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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNODC STUDY ON FIREARMS

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UNODC STUDY ON FIREARMS 2015

**A study on the transnational nature of and routes and
modus operandi used in trafficking in firearms**



UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Study on Firearms employs a pioneering data-focused approach to the study of trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. Based on information from 45 countries, it examines the quantities and types of firearms seized in different regions, the routes and methods used in the trafficking of firearms and other offences associated with reported seizures.

Background and mandate

The UNODC Study on Firearms was developed pursuant to resolutions 5/4 and 6/2 of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,¹ which mandated UNODC “to conduct a study of the transnational nature of and routes used in trafficking in firearms, based on the analysis of information provided by States on confiscated weapons and ammunition” (para. 7, Conference resolution 5/4). The Conference tasked UNODC to carry out the study in close collaboration with national authorities and to base it on official information provided by States on seized firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

Scope and objectives of the Study

The Study was developed to raise global knowledge on illicit trafficking in firearms, including its transnational nature and the routes and modus operandi used, by enhancing understanding of this phenomenon and its links to other serious crimes. The Study is the first of its kind and all Member States were invited “to participate in and contribute to it as appropriate” (para. 7, Conference resolution 6/2). It lays the foundation for further research at the international level on trafficking in firearms.² One of the primary objectives was to demonstrate the importance of data collection and analysis on trafficking in firearms and, consequently, highlight the usefulness of monitoring illicit firearms trafficking flows at the national, regional and international levels.

This Study demonstrates the importance of continuing efforts to enhance national systems for collection and analysis of detailed data on illicit firearms trafficking. It is a demonstration of the potential future value of improved national systems to collect data and international cooperation in collating and analysing that data.

¹ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No. 39574. The Convention was adopted in December 2000 and entered into force in 2003. 185 State Parties have so far ratified or acceded to it.

² The background paper entitled “Challenges and good practices in countering illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and measures to facilitate the implementation of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” (CTOC/COP/WG.6/2014/2) provides further information on the relevance of monitoring illicit trafficking flows, the objectives and methodological aspects of the Study, the challenges and good practices in facilitating States’ participation in the Study, as well as the progress of UNODC in the development of the Study.

Guiding principles and methodology

The Study is based primarily on country responses to two questionnaires, designed and circulated by UNODC:

- The annual seizures report questionnaire, asking primarily for aggregate data on firearms, their parts and components and ammunition seized during 2010-2013
- The significant seizures report questionnaire, asking primarily for detailed information about significant individual incidents related to trafficking seizures.

In this Study, the two data sources are used differently in order to reflect their respective strengths. The two questionnaires were intended to elicit two different sets of information related to seized firearms, their parts and components and ammunition in responding countries. Each questionnaire addresses seizures and then elicits quantitative and qualitative information relevant to illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

Outcome of the Study

The Study shows the value and usefulness of information related to firearms and ammunition seizures in terms of forming a better understanding of the transnational nature of and routes used in trafficking in firearms. It focuses on individual country results rather than on totals and to better reflect the participation and efforts of all responding countries.

Participation in the study was voluntary. Forty-eight countries responded directly to UNODC and provided information related to firearms seizures or trafficking. Of those countries, 42 were States parties to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,³ one was a signatory (Germany) and five were non-States parties (Colombia, France, Niger, Russian Federation and Zimbabwe). Additionally, information from two countries (Costa Rica, and Serbia) was collected through publicly available official data. However, not all the information was equally comparable for analytical purposes and could not always be utilized for the Study. As a result, the Study's findings are based on information from 45 countries. Latin America and Europe were the most represented regions, followed by West Africa.

Overview of seizure information

Data on aggregated national seizures is presented in Chapter 2. The data was reported by 39 countries, 37 of which provided data compiled by the police and two of which provided data compiled by customs. The seizure reports supplied by countries for this Study give a unique view of the scale and dimensions of illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. The key findings from the information provided by responding countries show:

- Large differences in the levels of reported seizures between countries, with some countries reporting dozens of seized firearms per year and others reporting tens of thousands.
- The annual reported seizures of firearms and ammunition within individual countries were highly volatile, with some countries reporting exponential variations from one year to the next.
- The degree of such differences and variations is due to a variety of issues, including different reporting practices, contingent seizure incidents, and trafficking situations in each country; as such, it is an important subject for further investigation.
- The existence of differences in reporting practices points to the need for more standardized and comprehensive reporting of seizures.
- Among the 35 countries that reported breakdowns by type of seized firearm, the most commonly reported types seized were handguns (pistols and revolvers), accounting for 53 per cent of all reported seizures.
- Rudimentary firearms, which are crude guns made by artisans, were not found in most countries that reported data or accounted for a small proportion (less than 5 per cent) of reported firearms seizures. Nevertheless, they were much more frequently found in the reported seizures of several countries, including Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Ghana, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago.

While the seizure data examined in Chapter 2 reveals a great deal about seized firearms and certain aspects related to trafficking, they also point to the importance of further international data collection and independent evaluation of the available information. While a general sense of scale and typical variations

³ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2326, p. 208-308, 2001. So far 113 States have ratified or acceded to the Protocol.

can already be determined, the implications for policymaking will be clearer once data has been collected over a longer period and there are more comprehensive seizure reports and background information about the legal context of a seizure.

Overview of trafficking information

Information on trafficking indicators was provided by 30 countries, of which five were from Africa, 14 from Europe and 11 from Latin America and the Caribbean. The information provided gives an initial overview of the dynamics of trafficking in firearms, and the key findings are:

- Countries reported that most of the trafficking appeared to be local and cross-border trafficking tended to concern mostly neighbouring or regional states
- Several countries reported that seized firearms had most commonly been manufactured in the same country as where the seizure took place
- Trafficking is most often reported to have been conducted by citizens of the country in which the firearms were seized, followed by citizens of neighbouring countries
- More complex types of trafficking between continents or by nationals from outside the region are rarely reported in the information provided to this Study
- The most frequently reported means of transport was by land
- Information on offences associated with seized firearms suggests that illicit firearms are trafficked largely for people engaged in other forms of criminal activity, primarily trafficking in drugs and other commodities, as well as organized crime and violent crime
- Generally, countries tend to cooperate in tracing with other countries of the same region

Policy considerations

This Study shows that great strides towards understanding trafficking in firearms can be made with a relatively modest amount effort. It complements pre-existing research on illicit arms trafficking. However, while producing this Study, a widespread lack of capacity to collect and analyse data on firearms sei-

zures and trafficking was revealed in developed and developing countries alike. The key issues are:

- Many countries lack systematic data collection mechanisms, including adequate tools and capacities, such as registries and software applications
- Challenges were encountered in obtaining data from different sources
- Criminal justice officials lack opportunities to participate in relevant networks and interact with fellow experts from their region or beyond, which is crucial in terms of understanding this transnational problem
- Criminal justice officials lack the capacity to analyse trafficking in firearms. In many cases, trafficking in firearms does not seem to be analysed regularly, and the results of analyses are not widely disseminated

Such problems diminish the ability of actions at the national level to prevent trafficking in firearms and undermine international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers. A key international priority, therefore, must be to enhance capacity for data collection and analysis, especially in countries most affected by trafficking in firearms, taking into account that:

- Assistance for improving capacities for data collection and analysis can be provided through existing international instruments that include commitments concerning international cooperation and technical assistance, especially the Firearms Protocol, Arms Trade Treaty, as well as the Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and various regional agreements.
- Technical support and training, as provided by UNODC to some Member States, can greatly assist in strengthening their data collection efforts. Regular opportunities for the sharing of information, data and good practices in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in firearms can greatly contribute to fostering confidence and strengthening international cooperation in this field.
- Progress towards internationally agreed terms, definitions and reporting procedures would facilitate information exchange and analysis and strengthen international cooperation

Almost fifteen years after the world agreed on the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action on Small

Arms, the international community still lacks sufficient tools to determine what policies actually work to prevent trafficking in firearms and where trafficking is increasing or decreasing.

The UNODC Study has laid the foundation to carry out more systematic data analysis and collection. A comprehensive data-focused approach, as pioneered by this Study, offers the best way to provide the information needed to design effective policies to prevent and eradicate trafficking in firearms. This Study demonstrates the potential value of further efforts, specifically:

- Producing similar studies in the future, to benefit from data covering a longer period and to provide Member States with regular updates.
- Encouraging a wider range of countries to participate and provide data for such future studies.

- Improving national capacities to collect and report data
- Encouraging greater comparability and consistency of national data collection systems and methods.
- Facilitate regular exchanges of information on firearms trafficking, including on diversion risks.

This Study has indicated what can be done. It is essential that as many Member States as possible report information on trafficking in firearms on a regular basis to UNODC in order to continue activities and conduct future research. Furthermore, such information needs to be analysed so that new conclusions can be made, and data needs to be published so that the work of UNODC can stimulate wider research and advocacy.



ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CEN	Customs Enforcement Network
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
MANPADS	Man-portable air defence system
SALW	Small arms and/or light weapons
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO	World Trade Organization



INTRODUCTION

Why conduct a study of trafficking in firearms?

Understanding the scale and nature of trafficking in firearms at the national, regional and global levels is of crucial importance to the international community. Monitoring illicit trafficking flows can help identify patterns and trends. This information can be used by law enforcement agencies and judiciaries to identify and mitigate risks and threats. Likewise, it can contribute to decision-making at policy and operational levels. Regular and comprehensive studies on trafficking in firearms could help to shed light on source/origin countries and the trafficking routes and methods used, as well as to expose those involved in such activities. Practitioners would be able to establish the extent of involvement of criminal groups and replace anecdotal evidence with empirically founded and verifiable data. Research on trafficking in firearms usually tends to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It mostly relies on case studies, a few statistics which are publicly available, and secondary evidence such as media reports. As case studies are inevitably limited to a particular time and geographical area they may be of limited use in establishing a general picture of a global problem, as well as in providing material for international cooperation and policy-making outside their scope.

In order to better understand the illicit flows of firearms that give rise to violence and other forms of crime within their territories, countries need to collect and analyse data on trafficking. One essential step in this direction is to ensure that data on firearms trafficking incidents discovered by national law enforcement agencies are collected and analysed routinely and comprehensively.

Today, many countries collect large quantities of data on the numbers and types of seized firearms, as well as on vital contextual information related to trafficking, such as the routes and types of transport used, related crimes and other trafficked goods. Moreover, law enforcement agencies are encouraged to use tracing requests in order to locate the likely origin of illicit firearms. Such data may prove to be of great value in forming a better understanding of trafficking in firearms and allowing for more informed planning and decision-making. However, national capacities to analyse data are usually limited and overstretched. A lack of resources and, at times, insufficient technical skills are major impediments to thorough and in-depth analysis. Many countries do not have a system in place that allows for systematic collection and analysis of data on firearms. Furthermore, they often lack the technical skills and resources to do so. Differing classifications of and methods for collecting statistical data make it more difficult to exchange information and to extrapolate relevant findings for regional or global studies.

The lack of an international system for standardized reporting on the scale, technologies, patterns, routes and methods of illicit trafficking in firearms is a major barrier to more effective international cooperation. Reliable data on the extent, patterns, routes and modus operandi of trafficking in firearms are scarce and difficult to obtain. Where available, data from different Member States are often not directly comparable owing to differences in recording and reporting practices. More fundamentally, many countries have not previously systematically collected or reported data on trafficking in firearms.

Countries can better appreciate the dynamics of trafficking in firearms by conducting their own analyses. By making the data available to the international community, such as through the present Study, countries can share information, thereby forming a collective knowledge that goes beyond the sum of the individual analysis a country can undertake by itself and contributing to a more comprehensive and global vision of the trafficking problem.

Mandate for the Study

The main purpose of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime⁴ under article 1 is “to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively”. The illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition is covered by article 1 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supplementing the Convention.⁵

Accordingly, one of the functions of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention is to promote cooperation and a better understanding of the patterns and trends of transnational organized crime with a view to “improve the capacity of States Parties to combat transnational organized crime” (Organized Crime Convention, paras. 1 and 3, art. 32). The need to strengthen international cooperation and the sharing of information to combat such crimes is also repeatedly stressed by the Conference (see Conference resolutions 5/4, 6/2 and 7/2).

With this in mind, the Conference requested UNODC “to conduct a study on the transnational nature of and routes used in trafficking in firearms, based on the analysis of information provided by States on confiscated weapons and ammunition, for consideration by the Conference at its sixth session” (Conference resolution 5/4). At its subsequent session, the Conference reiterated the mandate requesting UNODC “to improve methodology, in close consultation with Member States, and to complete the Study in accordance with the given mandate” and called upon States “to participate in and contribute to the study, as appropriate” (Conference resolution 6/2).

The Study was developed to enhance global knowledge on trafficking in firearms, its transnational nature, the routes and modus operandi used and its links to organized and other serious crimes. It is the first effort of its kind involving Member States in the collection and analysis of data on illicit trafficking. UNODC invited all Member States to participate and contribute to it. The Study lays the foundation for further global research on trafficking in firearms.⁶

One of the primary objectives of the Study is to underline the importance of collecting and analysing data on trafficking in firearms and demonstrate the advantages and worth of monitoring illicit firearms trafficking flows at the national, regional and international levels.

The following guiding principles underpin the Study:

- The Study should be based on an agreed transparent and simple methodology for the collection of empirical information from Member States
- Information should be verifiable, and data should be collected in a standardized and compatible way, so that the findings can be compared to each other
- The information provided by Member States should be easily retrieved from existing reports on firearms seizures in order to reduce the burden on Member States, where possible with a reduced number of institutions involved in providing the data
- By providing added value to information already available at the country level, the Study should be useful to decision makers and practitioners in terms of policy development
- The Study should also trigger a long term benefit for responding Member States, by contributing to the strengthening of their monitoring and analysis capacities and assisting them in producing and exchanging higher quality information on trafficking in firearms and related crimes

Improvement in monitoring, reporting and information-sharing is in line with article 12 of the Firearms Protocol, articles 11 and 13 of the Arms Trade Treaty and numerous articles of the Programme of Action on Small Arms.

⁴ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No. 39574.

⁵ Ibid., vol. 2326, No. 39574.

⁶ The background paper entitled “Challenges and good practices in countering the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and measures to facilitate the implementation of the Firearms Protocol” (CTOC/COP/WG.6/2014/2) provides further information on the relevance of monitoring illicit trafficking flows, the objectives and methodological aspects of the Study, the challenges and good practices for facilitating States’ participation in the study, as well as the progress of UNODC on the development of the study.

Through this Study, the UNODC aims to support the implementation of the Firearms Protocol and the work of the Conference, as well as to contribute to the development of structures for the systematic collection of data on and analysis of trafficking in firearms. It also aims to strengthen capacities for long-term national data collection in countries where this is a challenge. It is hoped that in future, by using a similar methodology and scope, UNODC will be able to produce more solid and measurable data on the transnational dimension of trafficking in firearms in order to identify trends and patterns over time and provide better support for efforts to combat trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

Roll-out of the Study

To ensure standardized and uniform data collection and comparability, UNODC developed two questionnaires:

- A consolidated annual seizures report questionnaire that elicits information on total numbers of seized firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, along with related information
- A significant seizures report questionnaire where States provide information on significant seizures and incidents at regular intervals

The online questionnaires were translated into all the official United Nations languages⁷ and disseminated through a password-protected webpage⁸ along with additional relevant information, including a concept note containing a description of the study methodology. Member States were able to download the questionnaires easily, provide available data on seizures and submit them to UNODC by using the same procedure. The data were automatically incorporated into the UNODC firearms trafficking database for further extraction and analysis. Furthermore, the Secretariat developed a toolkit for the successful completion of the questionnaires by focal points and reporting officers. The toolkit was prepared in English, Spanish and French and can be accessed from the portal home page.

After the distribution of notes verbales, the Secretariat undertook a series of follow-up activities with Member States in the form of regional and bilateral meetings and seminars, as well as individual follow-up

through email correspondence, phone calls and in situ visits. From February to September 2014, UNODC collected data and information from Member States on firearms seizures and trafficking and actively encouraged the participation of States in the Study. The quantitative information collected was shared with Member States for its final validation.

Structure of the Study

The Study is divided in four chapters:

Chapter 1 frames the issue of firearms and their illicit trade, with a short introduction to the global firearms market, and an overview of the scope and coverage of the study.

Chapter 2 presents seizure results, and provides an overview of seized firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition seizures as reported by countries' authorities, including an analysis of national seizure levels. This chapter also includes the analysis of global indicators, seizure rates across countries, as well as the types of firearms seized by responding authorities.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the quantitative and qualitative information on firearms trafficking provided by authorities based on specific trafficking indicators, including trafficking trends, modus operandi and trafficker profiles.

Chapter 4 sets out the main challenges identified by Member States in the monitoring of trafficking in firearms and presents international responses to the firearms trafficking problem.

The annexes provide details of the methodology employed and sources used for the collection of data, information on the types of firearms examined in this Study, a list of responding countries, useful reference material and a compilation of the most relevant statistical material collected.

The Study is further complemented by a separate annex with a country-by-country review of national seizures and trafficking data, as well as two separate regional studies for selected regions.

⁷ The two questionnaires were also disseminated as conference room papers at the past session of the Working Group on Firearms, held in Vienna from 26 to 28 May 2014. See annual seizures report questionnaire (CTOC/COP/WG.6/2014/CRP.1) and significant seizures report questionnaire (CTOC/COP/WG.6/2014/CRP.2).

⁸ The portal can be accessed at the following link: <https://firearmstrafficking.unodc.org>

Future of the Study

The Study shows the potential of information related to firearms and ammunition seizures. By developing this Study, UNODC has laid the foundation for systematic data analysis and collection. Furthermore, it has contributed to the strengthening of capacities for national data collection in virtually all responding countries.

The usefulness and relevance of a study on such a dynamic and changing phenomenon as trafficking in firearms would increase exponentially if data were

collected on an annual basis and studies were conducted at periodic and regular intervals. A review of the questionnaires and incorporation of additional research questions, such as an analysis of the legal context of and judicial case work related to cases of trafficking in firearms, as well as other indicators that could help measure the effectiveness of the criminal justice response to trafficking in firearms, could greatly assist in establishing patterns and trends, as well as in devising adequate prevention and control measures at the national and international levels.




CHAPTER ONE

THE UNODC STUDY ON FIREARMS: FRAMING THE ISSUE

A. Global demand for and supply of firearms

The most recent research on global distribution of firearms shows that there were approximately 875 million firearms in the world as of 2007. Almost three quarters of those were believed to be owned by civilians, with the remainder in the possession of military and law enforcement services (see Figure 1).⁹

Fig. 1 Proportion of global firearms ownership



This global market for firearms and ammunition is supplied by mostly formally licensed production in factories, with artisanal or ‘craft’ production in workshops accounting for a smaller, less well-understood proportion.¹⁰ As outlined later in this Study, the Firearms Protocol in articles 3 and 5 requires State Parties to license or authorize firearms manufacturing and make their unauthorized manufacturing a criminal offence.

As with manufacturing, the Firearms Protocol also requires all State Parties to establish a system of export and import licensing or authorization to cover international trade in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.¹¹ The export and import of firearms conducted under such regulations (by State Parties and other States alike) are often referred to as “authorized”.¹² Cross-border or transitional transfers that have not been authorized are therefore considered illicit.¹³ The size of such authorized trade is estimated to involve millions of firearms per year. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms registered the export of 1,808,904 firearms in 2013.¹⁴ This is likely to be a considerable underestimate since only 25 Member States reported data on firearms for that year

⁹ See A. Karp, “Data Sources and the Estimation of Military-owned Small Arms”, Small Arms Survey Research Note Number 34 (September 2013); and A. Karp, “Estimating Civilian Owned Firearms”, Small Arms Survey Research Note Number 9 (September 2011).

¹⁰ See E. Berman, “Craft Production of Small Arms”, Small Arms Survey Research Note Number 3 (March 2011).

¹¹ See article 10 of the Firearms Protocol.

¹² See for example P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh and M. Schroeder with J. Lazarevic, “Piece by Piece Authorized Transfers of Parts And Accessories” in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, eds. E. Berman and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 9-10.

¹³ The term “authorized” is not necessarily synonymous with “legal” as it is possible that an import and export licensed by national authorities may nevertheless violate international law (for example, a transfer to a State under embargo). For a similar definition see United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms, Glossary of terms, definitions and Abbreviations (New York: UN CASA, 2014, ISACS 01.20:2014(E)V1.1).

¹⁴ Data extracted from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms online database. Available from <http://www.un-register.org/SmallArms/Index.aspx> (accessed 9 May 2015).

and they had been encouraged to report on firearms “made or modified to military specification”.¹⁵ An academic project published in 2009 using numerous sources of data from Governments estimated that the annual authorized international trade was responsible for the transfer of at least 4.6 million firearms.¹⁶

International trade represents only a proportion of all firearms bought and sold in the world; the rest of demand is met by production and trade entirely within a single country. Several countries have large-scale industries, which primarily produce for domestic clients and are not significantly engaged in exporting.¹⁷

There are no contemporary scientific estimates of the overall size of global illicit trade in firearms. While the overall scale of illicit trade remains unclear, specific aspects are better understood. Illicit trade is often divided into “black” and “grey” transactions.¹⁸ The former involve illicit activities in all aspects of the transaction, while the latter involve some elements of an authorized transfer while other aspects may be illicit, for example if a transfer were authorized by either the importer or exporter but not both.

“Diversion” is the term used for the movement – either physical, administrative or otherwise – of a firearm from the legal to the illicit realm.¹⁹ Firearms can be

diverted during shipment from one location to another, for example if forged documentation is used to facilitate the transfer of firearms to a destination not authorized by the exporting government.²⁰ It is also widely recognized that arms being stored can be diverted, for example through pilfering of weapons located in a depot.²¹ Illicit cross-border trafficking in firearms or diversion can be facilitated by illicit brokers or dealers who arrange the necessary elements of an illicit shipment.²² Firearms that are legally owned may lose that status if the owner loses their licence or fails to keep them registered.

There are large differences in the size and complexity of different forms and instances of illicit trafficking. Criminological research has found that an important source of illicit trafficking in firearms occurs on a small scale and involves unsophisticated methods, such as a few handguns being transported over a border concealed in the back of a car.²³ Frequent small-scale trafficking can collectively move large quantities of firearms and ammunition over time.²⁴ In other cases, illicit traffickers are organized for large-scale shipments of arms, measured in hundreds of tons or more, that circumvent numerous national law enforcement agencies. Such large illicit shipments are associated with supplies to parties involved in armed conflict or shipments to embargoed destinations.²⁵

¹⁵ Information on reporting from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms online database. Available from <http://www.un-register.org/ReportingStatus/Index.aspx> (accessed 9 May 2015); see also Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Guidelines for Reporting International Transfers* (New York: United Nations, 2007).

¹⁶ See P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh and M. Schroeder with J. Lazarevic, “Piece by Piece Authorized Transfers of Parts And Accessories” in *Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War*, eds. E. Berman and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ N. Jenzen-Jones, “Producers of Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Their Ammunition”, *Small Arms Survey Research Note Number 43* (July 2014). A. Karp, “Small Arms of the Indian State A Century of Procurement and Production”, *Small Arms Survey Research Issue Brief Number 4* (January 2014).

¹⁸ See for example International Committee of the Red Cross, “Unregulated arms availability, small arms & light weapons, and the UN process”, 26 May 2006. Available from <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/small-arms-paper-250506.htm#a5>; or N. Marsh, “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illicit Trade in Small Arms”, *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. 9, No. 1 (2002).

¹⁹ Definition adapted from: United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism, *Glossary of terms, definitions and Abbreviations* (New York: UN CASA, 2014, ISACS 01.20:2014(E)V1.1).

²⁰ See for example P. Holtom and M. Bromley, “Transit and Trans-shipment Controls in an Arms Trade Treaty”, Solna: SIPRI, SIPRI Background Paper (July 2011).

²¹ See for example, the report of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF/192/BMS/2014/2).

²² For examples see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2006); and for definitions and other information see the report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/81 to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons (A/62/163).

²³ See for example G. Hales, C. Lewis and D. Silverstone, “Gun crime: The market in and use of illegal firearms.”, Home Office Research Study 298 (London: Home Office, 2006); S. Bricknell, “Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs”, Australian Institute for Criminology Report No. 116 (Canberra: Australian Institute for Criminology); T. Spapens, “Trafficking in illicit firearms for criminal purposes within the European Union”, *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, vol. 15 (2007), pp. 359–381 2007; A. Braga and others, “Interpreting the Empirical Evidence on Illegal Gun Market Dynamics”, *Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, vol. 89, No. 5 (2012), pp 779-793.

²⁴ See for example M. Bourne, *Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp 160-174.

²⁵ For examples see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2006).


B. Coverage of the Study

Participation in the Study and active submission of data to UNODC was carried out on a voluntary basis. Questionnaires were circulated to all Member States. A total of 48 countries responded directly to UNODC providing some official information related to their experience with firearms seizures or trafficking. The information was submitted through their designated national focal points, in coordination with national authorities and their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, thus contributing to the implementation of article 12 of the Firearms Protocol, which calls upon States to cooperate in the exchange of relevant information on firearms trafficking. Additionally, information from Costa Rica and Serbia was collected through publicly available official sources.

Of the 48 States that directly submitted data to UNODC, 42 (87 per cent) were States parties to the Firearms Protocol, one was a signatory (Germany) and five were non-States parties, (Colombia, France, Niger, Russian Federation and Zimbabwe).


Map 1 shows the geographical location of countries responding to the Study according to two different sources, namely police and customs or border control authorities. Respondents are not evenly distributed around the world, with Europe and Latin America being the regions with higher response rate.

Map.1 Countries covered by this Study



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: UNODC, data from the Seizure Questionnaires and other official sources



CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF SEIZURE DATA

A. What is a seizure?

The seizure reports supplied by Member States for this Study give a new and revealing sense of the scale and major characteristics of illicit transnational trafficking in firearms. As noted previously, this Study draws heavily on country data about seizures of firearms, parts and components, and ammunition. The basis for this approach, stressing the connection between illicit trafficking and confiscation, is found in article 6 of the Firearms Protocol, which states that “States Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition that have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked.”

