

# **Guidelines for the Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials**

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# CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THESE GUIDELINES

## 1.1 Background to these Guidelines

As corporate activities everywhere become increasingly global and extend beyond national borders, the volume of international commercial transactions that Japanese companies engage in is increasing steadily. In order to ensure the acquisition and maintenance of opportunities in the conduct of business in overseas markets, fair competition based on prices and quality of products and services should be the norm, and unfair competition through bribery of foreign public officials should be prevented.

This understanding is shared globally, which led to the development of the Anti-Bribery Convention (“Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions”<sup>1</sup>), which was adopted by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1997. In accordance with this Anti-Bribery Convention, signatory countries, led primarily by developed nations, have been working in concert towards achieving mutually equivalent measures to prevent bribery of foreign public officials<sup>2</sup>.

### Main Points of the Convention

#### (1) Elements of the Offence

The offence of bribery of foreign public officials is committed when the following elements apply:

- any person intentionally
- offers, promises or gives any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries,
- to a foreign public official,
- for that official or for a third party,
- in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties,
- in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.

#### (2) Definition of Foreign Public Official

"Foreign public official" means:

- any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign

<sup>1</sup> This Convention may hereinafter be abbreviated as the "OECD Convention" or, more simply, the "Convention." For information regarding the Convention and the Commentaries adopted together with the Convention in November 1997, refer to: <https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm> (text of the Convention and that of its Commentaries). For the Japanese translation of the text of the Convention, refer to: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oecd/jo\\_shotori\\_hon.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oecd/jo_shotori_hon.html).

<sup>2</sup> This Convention is also open to non-OECD member countries, and the signatories as of July 2019 are 36 OECD member countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) plus the eight other countries of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Russia and South Africa (44 signatories in total).

country, whether appointed or elected (including a local public entity in a foreign country);

- any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency (i.e. an entity constituted under public laws to carry out specific tasks in the public interest);
- any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public enterprise; and
- any official or agent of a public international organization.

(3) Sanctions

- The bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties;
- The range of penalties shall be comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the Party's own public officials;
- Legal persons shall also be held liable for the bribery of foreign public officials;
- The bribe itself, the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, shall be subject to seizure and confiscation, or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect shall be applicable; and
- The imposition of additional civil or administrative sanctions shall also be considered.

(4) Jurisdiction

- Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory; and
- Each Party which has jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for offences committed abroad shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the bribery of a foreign public official, according to the same principles.

(5) Money Laundering

- Each Party which has made bribery of its own public official a predicate offence for the purpose of the application of its money laundering legislation shall do so on the same terms for the bribery of a foreign public official, without regard to the place where the bribery occurred.

(6) Miscellaneous

- In addition to the above, measures in such areas as accounting, mutual legal assistance, extradition, and follow-up on the implementation of the Convention by the signatory countries shall also be taken in conjunction in order to ensure the effect of the Convention.

In concluding the OECD Convention, Japan has been taking actions including a revision to the Unfair Competition Prevention Act in 1998 (which came into force in February 1999)<sup>3</sup> and

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<sup>3</sup> A partial revision was made to the Unfair Competition Prevention Act in June 2001 in order to clarify the definition of foreign public official, etc. and in May 2004 to provide that a Japanese national who commits an offense of bribery of foreign public officials outside of Japan is punishable in Japan.

each signatory country is also working on measures including the creation of criminal penalties for the bribery of foreign public officials<sup>4</sup>. (For the details of the measures taken in Japan, refer to Chapters 3 and 4.)

In recent years, worldwide concern for the problem of fraud and corruption including bribery of foreign public officials has been showing a rapid increase. Calls have been made for enhanced action to combat the problem of fraud and corruption, and the issue is specifically mentioned in summit-level documents, including those issued at the Evian Summit in June 2003 ("Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency: A G8 Declaration"<sup>5</sup>), the APEC Leaders' Declaration in October 2003 ("Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future"<sup>6</sup>), at APEC in November 2004 (approval of the "Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency" and "APEC Course of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring Transparency"), at APEC in July 2007 (approval of "APEC Conduct Principles for Public Officials" and "APEC Code of Conduct for Business: Business Integrity and Transparency Principles for the Private Sector"), at G20 in November 2010 (adoption of "G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan" by G20 Leaders<sup>7</sup>) and in the APEC Leaders' Declaration in November 2014 ("Annex H – Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption"<sup>8</sup>). A commitment to play a leading role in the global effort to prevent corruption was also clearly stated in the G20 Osaka Summit Leaders' Declaration in Japan in June 2019. As another initiative, the United Nations hosted, with extensive participation from developed countries and developing countries alike, the signing ceremony for the "UN Convention Against Corruption" (UNCAC) in December 2003, which, among other things, includes provisions requiring legal measures against the acceptance of bribes by domestic public officials, and against the bribery of domestic or foreign public officials. Japan is a signatory to UNCAC<sup>9</sup>.

In consideration of these changes in the surroundings, all stakeholders in Japan are requested again to make efforts to raise awareness regarding the issue of bribery of foreign public officials,

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<sup>4</sup> For the discussion on the bribery of foreign public officials at the time of development of these Guidelines (2004), also refer to "Implementation of Measures for Effective Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials" (February 6, 2004; by the Subcommittee on Corporate Activities Related to International Commercial Transactions, of the Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee, of the Industrial Structure Council) at:

<https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chizai/chiteki/pdf/03zowaishoui.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary Japanese translation of the declaration is available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/summit/evian\\_paris03/ftk\\_z.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/summit/evian_paris03/ftk_z.html).

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary Japanese translation of the declaration is available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/2003/shuno\\_sen.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/2003/shuno_sen.html).

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary Japanese translation of "Action Plan" is available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/g20/seoul2010/annex3.html>.

<sup>8</sup> For the details of the declaration, please refer to: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000059616.pdf>. APEC member countries/economies have determined to strengthen practical cooperation with anti-corruption policies and through the use of anti-corruption mechanism and platform such as APEC Network of Anti-Corruption Authorities and Law Enforcement Agencies (ACT-NET), have committed to enhance cooperation with and arrangement of deportation and extradition of corrupt public officials as well as forfeiture and collection of proceeds from corrupt practices.

<sup>9</sup> In order to promote anti-corruption cooperation among signatory countries and to consider effective review process for the enforcement of the convention, a conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention is held every two years. Please refer to <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html>.

etc.

## **1.2 Objectives behind the Development of these Guidelines**

Bribing a foreign public official can constitute a bribery offense both in the country of that public official and can also violate the Unfair Competition Prevention Act of Japan. Whether criminal penalties apply or not, however, companies engaging in international commercial transactions are in any case expected to behave in a manner so as not to be mistaken for fostering fraud or corruption, from the standpoint of corporate governance.

Taking a preventative approach is extremely important in addressing the issue of fraud and corruption. Without this preventative approach, once a scandal has arisen, there is a likelihood that it will cause irreparable damage to the company's reputation.

In light of these concerns, **the objective behind the development of these Guidelines is to support companies involved in international commercial transactions to voluntarily take a preventative approach to the prevention of bribery of foreign public officials.** Specifically, these Guidelines provide information that can be useful as a reference when taking measures for the prevention of bribery of foreign public officials. It is our hope that companies can use this information as a tool to improve their understanding and raise their ability to predict the offense of bribery of foreign public officials.

Companies are expected to review existing measures and apply new measures as necessary with reference to these Guidelines, and to take specific actions such as dissemination of information and internal training on issues targeting its departments pertaining to international commercial transactions.

## **1.3 Structure of these Guidelines and Points to Note**

In Chapter 2 of these Guidelines, the compliance system for the prevention of bribery of foreign public officials that companies should be aiming for will be presented. In order for the company to smoothly develop specific prevention measures as thus presented, the scope of punishable acts under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act will subsequently be discussed in Chapter 3, which is followed by basic information on relevant issues in and outside of Japan in Chapter 4.

Note that the internal control methodologies referred to in these Guidelines are based on the results of analysis of the current situation as it stood when these Guidelines were developed or revised. The level of internal controls required of a company necessarily is changing and evolving according to changes in the economic and social environment. Companies need to heed this fact and be continually reviewing internal measures for further refinement.

As there are also still very few court cases at this point in time that have ruled on the offense of bribery of foreign public officials under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, details will

have to be added later once there are more cases available to reference. For that reason, readers are asked to note that the interpretations, etc. of laws described in these Guidelines are based on judgments made at this point in time.



## CHAPTER 2: COMPLIANCE SYSTEM FOR PREVENTION OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS BY BUSINESS

This Chapter illustrates examples of measures, etc. that might be referred to for the purposes of augmenting the effect of preventative measures against bribery of foreign public officials at the level of the individual company and the company group and improving the effectiveness of compliance systems for prevention of bribery of foreign public officials ("**Preventive Systems**") as part of an internal control system<sup>10,11</sup>.

### 2.1 Basic Views

#### (1) Background

Social responsibility of business is becoming increasingly weighty as consumer awareness increases and business operations become more and more internationalized, etc. Companies across the board are making active efforts in the area of internal controls, in their attempt to ensure statutory compliance and to add more efficiency to their operations, etc.

Such efforts in the area of internal control are also extremely effective in the prevention of bribery of foreign public officials. This point is clearly shown by the agreement reached during the Evian Summit in June 2003 that governments should encourage the private sector to develop compliance programs in respect of bribery of foreign public officials<sup>12</sup> and by the adoption of the "APEC Code of Conduct for Business: Business Integrity and Transparency Principles for the Private Sector"<sup>13</sup> at the APEC Ministerial Meeting in September 2007 and by the inclusion of the "Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance"<sup>14</sup> in Annex II to the "OECD Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" adopted in November 2009.

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<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of these Guidelines, the "internal control system" is used to mean the general term of the systems such as the information storage system and risk management system stipulated in Article 362, paragraph 4, item 6, Article 399-13, paragraph 1, item 1 (b) and (c) or Article 416, paragraph 1, item 1 (b) and (e) of the Companies Act, and Article 100, Article 110-4 or Article 112 of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Companies Act, namely, a "system to secure the properness of operations."

<sup>11</sup> The measures illustrated in this chapter do not represent legal obligations and do not uniformly require all measures to be taken. However, it is expected that each company will promptly start examining and taking measures to establish and operate Preventive Systems appropriately, referring to the examples given.

<sup>12</sup> "Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency: A G8 Declaration" sets out, "2. We will strengthen the enforcement of our Anti-Bribery Laws and will encourage the private sector to develop related compliance programs. We will ... 2.2 encourage the private sector to develop, implement and enforce corporate compliance programs relating to our domestic laws criminalizing foreign bribery."

<sup>13</sup> The gist of the APEC Joint Ministerial Statement is as follows: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/2007/kaku\\_ksk.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/2007/kaku_ksk.html). The content of such norm is as follows: [https://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/\\_media/Files/Groups/ACT/07\\_act\\_codebrochure.ashx](https://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/_media/Files/Groups/ACT/07_act_codebrochure.ashx).

<sup>14</sup> The said guidance is described from pages 30 through 32: [https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf).

## (2) Necessity of Establishing and Operating a Compliance System for Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials

The system for detecting the offense of bribery of foreign public officials has been strengthened in Japan.<sup>15</sup> Also, a number of cases have been detected overseas especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, including cases in which a Japanese company was subject to punishment and a case in which a penalty of over 100 billion yen was imposed.

Further, if a company is actually charged with bribing foreign public officials, such company will not only face criminal punishment but also be burdened with enormous loss such as termination of business transactions with its customers or damage to its brand value.<sup>16</sup>

Bribery of foreign public officials concerns not only overseas companies. We should reaffirm that this is a material risk that Japanese companies now face in reality when conducting business overseas.

In Japan, directors of companies are required by judicial precedents to establish internal control systems to avoid fraudulent acts that are normally foreseeable<sup>17</sup> as a part of their duty to give the due care of prudent manager, and in light of this, if a company is engaged in any business in which there is an ordinarily foreseeable risk of bribery of foreign public officials ("**Bribery Risk**") it must establish Preventive Systems necessary to comply with domestic and foreign applicable laws and to protect its corporate value.

In addition, while establishment of Preventive Systems is positioned as part of internal control systems, it can be expected to be taken into consideration when imposing criminal punishment (dual criminal liability provision of juridical persons). That is, based on judicial precedents, a juridical person can potentially be punished on the ground of "presumed negligence on the part of the enterprise in that it did not exercise necessary care in selection and oversight or in the prevention of illegal acts" (so called "theory of presumptive negligence"<sup>18</sup>). Therefore, the establishment of Preventive Systems can serve

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<sup>15</sup> A police officer in charge of measures to prevent bribery of foreign officials is designated at each prefectural police department. Also, each special investigation division in district prosecutors' offices with special responsibility for economic and financial crimes similarly has a public prosecutor in charge.

<sup>16</sup> For example, such company may be subject to sanctions such as suspension of transactions by international financial institutions, or placed on an exclusion list by multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, or refused trade insurance. Please refer to Chapter 4.2 ([page 51]) for further details.

<sup>17</sup> In relation to Japan System Techniques case (Supreme Court Ruling issued by the First Petty Bench on July 9, 2009; *Hanrei Jiho* No. 2055-147) where the representative director was defendant, the Supreme Court ruled, with respect to whether or not such representative director owed damages under Article 350 of the Companies Act, that the representative director cannot be said to have been in breach of his obligation to have a risk management system in place to prevent fraudulent acts that are normally envisaged, because a management system capable of preventing such fraudulent acts was established, and that, therefore, such fraudulent act can be said to have been conducted in a manner that cannot easily be envisaged, and there appear to be no special circumstance that might have made such fraud foreseeable.

