twentieth-century *German Realm* model, maintains that Russians everywhere, within and outside of the Federation’s borders, belong to the same national identity and heritage.²⁹ Accordingly, Moscow repeatedly justifies its participation in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the armed annexation of Crimean Ukraine in 2014, and the subsequent Russian-backed Ukrainian Civil War prevailing to the present.³⁰

Elsewhere, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, many Islamic leaders, such as the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, have sought a new caliphate system based on an ethno-religious context of the entire Middle East and Northern Africa.³¹ Though terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have sought these ends, nonviolent movements presently exist. The *Turkish-Islamic Union* (TIU), for example, presumes itself as “heir to the Ottoman

legacy” and seeks dominion of no less than half of the Eastern Hemisphere—including Crimea—to form an all-tolerant neo-Ottoman utopia.³² This movement presently does not condone violence to achieve these ends, but like the *German Realm* model before the Third Reich, TIU has potential to mutate into a genocidal holocaust if helmed by different leadership of a later generation.

German Naval Expansion

The tangible expression of 1909 German ambition, an important variable to a Positivist such as Harrison, was “the massive publicity surrounding the launching of each new battleship.”³³ In addition to German ambition and a “domineering attitude of the German Government,” he pontificated, “The sole ground for serious anxiety as to our national defences arises from what we see as we watch the feverish expansion of the German navy.”³⁴

Moreover, for two decades Britain had been exercising a “two-power standard”—a doctrine to maintain an equal number of warships to that of the world’s next two largest naval powers combined, which by 1909 were the German and US navies.³⁵ Meanwhile, Germany had adopted a “two-thirds” standard mandating that the German fleet keep an equal number of warships to no fewer than two-thirds of Britain’s fleet.³⁶ As Parliament reconsidered the sustainability of this naval arms race, Harrison concluded the outcome in the negative:

The continuous strain of maintaining a two-Power standard against nations far more populous and increasing more rapidly must in the long run break down. It seems that it has already broken down. Even if we could go on building more ships than Germany and America put together, could we be certain of manning them? . . . Can we rest at ease if a few years hence we were to find our home fleet no longer the strongest, even in the seas which wash our own shores?³⁷

Anglo-German Power Conflict

Finally, Harrison described the mounting tensions between the British and German empires as “an antagonism like that between Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage, Spain and Britain.”³⁸ Even though his contemporaries insisted that “Germany had just as much right to say that her preparations were in the nature of self-defence as [Britain] had,” he argued, “To talk of friendly relations with Germany and the domestic virtues of the Fatherland is childish.”³⁹ He,

instead, appealed to a transcendent principle, an “ultimate evolution of national destinies, . . . one which seems to be independent of persons, even of the will of peoples.”⁴⁰

Harrison’s model featuring arms races and power conflicts closely resembles the Steps-to-War thesis published nearly one hundred years later. Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez, who designed the latter, present the same variables as causal actions, which often contribute to interstate war. These variables also helped Ryan Maness and Brandon Valeriano design the Risk Barometer for War model that predicted the Ukraine Crisis two years before its onset.

Conclusion

In the decades leading up to WWI, Harrison took advantage of open source publications that came from foreign and domestic resources, hailing from both the public and private sectors. He harnessed this information and utilized qualitative reasoning to identify a trend of international-relations behavior that many of his contemporaries failed to identify. Though his model lacked a repeatable framework that would have allowed future researchers to analyze other nation pairs, his approach closely reflects modern scientific peace modeling methodologies that include such mechanisms. The Steps-to-War theory and its close descendent—the Risk Barometer for War model—exhibit the importance of arms races and power conflicts as prewar variables in international relations.

Further research that can either validate or falsify some features of this study include a re-evaluation of the etymology of *reich*. Specifically, a content analysis of German documents written before the Second Reich may reveal a more accurate narrative of when German-speakers began to use *reich* to mean *empire*. While etymological studies may not directly apply to every peace modeling exercise, they may help historians understand how nineteenth and twentieth-century German imperialism transitioned from ethnocentric nation-building to xenophobic genocide.

Further research that may complement the central phenomenon of this study may include a comparative analysis of the rise of ethnocentric German military aggression with other modern movements besides those explored here. The Russian World thesis and the Turkish-Islamic Union paradigm served only as two examples of the same phenomenon that Harrison observed in his lifetime. Similar movements may proliferate today in other parts of the world that peace advocates should monitor, considering the war-predicting precedent that Harrison established.

Notes

1. See Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, *Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003) and the SAGE publication journal *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, accessed February 21, 2018, <http://journals.sagepub.com/home/cmpb>.

2. Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez, *The Steps to War: An Empirical Study* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7.

3. *Ibid.*, 1.

4. See Senese and Vasquez, and Ryan Maness and Brandon Valeriano, "Russia and the Near Abroad: Applying a Risk Barometer for War," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 25, no. 2 (2012): 125-128.

5. Senese and Vasquez, 1-2.

6. Maness and Brandon, 125-128.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. Parliament, *Times* (London), March 18, 1909, under "The Alternatives," accessed October 17, 2017, <https://www.newspapers.com/image/33204414/>.

10. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. "John Dillon," accessed August 7, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Dillon>; Parliament; quotations appear in the article and are paraphrases of Members of Parliament original speeches rather than stenographical dictations.

11. Frederic Harrison, letter to the editor, *Times* (London), March 18, 1909, accessed October 17, 2017, <https://www.newspapers.com/image/33204474>.

12. Harrison.

13. These two gentlemen appear in the same March 18, 1909 edition of *The Times* which may provide sufficient cause for other researchers to conflate the two personalities as the same person since both individuals were prominent public figures, albeit in two very different contemporary spheres of influence.

14. Harrison.

15. Ceadel, 1673.

16. Harrison.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.* Bismarck's military campaigns were followed by twenty years of peace under his leadership as Chancellor of the German Empire. After his death, German policymakers returned to a militaristic foreign policy strategy for the subsequent twenty-year period to which Harrison refers.

19. See Charles Arnold-Baker, "German Empire or Second Reich (1871-1914)," in *The Companion to British History*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001); William F. H. Altman, *Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche: The Philosopher of the Second Reich* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013); and James Retallack, *Germany's Second Reich: Portraits and Pathways* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

20. Shoah Research Center, *Third Reich*, International School for Holocaust Studies, accessed February 1, 2018. http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205877.pdf.

21. Ibid.; William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 5.

22. Shoah Research Center.

23. See Tacitus *Germania*.

24. Harrison.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. Even so, Harrison argued that “Napoleon’s invasions of Italy, Spain, Austria, Germany, or Russia offer no true analogy” since “the British Empire is . . . without any real parallel in modern history,” the British Isles representing the “vitals” of such “an anomalous structure,” an attack of which would mean “ruin . . . such as modern history cannot parallel.”

27. Noah S. Hutto notes that the pre-twentieth century rise of a homogenous ethno-linguistic-based German political system in Central Europe was due in large part to the efforts of two Prussian statesmen living a century apart—Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck—who *a priori* sought to strengthen their home state rather than establish a unitary German nation, militaristic aggression on behalf of other Germans being a byproduct of the former endeavor, “German Unification through the Blueprint of Prussian Greatness: A Study of Similarities between the Prussians, Frederick the Great, and Otto von Bismarck,” *Saber and Scroll* 3, no. 4 (September, 2014): 7.

28. Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 350-51.

29. Ibid., Igor Zevelev, The Russian World in Moscow’s Strategy, August 22, 2016, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, accessed October 15, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy>; “Putin’s Russian World,” *The Moscow Times*, May 6, 2014, accessed October 12, 2014, <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/putins-russian-world-35150>; “Glory to the ‘Russian World,’” *New York Times*, October 13, 2014, accessed October 15, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/opinion/glory-to-the-russian-world.html>.

30. Ibid. Most politicians, scholars, and other authorities seem to avoid using the term *civil war* as a descriptor of the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine; Julia Strasheim refers to it as no more than an “armed conflict,” “Power-Sharing, Commitment Problems, and Armed Conflict in Ukraine,” *Civil Wars* 18, no. 1 (2016): 25-44. The International Criminal Court (ICC) ruled the event as a “non-international armed conflict,” International Criminal Court, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016,” (November 14, 2016), par. 168, p. 37, accessed October 16, 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf. Paul Roderick Gregory erroneously reports that the ICC classified the event as an “*international armed conflict*” between Russia and Ukraine, justifying his case to drop the term *civil war* from all Donbass-related dialogue, “International Criminal Court: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine is a ‘Crime,’ Not a Civil War,” *Forbes Media LLC* (November 20, 2016), accessed October 16, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2016/11/20/international-criminal-court-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-is-a-crime-not-a-civil-war/#6f2ab81c7ddb>. However, the ICC only assigned that description to the 2014 armed annexation of Crimea and not the subsequent war in Donbass; furthermore, the ICC determined a potential “international armed conflict [Russian participation in the Donbass War]” albeit “in parallel to the non-international armed conflict [the Donbass War itself],” International Criminal Court, par. 169, p. 37. Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel define *civil war* as any nation’s internal conflict that eventuates in “more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year,” “Civil War,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (March 2010), 3. As of the date of this note, the warfare in the region incurred at least 10,090 deaths in the 43 months since its onset,, averaging 2,818 deaths each year, thus qualifying the conflict for *civil war* status per Blattman and Miguel, Council on Foreign Relations, “Global Conflict Tracker: Conflict in Ukraine,” accessed October 16, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#/conflict/conflict-in-ukraine>. Such is the reasoning for this author’s usage of the term *Ukrainian Civil War*.

31. Julie Spears, 2002, "Muslim Brothers, Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Hizb Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon, al-Ikhwan ("The Brothers")," *Federation of American Scientists: Intelligence Resource Program*, accessed February 21, 2018, <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/mb.htm>.