Seizure (or freezing) is defined in article 2 (f) of the Organized Crime Convention as “temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority”. Seizure can precede final confiscation or forfeiture, defined by the same article 2 (g) of the Convention, as the “permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority”. It is the prerogative of States to adopt laws and regulations defining seizures within their domestic legal system. While the definition of seizure is more comprehensive than that of confiscation, it is not formally standardized; criteria for seizing firearms and ammunition may differ greatly from country to country.

Under the Protocol, States shall seize firearms, their parts and components and ammunition that have been illicitly trafficked or manufactured. In addition, States may also seize and destroy firearms that are suspected of being trafficked or illicitly manufactured while an investigation is being undertaken, as a measure to prevent these firearms from being trafficked elsewhere. Seizures appear to be the best currently available measure of transnational firearms trafficking. A seizure does not mean automatically the intercepted items were shipped illegally; they later might be ruled legal, returned to their port of origin, or to their proper owner. Consequently, seizure data always must be regarded with caution. But in lieu of more refined measures of trafficking, this probably is the most revealing indicator of illicit transnational flows.

National legislation and regulations normally go beyond the provisions of the Firearms Protocol, often establishing legal grounds for seizures that may not be limited to illicit manufacturing and trafficking. Firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition may be seized for many other reasons, such as when they are suspected of having been used in criminal offences. Seizures may therefore result also from administrative violations such as lack of a license or registration required for possession, commercial sale, import, transit or export. The offence associated with the seizure, the reason for taking the gun, can be highly dependent on the domestic legal framework and prevailing law enforcement practices. Indeed, seized property might be returned to its legal owners when suspected illegality cannot be proven or after its legal status is corrected.

While many factors can lie behind a particular firearms seizure by country officials, law enforcement is the basic mission of the agencies and personnel involved, and their seizures normally are based on that mission.

As a result, to compare firearms seizures from country to country is at least partially to compare such countries' laws, regulations and enforcement practices. Uses of firearms that are legal and socially accepted in one country may be illegal and unacceptable in another, meaning that a gun that is legally held in one country may - in otherwise identical circumstances - be liable to seizure in another. Not only do laws on gun ownership and trafficking vary, but so do the regulations justifying seizures. Law enforcement officials may be legally justified to seize a gun in one situation and inhibited in other seemingly similar situations.

Law and regulations also may affect the recording of seizures. A firearm taken by a law enforcement officer may not automatically be counted as a seizure. Just as a death is not counted as a homicide until certain conditions are satisfied, depending on domestic rules and practices, a firearm taken by authorities may not automatically be counted as seized.

There also is a general problem with respect to firearms seized, but later returned. Without knowing the number and reasons why they were returned, it is hard to judge the total number of firearms that actually were trafficked and the total number finally removed from private ownership. Was annual data later adjusted for returns? Were firearms seized by customs authorities returned to their port of origin? Was a gun temporarily taken into evidence by police later returned to its owner? Was it stolen and seized as evidence, which might permit it to be returned to its legal owner, or was it purchased legally and used to commit another crime, making return unlikely? A thorough understanding of a seizure event needs a matching report on the final disposition of the property at stake.

All versus selected seizures

One methodological question raised during the development of the Study was whether to consider all seizures or only selected examples that were directly related to illicit trafficking or other serious crimes. Differences in national legislation and regulation are major impediments in this regard, since there is no harmonized system in place to establish the criminal or administrative nature of the violation behind a seizure. The questionnaires sent to States therefore inquired about total seizures, the legal context of the seizures and the offences that led to them.

There is an additional problem of comparability between the responses from different States in terms of whether the data provided by a State covers border seizures (typically by customs authorities), domestic seizures (made within the national territory, typically by police) or some combination thereof. Firearms circulating within national borders are not at that particular moment being trafficked internationally, although they may have been or be bound to be trafficked.

The proportion of cases of illicit trafficking in firearms that lead to seizures is not known at this point, but is likely to be low. Most trafficking in firearms is thought to go undetected at State borders or ports. It often is only when firearms are found at a crime scene or in another criminal context that they are traced and the existence of illicit cross-border trafficking is identified. Therefore, limiting the scope of this Study to the analysis of firearms seized at borders and ports was considered too limiting and even misleading, as this would exclude a priori the possibility of finding more out about trafficked firearms that had been seized domestically and subsequently traced.

Although covering all seizures makes the Study more comprehensive, it raises potential sources of confusion. Using all official seizure reports, regardless of the reporting agency, risks including weapons suspected in crimes other than trafficking, such as violent crimes or administrative offenses. However, for the purposes of this preliminary Study, it was considered essential to distinguish as best possible the firearms seized domestically from those linked to explicit illicit cross-border trafficking in order to understand the fullest extent of the problem. For these reasons, this Study asked Member States to specify, whenever possible, the illicit activity to which a seizure was connected and quantify how many of those seized arms actually came from the domestic market as opposed to international traffic. This, and other, information on the context of the seizures is presented in the following chapter on trafficking data.

At the international level, Member States also collect and report on customs seizures to the World Customs Organization (WCO), through its worldwide Customs Enforcement Network (CEN).


Box 1 World Customs Organization Customs Enforcement Network Reports

Seizures data related to trafficking in firearms are also collected by the World Customs Organization (WCO). With the globalization of crime, the role of customs has expanded to include national security, including security threats posed by terrorism, transnational organized crime, commercial fraud, counterfeiting and piracy. To assist the international customs enforcement community in gathering data and information, the WCO Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) was developed.

CEN is a database of seizures and offences that includes photos required for the analysis of illicit trafficking in the various areas of the competence of WCO.

In 2013 (the latest year for which CEN data is available) a total of 4,902 weapon cases (involving firearms or other potentially lethal weapons) were reported by WCO Member States, involving more than 1.4 million individual items.

Seizures by Customs procedure



Classification by concealment method

Concealment method	Number of cases	Quantity (pieces)
In freight	595	60 0773
In baggage	940	39 8412
In transport	983	196 201
Not concealed	340	75 211
Unknown	1218	72 289
In premises	79	48 348
On the person	142	28 283
In mail	603	19 828
On market places	2	14
Total	4902	1 439 359

Classification by seizure location

Concealment method	Number of cases	Quantity (pieces)
Land boundary	1317	65 5858
Seaport	352	481 297
Inland	1362	160 018
Airport	1154	127 287
Mail centre	688	10 629
Rail	22	4 238
River	5	29
Unknown	2	3
Total	4902	1 439 359

The figure and tables reproduced here give an overview of the seized firearms, their parts and components and ammunition reported to CEN in 2012, concealment methods, seizure locations and customs seizure procedures. They show that items were found predominantly in freight in baggage, as attempts were made to transfer them across land borders and seaports.

The highest numbers of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition were seized at land borders and seaports. However, the overall number of reported cases at seaports (352) is much lower than the number of cases at land borders (1,317).

Sources: Figures from WCO 2013

Questions related to seizure indicators

As part of this Study, UNODC invited Member States to submit information related to seizures of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition through the Seizure questionnaires, covering the period 2010-13.

A detailed overview of the questions included in the Annual and Significant seizure report questionnaires is presented in Annex 5 of this Study.

UNODC received data on total firearms seized for at least one of the four reference years from national authorities in 39 countries. Of these, 37 countries responded to at least one question in the Annual seizure report questionnaire.

With a view to cover data gaps from countries that did not respond to the questionnaires, UNODC used information from official sources to provide additional data on firearm seizures. Many of the data published by official government authorities were not comparable, as they combined statistics on firearms found, seized, and confiscated. UNODC was able to identify comparable seizure statistics from two countries (Costa Rica and Serbia).

State responses regarding parts and components seized were provided by 22 countries, while 33 countries provided responses regarding ammunition seized. Similarly, a total of 36 countries submitted details on the types of firearms (handguns, rifles, shotguns, etc.) seized by their authorities.

The Annual seizure report questionnaire asked for data on seizures broken down year by year for the reporting period 2010-2013. However, not all respondents were able to disaggregate data this way. UNODC also received several aggregated responses covering either several years or the whole reference period 2010-2013. Such inconsistency in reporting by States largely reflects differences in capacities and standardization and makes it difficult to draw direct comparisons and identify trends.

B. Annual firearm seizures

Tables 1 and 2 show the number of firearms reported seized over the whole reporting period, as submitted to UNODC.

Data on seizures from two different sources – police and customs – are presented separately. This is because the two sources are not comparable; data from police covers all national territory, including purely domestic seizures, while customs seizures usually concern goods entering or leaving state territory through ports and borders.

Despite having national coverage, the data on the numbers of seized firearms reported in Table 1 cannot easily be compared, since they do not take into account relevant elements such as the country's population, land area or other factors. Seizures by population are presented later in this section. The totals presented here also do not offer a basis for regional or global extrapolation; they speak only to what each reporting state reported for its own territory, according to its own law and procedures.

Information was received and collected by the national authorities of 39 countries. Of those countries, 37 submitted data on total national seizures made by the police and two submitted data on those made by customs authorities. However, not all the information was equally comparable for analytical purposes, therefore not all responding countries are shown in Table 1.

Large variations in seizures are apparent. Annual seizures of over 10,000 firearms were reported per year by Brazil, Colombia, Iraq and Mexico. Germany reported 43,543 total firearms seizures over a four-year period. Conversely, fewer than 100 firearm seizures per year were reported by were reported by authorities from Greece, Kuwait, Latvia and Romania.



Tab. 1 Number of firearms reported seized by police, 2010-2013

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	1 872	2 502	9 568	4 218
Brazil	39 467			13048
Burkina Faso	-	174	852	1 231
Chile	3 460	3 699	3 631	6 229
Colombia	44 572	37 987	38 903	38 236
Costa Rica	7 725			-
Dominican Republic	1 104	948	1 266	713
Ecuador	514	4 606	5 171	3 739
El Salvador	4 737	4 456	7 726	-
Estonia	-	21	-	-
Finland	2 783	3 023	2 642	3 149
France	536			825
Germany	43 543			
Ghana	24	28	73	428
Greece	133			-
Guatemala	4 580	4 069	4 375	4 408
Iraq	10 949	17 281	11 820	-
Kenya	2134			
Kuwait	41			84
Latvia	23	120	27	16
Lithuania	183	170	115	204
Mexico	34 287	40 996	25 803	14 467
Montenegro	379	453	319	411
Niger	-	-	213	-
Panama	1 936	3 011	1 955	1 770
Peru	3 820	2 702	1 416	2 352
Poland	2 269	1 577	1 850	1 567
Romania	99	84	86	86
Serbia	-	668	1 258	-
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1 279	314	179	185
Togo	-		205	-
Trinidad and Tobago	384	425	429	419
Turkey	1 994			9 853
Uruguay	-	-	-	2 640

Source: UNODC



Many states reported large year-on-year variations in seizures. For example, seizures increased in Argentina from 1,872 in 2010 to 9,568 in 2012 (an increase of 500 per cent) and then decreased by 56 per cent in 2013. Additional historic data provided to this Study by Argentina show the trend in reported seizures since the year 2004. This longer time period makes it possible to discern the underlying trend from yearly variations, providing a more detailed picture of the levels of seizures over time. In addition to 2012, the highest peak in the amount of seized firearms was registered in 2006.

Fig. 2 Selected examples of trends in firearms seizures reported by police, absolute numbers seized in each year, 2010-2013 (except for Argentina)



Mexico reported a decline in seizures from a peak of 40,996 seized firearms in 2011 to 8,759 in 2013 (a decline of almost 80 per cent). Some States reported more complex fluctuations over that period.

Ecuador reported a 796 per cent increase from 2010 to 2011, followed by an increase of 12 per cent in 2012 and a 28 per cent decrease in 2013. Following relatively stable seizure levels from 2010 to 2012, Ghana registered a 483 per cent increase in 2013.



These ups and downs suggest that data on seizures can be highly sensitive to variations, but the causes of such variations are less obvious. They might be due to changes in State law, regulation and law enforcement practices, as well as specific trafficking events such as the seizure of an extraordinary shipment. Depending on the location of a seizure and the circumstances under which it takes place, annual seizures may consist of a steady stream of small instances of firearms seizures, as well as large-scale incidents accounting for a more significant proportion of the totals reported by each country. Large seizures may be unique or unusual events, which could thereby dramatically alter totals from typical levels. In other words, a single major haul may distort otherwise normal trends. Such seizures may be made thanks to occasional tip-offs, systematic intelligence by law enforcement agencies, evolved detection measures or mere good fortune. Caution should be taken before ascribing general causes to rising and falling trends, which may be affected by such events. As described in the course of this Study, in some cases Member States provided additional information on the reasons behind reported fluctuations in the levels of seized firearms.

These year-to-year variations are perhaps the most impressive characteristic of data on seizures. It is only rarely that the reporting States show stable trends. Swin-


ging from year to year or even rocketing up and down, data on seizures reveal powerful forces at work. But what are they? The causes of these fluctuations cannot be determined from the data available, neither within specific countries nor as trends among the respondents as a whole. Further research is necessary to determine what causes such fluctuations. They could be due to a wide spectrum of possible causes, including:

- Variations in national record-keeping or reporting practices
- Short-term exceptional events and circumstances
- Long-term processes shaping the seizure environment, including:
 - Changes in Government regulations or law
 - Changes in the policies of enforcement agencies
 - Changes in the resources of enforcement agencies
 - Changes in domestic demand (crime or armed conflict)
 - Changes in domestic supply or availability
 - Changes in foreign demand
 - Changes in the organizational ability of traders and brokers

This list of mechanisms is speculative and undoubtedly incomplete. Which mechanisms are at work in a particular situation cannot easily be determined from the raw data available here. Without a clear appreciation of the forces behind the numbers of seizures, comparative analysis is difficult.

In some cases, States were able to report causes for trends and variations in their responses to the seizure report questionnaires. For example, Turkey reported a surge in reported annual firearms seizures, from 1,994 in 2010-2012 to 9,853 in 2013. Turkish authorities explained in follow-up communications with UNODC, that the increase was “due largely to the current security situation and turmoil across Turkey’s southern borders”.

Fig. 3 Trends in firearms seizures reported by police, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2010-2013



A different trend was reported by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where total seizures fell from 1,279 in 2010 to 314 in 2011 (a decline of 75.4 per cent). Officials of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia attributed this decrease to a series of activities by police of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia preventing and combating trafficking in firearms.

Compared to seizure reports by police (responsible for virtually all national territory), seizures by customs authorities (responsible primarily for ports and borders) tend to be significantly smaller. However, customs reports are more likely to represent verifiable cases of attempted transnational trafficking. Table 2 only includes data on cross border seizures reported by customs or border authorities, submitted in response to the annual seizures report questionnaire.

Tab. 2 Number of firearms reported seized by customs, 2010-2013

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Russian Federation	47	2 233	18	56
Sweden	46	46	60	66

Source: UNODC

Different kinds of contexts surrounding seizures may involve different outcomes for the seized items. Although there is no overall evidence on the matter, it is possible that several seizures made by customs authorities resulted in the return of the seized property. Some of the largest seizures covered in the country reports provided for this Study may well have resulted in the property being returned. Smaller seizures may be temporary and resolved when licences and other administrative preconditions are later satisfied. A gun seized at the airport from a traveller, for example, may be returned after licences are granted or fees are paid. It is important to note the context in which seizures took place. Firearms may be seized because they are suspected of being illicitly trafficked or prepared for use in another criminal activity. In some Member States, firearms can be seized when owners violate regulations on personal possession, such as renewal of licences for firearms ownership or prohibitions on particular categories of firearms. Where possible, it is important to distinguish between such administrative offences, which may involve only temporary seizures, and firearms seizures relating to transnational trafficking or potential violent crimes, which may lead to permanent confiscation and destruction. For example, Germany reported seizures of 43,543 firearms by

police over the years 2010-2013. However, German authorities also noted in their response to this Study that “seizures are mainly cases of illegal possession and therefore there is no significant problem for the public safety in Germany arising from illicit trafficking of firearms and crimes related to firearms”.

Similar information on the context of seizures was reported to this Study by several Member States. Brazil’s response stated that 14 per cent of firearms seizures were for the illicit trafficking or smuggling of firearms and 85 per cent for “other criminal offences”. Ecuador reported that 20 per cent of seizures were for the illicit trafficking or smuggling of firearms, 70 per cent for administrative violations and 10 per cent for other criminal offences. Several States reported that the majority of reported seizures were for trafficking offences. Of the 428 firearms seizures reported in 2013, Ghana stated that 308 were for trafficking offences and 120 for other criminal offences, while none were attributed to administrative violations. Similarly, Latvia reported 281 seizures for trafficking and 26 for other criminal offences. All the firearms seizures reported by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were for trafficking in the cases where the context was identified.

Given that the capabilities of law enforcement agencies are limited, it is reasonable to think that reported seizures are less than actual total trafficking. The total number of seizures appears to be related to the capacity of law enforcement agencies within a State. The total quantities of seized firearms, their parts and components and ammunition reported provide only a partial indication of the extent of illicit trafficking within a State. A reliable judgement of how much traf-

ficking is being caught cannot be made on the basis of the preliminary research in this Study.

C. Firearm seizures by population

In addition to the factors already noted, raw data on total reported firearms seizures (as shown above) must be treated with caution, especially when making comparisons, because they do not take into account the size of the population in which the seizure took place. Table 3 shows the annual and average firearms seizure rates, standardized by population (total seizures per 100,000 residents). Rates of firearms seized were obtained for a total of 31 States responding to this Study. Of those, 29 refer to seizures made by the police and two to seizures made by customs authorities. Averages are only shown for States that provided data over the whole of the four-year period. Rates were not calculated for States that provided aggregated data covering several years.

Colombia and Ghana had the highest and lowest reported average rates respectively over the four-year study period, 2010-2013. El Salvador had the highest reported rate for an individual year. Other States reporting particularly high rates for individual years were Finland, Iraq, Montenegro, Panama and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The States with the highest reported annual seizures by population are diverse, including States with active internal armed conflict and others without, States with high levels of reported crimes and organized crime presence, and others without. After Ghana, the states with the lowest reported annual seizures by population are Burkina Faso, Estonia, France, Latvia and Romania.

Tab. 3 Annual rates of firearms reported seized by police per 100,000 residents, 2010-2013, by country

State	2010	2011	2012	2013	Average 2010-2013
Argentina	4.6	6.1	23.3	10.2	11.1
Brazil			-	6.5	-
Burkina Faso	-	1.1	5.2	-	-
Chile	20.2	21.4	20.8	35.4	24.4
Colombia	96.0	80.7	81.6	79.1	84.3
Dominican Republic	11.0	9.3	12.3	6.9	9.9
Ecuador	3.4	30.2	33.4	23.8	22.7
El Salvador	77.8	71.2	122.7	-	-
Estonia	-	1.6	-	-	-
Finland	51.8	56.1	48.8	58.0	53.7

State	2010	2011	2012	2013	Average 2010-2013
France			-	1.3	-
Ghana	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.7	0.5
Guatemala	31.9	27.7	29.0	28.5	29.3
Iraq	35.4	54.3	36.1	-	-
Latvia	1.1	5.8	1.3	0.8	2.2
Lithuania	6.0	5.6	3.8	6.8	5.5
Mexico	30.0	35.4	22.0	7.2	23.7
Montenegro	61.3	73.1	51.3	66.0	62.9
Panama	52.6	80.5	51.4	45.8	57.6
Peru	13.1	9.1	4.7	7.7	8.7
Poland	5.9	4.1	4.8	4.1	4.7
Romania	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Serbia	-	7.0	13.2	-	-
Spain			-	3.8	-
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	35.8	8.9	5.1	5.3	13.8
Togo	-		3.1	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	28.9	31.9	32.1	31.2	31.0
Turkey			-	13.0	-
Uruguay			-	77.5	-

Source: UNODC. UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision

Table 4 presents annual and average rates of firearms seizures based on seizure counts submitted by customs/ border authorities in response to the annual seizures report questionnaire.

Tab. 4 Annual rates of firearms seized by customs per 100,000 residents, 2010-2013, by country

State	2010	2011	2012	2013	Average 2010-2013
Russian Federation	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.4
Sweden	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.6

Source: UNODC. UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision

An important question for further research is whether seizure totals are relatively stable as a proportion of population, something that could be clarified by national data over a longer period. The data made available for this Study shows great variations between States in seizures as a proportion of population. However,

it is difficult to draw conclusions as the data is drawn from a limited pool of respondents that are weighted toward small and medium-sized countries. Given the lack of response from many of the world's most populous countries in the questionnaire process, our understanding remains far from complete.

D. Type of seized firearms

Looking at the types of firearms reported seized provides an insight into the dangers they pose and the way in which they might be employed. These types are explained at greater length in Annex 1, Basics of firearms. The annual and significant seizures report questionnaires requested that States disaggregate their data on seizures into 10 categories of firearms: rifle, shotgun, short shotgun (or pistol), machine gun, sub-machine gun, revolver, pistol, combination gun, rudimentary gun and other. Other includes air, gas, black powder, ceremonial or antique firearms, as well as light weapons, as defined by State law or regulations. This category gave respondents the opportunity to describe such types of firearms and a number of countries used this option. All categories are described in Annex 1.

A total of 35 countries submitted quantitative information on the types of firearms seized by their national authorities. Of those, 34 provided data collected by the police and one provided data from customs authorities.

Some States also provided information on types of firearms in the significant seizures report questionnaire. For example, Estonia reported that there were seizures of 12 submachine guns in spring 2011. Ten of the seized guns had been manufactured in Austria, Czech Republic and Israel, and two were described as “home-made” (craft guns). The seizures reported by Estonia also included five barrels and other parts. Lithuania reported an incident in January 2011 in which two shotguns, two machine guns and two pistols were seized, along with 25 rounds of ammunition and four barrels.

Tables 5 and 6 show the types of firearms reported seized by police and customs authorities of some responding countries. As with other seizure reports, these data do not show total distribution in ownership or typical trafficking patterns. They cannot be used to extrapolate national distribution of various firearms types, such as handgun versus rifle ownership. They show only what was reported seized during the reporting period.

Tab. 5 Types of firearms reported seized by police, absolute counts, 2010-2013, by country

State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	Combination gun	-	-	1	3
	Machine gun	1	-	1	-
	Other	-	-	2	-
	Pistol	456	704	2 671	1 517
	Revolver	787	1 288	4 845	1 519
	Rifle	296	249	1 018	696
	Short shotgun	20	24	78	32
	Shotgun	311	234	943	449
	Sub-machine gun	1	3	9	2
Brazil	Combination gun		0		5
	Machine gun		177		45
	Other		1		-
	Pistol		9 483		3 073
	Revolver		24 062		7 888
	Rifle		1 160		413
	Rudimentary arms		11		3
	Short shotgun		705		28
	Shotgun		3 748		1 562
	Sub-machine gun		120		31
	Unspecified		0		1

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State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Chile	Combination gun	170	170	263	0
	Machine gun	0	4	4	6
	Other	0	0	0	63
	Pistol	506	669	589	887
	Revolver	1 106	1 113	1 068	1 855
	Rifle	40	43	45	172
	Rudimentary arms	231	323	349	529
	Short shotgun	0	0	0	0
	Shotgun	1 327	1 377	1 313	1 502
	Sub-machine gun	0	0	0	0
	Unspecified	0	0	0	0
Colombia	Machine gun (and sub-machine gun)	130	118	192	123
	Other	98	116	404	113
	Pistol	10 519	8 238	7 957	6 936
	Revolver	23 623	20 174	18 805	16 466
	Rifle (and carbine)	1 288	819	2 070	568
	Shotgun	8 914	8 522	9 475	9 940
Costa Rica¹	Pistol	3 103			
	Revolver	3 484			
	Rifle	596			
	Rudimentary arms	785			
	Shotgun	353			
Czech Republic²	Machine gun	1			
	Pistol	15			
	Rifle	10			
	Sub-machine gun	20			
Dominican Republic	Pistol	803	732	911	501
	Revolver	141	134	250	136
	Rudimentary arms	72	16	7	6
	Shotgun	80	66	98	70
Lithuania	Combination gun	2	-	-	2
	Machine gun	2	14	3	7
	Other	34	45	24	48
	Pistol	-	-	4	7
	Revolver	-	-	-	2
	Rifle	34	32	16	30
	Rudimentary arms	26	25	15	18
	Shotgun	74	47	46	72
	Sub-machine gun	-	1	-	1
Unspecified	11	6	7	11	

¹ Data collected from Ministry of Public Security

² Data related to organized groups, cases involving multiple criminal activities or foreigners


State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Mexico	Machine gun	100	77	75	23
	Pistol	9 664	9 966	6 305	2 236
	Revolver	2 961	3 230	1 853	506
	Rifle (and fusils)	13 826	16 490	13 573	9 457
	Shotgun	-	5 035	2 406	542
	Sub-machine gun	337	367	255	103
	Unspecified	3 363	5 130	3 563	1 600
Montenegro	Machine gun	21	19	11	22
	Pistol	195	273	145	162
	Revolver	11	10	14	12
	Rifle	22	24	30	53
	Shotgun	81	74	79	110
	Sub-machine gun	4	3	9	4
	Unspecified	15	24	3	15
Niger	Machine gun	1			
	Pistol	26			
	Rifle	101			
	Rudimentary arms	1			
	Sub-machine gun	4			
	Unspecified	80			
Panama	Machine gun	44	29	21	11
	Other	0	47	25	25
	Pistol	662	1 143	795	846
	Revolver	753	1 360	733	611
	Rifle	234	192	162	111
	Shotgun	243	240	186	137
	Unspecified	-	-	33	29
Peru	Other	9	13	7	3
	Pistol	681	637	624	777
	Revolver	1 017	880	616	1 107
	Rifle	145	81	49	101
	Rudimentary arms	1 562	760	2	98
	Shotgun	358	148	92	236
	Unspecified	48	183	26	30

Source: UNODC

Overall, handguns (pistols and revolvers) were the most frequently seized type of firearm reported. Such seizures were prevalent in the 21 Member States that reported data on seizures by police.²⁶ The largest total quantities of seizures of handguns (over 10,000 per year) were reported in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico. This may be indicative of the illicit acquisition of large quantities of firearms intended for personal protection or criminal violence. Conversely, in Finland, there were more seizures of shotguns and non-automatic rifles, which are the types of firearms commonly used for hunting and recreation.