<sup>18</sup> In this regard, attention should be paid to suggestions that "providing general and abstract warning is not

as a piece of evidence to show that an enterprise has exercised such care.

In the case of both a director's liability under the Companies Act (civil liability) or the application of dual criminal liability provision of juridical persons (criminal liability), the company is not necessarily accountable for an employee's act of bribery.

### **(3) Internal Control Concept Applied in these Guidelines**

A variety of efforts are being undertaken both internally and externally to review methodologies of corporate internal control<sup>19</sup>. In particular, it is noteworthy that as part of a 2014 amendment to the Companies Act, provisions concerning improvement of internal control systems for corporate groups consisting of a stock company (*kabushiki kaisha*) and its subsidiaries, which were previously stipulated in the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Companies Act were upgraded to law and that it is also now required to provide an overview of the status of internal control systems in business reporting.

The internal control methodologies discussed in this Chapter provide an **illustration of the target approach when establishing and operating the Preventive Systems, focusing on the prevention of the bribery of foreign public officials**, by referring to and respecting existing achievements in various areas.

### **(4) Perspectives for Establishing and Operating Preventive Systems**

When establishing and operating Preventive Systems, it is particularly important to keep in mind (i) the importance of the attitude and message from top management, (ii) a risk-based approach, and (iii) the need to take action at a subsidiary<sup>20</sup> level based on the Bribery Risk.

#### **(i) Importance of the Attitude of and Message from Top Management**

Looking at cases of punishment in Japan and foreign countries, typically employees in the field have tended to "justify" their acts of bribery in terms of its benefit to the company. Then, only top management can prevent such wrongful perceptions from taking root. It is effective for the top management to clearly and repeatedly show the following to all employees:

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sufficient for the non-existence of negligence exemption to be admitted; it is necessary to have actively provided specific instructions for the purpose of preventing breaches in an active endeavor to prevent the breach. Consequently, liability will be pursued strictly and it will be difficult in practice to obtain the exemption." Criminal law, General Part [2nd Ed.]", page 41, by Atsushi Yamaguchi (in 2007, *Yuhikaku*).

<sup>19</sup> One of the examples of such efforts is the "Study Group on Risk Management and Internal Control" of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. This Study Group formulated and published the "Internal Control in the New Era of Risks ~ Guideline for Internal Control That Function Together with Risk Management ~" in June 2003 to assist the efforts of companies and industry. The text of those guidelines and a summary thereof are available on the following website:

<https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1368617/www.meti.go.jp/kohosys/press/0004205/index.html>

<sup>20</sup> For the purpose of these Guidelines, the term "subsidiaries" shall be used as a general term which includes third and fourth tier subsidiaries in line with the standard for de facto control under the Companies Act. For the definition of the subsidiaries under the Companies Act, refer to Article 2, item 3 of the Companies Act, Article 2, paragraph 1, Article 3, paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Companies Act.

- Not using wrongful means to obtain a profit but rather complying with the law without hesitation, is always the better choice for the company in the long run.
- Employees that earn profits for the company by wrongful means are not valued by the company; conversely, they will be subject to severe punishment.
- If there ever was a corporate culture of disrespect for compliance in the past, these ‘old attitudes’ must be weeded out.

**(ii) Risk-based Approach**

Business divisions, locations and business activities with a high Bribery Risk, should take measures to reduce risk with a focus on formulating and implementing approval rules for high-risk activities, educating employees and conducting internal audits\*, while business divisions, etc. with lower risk, may choose more simplified measures.

\* Note: These measures may include, for instance, requiring approval from progressively higher levels of management seniority as risk increases, or providing education, implementing audits or other similar measures with a higher frequency and more broadly targeted as risk increases.

The degree of Bribery Risk should be generally assessed with overall consideration of key points such as the Bribery Risk of the relevant country, the Bribery Risk of the relevant business area and the types of activities that have the potential to be used for offering bribery.

As to the degree of country risk, Asia, Middle East, Africa, South America, etc. are generally considered to have high Bribery Risk.<sup>21,22</sup>

As to business area, Bribery Risk is generally considered to be high when projects tend to foster close relationships with foreign public officials, such as in cases where projects require many permits and licenses from local governments, or involve multiple dealings with foreign governments or state-owned companies.

The following are examples of types of activities that are considered to have high Bribery Risk:

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<sup>21</sup> With respect to the assessment of the bribery risk for each country, an index such as, for example, the Doing Business Report (<https://www.doingbusiness.org/reports>) annually published by World Bank Group, The Worldwide Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>), Corruption Perceptions Index of NGO/Transparency International (<https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/>) will be used.

<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, a 2014 OECD Bribery Report analyzing 427 cases that occurred in signatory countries to the OECD Anti-Bribery Conventions between February 1999 and June 2014 reports that two thirds of cases covered in the report were cases in which payments were made to public officials of so-called developed nations, etc. (public officials in 24 out of 41 of the said signatory countries, or 15 of 19 member countries of the G20 were involved in bribery). In response to this, Secretary-General Gurría stated that this dispelled the myth that corruption is confined to developing countries: <https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecd-foreign-bribery-report-9789264226616-en.htm> .

- (a) appointment and contract renewal of an advisor or negotiating enterprise (such as an agent or consultant) in relation to the obtaining of permits or licenses, or winning orders from a local government, or having dealings with a state-owned company;
- (b) selection of a joint venture partner or utilization of an SPC in a country or a business area that is considered high-risk;
- (c) M&A of a company (acquisition of shares, etc.) which has undertaken many government-related projects in the past, in a country or a business area that is considered high-risk;
- (d) participation in a public procurement that is assessed at high Bribery Risk considering the amount of the order or the type of contract, etc.; and
- (e) socializing with direct or indirect payments to foreign public officials, etc.

In order that measures can be introduced effectively under a risk-based approach, it is necessary for companies to collect sufficient information relating to applicable foreign laws (including laws and regulations relating to the offense of bribery and practices and handling thereof) and to take appropriate actions<sup>23</sup> and to obtain as much information as possible in advance concerning any country in which international commercial transactions will be newly commenced.

**(iii) Necessity of Taking Action at Subsidiaries Level Based on the Bribery Risk**

Should a subsidiary (including an overseas subsidiary) be punished for the offense of bribery of foreign public officials under applicable laws, whether domestic or foreign, its parent company is likely to incur great loss that will affect not only the value of the shares of the subsidiary (its assets), but also damage the credit of the parent company itself, often leading to damage to the corporate value of the corporate group through a decline in brand power and trust<sup>24</sup>, or worse, cause it to face criminal punishment.\*

Therefore, parent companies need to ensure that subsidiaries within the corporate group establish and operate Preventive Systems as appropriate to the degree of risk.<sup>25</sup>

\* Note: Although it is often the case that it is the overseas local entity that actually engages in or perpetrates the act of bribery, if an employee or officer, etc. of the parent company was involved, then that employee or officer, etc. is likely to be culpable as an accomplice to an offense

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<sup>23</sup> If it is difficult to collect and process information on foreign laws, regulations, conventions and customs at an individual company level, it is recommended that multiple companies operating in the same foreign country to collectively conduct research and process information through, for instance, the use of the local chamber of commerce and industry that is well versed in affairs specific to that country.

<sup>24</sup> Refer to 4.1 of "Practical Guidelines for Group Governance Systems" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; June 28, 2019).

<sup>25</sup> If a parent company needs to secure the legal means to promote development/operation of the Preventive Systems at its subsidiaries, there are means at its disposal. For example, the parent company and the subsidiary could enter into a specific agreement aside from leveraging shareholder voting to appoint or remove officers of subsidiaries.

of bribery of foreign public officials, and moreover, as stated in Section (2) above, the parent company as a juridical person is likely to be subject to punishment pursuant to dual criminal liability provisions of juridical persons.

#### **(5) Other Points to Note**

It should not be forgotten that effectively functioning Preventive Systems are not only well structured but also well operated and evaluated at an appropriate frequency and by appropriate approach.

Another point to note is that the status of establishment and operation of internal control systems, including Preventive Systems, that are generally required of a company may be evaluated differently depending on the company size, business category, and the surrounding economic and social circumstances, and the historical background, etc., and it is accordingly difficult to define uniform criteria. Therefore, companies are required to make constant efforts to regularly examine whether the level of Preventive Systems that they have developed and are using are sufficient at that point in time, and work to improve these systems with reference to those of its domestic and overseas companies in the same industry, and guidelines issued from time to time by foreign authorities<sup>26</sup>.

### **2.2 Desirable Preventive Systems Methodologies for Business<sup>27</sup>**

The following sections illustrate desirable methodologies for Preventive Systems that companies engaged in international commercial transactions should aim for in order to prevent bribery of foreign public officials<sup>28</sup>. These illustrations do not constitute statutory requirements but companies are expected to refer to these illustrations and promptly start the process of examining and taking measures to properly structure and operate Preventive Systems.

Company officers, etc. have broad discretion in establishment and operation of specific Preventive Systems at each company, taking into consideration the degree of assessed risk based on the actual situation in its business and the likelihood of having the desired effect.

In doing so, it is expected that companies will establish and operate a system that is objectively

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<sup>26</sup> For example, a resource guide that provides interpretation, etc. of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as "U.S. FCPA") (<https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download>) and guidance that provides interpretation, etc. of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 (hereinafter referred to as "U.K. UKBA") (<https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf>) have been published.

<sup>27</sup> Of the Preventive Systems, methodologies for individual company responses to emergency are described in Chapter 2.4 below.

<sup>28</sup> The internal control methodologies illustrated here follow the sequence of "development of a policy, etc. (= plan)," "implementation of specific measures (= do)," "audit of the state of implementation and management of the measures (= check)" and "review existing policy, etc. based on the outcome of the audit (= act)." As management methods of this type tend to result in continual improvements in internal control management, it is also used as a standard method by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and has already been applied by a large number of companies as well.

considered highly effective with the support of external experts to an appropriate extent, by supplementing their own experience and know-how, which can often be inadequate within a single company. However, it must be noted that the goal is for companies to establish and operate highly effective system at their own initiative, and this cannot be achieved simply by putting in place a superficial framework such as the introduction of rules or establishment of contact desks, or leaving the matter to experts.

By reference to the following examples, it is expected that measures will be implemented with different intensity for each business division, location and business activity depending on the risk inherent therein. These efforts could reduce the possibility of a company being punished or its corporate value being greatly damaged under domestic or foreign laws.

### **(1) Basic Components of Preventive Systems**

Although the specific details will greatly vary depending on the size or corporate structure of a company, among other factors, the following six elements are generally considered to be desirable.<sup>29</sup>

Incidentally, when establishing specific Preventive Systems suitable for a particular company, the COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission) framework<sup>30</sup> is also a useful reference:

- Formulation/announcement of Basic Policies<sup>31</sup> (described in Section (2) below);
- Formulation of Internal Rules (approval rules for high-risk activities such as act of socializing or appointment of agency or rules for disciplinary punishment or censure, etc.) (described in Section (3) below);
- Development of organizational frameworks (described in Section (4) and Chapter 2.4 below);
- Implementation of educational activities in the company (described in Section (5) below);
- Audit, etc. (described in Section (6) below);
- Review by the management, etc. (described in Section (7) below)

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<sup>29</sup> The U.S. FCPA resource guide illustrates, as the hallmarks of effective compliance programs, commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption, code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures, oversight, autonomy, and resources, risk assessment, training and continuing advice, incentives and disciplinary measures, third-party due diligence and payments, confidential reporting and internal investigations, continuous improvement (periodic testing and review), etc.  
<https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download>

<sup>30</sup> COSO framework was published in 1992 as a guideline for assessing the structure, development and effectiveness of internal controls. Thereafter, in response to reflecting changes in business and the environment in which businesses operated, and to the expansion of businesses and the purposes of reporting, etc., "financial reporting" was redefined simply as "reporting" in 2013 in order to effectively apply to not only to the disclosure of financial information, but also the practices of reporting purposes, operational purposes, compliance purposes pertaining to non-financial information.

<sup>31</sup> Indicates polices, codes of conduct, and compliance policies.

## **(2) Formulation/announcement of Basic Policies**

Basic Policies incorporating the following factors should be formulated in order to prevent acts of bribery of foreign public officials which violate domestic or foreign laws. In this case, it is desirable to achieve accountability for the on-site employees of the subsidiary by clarifying the policy common to the corporate group.<sup>32</sup>

- (As stated in Chapter 2.1 Section (4) Part (i) above) Have a fundamental attitude of the management clearly, "compliance over immediate profit".
- Avoid engaging in any acts of bribery of foreign public officials, etc. that could constitute the offense of bribery under the laws of the relevant country or constitute the offense of bribery of foreign public officials under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (or applicable laws of third countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom).
- Establish an internal system to prevent bribery and make efforts based on such a system.

It is important that a company's Basic Policies and Internal Rules are shared internally and thoroughly enforced, along with corporate ethics that support prevention of bribery of foreign public officials. From this perspective, it is effective if not only the management but also the Compliance Supervisors<sup>33</sup> at each business division and location, etc., who are closer to employees in the field, send messages to the same effect over and over from the same eye-level as those from management.

In addition, it is desirable to announce the Basic Policies that have been formulated for expressing the company's intention to prevent bribery within and outside the company, and also translate such policies where necessary so that they may be used not only when thoroughly informing foreign employees of the company in and out of Japan, but also when seeking understanding from foreign governments, foreign investors and business partners and customers.