32. Harun Yahya, "The Turkish-Islamic Union is the Solution to the Problems of Crimean Turks," *Global Publications Ltd. Co.* (July 1, 2009), accessed October 23, 2017, <http://www.harunyahya.com/en/Announcements/14910/the-turkish-islamic-union-is>. This movement features a similar ethno-homogenous ideology as that of the German Realm: "We Turks are of the same race as our Muslim brothers, we share the same blood, the same faith and the same everything. It is unbelievable that we should be divided, it is astonishing and utterly illogical. . . . The family must be reunited at once," Adnan Oktar, "Mr. Adnan Oktar's Interview for TASCA (Turkish-Arab Science, Culture and Art Association)," *Harun Yahya International* (November 21, 2008), accessed October 23, 2017, <http://www.turkishislamicunion.com/transcripts.html>. Compare these remarks with Putin's claim that "Russians and Ukrainians [are] one and the same people," Serhii Plokhyy, "Are Russians and Ukrainians the Same People?" *The Daily Beast* (January 10, 2016), accessed October 23, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/are-russians-and-ukrainians-the-same-people>; It is important to note that pan-ethnic movements do not always begin with militaristic aggression but rather are peaceful in attributes. For example, Putin's Russian World thesis can be traced back to Boris Yeltsin's "compatriots abroad" rhetoric which caused no wars directly, Zevelev; and, it is difficult to imagine that German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of the Second Reich, who concluded the final 20 years of his career in peaceful foreign relations, would endorse the Holocaust of Hitler's Third Reich Germany. There hence, while the Turkish-Islamic Union may be characterized by peaceful attributes at the time of this writing, it is not immune to the hijacking by another charismatic leader who can change the non-violent paradigm into a vehicle for international military conflict.

33. Richard J. Evans, *The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815-1914* (New York: Penguin Random House LLC, 2016), 702.

34. Harrison.

35. GlobalSecurity.org, "British Naval Policy – 1890-1920," (n.d.), accessed October 18, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/uk-rm-policy2.htm>; Harrison.

36. Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I*. (London: University College London Press, 1994), 4.

37. Parliament, *Times* (London), March 18, 1909, under "Navy Estimates," accessed October 17, 2017, <https://www.newspapers.com/image/33204379>; Harrison. It did not yet occur to Parliament at this point that a sustainable replacement to the unsustainable two-power standard would take the form of an alliance with the next runner-up global naval power which was not the UK's enemy—the US—and thus combine their two fleets into one naval superpower.

38. Harrison.

39. Dillon made the former argument in the House of Commons the day before *The Times* published Harrison's letter, Parliament; Harrison.

40. Harrison.

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The Lighter Side of Khan

Christopher Sheline

When reflecting on history's greatest kings, emperors, philosophers, and military leaders, few have reached the immense prestige and influence of Genghis Khan (r. 1206-1227). Through his wisdom, charisma, and military ingenuity, Khan built one of the largest empires the world has ever known. However, along the road to immortality, Mongol methodology took on varying forms including psychological and economic warfare. As a result, scholars from as early as the late medieval period into the modern day have depicted Khan as a barbarian, crude and harsh in his ways. Myths and legends arose from these stereotypes, often heavily diminishing or even completely ignoring the many humble and noble characteristics of Genghis Khan. Rather than a bloodthirsty barbarian, he was a cunning warrior, an efficient administrator, and a prudent lawgiver that sought to create a peaceful and unified world.

The Myths and Legends of the Great Khan

Myths surrounding Genghis Khan include dramatically exacerbated kill counts, to degrading religions and their ceremonial sites, and even terrorism. There are varying tales of his death that include dying in battle, in bed, or from falling from his horse. In some cases, misinterpreted information even goes back to the original biographers of Khan. Intended to serve a particular purpose to a given community, each myth or legend is typically the production of a biased, prejudiced, or simply misinformed author. Westerners, especially, accepted the stereotype of Khan as a barbaric plunderer who operated with the single aim of slaughtering and destroying other tribes and civilizations to feed his unquenchable desires, which is perhaps the biggest of all myths. The belief that Khan was a brutal barbarian most often grew from those whom the Mongols conquered. They wished to discredit Khan and told a tale that drastically contradicted reality. Hence, Khan became the crazed killer, or "saber wielding maniac" when the opposite was true.

One popular myth alleges that Genghis Khan killed over one million seven hundred thousand people in a single hour or thirty thousand people per minute.¹ This death count originated from the estimated population of a Persian city called Nishapur, which Khan sacked in retaliation for the death of his son-in-

law at the hands of a Nishapur. The sack lasted over ten days, far longer than one hour, and Khan was not even present. Furthermore, while a massacre did occur at Nishapur, the death count remains questionable.² There is no reliable information to support the claim that this siege was any more severe than countless others throughout the thirteenth century.

Also unwarranted is a myth that suggests Khan was religiously prejudiced and disregarded other cultures' beliefs—particularly Christians and Muslims. An example of this myth occurred with an alleged eyewitness account of Khan reacting to a mosque in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, a common stop on the silk trading route. Genghis Khan approached the mosque inquiring as to whether it was the home of the Sultan; the mosque was the largest building in the city. However, when he discovered that it was, in fact, a house of worship, he turned away and said nothing.³ The religious belief of the Mongols, especially Khan, was that one God existed within the Eternal Blue Sky that stretched from horizon to horizon in all four directions. This was primarily a form of Shamanism. Clarifying this, Jack Weatherford, Professor of Anthropology at Macalester College and author of *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, stated, “[The Mongols] believed that God presided over the whole earth, and could not be cooped up in a house like a prisoner, nor, as the city people claimed, could his words be captured and confined inside the covers of a book.”⁴ For this reason, Khan disregarded religious structures and texts. He entered said mosque with the sole purpose of collecting money and lecturing the Bukhara elite.

Despite the Mongols' beliefs, they enforced religious tolerance, and in no way discriminated against others. The Bukhara mosque demonstrated a common practice of the Mongols entering a city and beginning to plunder. This is why Khan sought the Sultan and did not respect the mosque. Furthermore, he did not destroy or prohibit the city from practicing what it chose. The society's elites provided the source of treasures that would sustain the Mongolian army, thus showing submission to Mongolian rule. This was Khan's intention, not religious degradation. However, despite Khan's religious flexibility, he disrespected many “houses of God” and unintentionally promoted the myth of religious degradation.

To believe that any one of these myths have merit is to assume that there was little to no formal governing authority, political administrations, codes of law, empathy, honorable principles or motives. If the Mongols were simply crude and godless barbarians, they could not be capable of any of these relatively sophisticated developments when in fact they had them all. This fact directly conflicts with how the Mongols were portrayed, at least through the mid-twentieth century.

Chinggis Qan: The Early Life

To understand why Khan was successful as a leader, and why he chose his particular methods and goals, it is critical to understand his motivations and background. Genghis Khan took on many names throughout his life. His true name was Temuchin or Temujin, and he originally arose from Northeast Asia as a Mongol warlord.⁵ Allegedly, his most famous pseudonym, “Genghis Khan,” was a European mispronunciation of the more culturally accurate Chinggis Qan and Jenghiz Khan. A large portion of his success is the result of his prolonged hardship prior to his reign.

Temujin was born to the noble family of Yesugei and Ho’elun, head of the Khamag Mongol confederation.⁶ While still a young man, Temujin’s family betrothed him to a woman from another tribe named Borte. His father, Yesugei, fell ill and passed away after the Tartars, an enemy tribe, poisoned him.⁷ The Tartars were of similar ethnic origin and a neighboring tribe. Temujin also suffered through the kidnapping of his beloved Borte, which meant that his first-born was likely illegitimate. After receiving word of his father’s death, Temujin returned home and, after enduring further hardships as a slave until his daring escape, took a leadership position among the Mongols. He replaced his father as head of the Khamag at age thirteen. The aforementioned hardships provided him with one goal, to unify his people under one banner and eliminate the constant conflict between the many Mongol confederations. These facts are critically important when uncovering the reality of Chinggis Qan and the Mongols.



Figure 1. *Battle between Mongols and Chinese* (1211), c. 1431. Artist unknown.

In 1206, the Mongols, along with Turkish tribesmen, gathered and prepared to embark on one of the most influential campaigns in world history. At this time, Temujin took the name of Chinggis Qan, Qan—or Khan—meaning king or ruler. Under his leadership, they poured out of Mongolia to conquer northern China and Korea.⁸ By 1216, the Mongols succeeded in their mission and moved into Persia and, “By the end of 1221, Genghis Khan had crushed the Islamic Khwarizmian Empire in Transoxiana and invaded the Ukrainian steppes.”⁹ This created the largest empire in recorded history.

Brutal Barbarian versus a Skilled Strategist and Leader

During the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan cemented his reputation as a military leader due in part to his understanding of Sun Tzu, a leading eastern military philosopher. Sun Tzu urged that the ultimate goal of offensive strategy is to unite “All-under-Heaven intact,” as a means to resolve conflicts.¹⁰ With this unity, there would be no occasion for war. The fact that Khan aimed for such a goal demonstrates his desire for peace and order, as well as his motivation to develop one sovereign leadership. Based on his early life experiences, Khan certainly had reasons to desire such a goal. To realize peace, unity, and order an individual must devote themselves to the people’s welfare—practice benevolence and righteousness.¹¹ Clearly, Genghis Khan agreed with Sun Tzu and the idea of mass unity. So much so, that Khan expanded on this principle by aiming to unite the entire world. It is relevant to point out that the goal of unity is peace and part of his “moral” philosophy. This speaks to the true character and leadership methods of the Great Khan.

