

**Creating a Profile Using the IoT Core
Baseline and Non-Technical Baseline**

Michael Fagan
Jeffrey Marron
Kevin G. Brady, Jr.
Barbara B. Cuthill
Katerina N. Megas
Rebecca Herold

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259C-draft>

Creating a Profile Using the IoT Core Baseline and Non-Technical Baseline

Michael Fagan
Jeffrey Marron
Kevin G. Brady, Jr.
Barbara B. Cuthill
Katerina N. Megas
*Applied Cybersecurity Division
Information Technology Laboratory*

Rebecca Herold
*The Privacy Professor
Des Moines, IA*

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259C-draft>

December 2020



U.S. Department of Commerce
Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

51 National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency or Internal Report 8259C
52 25 pages (December 2020)

53 This publication is available free of charge from:
54 <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259C-draft>
55

56 Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an
57 experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or
58 endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best
59 available for the purpose.

60 There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance
61 with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies,
62 may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each
63 publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For
64 planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new
65 publications by NIST.

66 Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to
67 NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at
68 <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications>.

69 **Public comment period: December 15, 2020 through February 26 ~~12~~, 2021**

70 National Institute of Standards and Technology
71 Attn: Applied Cybersecurity Division, Information Technology Laboratory
72 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 2000) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-2000
73 Email: iotsecurity@nist.gov

74 All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

75

76

Reports on Computer Systems Technology

77 The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and
78 Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical
79 leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test
80 methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the
81 development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the
82 development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for
83 the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal
84 information systems.

85

Abstract

86 The core baseline in NISTIR 8259A, *IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline* and the
87 non-technical baseline in NISTIR 8259B, *IoT Manufacturer Non-Technical Supporting*
88 *Capability Core Baseline* can be expanded upon based on more specific contextual information.
89 Using source material with information pertinent to IoT device *customers'* needs and goals, the
90 central concepts of the NISTIR 8259 series can be used to guide the development of new
91 elaboration on device cybersecurity capabilities an IoT device may need and the non-technical
92 supporting capabilities that may be needed in relation to the IoT device. This process of
93 expanding on the core baseline and non-technical baseline using additional contextual
94 information is called profiling. A process by which readers of the NISTIR 8259 series can profile
95 source documents is described in this publication.

96

Keywords

97 cybersecurity baseline; Internet of Things (IoT); securable computing devices.

98

Acknowledgments

99 The authors wish to thank all contributors to this publication, including the participants in
100 workshops and other interactive sessions; the individuals and organizations from the public and
101 private sectors, including manufacturers from various sectors as well as several manufacturer
102 trade organizations, who provided feedback on the preliminary public content and colleagues at
103 NIST who offered invaluable inputs and feedback. Special thanks to Cybersecurity for IoT team
104 members Brad Hoehn and David Lemire and the NIST FISMA Implementation Project team for
105 their extensive help.

106

Audience

107 The main audience for this publication is IoT device manufacturers. This publication may also
108 help IoT device customers or integrators.

109

110

Note to Reviewers

111 NIST Cybersecurity for IoT Team has chosen a publication strategy of crafting separate
112 documents to address specific concerns within the IoT cybersecurity ecosystem. These
113 documents are part of a single family across the theme of providing guidance to IoT device
114 manufacturers. Industry encouraged this direction in the comments responding to the issuance of
115 Draft NISTIR 8259. The initial foundation documents in this series are as follows:

- 116 • [NISTIR 8259](#): *Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers*
- 117 • [NISTIR 8259A](#): *IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline*

118

119 The new documents in the series that are being released as drafts for comment provide guidance
120 to IoT device manufacturers complementing the guidance. The three additional documents in the
121 NISTIR 8259 series are:

- 122 • [NISTIR 8259B](#): *IoT Non-technical and Supporting Capability Core Baseline* –
123 NISTIR 8259B complements the NISTIR 8259A device cybersecurity core baseline by
124 detailing what additional, non-technical support is typically needed from manufacturers.
125 This non-technical baseline collects and makes explicit support capabilities like
126 documentation, training support, etc.
- 127 • *NISTIR 8259C: Creating a Profile of the IoT Core Baseline and Non-Technical*
128 *Baseline* – NISTIR 8259C presents a method of profiling the core baseline in NISTIR
129 8259A and the non-technical baseline in NISTIR 8259B to create a more detailed set of
130 capabilities responding to the concerns of a specific sector, based on some authoritative
131 source such as a standard or other guidance. This is the method used to create the profile
132 meeting the requirements of the federal information system low baseline found in draft
133 NISTIR 8259D.
- 134 • *NISTIR 8259D: Profile Using the IoT Core Baseline and Non-Technical Baseline for*
135 *the Federal Government* – NISTIR 8259D presents the profile defining the capabilities
136 needed from and related to IoT devices to incorporate those devices into a federal
137 information system implementing the low baseline controls of NIST SP 800-53B.