## **(3) Formulation of Internal Rules**

Internal Rules incorporating the following factors should be formulated in order to ensure careful consideration of high-risk business activities within the company:

- After putting together or organizing the cases in which contacts with foreign public officials, etc.<sup>34</sup> take place, compile internal procedures and judgment criteria<sup>35</sup>, etc.

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<sup>32</sup> Refer to 2.3.3 of "Practical Guidelines for Group Governance Systems" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; June 28, 2019).

<sup>33</sup> For a definition of "Compliance Supervisor," refer to Section (4) Part (i) below.

<sup>34</sup> Contacts with foreign public officials include the welcoming or seeing off of arriving or departing officials, dining occasions, inspection trips, golfing and other entertainments, gift exchanges, hiring of persons associated with foreign officials such as children of them, and speech occasions, etc.

<sup>35</sup> Internal procedures include prior inquiries with authorized personnel such as a Compliance Supervisor (including management and appropriate departments such as the Legal Department and the Accounting Department), and notification from overseas subsidiaries to the consultation desk (hotline) or reporting desk in the main office. Possible judgment criteria might take the form of, for example, a prior decision on the amount and frequency of appropriate



for each case in a manual. In preparing the manual, it should be noted that contact with foreign public officials can occur not only overseas but also in Japan, and that in recent years, in addition to the risk of direct bribery by companies, the risk of indirect bribery through other third parties such as agents has been increasing.

In particular, using a risk-based approach, it is desirable to establish rules regarding approval requirements, decision-making procedures and recording methods, etc. for the following high-risk activities:

- (i) Any activity that could be suspected as providing an improper benefit to foreign public officials, etc. such as paying for business meals or travel expenses for visits:
  - Internal Rules consisting of approval requirements, approval procedures, recording and after-the-fact verification procedures should be formulated for each type of activity (the specific approval procedures should be ultimately decided by a person of the appropriate level of management seniority depending on the risk of the activity); and
  - When it is externally announced and widely known that payments to foreign public officials, etc. are recorded in detail at a company, this could be expected to act as a warning also to foreign public officials, etc. who may otherwise wish to demand bribes from the company's employees.
- (ii) The types of activities with high risk listed in Chapter 2.1 Section (4) Part (ii) above<sup>36</sup>
  - Pre-contract confirmation procedures (representations and warranties, covenants and due diligence ("DD")) and procedures during the term of contracts, etc. (audit, requests for reference documents, cancellation without warning or suspension of payment) should be provided.
  - For example, in appointing agents, etc., the following may be considered.\*
    - In DD, the following items should be investigated: (i) the country where the agent, etc. is located or the country in which the transaction takes place, (ii) contacts and relationship with foreign public officials, etc. in the transactions, (iii) maintenance of and compliance with Internal Rules on anti-bribery by the agent, etc., (iv) past and present bribery risks, and (v) expenditures in transactions with government agencies,

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gift offering (for ceremonial occasions, etc.) to and entertainment of foreign public officials, etc. within the scope of law, or common sense of the respective countries, the establishment of limits to entertainment applicable at each specific stages of negotiation in respect of international commercial transactions, and clarification of the stance taken towards foreign public officials, etc. as well as their family members and family-run companies.

<sup>36</sup> Taking into account the fact that using a capable agent, etc. that does not engage in act of bribery at all in a high risk country/region will lead to strengthening the competitiveness of a company, it is desirable to discover and educate appropriate agents. In addition, in relation to appointment/contract renewal of an agent, it is desirable to keep records of the facts regarding the reasons (necessity) for appointment/contract renewal of the agent, the agent's quality/aptitude, appropriateness of fees, etc. have been fully considered.

etc.

- The contract clauses should incorporate provisions such as (i) representations and warranties of compliance with laws regarding bribery by agents, etc., (ii) authority to investigate and audit agents, etc., (iii) obligations to provide materials and information such as invoices, (iv) obligations to preserve records of transactions, etc., and (v) the right to terminate the contract and claim damages if a breach of representations and warranties is found.
- Confirm that the amount to be paid is reasonable in relation to the content of the work to be outsourced.

\* For points to note when conducting M&A, refer to page 20 below.

- It should be clearly ruled that employees who have engaged in the act of bribery or violated Internal Rules will incur personnel sanctions (including, disciplinary measures)<sup>37</sup>. When a company has related Internal Rules such as employment rules, decision-making rules or rules on request for decision already in place, one option for the company is to stipulate that these rules apply to the act of bribery, in order to clarify they apply to payments to and dealings with foreign public officials, etc.
- Small Facilitation Payments (SFP)<sup>38</sup> themselves may constitute the giving of advantage “to obtain a wrongful gain in business”, so it is desirable that internal rules specify that SFP are basically prohibited<sup>39</sup>.

#### **(4) Development of Organizational Frameworks**

An organizational framework for internal control purposes that is commensurate with the company size, etc. should be established, so that duties within the company and the authority and responsibility of relevant personnel are clearly delineated. When doing so, the following points should be noted, in particular:

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<sup>37</sup> In the event of a violation, personnel sanctions are necessary to deal with the matter strictly and in accordance with the prescribed rules.

<sup>38</sup> Although there is no unique definition of Small Facilitation Payments, for example, they may be considered as payments only aiming at smooth procedure related to regular administrative services. Whether or not small facilitation payments violate the Unfair Competition Prevention Act is determined based on the presence of the intention "to obtain a wrongful gain in business". In addition, if the advantage was permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, it does not violate the Unfair Competition Prevention Act as described in p.28. Regarding treatment of facilitation payments in foreign countries, the U.S. FCPA unlike Japan has a statutory exception of facilitation payments which are made in relation to routine government action of foreign public officials, etc. without their discretion. However, whether payments are considered as such facilitation payments is determined based on not the size of the payment but substantial factors, such as the purpose of each payment. (15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1 (b), 78dd-2 (b), 78dd-3 (b), please refer to pp 25-26 in "A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act": <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download>).

With regard to the U.K. UKBA, the guidance ("Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance of The Director of the Serious Fraud Office and The Director of Public Prosecutions") issued by the U.K. prosecution authorities shows the factors on considering prosecution by the authorities in terms of facilitation payments, however, there is no statutory exemption of facilitation payments under the legislations as well as Japan.

<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/bribery-act-2010-joint-prosecution-guidance-director-serious-fraud-office-and>

<sup>39</sup> For the establishment and operation of the Preventive Systems of subsidiaries, refer to "2.3 Parent Company's Assistance and Guidance with the Preventive Systems of Subsidiaries."

**(i) Appointment of a Compliance Officer or Compliance General Supervisor to Oversee Compliance Personnel**

- A compliance officer or a compliance general supervisor should be appointed to oversee the whole company (collectively referred to as "**Compliance Supervisor**")<sup>40</sup>. In addition to properly comprehending and understanding applicable laws and regulations as well as various information from the government such as these Guidelines, the Compliance Supervisor should sort out as is found appropriate the issues arising in the conduct of business.
- The Compliance Supervisor should regularly report to the management and the board of directors.
- In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Preventive Systems, it would be effective to appoint a Compliance Supervisor at each large-scale business location or each regional division with management oversight.

**(ii) Establishment of Internal Consultation Desks (Hotlines), Reporting Desks, etc.**

- A consultation desk (help line) should be set up to deal with cases where a judgment needs to be made on a particular case, such as in the face of a demand for a bribe from a foreign public official or a request from an agent or consultant for additional expenses that suggests a possible bribe.<sup>41</sup>
- In addition to a consultation desk, a reporting desk should also be set up to receive whistle-blower reports, etc.<sup>42</sup>
- Confidentiality should be ensured for the consultation and reporting desks. In addition to that, anonymous reporting should be thoroughly allowed and retaliatory actions against informants should be thoroughly prohibited. Also, advice from external specialists including lawyers, etc. should be actively utilized.
- Content and status of consultations and reports should be appropriately reported to the Compliance Supervisor and decisions on handling policy or improvements to the consultation and reporting desks function should be sought as needed.
- Opportunities to keep adequate mutual communication among persons involved in those desks should be ensured.
- Face-to-face consultation on reports and investigation by hearing, etc. should also be available where appropriate.

**(iii) Development of a Follow-Up System after Suspicion, etc. is Brought to Light**

As stated in "Chapter 2.4 Response in an Emergency Situation"

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<sup>40</sup> Some companies have a system of coordination between compliance staff in operational, management and financial divisions, etc., or set up a "compliance committee."

<sup>41</sup> Depending on whether the risk is high or low, a consultation desk that specializes in cases of bribery of foreign officials is expected to be set up, though in some cases utilization of an existing internal consultation desk might be adequate (such as a desk where the legal division or internal audit division or other divisions receive consultation).

<sup>42</sup> On the subject of safeguards against unfair treatment such as removal of employees who disclose information in the public interest, including whistle-blowing, the Whistleblower Protection Act was enacted on April 1, 2006.

**(iv) Other Points to Note**

- In the operation of the Preventive Systems, "openness" should be maintained within the organization which allows personnel in the field to casually consult with the Compliance Supervisor so that any sign of bribery in the field could be dealt with at an early stage.
- Consideration should be made for avoiding giving the sales division or sales personnel including those of subsidiaries any incentive to engage in acts of bribery by demanding unrealistic sales targets, etc.

**(5) Implementation of Educational Activities in the Company**

Appropriate educational activities should be conducted within the company to promote the improvement of employees' ethical awareness toward prevention of bribery and to enhance the effectiveness of the operation of internal control with attention to the following:

- Officers and employees involved in international commercial transactions should be thoroughly versed in and aware of the purpose and contents of the Basic Policies and the Preventive Systems.
- Education should be offered to employees, etc. involved in international commercial transactions at the time of hiring or transfer to a relevant department.
- In offering education and training, the company should make efforts to offer effective education considering the possibility of future contact with foreign public officials and training methods (such as lecture-based training and education using written information and e-mail, etc.).
- Education should be provided in relation to specific points that employees should pay attention to, such as how to respond in the case of receiving a demand for bribes, taking into consideration the local circumstances, after organizing not only the contents of the relevant laws and regulations but also previous cases of gift exchanges and entertainment, etc.
- As another awareness-raising effort, it is also useful to cause employees involved in international commercial transactions who have received the education or training discussed above to submit a written oath not to engage in act of bribery of foreign public officials.

**(6) Audit, etc.**

Regular or irregular audits should be conducted to assess whether the Preventive Systems are actually functioning, including the status of compliance with Internal Rules, and the results of audits should be reflected in the reviews described in Section (7) below as needed.

- Corporate officers and employees, etc. in charge of audit, such as the Compliance Supervisor and persons in charge of legal affairs/accounting, should regularly audit whether the Preventive Systems are effectively functioning or not and evaluate the status of implementation<sup>43</sup>. In doing so, it is desirable that the corporate officers

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<sup>43</sup> In recent years, the importance of a three-line defense consisting of business units (first line), management units

and employees in charge of the audit evaluate the information subject to the audit with skepticism<sup>44</sup>.

- Efforts should be made to have audit results shared widely among the management, Compliance Supervisor, the responsible persons at legal, accounting and audit division and related employees.

**(7) Review by the Management, etc.**

In order to facilitate continual and effective measures and operation, the effectiveness of the Preventive Systems should be evaluated and reviewed based on the results of regular audits, where appropriate, with the involvement of the management or Compliance Supervisor, etc.

**2.3 Parent Company's Assistance and Guidance with the Preventive Systems of Subsidiaries<sup>45</sup>**

A parent company should encourage its subsidiaries within the group of companies under its direct or indirect control to establish and operate necessary Preventive Systems based on Chapter 2.1 and 2.2 above and confirm the status thereof on a regular or irregular basis. In particular, in recent years, there has been an increase in the number of cases where overseas companies have been made subsidiaries through M&A. As companies with diverse backgrounds and values are included in the same corporate group, it can be said that a higher level of risk management is required. In doing so, the following key factors should be kept in mind:

**(1) General remarks**

- Risk-based approach should be applied to the scope and details of subsidiaries that a parent company should encourage establishment and operation of Preventive Systems. As to the scope of applicable subsidiaries, it is desirable that Preventive

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and internal control units (second line), and internal audit units (third line) has been pointed out when considering internal control. In 4.6.2 to 4.6.4 of "Practical Guidelines for Group Governance Systems" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; June 28, 2019), the following matters are described:

- "In order to ensure compliance at the first line (business units), it is important to work on both the hardware (rule establishment and IT infrastructure, etc.) and the software (fostering and spreading compliance awareness in the field)."
- "In order to ensure the effective functioning of the second line (management units), independence from the first line (business units) should be ensured, and inserting horizontal channels between the parent company and subsidiaries, such as direct reporting, should be considered."
- "In order to ensure the effective functioning of the third line (internal audit units), independence from the first line (business units) and the second line (management units) should be substantially ensured. With regard to the internal audit of subsidiary operations, it should be appropriately determined whether (1) the implementation status of the subsidiary should be monitored and supervised, or (2) the parent company should implement it centrally, depending on the situation of each subsidiary."

In addition to the audits by the second and third lines described in the text, independent risk management by the first line is also considered important.

<sup>44</sup> Although it is in the case of an accounting audit, the "emphasis on professional skepticism" under the Standards to Address Risks of Fraud in an Audit (Business Accounting Council, Financial Services Agency) will serve as a useful reference, in terms of its three step process: maintaining, exercising and increasing skepticism.