One of the most important factors that encouraged Khan’s success was that he was humble. He valued the advice of everyone, from his officers to his living relatives—even his wives. His soldiers valued his humility because it made them feel appreciated and respected by their leader. Those two aspects are crucial in every leadership environment. Many of history’s greatest leaders, including Cyrus the Great, Alexander the Great, and perhaps even Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden shared this practice. Each of these men recognized the value of enduring their subordinates’ hardship and listening to their concerns. And although Khan was born of noble blood, he shared the hardships of battle with his men. Genghis Khan courageously led his men into battle, risking his life in each conflict. He utilized unusual tactics, weapons, diplomatic methods, and even various forms of technology to accomplish his goals. The Battle of Liegnitz in 1241 demonstrated this and influenced Mongolian tactics even after Khan died.

Fought in a wide-open plain near Legnickie Pole, in what is today southwestern Poland, the Battle of Liegnitz pitted Henry II the Pious, Duke of Silesia, against the Mongolian Empire. Henry's army consisted of a combined European force of Poles, Moravians, and the famed Knights Templar sent by the Pope himself. They sought to stop the Mongolian invasion of Europe and uphold feudal nobility. This collection of soldiers, particularly Knights Templar, emphasizes the threat the Mongols posed to Europe as well as their military prowess.



Figure 2. *Battle of Legnica (Liegnitz)*, 1241. From *Legend of Saint Hedwig*, c. 1353. Medieval illuminated manuscript.

One of Henry's first moves was to send his cavalry brigades to attack the Mongol center, to which the Mongols responded by encircling the brigade and showering them with arrows.¹² Without having adequate support, the brigade quickly broke and fell back. Not learning from his original error, Henry decided to commit the main body of his cavalry again to the Mongol center. The Mongols responded by feigning a retreat, luring Henry, his contingent, and the Silesian cavalry into giving chase.¹³

A feigned retreat was a classic Mongol tactic, as it consistently deceived their enemy and the maneuver worked perfectly at Liegnitz. Richard A. Gabriel, Professor of War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada and author of

many biographies of history's greatest military leaders including Scipio Africanus of Rome and Hannibal, states, "The feigned retreat was a proven Mongol tactic designed to separate the enemy cavalry from its infantry and disperse their tightly packed formations."¹⁴ The Mongol light cavalry ambushed the Silesians with arrow fire and used firepots to obscure the battlefield behind Henry. This tactic embodied another Sun Tzu philosophy regarding the importance of moving when it is advantageous and when it creates situations of dispersal.¹⁵ The Mongols took advantage of the mass confusion and sent their heavy cavalry to surround the knights and shoot them down at close range. At the same time, the light cavalry darted in and out of the smoke peppering the infantry with arrows.¹⁶ With the horses shot out from under them, the Knights Templar fell helpless to Mongol lances. Nearly the entire European army perished.

Again consistent with Sun Tzu, Khan leveraged a critical mode of communication both on and off the battlefield that became common throughout the Mongolian domain. The Mongols used flags and banners to relay signals, each producing an efficient and often immediate response. This blended the army into a harmonious entity, even during the height of battle.¹⁷ The Battle of Leignitz and the clever methods of communication demonstrate deceptive and ingenious methodology. This produced many one-sided Mongol victories and is precisely why the Europeans depicted the Mongols as brutal barbarians rather than the skilled warriors and efficient tacticians they were.

One of the most profound realities of Mongol strategy is found within the psychological component. Despite having moral intentions, Khan often sought to make others perceive him as a threat. He hoped that they would surrender without a fight, and avoid scenarios like Leignitz. For example, when Khan approached a city, he gave the people a choice to surrender or die.¹⁸ Unfortunately, cities did not always surrender, which forced his hand. When this happened, it strengthened Khan's resolve and reputation, and eventually encouraged others to willfully submit to Mongol rule.

Principles, Administration, Religion, and Law

Khan built the Mongolian Empire on a variety of moral guidelines. He did not hesitate to make decisions, praised those that were loyal to him, and never broke a promise.¹⁹ He took loyalty very seriously. If an enemy soldier betrayed their leader, they died as an example. Alternatively, if an enemy soldier was loyal to his commander even when defeated, he received commendation and praise.²⁰ These actions helped Khan in his quests, as he was able to preserve good soldiers

and strengthen the depths of his army. Loyalty and ethnic unity proved to be greater bonds than the classic forced servitude, as well as the necessity to put the state and imperial interests first.²¹

The silks and spices of the Orient did not distract Khan, nor did any form of material wealth because he did not recognize or succumb to greed. Weatherford quoted Khan as saying, “I hate luxury, and I exercise moderation.”²² He only took what he needed to sustain his people. To put this into proper perspective, the Mongol Empire spanned from Korea to the Persian Gulf. It is nothing short of astonishing that Khan was able to sustain these anti-materialistic principles over such a vast territory. An elaborate and well-organized administration made it possible such that, “The Mongol state, while hardly a democracy, did have elements of a collective leadership, with Khan as chief executive, that was also a meritocracy and multinational organization that did not impose religious orthodoxy.”²³

Religion was not something that Khan restricted whatsoever. Rather, the Mongol administration consisted of people from various ethnic and religious backgrounds: “Perhaps the most striking feature of this empire was the complete religious toleration, as Christians, Pagans, Mahomedans, and Buddhists all served as councilors to Chinggis Khan.”²⁴ Each religion claimed to be the one true religion, so Khan enforced absolute religious freedom while simultaneously refusing to make his own beliefs a national cult. All religious leaders were exempt from taxation and public services. Khan understood the benefits of unifying with these contrasting religious entities if for no other reason than to gain intelligence and loyalty from the groups. In fact, the Mongols always maintained an attitude of pragmatism and toleration, rarely disturbing their subjects’ practices and beliefs unless it violated the Mongol law code.²⁵ This religious flexibility encouraged others to join the Mongols.

Khan also established a Mongol law code called “*Jasaq*,” which focused on handling problems, creating unity, and preserving peace.²⁶ Known as “The Great *Jasaq*,” or *Yasa*, in both Mongolia and China, this work codified written law passed down through generations, governing the Mongolian empire under its unwavering rule.²⁷ Even after the Mongols began converting to various other religions, particularly to Islam in the fourteenth century, the *Yasa* remained alongside Muslim law (*Sharia*). The relationship can be understood as “The *Yasa* was authoritative in political and criminal matters as well as in determining court ceremonies and protocols, while the *Sharia* prevailed in dealing with cult, personal status, and contracts.”²⁸ It is unclear how well the *Yasa* worked alongside other sets of laws, such as the thirteenth century Timurid or Uzbek laws. Nevertheless,

records indicate that Mongol India followed the *Yasa*, and that it influenced the Ottoman codex of secular law, the *qanun*.²⁹

Each nation or state recognized that the Mongols developed an efficient means of ruling an empire. As a result, various parts of the Mongol code still exist today. For example, the provincial division initiated in Yuan, China (c. 1279-1368) is still the basis for Chinese provinces, and the Mongolian imperial postal system still exists in China, Iran, and Muscovy.³⁰ The same goes for the Mongol method of using a decimal system for divisions of the army, as well as their system of military households, methods of guarding the emperor, and the Yuan garrison system.

The *Yasa* was successful because it was relatively simple, and aimed to maintain peace in a large and diverse atmosphere. Genghis Khan suppressed the traditional causes of tribal feuding and refused to base the law on a divine relation from God.³¹ This made the *Yasa* vastly different from most law codes in history, especially during the Middle Ages. Essentially, the code came from the customs and traditions of herding tribes, which meant allowing smaller groups to follow their traditional law as long as it did not conflict with the overall code of *Yasa*. It was an ongoing body of legal work and did not delve into all aspects of life.³² Instead, it sought only to control the most troublesome aspects, such as the kidnapping of women, which clearly had some personal value to Khan considering his past with Borte. In fact, most of the law seemed to develop from the hardships the Mongols suffered in the past.

The law also forbade the abduction and enslavement of any Mongol. The Tayichiud captured and enslaved Khan, making him well aware of the anguish it could cause not only to himself but also to all other tribes of the steppes. The law made all children legitimate, regardless of who mothered the child (wife or concubine), forbade the selling of women into marriage, outlawed adultery, and made animal theft a capital offense.³³ In addition, Khan incorporated an empire-wide lost and found system, in which everyone must return what they found or suffer the penalty for theft—execution. The animal aspect of the law was an effort to protect the much valued and relied upon horses that the Mongols used to propel their empire forward. Each of these developments relate to Khan's troubled past.

The law code also influenced various parts of daily Mongolian life, including hunting seasons and kill regulations. There were even laws that provided essential public service workers—lawyers, doctors, teachers—with tax exemptions, and laws designed to prevent anyone from challenging the Khan's official authority. In a manner outside hereditary obligations, the *Yasa* made it law to elect the next Khan by a *khuriltai*, a political and military council consisting of both Mongol and Turkish Chiefs and Khans.³⁴ The law also enforced group

responsibility. This made a family, entire military unit, or tribe subject to a penalty for one member's actions and promoted a just community rather than lawful individualism. The *Yasa* was so binding that not even the Khan could avoid its authority.

The Mongols were no more bloodthirsty than the societies they conquered; they were just more efficient at what they did.³⁵ Khan did not only focus on war and unity, but also how to maintain his empire once established. It is noteworthy to add that Alexander the Great's incredible accomplishments inevitably failed because he did not prepare his empire for longevity and stability after his death. To help prevent this, Kahn spent a lot of time establishing trading routes for his subjects and their lands. The true ambitions and policies of the Great Khan appear in a letter he had written to the Sultan Muhammad, who desired control of his kingdom despite the Mongolian presence. According to Alā al-Dīn Atā Malik Juvaynī, a Persian historian that served at the Mongol court in West Asia, the letter stated,

Human wisdom so requires it; that the path of concord should be trodden by either side; that the duties of friendship should be observed; that we should bind ourselves to aid and assist one another in the event of untoward happenings. That we should keep open the paths of security frequented and deserted, so that merchants may ply to and fro in safety and without restraint.³⁶

When the Sultan refused to follow its instructions, Khan killed him to preserve the peace and uphold the laws of the land.