138

139 In addition to the extensions to NISTIR 8259 listed above, the NIST Cybersecurity for IoT Team
140 is also working on **NIST SP 800-213: IoT Device Cybersecurity Guidance for the Federal**
141 **Government: An Approach for Establishing IoT Device Cybersecurity Requirements** which
142 explains from a customer organization's (i.e., federal agencies and other organizations)
143 perspective how to determine the technical and non-technical capabilities needed from and
144 related to devices to support the NIST SP 800-53 controls they use on their system and in their
145 organization. NIST SP 800-213 enables federal agencies to identify needed capabilities for
146 unique situations and turn those selections into requirements for new IoT devices.

147 NIST appreciates all comments, concerns and identification of areas needing clarification.
148 Ongoing discussion with the stakeholder community is welcome as we work to improve the
149 cybersecurity of IoT devices.

150

Call for Patent Claims

151 This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use
152 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this ITL draft
153 publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be directly stated in this ITL Publication or
154 by reference to another publication. This call also includes disclosure, where known, of the
155 existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications relating to this ITL draft publication and
156 of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents.

157

158 ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf,
159 in written or electronic form, either:

160

161 a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold
162 and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or

163

164 b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to
165 applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance
166 or requirements in this ITL draft publication either:

167

168 i. under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair
169 discrimination; or

170 ii. without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are
171 demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.

172

173 Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances
174 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the
175 assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on
176 the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of
177 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.

178

179 The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest
180 regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.

181

182 Such statements should be addressed to: iotsecurity@nist.gov

183

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 A Process for Profiling Using the IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability and Non-Technical Supporting Capability Baselines..... 3

 2.1 Three Central Concepts for Creating a Profile Using the Core Baseline and the Non-Technical Baseline 3

 2.2 Creating a Profile.....5

3 Conclusion 10

References..... 11

List of Appendices

Appendix A— Creating Sub-Capabilities for Specific Use-Cases and Sectors 15

Appendix B— Acronymns 17

Appendix C—Glossary.....17

List of Figures

Figure 1 - Information Systems and Associated Elements Support Security Functionality..... 4

Figure 2 - Three Steps to Creating a Profile using the Core Baseline and Non-Technical Baseline.....6

1 Introduction

Internet of Things (IoT) devices offer new functionality that can enhance the operations of government, commercial, and other enterprises and provide benefits to consumers and the general public. As such, IoT devices represent a tremendous opportunity for the federal government to leverage scarce resources, but that opportunity comes with new risks, especially in the area of cybersecurity. The NIST Cybersecurity for IoT program has defined IoT devices as “hav[ing] at least one transducer (sensor or actuator) for interacting directly with the physical world and at least one network interface (e.g., Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Long Term Evolution (LTE), Zigbee, Ultra-Wideband (UWB)) for interfacing with the digital world.” [1]

Government, academia and IT companies, both hardware and software, have a decades-long history of researching and developing cybersecurity-related technologies. IoT device manufacturers, especially those newly offering IoT devices or IoT versions of previously existing products, frequently do not have direct experience with that cybersecurity body of knowledge. The NISTIR 8259 series is intended to help bridge that gap for IoT device manufacturers. NISTIR 8259, *Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers* [1] provides guidance to manufacturers on foundational activities to incorporate cybersecurity considerations throughout the product development and lifecycle support process. NISTIR 8259A, *IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline* [2] provides a baseline of core cybersecurity device capabilities that are foundational for making IoT devices securable. These technical capabilities have been expanded with non-technical supporting capabilities such as those described within NISTIR 8259B, *IoT Non-Technical Supporting Capability Core Baseline* [3]. NISTIR 8259B provides a baseline of the non-technical supporting capabilities and actions (for example, documentation, and training) generally needed from manufacturers or other third parties to support common IoT device cybersecurity controls that protect an organization’s devices as well as device data, systems, and ecosystems. The combination of technical and non-technical capabilities as customized for the organization, sector, and/or use case creates what are known as the profiles for the IoT core baseline and non-technical baseline.