<sup>45</sup> Parent company's response in the case of Emergency Situation of subsidiaries is described in Chapter 2.4 below.

Systems are established for the following subsidiaries<sup>46</sup>:

- (i) subsidiaries considered important in light of not only current and future corporate value but also the degree of Bribery Risk or the nature of its business; and
  - (ii) subsidiaries that carry out projects for which the parent company is substantially involved by giving approvals with regard to important matters on the projects, etc.
- As a rule, each subsidiary should autonomously establish and operate its own Preventive Systems<sup>47</sup>. However, if a subsidiary lacks the ability or experience to do so in reality, the parent company should supplement insufficient resources and if necessary, take a leading role in establishing and operating such subsidiary's Preventive Systems\*.

\*Note: Many overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies may lack the ability or experience to prevent bribery of foreign public officials due to limited human resources and other reasons. For this reason, in many cases where it is difficult for a subsidiary to autonomously establish and operate its own Preventive Systems, the parent company, etc. needs to assist those subsidiaries.

When confirming the status of Preventive Systems in the subsidiaries, it is important that the parent company confirm not only the status of the introduction of rules<sup>48</sup> but also whether the Preventive Systems including such rules are really functioning in the field or not. Depending on the circumstances, the parent company may exchange opinions with the subsidiary's employees in the field or confirm how the rules have been operated in the past (sample checking, etc.). In addition, in order to effectively operate the Preventive Systems, expenditures for public officials can be approved by higher-level personnel<sup>49</sup>, depending on the

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<sup>46</sup> In 2.3.3 of "Practical Guidelines for Group Governance Systems" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; June 28, 2019), it is pointed out that "particularly, when there are many subsidiaries, uniform management is not effective, and it is reasonable to classify the risks (size and characteristics) of each business segment and subsidiary, and then determine the strength and method of the parent company's involvement according to each risk."

<sup>47</sup> In 4.6.1 of "Practical Guidelines for Group Governance Systems" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; June 28, 2019), it has been pointed out that overseas subsidiaries acquired through M&A are at a higher risk of misconduct due to the lack of attention from the head office. In order to conduct effective management based on the premise of different cultures and values, it is considered effective to specify and clarify the reporting standards to the group headquarters and to use IT to visualize management information in a unified manner.

<sup>48</sup> There are some subsidiaries that just "copy" rules of their respective parent companies on an as is basis. It is desirable, however, that each subsidiary structure functional regulations addressing risks, with respect to the decision and approval process, etc., depending on the organization/system, manpower, business category of the relevant subsidiaries, while based on its parent company's rules.

<sup>49</sup> In subsidiaries in countries with a high bribery risk, there have been cases where the person in charge of business (e.g., immediate superior) has been asked to approve small expenditures on public officials. However, even if the case can be rejected without hesitation by the management, there is a risk that the person in charge of business will be under intense pressure from the field and approve it. The decision makers for direct and indirect expenditures on public officials can be raised to the management level, for example, the president of the subsidiary, the director in charge of business, or the director in charge of accounting.

situation of the subsidiaries.

The following factors should also be noted depending on the type of risk:

- A corporate group should jointly offer educational programs for employees in relation to prevention of bribery or jointly operate audit or whistle-blower systems<sup>50,51</sup>, etc.
- The aforementioned joint program or joint operation is effective in that it is expected to ensure a certain standard in terms of content and operation, and in that it will enable quick and better response in an emergency situation.
- In the case of a joint venture within a corporate group over which a company does not have direct or indirect control, the company should make reasonable efforts to try to establish and operate necessary Preventive Systems to a possible extent.

## **(2) Points to note in M&A**<sup>52</sup>

- Based on the risk-based approach, when acquiring another company that is considered to have a high risk of bribery, the company should conduct DD on the target company to examine whether the target company has any problems with violations of bribery-related laws.<sup>53</sup>
- Since there may be non-cooperation of the target company and time constraints in pre-acquisition DD, for example, verification and audit of the risks faced by the acquired company that could not be confirmed in the prior DD should be conducted as early as possible, immediately after the acquisition.
- In the pre-acquisition DD, investigation including the following points can be conducted:<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> In the case of overseas subsidiaries, there is another measure to set up a local desk and have it provide feedback to the main office regarding the current state of affairs. However, EU GDPR (REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC) restricts the transfer of personal data to a third country. Attention must be paid to relevant laws and regulations such as this when processing information about whistle-blower reports within the entire corporate group.

<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, the importance of a mechanism to “absorb” local information, such as a global whistleblower system, is also stated at page 85 of “Report on Discussion Results of the Study Group for Japanese Companies’ M&A Overseas” (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; March, 2018). In order to make the whistleblower system function, it may be possible to establish, if necessary, a system that allows employees to report directly to the competent department at the head office, or a system that allows the head office to directly manage the receipt of reports by using an outside contractor.

<sup>52</sup> In actual M&A, it is expected that the measures to be taken will differ depending on the negotiations with the target company in each case. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate measures will be taken according to each individual case, referring to the examples given here, rather than uniformly requiring these measures in all cases.

<sup>53</sup> At page 35 of “Report on Discussion Results of the Study Group for Japanese Companies’ M&A Overseas” (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; March, 2018), the importance of compliance DD is described. It is also stated that it is noted that the need for compliance DD using experts is high in M&A in emerging countries because the risk of violating bribery-related laws (so-called corruption risk) is particularly high in emerging countries and FCPA violations are likely to occur.

<sup>54</sup> At page 34 of “Report on Discussion Results of the Study Group for Japanese Companies’ M&A Overseas” (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; March, 2018), it is pointed out that “it is necessary to categorize each question, whether it is a “Must Have” question that could lead to a deal break or a “Nice to Have” question that should be obtained as reference information, depending on the content of the answer, and clarify the priority of the investigation.” Also it is pointed out that “in legal DD, investigation related to compliance with anti-corruption laws,

- Whether the business scheme itself of the target company has a high bribery risk (e.g., whether it involves a lot of transactions with government agencies, whether it involves a lot of transactions in high-bribery risk areas, whether it involves business in which obtaining government permits is important).
  - Status of development and implementation of internal rules related to anti-bribery in the target company. For example, (i) maintenance of compliance manuals, (ii) implementation of internal training, (iii) implementation of risk assessment, (iv) implementation of risk-based audit, (v) evaluation and updating of agents, etc., (vi) education and management of agents, etc., and (vii) disciplinary and corrective actions in the event of compliance violation.
  - Past and present bribery risks perceived by the target company (e.g., past reports to internal reporting desks and bribery cases identified as a result of audits).
  - Whether there are any unnatural expenditures in transactions with government agencies, etc. (for example, whether large payments to agents, etc. are recognized in contracts related to transactions with government agencies, etc., or whether accounting books, etc. show expenditures for items that are different from actual expenditures).
- If sufficient information cannot be obtained through pre-acquisition DD<sup>55</sup>, the use of a representations and warranties clause, etc., may be considered in the M&A contract, but note that even if such a clause is established, the risks described in footnote 57 will not be immediately eliminated.
  - If, as a result of DD, bribery risks are identified in the target company, specific measures (review of the acquisition deal, review of the post-acquisition management integration (PMI) schedule, etc.) should be considered<sup>56</sup>, including decision not to acquire the company.
  - If unexpected problems or risks become apparent through post-acquisition verification, etc., promptly consider countermeasures and, if necessary, take corrective measures<sup>57</sup>, including reporting to the relevant authorities.

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etc. is a "Must Have" item."

<sup>55</sup> According to page 25 of "Report on Discussion Results of the Study Group for Japanese Companies' M&A Overseas" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; March, 2018), in the DD that requires information disclosure as a formal process (especially data room materials), it should be noted that the information that can be obtained may be limited and it may be difficult to detect defects. In addition, DD generally has severe time constraints, and unless the questions and issues are clarified in advance, it is difficult to make effective use of time.

<sup>56</sup> Should an acquired company commit an act of bribery, the acquiring company may succeed to the criminal or civil liability for the bribery committed by the acquired company, depending on the type of acquisition. Even in cases where the company does not legally succeed to the liability for the bribery of the acquired company, it is possible that the company will bear the financial loss associated with the decline in the corporate value of the acquired company, the practical costs associated with responding to the authorities, and reputational risks, etc.

<sup>57</sup> According to pages through 59 and 60 of "Report on Discussion Results of the Study Group for Japanese Companies' M&A Overseas" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; March, 2018), in the management of overseas subsidiaries by Japanese companies, those companies are often troubled by local fraud and scandals. It has been pointed out that there may be a considerable number of cases, including those that are not made public, where serious irregularities and compliance violations such as off-balance-sheet debts and fictitious inventories are discovered within a few years after an acquisition. Post-closing DD and internal audits immediately after an



- The parent company should support the subsidiary as described in (1) General remarks, as necessary, so that the acquired company can appropriately establish and operate Preventive System after the acquisition.

\* The above points were made with a particular focus on the case where a company acquires an existing company and makes it its own group company, such as a subsidiary, etc. In the case where a company establishes a joint venture (JV) with another company, for example, the above points are basically also applicable to the relationship with the company that will be the JV partner.

## **2.4 Response in an Emergency Situation**

If a foreign public official, etc. does demand (solicit or extort) bribes in reality or it is found by an internal audit or a whistle-blower report that local staff may have paid bribes to a foreign public official, etc. (collectively, referred to an "**Emergency Situation**"), it is necessary to strictly comply with applicable laws and regulations and to expeditiously take action to minimize any harmful effect including economic damage to the company (and ultimately to its shareholders).

In the case of an Emergency Situation at a subsidiary that lacks the ability to cope with the situation, one of the likely options for the parent company is to get actively involved in order to ensure appropriate response, as is commensurate with the impact such an event would have on the parent company. If necessary, the parent company is expected to take the lead in investigating the cause of the incident, converging the situation, and formulating preventive measures.<sup>58</sup>

In particular, it should be also noted that, in the case of an Emergency Situation, a conflict of interest may arise between the subsidiary and its officers, etc. in which case, there is a risk of a breakdown in appropriate internal investigation or in reporting to the parent company (for instance, given that the corporate officers, etc. at the subsidiary are at risk of being dismissed by the parent company if the act of bribery is revealed, they may fail to investigate or report the matter to protect themselves).

In relation to systems for dealing with an Emergency Situation, the following matters should be noted:

- Rules should be put in place in advance with regard to selection of responsible directors/persons in charge, cooperation with company auditors, establishment of investigation team, reporting systems for information on an Emergency Situation between the parent company and subsidiaries, and other systems necessary to cope

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acquisition can be meaningful for early detection of such fraud risks.

<sup>58</sup> Refer to 4.10.3 of "Practical Guidelines for Group Governance Systems" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; June 28, 2019).

with an Emergency Situation. In particular, a system to expeditiously pass on information regarding any Emergency Situation to the Compliance Supervisor or the management should be established in advance.

- In the case of a demand for bribes from a foreign public official in particular, the process for handling such situations should be established in advance, such as the first action to take in the field and establishing an emergency response team at the head office, etc., as appropriate corresponding to the severity of the situation, etc.
- Independent outside directors should also be appropriately provided with necessary information regarding any Emergency Situation. They should appropriately supervise conflicts of interest between the company and the management from a position independent from management.
- Upon preservation of relevant evidence including circumstances that are disadvantageous to the company and the corporate group, interviewing those involved, and other related research or investigation, if it appears highly likely that the act of bribery did take place, consulting with a lawyer, reporting to criminal investigation agencies or surrender, and requesting to apply the Agreement Procedure<sup>59</sup> to the prosecutor should be considered.
- After the situation comes to an end, the causes should be investigated and recurrence preventive measures should be considered by the corporate group as a whole.<sup>60,61</sup>
- Not only examine preventive measures, but also monitor the status of responses in the subsidiary. In addition, restore and strengthen the governance function as a corporate group, including pursuing responsibility of the management and confirming the effectiveness and implementation status of preventive measures.

When companies consider introduction or conduct a major review of Preventive Systems with reference to the suggestions above, the company may run into difficulties implementing it across the board. In such cases, the company should, at its own responsibility and as a provisional extraordinary measure, give preference to measures that it finds particularly

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<sup>59</sup> The Agreement Procedure (Article 350-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) is a procedure in which, for specific financial and economic crimes and drug firearm crimes, the prosecutor and the suspect or accused can make an agreement on the following contents with the consent of the defense counsel:

- The suspect or accused will cooperate with the prosecutor, such as by making statements about criminal cases of others or submitting the evidence.
- The prosecutor will treat the case of the suspect or accused in an advantageous manner, such as not prosecuting the case, prosecuting the case with a light count, or making a light sentence.

It is up to the investigative authorities to decide how to gather evidence, including the application of the Agreement Procedure, but in any case, if a company provides the investigative authorities with facts and other information uncovered through internal investigations, etc., it may contribute to the investigation of the cause of the case, which may lead to the early resolution of the situation.

<sup>60</sup> As described in Case (4) of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials at page 46 in this guideline, it is important to consider preventive measures because, in a judicial precedent, the fact that "the company reviewed its compliance system and took preventive measures, etc." was a factor to be taken into consideration in determining punishment.

<sup>61</sup> The establishment of a third-party committee or internal investigation committee is also worth considering when investigating the facts and causes of the incident and considering preventive measures. For a third-party committee, refer to "Guideline for Independent Committees relating to Company Scandals" (Japan Federation of Bar Associations, July, 2010. Revised in December, 2010).

necessary upon considering its company size and business category, existing systems, relevance to its international commercial transactions, and effectiveness, etc. as well as consideration of the extent of risk that the company may be charged with the offense of bribery of foreign public officials<sup>62</sup>.