Conclusion

Since the Renaissance and the Mongol Empire, misinformation reduced Genghis Khan to the lowest level of human history.³⁷ From what a Mongolian looked like to their mental capacity came under intense scrutiny, often by Western and Christian enthusiasts such as Francis G. Crookshank. Crookshank was a British physician who wrote *The Mongol in Our Midst* in 1924. In this text, Crookshank associated various physical and mental ailments to Mongolian heritage, which he called "the Mongolian stigmata." Unfortunately, this is why some people refer to children with Down Syndrome as "Mongoloids." The idea was to encourage their expulsion from society as a means to combat the widespread influence of the former Mongolian Empire. Nevertheless, the

Mongolians and collective Asians saw, and still see, the Great Khan as a hero.³⁸

Genghis Khan was a pioneer of his time because his skills and knowledge were far ahead of anyone else. Appreciating the guidance of Sun Tzu, Khan understood the importance of leadership, loyalty, flexibility, and virtue. Although he received much criticism for being brutal, his feigned brutality was just another well-played strategy to accomplish his goal of unity and peace. Khan taught the world that to be a great leader it is necessary to experience hardship—a Clausewitz philosophy—and that it is important to understand the pains of others. Leaders should present themselves as equals, be both a fighter and a lover, and never be interested in wealth. Most importantly, one should always keep in mind that a goal is more important than an individual is.

Centuries after his passing, Genghis Khan is still history's greatest conqueror. The quality of his leadership was the reason for his successes.³⁹ He focused on unity and preservation instead of destruction and attrition. Obviously, this is quite the opposite of the many myths and legends that still circulate today.

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The Land Ordinance Act of 1784: Defining the Political Geography of a New Nation

Jeff Ballard

In 1783, the Confederation Congress of the United States formed a committee to recommend policies for the disposal of lands ceded by Great Britain to the United States at the conclusion of the American War of Independence. After much debate during the spring of 1784, a significantly amended report became the Land Ordinance Act of 1784. The “Act,” proposed to Congress, embodied the political ideals of the committee’s chairman, Thomas Jefferson. The liberal democratic principles expressed by the Act ensured the success of Republicanism, which made individual liberty and unalienable human rights the central ideal of post-war American society.

As applied to the political geography of the new nation brought into existence by the Treaty of Paris (1783), these principles manifested themselves in four very distinct ways. First, the concepts of public domain and private land ownership emerged as land became a commodity to be bought and sold. Next, the physical geography of the states created by the subdivision of the Western Territory and their representative form of government fueled the cause of Republicanism. Third, the Act elevated colonial agrarianism and encouraged the capabilities of individual farming, giving Jefferson’s land policy a popular base in the agriculturally dominant west. Finally, the policy proposed a land division scheme, which was more democratic than the incumbent schemes, as it defined equal sized lots that simplified revenue collection.

European settlers of North America used methods that can be traced back to 1096 when Pope Urban II directed the Christian church to “recover the sacred city of Jerusalem, where Christianity was born, from the hands of Islam.”¹ These Holy Crusades taught Europeans how to organize far-flung expeditions to unknown lands and how to enrich themselves in the process. In 1295, the Venetian, Marco Polo, returned from seventeen years in the Chinese Empire and published an account of his exploits, which predicted the wealth that European trade with the East would generate.

During the next two hundred years, explorers, supported by various governments, attempted to find a water route, around or through the Americas. Portuguese Ferdinand Magellan sailed southward around Cape Horn and into the

Pacific, while Englishman Martin Frobisher probed northward looking for the Northwest Passage to the Orient. Finding the continents to be a north-south barrier to China in the Atlantic explorers looked elsewhere.

Looters and plunderers recognized the opportunities in the Americas, however, and exploited them. By 1519, Hernando Cortés had spent two years pillaging in Central America, “capturing several king’s ransoms of gold and silver.”² Two decades later Francisco Pizarro mounted his campaign in Peru and liberated \$65 million of treasure from the Inca Empire.³

The wealth extracted from the Americas made Spain the predominant political power in Europe in the 1600s. However, Spain’s mismanagement of its profits allowed France to begin its incursions into North America. Preoccupied with the war between Catholics and Protestants, the English entered the race for the European colonization of North America late. Instead of treasure-taking in the New World, the Protestant Queen Elizabeth filled the royal coffers by enlisting privateer Sir Francis Drake to capture the treasure ships of her chief Catholic enemy, Spain.

During the seventeenth century, European commercial interests in North America were informal, haphazard, and seasonal expeditions to harvest coastal resources by fishermen, lumbermen, and speculative merchants. Through this process, the French discovered their own “Inca Gold” and exploited the abundance of furs—beaver, fox, and lynx.

Failed private colonization schemes, like that of Sir Walter Raleigh in North Carolina, convinced English administrators that government sponsorship and financial encouragement were required to establish commercial trading companies. In 1606, the English King James I granted two joint-stock companies a royal charter to establish permanent colonial settlements in North America. The Virginia Company of London received the deed to all the lands from the 34th parallel north to the 41st parallel, land which encompassed the area now known as Cape Fear to Long Island. The king granted the Massachusetts Bay Company the area between the Charles River, of present-day Boston, to the Merrimack River, which lays in northern New Hampshire. Inexplicably, no western boundary for either company’s charter was specified, a fact which would further complicate settlement of the Western Territory.

English colonial settlement spread outward slowly from its first few permanent settlements on the Atlantic coast and the Chesapeake Bay over the next one hundred fifty years. By 1700, more than a quarter million people had settled in the mainland English colonies.⁴ Few settlements were farther than fifty miles from the sea. In 1775, the population of the colonies had reached two and a half million

people and was then one-third the population of Britain.⁵ By 1820, the population of the United States would surpass that of Britain. The total population of the United States in 1790, the year of the first official census, excluding slaves, was 3.23 million people, an increase of approximately one-third since the start of the American Revolution.⁶

By 1752, the thirteen colonies had organized themselves such that visitors from England would find colonial North America quite agreeable, appreciating the familiar dedication to liberty, property, and mercantilism. English conceptions of county governments and the concept of private property ownership ruled territorial organization below the colonial level. County courts established no farther than one day's round trip ride for any resident made the seat of government accessible to all. However, this was not universally true of all colonies. Until 1769, South Carolina had only a single court in Charleston, at which time the South Carolina Judicial Districts were established to serve the backcountry. English was by far the predominant language, as was the prevalence of British social institutions like the Church of England and the militia.

There were many exceptions, however, as Colonial America was by no means a homogeneous society. The Chesapeake region, for example, had a much higher percentage of Catholics than elsewhere in the colonies while English indentured servants, whose labors in the tobacco fields were replaced by African slaves in the late 1670s, were predominately Protestant. Englishman Henry Hudson's explorations, on behalf of the Dutch of New Netherlands in 1609, established Anglo-Dutch settlements from the lower Delaware River to Long Island, and from western Pennsylvania to upstate New York. The Dutch encouraged culturally and linguistically diverse groups of Catholics, Mennonites, and Lutherans speaking Dutch and German, to immigrate to their North American settlements.⁷

The proximity of all thirteen colonies to the Atlantic Ocean and few, if any, improved roads meant that eighteenth-century America was a maritime society. The number of adventurous souls willing to forgo the safety provided by the British Army further regulated migration to the fertile farmland of the Ohio Country. After the French and Indian War ended, the British Proclamation Line of 1763 prevented trans-Appalachian settlement, much to the chagrin of the colonists, who had expected the war's end to open up that very territory to settlement. But the Proclamation Line was not universally respected and speculative investors, most notably George Washington, made claims on the Western Territory.⁸ Intrepid settlers moved west as far and as fast as their courage allowed.

The 1783 Treaty of Paris declared the end of the American Revolution

and set the boundaries of the United States. The new nation acquired vast tracts of land from the Proclamation Line west to the Mississippi River, north to the Great Lakes, and south to the Gulf of Mexico. Faced with the daunting task of governing a virtually unsettled nation that “was larger than any country in western and central Europe,” the Confederation Congress appointed a committee to prepare a plan for the temporary government of the Western Territory.⁹

The plan titled, “Report on Government for Western Territory,” was presented in the handwriting of its chairman, Thomas Jefferson, and was read to Congress on March 3, 1784. The date of the report coincided with Virginia’s cession, by deed to the United States, to its claim on lands north and west of the Ohio River above the 34th parallel. Congress debated the Plan between March 8 and April 23 which once amended became the basis for the Land Ordinance Act of 1784, known to many scholars as “Jefferson’s Ordinance.” The Act constituted nothing less than a “grand plan for the entire trans-Appalachian West according to Jefferson’s political geography and his perception of Virginia’s interests.”¹⁰




Figure 1. *Thomas Jefferson*, oil on canvas by Mather Brown, c. 1786.

The abandonment of Virginia’s claims on the Ohio country resolved the crisis, which had made Maryland the last state to join the Confederation in 1781. Before ceding its claim, Virginia argued that Maryland, bounded by the Mason-Dixon Line in the north and the Potomac River in the south, had no access or

legitimate claim to the Western Territory. Virginia further argued that their land claim had no western boundary. Maryland countered with the vagaries of the colonial charters. Virginia's cessation, however, came with conditions, which Jefferson co-opted and incorporated into the plan. Most notably, Jefferson wrote, "[the ceded territory] shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct republican states, which shall become members of the federal union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other states."¹¹ This deed established the precedent for "public domain," which held that land was a commodity to be bought and sold for the benefit of the nation.