This document discusses how to expand on the foundational activities discussed in NISTIR 8259 by providing a process that can be used to create customized profiles (for example, to a specific organization or industry) using the core baseline of cybersecurity device capabilities discussed in NISTIR 8259A and the non-technical baseline discussed in NISTIR 8259B. Specifically, this document expands on activity 3 of NISTIR 8259, “Determine how to address customer needs and goals.” The NISTIR 8259A core baseline’s six capabilities, and NISTIR 8259B non-technical baseline’s four capabilities are a starting point. This document provides a structured process for expanding those baselines to provide all the device cybersecurity capabilities and non-technical supporting actions needed to make the device securable.

Section 2.1 discusses the three concepts central to creating a profile using the core baseline: device-centricity, cybersecurity focus, and minimal securability. Device-centricity is key across the NISTIR 8259 publication series. Unlike many other NIST cybersecurity publications, the NISTIR 8259 series takes a device-centric view because the focus is on the manufacturer of the device and what the manufacturer can do to support cybersecurity goals. Cybersecurity focus is important because there are many other considerations (e.g., privacy, safety, reliability,

249 resilience) which are important but not the focus of this work. Defining a set of technical device
250 capabilities and non-technical supporting capabilities providing minimal device securability
251 depends on what the device is intended to do, what networks the device connects to, and where
252 the device is located. These are critical aspects of the sector use-case used in developing the
253 profile.

254 Section 2.2 documents the profiling process for the NISTIR 8259 series. This process uses the
255 source documents gathered in the NISTIR 8259 foundational activities of *defining customer use*
256 *cases* and *gathering relevant source documents* such as relevant regulatory requirements¹,
257 guidance² and standards³. Critical cybersecurity requirements for those customers are extracted
258 from the relevant source documents. Many new cybersecurity capabilities and supporting non-
259 technical capabilities needed are likely to be sub-capabilities of existing capabilities in the
260 NISTIR 8259 baseline; however, this document also provides a process to document a new top-
261 level capability for a profile.

¹ For example, the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and many others.

² For example, guidance from government agencies such as in the US the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), in the EU the National Data Protection Authorities, in Canada the provincial Privacy Commissioners, and in similar roles throughout other countries.

³ For example, the ISO/IEC 27001 family of standards providing requirements for an information security management system (ISMS). and the CTIA IoT Cybersecurity Certification Program best practices standards.


2 A Process for Creating Profiles Using the IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability and Non-Technical Supporting Capability Baselines

The high-level articulation of cybersecurity device capabilities in the NISTIR 8259A Core Baseline and non-technical supporting capabilities in the NISTIR 8259B Non-Technical Baseline may not provide enough detail to manufacturers when designing IoT devices for specific industry sectors or use cases. It is therefore valuable to *profile* the core baseline for the specific sector or use case. Readers should keep in mind that profiling as defined in this publication can be performed by different entities in the IoT ecosystem, including, but not limited to manufacturers, customers, and trade organizations representing various stakeholders. The goals and perspective of a profile remain the same regardless of the author. The goal of a profile of the core baseline is to take the needs and goals reflected in applicable source documents (e.g., control catalogs, regulatory requirements) and apply the three central concepts to best expand and filter the device cybersecurity requirements for manufacturers.

2.1 Three Central Concepts for Creating a Profile Using the Core Baseline

Cybersecurity is a coordinated goal that places expectations and responsibilities on both device manufacturers and consumers. The NISTIR 8259 series is motivated and scoped to provide guidance for manufacturers that reflects three central concepts: device-centricity, cybersecurity focus, and minimal securability. Each of these three concepts is central to profiling using the core baseline and non-technical baseline.

Device-centricity – Many cybersecurity guidance documents are focused on cybersecurity activities for the system/network and/or organization. For example, NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5, *Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations* [4] and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [5] present controls and outcomes, respectively, that guide organizations to manage cybersecurity risk within a *system* and the larger *organization*. Figure 1 depicts how information systems contain *elements* (including IoT devices) and must conform to and support the technical and organizational security capabilities required to mitigate risks. In addition to the support the system provides for security capabilities, the elements nested within the systems also need to conform to and support the organization’s established technical and organizational security capabilities directly.