Establishing sub-categories of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition is important in understanding the implications of certain seizures. It is difficult to draw conclusions from seizures of rifles without, for example, knowing whether they are automatic or semi-automatic (self-loading) firearms designed primarily for military use or single-shot (manually loaded) rifles usually intended for hunting and recreation (see Annex 1 for more on the design of firearms). The two examples below are illustrative of the importance of distinguishing the seized firearms by their type and their potential use.


Fig. 4 Types of firearms seized, absolute counts, Turkey, 2010-2013



Aggregated data for the period 2010-2012 show a prevalence of pistols being seized by Turkish authorities, while in 2013 rifles were the most frequently seized firearm. Overall, there was a 278 per cent increase in the amount of firearms seized in 2013 compared to

the 2010-2012 period (from 1,994 to 9,853 seizures). According to Turkish Government officials the swift change in the type of firearm seized and the surge in quantity are due “largely to the current security situation and turmoil across Turkey’s southern borders”.

Fig. 5 Types of firearms seized, absolute counts, Montenegro, 2010-2013



In 2010-2013, pistols were consistently seized more than any other firearm in Montenegro. The largest of the reported seizures in that period were reported in 2011. The year with the most seizures was 2013, in which pistols were the most frequently seized firearm, followed by shotguns and rifles.

Some State reports offer vital insights into the nature of the weapons seized. Burkina Faso, for example, reported that over the period 2011-2013 around 40 per cent of annual firearms seizures were of Kalashnikov-type rifles. Similarly, Niger reported that in 2013 50 per cent of seizures were of Kalashnikovs and 35 per cent were of G3 military-style rifles. In both these cases, the information provided suggests that seized rifles were predominantly military-style rather than firearms designed primarily for hunting or recreation. Greece also reported an abundance of rifles seized, along with pistols, sub-machine guns and revolvers. During the aggregate period 2010-2012, 50 per cent of firearms reported seized by Greek police were rifles.

²⁶ Handguns were the most common firearms seized in: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Guatemala, Kuwait, Latvia, Montenegro, Panama, Peru, Poland, Serbia, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

Tab. 5 Types of firearms reported seized by police, absolute counts, 2010-2013,, by country, continued

State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Ecuador	Combination gun	1	1	12	6
	Machine gun	5	7	6	9
	Pistol	44	203	432	310
	Revolver	385	3 698	3 053	2 323
	Rifle	3	6	17	25
	Rudimentary arms	11	323	814	212
	Shotgun	52	306	504	636
El Salvador	Machine gun	-	32	2	-
	Other	67	61	123	-
	Pistol	2 182	2 026	4 004	-
	Revolver	1 558	1 448	2 011	-
	Rifle	291	262	437	-
	Rudimentary arms	119	126	184	-
	Shotgun	559	473	878	-
	Sub-machine gun	20	-	36	-
Estonia	Other	-	5	-	-
	Pistol	-	4	-	-
	Revolver	-	2	-	-
	Sub-machine gun	-	10	-	-
Finland	Combination gun	30	22	18	29
	Machine gun	39	43	55	120
	Pistol	386	448	399	413
	Revolver	386	449	399	414
	Rifle	677	686	686	662
	Shotgun	677	770	570	612
France	Machine gun		4		14
	Other		187		109
	Pistol		111		222
	Revolver		72		60
	Short shotgun		133		259
	Sub-machine gun		19		7
	Unspecified		-		154
Germany	Machine gun		122		
	Other		18 049		
	Pistol		12 897		
	Revolver		3 107		
	Rifle		8 533		
	Rudimentary arms		140		
	Sub-machine gun		519		
	Unspecified		176		

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State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Ghana	Other	-	-	-	286
	Pistol	7	10	1	26
	Revolver	-	-	1	4
	Rifle	-	-	10	5
	Rudimentary arms	12	14	20	86
	Shotgun	5	4	41	21
Greece	Pistol	72			-
	Revolver	16			-
	Rifle	99			-
	Shotgun	3			-
	Sub-machine gun	9			-
Guatemala	Machine gun	23	4	1	2
	Other	143	143	138	150
	Pistol	2 737	2 375	2 695	2 914
	Revolver	805	703	766	744
	Rifle	158	137	74	56
	Rudimentary arms	273	253	285	297
	Shotgun	433	452	419	395
Iraq	Machine gun	467	605	677	-
	Pistol	1 444	1 443	1 459	-
	Rifle	9 016	15 158	9 624	-
	Shotgun	22	75	60	-
Kenya	Combination gun	0			
	Machine gun	14			
	Pistol	133			
	Revolver	29			
	Rifle	1 752			
	Rudimentary arms	163			
	Short shotgun	0			
	Shotgun	25			
	Sub-machine gun	18			
	Unspecified	0			
Poland	Machine gun	168	158	184	162
	Pistol	262	201	216	219
	Revolver	263	201	215	220
	Rifle	167	159	184	161
	Rudimentary arms	118	84	102	86
	Shotgun	168	158	184	161
	Sub-machine gun	37	47	17	23
	Unspecified	54	47	147	24

State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Romania	Other	79	69	78	75
	Pistol	1	3	2	-
	Revolver	2	1	-	-
	Rifle	5	4	-	6
	Short shotgun	-	1	-	1
	Shotgun	12	6	6	4
Saudi Arabia³	Other	-	-	108	
	Pistol	-	-	3 440	
	Revolver	-	-	324	
	Rifle	-	-	21 866	
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	1 185	
	Unspecified	-	-	9 698	
Serbia⁴	Other	-	33	-	-
	Pistol	-	223	-	-
	Revolver	-	222	-	-
	Rifle	-	190	-	-
Spain⁵	Machine gun	-	-	-	24
	Pistol	-	-	-	926
	Revolver	-	-	-	256
	Rifle	-	-	-	171
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	15
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	8
	Shotgun	-	-	-	378
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Machine gun	9	1	-	-
	Other	6	12	7	9
	Pistol	101	81	65	60
	Revolver	10	10	5	15
	Rifle	87	49	68	58
	Rudimentary arms	-	3	-	-
	Sub-machine gun	4	136	14	22
	Unspecified	1 062	22	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	Pistol	163	151	186	194
	Revolver	102	125	110	98
	Rifle	4	31	25	14
	Rudimentary arms	57	55	49	61
	Shotgun	51	53	51	37
	Sub-machine gun	7	7	7	11

³ Trafficked into Saudi Arabia. Reference period: 15 November 2012 - 03 April 2014

⁴ Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

⁵ Data from the National Police Corps, do not include the autonomous communities of Catalonia and the Basque Country


State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Turkey	Machine gun		6		3
	Other		-		52
	Pistol		1 769		190
	Revolver		22		417
	Rifle		197		7 587
	Shotgun		614		1 604
Uruguay	Pistol	-	-	-	557
	Revolver	-	-	-	1 211
	Rifle	-	-	-	398
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	15
	Shotgun	-	-	-	309
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	4
	Unspecified	-	-	-	146

Source: UNODC

Machine guns and sub-machine guns are fully automatic firearms usually used for military, policing or security roles. Machine guns fire rifle cartridges or larger cartridges and are destructive at relatively long ranges, while sub-machine guns are smaller, use pistol ammunition and are intended for short-range security (see Annex 1 for a full description). Seizures of both these kinds of firearms were comparatively rare overall. Some States did not report any seizures of either type of firearm during the four-year reporting period.²⁷ Several States reported fewer than 10 seizures per year of machine guns and sub-machine guns.²⁸

States that stand out with the highest total quantities of reported seizures of machine guns or sub-machine guns are Iraq with 1,749 machine guns reported seized during 2010-2012, Saudi Arabia with 1,185 sub-machine guns reported seized over a two-year period and Mexico with reported seizures of 1,102 sub-machine guns and 275 machine guns reported seized over the four year period. However, as shown in Figure 6 below, authorities from these three countries reported seizing far more rifles than any other firearm throughout the whole reporting period 2010-2013.

Fig. 6 Types of firearms reported seized by police, as percentage of the total, selected examples



²⁷ States that reported by type but did not report any seizures of machine guns or sub-machine guns are: Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ghana, Peru and Romania.

²⁸ The States that did not report more than 10 seizures of machine guns or sub-machine guns per year are Argentina, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Latvia, Niger, Turkey and Uruguay.

Swedish customs authorities provided a detailed breakdown by type of firearms seized by customs authorities, shown in Table 6, in response to the annual seizures report questionnaire. Sweden did not supply comparable data on seizures by its police or other law enforcement agencies.

Tab. 6 Types of firearms reported seized by customs, absolute counts, 2010-2013

State	Type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Sweden	Combination gun	-	-	-	-
	Machine gun	-	1	1	2
	Other	-	-	-	-
	Pistol	15	13	19	14
	Revolver	7	9	17	5
	Rifle	2	7	7	-
	Rudimentary arms	0	1	-	-
	Short shotgun	0	-	-	-
	Shotgun	0	4	-	-
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	4
	Unspecified	22	11	-	41

Source: UNODC

Rudimentary firearms (the term used in the UNDOC questionnaires, also commonly known as craft guns) are not produced in factories and may not, therefore, stand up to the standards of quality and reliability of factory-produced firearms. Rather they are usually low-cost weapons made in small quantities in workshops by artisans. For the purpose of this Study, the UNODC questionnaires defined rudimentary or craft arms as “artisanal, home-made firearms or any firearm that has been assembled using parts and components manufactured for another utility or belonging to other firearms”. The most common craft firearms are simple single-shot handguns or shotguns, often improvised from common materials such as pipe and springs. Many simple craft firearms need to be manually reloaded after every shot. Some are designed to be fired only once and then discarded. Others are made in small workshops and appear superficially identical to fully automatic military weapons.

Craft or rudimentary firearms are usually illegal and manufactured without proper licensing. Article 3 (d) of the Firearms Protocol defines illicit manufacturing as:


The manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and components, or ammunition:

- (i) From parts and components illicitly trafficked;
- (ii) Without a licence or authorisation from a competent authority of the State party where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or
- (iii) Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture, in accordance with article 8 of the Firearms Protocol. Licensing or authorisation of the manufacture of parts and components shall be in accordance with domestic law.

Only eighteen States reported seizures of craft or rudimentary firearms, and the majority of states that reported the type of firearms seized did not report any. In many of those States that did report seizures of rudimentary firearms, the proportion seized was low. In Brazil, Germany, Niger and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, seizures of craft or rudimentary firearms made up less than 1 per cent of all reported seizures. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, El Sal-

vador and Latvia, rudimentary firearms were less than 5 per cent of total reported seizures. Higher seizures of rudimentary firearms were found in Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Poland where they made up between 5 and 10 per cent of all seizures. As shown in Figure 7, the highest levels were reported in Ghana and Peru where they made up a reported 24 per cent each.

Fig. 7 Types of firearms reported seized by police, as percentage of the total, Ghana and Peru



E. Seizures of parts and components

The illicit trade in parts of firearms can be no less consequential than transfers of finished guns. More so than with firearms and ammunition, reports of seizures of parts are affected by a lack of standard definitions, which can make reports hard or impossible to compare.

UNODC received quantitative information on seizures of parts and components of firearms from a total of 22 countries. Of these, 20 reported data on seizures of parts made by police and two provided information from customs or border authorities. During the whole reporting period 2010-2013, police forces from the

reporting countries reported seizures of 28,320 parts and components of firearms (Table 7).


Parts and components may be used for the illicit manufacturing of firearms, to reactivate decommissioned or disarmed weapons or to increase the capability of existing firearms. Whole firearms can be made from by assembling illicitly trafficked, factory-made parts. Parts and components can also be used to repair and maintain illicitly acquired firearms.

Knowing what types of parts or components are involved is critical when evaluating the trade of parts. Some parts and components are essential to the working of

a firearm, for example the lower receiver (or frame), which holds the moving parts in a gun (usually the trigger mechanism and bolt). Other parts can be added to increase the capability of a working firearm, such as large capacity magazines, optical sights or a silencer.

The types of parts seized were reported by 11 respondent States. For example, Turkey reported seizures of 194 firearms barrels, 4 receivers, 16 bolts, 1,583 magazines, one silencer and 1,559 pistol grips over the years 2010-2012.

Fig. 8 Types of parts and components reported seized by police, as percentage of the total, Turkey and Greece



Seizures reported by Greece for the period 2010-2012 included 137 gun barrels, 32 receivers, 243 bolts, 98 breech blocks, 260 magazines, 9 telescopic scopes, one silencer and 93 stocks. Over the years 2010-2013, Germany reported seizure of 89 gun barrels, 63 bolts and 338 silencers.

Overall, the numbers of reported seizures of parts appear to have been lower than seizures of complete firearms or ammunition. However, total numbers of reported seizures of parts of firearms must be considered carefully, taking into account differing definitions. In some countries, a lower receiver may qualify as a firearm, the same as a complete gun, while in others it qualifies as a part.

Eight states reported annual seizures of fewer than 100 parts. Ghana, for example, reported the seizure of just one part in 2011 and in 2012. Higher levels were recorded by Chile, which reported the seizure of 5,441 firearms parts in 2010. These included 1,106 gun barrels, 3,229 receivers and 1,106 cylinders (the rotating part of a revolver). At this point, it is impossible to determine whether these reported differences are due to variations in actual trafficking, differences in law, regulation and enforcement practices or differences in definitions of firearms and their parts.

Tab. 7 Parts and components of firearms reported seized by police, absolute counts, 2010-13

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	2	4	7	-
Chile	5 441	18	11	205
El Salvador	29	330	0	-
Estonia	-	27	-	-
France	-			236
Germany	490			
Ghana	2	1	17	1
Greece	873			-
Iraq	585	193	221	-
Latvia	0	107	9	0
Lithuania	-	-	-	7
Mexico	98	106	38	15
Niger	-	-	68	-
Peru	21	30	37	21
Poland	606	485	1 001	367
Sweden	-	-	11	19
Trinidad and Tobago	-	11	-	-
Turkey	3 357			933

Source: UNODC

Table 8 shows data on seizures data of parts and components of firearms submitted by customs or border authorities in response to the annual seizures report questionnaire.

Tab. 8 Parts and components of firearms reported seized by customs, absolute counts, 2010-2013

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Russian Federation	2	30	105	51
Sweden	-	-	11	19

Source: UNODC

F. Seizures of firearms ammunition

Without ammunition, firearms are virtually harmless. Cognisant of this, the Study asked Member States to also report on their seizures of firearms ammunition. Thirty-three responded to the UNODC questionnaires with data on firearms cartridges or rounds of ammunition seized during the reporting period by their authorities. Like firearms seizures, the majority of reported ammunition seizures were made by police. Of the reporting States, 31 referred to seizures by police and two to seizures by customs or border authorities. The police forces collectively reported seizing 22,985,213 rounds of ammunition. The total ammunition reported by customs authorities (for just two countries) amounted to 133,958 cartridges.

Table 9 and 10 show the comparable responses to the annual seizures report questionnaire indicating the reported annual ammunition seizures by police and customs authorities.

The largest ammunition seizures reported by any single country were reported by Mexico, which stated that almost 12 million rounds were seized in the period 2010-2013. Mexican authorities also reported high quantities of seized firearms (see Table 1 above). Ghana and Mexico reported seizing over a million rounds in a single year, with over 1 million rounds seized every year in 2010-2013 and over 4 million in 2011 alone.

Many states seized much smaller total quantities, but reported apparently impressive fluctuations in ammunition seizures from year to year. There are striking variations in the quantities of ammunition seized between different States. For example, Ghana reported seizing 200 cartridges in 2011, followed by 3,888,618 rounds in 2012. The lowest reported annual seizure was of one round, reported by Lithuania for 2011. Other responding countries in Europe reported much higher total annual ammunition seizures, for example 556,064 rounds by France in 2013, and 1,538,479 rounds in Germany over the whole four-year period. The existence of these fluctuations and variations may be an important discovery, but existing data does not help in identifying the cause of such changes.

Tab. 9 Rounds of ammunition reported seized by police, absolute counts, 2010-2013, by country

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil		203 718		62 912
Chile	7 030	9 330	28 482	386 448
Colombia		-		851 414
Ecuador	22 253	3 301	309 522	399 845
El Salvador	353	277	167	-
Estonia	-	766	-	-
France		17 102		556 064
Germany		1 538 479		
Ghana	1 732	200	3 888 618	1 607
Greece		14 208		-
Guatemala	-	-	-	12 239
Iraq	470 728	293 006	467 240	-
Kenya		104		
Kuwait		746		1 826
Latvia	961	3 275	4 349	1 088
Lithuania	-	1	18	359
Mexico	3 442 020	4 163 577	3 107 903	1 273 571
Montenegro	8 666	4 292	2 361	25 819
Niger	-	-	3 309	-

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Poland	4 851	1 860	136 131	90 810
Romania	-	6 438	292	-
Serbia	-	-	9 456	-
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	17 918	3 778	8 682	10 773
Trinidad and Tobago	4 883	8 578	8 823	27 103
Turkey	302 145			751 406

Source: UNODC.

Fig. 9 Examples of trends in firearms ammunition reported seized by police, Ghana and Latvia, absolute counts, 2010-2013




Table 10 only includes data on rounds of ammunition seized by customs and border authorities, submitted in response to the annual seizures report questionnaire.

Tab. 10 Ammunition seized by customs, absolute counts, 2010-2013

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Russian Federation	15 379	2 212	1 630	106 246
Sweden	343	2 580	2 500	3 068

Source: UNODC

G. Conclusion: a basis for better policy-making

The seizures reports supplied by Member States to UNODC for this study give a sense of the scale and dimensions of illicit trafficking in firearms. The reports also reveal the great differences between countries and fluctuations in officially reported seizures within countries from year to year. Seizures appear to be a revealing measure of unlawful activity involving firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. They may also point to the differing national problems and law enforcement capabilities. The reported totals seem also to be significantly affected by the agency responsible for reporting the seizures – i.e. national police versus customs agencies.

Other key findings include:

- The information collected from 45 States shows large differences in the levels of reported seizures from country to country, with some countries reporting dozens and others tens of thousands of seized firearms per year.
- An important finding is the volatility of annual firearms and ammunition seizures reports within individual countries from year to year, with some countries reporting exponential variations from one year to the next. Further investigation is required in order to determine to what extent the differences and variations identified are due to different reporting practices or to the different trafficking situations in each country. In either case, reporting differences point to the need for more standardized and comprehensive reporting of seizures in order to form a basis for better policy-making.
- Among the 35 Member States that reported breakdowns by type of seized firearm, the most commonly reported types seized were handguns, constituting 53 per cent of reported seizures. Rifles made up 25 per cent and shotguns 12 per cent of reported seizures.

While the preliminary data on seizures examined here reveal much about seized firearms and issues such as trafficking, they also point to the importance of further international data collection and independent evaluation. Scientific correlation between seizures reports and other indicators, such as total firearms holdings, crime rates, homicide, suicide and state stability, will benefit greatly from increased participation by more States. While a general sense of scale and typical variations can already be determined, the implications for policy-making will be clearer once data has been collected over a longer period and there are more comprehensive seizures reports and background information about the legal context of seizures. Seizures reports set the stage for novel insights into transnational trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, as examined in the following chapter.



CHAPTER THREE

INSIGHTS INTO TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS

Illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition has for long been a major concern for the international community and was fully recognized by the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action on Small Arms in 2001.

While the importance of illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and the need for effective action is universally accepted, the overall scale and trends in trafficking often remain elusive. Specific aspects of trafficking, especially major examples and cases, have been studied extensively. As a result, the forms of illicit trafficking are better known than general trends and relative dimensions. The evidence put forward in this Study offers a systematic, review of general trends and processes in transnational trafficking in firearms based upon official data. Such a review is expected to support the refining of international priorities for policy and action to combat illicit trade.

A. What is illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition?

The Firearms Protocol defines Illicit trafficking as:
... the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition from or across the territory of

one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol. (art. 3 (e))

Under article 10 of the Firearms Protocol, States parties are required to establish or maintain “an effective system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as of measures on international transit, for the transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition”. The criminalization of cross-border transfers of firearms that have not been authorized by Governments is called for in article 5.²⁹ As a preventative measure to help minimize trafficking, the Firearms Protocol requires in article 3 (d) that the manufacturing of firearms should be authorized by governments, making any unauthorized manufacturing illicit.

The Protocol clearly defines illicit trafficking in firearms – that is the international transfer of firearms without government authorization - as a criminal offence. Similar definitions can be found in other international agreements.³⁰ Not all international agreements on firearms explicitly define illicit trafficking. Most prominently, the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms does not include a definition of illicit trade. Also other regional agreements and documents, although created to prevent and combat the

²⁹ The Firearms Protocol contains an exception for state-to-state transfers. For the purposes of this Study, it is assumed that such transfers (as long as proper procedures have been followed) are also authorized transfers.

³⁰ Definitions of illicit trafficking are contained, for example, in the 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, the 2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region, and the 2000 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

illicit trade in small arms, do not contain a clear definition of trafficking,³¹ leaving it to Member State's discretion to decide on their enforcement through domestic laws and regulations, such as export licensing, governing the international trade in firearms and their ammunition.

In fact, in order to be effective, implementation of all international legal instruments and agreements on firearms control requires domestic enforcement through internal laws and regulations, including criminalization provisions, as required by the instruments and deemed appropriate by each Member State. The importance of domestic law and regulations is also recognized in the Firearms Protocol, which, in line with paragraph 3, article 34 of the Organized Crime Convention, provides for States parties to adopt more strict or severe measures to combat illicit trafficking and punish domestic offences.³²

How Member States incorporate the provisions contained in these instruments can, therefore, vary considerably from country to country. One option is, for example, to include domestic transfers in the national definition of illicit trafficking in firearms like Australia and Uruguay, which both include illicit internal transfers in their criminal law on trafficking in firearms. Many governments have laws or regulations concerning the licensing or registration of firearms in civilian possession, with comparable implications for trafficking. Under such regulations, an internal transfer of unregistered firearms could be defined as illicit trafficking by national authorities, although it might not be recognized as transnational trafficking.

Given that domestic law and regulations often cover domestic transactions, it is likely that some definitions of illicit trafficking used by countries responding to this Study have wider coverage than the definition contained in the Firearms Protocol. Some other countries may have different or narrower definitions of illicit trafficking. Others still may not have even established it as a criminal offence and may treat such conduct as a form of contraband. For the sake of consistency, this Study focuses on the internationally agreed, narrower category of transnational trafficking as defined in the Firearms Protocol.

B. From seizures to trafficking

Data on seizures, reviewed in the previous chapter, are a vital indicator for measuring the magnitude and

trends in problems related to trafficking in firearms. However, data on seizures need to be used carefully, since only a proportion of all trafficked firearms and ammunition are reported to have been seized, and many of those seizures are associated not with transnational trafficking, but with purely domestic illicit transfers or other illicit activities. Firearms and ammunition involved in violent crime, for example, may have been illicitly acquired and subsequently seized by authorities, but not transnationally trafficked.

The data on seizures reported by Member States, reviewed in the previous chapter, form the basis for the analysis of transnational trafficking presented in this chapter. Further insights come from the quantitative and qualitative responses of Member States specifically regarding aspects of trafficking. UNODC asked Member States to provide quantitative and qualitative information on their seizures of firearms and aspects related to trafficking in the two questionnaires. Data specifically on trafficking were obtained from the following indicators:

- Domestic and international tracing of seized firearms
- Trafficking routes
- Modus operandi and modes of transportation
- Offences associated with reported seizures
- Country of nationality of identified traffickers

Of the 39 Member States that provided detailed information about their seizures, as reported in the previous chapter, a total of 30 States also provided quantitative information related to trafficking in firearms for at least one year in the period 2010-2013. Of those 30, five were from Africa, 14 from Europe, 11 from Latin America and the Caribbean and none from other regions. Table 11 shows the responses to questions related to trafficking in firearms in the annual seizures report questionnaire, as provided by responding countries.

The analysis included in the present chapter is based on the information provided by responding States. Therefore, the reporting of (third) countries or citizenships, as identified by responding States to this Study, does not imply any form of endorsement of the information received by UNODC. Additionally, third countries mentioned in this Study were not requested to validate the information submitted to UNODC. As such, the information related to routes and firearms traffickers ought to be deemed only as reflective of the experience of responding States.

³¹ See for example the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1), the 2002 Council of the European Union Joint Action of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP (2002/589/CFSP), the 2006 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms And Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the 2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

³² This is consistent with paragraph 3 article 34 of the Organized Crime Convention, which establishes that "each State Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those provided for by this Convention for preventing and combating transnational organized crime". See Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 487.

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Tab. 11 Data reporting on trafficking in firearms, by country, 2010-2013

Reporting Government (2010-2013) ¹	Routes						Transportation mode air / land / sea / mail	Traffickers		Related offence	Tracing Non registered / registered in another country / registered in country / unknown	Int'l cooperation ²
	country of manufacture		country of departure		country of destination			X	%			
	X	%	X	%	X	%						
Argentina											•	
Benin	•		•		•		•	•				
Brazil	•	•	•		•	•	•		•	•	•	•
Burkina Faso							•			•		
Chile										•	•	
Czech Republic		•			•		•		•	•	•	•
Dominican Republic ³										•		
Ecuador		•		•		•	•		•	•		•
El Salvador	•		•				•		•	•	•	•
Estonia		•		•		•	•		•	•	•	•
Finland			•		•							
Germany										•		
Ghana		•		•		•	•		•	•		
Greece								•		•		
Guatemala		•		•			•		•	•	•	
Latvia		•		•		•	•			•	•	
Lithuania ⁴				•			•		•	•	•	•
Mexico				•		•	•					•
Montenegro			•		•		•	•		•	•	•
Netherlands	•		•						•	•	•	•
Nigeria ⁵	•		•		•		•	•		•	•	
Peru	•		•		•		•					
Romania		•		•		•	•		•	•	•	•
Spain		•					•		•	•		•
Sweden							•					
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							•		•	•	•	
Trinidad and Tobago		•		•		•			•	•	•	•
Turkey	•						•		•	•	•	
Uruguay		•								•		
Zimbabwe ⁶	•									•		

Source: UNODC

¹ Reference period: Benin (not specified); Brazil (2010-2012/2013); Czech Republic (2010-2013); Estonia (2011); Germany (2010-2013); Greece (2010-2012); Spain, The Netherlands, Uruguay (2013); Turkey (2010-2012/2013)

² Questions: Countries from which your country has received tracing requests / Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests / Countries which have cooperated with your country / Countries with which your country have cooperated

³ Related offences were only provided in response to the Significant Seizure Questionnaire

⁴ Tracing information was only provided in response to the Significant Seizure Questionnaire

⁵ Routes, transportation mode, traffickers, related offences, and tracing were only provided in response to the Significant Seizure Questionnaire

⁶ Country of manufacture and related offences were only provided in response to the Significant Seizure Questionnaire

The reports of these countries form the most comprehensive source of insights into aspects of trafficking, but they are not always strictly comparable. In a few cases, the reports summarized in Table 11 draw upon answers provided only in country responses to the significant seizures report questionnaire. Such reports only refer to specific instances of seizures. They do not reveal the full scale of reports for an entire reporting year. Some authorities submitted information for only one reference year. Others only provided aggregated data rather than examples of specific trafficking seizures.