Land and the abundance of natural resources were the lures to English colonists. The English philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704), wrote after the first visits by Europeans to North America that, "In the beginning, all the world was America."¹² Centuries later, the American naval historian, Edward L. Beach (1918-2002) observed that "Magnificent stands of timber were among the natural resources that instantly struck early explorers of North America."¹³

Since the Native Americans had "nothing but their beliefs, traditions, and culture to show that they 'owned' the land, the Europeans thought they could appropriate it freely."¹⁴ The settlers assumed "the natural right of individual property rights" advanced by Locke, who had also inspired Jefferson's ideals of "government by the consent of the people" and "rights of life liberty and property."¹⁵ This practice of progressive infringement upon the Native American land, with token or no compensation at all, caused one English colonist to observe, "America was a place where one could go to 'live bravely' and live without restraint in the new uncharted lands."¹⁶

Since there was little precedent for private land ownership in America, colonists simply did what they had done in their native Europe. Owners filed property deeds at the seat of county government where clerks recorded them in bound volumes. Since no permanent survey monuments existed, colonists used land survey and division methods that mirrored the systems they had used in their Old World homelands.¹⁷

Before the Act introduced the uniquely American system of rectangular land survey, two schemes defined property boundaries in North America. The first was "metes and bounds" and the second French "long lots."¹⁸ In feudal England, deeds described land claims in relative terms and recorded physical features, both natural and manmade, to define the enclosed parcel. This method was known as "metes and bounds," because it explained how one's property butted—meted—against neighboring properties or bordered by a road, fence, or riverbank. This

system was the predominant method in the original thirteen colonies, plus Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee.¹⁹

Metes and bounds created irregularly sized and oddly shaped parcels, with few straight lines, which depended upon unstable terrain features or manmade landmarks. For example, a 1789 parcel filed on the Virginia Military Reservation was an exceedingly complex polygon with 118 sides. Neither was the area of parcels surveyed using metes and bounds very precise. An Ohio country lot, thought to contain 458 acres, was later determined to contain 1,662 acres.²⁰ Finally, with the passage of time, identification became problematic as trees died, streams changed course, and property owners changed.

The French, who also settled vast areas of North America, brought with them a different system for a land division called long lots. Given their French origins, long lots unsurprisingly dominated Eastern Canada, the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence River, Mississippi River, and Louisiana.²¹ These parcels were often ten times longer than they were wide, laid down in successive parallel ranges with one width bounded by a body of water. The opposite end with farmhouse and outbuildings bordered the road. The chief benefit of this scheme gave each property access to both water source and over-land and river transportation. The fact that residences lay very close together, however, was less desirable. Furthermore, French inheritance practices created lengthwise subdivisions that could result in parcels too narrow to be farmed efficiently.²² Long lot parcel descriptions also relied on stakes, fences, and stone markers, with their inherent flaws, to delineate property lines.

The preamble to Jefferson's plan read: "Resolved, that the territory ceded or to be ceded by Individual states to the United States shall be formed into distinct states." Every aspect of his plan for the subdivision and governance of the Western Territory promoted the success of Republicanism, including the number, physical dimensions, and arrangement of the proposed states.²³

Jefferson's ideas about the number of states to be created by the subdividing changed from formal discussions held before the report to Congress. His original thoughts had evolved from previous proposals for creating only one or two states to forming six to fourteen or more.²⁴ Jefferson believed that for state governments to remain republican, the size of the state must be small enough to "preserve the homogeneity of the interests, opinions, and habits of the citizens."²⁵ If the state were too large, he warned, "a stronger, more centralized government than desirable for Republicanism would be needed to extend its influence to the far corners of the state."²⁶ Jefferson argued then that Virginia should, for its good, "cede all the territory it could not govern according to republican principles, to

maintain homogeneity of interests among the state's population."²⁷

Jefferson arranged his new states and selected his meridian lines on "the abstract idea of balance and from fear of conflict between large and small states."²⁸ The parallels drawn through the falls of the Ohio River and the mouth of the Great Kanawha River would determine east to west dimensions.²⁹ He formed the new states into three tiers when added to the original thirteen. The first tier would border the Atlantic, and the third tier would border the Mississippi River. The middle tier "is to be the smallest, and to form a balance betwixt the two more powerful ones."³⁰ Each state would extend two degrees of latitude to include lands south of the Ohio River still claimed by Georgia and North and South Carolina as well as by Virginia.

Jefferson's report also suggested names for the new states. Washington and Saratoga were recognizable in American annals, while the others were Indian tribes with classical suffixes. Only two of the latter would be familiar to today's student. The territory "which lies under the 45'th. & 44'th. degrees that which lies Westward of Lake Michigan," Jefferson suggested being "MICHIGANIA" and "Of the territory which lies under the 41'st. & 40'th. degrees the Western, thro which the river Illinois runs, shall be called ILLINOIA."³¹ Though used later, none of the state names survived the report's amendment process and are not a part of the Act.

Neither the plan, nor the Act, discussed the location of state capitals, or the relocation of the capitals of the original states. However, between 1776 and 1812, eleven of the original thirteen colonies voted to relocate their capitals westward towards the geographic centers of their state.³² This move promoted the democratic ideal of access to representative government.

The selection for the site of the "Federal City" was the result of a compromise with far-reaching political significance. Virginia congressman James Madison agreed to support the core provisions of Alexander Hamilton's fiscal program in exchange for locating the national capital at a site along the Potomac River at a location that appeared "seemingly plopped down at random on land where tobacco and wheat had grown." The Federalist Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton, benefitted, as did the Jeffersonian Democrats, who had shifted the seat of federal government away from the commerce and manufacturing Atlantic coast to the rural and agrarian Virginia tidewater.³³

Furthermore, the Act set down a plan by which settlers in the new states of the Western Territory could achieve self-government, on par with the original thirteen states. The first step authorized prospective states to meet and form a "temporary government" by adopting the constitution and laws of one of the

original states.³⁴ The temporary government would remain in effect until any state grew to twenty thousand free inhabitants. Then, after certifying its population before Congress, “the state was given authority to call a Convention of representatives to establish a permanent Constitution & Government for themselves.”³⁵ When a new state’s population reached that of the “least numerous of the thirteen original states, such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the said original state provided the consent of nine states to such admission may be obtained according to the eleventh of the Articles of Confederation.”³⁶ Until such admission, the delegates sitting in Congress would have the right to debate but not to vote.³⁷

The grants of both temporary and permanent self-government were sanctioned only as long as the states adhered to five democratic principles. The Act resolved that: 1) the states shall forever remain a part of the United States of America; 2) the persons and property of the states “shall be subject to the Government of the United States in Congress assembled and to the Articles of Confederation in all those cases in which the original states shall be so subject;” 3) the states shall pay a part of the federal debts apportioned on them by Congress, “according to the same common rule and measure by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other states;” 4) their government will take a republican form and no citizen, who holds any hereditary title will be allowed to participate; and 5) “After the year 1800 of the Christian era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted to have been personally guilty.”³⁸

Thomas Jefferson’s vision of America as a farming republic, elevated colonial agrarianism and the support of individual farming families to the highest priority of American government. Jefferson maintained a reverence, bordering on religious fanaticism, for agriculture his entire life. While governor of Virginia, Jefferson wrote in *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1785), “Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breast he has made particular deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.”³⁹ Jefferson envisioned for America a land of yeoman farmers, who were the “true representative of American interests,” and went so far as to advocate that only farmers may serve in Congress.

In 1776, Jefferson proposed, but failed to have ratified in the Virginia State Constitution, a provision that “every free person was to be entitled to fifty acres of land.”⁴⁰ His estate, Monticello, had swallowed his parents’ land holdings and grown to 5,500 acres by 1794. His Albemarle County, Virginia plantings were

devoted mostly to the production of wheat, and additional holdings in nearby Bedford County were planted with tobacco.⁴¹ Monticello expressed his conviction that, “agriculture and the independent small-scale farmer were . . . the building blocks of the new nation.”⁴²

Only Jefferson’s disdain for commercial and manufacturing pursuits matched his veneration of agriculture. However, the reality of Colonial America was that before the economic schism caused by the American Revolution, there was little motivation for Americans to do anything else but farm, fish, and ranch. Despite Benjamin Franklin’s bravado that he “did not know of a single article that the colonies could not do without or manufacture themselves,” the colonists were wholly dependent upon Great Britain for their muskets, nails, and farm implements, except, of course, for the significant smuggling industry which brought in goods from French, Dutch, and Spanish sources, typically from the West Indies. Furthermore, a lack of labor and laws, regulations, and duties imposed by Britain, helped promote America’s agrarian prominence, which further inhibited the colonists from developing their manufacturing sector.⁴³ Again, in *Notes on the State of Virginia*, Jefferson wrote, “for manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe. The mobs of cities add just so much to the support of government, as sores do to the strength of the human body.”⁴⁴

Jefferson’s plan also introduced the rectangular land survey, which was a considerable improvement over early strategies for land division. The Public Land Survey, or PLS as it came to be known, was inherently democratic because it offered small, equal-sized, square lots and provided the federal government with a systematic basis for revenue collection.⁴⁵

The incumbent methods of land survey, which were sufficient for dividing the limited geography of the colonies, became inadequate after the Revolutionary War, and after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, became absurdly deficient. A system dividing America’s vast land acquisitions quickly and fairly needed to be devised. Fortunately for the cause of westward expansion, Jefferson, the former professional land surveyor, had a solid understanding of geography, astronomy, mathematics, and surveying techniques which were a product of the eighteenth century Age of Enlightenment.

Jefferson recognized that modern survey methods applied to the North American landscape required revising the arcane units of measuring distance. Chains, which measured sixty-six feet and poles of sixteen and a half feet, were converted to feet, equal to 0.06 poles and miles, which measured eighty chains. Colonial Americans also incorporated compass directions in their parcels’ description.⁴⁶ In locations where there were no outstanding terrain features,

surveyors drove stakes or erected stone monuments, to mark key points. The advantage of this method was that property owners could easily envision and communicate the boundaries of their parcel to others.