291

292

Figure 1 - Information Systems and Associated Elements Support Security Functionality

293 As organizations acquire an increasing number of diverse IoT devices and these devices become
 294 elements of existing systems, the complexity of the cybersecurity challenge increases. The
 295 diversity of customer use cases (i.e., how IoT devices will be incorporated into existing systems
 296 across a variety of industry sectors) and IoT functionality (i.e., the ways IoT devices can interact
 297 with the world) increases the challenges for manufacturers to understand how their IoT devices
 298 must support system and organizational security functionality. These concerns have led to a
 299 focus on how cybersecurity capabilities at the device level, and supporting capabilities around
 300 devices may be required to support system and organizational security functionality. This is
 301 called a device-centric view since it scopes cybersecurity capabilities to a connected device,
 302 which is often an individual element of a system, rather than an entire system. The device-centric
 303 view means that individual IoT devices have cybersecurity capabilities and non-technical
 304 supporting capabilities that support system and organizational security functionality⁴. The
 305 NISTIR 8259 series takes this device-centric perspective.

306 **Cybersecurity Focus** – Cybersecurity is not the only requirement that manufacturers and
 307 consumers consider when designing and acquiring IoT devices. Use cases may need to
 308 emphasize safety, privacy⁵, reliability, or resilience—or other requirements related to the IoT
 309 device and its environment of operation—in addition to cybersecurity. Compliance may need to
 310 be demonstrated to requirements of these types with varying levels of formality depending on the
 311 sector. Cybersecurity must be considered in combination with other prioritized and potentially
 312 conflicting requirements in a comprehensive risk management framework.⁶ The diversity of use

⁴ Note that IT devices also need to have these cybersecurity capabilities and supporting non-technical capabilities, but IT devices have routinely provided these capabilities. Because IoT devices are new and come from manufacturers with a variety of backgrounds with cybersecurity, more explicit definition for this sector is needed.

⁵ The NIST Privacy Framework [9] provides more information about privacy needs and goals that may be targeted by customers. Privacy is distinct from cybersecurity, though there are common goals and even capabilities that can help mitigate both cybersecurity and privacy risks.

⁶ The five concerns listed (i.e., cybersecurity, privacy, reliability, resiliency, and safety) are used as examples of other considerations or goals beyond cybersecurity from which additional requirements could originate. These five concerns are taken from the NIST Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems [10], where they are identified

313 cases across IoT devices and industry sectors increases the likelihood that manufacturers must
314 balance the demands of requirements in cybersecurity and in other areas of concern.

315 Examples of requirements documentation can be found in guidance for devices used in the
316 electric grid addressing reliability, resilience, and human safety [6] and in guidance for medical
317 devices addressing human safety and privacy [7]. Nevertheless, organizations will likely need
318 specific guidance related to device cybersecurity requirements. The NISTIR 8259 series focuses
319 on cybersecurity as the primary goal of the guidance, while considering other concerns where
320 appropriate.

321 **Minimal Securability**— NISTIR 8259 defines a *minimally securable* IoT device as one that has
322 “the device cybersecurity capabilities customers may need to mitigate some common
323 cybersecurity risks, thus helping to at least partially achieve their goals and fulfill their needs.”
324 This concept of minimal securability is rooted in the idea that manufacturers have an important,
325 but sometimes limited, role in the cybersecurity of an IoT device. The IoT device—as an element
326 of a larger system—must interact with the various other system elements in ways that achieve
327 system security functionality (e.g., through supporting/conforming to security controls). The
328 NISTIR 8259 series also introduces the concept of manufacturer-provided non-technical
329 supporting capabilities. These non-technical capabilities, complementing the technical
330 capabilities, also contribute to a state of minimal securability. The level of support via device
331 cybersecurity and non-technical supporting capabilities needed from an IoT device and/or
332 manufacturer will partially depend on how the customer organization expects to integrate the IoT
333 device within the broader information system. Integration can vary from full integration to
334 minimal integration with the information system. Even minimal integration will require that the
335 IoT device and manufacturer provide minimal support towards cybersecurity. Generally, the
336 more extensive integration requires greater support for cybersecurity.

In some cases, organizations may want to fully integrate an IoT device with an information system. This would mean the system may require certain cybersecurity capabilities directly from element IoT devices and the organization may require certain non-technical support from manufacturers or third parties. For example, an IoT camera used in an office may require a full network connection and the ability to interact with many other system elements. To minimally secure this camera with the information system, it may need support for various security functionality such as protection of data at rest and in transit, configurable and reliable access control, and vulnerability management just to name a few.