Although the majority of reporting countries submitted disaggregated information for the entire 2010-2013 reporting period, not all sections of the annual seizures report questionnaire could always be fully completed; some countries reported on different years when responding to different questions. These variations make it difficult to make direct comparisons between responding countries and complicate efforts to extrapolate globalized conclusions. They point to the potential need to repeat the questionnaire process and modify the questionnaires.

A more detailed picture of country responses to individual questions on the annual seizures report questionnaire is shown below in Table 12.

For at least one single year or more during 2010-2013, a total of 23 countries provided qualitative information in the form of descriptive reports in response to open questions in the annual seizures report questionnaire on trafficking groups, trends, routes and modus operandi in their respective territories.

A select group of countries, listed in Table 2, provided qualitative information related to trafficking trends. Details on trafficking groups, and routes or modus operandi were provided by 18 of these countries.

Country responses to the annual seizures report questionnaire reveal general trends on five dimensions of transnational trafficking corresponding to the indicators identified in the previous section. They are presented in the remainder of this chapter.

Tab. 12 Qualitative reporting on trafficking, 2010-2013

Reporting Government (2010-2013) ¹	Trafficking groups	Trafficking trends	Trafficking routes and MO
Argentina	•	•	•
Brazil	•	•	•
Chile	•	•	
Czech Republic	•	•	•
Dominican Republic		•	•
Ecuador	•	•	•
Estonia	•	•	•
Finland	•	•	•
Germany		•	•
Ghana	•	•	•
Greece	•	•	•
Guatemala		•	
Latvia		•	
Mexico	•	•	•
Montenegro	•	•	•
Netherlands		•	
Nigeria	•	•	
Peru	•	•	•
Romania	•	•	•
Spain	•	•	•
Sweden	•	•	•
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	•	•	•
Trinidad and Tobago	•	•	•

Source: UNODC

¹ Reference period: Brazil (2010-2012/2013); Czech Republic (2010-2013); Estonia (2011); Germany (2010-2013); Greece (2010-2012); Spain, The Netherlands (2013)

C. Domestic and international cooperation in tracing

Tracing of firearms is valued as a source of evidence for prosecution of trafficking and other offences, as well as a source of information for analysing and combating the routes used by firearms traffickers. Some of the insights provided by countries to this Study and presented in this chapter are the result of tracing of firearms.

In order to summarize major findings from international cooperation in the tracing of firearms, responding States were asked to provide UNODC with information regarding the five leading States in terms of their tracing efforts, including:

- The State from which the responding State received tracing requests
- The State to which the responding State sent tracing requests
- States that have cooperated with the responding State, and
- States with which the responding state has cooperated.

Box 2 Tracing of firearms: a tool against trafficking

Whenever national authorities seize a firearm on their territory, national authorities can attempt to trace its origin regardless of the reason for the seizure. Tracing firearms is a systematic process that involves tracking the movement of a firearm via unique markings and government registers from its manufacture to when it was seized or otherwise came into the possession of law enforcement agencies.

Tracing is often facilitated via the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (or iARMS) run by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) that enables information exchange and cooperation between law enforcement agencies international transfers of illicit firearms, and licit firearms that have been involved in crimes.³³ UN Member States have also agreed upon common definitions, standards and practices (especially concerning marking firearms, record keeping and tracing) in the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.³⁴

The first step in the tracing process is usually conducted domestically, by checking for possible records on the seized firearm in national registries. When the domestic tracing of a firearm suspected to have been trafficked yields negative results, the following step would be to search for the origins of the seized firearms abroad.

International tracing usually requires some form of international cooperation as it involves at least two countries. Law enforcement personnel in the country where the firearm is seized usually make a tracing request to foreign Governments (such as the country of manufacture) in order to obtain information about the firearm's movements (such as via lawful export). Successful international tracing can help verify the licit or illicit origin of seized weapons and sometimes establish routes of trafficking, including the country of manufacture, departure and even the intended destination.

Definition of tracing

The Firearms Protocol defines tracing as “the systematic tracking of firearms and, where possible, their parts, components and ammunition) from manufacturer to purchaser for the and components and ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of assisting the competent authorities of States Parties in detecting, investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking” (art. 3 (f)).

³³ For more information on iARMS see: <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms/INTERPOL-Illicit-Arms-Records-and-tracing-Management-System-iARMS>

³⁴ For more information see: <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx>

A total of 12 Member States submitted information on international cooperation in tracing in their responses to the annual seizures report questionnaire. Most of them provided information related to the four above-mentioned categories of cooperation. For example, Brazil informed this Study of collaborative tracing within and outside its region through the International Criminal Police Or-

ganization (INTERPOL), including tracing requests involving neighbouring States in South America, as well as further afield in Europe and the United States of America.

In Table 13 the leading States for tracing requests are listed alphabetically rather than in order of the number of tracing requests.

Tab. 13 Summary of reported international requests for tracing of firearms, 2010-2013

State	Cooperation requests	Country (2010-2013)
Brazil	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Argentina, Germany, Guyana
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Argentina, Austria, Eastern European countries, Paraguay, United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Argentina (INTERPOL), Austria (INTERPOL), Paraguay, Paraguay (INTERPOL), Uruguay, Uruguay (INTERPOL), United States
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Germany, Guyana, United States
Czech Republic	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Germany, Netherlands, Slovakia
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Germany, Slovakia
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Germany, Netherlands, Slovakia
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Germany, Netherlands, Slovakia
Ecuador	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Colombia, Peru
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Colombia, Peru
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Colombia, Peru
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Colombia, Peru
El Salvador	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Costa Rica, Nicaragua, United States
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, United States
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
Estonia	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Lithuania
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Lithuania
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Lithuania
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Lithuania

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State	Cooperation requests	Country (2010-2013)
Lithuania	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Croatia, France, Poland, Russian Federation, United States
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Finland, Germany, Israel, United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Spain
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Czech Republic, France, Germany
Mexico	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	United States
Montenegro	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo ¹ , Serbia
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Not available
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Not available
Netherlands	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	None
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Belgium, Germany, Spain, United States
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Unknown
Romania	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Brazil, Colombia, France, Hungary, Russian Federation, Serbia, United States
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	France, Germany, Italy
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Bulgaria
Spain	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Belgium, Colombia, Portugal, Romania, Ukraine
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	Belgium, Germany, Morocco, United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	Belgium, Germany, United States
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
Trinidad and Tobago	Countries from which your country has received tracing requests	Austria, Brazil, Italy, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
	Countries to which your country has sent tracing requests	United States
	Countries which have cooperated with your country	United States
	Countries with which your country has cooperated	United States

Source: UNODC

¹ All references to Kosovo in the present publication should be understood to be in compliance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

Although the limited amount of available information makes it impossible to establish unambiguous conclusions or global principles, it generally seems that states cooperate most in tracing requests with other countries in the same region. This tendency appears to reflect the nature of trafficking, rather than just official policy in terms of responding to requests. For example, during the whole reporting period, Ecuador reported having cooperated exclusively with Colombia and Peru. The Czech Republic and Montenegro also reported having cooperated exclusively with countries or territories from their own regions. This corresponds with findings, presented later, which suggest that trafficking tends to happen mostly between bordering States and within a single region.

Many States also reported tracing cooperation in cases of trafficking in firearms with authorities beyond the home region of the reporting country. Such reports were received from, inter alia, Lithuania (which reported tracing cooperation in trafficking cases with Israel and the United States of America), Romania (with Brazil and the United States of America), Spain (with Colombia) and Trinidad and Tobago (with Austria, Italy and the United States of America).

D. Routes, modus operandi, and identity of firearms traffickers

Combating transnational trafficking largely means preventing or intercepting questionable transfers. The mandate for this Study calls for the examination of the nature of and routes used in trafficking in firearms. As with any other trafficking phenomenon, the covert nature of the illicit trade makes discovery of the routes used a difficult task, but this is vital for its suppression. Fortunately, the law enforcement experience of the many countries involved in the effort to combat the illicit trade means considerable data and experience are available for evaluation. This Study makes that data available for analysis.

The annual seizures report questionnaire circulated among Member States for this Study requested information on four categories of information outlining the context of seized firearms: the place of origin of a trafficked shipment, the country of manufacture, the country of departure and their intended destination. Together these four categories provide a basic geographical guide to trafficking routes. Several States also provided qualitative information on trafficking routes.

The trafficking routes identified by State authorities for this Study were largely revealed through some form of tra-

cing.³⁵ Eighteen responding States indicated one or more countries of manufacture of the firearms they seized and 11 of those reported figures as percentages. One or more source or departure countries were reported by 17 responding States, 11 of which included percentages. Fourteen responding States indicated the intended destination of the seized firearms and 8 of those reported percentages.

Origins of seized firearms

Governments provided information to this Study on the origin of seized firearms, including information from tracing requests, physical examinations of the firearms and checks by official registries of production, import or export. Aggregated information was requested in four categories, covering the number of:

- Firearms registered in the country in which they were manufactured or to which they were lawfully imported or in which the seizure took place.
- Firearms registered in another country from which the seizure took place.
- Unregistered firearms, such as those illicitly manufactured, without a serial number or other manufacturing identification.
- Unknown firearms for which it was impossible to establish whether the seized firearms had been registered. For example, the firearm might have been manufactured before mandatory registration.

Information on the origin of firearms illuminates the routes used by traffickers. It shows what proportion of seized firearms had previously been registered (following manufacture or lawful import) outside the country where the seizure took place, which might suggest that the firearm was illicitly trafficked. Information provided by responding States on total numbers of seized firearms is presented in Table 14. Four Governments reported the percentage of seized firearms.

Tables 14 and 15 contain a diverse range of responses, suggesting different trafficking contexts in each reporting country. For example, Chile, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported that all their seized firearms had been “registered in country”, and presumably obtained prior to seizure domestically, rather than trafficked across the border. A very different tendency was shown by the Czech Republic and El Salvador, where all reported seizures involved firearms that were

³⁵ The Study has not further inquired how countries engaged in tracing, whether through direct bilateral contacts among competent firearms control authorities, their respective diplomatic channels or other international or regional cooperation mechanisms, such as, inter alia, INTERPOL or the European Police Office.

“not registered”. Romania, on the other hand, reported that all the seized firearms were of unknown provenance. Other States reported more diverse profiles for their traced firearms, coming from several different categories.

As an example of data provided as percentages, Brazil reported that 82 per cent of the firearms seized in 2013 had been registered in the country, while only 15 per cent were registered in another country. This suggests

that the main source of reported seized weapons in Brazil was domestic rather than international trafficking.

At the opposite end of the spectrum was the Netherlands where 75 per cent of firearms seized in 2013 were not registered in the country. Authorities of the Netherlands indicated to this Study that the principle sources of these guns were Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain and countries in the Balkans.

Tab. 14 Origin of reported seized firearms, 2010-2013

State	Origin of seized firearms	2010	2011	2012	2013
Chile	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	3 460	3 699	3 631	3 258
	Unknown	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	Not registered	644	1 734	1 508	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	-	-	-	-
	Unknown	-	-	-	-
Estonia	Not registered	-	4	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	-	-	-	-
	Unknown	-	17	-	-
Guatemala	Not registered	1 258	1 313	978	1 167
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	3 547	3 678	3 142	3 810
	Unknown	1 258	1 313	978	1 167
Latvia	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	-	-	-	-
	Unknown	-	1	-	2
Montenegro	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	178	263	144	130
	Unknown	-	-	-	-
Romania	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	-	-	-	-
	Unknown	99	84	86	86
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	-	-	-	185
	Unknown	-	-	-	-


State	Origin of seized firearms	2010	2011	2012	2013
Trinidad and Tobago	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	95	16	41	22
	Registered in country	7	1	1	0
	Unknown	280	408	378	397
Turkey	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	-
	Registered in country	-	-	-	2
	Unknown	-	2	-	-

Source: UNODC

Another variation of trafficking was found in Montenegro, which reported that it is not usually a source or destination country, but rather a transit route for smuggled firearms originating and going elsewhere. Montenegro also reported that firearms traffickers in the country were usually involved primarily in drug trafficking, but also smuggled firearms either to protect their business or opportunistically. One significant trafficking case reported by Montenegro involved residents of Montenegro who were found to have organized the smuggling of arms and explosives from Bosnia and Herzegovina to France and the Netherlands, with the intention of exchanging them for cocaine and synthetic drugs.

Different routes within a particular country may be associated with different points of departure outside of it. For example, as shown in Map 2, Romanian authorities stated that the main documented origin of trafficking in firearms into the country was Bulgaria, via buses and private vehicles crossing the shared border between the towns of Varna and Vama Veche, Ruse and Giurgiu, Silistra, Calafat and Corabia (indicated by arrows on the map). In the response from Romania, firearms being trafficked into the country from France, Germany, Italy and Spain were reported to have been transported through a different set of points at the border with Hungary, namely at Bors, Nădlac, and Cenad (indicated by arrows on the map).

Map 2 Firearm border crossing points reported by Romanian authorities



Source: UNODC, data from the Annual Seizure Questionnaire

Map Source: United Nations Cartographic Section

Tab. 15 Origin of seized firearms, in per cent, 2010-2013

State	Origin of seized firearms	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	Not registered	-	-	-	-
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	20
	Registered in country	-	-	-	80
	Unknown	-	-	-	-
Brazil	Not registered	-			-
	Registered in another country	5			15
	Registered in country	80			82
	Unknown	15			3
Czech Republic	Not registered	100			
	Registered in another country	0			
	Registered in country	0			
	Unknown	0			
Netherlands	Not registered	-	-	-	0
	Registered in another country	-	-	-	75
	Registered in country	-	-	-	25
	Unknown	-	-	-	0


Source: UNODC

Two cases of traced firearms

The following examples show the percentage of seized firearms that were successfully identified and, whenever possible, traced back to the country of manufacture in Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil during 2013. They indicate two quite different realities in the respective countries. As previously noted, the majority of firearms reported to this Study as having been seized and traced by national authorities in Brazil were found to have been registered in the territory (82 per cent). This is the result of two possible scenarios: a) the firearms

had been manufactured in Brazil; b) the firearms were last registered in the country. In either case, it should be possible to verify such information against national registries, if any, so as to allow national authorities to identify whether the country suffers from a domestic proliferation of firearms (e.g. high diversion rates etc.) rather than from external threats. Only 15 per cent of firearms seized in Brazil were registered in another country, whereas very few had unknown origins.

Fig. 10 Amount of seized firearms identified and, whenever possible, traced back to the country of manufacture, 2013 or latest available year



In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, only 5 per cent of the firearms reported seized by authorities in 2013 were previously registered in the country, meaning that they had been legally imported or transferred into the country prior to their seizure. Ninety-five per cent of the seized firearms appear to have unknown or foreign origin. The former would normally refer to firearms that have been illicitly manufactured or assembled with illicit parts and components, therefore showing no sign of traditional identifiers or marking and thereby making their traceability by national authorities virtually impossible. The latter could be indicative of firearms that have been manufactured in a foreign country and subsequently trafficked to the reporting country.

Country of manufacture

A country of manufacture is the place where firearms, their parts and components or ammunition originally were produced. This can be very different from the place from which a trafficked shipment originated. Determining the place of manufacture is usually based on a physical examination of the shipment. Factory-made firearms are usually marked, as required by law or regulations, with symbols, branding and serial numbers to show where and, sometimes, when they were made.

Identifying the country of manufacture is a vital step towards tracing the place of origin of a seized firearm.

Often the country of manufacture is the same as the place of origin for trafficking. Nevertheless, the country of manufacture should not be automatically assumed to be the place of origin of a trafficked shipment, which may involve firearms previously traded legally and, sometimes, repeatedly.

Tables 16 and 17 show the most frequently identified countries of manufacture of seized firearms and ammunition. Table 16 shows the proportion of trafficked firearms from each country identified as a place of manufacture, while Table 17 summarizes reporting countries that provided lists of countries of manufacture, but not the relative proportions of each.

Several countries reported that the most common country of manufacture was the same as the country where the seizure took place. Brazil reported that some 87 per cent of seized firearms originated domestically, while the Czech Republic reported this was true for 95 per cent of seizures. Spain reported that 99 per cent of seized trafficked firearms had been domestically manufactured. Brazil further noted that its large manufacturing industry and large civilian market were a source of illicit arms. Germany reported an “influx” of firearms previously owned by State security services in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, including deactivated firearms that had since been reactivated. In addition, Germany reported trafficking in gas-powered guns that had been converted to fire explosive ammunition.

Tab. 16 Reported countries of manufacture of seized firearms and ammunition, in per cent, 2010-2013

State where seizure occurred	Country of manufacture	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	Argentina	Firearms		1.3		-
	Austria	Firearms		0.7		0.9
	Brazil	Firearms		87.7		86.7
	Italy	Firearms		1.1		1.1
	Not Informed	Firearms		-		3.3
	Uruguay	Firearms			4.6	4.6
Czech republic	Czech Republic	Ammunition		95.0		
		Firearms		95.0		
	Former Soviet Union countries	Ammunition			5.0	
		Firearms			3.0	
	Former Yugoslavia	Firearms			2.0	

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State where seizure occurred	Country of manufacture	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Ecuador	Belgium	Firearms	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Ammunition	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Brazil	Firearms	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
	Czech Republic	Ammunition	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Ecuador	Ammunition	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
		Firearms	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0
	Italy	Firearms	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
	Peru	Ammunition	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
	Spain	Ammunition	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
United States	Firearms	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	
Estonia	Austria	Firearms	-	4.0	-	-
	Czech Republic	Ammunition	-	26.0	-	-
		Firearms	-	23.0	-	-
	Germany	Ammunition	-	9.0	-	-
	Israel	Firearms	-	19.0	-	-
	Italy	Firearms	-	4.0	-	-
	Russian Federation	Ammunition	-	52.0	-	-
		Firearms	-	23.0	-	-
United States	Ammunition	-	6.0	-	-	
Ghana	Brazil	Firearms	-	-	2.6	0.2
	Germany	Firearms	-	-	-	5.0
	Ghana	Firearms	50.0	50.0	27.0	20.0
	Italy	Firearms	-	4.0	-	0.7
	Russian Federation	Ammunition	-	-	100	
		Firearms	8.0	-	40.0	3.0

Source: UNODC

An important source of illicit firearms in some regions is domestic craft production, which is predominant in some States. For example, 60 per cent of the firearms reported seized in Ecuador, were domestically made craft firearms. In Peru, craft firearms accounted for 40 per cent of all seized firearms. Ghana reported that 100 per cent of ammunition and 50 per cent of firearms seized in 2012 were manufactured domestically (Ghana has no formal nationally licensed firearms industry).

Tab. 16 Reported countries of manufacture of seized firearms and ammunition in per cent, 2010-2013, continued

State where seizure occurred	Country of manufacture	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Guatemala	Argentina	Firearms	26.0	23.0	23.0	23.0
	Czech Republic	Firearms	-	14.0	-	16.0
	Israel	Firearms	23.0	24.0	24.0	24.0
	Korea	Firearms	17.0	-	16.0	-
	Turkey	Firearms	17.0	17.0	16.0	17.0
	United States	Firearms	17.0	22.0	21.0	20.0
Latvia	Germany	Firearms	-	-	-	100
	Unknown	Ammunition	-	-	-	100
Romania	Bulgaria	Firearms	-	-	-	4.65
	Czech Republic	Firearms	-	2.4	-	-
	Germany	Firearms	11.11	9.5	4.2	14.0
	Italy	Firearms	15.2	7.1	9.3	3.5
	Portugal	Firearms	-	-	4.16	-
	Spain	Firearms	12.1	17.9	14.0	23.3
	Turkey	Firearms	37.4	34.5	48.8	30.2
	United States	Firearms	3.0	-	-	-
Spain	Austria	Firearms	-	-	-	0.3
	Germany	Firearms	-	-	-	0.07
	Italy	Firearms	-	-	-	0.13
	Spain	Firearms	-	-	-	99.45
	United States	Firearms	-	-	-	0.05
Trinidad and Tobago	Austria	Ammunition	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
		Firearms	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Brazil	Ammunition	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
		Firearms	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
	Italy	Ammunition	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
		Firearms	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
	United States	Ammunition	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
		Firearms	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Ammunition	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
		Firearms	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Uruguay	Argentina	Firearms	-	-	-	13.0
	Brazil	Firearms	-	-	-	7.6
	Germany	Firearms	-	-	-	1.2
	Spain	Firearms	-	-	-	1.3
	United States	Firearms	-	-	-	5.5

Source: UNODC

Other countries' reports illustrated more distinctive trafficking routes, sometimes reflecting their particular laws and regulations. Authorities in Finland reported that the main sources of reported illegal firearms were burglaries, thefts and reactivation of previously neutralized weapons. Reactivated firearms

are reportedly becoming more common in Finland, especially old firearms decommissioned by the Finnish defence forces. Under previous legislation, deactivated machine guns, military rifles, sub-machine guns and pistols are available to the public and reportedly not difficult to reactivate.

Box 3 Re-activated firearms

Firearms are deactivated (also known as decommissioned) when they are modified so that they cannot be used to fire ammunition. Deactivated firearms may be owned by museums or private collectors, or even used in film or theatre productions. Article 9 of the Firearms Protocol sets out standards for the deactivation of firearms. In particular, deactivation should be verified, certificated and involve essential parts of the firearm being rendered permanently inoperable, in such a way that they cannot be removed, replaced or repaired. Such standards are necessary to ensure that deactivation cannot be reversed – in which firearms are re-activated so that they can be used once again to fire live ammunition. However, inadequate deactivation means that the firearm can be re-activated, and this has been highlighted as a problem by States that responded to this Study.

Quantitative information on reactivated firearms was not requested in the questionnaires used by this Study. In qualitative responses several States reported that they perceived a problem with deactivated firearms, especially those that had been subsequently re-activated.

Germany reported that there had been “been some seizures of formerly deactivated war weapons, which were converted into firearms (for example former machine guns pre-owned by army or authorities from countries of the former Yugoslavia).”

The Czech Republic reported a current trend as being the “reactivation of deactivated weapons, including operations enabling the fully-automatic function of the reactivated firearms”.

Estonia reported the re-activation of the deactivated firearms as being a rising trend because of the considerable profit to be made and a lack of the common EU rules (which facilitate the criminal activities). It stated that “The deactivated firearms are mainly purchased, transported, reactivated and sold to the black-market within the EU and Schengen area. Mainly the firearms are transported in small quantities by vehicles.”

Finland mentioned that, “reactivation of deactivated firearms has become more common; the markets are flooded with the Finnish Defence Forces' old deactivated machine guns, rapid-fire rifles, submachine guns and military rifles and pistols, which do not require a license.” Finland stated that earlier, now superseded, legislation had been a problem, “a significant number of firearms deactivated according to the older more lenient legislation have been available in the market, these firearms have been rather easy to reactivate due to the rather insignificant deactivation measures stipulated by the former law. With the new legislation this has been changed, and newly deactivated firearms are not a relevant threat anymore.”

Finland reported that illicit traffickers had transferred deactivated firearms. It stated that people connected to Estonian organized crime groups had “purchased deactivated firearms and their parts from Finland; these purchases have been found in Estonia. Deactivated firearms have also been transported to Russia.”

Tab. 17 Reported countries of manufacture of seized firearms and ammunition, without quantity or percentage, 2010-2013

Location of the seizure	Country of manufacture	Category	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	Brazil	Ammunition		X		-
	China	Ammunition		X		-
	Mexico	Ammunition		X		-
	Russian Federation	Ammunition		X		-
	United States	Ammunition		X		-
El Salvador	Argentina	Firearms	X	X	X	-
	Brazil	Firearms	X	X	X	-
	United States	Firearms	X	X	X	-
Netherlands	Austria	Firearms		X		-
	Belgium	Firearms		X		-
	Bulgaria	Firearms	-	-	-	-
	Czech Republic	Firearms		X		-
	Former Yugoslavia	Firearms		X		-
	Germany	Firearms		X		-
Turkey	Austria	Firearms		X		X
	France	Ammunition		X		-
		Firearms		X		-
	Germany	Firearms		X		-
	Hungary	Firearms		X		-
	Lebanon	Ammunition	-	-	-	X
		Firearms	-	-	-	X
	Syrian Arab Republic	Ammunition		X		X
		Firearms		X		X
	Turkey	Ammunition	-	-	-	X
Firearms		-	-	-	X	
United States	Ammunition		X		-	

Source: UNODC

Country of departure

The country of departure (or source country) of trafficked firearms, their parts and components or ammunition is the last place where the firearm or other trafficked items can be identified as being under lawful authority and is the location from which the illicit cross-border trafficking route originated. Fourteen states provided information to the annual seizures report questionnaire on the country of departure of seized firearms.

Table 18 includes percentages of countries of departure as reported by responding authorities during the reference period. Table 19 only lists identified countries, without proportions. The tables show that the most commonly

reported trafficking route was between two countries sharing a common border. Trafficking between two or more countries in the same region but which do not share a common border was also frequently reported.

An example of this is the Netherlands, which identified other European countries as the leading countries of departure for trafficked firearms seized by its authorities, including: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Intraregional trafficking routes were illustrated by Latvian authorities, which reported encountering weapons and ammunition originating from the Netherlands, transiting through Lithuania and destined for Latvia. Similarly, Estonia reported Germany as the source of 60 per cent of seized firearms.