The rectangular system demonstrated the ideals of Republicanism and was “steeped in Jefferson’s political geography.”⁴⁷ The concept was simple but implementation required progressive surveyors to execute it. The PLS established a geometric grid of east-west latitude “baselines,” and north-south longitude “ranges.” The grid was independent of the landscape or geographical features that metes and bounds or long lots surveys required. Surveyors laid out “townships,” six miles on each side and further subdivided them into thirty-six “sections,” each a mile square, or forty acres.⁴⁸ The Secretary of War was allotted five sections in each township for use by the Continental Army, or to be disposed of as he wished. One of the central sections of the township was reserved for government, maintenance, and public schools.⁴⁹ Much like his plan while governor of Virginia, Jefferson intended to give away the remaining thirty sections to the yeomanry, a quarter or a quarter-quarter section he thought ideal for a single family farm.⁵⁰ Congress however, directed that all unallocated lands be sold for one dollar an acre.⁵¹

Congress ratified the Act but certainly not as Jefferson had drafted it. On the second vote, held April 22, 1784, the provision abolishing slavery was defeated and stricken. America’s first attempt to legally abolish slavery failed for lack of support. Jefferson of Virginia and Hugh Williamson of North Carolina were the only southern congressmen who voted to approve that provision.

The Land Ordinance Act of 1784, however, was short-lived. It was superseded the following year and then again in 1787 by the Northwest Ordinance Act. The latter addressed the issue of expansion of slavery in the territory but did not emancipate the slaves in the existing southern states.

Jefferson’s ultimate goal in drafting his policies was “to guaranty the success of Republicanism,” even to the extent that it required a new state to adopt the constitution from one of the original states.⁵² His integration of the principles of democracy, Republicanism, and representative government influenced the characteristics and political organization of geographical space of the Western Territory and ultimately the nation.⁵³ While the abolition of slavery in the Western Territory after 1800 would have been the ultimate expression of his liberal democracy, it was not to be, and the founding fathers would leave that question for future generations to address.

Any American who has flown over the midwestern United States has seen incontrovertible evidence that Thomas Jefferson’s policy for the disposition

of the land in the Western Territory forever shaped our nation. The checkerboard pattern of mile square sections, planted with wheat, corn, soybeans or grazing cattle, is unwavering unless the presence of mighty rivers or great mountains “may render [Jefferson’s Public Land Survey] impracticable, and then it shall depart from the rule no farther than such particular circumstances may require.”⁵⁴

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40. Andrea Wulf, *The Founding Gardeners: The Revolutionary Generation, Nature and the Shaping of the American Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 116.
41. Cunningham, 196.
42. Wulf, 10.
43. Ibid., 7.
44. Cunningham, 17.
45. Berkhofer, 248.
46. Mitchell, 152.
47. Ibid., 153.

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50. Mitchell, 152-153.

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53. Mitchell, 147.

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Mike Duncan. *The Storm before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic*. New York: Hachette Book Group, 2017.

Book Review

Robert Smith, PhD

Mike Duncan's *The Storm before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic* is a dramatic tale of the political turmoil engulfing Rome before the rise of Caesar, Pompey Magnus, and the Caesar-Pompey Roman Civil War as portrayed in Rome. The fact that Mike Duncan is renowned as a history podcaster should not be cause to avoid this both relevant and bloody book. Duncan's book is a rich survey of the period when the Republic began its slide from its noble trappings to a state existing solely for the benefit of roughly a hundred noble families and the equestrian order or class who held the reins of the Roman Republic economy. Duncan astutely works in the Roman political structure, which is far more complex, with seemingly a series of check and balances by different offices and assemblies.



Figure 1. *Destruction* from *The Course of the Empire* by Cole Thomas, c. 1833-1836.

Duncan's overall thesis seems to anchor itself upon the fact that the Roman Republic's political aristocracy was unable to cope with its military and political ascendancy in the *Mare Nostrum*. With the defeat of Carthage and the subjugation of the tribes of Spain, Rome ruled much of their known world. What upset the economic balance was all the new wealth and slaves flooding into Rome. With the defeat of Carthage, Rome now controlled the silver mines of Spain. Duncan, though, does not explore if this sudden dramatic influx of wealth caused inflation, but such a massive infusion surely caused some inflationary pressures. In turn, that infusion would have put greater economic pressure on the smaller land holdings owned by individual Roman farmers.

In a circular fashion, Duncan addresses this by noting that there soon seemed to be a fire sale of land that the top one-hundred families were adding to their already substantial estates. In turn, those farmers became in essence a free "serf," bound to that family and who was expected to vote for those of the estate standing for election, or they became part of the new urban masses. In turn, this led to the economic pressure of needing to subsidize a grain dole for those now dispossessed from the land. The other major unresolved political crisis was there were still at this time two Italys, Roman Italy and the Italian Italy whose residents the Romans did not treat as Roman citizens. Their status was usually one of Allied cities or *Socii*, but as they lacked citizenship, were subject to arbitrary actions with no legal recourse.

Think of both of those elements as the third rails of Roman Republican politics. In addition, Romans either represented the established families that comprised the majority of the Senate, or those Senatorial reformers and the "plebs," the free Romans of lower classes. Moreover, elections were held by tribal vote in which thirty-five tribes—four urban and thirty-one rural—would assemble on the Field of Mars and vote for candidates. Here is seen the rise of populism in terms of a political tool to rise to power that Caesar would use with great effect. However, to hold many of the offices, one first needed to have done their time in the legions, a stint of ten years, as it was mandatory for office. But with this rise of populism and now class baiting, Duncan lays out how the competing factions began using political violence, to include murdering foes and dumping their bodies and those of their supporters in the Tiber.

The end state reached was laws would be passed—and then either ignored or simply undone by the next faction to come into power. Rome had reached a state of political paralysis, which was even more harmful as it lacked any meaningful bureaucratic administrative machinery. In turn, Duncan lays out how each of the major civil wars that convulsed Rome further weakened the Republic.

The first was by the native Italians who rose against Rome. Eventually, though victorious, Rome granted these various tribes citizenship rights, but much of Italy was devastated in the conflict. Of greater portent for the future was the political competition between Marius and Sulla, and its impact lasted down into the era of Julius Caesar. The outcome of Sulla's victory was the use of a dictatorship not just as a temporary measure as in the past but as one for as long as deemed critical for the reestablishment of order and security. This set a dangerous future precedent for Rome. So did Sulla's use of proscription, a method to pay his troops by declaring either an opponent or someone wealthy to be an enemy, having them killed, and seizing their assets for the Republic.




Figure 2. Numéro 138 dans *Figures de l'histoire de la république romaine accompagnées d'un précis historique*, Paris, an VIII. Silvestre David Mirys, c. 1799. A proscription list—once published, citizens were under an obligation to kill those upon it.

The Storm before the Storm could have helped the new or even casual reader by use of a technique that Jeff Sahara uses in all his works. He gives the readers a condensed thumbnail of the major actors in his volumes, enabling the

reader to have a pre-immersion of who is who. That is even more important in certain cultures, as we have various Julia, Marius, Pompey-like names and such that can easily confuse and frustrate the reader (and one supposes the Romans as well). Worse, though, is the failure to adequately proof the book. There are at least twelve instances this reviewer found of a capital U that was mistakenly transposed in exchange for other letters, usually words with the letters ch but not in all instances. This capital U sticks out like the proverbial sore thumb.


Yet Duncan with *The Storm before the Storm* admirably fills a gap for not just the casual reader of Roman history. Duncan here made the period of the Republic at the height of its military and political success accessible, rendering a great service for the field. Moreover, Duncan allows his readers to draw their own conclusions on the current state of both American and global political affairs through the use of Roman history rather than interject in any heavy handed way the “this means that” school of writing. In all, Duncan provides a fine read. *The Storm before the Storm* is a book readers will not start and forget about.

Hugh Gough. *The Terror in the French Revolution*, 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Book Review

Jessica Lathrop

The second edition of *The Terror in the French Revolution* by Hugh Gough is an interesting, short, and concise book advancing the theory that the French Revolution was the wellspring of political terrorism. In the initial pages of his book, Gough adds a preface exclusively for his second edition, illustrating the more recent research and historical interpretations which have caused him to deemphasize certain aspects of the French Revolution's early stages. Alternatively, Gough provides additional research and materials that focus on the overall effect of *the terror* in terms of the social, cultural, and political changes that it wrought. Gough also includes a chronology of events, followed by an extensive annotated bibliography. With the book barely one hundred fifty pages long, this leaves an abbreviated but easily readable version of the French Revolution. It focuses on the events that occurred during the year of 1789 and then the years 1793-1794, which are effectively considered the beginning and the end of the French Revolution, commonly referred to as "the terror."



In *The Terror in the French Revolution*, Gough starts with an in-depth definition of what can be considered terror, including the etymology of the word and explains briefly why terror had a new meaning for France by the early nineteenth century. He discusses that during the terror, over sixteen thousand

people were guillotined, more than twenty thousand prisoners died during captivity, and another two hundred thousand died from civil war. Gough observes that although the death toll is a fraction in comparison to those caused by other destructive political regimes such as Stalin's 1930s purges, Germany's Holocaust, and Pol Pot's Cambodia, as a terror it was highly effective. Body count was not the issue so much as the overall intent and dedication of the French revolutionaries to remake society. Gough also states, "For the first time in history terror was used in the name of popular sovereignty, in the name of people, to kill opponents of democracy."¹

Gough's second chapter tells of events leading up to the Parisian assault on the Bastille in July of 1789 and the democratic reforms that followed throughout the next two years. He notes, "These reforms made France into Europe's most democratic state."² However, by 1792, France had declared war with Europe and the fledgling democracy collapsed. In 1793, the king had been executed and France was thrown into civil war.