In other cases, organizations may prefer to mitigate risks by configuring the IoT device for use without introducing unacceptable risk (e.g., disable features or aspects of operation), or may prefer to mitigate the risks introduced by the IoT device through additional or compensating controls (e.g., through network segmentation). In these cases, the level of integration and thus support in terms of minimal securability needed from the IoT device and its manufacturer will


as the five concerns of the trustworthiness aspect, in the context of that framework, but relate to a hierarchy of considerations that are related, but also sometimes conflicting.

vary and could be low. For example, a small IoT appliance to be used in an office may be placed on a limited sub-network to segment the appliance from other elements of the information system. With the possible risks associated with the IoT device mitigated through network segmentation, there may be little required from the appliance to be considered minimally securable.

337 Other factors will also influence what constitutes minimal securability for a given IoT device and
 338 customer organization, notably how the customer mitigates risk faced by their systems and
 339 organization. How risks are mitigated will impact many other aspects of how the IoT device is
 340 incorporated into the information system (including the IoT device’s level of integration with the
 341 information system) and serve as the target of device-centric, cybersecurity-focused guidance
 342 produced in profiling.

343 **2.2 Creating a Profile**

344 Understanding the three concepts described above (i.e., device-centricity, cybersecurity focus,
 345 and minimal securability) is important to following the process described in this section to create
 346 a profile using the core baseline and non-technical baseline. The steps shown in Figure 2 and
 347 detailed below explain how a profile can be created using existing source guidance and
 348 documents, resulting in a profile that reflects the concepts of device-centricity, cybersecurity
 349 focus, and minimal securability and builds upon the IoT device cybersecurity capability core
 350 baseline and supporting non-technical baseline.



351

352

Figure 2 - Three Steps to Creating a Profile Using the Core Baselines

353 **Step 1: Identify and Gather Source Documents for Sector/Use Case Device Cybersecurity**
354 **Requirements**

355 Source documents are critical to producing a profile of the core baseline and might include
356 controls catalogs, regulatory requirements, guidance documents, contractual requirements, or any
357 other resource important to a particular industry sector or use case. To begin the profiling
358 process, a pertinent set of these source documents must be identified. This document set will
359 serve as the basis for defining customer needs and goals in the sector or use case. This set can
360 reflect common practice in the sector or use case. Thoughtful selection of source documents is
361 vital so that customer cybersecurity needs and goals are adequately represented and understood
362 in the resulting profile.

Different Source Documents Likely for Different Sectors/Use Cases

Each industry sector will likely select different source documents. For example, source documents for the energy sector will likely include the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) standards and requirements [6]. Whereas, the Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule and Privacy Rule would likely be an appropriate source document when creating a profile for the healthcare industry [7].

363 **Step 2: Assess to What Extent Source Documents Address the Three Central Concepts**

364 With an applicable set of source documents identified, assess whether each source document
365 addresses one or more of the three NISTIR 8259 central concepts (i.e., device centrality,
366 cybersecurity focus, and minimal securability). Some source documents might be device-centric;
367 others might be system or organization-centric. Similarly, source documents might focus
368 exclusively on cybersecurity, but others might focus on privacy, safety, reliability, or resilience
369 (or other concerns). Most common source documents will focus on a combination of these
370 concerns. In some cases, cybersecurity requirements may have to be inferred from requirements
371 around other areas of concerns (e.g., safety, privacy). Unless the source document takes a strict
372 device- and cybersecurity-centric focus with a manufacturer audience in mind, it is unlikely to
373 address minimal securability.

Variability in Need to Apply Central Concepts

Source documents will many times need to have all three concepts applied to create a profile, but it is possible that some will exhibit, in full or in part, one or more of the concepts. For example, some source documents that may be leveraged for cybersecurity, such as requirements from a specific customer or that are a universal minimum for a sector, may already reflect the minimum requirements expected by customers of the IoT device and encapsulate minimal securability. Whereas another source, such as one that describes network-level cybersecurity solutions customers are likely to use, will likely already have a cybersecurity focus, but may lack device-centrality and minimal securability.

374 **Step 3: Apply Device Centricity, Cybersecurity Focus, and Minimal Securability to the**
375 **Source Documents to Create the Profile**

376 The final step is to work through the needs and goals reflected in the source documents with a
377 focus on applying the concepts of device-centricity, cybersecurity-focus, and minimal
378 securability to identify the applicable device cybersecurity and non-technical supporting
379 capabilities and assemble these into a profile.