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Tab. 18 Reported country of departure of seized firearms and ammunition, in per cent, 2010-2013

Reporting State	Country of departure	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Ecuador	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Ammunition	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
	Ecuador	Ammunition	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
		Firearms	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
	Peru	Ammunition	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
		Firearms	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
Estonia	Germany Unknown	Firearms	-	60.0	-	-
		Firearms	-	40.0	-	-
Ghana	Côte d'Ivoire	Firearms	-	-	0.0	-
		Ammunition	-	-	12.8	-
	Germany	Firearms	-	-	-	5.0
	Ghana	Ammunition	-	-	100	-
		Firearms	-	-	37.2	-
Guatemala	Argentina	Firearms	26.0	23.0	23.0	23.0
	Czech Republic	Firearms	-	14.0	-	16.0
	Israel	Firearms	23.0	24.0	24.0	24.0
	Republic of Korea	Firearms	17.0	-	16.0	-
	Turkey	Firearms	17.0	17.0	16.0	17.0
	United States	Firearms	17.0	22.0	21.0	20.0
Latvia	Netherlands	Ammunition	-	-	-	100
		Firearms	-	-	-	100
Lithuania	Belarus	Firearms	-	-	100	-
Mexico	Belize	Ammunition	-	1.4	-	-
	Canada	Ammunition	3.9	-	-	-
		Firearms	2.9	-	-	-
	Costa Rica	Ammunition	-	1.4	-	-
		Firearms	2.9	2.9	-	-
	Cuba	Ammunition	2.0	-	-	-
	Guatemala	Ammunition	2.0	-	-	10.5
		Firearms	5.7	-	-	10.0
	Italy	Firearms	-	2.9	.	.
	Mexico	Ammunition	33.3	18.9	28.8	21.1
		Firearms	40.0	23.5	45.2	30.0
	Turkey	Firearms	-	2.9	-	-
	United States	Ammunition	58.8	78.4	71.2	68.4
Types of firearms		48.6	67.7	54.8	60.0	

Reporting State	Country of departure	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Romania	Bulgaria	Firearms	39.4	40.5	51.2	29.1
	France	Firearms	1.0	-	-	-
	Germany	Firearms	4.04	3.57	3.5	5.8
	Hungary	Firearms	2.0	-	-	-
	Italy	Firearms	4.0	7.1	10.4	12.8
	Moldova	Firearms	-	4.8	-	-
	Portugal	Firearms	-	-	2.32	2.3
	Spain	Firearms	-	17.9	10.41	25.6
Trinidad and Tobago	Brazil	Ammunition	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
		Firearms	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Dominican Republic	Ammunition	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
		Firearms	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
	Mexico	Ammunition	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
		Firearms	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
	United States	Ammunition	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0
		Firearms	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Ammunition	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
		Firearms	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0

Source: UNODC

Trafficking from one region to another was also reported, but less often. Examples were reported of trafficking in firearms from the United States of America to Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, from Europe to Africa and the Americas, and from Asia to Central America. Reports provided by authorities in Guatemala noted trafficking routes connecting their country to South Korea and Turkey. Ghana reported that some firearms (5 per cent of its total) were trafficked from Germany in 2013.

There were several reports from national authorities of firearms being illicitly trafficked from the United States of America, especially to destinations in Cent-

ral and South America and the Caribbean. Brazil reported an example of a criminal group discovered by the federal police, trafficking firearms from Miami in containers of furniture belonging to Brazilian citizens moving from the United States to Brazil. The traffickers hid inside mattresses Romanian, Hungarian and Chinese Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and ammunition that had been purchased in the United States. After Brazil sent a tracing request to the United States, an investigation resulted in successful prosecutions in both countries. Brazilian authorities specifically stated that the information obtained by tracing firearms to their country of departure facilitated further interdiction of trafficking in firearms.

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Tab. 19 Reported countries of departure of seized firearms and ammunition, without quantity or percentage, 2010-2013

Reporting State	Country of departure	Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Brazil	Argentina	Firearms		X		-	
	Bolivia	Firearms		X		-	
	Brazil	Ammunition		X		-	
	China	Ammunition		X		-	
	Mexico	Ammunition		X		-	
	Paraguay	Firearms		X		-	
	Russian Federation	Ammunition		X		-	
	United States	Ammunition			X		-
		Firearms			X		-
Uruguay	Firearms		X		-		
El Salvador	Guatemala	Ammunition	X	X	X	-	
		Firearms	X	X	X	-	
	Honduras	Ammunition	X	X	X	-	
		Firearms	X	X	X	-	
Finland	European Union members	Ammunition	X	X	X	X	
		Firearms	X	X	X	X	
	United States	Ammunition	X	X	X	X	
		Firearms	X	X	X	X	
Montenegro	Albania	Ammunition	X	X	X	X	
		Firearms	X	X	X	X	
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ammunition	X	X	X	X	
		Firearms	X	X	X	X	
	Kosovo	Ammunition	X	X	X	X	
		Firearms	X	X	X	X	
	Serbia	Ammunition	X	X	X	X	
		Firearms	X	X	X	X	
Netherlands	Austria	Firearms		X		-	
	Belgium	Firearms		X		-	
	Former Yugoslavia	Firearms		X		-	
	Germany	Firearms		X		-	
	Spain	Firearms		X		-	

Source: UNODC

Intended destination

The intended destination is the country to which traffickers meant for the firearms, parts or ammunition to go at the moment when the seizure took place. Determining the expected destination can be tricky, especially when trafficking seizures occur in transit countries. The countries of destination reported for this Study seem to have been determined by intercepting authorities, which may have made estimates or approximations.

Tables 20 and 21 show the most frequently identified State of intended destination for seized firearms and

ammunition. Table 20 shows the proportion of illicit transfers believed to be intended for each State identified as the intended destination. Table 21 summarizes the reporting States that did not provide percentages. In several cases, States pointed to themselves as the intended destination of illicit trafficking in firearms. In particular, this was the case for Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico in Latin America, for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Turkey in Europe, and for Ghana in West Africa.

Tab. 20 Reported countries of intended destination for seized firearms and ammunition, in per cent, 2010-2013

State where the seizure occurred	Intended destination	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	Brazil	Ammunition	100			100
		Firearms	100			100
Ecuador	Colombia	Ammunition	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
		Firearms	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.
	Ecuador	Ammunition	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
		Firearms	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
	El Salvador	Ammunition	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
		Firearms	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
	Mexico	Ammunition	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
		Firearms	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Nicaragua	Ammunition	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	
	Firearms	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	
Estonia	Estonia	Firearms	-	70.0	-	-
	Lithuania	Ammunition	-	90.0	-	-
		Firearms	-	30.0	-	-
Estonia	Ghana	Ammunition	-	-	-	100
		Firearms	1.0	100	63.0	100
	Nigeria	Firearms	-	-	37.2	-
Latvia	Latvia	Ammunition	-	-	-	100
		Firearms	-	-	-	100

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State where the seizure occurred	Intended destination	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Mexico	Brazil	Firearms	-	2.9	-	-
	Costa Rica	Firearms	-	2.9	-	-
	Mexico	Ammunition	96.1	98.7	97.0	100
		Firearms	97.1	88.2	97.3	100
	Nicaragua	Firearms	-	2.9	-	-
	Peru	Ammunition	-	-	1.5	-
		Firearms	-	-	2.4	-
	Spain	Ammunition	2.0	-	-	-
	United States	Ammunition	2.0	1.4	1.5	-
Firearms		2.8	2.9	-	-	
Romania	Greece	Firearms	-	-	-	1.16
	Moldova	Firearms	6.1	-	-	18.6
	Romania	Firearms	93.9	91.7	96.5	80.2
Trinidad and Tobago	Guyana	Ammunition	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
		Types of firearms	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
	Jamaica	Ammunition	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0
		Firearms	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0
	Saint Lucia	Ammunition	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
		Firearms	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Ammunition	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
		Firearms	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0

Source: UNODC

Illustrating not only the complexity of trafficking processes, but also the ability of law enforcement agencies to identify countries of origin, Swedish customs authorities reported on the specific mechanisms used to traffic firearms into their country. Among the routes they reported was via postal and parcel delivery services. They reported several seizures of packages from the United States of America and others from European Union member States, such as Germany and the Czech Republic.

Another path highlighted by Swedish customs authorities involved firearms produced in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which were the most

common firearms reported seized in Sweden. These appear mostly to have been smuggled in vehicles driven from the western Balkans, trafficked largely by Swedish citizens with roots in the region. Swedish customs authorities reported that they rarely seized large quantities of firearms (more than 10 at the same time). Most often their seizures are associated with an armed individual crossing the border.

An example of the complexity of trafficking came from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where reporting authorities describe their own country as a source, transit and destination country of trafficking in firearms (see case study below).

Tab. 21 Reported countries of intended destination for seized firearms and ammunition, without quantity or percentage, 2010-2013

State where the seizure occurred	Intended destination	Category	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	Guyana	Firearms		X		-
Czech Republic	Czech Republic	Ammunition		X		-
		Firearms		X		-
	Germany	Ammunition		X		-
		Firearms		X		-
	Netherlands	Ammunition		X		-
		Firearms		X		-
Finland	Finland	Ammunition	X	X	X	X
		Firearms	X	X	X	X
Montenegro	Albania	Ammunition	X	X	X	X
		Firearms	X	X	X	X
	Croatia	Ammunition	X	X	X	X
		Firearms	X	X	X	X
	Kosovo	Ammunition	X	X	X	X
		Firearms	X	X	X	X
	Serbia	Ammunition	X	X	X	X
		Firearms	X	X	X	X
	Slovenia	Ammunition	X	X	X	X
		Firearms	X	X	X	X

Source: UNODC

Selected country summaries

Illustrative examples of the kind of aggregated information about trafficking reported by state authorities in the Annual Seizure Questionnaire are provided in the pie charts in figures 11 to 14 for Ecuador, Estonia, Ghana and Romania. These examples were chosen for their detail as well as to provide regional balance and illustra-

te a wide range of phenomena. Each figure shows the main trafficking connections for each State, including the countries of manufacture, departure and intended destination of trafficked firearms, countries of departure, with the percentage share for each of those countries as identified in the responses to the questionnaire.

Box 4 Case study of intraregional trafficking: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

National authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported that their State is simultaneously a country of origin, transit and destination of trafficking in firearms. Their reports show that the country does not face one single trafficking problem, but a diverse range of challenges related to transnational trafficking in firearms.


Origin: In the course of 2012, authorities identified a new trend in the illegal trade of firearms and ammunition involving legal entities. Companies registered in compliance with domestic law and regulations appeared to engage in illegal sales of firearms and ammunition, but were found to be falsifying documentation, such as through false declarations of theft, in order to facilitate illicit exports.

Transit: Around the same time, firearms and explosives also were detected entering the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from neighbouring countries, most often from Albania, Kosovo and Serbia. Firearms in transit through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia bound for Albania were identified, as were firearms in transit from Albania. They were reportedly intended to be resold in the country or trafficked towards other areas in the Balkans, Greece and Scandinavia.

The complexity of trafficking patterns was exemplified by a reported seizure at a border crossing with Bulgaria. In this case, a vehicle traced to Albania and reportedly bound for Crete, was found to be carrying eight automatic rifles, 4,747 rifle cartridges, one pistol, eight pistol cartridges, 20 detonators for explosives, seven wooden stocks and 20 hand grenades.

Destination: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is also a destination country for traffickers from the region. A specific form of trafficking was identified for converted firearms. Authorities reported the trafficking of gas or signal pistols initially purchased abroad and subsequently converted in the country to fire explosive ammunition. The converted firearms then sell within the country for €100-€150 each or are trafficked to other European countries where they are sold for approximately €300-€500.


Fig. 11 Trafficking routes identified by reporting authorities, Ecuador



Most of the firearms reported seized by Ecuadorian authorities in 2013 (Figure 11) also were manufactured in Ecuador (80 per cent). Most of the firearms identified as departing from Ecuadorian traffickers were reportedly destined for Ecuadorian territory (60 per cent) or to neighbouring Peru (40 per cent). Similarly, 60 per cent of reported illicit firearms transfers were destined for the internal Ecuadorian market and would remain in the country, while 30 per cent were destined for Colombia, Ecuador’s northern neighbour. Intended destinations further afield, such as El Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua, were also identified.

Estonia (Figure 12) was the intended destination of 70 per cent of the illicit firearms seized by Estonian authorities in 2011. Trafficking to Estonia appears to be dominated by one major country of origin - Germany. 60 per cent of trafficked firearms seized by Estonian police reportedly departed from Germany. However, the country of departure is not the same as the country of manufacture. Most firearms reported seized in Estonia were manufactured not in Germany, but in the Czech Republic, Israel or the Russian Federation.


Fig. 12 Trafficking routes identified by reporting authorities, Estonia



Although located in a very different region, Ghana reported somewhat similar trafficking patterns, but with some important differences. During 2012, Ghanaian authorities mostly seized firearms manufactured in the Russian Federation (40 per cent) and Ghana (27 per cent). The latter were rudimentary or craft guns, which are the only kind manufactured in Ghana.

Ghana is also the main intended destination of firearms reported seized in the country (63 per cent), followed by a substantial proportion reportedly in transit to Nigeria (37 per cent). As a result, Togo and Benin are likely to be the two transit countries for firearms moving by land from Ghana to Nigeria.


Fig. 13 Trafficking routes identified by reporting authorities, Ghana



A different dynamic can be seen in Romania, where an even higher portion of trafficked firearms are believed to be intended for the domestic market. Of all firearms reported seized by Romanian authorities, over 80 per cent were destined for Romania, while 18 per cent were destined for Italy.

However, like the other examples cited, most firearms seized in Romania departed from elsewhere in Europe, with Bulgaria as the main departure country (over 29 per cent of total seizures). The intraregional movement of seized firearms is also confirmed by manufacturing countries identified by Romanian authorities, with Turkey accounting for 30 per cent.

Fig. 14 Trafficking routes identified by reporting authorities, Romania



Means of transportation and modus operandi

How do trafficked firearms, their parts and components and ammunition reach their destinations? The annual seizures report questionnaire provided four options to report the identified means of transportation of firearms that had been seized: air, land, sea and by mail. Twenty states submitted percentages of identified means of transportation of firearms trafficked into their territories. Similarly, qualitative information on the modus operandi of traffickers was submitted by authorities in 18 countries.

Land was the most frequently mentioned shipping route. During the whole reporting period, eight countries – Brazil, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Estonia, Montenegro, Latvia, and Lithuania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – reported that firearms were exclusively seized while being transported by land. This

appears to be a common pattern. Except for the five instances listed below in Table 22, Mexico and Turkey seized firearms and ammunition that had primarily been transported by land. For all available years, Romania and Ecuador mostly registered seizures that had been transported by land (86 per cent and 85 per cent respectively), while the rest were intercepted from mail.

The means of transportation and modus operandi of firearms trafficking appears to borrow much from other trafficking processes. Montenegro reported to this study that:

Firearms are smuggled to a large extent via the same smuggling routes used to smuggle drugs, often by the same actors transporting other illegal goods or migrants. Firearms are usually smuggled by hiding them in other cargoes that are legally transported or in smaller quantities by hiding them in private vehicles.

Tab. 22 Proportion of reported seizures by means of transportation, in per cent, 2010-2013

State	Transportation	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	LAND	Ammunition	100			100
		Firearms	100			100
Burkina Faso	LAND	Firearms	-	100	100	100
Czech Republic	LAND	Ammunition	100			
		Firearms	100			
Ecuador	AIR	Ammunition	3	3	3	3
		Firearms	3	3	3	3
	LAND	Ammunition	85	85	85	85
		Firearms	85	85	85	85
	MAIL	Ammunition	4	4	4	4
		Firearms	4	4	4	4
SEA	Ammunition	8	8	8	8	
	Firearms	8	8	8	8	
El Salvador	LAND	Ammunition	100	100	100	-
		Firearms	100	100	100	-
Estonia	LAND	Ammunition	-	100	-	-
		Firearms	-	100	-	-
Ghana	AIR	Ammunition	38.9	69.5	0.0	22.2
		Firearms	29.1	25.0	2.6	0.5
	LAND	Ammunition	-	-	100	-
		Firearms	-	-	50	-
	SEA	Ammunition	-	25.0	0.0	65.3
		Firearms	8.3	21.4	3.9	71.3
Latvia	LAND	Ammunition	-	-	-	100
		Firearms	-	-	-	100
Lithuania	LAND	Firearms	-	-	100	-

Source: UNODC

Trinidad and Tobago reported to this study that:

Firearms, their parts and components and ammunition are mostly smuggled into the country via small fishing vessels along with other contraband items. This country has large areas of unprotected coastline and numerous small fishing ports which enable this type of trafficking. To a lesser extent, firearms, their parts and components and ammunition are also smuggled into the country through commercial air and sea ports, where they are concealed in, inter alia, household appliances.

Ghana reported that “most traffickers conceal their arms, especially pistols, in compartments of vehicles imported into the country”. Furthermore, “some of the firearms seized were concealed in shipped consignments, some were concealed in sacks of cola nuts, while others were concealed in a [...] soft drink truck with a hidden compartment”.

Tab. 22 Proportion of reported seizures by means of transportation, in per cent, 2010-2013, continued

State	Transportation	Category (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Mexico	AIR	Ammunition	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1
		Firearms	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
	LAND	Ammunition	99.6	99.8	99.9	99.9
		Firearms	99.8	97.5	99.9	99.8
	SEA	Ammunition	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Firearms	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.2
Montenegro	LAND	Ammunition	100	100	100	100
		Firearms	100	100	100	100
Romania	AIR	Firearms	-	1	2	2
	LAND	Firearms	98	79	82	84
	MAIL	Firearms	1	4	1	-
Spain	LAND	Ammunition	-	-	-	100
		Firearms	-	-	-	100
Sweden	AIR	Firearms	3	0	2	4
	LAND	Ammunition	100	-	-	-
		Firearms	33	48	10	41
	MAIL	Firearms	38	32	67	39
	SEA	Firearms	14	20	7	16
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	LAND	Firearms	100	100	100	100

Source: UNODC

Tab. 23 Reported seizures by means of transportation, absolute counts, 2010-2013

State	Transportation	Category	2010	2011	2012	2013
Guatemala	AIR	Firearms	1 991	2 176	1 791	2 293
	LAND	Firearms	295	275	252	277
	MAIL	Firearms	3	3	4	4
	SEA	Firearms	438	446	449	496
Turkey	AIR	Ammunition	5			2
		Firearms	3			-
	LAND	Ammunition	186 164			24 817
		Firearms	1 390			941
	SEA	Ammunition	3			2
		Firearms	3			5

Source: UNODC

Offences associated with seized firearms

Sometimes, the type or category of firearms seized on a State's territory is specified in the information on the offences/violations associated with such seizures. However, it is difficult to compare the use of criminal charges, because of the different ways of categorizing offences and national legal frameworks. Several states did try to provide useful information in this regard. As part of the annual seizures report questionnaire, authorities were asked to specify the five most frequent offences associated with seized firearms, selecting from a drop down list. Twenty-four countries indicated at least three offences associated with firearm seizures. However, three of those countries only reported on specific seizures examples in the significant seizures report questionnaire, which is why Table 24 only includes responses from 19 Member States. Their responses are listed according to their ranking of the reported offences on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means the most frequent and 5 the least frequent.

Firearms seizures and offences directly related to trafficking in firearms do not always go hand in hand. As shown in Table 24, a large proportion of the reported offences were related to drug trafficking, smuggling or participation in organized crime, rather than directly to trafficking in firearms. However, specific offences related to illicit carrying, possession or manufacturing of firearms were listed by many countries. Homicide and robbery were also frequently mentioned in connect to firearms seizures. It may be that trafficking in firearms is not consistently emphasized as a criminal offence in cases involving seized firearms, possibly because law enforcement focuses on more serious offences, such as drug trafficking or violent acts.

In qualitative responses, several reporting States emphasized that trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition was usually associated with groups specializing in other crimes, particularly drug trafficking. For example, Mexico reported that illicit trafficking in firearms is linked primarily with drug trafficking and groups often acquire firearms to protect their drug shipments. Spanish authorities reported that firearms trafficking “usually is linked to other crimes such as drug trafficking and robbery with violence or intimidation”. Romanian officials reported that there hadn't been any documented cases of groups committing crimes only related to firearms. Instead, firearms illegally possessed through trafficking were “used in spontaneous incidents or in connection with other crimes such as poaching”. Similarly, Sweden stated that:

We have, nationally and in international cooperation, looked hard and long for groups specialized in the trafficking in firearms. We have not found such groups. Where criminal networks have been active, they have been generally involved in smuggling, most often of narcotics. Trafficking in firearms has been a supplementary activity to trafficking in narcotics.

Tab. 24 Most frequent offences reportedly associated with seized firearms, 2013 (or latest available year)

	Carrying without licence	Contraband/smuggling	Customs violations	Drug trafficking	Falsifying the marking on firearms	Homicide	Illicit manufacturing of firearms	Illicit possession	Illicit trafficking in firearms	Illicit use	Other	Participation in organised crime group	Possession for the purpose of illicit trafficking	Robbery	Terrorist offences	Theft
Brazil	2	-	-	3	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	1	-	-
Burkina Faso	5	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	4	-	1	-	2	-	-
Chile*	3	-	-	-	6	-	5	1	-	2	-	-	4	-	-	-
Czech Republic***	-	5	-	-	4	-	2	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	4	2	-	-	-
El Salvador*	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Estonia**	-	-	3	-	-	-	4	2	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
Germany***	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	3	5	1	-	-	-	2	-	-
Greece***	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	2	4	-
Guatemala	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	3	-	4
Latvia	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Montenegro	-	-	-	2	-	3	-	1	-	-	5	4	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	3	-	4	-	-	-	5	-	-
Romania	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	5	3	2	1	-	-
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	5	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

Source: UNODC

* Data presented for 2012.

** Data presented for 2011.

*** Data presented are aggregated over several years.

Although its reporting used a slightly different scale and is therefore not included in Table 24, Trinidad and Tobago reported a similar link between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking. The country stated that trafficking in firearms was mainly carried out by criminal gangs predominantly involved in the importation and sale of illegal narcotics. Furthermore, the country said that while most of the narcotics were further trafficked to Europe and North America, firearms remained in this country and were used by criminal gangs in turf wars, armed robberies and other firearms-related crimes.

Estonia, on the other hand, emphasized that some criminal gangs did focus on trafficking in firearms. It stated that criminal groups focused on illicit firearms trafficking were transnational, multi-ethnic and focused mainly on firearms. Similarly, Brazil said that although many times criminal groups sent firearms together with drugs in their illicit shipments, there were groups mainly dedicated to firearms trafficking.

Citizenship of firearms traffickers

The findings from the Study appear to show that trafficking in firearms is largely a home-grown business. According to the responses from Member States, most traffickers reported to have been apprehended were locals, not foreigners.

As part of the annual seizures report questionnaire, responding States were asked to list the 10 most common citizenships reported in incidents of trafficking in firearms in their country. UNODC received quantitative responses from a total of 18 countries. Of those, 16 reported identifying at least one foreign trafficker (Table 25), the others reported that all those accused were nationals of the countries. Other States provided qualitative or interpretive responses relating to trafficking groups.

Of the 18 countries that reported the citizenship of accused firearms traffickers, 12 noted at least some of their own nationals among them (Table 25). In most of those countries, the majority of the accused were nationals, while only a minority had foreign citizenship. For example, Greece reported that the majority of people involved in trafficking in firearms in Greece are Greek. Similarly, Spain noted that the predominant nationality in organized groups detected in its country was Spanish (some 82 per cent). Ghana also noted that traffickers were usually Ghanaians who did not operate as a group but smuggled firearms individually with the purpose of selling them illegally. States like Ecuador and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which both reported a minority of traffickers who were nationals of their countries, show that a preponderance of foreign traffickers is not unknown (Table 25 and Table 26).

Tab. 25 Accused firearms traffickers identified as citizens of the seizing country, in per cent, 2010-2013

State	2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil		90		90
Czech Republic		75		
Ecuador	30	30	30	30
El Salvador	100	98.3	98.9	-
Estonia	-	70	-	-
Ghana	95.0	83.3	36.4	80
Guatemala	99	99	99	99
Lithuania	100	100	100	100
Romania	76.8	88.1	69.8	77.9
Spain	-	-	-	82
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	38.7	42.9	55.8	46.0
Turkey		90		77

Source: UNODC

Among firearms traffickers identified as foreign citizens, the majority are from neighbouring countries and countries in the same region (Table 25). For example, Finland reported that traffickers connected to organized crime in Estonia had purchased firearms and parts in Finland. Estonian authorities reported that most of the identified firearms traffickers were Estonian citizens (70 per cent), followed by citizens of the Russian Federation (20 per cent) and Lithuania (10 per cent).

Brazil reported that most of the traffickers were Brazilian, supported by Paraguayans, who crossed

the border by car, trucks and buses, as well as in little boats in a part of the border divided by the Paraná river and Itaipu Lake. In 2013, 90 per cent of traffickers identified by Brazilian authorities were citizens of Brazil. Much smaller proportions came from the neighbouring Plurinational State of Bolivia and Paraguay. A total 77 per cent of traffickers apprehended by Turkish authorities in 2013 reportedly were from Turkey. The second largest share was from the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic (14 per cent).

Tab. 26 Accused firearms traffickers identified as citizens of foreign countries, 2010-2013

Responding state	Traffickers from neighbouring States	Traffickers from other regional States	Traffickers from outside the region
Benin	Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	-
	Togo	Ghana	-
	Nigeria	-	-
Brazil	Argentina	United States	-
	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	-	-
	Colombia	-	-
	Paraguay	-	-
	Uruguay	-	-
Czech Republic	Slovakia	Albania	-
	Poland	Netherlands	-
	-	Ukraine	-
Ecuador	Colombia	Mexico	-
	Peru	-	-
El Salvador	Guatemala	United States	-
	Honduras	Mexico	-
	-	Nicaragua	-
	-	Panama	-
Estonia	Russian Federation	Lithuania	-
Ghana*	-	Nigeria	-
	-	-	-
Greece	Bulgaria	Germany	United States
	-	Russian Federation	Canada
	-	-	Australia


CHAPTER THREE: INSIGHTS INTO FIREARMS TRAFFICKING

Responding state	Traffickers from neighbouring States	Traffickers from other regional States	Traffickers from outside the region
Guatemala	El Salvador	Colombia	Germany
	Honduras	Ecuador	China
	Mexico	United States	France
	-	Guatemala	Italy
	-	Nicaragua	Republic of Korea
	-	Uruguay	-
	-	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	-
Montenegro	Albania	Slovenia	-
	Bosnia	-	-
	Croatia	-	-
	Kosovo	-	-
	Serbia	-	-
Netherlands	Belgium	-	Turkey
	Germany	-	United States
	-	-	Morocco
Romania	Moldova	France	-
	-	Italy	-
	-	Spain	-
Spain	Portugal	Romania	Morocco
	-	United Kingdom	Ecuador
	-	Bulgaria	Colombia
	-	-	Dominican Republic
	-	-	China
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	Albania	-	-
	Serbia	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	-	Dominican Republic	United Kingdom
	-	Guyana	United States
	-	Haiti	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Source: UNODC

* State responses included a category of 'others' without further explanation.