## **2.5 Other Matters**

In many cases, it is difficult for a single company to cope with issues of bribery of foreign public officials by, for example, accepting risk of being treated disadvantageously by refusing continuous demands (solicitation or extortion) for bribery by foreign public officials, etc.

In such cases, it can be fruitful to consult with the business support desk for Japanese companies at the local Japanese Embassy or consular office, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) or local chamber of commerce, etc., or leveraging such organizations to demand the local government stop explicitly or implicitly demanding bribes through specified or unspecified public officials. This can be done both before and after the fact. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs designates an officer in charge of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention at each of its 225 diplomatic missions to serve as a point of consult for bribery cases of foreign public officials.

Further, in relation to development cooperation projects, there is an option to consult with the consultation desk for information on fraud and corruption established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) or to have such institutions negotiate with the local government based on information provided<sup>63</sup>.

On the other hand, in the light of assisting Japanese companies, the Japanese government is expected to promptly propose to the local government if requested by a local Japanese company and to consider with the relevant governmental agencies disclosing the status of such proposals and the status of action taken for each country so that Japanese companies may assess country risk.

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62 A survey conducted by the Quality-of-Life Policy Bureau of the Cabinet Office indicates that the ratio of companies which introduce a whistle-blower system is on the increase, showing a mounting awareness of the importance of such systems.

63 Information about the fraud and corruption information consultation desk of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan can be found here: <https://www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/fusei/>. Information about the fraud and corruption information consultation desk of JICA can be found here: <https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/odainfo/index.php>.

## CHAPTER 3: SCOPE OF PUNISHMENT UNDER THE UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT

The action that Japan has taken in connection with the acceding to the OECD Convention is implementing the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, among other things, through a revision to the Unfair Competition Prevention Act in 1998<sup>64</sup>.

This Chapter provides an article-by-article explanation of the relevant articles of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act from the perspective of further understanding and better predictability regarding the bribery of foreign public officials.

As an additional note, readers are reminded that it is the criminal investigation and prosecution agencies that are actually in charge of the application of the Act with respect to each individual and specific case and that the final interpretation of the Act is left to the courts.

### 3.1 The Elements of the Offense of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (in Respect of Article 18(1) of the Act)

- Article 18(1) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act

No person shall give, or offer or promise to give, any money or other benefit to a Foreign Public Official, etc. in order to have the Foreign Public Official, etc. act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, or in order to have the Foreign Public Official, etc., use his/her position to influence another Foreign Public Official, etc. to act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain a wrongful gain in business with regard to international commercial transactions.

#### **(1) Overview (the subscript numbers in bracket each refer to the Items where the terms are explained in the following 3.1 (2))**

Article 18(1) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act provides, "(i) No person shall (vii) give, or offer or promise to give, any (vi) money or other benefit, to a (refer to "3.2 Definition of Foreign Public Official, etc.") Foreign Public Official, etc., in order to have the Foreign Public Official, etc. (v) act or refrain from (iv) acting in relation to the performance of official duties, or in order to have the Foreign Public Official, etc., use his/her position to influence another Foreign Public Official, etc. to act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, (iii) in order to obtain a wrongful gain in business with regard to (ii) international commercial transactions."

This paragraph is intended to assure the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Anti-Bribery Convention. In other words, it prohibits the giving, offering or promising of

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<sup>64</sup> The Preamble of the Convention sets out, "achieving equivalence among the measures to be taken by the Parties is an essential object and purpose of the Convention," and, in line with this view, requires, for example, that measures be taken including the criminalization of the bribery of foreign public officials.

any improper benefit in order to cause an act of commission or omission, etc. in relation to the performance of official duties of foreign public officials, etc., committed in order to obtain a wrongful gain in business with regard to international commercial transactions.

Incidentally, as stated in the Commentary 8<sup>65</sup> of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, if the advantage was permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, including case law, it is not a violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act because the advantage is not considered as any money or other benefit which are given to a foreign public official, etc. in order to obtain a wrongful gain under Article 18(1) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

● **Typical Behaviors subject to Punishment**

1. giving a benefit to an official of the Ministry of Health of Country A with the intention of obtaining minimum bid price information that is not released in advance, in order to win a bid for a national hospital construction project in Country A;
2. giving a benefit to an official of the inspection agency of Country B with the intention of obtaining a license to install equipment at a chemical plant constructed in Country B that does not satisfy environmental standards;
3. giving a benefit to an official of the customs agency of Country C with the intention of obtaining an illegal reduction of import duty on building materials; and
4. giving a benefit to a public official of Country D with the intention of getting preferential treatment in commodity export approval procedures with an aim of gaining an advantage over competitors.

**(2) Interpretation of Terms**

**(i) "No person"**

If someone commits the whole or part of an act subject to this offense in Japan, the Act will apply irrespective of the nationality (in other words, whether the person is Japanese or a non-Japanese). If a Japanese national commits a prohibited act outside of Japan, the Act will also apply to that person.

→ **[Refer to "(3) Geographical Scope of Application" in Chapter 3.3: Penalties.]**

**(ii) "International commercial transactions"**

This offense is to prohibit bribery to foreign public officials in the conduct of international business (Article 1-1 of the Convention).

Within this paragraph, "international commercial transactions" means the act of

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<sup>65</sup> The Commentary 8 of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions sets out, "It is not an offence, however, if the advantage was permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, including case law."

economic activity beyond national borders such as trade and foreign investment. Concretely, "international" means (i) "international relations"<sup>66</sup> among the trading parties, or (ii) "international relations" in the content of business activities.

- **Specific examples regarding "international commercial transactions"**
  1. Where a trading company of Japan bribes a public official of Country A in order to win an order for bridge construction under an ODA project in Country A:  
→ **As international relations exists between trading parties, this would be considered to be the "international commercial transactions."**
  2. Where a Japanese-run construction company located in Country B bribes a public official of Country B in Japan in order to win an order for repair work for the embassy of Country B in Tokyo:  
→ **As international relations exists in the business activity, this would be considered to be the "international commercial transactions."**

**(iii) "Wrongful gain in business"**

○ **Concept of "gain in business"**

Judicial precedents have, in light of the legislative intent to secure fair competition among enterprises, defined the term "business (*eigyō*)" to mean not only activities conducted simply for profit but also any activities that involve economic calculations of income/expenditure more broadly (such as hospital management, etc.).

Therefore, it is understood that the term "gain in business" refers to a tangible or intangible economic value or any other gain in a general sense that an enterprise can gain in carrying out such "business."

○ **Concept of "wrongful gain"**

The term "wrongful gain" means any gain obtained in a manner running counter to public policy or principle of good faith. Specifically, it is interpreted as referring to:

- (a) any gain obtained for oneself, any other natural or legal entity through the giving, etc. of an improper benefit to a foreign public official, etc., and having the said foreign public official, etc. exert his/her discretion in a manner favorable to oneself, or
- (b) any gain obtained through the giving, etc. of an improper benefit to a foreign public official, etc., and having the said foreign public official, etc. commit an illegal act.

○ **Cases where the existence of the intention to obtain a wrongful gain in business can be an issue**

**(I) Acts of Socializing**

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<sup>66</sup> "International relations" means relations beyond national borders.

- Burden of expenses such as expenses for travel or meals or gift-giving for a foreign public official, etc. can be a typical form of bribery. However, if it is purely for general socializing or for fostering understanding of the company's products or services and not for any unjust purpose such as preferential treatment from the relevant foreign public official, etc. in the course of his/her duties, such acts may not be necessarily considered an act of bribery aimed at obtaining a "wrongful gain in business".
- Specific examples of this might be gift-giving, paying for travel expenses or the provision of entertainment in small amounts that, in light of the timing, type of item, amount of money, frequency or other factors, be regarded as purely for the purpose of socializing or for fostering understanding of the company's products or services. As stated in Chapter 2.2 Section (3) above, it is desirable that these acts are made only after careful consideration based on the company's internal standards, which themselves are formulated from the perspective of ensuring careful internal consideration and with consideration for local laws and regulations, and that the outcome is appropriately recorded to allow for later audit.\*

\*Note: Unofficial approval procedures or false records would be indicative of a payment to obtain a "wrongful gain in business".

(i) The following are highly likely to be considered payments to obtain a "wrongful gain in business":

- providing a sports car to a foreign public official, etc.;
- providing gifts, even those of low cost, frequently to a foreign public official, etc.;
- giving a merchandise coupon that is cash convertible to a foreign public official, etc.;
- a group company preferentially employing the family member or relative of a foreign public official, etc.;
- inviting the family members of a foreign public official to a resort that has little relationship with the company's products or services;
- engaging a company associated with a foreign public official, etc. as agent or consultant; and
- paying money or providing goods immediately before public bidding regardless of the amount or economic value thereof.

(ii) The following may not be necessarily always considered payments to obtain a "wrongful gain in business":

- giving promotional giveaways or commemorative gifts for general distribution, such as publicity calendars;

- providing appropriate refreshments or simple food and drink at a business meeting;
- riding with a foreign public official in a company car when it is necessary to visit the company's office due to transportation conditions;
- providing an appropriate seasonal gift of low cost in accordance with legally accepted case law;
- in cases where presenting of the company's products or services at an exhibition only is inadequate to understand the company's products or services, and a visit to the company's factory/laboratory (including any local one and those in Japan or a third country) is required, paying the cost of travel expenses of foreign public officials, etc. who are selected under certain internal standards (actual cost based on the company's internal standards formulated in accordance with the local laws and regulations); and
- providing reasonable and appropriate meals (if any anti-corruption laws exist in the country of visit or the country of the relevant foreign public officials that stipulates standards regarding the amount, then with reference to the cost stipulated in such standards) and sightseeing during spare time in connection with the foregoing visit.

## (II) Acts of Donation

There may be cases where an enterprise makes a donation; however, it should be noted that any payment to a foreign public official, etc. is in most cases payment to obtain "a wrongful gain in business", i.e. a typical act of bribery. Even if it appears to take the form of a donation to a non-profit organization, if such donation is in fact made to a foreign public official, etc., then it would also constitute a typical act of bribery.

In fact, even a donation made to a non-profit organization purely for the purpose of fulfilling the company's corporate social responsibility as a "good corporate citizen" can constitute an act of bribery.

For these reasons, it is necessary to confirm prior to making a donation whether any officer of the recipient, or any family member or relative thereof, is related to a foreign public official, etc. involved with the company's project, and on top of that, to confirm that money donated is not flowing back to any person related to the foreign public official, etc.\* to a reasonable extent, such as inspection of the accounting books of the recipient after donation.



\*Note: Unofficial approval procedures or false records would be indicative of payment to obtain a "wrongful gain in business".

### (III) Others

- Since there is no exceptional provision with regard to Small Facilitation Payments (SFP) <sup>67</sup> explicitly under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, the giving of any money or other benefit to a foreign public official, etc. in order to 'obtain a wrongful gain in business', even if the amount is small, is a violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. Therefore, it is impossible to escape punishment solely on the basis of being a so-called SFP.
- In case of receiving unreasonably disadvantageous discriminative treatment<sup>68</sup>. There are cases where, in a customs setting for instance, an enterprise has taken all the necessary procedures under local laws and regulations, yet will experience delays or other unreasonably disadvantageous discriminative treatment by the local government, effectively until money or goods are provided<sup>69</sup> to the local government officials.
  - (i) An official who simply receives an application form from a company but who is not actually in charge of the examination refuses to affix a seal of receipt on the application despite there being no inadequacies with the form.
  - (ii) An enterprise is entitled to a tax refund under the local laws and regulations, but the tax office fails to process the refund without giving any reasonable grounds.
  - (iii) An enterprise has an obligation to have its fire protection equipment inspected by the fire department under the local laws and regulations, but the fire department is not willing to cooperate and conduct the inspection.

Any payment, whether it is for the purpose of avoiding discriminatory disadvantages such as the above, is itself likely to be considered to be the giving of money or other benefit "to obtain a wrongful gain in business" for oneself. Moreover, whatever the purpose, once such a payment has been made to a foreign public official, etc., the practice is likely to persist as a convention, so the fundamental principle should

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<sup>67</sup> For the details of Small Facilitation Payments, please refer to footnote 38 in p.15.

<sup>68</sup> Even if no imminent danger to human body/life exists, if, for example, security is poor and personal protection, etc. by local police or armed force is needed, rather than providing money, etc. directly to an individual police officer or individual military personnel, it might be possible to execute a service agreement for personal protection, etc. with the police or military organization itself, to the effect that expenses will be covered. Naturally, however, the giving of improper benefit to the police, etc. on the pretense of executing an agreement would be considered to constitute the giving of "improper benefit".

<sup>69</sup> It is the so-called Small Facilitation Payments and please refer to footnote 38 in p.15 for the details.

always be to refuse such demands for money, etc.

From the perspective of preventing the further encouragement of payment demands, it is desirable to clearly convey the intention of refusal, either independently or through the local Japanese Embassy, consular office or the local chamber of commerce, etc. as stated in Chapter 2.5 above.

Being compelled to give, etc. a benefit for the purpose of avoiding danger to one's own life or body may, in some cases, be determined as not given with the intention to obtain a "wrongful gain."