380 To manage any gaps, if multiple source documents are used, it is recommended that source
381 documents be analyzed individually. The analysis of each source document can focus on
382 interpreting applicable device cybersecurity and non-technical supporting capabilities that the
383 customer may need to support the needs and goals from the document while considering any
384 gaps in the central concepts. As discussed in step 2, the selected source documents may have
385 gaps in how they address the concepts of device-centricity, cybersecurity focus, or minimal
386 securability. Where the source already addresses a concept (e.g., cybersecurity focus),
387 consideration of the concept for the purpose of creating a profile may not be necessary. The
388 following describes how each concept can be considered for source documents, as needed:

- 389 A. **Device-centricity:** Source documents may describe needs and goals beyond an IoT
390 device, such as solutions and guidance for the network, system, or organizational level.
391 These perspectives will need to be filtered into capabilities an IoT needs *to support* the
392 needs and goals described in the source document. Source documents may represent
393 needs and goals that require both technical and non-technical support for customers. In
394 the context of an IoT device, device cybersecurity capabilities define the technical side
395 and are features and functions provided by the IoT device itself (i.e., through its device
396 hardware and software) in support of cybersecurity needs and goals of customers. These
397 capabilities, when present in an IoT device, can provide technical support for system and
398 organizational security functionality. Non-technical support for IoT devices'
399 cybersecurity is called non-technical supporting capabilities in this publication. These
400 capabilities are actions performed by manufacturers (or possibly their contracted third
401 parties) in support of the securability of a device and can further contribute to minimal
402 securability for some customers. Examples of non-technical capabilities include
403 manufacturer-provided device documentation or online support for a product.
- 404 B. **Cybersecurity Focus:** IoT devices will likely have needs and goals beyond cybersecurity
405 described in source documents (for example, privacy, safety). To create the targeted
406 cybersecurity-focused profile, these other aspects of the source document that describe or
407 address needs and goals other than cybersecurity should be filtered out. Only the
408 cybersecurity related that may impact the device cybersecurity and non-technical
409 supporting capabilities should be identified for the profiling effort.
- 410 C. **Minimal Securability:** Minimal securability is central to the NISTIR 8259 series and
411 profiles created using the core baseline and non-technical baseline should reflect minimal
412 securability. How to define minimal securability will vary by sector and use case. Like
413 any of the three concepts discussed here, in some instances, minimal securability may be
414 reflected in the source document and may not need to be considered directly in the
415 creation of a profile. If this is the case, a profile can be considered complete after the
416 application of the other two central concepts. If not, then the set of device cybersecurity

417 and non-technical supporting capabilities created by application of the other two
418 concepts⁷ must be filtered using minimal securability to create a profile. After minimal
419 securability criteria have been applied to the catalog and a subset of capabilities
420 identified, this subset can be considered the profile of the core baseline and non-technical
421 baseline for the sector/use case.

422 Capabilities developed from each source document should be combined into a coherent catalog.
423 Developing this catalog may require combining closely related capabilities, removing duplicate
424 capabilities, or even organizing capabilities into logical groupings. Checking that catalog against
425 other sources like the NISTIR 8259A core baseline and the NISTIR 8259B non-technical
426 baseline, published sector baselines, or other applicable standards can confirm that all potentially
427 needed device cybersecurity capabilities and supporting non-technical capabilities are included.
428 Appendix A provides a process to work through documenting new capabilities and sub-
429 capabilities. The final set of selected capabilities from this catalog (using the concept of minimal
430 securability as a final filter) organized into a form usable as a requirements definition is the
431 resultant profile.

432 Structure and Format of Output

433 Most sectors and use cases will benefit by dividing the profile into at least parts, one for the
434 technical capabilities, and the other for the non-technical supporting actions. This will address
435 the common practice of having different roles for non-technical actions and technical device
436 support. This will allow the two types of roles within the sector or use case to more easily
437 reference the full set of technical or non-technical capabilities that are grouped together. This
438 will also help ensure that the different roles do not leave gaps in the capabilities chosen.

439

⁷ For some sources, this set of capabilities could be considered a *catalog* of device cybersecurity and non-technical supporting capabilities that may have value as an artifact complementary to the profile. This may be a useful tool for instances when customers or manufacturers may desire guidance on capabilities that go beyond the minimal securability reflected in the profile (e.g., when there is flexibility in how specific customers may define their minimal securability).