With this brief explanation underway, Gough goes on to break down the actual events of France in the years following 1789. Political conflict in 1789 and 1791 frustrated French citizens, especially the aristocrats, dividing the upper class into two threads: the *monarchiens* and the *noirs*. While the *monarchiens* were still royalists, they were in full support of the parliamentary style of government, using Britain as an effective example, keeping veto power with the King and nobles, while defending the position of the Catholic Church. The *noirs*, in contrast, wanted reinstatement of the Estates-General while disbanding the King's Assembly, and to have ideals such as feudalism and religious discrimination returned. Gough explains that due to the poor communication during that time, "plot theory" became a very real threat to French aristocracy by 1790.

Gough continues to describe other political issues as well, including the loss of absolute power for King Louis XVI and his subsequent flight to Varennes in 1791, the Girondins (considered to be radicals) campaigning for war, and the six-week long "first terror" of political violence caused by the Austro-Prussian armies advancing against the Tuileries Palace.³ Lastly, Gough circles back to the Girondins and their "failure" of sentencing the former King Louis to death by guillotine, effectively weakening the power of the Girondins' regime. This caused political strife among the country in a time when it desperately needed stability and comradery.

Gough's third through fifth chapters explain the beginning and consummation of the Terror—largely the "critical points were, first, the overthrow of the Girondins on 2 June 1793 and then the destruction of the 'factions' in the

early spring of 1794.”⁴ The sixth chapter discusses the rapid rise of execution rates that came with the summer of 1794, later known as the “Great Terror.” During this period, the amount of blood that surrounded the guillotine grew into such a putrid mess that the revolutionaries were forced to move the guillotine and stage to the Bastille—only to have citizens still complain of the stench. This resulted in the revolutionaries moving the guillotine again, this time to the far city outskirts with the bodies merely dumped in a nearby mass grave. Considered the high point of the French Revolution, the guillotine was steadily maintaining over thirty executions per day. For a spectator, this would have been a grisly scene, as thirty deaths per day equate to at least two deaths per hour, if the guillotine operators ceased for a short eight hours of rest at night.

Gough moves on to explain the culmination of the Terror, and the creation of a new Republic beginning in 1794. He outlines the lasting effects—including consequences affecting women’s rights, religious issues, education, and the economy. Gough also briefly mentions Napoleon’s contributions to ending the Revolution, although his name is mentioned less than expected.

As a conclusion, Gough briefly re-describes the Revolution and then succinctly incorporates the Democratic Period of 1792-1804, despite his extensive explanations of revolutionary “terror” including events up to 1794, which is then followed by the Napoleonic Period of 1804-1815. Gough describes the long-term consequences: “Death was the most obvious, making the guillotine, possibly, the terror’s most lasting image,”⁵ following the “overwhelming majority of victims . . . opposing the authority of the Convention.”⁶ Essentially, anyone found to oppose the government during this time was sentenced to death. Gough also states that the political impact was primarily to save the republic from defeat by creating oppression. The lasting result of the terror, then, was a republican democracy, parliamentary democracy, and separation of church and state. Even these results were short-lived, however, as one of Gough’s last sentences reflects upon the French Revolution signaling the beginning of two hundred years of political instability for France.

In general, Gough provides an authoritative view of the French Revolution and the terror it created, giving a broad yet succinct description of key issues and events. He tries to explain the impact of each event on the Terror as a whole—summarizing it all into one large, generalized effect culminated from many smaller and individual incidents. While his book is well written without being too lengthy, Gough does often jump around in his chronology in order to explain certain points as he proceeds through his book. While readers can counter this by referring to the Chronology section of the book there are times when, as a

reader, the amount of cross-referencing seems unnecessary. In relation to Gough's argument that the French Revolution was the birth of political terrorism, the author provides a fair amount of evidence in support of his point. While Gough's discussion includes many valid points in his favor, one area he is lacking is the discussion of ancient acts of political malice, such as Rome during the reign of Emperor Nero, and why these would have contrasted with the French Revolution in terms of political terrorism. Despite this, in using the information provided by Gough, his point is well illustrated and easily argued. Overall, it is a worthwhile read, which provides a thorough look at the French Revolution.

1. Hugh Gough, *The Terror in the French Revolution*, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

2. *Ibid.*, 14.

3. *Ibid.*, 18.

4. Mike Rapport, review of *The Terror in the French Revolution* by Hugh Gough, Macmillan, 1998, *History* 85, no. 277 (January 2000): 169, accessed June 11, 2015, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

4. Gough, *The Terror*, 109.


5. *Ibid.*, 110.

Mark Simner. *Chitral 1895: An Episode of the Great Game*. England: Fonthill Media Limited, 2017.

Book Review

Chris Schloemer

The remote mountainous area of the Hindu Kush in northwest Pakistan and northeast Afghanistan is one of the most desolate and inaccessible on earth. For centuries, tribes have dominated it. Even now, the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have little leverage there. Because of this, Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban, have used it as a base of operation, holing up in the highly inaccessible mountains. In the late 1800s, the area interested Great Britain. Mark Simner, in his book, *Chitral 1895: An Episode of the Great Game*, relates the importance of this area to the British and the difficulties British and Indian soldiers had dealing with the tribes there. The area, in what is now Pakistan, really had no national interest to Britain, except in its “Great Game” to prevent Russia and China access to India (p. 15). This resulted in a conflict in which a small force of British soldiers and allies holed up in an old, dilapidated fort, held out for forty-eight days under siege while the British mounted two separate relief efforts to save them. This book brilliantly depicts the difficulties in mounting a campaign and attempting to pacify this volatile, inaccessible region and the resulting strife the attempted pacification caused.



So where is Chitral? Initially, Simner describes it as in the far northwest border of Pakistan (then part of British India), just east of the far northeast border of Afghanistan. Geographically, it was near the point where the British, Russian, and Chinese empires of the period met. Maps provided help to orient the reader. Using quotes from British army officers of the time, the reader gets a feel for the remoteness of this desolate area, tucked into majestic mountain peaks. Travel was difficult and dangerous, especially in crossing periodically torrential rivers, sometimes using cantilever bridges when available, but often only accessible by precarious rope bridges. It was a difficult area to live in, much less fight in (p. 21). Furthermore, the people did not conform to British ideas.

Simner provides the reader with British military officers' varied descriptions of the native peoples, describing their treachery, tribal leaders' ambitions, dealings through bribes and temporary alliances, and propensity to assassinate each other and participate in power struggles. Conversely, the officers also described their kindness and love for music and dancing (p. 22). This gives the reader much information showing who the British thought they were dealing with.

In the 1880s and 90s, the British came into increased contact with the tribes of the area while exploring passes through the mountains and encountered Russian Cossack troops doing the same thing. This is where Simner presents the area as important in the "Victorian era cold war between the ever-expanding British and Russian empires (p. 28)." Without this cold war emphasis, the British may never have been interested in the area at all, but they believed the Russians were interested in "pushing the Chitrali door to India wide open (p. 28)." The common use of bribes with money and weapons gained the British an unsteady foothold in the area. Ruled by a *mehtar* (king), Chitral was constantly torn by inter and intra-tribal conflict.

The area was regularly contested by Chitrali, Afghani, Pathan, and Kashmiri rulers. After a strong *mehtar*, a British ally (of course for a price), died in 1892, a bloody conflict for accession began in Chitral. The British did not want to get involved, but one son gained the capital and sought British recognition, getting it by agreeing to his father's terms. This accession struggle precipitated the campaigns that are the meat of this book. The new *mehtar* was not strong, nor respected by the locals. Before he took the capital, the fleeing leaders looted the treasury and armory. This weak leader, without money to bribe or arms to cow, was in a difficult situation, as were the British, who had committed themselves to him. Chitrali groups, Pathans, and others saw an opportunity in this power vacuum.

Chitrali rebel factions and Pathan allies killed the new *mehtar*, installed a puppet *mehtar*, and the Pathans moved an army towards Chitral. A small force of

the British, under the political control of Surgeon General Robertson and the military control of Captain Townshend, already in Chitral, were forced to hole up in the town's fort. The besiegers tried to entreat with the besieged, all the while moving their entrenchments closer and closer.

Simner describes two local relief attempts. Both failed. The first, the Defence of Reshun, involved a small force of British soldiers, with Bengal Sappers and Kashmiri Infantry that tried to make their way some sixty miles to Chitral to consolidate with General Robertson's force. They were waylaid at Reshun, their force dispersed, and their two British officers taken hostage. The second, the Koragh disaster, was an expedition of a force of Sikh troops, led by a British officer, to help the force in Reshun. The officer ignored the warnings of locals and marched directly into a trap. His force was destroyed and he was killed. Only a few escaped to tell the story. This left the defenders of the fort on their own.

In Chitral, the conglomeration of tribes settled down to besiege the beleaguered defenders. The British defenders were amazed that their enemies did not overwhelm them, believing they could have been overrun at any time. Anywhere from three to five thousand tribesmen besieged about four hundred Sikh, Kashmiri, and Chitrali (of dubious loyalty) soldiers supervised by a small number of British. However, the Chitrali and Pathan besiegers tried to coax the defenders out with promises and potential agreements, while simultaneously trying to find a weak point in the fort's walls. The tribesmen still respected the might of the British Empire, preferring recognition rather than destroying the defenders and facing British repercussions. Much of the book recounts the actions of the besiegers against the defenders' valiant efforts to prevent the fort's fall. Meanwhile, the British were sending reinforcements.

A small force came from the east through a barren, mountainous region. Despite the difficult terrain, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, with a force of about five hundred men and two pieces of artillery, made his way through. They began on 24 March 1895, slowed by heavy snow and exposed to snow blindness and frostbite, methodically making their way towards Chitral. The British artillery was invaluable, blasting the enemy out of entrenched positions along the way. On 20 April, Kelly and his men relieved the fort, after a journey of three hundred fifty gruelling miles in thirty-five days performed in some of the toughest weather conditions.