**(iv) "Acting in relation to the performance of official duties"**

"Acting in relation to the performance of official duties" naturally includes any act within the scope of official authority of the said Foreign Public Official, etc., but also includes acts closely connected to his/her official duties.

Note that the definition of "official duty (*shokumu*)" here is the same as that for "official duty (*shokumu*)" in the provision of Article 197 (Acceptance of Bribe) of the Penal Code.

Judicial precedents concerning acts closely connected to official duties in the context of the offense of giving or taking bribes under the Penal Code include cases in which it was found that acts conventionally taken by a public official or acts preliminary to legitimate official duty were acts closely connected to official duties.

**(v) "...act or refrain from (acting in relation to the performance of official duties), or in order to have the Foreign Public Official, etc. use his/her position to influence another Foreign Public Official, etc. to act or refrain from (acting in relation to the performance of official duties)..."**

The requirement here is that the purpose of the giving, etc. of an improper benefit should be the commission or omission of a certain act by a Foreign Public Official, etc., or causing the commission or omission of a certain act by another Foreign Public Official, etc.

As stated in Section (iv) above, acts by a Foreign Public Official, etc. himself/herself refer to an act within the scope of official authority of the said Foreign Public Official, etc. and an act closely connected to his/her official duties. Also, to "influence ~ to act (*assen*)" includes having the said Foreign Public Official, etc. use his/her position, influence upon another Foreign Public Official, etc. to act in relation to the performance of official duties, even if that action is beyond the scope of official authority of the former official, etc.

**(vi) "any money or other benefit"**

The term "any money or other benefit" can mean not only economic benefit, but any benefit that serves to satisfy a demand or desire of a person. Accordingly, it would be considered to cover, naturally, money and property, as well as any economic benefit such as financial benefit, free renting of a house or building, entertainment and paid dining, offering of a collateral or guarantee, but also cover any and all other tangible and intangible benefits including non-economic benefits such as a sexual relationship or occupational position.

**(vii) "...give, or offer or promise to give (to a Foreign Public Official, etc.)"**

To "give (*kyoyo*)" does not only mean simply providing any money or other benefit as a bribe, but also must be accompanied by the acceptance of such benefit by a Foreign Public Official, etc. on the other side.

To "offer (*moshikomi*)" is an act of prompting a Foreign Public Official, etc. to accept any money or other benefit in a situation where it can be recognized as a bribe, and does not need to be accompanied by any reaction on the part of that official, etc.

To "promise (*yakusoku*)" means an agreement on the giving/acceptance of any money or other benefit between parties of bribery.

In the case of giving, or offering or promising to give any money and other benefit to a third party other than a Foreign Public Official, etc., it would constitute an offense of bribery of Foreign Public Officials as well, if:

- there is a conspiracy between the said Foreign Public Official, etc. and the said third party;
- it is obvious that the money or benefit has been given to the said Foreign Public Official, etc., such as where it is directed to a relative of that official, etc.; or
- the Foreign Public Official, etc. has used the third party as a tool and had him/her receive the money or benefit.

**(3) Averting Present Danger**

- In the case of acts that are found to be averting present danger as stipulated in Article 37 of the Penal Code, illegality will be rejected and no penalty will be imposed\*.

\*Reference: The requirement for "averting present danger" is met if "an act is unavoidably performed" (there is no realistic other way to preserve legal benefit) to "avert" (intention of averting is required) a "present danger" (infringement of legal benefit to be preserved actually exists or is pressing) to "the life or body of oneself or any other person" (legal benefit to be preserved), etc. "only when the harm produced by

such act does not exceed the harm to be averted" (the relative merits of legal benefits should be determined based on conventional wisdom depending on specific case).

- In a relation to foreign public officials, etc., for instance, the aforesaid requirement for averting present danger may be met when a person is in danger of being assaulted if he/she fails to make payment and has no choice but to make a minimum payment necessary to avert actual infringement of life or body.
- An example of when the requirement for averting present danger may be met:
  - When a person pays money to a policeman carrying a gun on regular duty who expressly or implicitly demands payment and refuses to leave his/her office, with the imminent threat of physical restraint.

### **3.2 Definition of Foreign Public Official, etc. (in Respect of Article 18(2) of the Act and the Government Ordinance)**

- Article 18(2) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act
- 2. The term "Foreign Public Official, etc." as used in the preceding paragraph means any of the following persons:
  - (i) any person who engages in public service for national or local foreign government;
  - (ii) any person who engages in the business affairs of any entity established under foreign special laws to carry out specific business affairs in the public interest;
  - (iii) any person who engages in the business affairs of an entity in which one or more of the national or local governments of foreign states directly owns a number of voting shares or an amount of capital subscription that exceeds 50 percent of that enterprise's total issued voting shares or total amount of capital subscription, or in which the majority of the Officers (meaning directors, auditors, council members, inspectors, liquidators, and other persons engaged in management of the business) are appointed or designated by one or more of the national or local foreign governments, and to which special rights and interests are granted by the national or local government of the foreign states for performance of its business, or a person specified by Cabinet Order as an equivalent person;
  - (iv) any person who engages in public service for an International Organization (meaning an international organization which is formed by governments or intergovernmental international organizations); or
  - (v) any person who engages in the business affairs under the authority of the national or local government of a foreign state or an International Organization and is delegated by them.

#### **(1) Purposes**

A definition of a "Foreign Public Official, etc." who can be a party to bribery is provided in Article 18(2) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act and the "Government ordinance to define 'such person as defined in the government ordinance as a Foreign Public Official, etc.'" provided for in Article 18(2) (iii) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act".

Foreign public officials, etc. subject to the application of this Act can be divided into the following five categories:

- (i) Any person who engages in public services for a national or local foreign government (Item 1)
- (ii) Any person who engages in services for an agency affiliated with a foreign national government (Item 2)
- (iii) Any person who engages in services for a foreign public enterprise (Item 3)
- (iv) Any person who engages in public services for an International Organization (Item 4)
- (v) Any person who exercises a public function on behalf of a foreign national government, etc. as delegated (Item 5)

Note that those countries which Japan has not recognized as countries are also covered by the concept of "foreign."

**(2) Item 1: Person who engages in public services for a national or local foreign government (Foreign Public Official)**

A person who engages in public services for a national or local foreign government refers to a person who occupies a position in an administrative or legislative body, or a judicial agency.

\* Note that political party officials and candidates for public office are not subject to the application of this Act because they are not included in the definition of foreign public official under the Convention.

**(3) Item 2: Person who engages in services for an agency affiliated with a foreign national government**

An agency affiliated with a foreign national government refers to an organization constituted under special laws to carry out specific tasks concerning public interest, which is the equivalent of a public corporation (*tokushu hojin*) or special company (*tokushu gaisha*) in Japan.

Note that an organization constituted under special laws does not include any corporation organized under civil law, such as a public interest corporation or a commercial company, that can, under the rule-based (as opposed to permission-based) principle, be constituted if certain requirements are met.

A "person who engages in services" refers to a person who is determined, in terms of the function fulfilled by him/her, to perform services for the said agency.

- **Examples of agency affiliated with a foreign national government**  
Government corporations in the United States:  
Specific examples include Tennessee Valley Authority and National Railroad Passenger Corporation (a.k.a. Amtrak).  
Établissements publics in France:  
Specific examples include *Bibliothèques nationales*, and university.

**(4) Item 3: Person who engages in services for a foreign public enterprise**

A "public enterprise" in this Item covers any enterprise for which:

- (i) a majority of its voting shares are owned by;
  - (ii) a majority of its total capital is contributed by; or
  - (iii) a majority of its officers are designated or appointed by;
- one or more national or local foreign government (including public interest corporations), and such enterprise equivalents as defined by government ordinance.

An enterprise defined by government ordinance as equivalent to any of the foregoing refers to an enterprise:

- (i) a majority of the voting rights of all shareholders of which are owned by;
- (ii) which is under the control of, through the holding of golden shares that require permission, license, approval or consent, etc. in order for all or some resolutions at general shareholders' meetings cannot be effective; or
- (iii) which is under the control of, via indirect ownership of a majority of its stock, etc; one or more national or local foreign governments.

Any person engaging in services for such "public enterprises" as are given special privileges by national or local foreign governments to do the public enterprises' business falls under the definition of foreign public official, etc. under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

- **Example of "public enterprise" 1: Control through golden shares**

The articles of incorporation of Company B in Country A, a private company that was formerly state-owned, had provisions requiring the consent of the government, *i.e.*, the golden share owner, for a resolution of a general shareholders' meeting to amend certain articles to take effect, including articles such as:

  - (i) No one may own 15% or more shares or exercise 15% or more voting rights, either separately or jointly; and
  - (ii) No non-citizen of Country A may serve as the chairman of the Company or the chief executive of the Company.

In this case, Company B would be considered to be a "public enterprise" under this Item.

- **Example of "public enterprise" 2: Indirect control**

Companies D<sub>1</sub> and D<sub>2</sub> are both 70%-owned subsidiaries of Company D, a state-owned electricity power company in Country C (the government owns 80% of its shares). Company D<sub>1</sub> generates power mostly in the northern part of Country C while Company D<sub>2</sub> conducts the same operation mostly in the southern part of Country C.

In this case, Companies D<sub>1</sub> and D<sub>2</sub> would each be considered to be a "public enterprise" under this Item.

- **The government ordinance to define “such person as defined in the government ordinance as Foreign Public Official, etc.” provided for in Article 18(2) (iii) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act**

1. Such person as defined in the government ordinance as Foreign Public Official, etc. provided for in Article 18(2) (iii) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (hereinafter, referred to as the “Act”) means any person engaging in services for any of the following enterprises (excluding the enterprises stipulated in Article 18(2) (iii) of the Act) which are given special privileges by national or local foreign governments to do its business:
  - (i) any enterprise of which one or more national or local foreign governments directly own more than half of all the shareholders’ rights to vote;
  - (ii) any enterprise which requires permission, approval, consent of, or other similar acts by any national or local foreign government in order for all or part of the resolutions of general meetings of shareholders cannot be effective, or whose such resolutions can be invalidated by a national or local foreign government; or
  - (iii) any enterprise (excluding any enterprise described in 1(i) of this government ordinance), of which one or more foreign governments, whether national or local, or public enterprises directly own more than half of (a) the total issued shares with the right to vote, (b) the total subscribed capital, or (c) all the shareholders’ voting rights , or the majority of whose Officers (meaning directors, auditors, council members, inspectors, liquidators, and other persons who engaged in management of the business; “Officers” in the next paragraph shall mean the same) are designated or appointed or named by one or more foreign governments, whether national or local or public enterprises.
2. “Public enterprise” stipulated in 1(iii) of this government ordinance shall mean any enterprise stipulated in Article 18(2) (iii) of the Act and those described in 1(i) and (ii) of this government ordinance. In this case, any enterprise of which one or more foreign governments, whether national or local, or public enterprises directly own more than half of (a) the total issued shares with the right to vote, (b) total subscribed capital, or (c) all the shareholders’ voting rights, or the majority of whose Officers are designated or appointed by one or more foreign governments, whether national or local, or public enterprises, shall be deemed to be a public enterprise.

**(5) Item 4: Person who engages in public services for an International Organization**

An "International Organization" in this Item refers to an international organization organized by a nation state, government or any other public body, irrespective of the organizational form or the scope of authority.

Incidentally, it does not include international organizations constituted by a private body, such as the IOC (International Olympic Committee).

- **Examples of International Organizations**  
United Nations, UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund), ILO (International Labour Organization), WTO (World Trade Organization), etc.



**(6) Item 5: Person who exercises a public function on behalf of a foreign national government, etc. as delegated**

This refers to a person to whom privileges are delegated by national or local foreign governments or an international organization and who engages in services as delegated. In other words, it is intended to mean a person to whom privileges are delegated by a foreign national government, etc. or an International Organization over services that fall under the competence of the said foreign national government, etc., such as inspection and testing services, etc., and who engages in the said services.

It does not include those persons who process some work ordered by a foreign national government, etc. without any delegation of authority, such as staff, etc. of construction companies contracted for public works projects.

- Example of person who exercises a public function on behalf of a foreign national government, etc. as delegated  
  
"Foreign public officials, etc." includes staff of a designated inspection agency or designated testing agency delegated to conduct inspections and testing operations, etc. for a chemical plant construction to check in advance if it meets environmental criteria for permission, etc. for equipment installation, etc. pursuant to the laws of the country in which the construction takes place.

### 3.3 Penalties (in Respect of Articles 21(2) (vii), 21 (8) and 22)

- Articles 21 and 22 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (abbreviated)
- Article 21 (omitted)
2. Any person who falls under any of the following items shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than five years, a fine of not more than five million yen, or both:
    - (i) to (vi) (omitted)
    - (vii) a person who violates any provision of Article 16, 17, or 18, paragraph (1).
  3. to 7. (omitted)
  8. The offence prescribed in paragraph (2), item (vii) (limited to the part under Article 18, paragraph (1)) shall be governed by Article 3 of the Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907).
  9. to 12. (omitted)
- Article 22
1. When the representative of a juridical person, or the agent, employee, or other worker of a juridical person or of any person has committed the violation listed in any of the provisions of following items with regard to the business of said juridical person or said person, in addition to the offender being subject to punishment, said juridical person shall be punished by the fine prescribed in said items, and said persons shall be punished by the fine prescribed in the relevant Article:
    - (i) and (ii) (omitted)
    - (iii) paragraph (2) of the preceding Article - fine not more than three hundred million yen.
  2. (omitted)
  3. The period of prescription for the punishment by fine to which a juridical person or person is subject pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) in regard to violation under (omitted) paragraph (2) (omitted), is the same as that for the offences referred to in the provisions of the same Article.