3 Conclusion

441 Creating a profile is an essential step in the tailoring of cybersecurity requirements for a specific
442 product to the needs of the specific sector and intended customers of the device. While source
443 documents may be more or less detailed depending on the nature of that sector, the NISTIR
444 8259A core baseline and NISTIR 8259B non-technical baseline can provide starting points, and
445 this document can provide a structured process for addressing the definition of required
446 cybersecurity device capabilities and non-technical supporting capabilities.

447

References

- [1] Fagan M, Megas KN, Scarfone K, Smith M (2020) Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 8259. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259>
- [2] Fagan M, Megas KN, Scarfone K, Smith M (2020) IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 8259A. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259A>
- [3] Fagan, M, Marron, J, Brady, KG, Jr., Cuthill, BB, Megas, KN, Herold R (2020) IoT Non-Technical Supporting Capability Core Baseline. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), Draft NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 8259B. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259B-draft>
- [4] Joint Task Force (2020) Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Rev. 5. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5>
- [5] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2018) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD). <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04162018>
- [6] North American Reliability Corporation (2018) Cybersecurity – Security Management Controls. (North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Washington, DC) Critical Infrastructure Protection Standard CIP-0003-8. Available at <https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx>
- [7] Subrahmanian E, Rachuri S, Bouras A, Fenves SJ, Fofou S, Sriram RD (2006) The Role of Standards in Product Lifecycle Management Support. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 7289. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7289>
- [9] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy Through Enterprise Risk Management, Version 1.0. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD). <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020>
- [10] Cyber-Physical Systems Public Working Group (2017) Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems: Volume 1, Overview, Version 1.0. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 1500-201. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1500-201>
- [11] Johnson A, Dempsey K, Ross R, Gupta S, Bailey D (2011) Guide for Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-128. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-128>

- [12] International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000:2015, Quality management systems – Fundamentals and vocabulary, September 2015.
- [13] Barker E, Chen L, Roginsky A, Vassilev A, Davis R (2019) Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56A, Rev. 3. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>
- [14] Committee on National Security Systems (2015) Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary. (National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD), CNSS Instruction (CNSSI) No. 4009. Available at <https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm>
- [15] Stouffer KA, Lightman S, Pillitteri VY, Abrams M, Hahn A (2015) Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-82, Rev. 2. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2>
- [16] Souppaya M, Scarfone K (2013) Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-40, Rev. 3. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-40r3>

450 **Appendix A - Creating Sub-Capabilities for Specific Use-Cases and Sectors**

451 The following questions can help guide in the development of new sub-capabilities based on
452 source documents and guidance while profiling. First, you must consider the scope and sources
453 of the new capabilities you are developing (i.e., Step 1) and should consider:

- 454 1. For what sector(s) are you developing a profile?
- 455 2. What are source documents for cybersecurity goals and needs for customers and use
456 cases in this sector? (e.g., guidance documents, industry standards, regulations,
457 contractual requirements)

458 To develop a new sub-capability, as described in Step 3, review the format of NISTIR 8259A
459 and NISTIR 8259B, as well as the contents of NISTIR 8259, then consider *commonly necessary*⁸
460 device cybersecurity capabilities and non-technical supporting capabilities to meet or support
461 guidance and requirements in the source documents you identified. You can create sub-
462 capabilities by using the following template:

- 463 1. What is the name for the sub-capability (<5 words)?
- 464 2. What is a short description of the functionality or actions that comprise the sub-capability
465 (1-2 sentences)?
- 466 3. Is this sub-capability technical or non-technical⁹?
 - 467 a. Technical
 - 468 b. Non-Technical
- 469 4. Which capability does this specific sub-capability relate to (select one)?
 - 470 a. Device Identity
 - 471 b. Device Configuration
 - 472 c. Data Protection
 - 473 d. Logical Access to Interfaces
 - 474 e. Software Update
 - 475 f. Cybersecurity State Awareness
 - 476 g. Device Security
 - 477 h. Documentation
 - 478 i. Information and Query Reception (how customers can contact and communicate
479 with the manufacturer or their supporting parties)
 - 480 j. Information Dissemination (how manufacturers, or their supporting parties, can
481 provide information to customers)
 - 482 k. Education and Awareness
 - 483 l. Other?

⁸ Commonly necessary capabilities may not be trivial to identify for all sectors and usually will represent a balance between clear minimal guidance/requirements and flexible, tailorable, additional sector-specific requirements.

⁹ If you feel the capability is both technical and non-technical, create two capabilities, one with the technical elements and another with the non-technical actions.