A much larger force came from the south. Major General Low led this force of over fifteen thousand soldiers and over twenty thousand porters and animals carrying supplies. This large force was meant to send a message to the

tribes (and possibly Russia). However, it was a march through some of the most inhospitable terrain imaginable, and through the Swat Valley, where numerous hostile Pathan tribes opposed them. General Low pressed on, despite facing heavy resistance. This was the Pathan homeland. They saw this as an invasion. Again, the British artillery was key, displacing entrenched enemies. The British force also performed numerous engineering feats, such as improving roads and building bridges. As this large force approached Chitral, the British officer hostages were released and the Pathan and Chitrali leaders that did not flee from Kelly's force wanted to come to terms.

Those who fought saw this conflict as a series of minor skirmishes, but its results had later implications. Simner recounts how the new *Mehmet* installed led a peaceable reign of over forty years. However, Indian authorities decided they either needed better access to Chitral or had to abandon it. Due to fears of Russian intervention, they decided on the former. They built a road and outposts through the Swat Valley. Two years later, the Pathans, resentful of occupying forces in their territory, rose up. Although many Pathans had fought against General Low, most did not because he had told them the British just wanted to pass through Swat, not occupy it. The British finally put down the rebellion at great cost in money and lives. Afterwards, they abandoned the Swat outposts.

This is an excellent book for those interested in this area of the world. It is a bit technical and in-depth for the casual reader. It can be a bit dry at times and hard to follow if one is not familiar with the area. The many tribal names and areas are difficult to navigate. The book does have some vital maps. Larger maps would have been helpful. Excellent pictures and drawings included in the book show the reader just how difficult the terrain was. The pictures really enhance the book and his descriptions of the campaigns, giving the reader a great sense of the environmental difficulties that armies had in traveling and fighting in these mountainous areas.

It is in the details of the siege and campaigns that Simner excels. The reader really gets a feel for what these men went through and how disciplined and efficient the British military machine was, especially against tribes with varying motivations to fight. His descriptions of troop movements and actions are very detailed. Simner uses many sources directly from those involved and others from the time period covered. Accounts written by Surgeon General Robertson, who had political control of the besieged defenders at the fort, as well as accounts written by the British officers held hostage after the Defence of Reshun, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, and newspaper accounts from the period, help give the book authenticity. These primary sources enhance the narrative.

Chitral 1895 gives a good idea of what it takes to try to pacify and control these mountain areas. During the siege of Chitral and its aftermath, many soldiers, tribesmen, and civilians lost their lives or their livelihoods. It was hard enough just to survive in this desolate terrain. In the end, the locals suffered and the tough British troops prevailed. If not for the “Great Game” between the Victorian British and Russian empires, this era of attempted pacification and conflict, costly both in lives and money, would never have happened. Control of the Hindu Kush is still a challenge in modern times. Many modern forces, including the USSR, have attempted it with great difficulty and little success. The United States has had difficulty tracking and fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban forces there. The book gives great insight into an area and historical period that many have never delved into.

Blood and Steel, The Wehrmacht Archives: Volumes I Normandy 1944; Volumes II Retreat to the Reich: September to December 1944 and Volumes III The Ardennes Offensive: December 1944 to January 1945. Edited by Donald E. Graves. Frontline Press: London: 2013.

Book Review

Robert Smith, PhD

Having reviewed Mark Reardon's *Defending Fortress Europe*, this reviewer was prepared for the concept of what Donald Graves attempted to achieve in this series by his judicious editing of the Daily Intelligence Summaries of the First Canadian Army. Graves was aided in his editing process as the land portion of the War in the West is easily broken out into four phases, three of which he covered with these three volumes. A planned fourth volume will encompass the endgame for the German Army in the West. Graves's work illustrates that the German Army was very meticulous in its staff work, understanding that no detail was too small and too insignificant to the German war effort. For the reader to fully grasp each volume, one almost needs to read all three together. These volumes are not studies of the campaigns, but do instead cast a revealing light on the German Army in these campaigns. These volumes cover official tactical doctrine, weapon instructions, letters and diaries captured by the allies, and Allied intelligence reports and summaries.

The Normandy volume was the least interesting personally, having read the Seventh Army's journal in *Defending Fortress Europe*. However, it is a miniature gamers and tacticians delight. Much of this volume's fifteen chapters are about tactical considerations, combat, and equipment observations, as expected. Much of this is standard territory. Graves included, though, chapters on tensions between the Wehrmacht and SS, logistical shortages in medical supplies, weapons and equipment in general, the German replacement system, and even pages on German soldier etiquette. He mentioned the fuel shortages that plagued the German Army once the strategic bombing campaign against oil plastered the refineries. He reminded readers that the Panther uses twice as much fuel as the Panzer III or IV, a reminder that logistics had to weigh heavily before any use of the Panther in combat. Repeatedly running through *Normandy 1944* is the German

healthy respect for Allied artillery and air support, with examples shown such as instructions on how to properly dig in horses for force protection. There is also a mirrored reaction, a disdain for the Luftwaffe—always seemingly in some other sector—and the German rationing of shells versus, in their worldview, the Allied firepower on demand. Yet running through much of the volume is a belief in German victory—and why not—as to think otherwise would be an admission the last five years were in vain, and never mind the increasing severity of punishments handed out for defeatist sentiments.



Figure 1. Atlantikwall Batterie, photographer Maier, c. 1943-1943, Bunde Archives.

The Retreat to the Reich volume deals with, as Chapter One is entitled, “Stemming the Flood.” After the Allied breakout in Operation Cobra and their mad dash across France, the Wehrmacht was reeling in the West. After the Battles of the Falaise Gap, it appeared the collapse of the German Army was imminent. That this collapse did not happen is well detailed at the small-unit and personal level by the documents that Graves selected here. The overall outline of *Retreat to the Reich* is like *Normandy 1944*, but the Home Front and allied bombing now begin to figure prominently in the pages of the book. “The Diary of a Nazi Girl,” a series of captured documents, was in both content and purpose new and allows

readers to better understand the efforts that Hamas and Hezbollah today make in their indoctrination of the young. The chapter on desertion and discipline was a little surprising, as many accounts do not note that this was really a continuing issue, that the stiffening of the West Wall and the Rhine Barrier did not simply magically dissipate the sense the war was continuing to proceed in an unfavorable manner. Three facts stood out—the German claim that the Allies were using cement shells and that Americans tend to be very expert in their tossing of hand grenades. The third was that the 12th SS Panzer Division soldier strength was comprised mainly of eighteen and nineteen year olds, who made up eighty-two percent.

The *Ardennes Offensive* volume is easily summed by the exhilaration of the letter “We March,” the belief in impending victory that would turn the fortunes of war to the despair that Germany had shot its last bolt, summed up succinctly by “Everything looks hopeless” (p. 136). Graves focuses a deserved amount of attention on the quest for English speaking soldiers for Kampfgruppe Peiper—KG Peiper was to be the *schwerpunkt* for the Ardennes Offensive in an effort to breach the Meuse River—with his sort of loose format that replicates chapters in the previous volumes. He made the factual error in the use of Major Hal McCown’s (who retired as Major General) account as a POW with Kampfgruppe Peiper, listing him as from the 199th Infantry Division, as he was from the 199th Infantry Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division. However, the most engrossing document is the diary of Flak Sergeant Karl Laun, attached to Kampfgruppe Peiper. Laun, after breaking out of the pocket Peiper found itself in when it ran out of fuel, begins a period of “official” medical furloughs, using every means possible to stay AWOL by the use of documents either to receive medical care or to be transferred to it. Portions of his diary are among the most fascinating documents ever written. It is also interesting that the German telephone intelligence section intercepted a call between Field Marshall Model and his wife, where she advises him to come home and stop playing soldier. Model would commit suicide in April 1945 in the Ruhr Pocket rather than surrender to American forces.



Figure 2.

SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper, photo by Kurt Alber, c. 1943-1944, Bunde Archives.

A caveat for Graves's work is small—but for a historian of his depth it is perhaps surprising that more thought was not given to the placing of the material presented in its bigger picture perspective. Unlike Reardon in *Defending Fortress Europe*, Graves does not preface chapters, instead relying on his brief introduction for each book. The reader would have been perhaps better served by a little more historical context throughout the book, as a little historical factual knowledge and perspective would have aided in tying together the many facets that Graves chose to present. The books also suffer from a lack of an index. Graves has done exceptionally fine work here, ensuring that there is a wide swath of interesting material to appeal to a wider audience than one might suspect from the dust jacket. It is highly recommended that readers tackle all three volumes published to date concurrently, as the totality of this efforts gives different glimpses into an army that while fighting desperately for its very existence, continues to grind on with its bureaucratic and administrative apparatus. In sum, it is fascinating material.

Letter to the Editor

Sharon Gregory

To whom it may concern:

I currently reside in Richmond, Virginia—a small, but ever growing metropolis of a city deep in Civil War history and rich in Southern culture. There are many historical places to visit in Richmond, as well as the rest of the country, protected and preserved places for future generations to see and learn from. These include presidential homes, churches, and battlefields. There are also numerous locations quickly falling into disrepair that are in danger of possibly being lost to history for good. I fear that some of the most overlooked places in need of protection are those containing cemeteries—especially cemeteries that have never been acknowledged as historical landmarks nor contain someone of credible note to today’s generation.

At some point in everyone’s life, they will encounter a cemetery. They might be attending the funeral of a family member or friend or perhaps simply visiting one to acknowledge someone of historical importance. Losing a loved one or a prestigious figure takes its toll and inevitably leaves one with a sense of loss, even if not acknowledged immediately. Having a place to remember, memorialize, and visit is a great comfort to those in mourning. As human beings possess the universal desire to be remembered after their mortal life, cemeteries provide places for others to investigate them and learn about their lives, long after they have passed on. It is for this reason that cemeteries should be preserved for all eternity.

Sincerely,
Sharon Gregory
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