#### (1) Penalties for Perpetrators (natural person)

- (i) Article 21(2) (vii) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act provides that a person who gave, etc. an improper benefit to a foreign public official, etc. in violation of Article 18(1) shall be subject to **imprisonment with work for a period not exceeding five years or for a fine not exceeding 5,000,000 yen.**
- (ii) By imposing a penalty at least equal to "imprisonment with work for not more than three years or for a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen" provided as imposable in the case of a bribery offense committed with respect to a public official of Japan (Article 198 of the Penal Code), this provision fulfills a requirement under the Convention regarding the severity of penalty, which sets out that "the range of penalties shall be comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the Party's own public officials" (Article 3-1).
- (iii) Also, the provision of Article 21(8) sets out that the offense of bribery of foreign public officials is subject to Article 3 of the Penal Code.

As Article 3 of the Penal Code provides that Japanese nationals who have committed certain offenses outside of Japan shall be punishable under the Code, this forms the basis for punishment of a Japanese national for an offense committed outside of Japan with regard to the offense of bribery of foreign public officials as well (*i.e.*, a Japanese national who has given an improper benefit to a foreign public official, etc. outside of Japan will also be punishable)<sup>70</sup>.

→**[Refer to "(3) Geographical Scope of Application" in this Chapter 3.3: Penalties.]**

- (iv) Note that a person who has been convicted of a bribery offense in the country of offense may still be punishable under the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, as provided for in Article 5 of the Penal Code<sup>71</sup>.

If, however, the person has actually served a sentence either in whole or in part in that foreign country, execution of a sentence in Japan will be mitigated or discharged pursuant to the provision of the said Article.

- (v) The statute of limitation is five years<sup>72</sup>. Under Article 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, the statute of limitation does not run during the period for which the offender is outside of Japan.

## **(2) Penalties for Juridical Persons**

### **(i) Dual Criminal Liability Provision**

Article 22 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act provides that where a representative, agent, employee or any other staff, etc. of a juridical person<sup>73</sup> has committed a violation in connection with an operation of the said juridical person, a fine not exceeding 300,000,000 yen will be imposed on that juridical person, which is in addition to punishment for the offender himself/herself.

This article was created because the Convention requires that juridical persons that engage in international commercial transactions should also be held liable for the foreign bribery offense.

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<sup>70</sup> The "Bill for Partial Revision of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law," by which punishment of a Japanese national for an offense committed outside of Japan is established with regard to the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, was passed by the Diet on May 19, 2004 and came into force as of January 1, 2005.

<sup>71</sup> Article 5 of the Penal Code: Even when a final and binding decision has been rendered by a foreign judiciary against the criminal act of a person, it shall not preclude further punishment in Japan with regard to the same act; provided, however, that when the person has already served either the whole or part of the punishment abroad, execution of the punishment shall be mitigated or remitted.

<sup>72</sup> As provided for in Article 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; further, the statute of limitations for penalties to be imposed on the juridical person was amended to five years under the "Bill for Partial Revision of the Design Act, etc. (Act No. 55 of 2006)" (came into force on January 1, 2007).

<sup>73</sup> The dual criminal liability provision may also be applied to sole proprietor businesses. However, the fine is limited to 5,000,000 yen.

**(ii) Presumption of Negligence on the Part of a Juridical Person**

The Supreme Court has previously ruled that the legislative intent with respect to a provision of penalties for juridical persons is that the business proprietor cannot be discharged from criminal liability because of a presumption of negligence of the juridical person in its failure to appoint and oversight of the perpetrating employee, etc. and to exercise other caution necessary to prevent violation unless it is found that such caution was exercised<sup>74</sup>.

While this ruling is not about the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, in order for the exemption from the dual criminal liability of juridical persons to be applicable on the basis of non-existence of negligence, it is also likely that the Act also requires that such caution be exercised as necessary to prevent violation, not just simply in the form of general and abstract advice but in the form of proactive and specific instruction.

From this perspective also, it is necessary to augment the effect of measures for preventing bribery of foreign public officials and to improve the effectiveness of internal controls by, for instance, establishing and operating a system capable of appropriate prevention of bribery of foreign public officials as illustrated in Chapter 2 and conducting dissemination of knowledge and education activities, regarding the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, using these Guidelines, etc.

Whether the dual criminal liability provision will be applied to the main office of a Japanese company where a Japanese employee of its overseas subsidiary gave an improper benefit to a foreign public official, etc. would be judged in light of the individual and specific circumstances, including the degree of involvement of the main office in the regular business activities of the bribe-giver (the Japanese employee), and the state of appointment and oversight of the bribe-giver (the Japanese employee) by the main office. If the bribe-giver (the Japanese employee) can be considered to be virtually an employee of the main office in Japan, then the dual criminal liability provision should be applicable to the main office in Japan.

**(3) Geographical Scope of Application of Penalties**

- (i) The geographical scope of application means the scope in terms of exercise of jurisdiction within which cases that have occurred in a given geographical area can be governed by criminal laws of that country and be treated pursuant to those laws.
  
- (ii) The Penal Code of Japan applies the "principle of territorial jurisdiction" in Article 1 under which the criminal legislations of Japan apply to offenses committed within the territory of Japan, irrespective of the nationality of the offender;

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<sup>74</sup> Supreme Court Ruling on March 26, 1965. Supreme Court Criminal Case Reports, Volume 19, Issue 2, page 83 (for a case of violation of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act).

however, it applies the "principle of nationality jurisdiction" to certain offenses, including murder, assault and fraud, etc., in Article 3, under which the criminal legislation of Japan also applies to, in addition to offenses committed within the territory of Japan, offenses committed by Japanese nationals when outside Japan.

As the principle of nationality jurisdiction is applied to the offense of bribery of foreign public officials pursuant to Article 3 of the Penal Code, Japanese nationals who have committed acts of bribery outside of Japan are also punishable, in addition to those who have committed acts of bribery in Japan.

- (iii) Under the principle of territorial jurisdiction, the criminal laws of Japan will be applicable to an offense if any "act" constituting a necessary element of the offense, has been committed in Japan, or the "result" constituting another necessary element of the offense, has occurred in Japan.

In respect of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, this can possibly lead to the conclusion that if any improper benefit is offered or promised to a foreign public official via e-mail or fax, etc. from a location in Japan, then even if the benefit is subsequently given in a location overseas, the offense as a whole is considered to have been committed in Japan.

- (iv) In the case of non-Japanese corporations, the dual criminal liability provision in Article 22 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act would be applicable to, for instance, a foreign company (*gaikoku gaisha*) as defined under the Companies Act<sup>75</sup>.

#### **(4) Giving of an Improper Benefit Using an Overseas Subsidiary (Branch) or Agent**

It is common practice to use an overseas subsidiary (branch) or agent in the conduct of international business such as foreign trade and overseas investment.

As an accomplice to an offense of bribery of foreign public officials is also subject to punishment according to the Convention, companies should be aware of the potential for complicity of an employee of the company's main office in Japan in cases where an employee of an overseas subsidiary (branch) or agent has committed act of bribery to a Foreign Public Official<sup>76</sup>.

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<sup>75</sup> Article 823 of the Companies Act provides, "With regard to application of other acts, a foreign company shall be deemed to be the same kind of company or the most similar kind of company in Japan." See "Organization Criminal Liability Theory" by Kensuke Ito, page 76-79, (2012, *Seibundo*).

<sup>76</sup> Article 1-2 of the Convention sets out, "Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in, including inducement, aiding and abetting, or authorization of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a criminal offence."

The respective provisions for co-principals, inducement and aiding and abetting, etc. in Articles 60 through to 65 of the Penal Code are applied to these matters.

The applicability of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act is summarized below with respect to typical examples of bribing a foreign public official by an employee of an overseas subsidiary (branch) or agent where an employee of the company's main office in Japan is or is not involved.

**(i) Case of co-principals in conspiracy<sup>77</sup>, based on the existence of conspiracy between an overseas subsidiary (branch) employee and a main office employee**

If the conspiracy between an overseas subsidiary (branch) employee and a main office employee took place in Japan, one necessary element of an offense by co-principals in conspiracy would be considered to have occurred in Japan; therefore, the offense is considered to be committed in Japan even if the improper benefit was actually given in an overseas location.

Therefore in this case, both the overseas subsidiary (branch) employee and the main office employee would be culpable of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials. (In such cases, that chargeability against the employee of the overseas subsidiary (branch) would not be limited only to Japanese nationals.)

**(ii) Case of a main office employee inducing<sup>78</sup> or aiding and abetting<sup>79</sup> the offense and an overseas subsidiary (branch) employee perpetrating the act**

In case the principal offender perpetrated the act (such as the giving of an improper benefit) outside of Japan, but the inducement, or aiding and abetting took place within Japan, then the Japanese employee of the overseas subsidiary (branch) should, as with the main office employee who induced or aided and abetted the act, also be culpable of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials.

**(iii) Case of an overseas subsidiary (branch) employee giving an improper benefit at his/her own decision or upon instruction from that overseas subsidiary (branch) alone**

The perpetrating Japanese employee of the overseas subsidiary (branch) who gave improper benefits and the Japanese employee of the overseas subsidiary (branch) who gave the instruction thereof would be culpable of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials. On the other hand, the overseas subsidiary (branch) employee and any employee of the main office in Japan who has no involvement in the giving of the improper benefit would not be culpable of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials.

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<sup>77</sup> Co-principals (Article 60 of the Penal Code) are "two or more persons who have jointly committed an offense." A "person who had no role in the act of actual perpetration of an offense where several persons had conspired to commit the offense and some of them actually perpetrated it" may also be punished as a principal offender, which constitutes a case of co-principals in conspiracy.

<sup>78</sup> Inducement (Article 61 of the Penal Code) is the "act of inducing another person to decide to perpetrate an offense."

<sup>79</sup> Aiding and abetting (i.e. "accessoryship (*houjo*)" per Article 62 of the Penal Code) is the "act of assisting a principal offender in a manner other than perpetration of an offense."

**(iv) Case of giving an improper benefit through the use of an overseas agent**

Cases where an employee of an overseas agent, rather than an overseas subsidiary (branch), gave an improper benefit are as with the cases under (i) and (ii) that involve an overseas subsidiary (branch) employee.

Examples aside, the question of whether there is a conspiracy with an employee from the main office in Japan falls to a judicial decision based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

Even when an employee from an overseas subsidiary (branch) or from an overseas agent is not culpable of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, he/she may not be exempt from being charged for a bribery offense under the criminal law of the country of his/her location, which is a matter left to judicial decision of that country based on the facts of each case.

### **3.4 Cases of the Offense of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials**

Cases that have been prosecuted so far since the establishment of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act in 1998 are as follows (as of June 2020):

**(1) Case of giving improper benefits to Filipino public officials (Fukuoka Summary Court, March 2007)**

The case: Two employees who had been loaned to a local corporation of a Japanese stock company in the Philippines gave improper benefits such as golf club sets (equivalent to approximately 800 thousand yen) to two senior officials of the National Bureau of Investigation (Philippines) (NBI) in order to promptly conclude a contract for a business which NBI was planning.

In this case, the two defendants received fines of 500,000 yen and 200,000 yen, respectively.

**(2) Case giving improper benefits to a Vietnamese public official (Tokyo District Court, January and March 2009)**

The case: Four persons who had been employees, etc. of the defendant company whose head office is located in Tokyo gave improper benefits on two separate occasions, worth around US\$600,000 and US\$200,000, respectively, with the intention of mainly expressing their gratitude for having been able to receive an order for the consulting business related to main roads construction project in Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam to a senior official in charge of this project.

In this case, the four defendants were sentenced to imprisonment with work for two years and six months, two years, one year and six months, and one year and eight months, respectively (each with a suspension of execution of the sentence for three years; however, for one of them, including separate charge of fraud). The defendant company received a fine of 70 million yen. This was the first case where dual criminal liabilities provision applied for the offense of bribery of foreign public officials.

\* The prosecutors, on the day on which this case was prosecuted, requested a change in the count to exclude cash worth US\$600,000 that had been accounted for as consignment fees such as designing from tax deductible expense in accordance with the Act on Special Measures concerning Taxation in relation to a case of violation of the Corporate Tax Act against the defendant company, etc. for which prosecution had already been instituted, and increase the evaded income and the evaded tax for the year ended in September 2004 by approximately 66 million yen and 20 million yen, respectively.



**(3) Case of giving improper benefits to a Chinese local government official (Nagoya Summary Court, October 2013)**

The case: The former executive director of a stock company engaged in the manufacturing of automobile parts, etc. with its head office in Aichi gave money (in Hong Kong dollars) equivalent to approximately 420,000 yen and a ladies' handbag (approximately 140,000 yen in value) to a senior official of the local government in order to have illegal operations of its local factory in China overlooked.

A fine of 500,000 yen was imposed on the defendant in this case.

**(4) Cases of giving improper benefits surrounding yen-loan projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and Uzbekistan (loan assistance projects) (Tokyo District Court, February 2015)**

The case: The former president, the former international division manager and the former accounting director of a stock company engaged in railway consultancy business with its head office in Tokyo gave money to persons related to public railway corporations in relation to ODA projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and Uzbekistan.