- 484 5. What are the bulleted abilities (if technical) or actions (if non-technical) of this sub-
485 capability?
486 6. What are the rationales for this sub-capability and its elements and/or actions?
487 7. Which sources for cybersecurity goals and needs (or sections/provisions of those source
488 documents) does this sub-capability support?
489

490 By documenting and maintaining the answers to the above, the sector or use case will establish a
491 referenceable tool to guide use of the resulting profile and support updates to the profile as the
492 supporting source documents are updated or new ones are created. Such documentation also will
493 likely provide evidence of due diligence and explain to regulators and auditors of entities using
494 the profiles how they made decisions for the implemented abilities and actions.

495 Appendix B - Acronyms

496 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this paper are defined below.

497	ACD	Applied Cybersecurity Division
498	CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
499	CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
500	CNSS	Committee on National Security Systems
501	CNSSI	Committee on National Security Systems Instructions
502	CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
503	DNS	Domain Name System
504	DNSSEC	Domain Name System Security Extensions
505	EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
506	EU	European Union
507	FFIEC	Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
508	FISMA	Federal Information System Modernization Act
509	GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
510	GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
511	HIPAA	Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
512	IoT	Internet of Things
513	ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
514	IR	Internal Report
515	LTE	Long Term Evolution
516	MAC	Media Access Control
517	NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
518	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology

519	PEAP	Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol
520	RMF	Risk Management Framework
521	SP	Special Publication
522	TLS	Transport Layer Security
523	UHF	Ultra-High Frequency
524	UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
525	UWB	Ultra Wide Band
526	VHF	Very High Frequency

527 **Appendix C - Glossary**

528 Selected terms used in this document are defined below.

Core Baseline	A set of technical device capabilities needed to support common cybersecurity controls that protect the customer's devices and device data, systems, and ecosystems.
Customer [12]	The organization or person that receives a product or service.
Cybersecurity State	The condition of a device's cybersecurity expressed in a way that is meaningful and useful to authorized entities. For example, a very simple device might express its state in terms of whether or not it is operating as expected, while a complex device might perform cybersecurity logging, check its integrity at boot and report the results, and examine and report additional aspects of its cybersecurity state.
Device Cybersecurity Capability	Cybersecurity features or functions that computing devices provide through their own technical means (i.e., device hardware and software).
Degraded Cybersecurity State	A cybersecurity state that indicates the device's cybersecurity has been significantly negatively impacted, such as the device being unable to operate as expected, or the integrity of the device's software being violated.
Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline	See <i>core baseline</i> .
Device Identifier [13, Adapted]	A context-unique value—a value unique within a specific context—that is associated with a device (for example, a string consisting of a network address).
Interface [14, Adapted]	A boundary between the IoT device and entities where interactions take place. There are two types of interfaces: network and local.
Network Interface	An interface that connects the IoT device to a network.
Non-Technical Baseline	See Non-Technical Supporting Capability Core Baseline

Non-Technical Supporting Capability	Non-technical supporting capabilities are actions an organization performs in support of the cybersecurity of an IoT device.
Non-Technical Supporting Capability Core Baseline	The non-technical supporting capability core baseline is a set of non-technical supporting capabilities generally needed from manufacturers or other third parties to support common cybersecurity controls that protect an organization's devices as well as device data, systems, and ecosystems.
Profile	A profile is a baseline set of minimal cybersecurity requirements for mitigating described threats and vulnerabilities, as well as supporting compliance requirements for a defined scope and type of a particular use case (e.g., industry, information system(s)), using a combination of existing cybersecurity guidance, standards and/or specifications baseline documents or catalogs. A profile organizes selected guidance, standard(s) and/or specification(s) and may narrow, expand and/or otherwise tailor items from the starting material to address the requirements of the profile's target application.
Software [7]	Computer programs and associated data that may be dynamically written or modified during the device's execution (e.g., application code, libraries).
Supporting Parties	Providers of external system services to the manufacturer through a variety of consumer-producer relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements); licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges. Supporting services include, for example, Telecommunications, engineering services, power, water, software, tech support, and security.
System Element [12]	Member of a set of elements that constitute a system.
Training	Teaching people the knowledge and relevant and needed security skills and competencies by that will enable them to understand how to use and configure the IoT devices to enable them to most securely use the IoT devices.
Update [7, Adapted]	A patch, upgrade, or other modification to code that corrects security and/or functionality problems in software.