Fig. 15 Citizenship of identified traffickers, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2011



For the reference year 2011, citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania accounted for 83 per cent of all identified individuals in connection to seized firearms. Traffickers are often criminals wanted under criminal charges for murder or accused of being involved in more traditional organized crime, such as trafficking in persons or drug trafficking.

Fig. 16 Citizenship of identified traffickers, Estonia, 2011

Estonian authorities reported that identified firearms traffickers were predominantly nationals. Estonian citizens accounted for 70 per cent of identified traffickers, followed by citizens of the Russian Federation (20 per cent) and Lithuania (10 per cent).






Fig. 17 Citizenship of identified traffickers, Brazil, 2013



In 2013, a remarkable 90 per cent of traffickers identified by Brazilian authorities were citizens of Brazil. To a much lesser extent, other identified traffickers were reported to be from the neighbouring countries of Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

Fig. 18 Citizenship of identified traffickers, Turkey, 2013

In total, 77 per cent of traffickers apprehended by Turkish authorities in 2013 were reportedly from Turkey, while the second largest share of identified traffickers were citizens of the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic (14 per cent).



E. Conclusion: the distinctive features of firearms trafficking

The responses by Member States to the two questionnaires show what kinds of information about firearms seizures and trafficking are readily available. As assembled here, a preliminary picture of global trafficking is beginning to emerge. The resulting portrait reaffirms long-standing impressions of the complexity of transnational trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. It also shows that it is possible to make general observations about the illicit trade, raising new possibilities for coordinated policy and action.

The evidence collected here appears to show that some traditional assumptions about transnational firearms trafficking are in need of careful re-examination and, perhaps, revision. While trafficking incidents connecting distant parts of the globe might attract the most media attention, the data collected for this Study suggests that the majority of trafficking is local. Where evidence is available, it appears to show that most trafficking is domestic and transnational trafficking tends mostly to involve neighbouring or regional states. In the States that contributed information to this Study, trafficking appears to be conducted most often by residents and citizens of the country in which the firearms were seized. The next most frequently reported are nationals of neighbouring countries. Reports of more complex trafficking between continents or by nationals from

outside the region may attract more attention, but are much rarer in country responses to the questionnaires.

Country responses on the offences associated with seized firearms suggest that illicit firearms are trafficked in large part for instrumental purposes. Firearms often were seized from people engaged in other forms of criminal activity, primarily the trafficking of drugs and other commodities, as well as involvement in organized and violent crime.

The preliminary findings here suggest that reassessment of some aspects of the conventional wisdom about trafficking in firearms might be in order. The apparent prevalence of localized trafficking discovered here suggests that the more complex networks associated with some other forms of illicit transnational commerce may be less important for the overall illegal trade in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. Further research into this could have implications for policy priorities. The association of seized firearms with other forms of organized criminal activity (other than just firearms offences) also supports the conclusion that, in countries that responded to this Study, the illicit acquisition of firearms is largely linked to criminal groups, rather than being widespread in the general population.



CHAPTER FOUR

IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFORTS TO COUNTER ILLICIT FIREARMS TRAFFICKING

A. Data collection and monitoring challenges

Global policy on transnational trafficking in firearms has lagged behind some other policy areas, including other aspects of illicit commerce and other small arms issues. This is the result, at least in part, of the lack of a systematic appreciation of the scale and dimensions of the problems. Systematic data collection and monitoring, as illustrated by this Study, form the foundation for scientific insight and effective policy-making.

This Study shows that great strides toward common understanding can be made with relatively modest effort. Many countries have considerable resources to draw upon, including some countries not usually assumed to be at the forefront of global data gathering. By pooling their knowledge and insights, a coherent picture of transnational trafficking in firearms begins to emerge - one that substantiates some old assumptions, but also reveals some surprising realities.

Showing the current potential for international data sharing, this Study also found that several countries had difficulties in providing data on transnational trafficking in firearms across their borders. Several countries reported having first to pull the data together from different sources. Several other countries simply did not have this type of information available. When tackling a cross-border phenomenon like traf-

ficking in firearms, such difficulties have implications for the entire international community.

Data on transnational trafficking in firearms not only has to be collected, but also must be analysed to support improved efforts to combat trafficking. Criminal justice officials may lack sufficient information on the overall firearms problem, especially about links to the illicit trade outside their home State. Even within countries, criminal analysis on trafficking in firearms does not appear to be produced regularly and is not widely disseminated. An additional factor may also be the fact that many law enforcement officials lack opportunities to participate in relevant networks and interact with fellow experts from their region or beyond. These gaps undermine opportunities for international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking in firearms. Many countries lack systematic data collection mechanisms, including adequate tools and capacities, such as registries and software applications, which would facilitate these tasks.

Many countries have stronger capabilities, but reported to this Study that they still do not collect or analyse firearms-related statistics in a systematic fashion. Others possess decentralized data-collection systems, which require superior coordination efforts among

national authorities. Others that collect data but do not have a standardized collecting and reporting system cannot make the best possible use of their mutual efforts. Progress towards internationally agreed terms, definitions and reporting procedures would facilitate information exchange and harmonization of insights on transnational trafficking in firearms, greatly strengthening the foundation for concerted international action.

B. Overcoming national challenges to countering illicit firearms trafficking

Addressing illicit trafficking in firearms requires concerted international action, but it must start with adequate State-level capabilities.

The first condition for effective monitoring and action against illicit trafficking is an adequate legal framework that clearly distinguishes licit conduct from illicit conduct relating to firearms and that lays the foundation for effective firearms control.

Despite substantial progress in the implementation of the international firearms regime, many countries still lack updated legal frameworks with respect to firearms control. Some have out-of-date legislation or regulations with respect to firearms, while others do not have comprehensive and coherent firearms laws, consistent with the international legal framework on firearms. National rules and procedures may not integrate all requirements of the Firearms Protocol, in particular on marking and record-keeping, making the tracing process difficult.

In particular, the criminalization provisions contained in the Firearms Protocol have not been fully implemented by several countries, which either do not criminalize or criminalize in different ways the illicit conduct defined in the Protocol as criminal offences, such as the illicit manufacturing of or illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. This lack of harmonization has been reported by some countries as an obstacle for effective cooperation with neighbouring countries in particular.

Beyond the normative framework, systematic recording and tracing of seized, collected and surrendered firearms are key elements in addressing illicit trafficking in firearms that require time and resources, as well as the firm determination of policy makers and operators to make this a global standard operating procedure.

C. International responses to trafficking in firearms

Illicit trafficking is a transnational phenomenon that requires international responses. To help guide State responses, several international and regional instruments on small arms have been adopted, which provide a framework and a common basis for action. Four instruments with global scope – two of which legally binding – comprise the international legal regime:

- The Firearms Protocol, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2001 and entered into force in 2005.
- The Arms Trade Treaty, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 2 April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014.³⁸
- The Programme of Action on Small Arms,³⁹ adopted in 2001 by the General Assembly as a non-legally binding document.
- The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2005 as a non-legally binding document.

These four instruments, while different in scope, have overlapping objectives and mutually complement and reinforce each other. With several other regional agreements,⁴⁰ they form a web of international governance over the trade in firearms. They facilitate the coordination of action by law enforcement officers in different jurisdictions, standardize laws and regulations and provide international support and cooperation to counter illicit diversion and trafficking.

The Firearms Protocol

The Firearms Protocol supplements the Organized Crime Convention and ought to be read in conjunction with the purposes and objectives of the latter in order to comprehend its broad implications. While the Organized Crime Convention establishes the framework to prevent and combat transnational organized crime, the Firearms Protocol provides for measures to prevent, investigate and prosecute offences stemming from the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms. Specific measures include, inter alia:

³⁸ The Arms Trade Treaty was adopted on 2 April 2013 by General Assembly resolution 67/234 (A/CONF.217/2013/L.3).

³⁹ Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15), para. 24, chap. IV.


⁴⁰ A detailed list of regional and international agreements and instruments is contained in the annex to this Study.

CHAPTER FOUR: IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFORTS TO COUNTER ILLICIT FIREARMS TRAFFICKING

- Establishing as a criminal offence the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and the falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the marking on firearms, in line with the Protocol's requirements and definitions
- Measures on seizure and confiscation of firearms
- Effective control and security measures, including the disposal of firearms, in order to prevent theft and diversion
- A system for regulating brokers and brokering activities;
- A system of government authorizations or licensing intending to ensure legitimate manufacture and trade
- Effective marking at time of manufacturing, import and transfer from government stocks to permanent civilian use, adequate recording and tracing of firearms and effective international cooperation
- Cooperation and information exchange for tracing


Further to the provisions contained in its parent Convention, the Firearms Protocol aims at promoting and strengthening international cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in order to achieve its objectives, including through exchange of relevant case-specific information on matters such as authorized producers, dealers, importers, exporters and carriers of firearms, as well as information on organized criminal groups known to take part in the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms.

Fig. 19 Status of ratification of the Firearms Protocol



Accession to the Firearms Protocol has been steady. As can be seen from Map 3, as of May 2015, there are 113 parties, distributed as follows among regions: Africa 33; Asia and the Pacific 13; Eastern Europe 21; Latin America and the Caribbean 29; Western Europe and Other 16.

Map 3 Status of ratification of the Firearms Protocol (as of 20 May 2015)



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection

The Arms Trade Treaty

With its recent entry into force, the Arms Trade Treaty complements and further enriches the international arms control regime. It introduces a set of standards to uphold the core norms of international law often threatened by unregulated transfers of firearms and other conventional weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty is, strictly speaking, neither an instrument for the control of firearms, nor an effort at disarmament. It seeks to “establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms” and to “prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion” (art. 1). The Arms Trade Treaty sets out substantive standards for arms transfers including obligations such as human rights and humanitarian law to be considered when a State authorizes arms transfers. One standard is that a party should, when authorizing an arms export, assess the risk that an arms transfer would “commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party” (para. 1, art. 7). In doing so the Arms Trade Treaty requires that parties should not authorize an arms export if there is an “overriding risk” that the export would facilitate a violation of the Firearms Protocol. There are several commonalities between the two legal instruments: the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty complement the Firearms Protocol, even though the Arms Trade Treaty is broader in scope as it specifies the regulation of international trade *inter alia* through the introduction of pre-defined criteria to be used in assessing authorizations for the international transfer of conventional arms. As in the Firearms Protocol, the Arms Trade Treaty requires that national records on export authorisations or actual exports be kept for at least 10 years. Parties are also encouraged to keep records on imports and arms transiting their territory. Furthermore, while the Arms Trade Treaty covers eight categories of conventional weapons, the Firearms Protocol covers only firearms. Both the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol cover parts, components and ammunition of their respective weapons. Moreover, the Firearms Protocol excludes State-to-State transactions, whereas the Arms Trade Treaty only excludes “the international movement of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that State Party’s ownership” (para. 3, art. 2). Common across both instruments is the importance attached to international or regional cooperation. Furthermore, the Firearms Protocol supplements and reinforces the Arms Trade Treaty, as the Treaty does not introduce

penal measures, thus leaving the enforcement and criminal justice response to violations up to State parties to take appropriate measures as they see fit.

The Programme of Action on Small Arms

The Programme of Action on Small Arms was adopted as a non-legally binding political commitment. The Programme sets out appropriate measures to prevent illicit SALW transfer at national, regional and global levels and thus reinforces the Firearms Protocol. The Programme is wider in scope as it encompasses light weapons which are not covered by the Firearms Protocol.

The Programme, too, calls for the establishment of national controls on production and transfers, provisions on criminalization of trafficking, marking, record keeping, tracing and international cooperation and assistance. In addition, it has a much wider scope than the Firearms Protocol and it includes articles on: stockpile management, disposal of surplus arms, brokering controls, post-conflict disarmament demobilisation and reintegration and public awareness programmes. As a non-binding instrument the Programme creates a framework of action at different levels (national, regional and international), while leaving room for States to determine how to implement it, and promotes global, regional and national awareness and cooperation among States and other important actors.

The International Tracing Instrument

Adopted by the General Assembly in 2005 as non-binding instrument, the International Tracing Instrument deals with commitments to mark, keep records on and trace small arms and light weapons, as well as with cooperation to prevent and restrain illicit activity relating to these weapons. The International Tracing Instrument is complementary to and consistent with the existing commitments of States under relevant international instruments, including the Firearms Protocol.

D. Addressing the challenges through technical assistance

The global experience of the past two decades shows that faster progress to combat illicit trafficking in firearm, their parts and components and ammunition will not come by accident. With problems and solutions to be found at every level of research, law enforcement, criminal justice, conflict resolution and policy-making, the only promising path forwards involves coordinated State, regional and global action.

The mandate for this Study and the breadth and depth of responses by Member States testify to the extent of international concern and the willingness of the international community to cooperate on the problem. The responses also reveal the diversity of problems and responses. Because there is no single solution for any aspect of transnational trafficking, coordination and commitment are synonymous with effective action. The call for greater cooperation and information exchange is not only contained in various instruments outlined here, but has repeatedly been echoed by several intergovernmental bodies, including the Conference of the Parties to the Organized Crime Convention. This Study is one example of this international priority of encouraging cooperation and information exchange.

For the purpose of this Study, UNODC developed a series of activities and tools to support the participation of Member States and the strengthening of their internal capacities in the monitoring of trafficking in firearms. During the early stages of the data collection process, UNODC made available on its portal a toolkit to guide both focal points and completing officers on how to successfully complete the questionnaires. The toolkit was prepared in English, Spanish and French and could be accessed from the portal home page.

On several occasions in the course of 2014, UNODC provided accompanying technical support and training to national authorities on the use of the firearms portal, as well as the completion and subsequent submission of the seizures report questionnaires. Last but not least, the great emphasis placed on the instrumental role of national focal points – prior and following their designation – additionally enabled the Global Firearms Programme to establish an ongoing dialogue with a network of relevant authorities in each responding Member State. This was done while furthering the creation of official arenas for the exchange of firearms expertise and knowledge among practitioners and, whenever possible, civil society.

Cognisant of the challenges faced by Member States in acceding to and fully implementing the international agreements on firearms, many instruments, such as the Firearms Protocol and the Organized Crime Convention, emphasize the importance of continuous training and capacity-building for practitioners to effectively implement the instruments. These instruments also contain a call to States parties to cooperate with each other and with relevant international and regional organizations in order to facilitate such training and technical assistance, which are necessary to enhance their ability to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms and related forms of organized crime (see art. 29 Organized Crime Convention and art. 14 Firearms Protocol).

Technical and legislative assistance are essential elements to support Member State's efforts to take decisive steps to strengthen their national capacities to prevent, combat and prosecute transnational organized crime.

Established in 2011 with voluntary contributions from Member States, the UNODC Global Firearms Programme seeks to assist Member States in their efforts to counter illicit trafficking in firearms through the full implementation of the Organized Crime Convention and its supplementary Firearms Protocol, and represents just one example of collective efforts to help countries overcoming their challenges in facing these serious and transnational threats. Based on a multidisciplinary approach, the Programme seeks to provide support in a variety of areas, including:

- Policy advice and legislative assistance
- Capacity building and training
- Technical support for marking, record-keeping, seizure, collection, management and destruction of firearms
- Development of technical tools
- Data collection, research and analysis on firearms trafficking

Box 5 Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition

The Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition was developed with the wide participation of experts and practitioners from different countries and regions to serve as a guide for States parties to review and strengthen their legislative regimes on firearms in a manner consistent with the Firearms Protocol. The Model Law complements the Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the Organized Crime Convention and its supplementing Protocols. Its broad range of provisions cover preventive firearms control measures on manufacturing, record-keeping, deactivation and international transfers of firearms and related brokering activities, as well as penal and procedural measures derived from the Firearms Protocol and the Organized Crime Convention. Each provision is accompanied by a detailed commentary, legal sources and examples, providing several options for legislators, as appropriate. The Model Law is available in all the official United Nations languages.

Through its Global Firearms Programme, UNODC has provided support to approximately 20 countries over these past years and has proven to be a useful vehicle to channel legislative and technical assistance and capacity building to Member States, as well as a platform for the initiation of research and data collection on trafficking in firearms.

Legislative advice and drafting support to strengthen the domestic legal framework, is another essential pillar to support Member States. In this connection, legislative tools such as the Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition,⁴¹ can greatly help Member States to review their legal frameworks and bring them in line with the international legal regime, as well as to meet important preconditions for effective information exchange and cooperation.

Technical support in key areas, such as marking and record-keeping, enhancement of national data collection capacities, the provision of specialized training on firearms control matters and the investigation and prosecution of illicit trafficking are additional ways of supporting the efforts of Member States to counter illicit firearms trafficking.

Research and analysis becomes, in this context, part of a dual strategy to enhance the collective knowledge while at the same time addressing some of the underlying difficulties and obstacles that exist today to ensure the proper monitoring of illicit trafficking flows at the national, regional and international levels.

⁴¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, second revised edition (Vienna, 2014)



CONCLUSIONS

This Study, undertaken in response to the mandate of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, shows that incisive and compelling findings about international illicit trafficking can be drawn from data collected by States. Based on the information States were able to provide, the findings of this Study reaffirm some long-standing assumptions about the way transnational firearms trafficking is conducted. It also suggests that many other older assumptions should be regarded sceptically and replaced with better-informed and more accurate analysis of the nature of the problem. The Study shows that progress towards a more complete picture of trafficking in firearms lies well within reach of the international community, promising a strong foundation for more effective international action.

The usefulness of tracing firearms for the prevention and prosecution of traffickers has been shown time and time again. This Study has demonstrated that data from seized and traced firearms, combined with other sources, can provide a new insights in firearms trafficking. As a pioneering international effort between the UNODC and Member States, this Study has, first and foremost, confirmed the usefulness of its methods, as well as the need for further research and future efforts on this subject.

This Study shows that trafficking in firearms occurs across a wide variety of States, including those far removed from wars or arms embargoes. Governments

have repeatedly recognized that the use by criminals of trafficked firearms is a global problem. The only way to establish global patterns is through the rigorous and systematic collection and analysis of data provided by a sufficiently large sample of States.

As indicated earlier, several instruments invite or request Member States to collect, share and report information related to illicit trafficking in firearms and related fields. The Transnational Organized Crime Convention and its supplementary Firearms Protocol encourage States parties to cooperate and exchange information on organized crime groups and illicit firearms trafficking patterns and modus operandi, among others. UNODC has been mandated to continue to collect information from Member States on trafficking in firearms. States parties to the Arms Trade Treaty are encouraged to report or share information about illicit trafficking in conventional arms (including firearms).⁴² All Member States are encouraged, via the reporting templates for the Programme of Action on Small Arms, to report on confiscations and seizures. There is a growing common understanding of the need to enhance cooperation and information sharing to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in firearms and to enhance collective knowledge on the phenomenon.

Producing this Study has shown, over and again, not only the commitment of many countries to provide and share data on firearms seizures and trafficking, but

⁴² See para. 2, article 13 and para. 5, article 11 of the Arms Trade Treaty. States are encouraged to report on measures taken that have proven effective in addressing the diversion of conventional arms to illicit channels and to share information on illicit activities associated with the conventional arms trade, in particular on corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment and common points of dispatch or destinations.

also that many Member States encountered difficulties in systematically collecting, collating and analysing data related to trafficking in firearms. Problems were encountered in both developed and developing States and within all regions. As discussed in the course of the Study, these problems do not appear to be due to lack of goodwill, but to inconsistent or inadequate record-keeping systems, lack of technical skills, problems of inter-agency coordination and operating procedures optimized for other tasks.

Through the process of developing and circulating questionnaires, this Study provided a framework for States to collect and collate data in a standardized manner. Some countries reported that the Study also produced some beneficial effects, in that it contributed to strengthening inter-institutional coordination and cooperation and triggered the development of national assessments based on the information provided to UNODC.

Accompanying technical support and training, as provided by UNODC to some Member States, can greatly assist in strengthening their data collection efforts, but more needs to be done to produce sustainable changes in this field.

The Firearms Protocol, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Programme of Action on Small Arms all contain commitments by States to provide assistance in preventing illicit trafficking. States that need help creating or improving their ability to collect and analyse data on trafficking should be able to obtain training and technical or material assistance from other States and the United Nations.

Future of the Study

Almost fifteen years after the world agreed upon the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action on Small Arms, the international community still lacks


sufficient tools to find out what policies to prevent firearms trafficking actually work and where firearms trafficking is worsening or reducing. A data-focused approach, as pioneered by this Study, offers the only comprehensive way to assess the efficacy of policies and identify areas to which more attention needs to be directed. Some important work has been undertaken already, but much more needs to be done.

In order to produce wider results on transnational trafficking, it is necessary to reduce the wide gaps in the data which currently inhibit coordinated international responses, as discussed in the Study. While the reports examined here reveal much about seized firearms and trafficking, they also point to the importance of more complete and comprehensive international data collection and analysis. Scientific study of seizure reports and other indicators such as total firearms holdings, crime rates, homicide, suicide, state stability and other related issues, hold great promise for better policy-making. While the general sense of scale and typical variations are now apparent, the implications for policy-making will be clearer as states supply more comprehensive seizure reports, more background information about the legal context, supporting stronger insights and greater agreement about how best to address transnational trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

This Study has laid the foundation for more systematic data analysis and collection. A solid evidence-base for understanding and more effective action against the illicit trade would benefit greatly from long-term and routine commitment by Governments to annually report information on trafficking in firearms. UNODC is well placed to continue with the work and would welcome the opportunity to support further undertakings to solicit, collect and analyse this information for use by Member States.



ANNEXES



ANNEX I

REFERENCE MATERIAL

1. BASICS OF FIREARMS

A. Basic definitions

Firearms

In the early 1990s, two different terms emerged in the United Nations: “firearms” and “small arms”. “Firearms” was predominantly used to describe civilian arms, while “small arms” was often used in conjunction with “light weapons” and included military-style weapons and their use in armed conflict.⁴³ Traditionally, research into the areas of conflict and crime ran in parallel, despite obvious conceptual and practical overlaps between the two.⁴⁴ Factual realities in many parts of the world are making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between “crime” and “conflict” guns. As a result, “firearms” and “small arms” are frequently used as synonyms.

An important early attempt came in 1997 in the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. The first legal definition of firearms emerged

with the Firearms Protocol, supplementing the Organized Crime Convention. This definition is primarily based on the technical function of a firearm.

Box 6 Firearms Protocol definition of a firearm

Article 3 (a): “Firearm” shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899.

Source: Firearms Protocol

⁴³ Since the 1990s, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice focused its work on reducing the availability of firearms in the context of crime, in particular transnational organized crime. The term “firearm” was applied mostly to non-military weapons. In parallel and almost simultaneously, the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms focused its work on preventing the proliferation of military weapons and reducing illicit State-to-State transfers in violation of international treaties and codes of conduct, using the term “small arms and light weapons”, which consequently referred mainly to military-style weapons.

⁴⁴ For summaries of the two bodies of literature on crime and conflict see T. Jackson and N. Marsh, “Guns and Deaths a Critical Review” in *Small Arms Crime and Conflict Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence* eds. O. Greene and N. Marsh (London: Routledge, 2012); N. Marsh, “The tools of insurgency A review of the role of small arms and light weapons in warfare” in *Small Arms Crime and Conflict Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence* eds. O. Greene and N. Marsh (London: Routledge, 2012); and O. Greene and N. Marsh “Armed violence within societies” and N. Marsh, “Guns and Deaths a Critical Review” in *Small Arms Crime and Conflict Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence* eds. O. Greene and N. Marsh (London: Routledge, 2012).

Small arms and light weapons

The Programme of Action on Small Arms, adopted in the same year 2001, did not contain a definition of either “small arms” or “light weapons”.

The document, however, builds on earlier attempts made by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, established in 1997 with the mandate to report, inter alia, on the types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts. The Panel adopted a definition and a list of weapons, divided according to their portability.⁴⁵

Subsequent United Nations documents and agreements negotiated by other regional and multilateral organizations include different definitions of small arms albeit with a high degree of overlap.⁴⁶

Subsequently, the General Assembly’s International Tracing Instrument of 2005 adopted another definition, followed by the same list of examples contained in the 1997 Panel report. These definitions, although not universally accepted, have over time acquired a high degree of authority and, although not enshrined in any legally binding in-

strument, are commonly used in official United Nations documentation and in other international settings.

The definition of “firearm” adopted by the Firearms Protocol overlaps greatly with that of “small arms”, and covers many “light weapons”, particularly barrelled weapons such as heavy machine guns, which are too large to be transported and used by a single person. The term “firearms” excludes light weapons that employ a tube or rail as opposed to a barrel, such as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). Another difference lies in the fact that firearms must “expel” the projectile, which contrasts with the definition of “small arms and light weapons” in the International Tracing Instrument, which covers any weapon that “expels or launches” the projectile. Self-propelled projectiles, such as rockets or missiles, seem therefore to be excluded from the definition of firearms. Only light weapons that use cartridge-based ammunition qualify as firearms under the Firearms Protocol.⁴⁷

Beyond these conceptual differences, the dichotomy between firearms and small arms and light weapons often has not been applied consistently.⁴⁸ Other distinctions important to trafficking may also be flexible in practice and require interpretation. For example, in

Box 7 1997 Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms

Definition of small arms and light weapons

All arms that fire a projectile, on the condition that the unit or system may be carried by an individual, a smaller number of people or transported by a pack animal or a light vehicle.

Small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns.

Light weapons: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems and anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre.

Source: Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on

⁴⁵ Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (A/52/298), paras. 25, 26 and 27 (a).

⁴⁶ Use of terms has not been consistently applied in international and regional instruments either. The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials and the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region to firearms, while several other regional instruments follow the path of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and refer to small arms. Such is the case of the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The European Union regulation 258/2012 implementing article 10 of the Firearms Protocol refers to firearms, while the Directive 2008/51/EC refers generically to weapons and earlier documents refer to small arms.

⁴⁷ Sarah Parker and Marcus Wilson, *A Diplomat’s Guide to the UN Small Arms Process 2014 Update*, page 15. *Small Arms Survey*, 2014, page 15.

⁴⁸ The overlaps between the two concepts were recognized and acknowledged by both the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In its resolution E/CN.15/1997/L.19/Rev.1 of 1997, the Commission stated that the uncontrolled availability of firearms was “not only fuelling conflicts but exacerbating violence and criminality”. The Panel recognized in its report that non-military weapons had been used in conflict, and vice versa, small arms and light weapons “were also of advantage for terrorist and criminal action”.

some regions it is not possible to readily distinguish between conflict violence and criminality.⁴⁹ Networks that arm “criminals” also, in some cases, arm combatants. Organized crime groups might also traffic arms to terrorists and rebels. Rebel movements can sell their old guns to street gangs. As a result, dichotomous distinctions often breakdown when applied to concrete situations and such terms may be used almost as synonyms.⁵⁰

Although the present Study focuses primarily on firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, it also allows for the commonplace use of ‘guns’, even in official records, and recognizes occasional confusion among different types of small arms and some light weapons. The latter may be included in the State responses and data used in this report, except where it has been possible to explicitly exclude or separate them.

B. Common types of firearms

Correct identification and categorization of firearms, their parts and ammunition is a priority for the most effective description of seizures and trafficking.

There is no universal system to identify and classify firearms. Countries apply different definitions, terms and classifications, depending on their legal, cultural, historical, and linguistic traditions and practices. Firearms are sometimes identified according to their legal status (e.g. prohibited

and restricted arms), their use (civilian, police and military arms), their level of restriction (for civilian use or for military use only) or, as seen above, their function or portability.

Despite these variations, it is clear that a basic nomenclature exists. For example, an automatic firearm, which continuously feeds ammunition into its firing chamber so long as the operator depresses the trigger, is an automatic firearm no matter where in the world it is found and regardless of the legal definition of the particular weapon. This common language is not dependent on national definitions, but on professional understanding of the technical characteristics and features of a firearm. It permits some agreement on international trends and priorities.

For the purposes of this Study, UNODC collected information on Types of firearms based on their technical characteristics and specifications. As part of the seizures report questionnaires, UNODC additionally provided brief descriptions of the proposed types of firearms to help respondents for the purpose of the data collection.

Accurate identification of the type of firearm in question is of paramount importance for its inclusion in a corresponding conceptual/technical category. However, advances in firearms technology have created grey areas for firearms identification, where a given weapon may fit within two or more categories. Based on the technical characteristics of the firearms, this Study employs 10 categories of firearms, described in figure 20.

Fig. 20 Common types of firearms

Type of firearm and description

Pistol

Hand-held firearms designed for semi-automatic operation. The chamber is part of the barrel. Cartridges are generally loaded into a magazine, which is inserted into the grip. The action of the firearm feeds the next cartridge and expels the spent round.

Action: The firing systems can consist of a trigger, repetitive, semi-automatic or automatic.

Types: single shot, repeating, semi-automatic and automatic pistol.

Revolver

A short or hand-held firearm with a revolving cylinder typically of five to nine chambers, manually loaded with cartridges. As the cylinder rotates into position, the trigger can be pulled, releasing the hammer firing the cartridge. Expended cartridge cases remain in the cylinder until manually unloaded.

Action: According to the system of operation of the trigger tail, revolvers can be of double or single action.

Example(s)



Source: HAAP Media Ltd, www.freemages.com



Source: RENAR

⁴⁹ Joakim Kreutz, Nicholas Marsh and Manuel Torre, ‘Regaining State Control Arms and Violence in Post Conflict Countries’ in Nicholas Marsh and Owen Greene eds *Small Arms Crime and Conflict* (London Routledge 2012), pp. 70-71.

⁵⁰ Anna Alvazzi del Frate, *Beyond the Gun. Comprehensive Training Curriculum on Firearms, module one* (manuscript), UNODC 2014

Short shotgun (pistol)

A handgun with one or more smoothbore barrels.

Action: Single-shot.



Source: HAAP Media Ltd, www.FreelImages.com

Shotgun

A shoulder-fired long gun with one or two unrifled barrels (side-by-side or over configuration), usually designed to shoot a large number of small projectiles (“shots”) rather than a bullet. The calibre of a shotgun is referred to as the gauge (see below) and is usually larger in diameter than other small arms.

Action: Usually single-shot, repeating or semi-automatic.



Source: HAAP Media Ltd, www.FreelImages.com

Rifle or carbine

A relatively long-barrelled firearm, fired from the shoulder, with a series of spiral grooves cut inside the barrel (“rifling”) imparting spin to the projectile. Some rifles have a detachable magazine similar to the pistols described above, and others have integral magazines.

A carbine resembles a rifle but has a shorter barrel.

Action: Single-shot, repeating, semi-automatic or fully automatic.



Source: iStockphoto LP, www.istockphoto.com

Machine gun

Weapons which automatically shoot more than one shot without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The weapon will continue to load and fire until the trigger, or other activating device is released, the ammunition is exhausted or the firearm is jammed. Machine guns are weapons designed to be used with a support or a gun carriage, as they lack a stock to be fired from the shoulder or the hip.

Action: Automatic, often can be selected to fire in semi-automatic mode.



Source: US Government Public Domain

Sub-machine gun

A hand-held, lightweight short barrelled machine gun consisting of relatively low-energy handgun-type cartridges and fired from the hand, hip or shoulder.

Action: Semi-automatic. Where the firing system is automatic, the firearm would be classified as an automatic pistol or automatic machine-gun.



Source: iStockphoto LP, www.istockphoto.com

Combination gun

A shoulder-held firearm comprising at least two barrels, a rifle barrel and a shotgun barrel, often but not always in an over and under configuration.

Billing (two barrels)

Drilling (three barrels)

Vierling (four barrels)

Action: Single-shot.



Source: ZOLI ANTONIO srl

Billing Drilling

Combination gun

Source: ZOLI ANTONIO srl

Craft or rudimentary firearms

Guns not manufactured in factories, also known as “craft” or “rudimentary” weapons. These are mostly weapons and ammunition that are fabricated largely by hand in relatively small quantities. Craft-produced small arms range from rudimentary pistols and shotguns, made by copying automatic rifles, to very expensive bespoke guns used for hunting or target shooting.

Craft-produced guns take a variety of forms, and rudimentary versions may be constructed from basic household materials.

Other types of firearms

Other types include less common firearms produced in limited numbers, as well as air, gas and antique guns, etc.



Source: RENAR



Source: RENAR

Fig. 21 Craft weapons

Additional examples of handcrafted or homemade weapons production⁵¹

Unlicensed copies: Designed to replicate almost exactly a “designer brand” gun, these are weapons sold at cheaper prices, often on the illicit market.



Source: INTERPOL

Parts kits: This photo is an example of an 80 per cent made frame/receiver; the other 20 per cent of the firearm must be manufactured and assembled by the purchaser. People can purchase these firearms to avoid them being traced, because they are not marked with a serial number. Generally, these items are purchased on the Internet but can also be bought from licensed firearms dealers.



Source: INTERPOL

3D guns: Advances in technology have also made it possible to print firearms based on 3D imagery and blueprints shared online. Though the technology is still in its early stages, 3D-printed guns that are fully operational have been made and fired. Several questions remain in terms of the legality and regulations required to govern the production of this new type of firearm.



Source: Forbes
<http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mhl45ediih/the-liberator/>

⁵¹ UNODC Comprehensive Training Curriculum. Module 2, Basic Concepts about firearms. INTERPOL (manuscript).2014.

There are several key elements on a firearm that allow for identification and can indicate its source. Additional physical properties are usually necessary to identify a firearm. In particular a serial number is usually indelibly stamped on the firearm. Other identifying features are the name of the manufacturer, branding and additional markings added during production, import or acquisition. Detailed aspects of the physical design of the firearm are also important. In general, identification requires a combination of all the physical characteristics of a firearm, and not just the serial number.

Parts and components of firearms

The Firearms Protocol defines parts and components as “any element or replacement element specifically designed for a firearm and essential to its operation, including a barrel, frame or receiver, slide or cylinder, bolt or breech block, and any device designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm” (art. 3 (b)).

Article 7 of the Firearms Protocol recommends States to maintain, where appropriate and feasible, records for parts, components and ammunition that might be necessary to trace and identify firearms and, where appropriate and feasible, these items, but it does not refer at all to parts and components and ammunition in its subsequent provision on marking. Ensuring ef-

fective control over parts and components (and, where possible, ammunition) is of great importance because such items can be used to assemble firearms that can be very difficult or impossible to trace.

Difficulties in the import, export and transit of parts and components arise owing to the lack of legislative harmonization and differing criteria adopted by countries for their control, marking, registration and verification. This is a major facilitator of illicit activities involving firearms assembled with those parts. For that reason, some countries treat parts and components the same way as firearms, as far as their authorization, manufacturing, marking, recording and transfer control regime is concerned. National regimes can differ to the extent that some parts and components can be under strict control or restricted in one country, yet freely or relatively easily available in another, thus leading to illicit flows from one State to another.

One of the key parts of firearms is the barrel, which is a metal tube through which a projectile travels under the force of the explosive charge. The barrel is attached to the receiver, which houses the moving parts of the firearm that fire the ammunition. A magazine, which holds ammunition, may also be attached to the receiver. The picture below depicts, by way of example, a pistol and its parts and components.


Fig. 22 Parts and components of a pistol



Source: HAAP Media Ltd, www.freeimages.com

C. Ammunition

Fig. 23 A cartridge and its elements



Ammunition is defined in the Firearms Protocol as “the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles that are used in a firearm, provided that those components are themselves subject to authorization in the respective State Party” (Art. 3 (c)).

Ammunition varies significantly in size, composition, purpose and technical specifications. Most firearm ammunition is cartridge-based and self-contained. A typical round consists of a cartridge case, primer, propellant and projectile.

Source: F. Schütz, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité. Published in UNODC Technical Guide to the Implementation of the Firearms Protocol. 2011, P. 49.



ANNEX II

2. MONITORING TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS, THEIR PARTS AND COMPONENTS AND AMMUNITION: METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

A. Methodology

This Study introduces new sources, based on official data and reports from States, to achieve greater reliability in the depth and breadth of understanding of trafficking in firearms. It provides the international community with a stronger foundation for policy-making. Its innovative methods permit new levels of verifiable findings. However, limitations on those insights must be accepted. Consequently, this Study's findings should be regarded as exploratory and preliminary, exposing methodological strengths to build upon and hurdles to be overcome in subsequent studies.

Data sources – limitations of official sources

Reliance on official sources of information, as opposed to media reports or other informal sources, represents a strength for this Study, giving its findings unprecedented reliability, but also limits its scope. Despite the underlying reliability of public information, official sources may lack the comprehensiveness of other sources of information. As noted in other UNODC publications, official data on firearms and trafficking mostly serve administrative or legal purposes, including the monitoring of law enforcement performance and priorities.⁵²

As such they are affected by differences between States in classifications and regulations, which tend to limit comparability. In the same vein, priorities given by policymakers to certain areas and the effectiveness in implementing them may lead to an over- or under-representation in the data of certain conducts. As a result, the capacity of authorities to collect data on seizures and the subsequent reporting volumes may significantly vary from one place to another, showing differences in total numbers that may be unrelated to actual levels of trafficking.

Data types - focus on firearms seizures

Some of the methodological problems encountered in the development of the Study were overcome by switching from a focus on confiscation to an emphasis on seizures of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. The original mandate from the Conference of the Parties sought a study “based on the analysis of information provided by States on confiscated weapons and ammunition” (para. 7, Conference resolution 5/4). In the Conference's subsequent resolution on the topic, it requested UNODC more broadly “to improve methodology, in close consultation with Member States” *para. 7, Conference resolution 6/2). Consequently, this

⁵² UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2012, p. 19.

Study focuses on the more inclusive data on seizures of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

Box 8 Definition of seizure

Article 2 (f)

(f) "Freezing" or "seizure" shall mean temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority'

Source: Organized Crime Convention.

Data on judicial confiscation or forfeiture orders, usually the result of a legal decision by a court or other agency, is not as readily available or as readily analysed. Seizures are defined as a temporary measure, which can become permanent, or the goods could be returned. Seizures are considered to be a preventive measure adopted in response to a particular threat or urgency and are regulated by national criminal or administrative law.

Most Member States responding to the request for information for this Study keep paper or digital records of seized firearms and related items. Although there usually are important country-to-country variations, these records normally can be accessed by respective officials of each country in a relatively easy and swift way, and often include details on the circumstances under which a firearm was seized and subsequently registered.

Official data on firearms seizures appear to be most commonly collected and recorded by law enforcement agencies such as national police and customs authorities. Cooperation between these agencies, especially data-sharing, often is lacking, so States were not always able to share complete country seizure data. State responses tend to stress one agency or another, one set of data or another. To facilitate data sharing and ensure a sufficiently standardized format, this Study focused primarily on State seizures and not on other aspects of State firearms collection. It includes complementary information on the final disposal of seized items, including confiscation, when available.

Despite their great potential to provide an insight into the illicit trade, data on seizures also come with limitations which must be taken into account whenever trying to relate them to other elements and indicators.

These include:

- Seizures are at the outset temporary measures. Seized firearms, parts and components and ammunition may be returned to their owner or port

of origin. As such, data on seizures are not conclusive and can require periodic updating.

- Data on seizures reflect different recording and reporting capabilities, law enforcement policies and priorities within each State and legal system. Depending on State policy and practices, response rates and the willingness to provide thorough data will vary from State to State. Seizures may more completely represent trafficking in some states, less in others, making comparisons difficult.
- Seizure results may vary from country to country, depending on the different normative frameworks and practices. Differences in the legal status of firearms and trafficking affect seizure rates and resulting seizure totals. As a result, higher levels of seizures do not necessarily indicate higher illicit firearms flows, but may testify more to different legal environments for the possession of and trading in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

Data collection methods

This Study is based primarily on State responses to two questionnaires, designed and circulated by UNODC:

- The annual seizures report questionnaire, which asks States primarily for aggregate data on firearms, their parts and components and ammunition seized during the years 2010-2013
- The significant seizures report questionnaire, which asks States primarily for detailed information about significant individual incidents of trafficking seizures.

In this Study, the two data sources are used differently, reflecting their different strengths - the first statistical and collective, the second specific and anecdotal.

Together, the two questionnaires were intended to elicit two different sets of information related to seized firearms, their parts and components and ammunition in responding countries. Each questionnaire addresses this topic by initially focusing on seizures of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition in general and trafficking-related seizures in particular. By working deductively, from general data to specific examples, the Study examines the connections between quantitative and qualitative information, as well as between general trends and important examples of trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

The seizure information asked as part of the annual seizures report questionnaire covers several aspects related to total and annual State seizures, and the types of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition seized. The trafficking-related information builds on the initial seizure questions and further expands on seizure routes, transportation modes and modus operandi, tracing activities, related crime and identified traffickers. In doing so, UNODC sought to obtain a more comprehensive picture of previously obscure dimensions of trafficking in firearms.

The significant seizures report questionnaire focuses less on statistical data and more on reports of specific incidents of transnational trafficking throughout the whole reporting period. This shares the same great strength of the statistical seizure reports, since responses are highly reliable and the seizures they report actually happened. Yet even more so than data on seizures, trafficking reports, which although are highly detailed, are not complete. Without greater completeness or random global distribution, they cannot serve as a basis for global estimation. Indeed, their use was intended by UNODC as a complement to the information submitted in response to the annual seizures report questionnaire.

The strength of the responses to the significant seizures report questionnaire is their thoroughness. They reveal much about the events, sequences and scale in trafficking apprehensions. The trafficking analyses that follow in this report focus more on path analysis, examining the processes of transnational trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. While this approach does not make it possible to say much about trafficking in general, it reveals a great deal about the kinds of events and behaviour facing efforts to combat trafficking, adding greater depth to the international community's understanding of these problems.

As noted in chapter two, in addition to the UNODC seizures questionnaires, comparable data on firearms seizures were collected from official government sources of two countries.

All data collected by UNODC were subsequently submitted to the respective Member States for review.

Overview of questionnaire responses and collected data

The numerical data of the annual seizures report questionnaires and other sources introduced in the report enable the statistical analysis of seizures and trafficking phenomena. Yet the strength of this analysis is limited by the lack of comprehensiveness, inconsistencies and incompleteness of the first round of State submissions.

The most fundamental problem in analysing the data generated by the questionnaires is insufficient comprehensiveness. Of the 193 United Nations Member States, 185 are States parties to the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the mandating body for this Study and the principal recipients of the questionnaires.

Responses to the annual seizures report questionnaire were received from 36 States parties. The limited number of first-round responses diminishes the global relevance of the findings. Among States that did not respond are many of the most populous Member States. Nor are respondents evenly distributed around the world; Europe and Latin America are disproportionately represented. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the responses. Even fewer countries provide significant seizures reports, and even when made available, trafficking reports tended to cover only a small proportion of total seizures. Above all, this inhibits global extrapolation at this point, as it is extremely difficult to infer global seizure and trafficking trends from the sample of respondents. The data currently available tell us about the responding countries, but say little about non-responding ones.



ANNEX III

3. MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS

Multilateral and regional instruments and documents

1. United Nations

Treaties

- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime⁵³
- Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime⁵⁴
- Arms Trade Treaty⁵⁵

Other instruments

- Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects⁵⁶

- International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons⁵⁷

Documents

- Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/81 to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons⁵⁸
- Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 61/72 to consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus⁵⁹
- Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/54 V, entitled “Small arms”⁶⁰

⁵³ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No. 39574.

⁵⁴ Ibid., vol. 2326, No. 39574.

⁵⁵ General Assembly resolution 67/234 B.

⁵⁶ Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15), chap. IV, para. 24.

⁵⁷ A/60/88 and Corr. 2; see also General Assembly decision 60/519.

⁵⁸ A/62/163 and Corr. 1.

⁵⁹ A/63/182.

⁶⁰ A/CONF.192/2.

- Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Comprehensive International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the work of its twelfth session: interpretative notes for the official records of the negotiation of the Firearms Protocol⁶¹
- Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the Organized Crime Convention and its Supplementary Protocols⁶²
- How to Guide: Small Arms and Light Weapons Legislation⁶³
- How to Guide: the Establishment and Functioning of National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commissions⁶⁴
- International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)⁶⁵
- UNODC Technical Guide to the Implementation of the Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime⁶⁶
- Digest of Organized Crime Cases: A Compilation of Cases with Commentaries and Lessons Learned⁶⁷
- Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, second revised edition⁶⁸
- Model Legislative Provisions against Organized Crime⁶⁹
- Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition⁷⁰
- Manual in International Cooperation for the Purposes of Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime⁷¹

2. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

- Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons⁷²
- Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition⁷³
- Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons⁷⁴
- Standard Elements of End-User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports⁷⁵
- Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons⁷⁶
- Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons⁷⁷
- Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers⁷⁸
- Best practice guide on marking, record-keeping and traceability of small arms and light weapons⁷⁹

⁶¹ A/55/383/Add.3.

⁶² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.2.

⁶³ United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, *How to Guide: Small Arms and Light Weapons Legislation* (Geneva, 2008).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, *How to Guide: the Establishment and Functioning of National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commissions* (Geneva, 2008).

⁶⁵ United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) project <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/>

⁶⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Technical Guide to the Implementation of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (Vienna, 2011).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *Digest of Organized Crime Cases: A Compilation of Cases with Commentaries and Lessons Learned* (Vienna, 2012).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, *Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, second revised edition* (Vienna, 2014)

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, *Model Legislative Provisions against Organized Crime* (Vienna, 2012).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition* (Vienna, 2012).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, *Manual on International Cooperation for the Purposes of Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime* (Vienna, 2012).

⁷² Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, document FSC.DEC/2/10.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, *Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition* (Vienna, 2008).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Forum for Security Cooperation, decision No. 8/04, 24 November 2004.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Forum for Security Cooperation, decision No. 5/04, 17 November 2004.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Vienna, 2003).

⁷⁷ A/CONF.192/PC/20, annex and appendix.

⁷⁸ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Programme for Immediate Action Series No. 3 (DOC.FSC/3/96), 1993.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, "Best practice guide on marking, record-keeping and traceability of small arms and light weapons", in *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Vienna, 2003), part II.

3. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

- Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering

Regional instruments and documents

1. Africa

Treaties

- Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly⁸⁰
- Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials
- Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
- Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region

Documents

- Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons⁸¹

- Decision on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons⁸²
- Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa
- Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
- Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

1. Americas

Treaties

- Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials⁸³
- Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions⁸⁴

Documents

- Draft Model Legislation and Commentaries on Legislative Measures to Establish Criminal Offences in Relation to the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials⁸⁵
- Model Legislation and Commentaries in Relation to Confiscation and Forfeiture of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials⁸⁶
- Proposed Model Legislation and Commentaries for Strengthening Controls at Export Points for Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials⁸⁷
- Model Legislation on the Marking and Tracing of Firearms⁸⁸

⁸⁰ A/65/517-S/2010/534, annex.

⁸¹ A/CONF.192/PC/23, annex.

⁸² Organization of African Unity, document AHG/Dec.137 (XXXV), July 1999.

⁸³ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2029, No. 35005.

⁸⁴ A/CONF.217/2013/L.3

⁸⁵ Organization of American States, document OEA/Ser.L/XXII.6.3-GE/CIFTA/doc.2/07 rev.3.

⁸⁶ Ibid., document OEA/Ser.L/XXII.2.11-CIFTA/CC-XI/doc.12/10.

⁸⁷ Ibid., document OEA/Ser.L/XXII.6.2-GE/CIFTA-CICAD/doc.2/06 rev.4.

⁸⁸ Ibid., document OEA/Ser.L/XXII.6.1-GE/CIFTA-CICAD/doc.3/06 rev.3.

⁸⁹ Ibid., document OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.34-CICAD/doc1281/03.

- Guidelines for Controlling and the Security of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
- Code of Conduct of Central American States on the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material
- Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition⁸⁹
- Amendments to the Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition: Broker Regulations⁹⁰
- Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects⁹¹
- Andean Chart for Peace and Security and Limitation and Control of the Expenditure on Foreign Defence
- CARICOM Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Model Regulations
- CMC Decision No. 7/98: Joint Register Mechanism of Consumers and Sellers of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials for MERCOSUR
- Southern Cone Presidential Declaration on Combating the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials
- CMC Decision No. 15/04: Memorandum of Understanding for Information Exchange on the Manufacture and the Illicit Traffic of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials

2. Arab States

Documents

- Resolution on Arab coordination for combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons⁹²
- Report of the first meeting of Arab national focal points on small arms and light weapons⁹³
- Resolution on Arab coordination for combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons⁹⁴
- Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous Material⁹⁵

3. Asia and the Pacific

Documents

- Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime⁹⁶
- “Towards a common approach to weapons control” (the Nadi Framework)⁹⁷

4. Europe

Instruments

- European Parliament and Council of the European Union regulation 258/2012 implementing article 10 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition⁹⁸

⁸⁹ Ibid., document OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.34-CICAD/doc1271/03.

⁹⁰ Andean Community, Andean Council of Foreign Ministers, Quirama, Colombia, decision 552, 25 June 2003.

⁹¹ League of Arab States, Ministerial Council resolution 6625, 4 March 2006.

⁹² League of Arab States, Report of The First Meeting of Arab National Focal Points on Small Arms and Light Weapons. (Cairo, 26-27 December) Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx> (Accessed 21 May 2015)..

⁹³ Ibid., Ministerial Council resolution 6447, 14 September 2004.

⁹⁴ Ibid., Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior, Tunisia, 2002.

⁹⁵ See the Joint Communiqué of the Special Association of Southeast Asian Nations Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, 20 and 21 May 2002.

⁹⁶ South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference and Oceania Customs Organization, 2000.

⁹⁷ Official Journal of the European Union, L 94, 30 March 2012.

⁹⁸ Ibid., L 134, 29 May 2009.

- Council of the European Union regulation 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items⁹⁹
- Council of the European Union common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment¹⁰⁰
- European Parliament and Council of the European Union directive 2008/51/EC amending Council directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons¹⁰¹
- European Union strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition¹⁰²
- Council of the European Union common position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering¹⁰³
- Council of European Union joint action on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing joint action 1999/34/CFSP¹⁰⁴
- European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
- Joint Action on the EU contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons
- European Union Development Council Resolution on Small Arms
- European Union Plan of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
- European Union Council Decision 2010/765/CFSP on European Union Action to Counter the Illicit Trade of SALW by Air
- Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for combating the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in South East Europe
- EAPC Workshop on Combating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons
- OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons
- OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons
- OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
- OSCE Principles for Export Controls of MANPADS
- OSCE Standard Elements of End-user Certificates and Verification Procedures for Small Arms and Light Weapons Exports
- OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons
- FSC Decision 7/06 Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Air
- OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition
- Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons


¹⁰⁰ Ibid., L 335, 13 December 2008.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., L 179, 8 July 2008.

¹⁰² Council of the European Union, document 5319/06.

¹⁰³ Official Journal of the European Union, L 156, 25 June 2003.

¹⁰⁴ Official Journal of the European Communities, L 191, 19 July 2002.



ANNEX IV

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ANNEX V

5. SEIZURE QUESTIONNAIRES

ANNUAL SEIZURES REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS:

- **ANNUAL SEIZURES:** What is the total quantity of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition seized in your country in the reporting period? / Please indicate the 5 most frequent makes of the seized firearms
- **ROUTES:** Please indicate the 5 main countries of manufacture of the seized items / Please indicate the 5 main source (departure) countries from where the seized items were obtained / Please indicate the 5 main transit countries, via which the seized items entered your country / Please indicate the 5 main destination countries.
- **TRANSPORTATION:** What percentage of seizures in the reporting period was being transported by each method?
- **TRAFFICKERS:** List the 10 most common citizenships of people recorded for or associated with firearms trafficking in your country, from most common to least common / Describe the current situation with regard to firearms trafficking groups or organizations operating in your country. For example, what are the nationalities of those involved in firearms trafficking? What is the structure of such groups operating in your country? Specify the types of arms involved. Specify whether the group is mainly dedicated to firearms trafficking or to other criminal activities. If so, to which ones. Describe also new trends and technologies in trafficking.
- **TRAFFICKING TRENDS:** Please provide details on the routes and modus operandi of the trafficking in firearms, parts and components, and ammunition in your country during the reporting period
- **RELATED CRIMES:** Question 1 asked about the number of seizures during the reporting period. How many of these seizures were associated with: Illicit trafficking - contraband - smuggling of firearms / Other criminal offences / Non-criminal law proceedings, such as administrative violations.
- Specify the 5 most frequent offences that came to the attention of the authorities in connection to the firearms seizures. Please use the drop down menu / Which are the 5 most frequent items seized together with firearms, their parts and components and ammunition? Please use the drop down menu.

- TRACING: Please indicate the number of the seized firearms which were: Registered in your country / Registered in another country / Non registered / Unknown
- Please indicate the number of the firearms which were registered in your country at the time of seizure, in relation to their ownership: Civilian possession / State institutions / Commercial entity
- INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: Please indicate the 5 main countries which have cooperated with your country in relation to the firearms seizures / Please indicate the 5 main countries with which your country has cooperated in relation to seizures in foreign countries / Please indicate the 5 main countries to which your country has sent tracing requests / Please indicate the 5 main countries from which your country has received tracing requests
- ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: Use the space below to make notes and comments, to clarify any of the information contained in this questionnaire and to document any other issues that you wish to bring to the attention of UNODC. If your comment relates to a specific question in the questionnaire, please indicate the number of the question

SIGNIFICANT SEIZURES REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS:

- FIREARMS, THEIR PARTS AND COMPONENTS, AND AMMUNITION: Case#; Seizure ID (seizure date, operation name); Location (country, place); Firearms identification (type, make model, caliber, action, country of manufacture and of legal import); Ammunition (No. seizures, type), Parts & components (No. seizures, type); Seizure context (offence leading to seizure); Remarks
- TRAFFICKING ROUTES AND METHODS: Case#; Trafficking route (country of departure, transit country, destination country); Trafficking method (type of routing, location, hiding place, transportation mode); Remarks
- TRAFFICKERS: Case#; Number of traffickers, Trafficker details (nationality, age, gender); Remarks
- TRACING: Case#; Firearm identification (type, make, model, caliber, action, country of manufacture); Registered in country (ownership); Registered in another country (country, ownership, status), Unknown registration; Remarks
- ITEMS SEIZED IN CONNECTION WITH FIREARMS: Case#; Seized items (type, quantity, unit); Remarks
- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Trafficking trends; Trafficking routes and modus operandi



STATISTICAL ANNEX



ANNEX VI

6. COUNTRY RESPONSES TO UNODC QUESTIONNAIRES¹⁰⁵

Country	Source	Quantitative info	Qualitative info
Argentina	UNODC	X	-
Benin	UNODC	N/A	-
Brazil	UNODC	X	X
Burkina Faso	UNODC	X	X
Chile	UNODC	X	X
Colombia	UNODC	X	-
Czech Republic	UNODC	X	X
Dominican Republic	UNODC	X	X
Ecuador	UNODC	X	X
El Salvador	UNODC	X	X
Eritrea	UNODC	-	X
Estonia	UNODC	X	-
Finland	UNODC	X	-
France	UNODC	X	X (2012)
Germany	UNODC	X	X
Ghana	UNODC	X	X
Greece	UNODC	X	X
Guatemala	UNODC	X	X
Iraq	UNODC	X	-
Italy	UNODC	N/A	X
Kenya	UNODC	X	-
Kuwait	UNODC	X	-
Latvia	UNODC	X	X
Lithuania	UNODC	X	X

Mexico	UNODC	X	X
Moldova	UNODC	N/A	N/A
Montenegro	UNODC	X	X
Morocco	UNODC	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	UNODC	-	X
Niger	UNODC	-	X
Nigeria	UNODC	X	X
Panama	UNODC	X	-
Peru	UNODC	X	X
Poland	UNODC	X	-
Romania	UNODC	X	X
Russia	UNODC	X	-
Saudi Arabia	UNODC	X	-
Senegal	UNODC	-	X
Spain	UNODC	X	X (2012)
Sweden	UNODC	X	X
Tajikistan	UNODC	N/A	N/A
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UNODC	X	X
Togo	UNODC	X	-
Trinidad and Tobago	UNODC	X	X
Turkey	UNODC	X	X
Turkmenistan	UNODC	N/A	-
Uruguay	UNODC	X	-
Zimbabwe	UNODC	X	-

¹⁰⁵ In addition to the data collected through the questionnaires, this Study also includes data on Costa Rica and Serbia obtained from publicly available official governmental sources.



ANNEX VII

7. FIREARM SEIZURES BY YEAR

REPORTING YEAR

State	Category	REPORTING YEAR					Metadata (*)
		2010	2011	2012	2013	2013	
Argentina	Ammunition	-	-	-	-	-	Data provided from 2004 to 2014 - Data from the Ministry of Justice, RENAR
	Firearms	1 872	2 502	9 568	4 218		
	Parts and components	2	4	7	-		
Brazil	Ammunition		203 718		62 912		Data from Brazilian Federal police
	Firearms		39 467		13 048		
	Parts and components		-		-		
Burkina Faso	Ammunition	-	-	-	-	-	Data from Commission nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères
	Firearms	-	174	852	1 231		
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-		
Chile	Ammunition	7 030	9 330	28 482	386 448		Data from Dirección General de Moviliza- ción Nacional
	Firearms	3 460	3 699	3 631	6 229		
	Parts and components	5 441	18	11	205		
Colombia	Ammunition		-		851 414**		Data from (*) Policía Nacional - Observato- rio del Delito, Comando General de las Fu- erzas Militares / (**) Ministerio de Defensa
	Firearms	44 572*	37 987*	38 903*	38 236**		
	Parts and components		-		-		
Costa Rica	Ammunition		-		-		Data from Ministerio de Seguridad Pública
	Firearms		7 725		-		
	Parts and components		-		-		
Czech Republic	Ammunition		400 000				Data from Ministry of Interior. Data related to organized groups, cases involving multip- le criminal activities or foreigners
	Firearms		46				
	Parts and components		-				
Dominican Republic	Ammunition	-	-	-	-		Data from the Intendencia de Armas del Mi- nisterio de Interior y Policía
	Firearms	1 104	948	1 266	713		
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-		

REPORTING YEAR

State	Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	Metadata (*)
Ecuador	Ammunition	22 253	3 301	3 095 522	399 845	Data from Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad
	Firearms	514	4 606	5 171	3 739	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
El Salvador	Ammunition	353	277	167	-	Data from Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública
	Firearms	4 837	4 456	7 726	-	
	Parts and components	29	330	0	-	
Estonia	Ammunition	-	766	-	-	Data from Estonian Ministry of the Interior
	Firearms	-	21	-	-	
	Parts and components	-	27	-	-	
Finland	Ammunition	-	-	-	-	Data from National Bureau of Investigation
	Firearms	2 783	3 026	2 642	3 149	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
France	Ammunition	-	17 102	-	556 064	Data from Directorate for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament
	Firearms	-	536	-	825	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	236	
Germany	Ammunition	-	1 538 479	-	-	Data from the German Federal Criminal Police / Zollkriminalamt
	Firearms	-	43 543	-	-	
	Parts and components	-	490	-	-	
Ghana	Ammunition	1 732	200	3 888 618	1 607	Data from National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons
	Firearms	24	28	73	428	
	Parts and components	2	1	17	1	
Greece	Ammunition	-	14 208	-	-	Data from State Security Division/ Hellenic Headquarters
	Firearms	-	133	-	-	
	Parts and components	-	873	-	-	
Guatemala	Ammunition	-	-	-	12 239	Data from Dirección General de Control de Armas y Municiones / Ministerio de Gobernación
	Firearms	4 580	4 069	4 375	4 408	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	

REPORTING YEAR

State	Category	REPORTING YEAR				Metadata (*)
		2010	2011	2012	2013	
Iraq	Ammunition	470 728	293 006	467 240	-	Data from the Ministry of Interior
	Firearms	10 949	17 281	11 820	-	
	Parts and components	585	193	221	-	
Kenya	Ammunition		104			Data from the Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government
	Firearms		2 134			
	Parts and components		-			
Kuwait	Ammunition		746		1 826	N/A
	Firearms		41		84	
	Parts and components		-		-	
Latvia	Ammunition	961	3 275	4 349	1 088	Data from Ministry of the Interior / Customs Criminal Board of State Revenue Service of Republic of Latvia
	Firearms	23	120	27	16	
	Parts and components	0	107	9	0	
Lithuania	Ammunition	-	1	18	359	Data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania / State Border Guard Service / Information and Communications department under MI
	Firearms	183	170	115	204	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	7	
Mexico	Ammunition	3 442 020	4 163 577	3 107 903	1 273 571	Data from Agencia de Investigación Criminal
	Firearms	34 287	40 996	25 803	14 467	
	Parts and components	98	106	38	15	
Montenegro	Ammunition	8 666	4 292	2 361	25 819	Data from Ministry of Interior Police Directorate
	Firearms	379	453	319	411	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
Niger	Ammunition	-	-	3 309	-	Data from Gendarmerie National
	Firearms	-	-	213	-	
	Parts and components	-	-	68	-	

REPORTING YEAR

State	Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	Metadata (*)
Panama	Ammunition	-	-	-	-	Data from Policia Nacional
	Firearms	1 936	3 011	1 955	-	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
Peru	Ammunition	-	-	-	-	Data from Superintendencia Nacional de Control de Servicios de Seguridad, Armas, Municiones y Explosivos de Uso Civil-SUCAMEC
	Firearms	3 820	2 702	1 416	2 352	
	Parts and components	21	30	37	21	
Poland	Ammunition	4 851	1 860	136 131	90 810	Data from Ministry of Interior
	Firearms	2 269	1 577	1 850	1 567	
	Parts and components	606	485	1 001	367	
Romania	Ammunition	-	6 438	292	-	Data from General Inspectorate of Romanian Police
	Firearms	99	84	86	86	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
Russian Federation	Ammunition	15 379	2 212	1 630	106 246	Data from the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation
	Firearms	47	2 233	18	56	
	Parts and components	2	30	105	51	

REPORTING YEAR

Saudi Arabia	Ammunition	-	-	751 486	Trafficked into Saudi Arabia. Reference period: 15/11/2012 - 03/04/2014	
	Firearms	-	-	36 621		
	Parts and components	-	-	12 092		
Serbia	Ammunition	-	-	9 456	Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia	
	Firearms	-	668	1 258		
	Parts and components	-	-	-		
Spain	Ammunition	-	-	75 093	(*) Data received in 2012 as part of UNODC preliminary data collection / (**) Data from Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, do not include the Comunidades Autónomas de Cataluña y País Vasco	
	Firearms	116*	178*	61 (1st Q)*		1 778**
	Parts and components	-	-	-		-
Sweden	Ammunition	343	2 580	2 500	Data from Swedish Customs	
	Firearms	46	46	60	66	
	Parts and components	-	-	11	19	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Ammunition	17 918	3 778	8 682	Data from the Ministry of Interior	
	Firearms	1 279	314	179	185	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
Togo	Ammunition	-	-	-	Data From Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la Proliferation, La Circulation et le Trafic Illicites des Armes Legeres et de Petit Calibre	
	Firearms	-	-	205	-	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	
Trinidad and Tobago	Ammunition	4 883	8 578	8 823	Data from Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Crime & Problem Analysis Branch / Customs and Excise	
	Firearms	384	425	429	419	
	Parts and components	-	11	-	-	
Turkey	Ammunition	302 145		751 406	Data from Turkish National Police	
	Firearms	1 994		9 853		
	Parts and components	3 357		933		
Uruguay	Ammunition	-	-	-	Data from Ministerio del Interior	
	Firearms	-	-	-	2 640	
	Parts and components	-	-	-	-	




ANNEX VIII


8. TYPES OF SEIZED FIREARMS

State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	Combination gun	-	-	1	3
	Machine gun	1	-	1	-
	Other	-	-	2	-
	Pistol	456	704	2 671	1 517
	Revolver	787	1 288	4 845	1 519
	Rifle	296	249	1 018	696
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-
	Short shotgun	20	24	78	32
	Shotgun	311	234	943	449
	Sub-machine gun	1	3	9	2
Unspecified	-	-	-	-	



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

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

Brazil	Combination gun	0	5
	Machine gun	177	45
	Other	1	-
	Pistol	9 483	3 073
	Revolver	24 062	7 888
	Rifle	1 160	413
	Rudimentary arms	11	3
	Short shotgun	705	28
	Shotgun	3 748	1 562
	Sub-machine gun	120	31
Unspecified	0	-	




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Chile	Combination gun	170	170	263	0		
	Machine gun	0	4	4	6		
	Other	0	0	0	63		
	Pistol	506	669	589	887		
	Revolver	1 106	1 113	1 068	1 855		
	Rifle	40	43	45	172		
	Rudimentary arms	231	323	349	529		
	Short shotgun	0	0	0	0		
	Shotgun	1 327	1 377	1 313	1 502		
	Sub-machine gun	0	0	0	0		
Unspecified	0	0	0	0			







Colombia	Combination gun	-	-	-	-
	Machine gun	130	118	192	123
	Other	98	116	404	113
	Pistol	10 519	8 238	7 957	6 936
	Revolver	23 623	20 174	18 805	16 466
	Rifle	1 288	819	2 070	568
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-
	Shotgun	8 914	8 522	9 475	9 940
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-
Unspecified	-	-	-	-	











State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Dominican Republic	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	803	732	911	501		
	Revolver	141	134	250	136		
	Rifle	-	-	-	-		
	Rudimentary arms	72	16	7	6		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	80	66	98	70		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			
Ecuador	Combination gun	-	1	12	6		
	Machine gun	5	7	6	9		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	44	203	432	310		
	Revolver	385	3 698	3 053	2 323		
	Rifle	3	6	17	25		
	Rudimentary arms	11	323	814	212		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	52	306	604	636		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			





State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
El Salvador	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	32	2	-		
	Other	67	61	123	-		
	Pistol	2 182	2 026	4 004	-		
	Revolver	1 558	1 448	2 011	-		
	Rifle	291	262	437	-		
	Rudimentary arms	119	126	184	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	559	473	878	-		
	Sub-machine gun	20	-	36	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			
Estonia	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-		
	Other	-	5	-	-		
	Pistol	-	4	-	-		
	Revolver	-	2	-	-		
	Rifle	-	-	-	-		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Sub-machine gun	-	10	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			



State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Finland	Combination gun	30	22	18	29		
	Machine gun	39	43	55	120		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	386	448	399	413		
	Revolver	386	449	399	414		
	Rifle	677	686	686	662		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	677	770	570	612		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
France	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	4	-	14		
	Other	-	187	-	109		
	Pistol	-	111	-	222		
	Revolver	-	72	-	60		
	Rifle	-	-	-	-		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	133	-	259		
	Shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Sub-machine gun	-	19	-	7		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013
FYR Macedonia	Combination gun	-	-	-	-
	Machine gun	9	1	-	-
	Other	6	12	7	9
	Pistol	101	81	65	60
	Revolver	10	10	5	15
	Rifle	87	49	68	58
	Rudimentary arms	-	3	-	-
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-
	Shotgun	-	-	-	-
	Sub-machine gun	4	136	14	22
Unspecified	1 062	22	-	-	

2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)





2010-2013





Germany	Combination gun	-
	Machine gun	122
	Other	18 049
	Pistol	12 897
	Revolver	3 107
	Rifle	8 533
	Rudimentary arms	140
	Short shotgun	-
	Shotgun	-
	Sub-machine gun	519
Unspecified	176	



2010 - 2013







State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Ghana	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-		
	Other	-	-	-	286		
	Pistol	7	10	1	26		
	Revolver	-	-	1	4		
	Rifle	-	-	10	5		
	Rudimentary arms	12	14	20	86		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	5	4	41	21		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2012	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Greece	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	-	72	-	-		
	Revolver	16	-	-	-		
	Rifle	99	-	-	-		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	3	-	-	-		
	Sub-machine gun	9	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Guatemala	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	23	4	1	2		
	Other	143	143	138	150		
	Pistol	2 737	2 375	2 695	2 914		
	Revolver	805	703	766	744		
	Rifle	158	137	74	56		
	Rudimentary arms	273	253	285	297		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	433	452	419	395		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			
Iraq	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	467	605	677	-		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	1 444	1 443	1 459	-		
	Revolver	-	-	-	-		
	Rifle	9 016	15 158	9 624	-		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	22	75	60	-		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Kenya	Combination gun		0				
	Machine gun		14				
	Other		-				
	Pistol		133				
	Revolver		29				
	Rifle		1 752				
	Rudimentary arms		163				
	Short shotgun		-				
	Shotgun		25				
	Sub-machine gun		18				
Unspecified		-					





Kuwait	Combination gun	-	-	-	-
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-
	Other	-	-	-	-
	Pistol	26	-	-	61
	Revolver	-	-	-	-
	Rifle	7	-	-	12
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-
	Shotgun	8	-	-	11
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-
Unspecified	-	-	-	-	








State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Mexico	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	100	77	75	23		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	9 664	9 966	6 305	2 236		
	Revolver	2 961	3 230	1 853	506		
	Rifle	13 826	16 490	13 573	9 457		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	-	5 035	2 406	542		
	Sub-machine gun	377	367	255	103		
Unspecified	3 363	5 130	3 563	1 600			







Monte-negro	Combination gun	-	-	-	-
	Machine gun	21	19	11	22
	Other	-	-	-	-
	Pistol	195	273	145	162
	Revolver	11	10	14	12
	Rifle	22	24	30	53
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-
	Shotgun	81	74	79	110
	Sub-machine gun	4	3	9	4
Unspecified	15	24	3	15	









State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Peru	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-		
	Other	9	13	7	3		
	Pistol	681	637	624	777		
	Revolver	1 017	880	616	1 107		
	Rifle	145	81	49	101		
	Rudimentary arms	1 562	760	2	98		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	358	148	92	236		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-		
Unspecified	48	183	26	30			
Poland	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	168	158	184	162		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	262	201	216	219		
	Revolver	263	201	215	220		
	Rifle	167	159	184	161		
	Rudimentary arms	118	84	102	86		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	168	158	184	161		
	Sub-machine gun	37	47	17	23		
Unspecified	54	47	147	24			




State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Serbia	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-		
	Other	-	33	-	-		
	Pistol	-	223	-	-		
	Revolver	-	222	-	-		
	Rifle	-	190	-	-		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	-		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	-		
	Shotgun	-	-	-	-		
Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-			
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			





Spain	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	-	-	-	24		
	Other	-	-	-	-		
	Pistol	-	-	-	926		
	Revolver	-	-	-	256		
	Rifle	-	-	-	171		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	15		
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	8		
	Shotgun	-	-	-	378		
Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	-			
Unspecified	-	-	-	-			








State	Firearms type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013	2013 or latest available year (unless otherwise specified)
Turkey	Combination gun	-	-	-	-		
	Machine gun	6	6		3		
	Other				52		
	Pistol	1 769	1 769		190		
	Revolver	22	22		417		
	Rifle	197	197		7 587		
	Rudimentary arms	-	-		-		
	Short shotgun	-	-		-		
	Shotgun	614	614		1 604		
	Sub-machine gun	-	-		-		
Unspecified	-	-		-			



Uruguay	Combination gun	-	-	-	-
	Machine gun	-	-	-	-
	Other	-	-	-	-
	Pistol	-	-	-	557
	Revolver	-	-	-	1 211
	Rifle	-	-	-	398
	Rudimentary arms	-	-	-	0
	Short shotgun	-	-	-	15
	Shotgun	-	-	-	309
	Sub-machine gun	-	-	-	4
Unspecified	-	-	-	146	





ANNEX IX

9. MAKE OF SEIZED FIREARMS

Information provided in response to the following question: please indicate the 5 most frequent makes of the seized firearms.

State	Make (%)	REPORTING YEAR			
		2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	Boito		2.0		2.2
	CBC		2.9		3.5
	Not Identified		4.4		3.6
	Rossi		17.5		17.9
	Taurus		57.7		58.0
Burkina Faso	Rudimentary firearms	-	36.0	36.0	44.8
	Not Identified	-	23.2	23.2	14.1
	Kalashnikov type	-	40.7	40.7	41.2
Chile*	Baikal	-	-	-	101
	Taurus	-	-	-	340
	Rossi	-	-	-	187
	Pasper	-	-	-	348
	Smith & Wesson	-	-	-	245
Dominican Republic	Bersa	14.0	13.0	21.0	18.0
	Carandai	33.0	38.0	24.0	34.0
	CZ	10.0	5.0	12.0	13.0
	S&W	19.0	23.0	11.0	14.0
	Taurus	24.0	21.0	32.0	21.0
Ecuador	Artesanal	75.0	80.0	59.0	62.0
	Beretta	3.0	2.0	5.0	5.0
	Browning	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0
	Mossberg	10.0	14.0	27.0	23.0
	Taurus	10.0	3.0	7.0	8.0

* Except for Chile, providing absolute counts, the information presented is expressed as percentage of annual totals. The information submitted does not always refer to the make of firearms. At times states provided models or type of identified firearms instead.

REPORTING YEAR

State	Make (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
El Salvador	Colt	3.1	3.1	2.9	-
	Maverick	4.3	3.9	4.0	-
	Ranger	4.0	2.5	2.9	-
	Smith & Wesson	6.8	11.1	11.5	-
	Taurus	4.2	6.6	7.5	-
Estonia	Homemade	-	19.0	-	-
	Kalashnikov type	-	4.0	-	-
	UZI	-	19.0	-	-
	VZ-26	-	14.0	-	-
	VZ-58	-	9.0	-	-
Ghana	Brazil	-	-	2.6	0.2
	Germany	-	-	-	4.7
	Ghana	50.0	-	27.4	20.0
	Italy	-	-	-	0.7
	Russia	8.3	-	40.3	3.0
	Unknown	42.0	-	-	-
Guatemala	CZ	27.0	25.0	24.0	26.0
	Daewoo	18.0	17.0	20.0	0.2
	Glock	-	-	15.0	19.0
	Jericho	21.0	22.0	22.0	22.0
	Maverick	-	18.0	-	-
	Ranger	15.0	-	-	-
	Smith & Wesson	18.0	18.0	18.0	17.0
Netherlands	Glock	-	-	-	-
	Walther	-	-	-	-
	FN	-	-	-	-
	CZ	-	-	-	-
	Zastava	-	-	-	-
Niger	AK 47 - Kalashnikov type	-	-	50.0	-
	HKG3	-	-	35.0	-
	FAL	-	-	5.0	-
	M14	-	-	5.0	-
	Autres	-	-	5.0	-

REPORTING YEAR

State	Make (%)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Romania	Beretta	4.04	-	-	-
	Bruni	-	-	3.48	-
	Ekol	12.12	17.85	18.60	19.76
	Gamo	7.07	16.66	15.11	3.48
	Hatsan	5.05	8.33	19.76	-
	Markhor	-	-	-	13.95
	Valtro	18.18	-	-	-
	Voltran	-	4.76	-	-
	Walther	-	4.76	4.65	3.48
	Zoraki	-	-	-	5.81
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Automatic and semi-automatic pistols	-	-	-	11.9
	Air guns, gas pistols and signal pistols	-	-	3.9	-
	Grenades	42.7	-	-	-
	Other (RPG, hand bombs and granates)	-	-	-	16.3
	Mines	26.9	-	-	-
	Pistol	7.9	25.7	36.3	32.4
	Semi-automatic pistol	-	43.3	7.8	-
	Rifles	6.8	15.6	38.0	31.3
	Hand granates	10.7	4.7	-	-
	Revolvers	-	3.1	-	8.1
RPG, mines, hand granades	-	-	11.1	-	
Trinidad and Tobago	Beretta	-	-	-	-
	Colt	-	-	-	-
	Ruger	-	-	-	-
	Smith & Wesson	-	-	-	-
	Winchester	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	Doberman	-	-	-	4.6
	Glock	-	-	-	3.7
	Rossi	-	-	-	5.3
	Smith & Wesson	-	-	-	9.4
	Taurus	-	-	-	6.6



ANNEX X

10. ITEMS RELATED TO SEIZED FIREARMS

Information provided in response to the following question: Which are the 5 most frequent items seized together with firearms, their parts and components and ammunition? The following choice of items was provided as a drop-down menu: money, drugs, precursors, counterfeit goods, precious metal, cultural property, ivory, endangered species, contraband goods.

Responses are ranked from 1 to 5, according to the order given by responding states.

State	Items seized together with firearms	REPORTING YEAR			
		2010	2011	2012	2013
Brazil	Contraband goods		2		2
	Counterfeit goods		4		4
	Drugs		1		1
	Money		3		3
	Precursors		5		5
Burkina Faso	Contraband goods				2
	Drugs				3
	Money				1
	Other				5
	Precious metals				4
Chile	Counterfeit goods		3		
	Drugs		2		
	Money		1		
Czech Republic	Contraband goods		2		
	Drugs		1		
	Money		3		
	Other		4		

REPORTING YEAR

State	Items seized together with firearms	2010	2011	2012	2013
Ecuador	Contraband goods	3	3	3	3
	Drugs	1	1	1	1
	Money	4	4	4	4
	Other	5	5	5	5
	Precursors	2	2	2	2
El Salvador	Counterfeit goods	4	4	4	
	Drugs	2	2	2	
	Money	1	1	1	
	Precious metals	5	5	5	
	Precursors	3	3	3	
Estonia	Other		1		
Latvia	Contraband goods		1		
	Drugs	1			1
Lithuania	Contraband goods		2		2
	Drugs		1		1
Montenegro	Contraband goods	3	3	3	3
	Drugs	1	1	1	1
	Money	2	2	2	2
	Other	9	9	9	9
The Netherlands	Drugs				1
	Money				2
	Precursors				3
Trinidad and Tobago	Drugs	1	1	1	1
	Money	2	2	2	2
	Other	3	3	3	3
Turkey	Other		1		1



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