Specifically, with the aim of gaining advantages for themselves, the defendants gave around 70 million yen (in Japanese yen) to persons related to Vietnam Railways in connection with a yen-loan to Vietnam for "Hanoi City Urban Railway No.1 Construction Project", and around 20 million yen (in Japanese yen and rupiah) in total to persons related to Directorate General of Railways of Indonesia's Department of Transportation in connection with a yen-loan to Indonesia for "Railway Double Tracking on Java South Line Project", and around 54.77 million yen (in US dollar) to persons related to The Uzbekistan Railways in connection with a yen-loan to Uzbekistan for "Karshi-Termez Railway Electrification Project".

In this case, the three individual defendants were sentenced to imprisonment with work for two years (with a suspension of execution of the sentence for three years), three years (with a suspension of execution of the sentence for four years) and two years and six months (with a suspension of execution of the sentence for three years), respectively, and the defendant company received a fine of 90 million yen.

In sentencing, the court gave the following facts as favorable to the defendant company: (i) the company was socially punished (it was forced to withdraw from overseas operations and was also excluded from the nomination in nominated competitive tenders for a certain period of time by many local governments, etc. in Japan), (ii) the company incurred a huge loss due to non-payment of completed construction as a result of becoming unable to continue the contract, (iii) the company had declared the paid bribery as expenditure for a secret purpose and had paid tax thereon, and (iv) the company reviewed its compliance system and took preventive measures, etc.

**(5) Case of giving improper benefits to a Thai public official (Tokyo District Court, March 2019)**

The case: Two former officers (Senior Vice President, Senior General Manager of Procurement & Sourcing Division; and Director, Executive Vice President, Head of Engineering Headquarters) and the former General Manager of the then-existing Logistics Division of a company whose business activities are related to research, development, design, procurement, and manufacture of boilers, gas turbines, and other equipment and devices that constitute facilities or equipment for thermal power generation systems, etc. with its head office in Yokohama gave money to a Thai public official through a person sent from its local subcontractor. The Agreement Procedure<sup>80</sup> was applied.

Specifically, with the aim of gaining convenience and advantages for not being prohibited from using a temporary jetty and unloading cargoes while giving tacit approval of violation of permission conditions without undertaking official procedures to get authorization to use the jetty, the defendants gave 11 million Thai baht equivalent to 39.93 million yen at that time to a public official in Thailand through a person sent from its local subcontractor.

In this case, the two defendants were sentenced to imprisonment with work for one year and six months (with a suspension of execution of the sentence for three years), one year and four months (with a suspension of execution of the sentence for three years). As a result of applying the Agreement Procedure to this case, the company has not been prosecuted.

**(6) Case of giving improper benefits to a Vietnamese public official (Kobe Summary Court, December 2019)**

The case: A Vietnamese living in Japan gave money (total 150,000 yen) to a then-existing consul at Consulate-General of Vietnam in Fukuoka to issue the necessary documents for application of Vietnamese residence status.

A fine of 500,000 yen was imposed on the defendant in this case.

**(7) Case of giving improper benefits to Vietnamese customs officers (Nagoya Summary Court, January 2020)**

The case: The then-existing President of a local corporation that sells electronic products as its business gave 1.5 billion Vietnamese dong (approximately 7.35 million yen) to two senior officials in Hai Phong City Customs Department with the aim of gaining advantages for reducing surcharges by customs violations.

A fine of 1,000,000 yen was imposed on the defendant in this case.

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<sup>80</sup> It was introduced with the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure on May 24th 2016, and it was enforced in June 2018.

**(8) Case of giving improper benefits to a Vietnamese public official (Kobe Summary Court, June 2020)**

The case: A Vietnamese living in Japan gave money (approximately 100,000 yen) and promised to give money to a then-existing consul at Consulate-General of Vietnam in Osaka to issue the necessary documents for submitting marriage registration.

A fine of 500,000 yen was imposed on the defendant in the case.

**(9) Case of promising to give improper benefits to a Vietnamese public official (Tsu Summary Court, July 2020)**

The case: A Vietnamese living in Japan promised to give money (total 140,000 yen) to a then-existing consul at Consulate-General of Vietnam in Osaka to issue the necessary documents for submitting marriage registration.

A fine of 500,000 yen was imposed on the defendant in the case.

## CHAPTER 4: OTHER MATTERS OF RELEVANCE

This Chapter provides information on measures taken in Japan with regard to the bribery of foreign public officials other than the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, and relevant information from other countries. The information provided here is also expected to be utilized as basic information, etc. for companies to refer to in examining its measures.

### **4.1 Relevant Measures Taken to Implement Obligations under the OECD Convention**

In implementing the obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, statutory measures have been taken through other laws and regulations, etc. in addition to those under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. The overview of the measures taken in accordance with articles of the OECD Convention is as follows:

#### **(1) Notification (Article 1 of the Convention)**

Article 1 of the Convention states the measures should be taken to punish bribery of foreign public officials under their own country laws.

Regarding the measures, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act is listed among the laws which the law for Whistleblower Protection Act<sup>81</sup> is applied. The Whistleblower Protection Act protects the employee who provided whistle-blowing appropriately from disadvantageous treatment such as dismissal by the Japanese company, so that the offense of bribery of foreign public officials can be discovered.

#### **(2) Confiscation of Proceeds (Article 3 of the Convention) - Money Laundering (Article 7 of the Convention)**

Article 3.3 of the Convention sets out, "Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable."

In Japan in addition to monetary sanctions under the dual criminal liability provision in the Unfair Competition Prevention Act mentioned above, Article 2(2)(i)(a) of the "Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds" (hereinafter referred to as the "Organized Crime Punishment Act") sets out that the property which is produced by a criminal act which is punishable by imprisonment with work for a maximum period of four years or more, obtained through the crime act, or acquired as a reward for the criminal act will be considered "proceeds of crime" subject to confiscation under article 13 of the Organized Crime Punishment Act.

Article 21(2)(vii) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act sets out that a person who have interfered with a bribery to public official shall be punished by imprisonment with

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<sup>81</sup> Please refer to the Whistleblower Protection website for details  
([https://www.caa.go.jp/policies/policy/consumer\\_system/whistleblower\\_protection\\_system/](https://www.caa.go.jp/policies/policy/consumer_system/whistleblower_protection_system/)).

work for five years or less, so property acquired by bribe-giver's side will be considered "proceeds of crime" and subject to confiscation.

Article 2(2)(iii)(b) of the Organized Crime Punishment Act sets out that the "property given" to a foreign public official, etc. (which is property given to the bribe-taker's side) will be considered "proceeds of crime" subject to confiscation

Article 7 of the Convention sets out that "Each Party which has made bribery of its own public official a predicate offence for the purpose of the application of its money laundering legislation shall do so on the same terms for the bribery of a foreign public official, without regard to the place where the bribery occurred." Article 10 of the Organized Crime Punishment Act sets out that a person who have concealed proceeds of crime shall be punished.

### **(3) Accounting (Article 8 of the Convention)**

Article 8 of the Convention requires signatories to take such measures as may be necessary regarding inadequate and false entries in books and records, and financial statements, etc. for the purpose of, for example, hiding the giving of an improper benefit to a foreign public official.

In Japan, false entries, etc. are prohibited under the general principles of the "Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises" and Article 5 of the "Ordinance on the Terminology, Forms and Preparation Methods of Financial Statements, etc." In addition, violations may be subject to civil damages under Articles 18, 21, 22 and 24-4 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, or administrative or criminal sanctions under Article 976 of the Companies Act, Articles 10, 24-2, 172, 172-2, 172-3, 172-4, 197, 197-2 and 207 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, and Articles 30, 31-2, 34-21 and 34-21-2 of the Certified Public Accountants Act.

### **(4) Mutual Legal Assistance (Article 9 of the Convention) and Extradition (Article 10 of the Convention)**

Article 9 of the Convention lays down a requirement for mutual legal assistance such as the provision of prompt and effective legal assistance to other signatory countries.

This requirement can adequately be met through the relevant procedures provided in the "Act on International Assistance in Investigation and Other Related Matters" and the "Act on Assistance Based on Commission by Foreign Courts".

Article 10 of the Convention requires that bribery of a foreign public official should be included as an extraditable offense under the internal laws of each country and the criminal extradition treaty of the signatory countries<sup>82</sup>, the country's own nationals should be extraditable or, when the country declines a request to extradite a person for bribery of

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<sup>82</sup> According to the Convention, any signatories where the extradition of a criminal is conditional upon the existence of a criminal extradition treaty may deem the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions to be the legal grounds for the extradition of a criminal in connection with the bribery of foreign public officials (Article 10-2 of the Convention).

a foreign public official solely on the ground that the person is its national, the case should be submitted to its competent authorities.

As the offense of bribery of foreign public officials under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act falls under an offense punishable by imprisonment with work for three years or longer, it is an extraditable offense under the "Act of Extradition".

#### **(5) Monitoring and Follow-Up (Article 12 of the Convention)**

Based on the awareness of the need to achieve equivalence among the measures to be taken by signatory countries, Article 12 of the Convention requires cooperation among signatory countries for the purpose of monitoring and promoting the full implementation of the Convention.

In response to this requirement, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions has been conducting a sequenced series of evaluations after the Convention came into force in February 1999, *i.e.*, the evaluation of the consistency of signatory countries' implementation of the Convention by reference to their relevant laws (Procedure of Self- and Mutual Evaluation - Phase 1), the follow-up evaluation on the issues pointed out in the Phase 1 evaluation (Phase 1 bis), and the evaluation of the state of operation (effectiveness) of the relevant laws (Procedure of Self- and Mutual Evaluation - Phase 2), and follow up on the Phase 2 evaluation and the evaluation with emphasis on the aspect of enforcement (Procedure of Self- and Mutual Evaluation - Phase 3), and thereby continually monitors the systems and applications of all signatory countries.

Further, the Phase 4 evaluation (which is related to the main cross-cutting problem in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, and the progress about matters pointed out between Phase 1 and Phase 3) was started in 2016.

For Japan, the Phase 1 evaluation was conducted in October 1999, the Phase 1 bis evaluation in April 2002, Phase 2 evaluation in December 2004 and January 2005, Phase 2 bis evaluation in June 2006, Phase 2 follow-up evaluation in October 2007, Phase 3 evaluation in December 2011, Phase 3 follow-up evaluation in February 2014 and Phase 4 evaluation in June 2019<sup>83</sup>.

#### **4.2 Other Relevant Actions in Japan**

In addition to the measures in accordance with the OECD Convention, the Japanese government and governmental agencies have taken actions that contribute to preventing corruption, including prevention of bribery of foreign public officials. Among these actions, the following two are of particular relevance.

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<sup>83</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/japan-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm>

**(1) Actions in relation to Export Credits**

The OECD Export Credit Group adopted the "Action Statement on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits" (December 2000, OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (OECD-ECG)), which stipulates, among others, that appropriate steps be taken to deter bribery in officially supported export credits and, in the case that bribery was involved in the award of the export contract, appropriate measures be taken. Subsequently, as means to further promote the efforts stipulated in this Action Statement, the OECD Council adopted the "OECD Council Recommendation on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits" in December 2006 and later its revised recommendation ("**New OECD Recommendation**"<sup>84</sup>) in March 2019. As a result, agencies of the OECD member countries that are involved in officially supported export credits are required to take equivalent action.

In Japan, Nippon Export and Investment Insurance ("**NEXI**") and Japan Bank for International Cooperation ("**JBIC**") have been making efforts in the following matters with regard to companies applying for an insurance contract and exporters, etc. in compliance with the said New OECD Recommendation since April 2020<sup>85</sup>.

**(NEXI)**

- When applying for insurance, companies, etc. applying for an insurance contract are required to take an oath that "such companies, their officers, employees and agents involved in the transaction covered by the insurance contract" (hereinafter, "**companies, etc. applying for insurance**") have not previously been and will not be involved in foreign bribery in violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.
  
- When applying for insurance, said companies, etc. are required to declare any of the following matters, if applicable.
  - "Companies, etc. applying for insurance" are currently under prosecution or formally under investigation in any country for a crime in violation of laws, including foreign laws, against bribery.
  - Within a five-year period preceding the application, "companies, etc. applying for insurance" have been convicted in any court for violation of laws against bribery of any country, including foreign laws, been subject to equivalent measures which include deferred prosecution and administrative punishment but are not limited to them, or been found as part of a publicly-available arbitral award to have engaged in bribery

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<sup>84</sup> The New OECD Recommendation covers the bribery of foreign and domestic public officials and bribery between private sectors if the bribery between private sectors involved in export contracts and other equivalent contracts is prohibited under national laws. Also, bribers may include not only exporters and companies which apply for insurance, but also borrowers and other relevant parties.

<sup>85</sup> NEXI: <https://www.nexi.go.jp/international/measures/index.html>,  
JBIC: <https://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/support-menu/export/prevention.html>

- If the above matters are applicable, more strict due diligence than usual, which is defined as Enhanced Due Diligence by the New OECD Recommendation, is conducted and it will be confirmed that appropriate internal corrective measures and preventive measures are taken and maintained, and that rules are documented and so on because the risks associated with bribery which is involved in the transaction covered by an insurance contract need to be confirmed more carefully.
- If there is doubt of involvement of bribery in a transaction covered by an insurance contract prior to its conclusion, its conclusion shall be withheld, and if it is later found that "companies, etc. applying for insurance" are indeed involved in bribery, then the transaction is not underwritten.
- If it is concluded that "companies, etc. applying for insurance" is involved in bribery after the conclusion of an insurance contract, appropriate measures shall be taken, such as rejection of insurance claims, return of paid insurance or cancellation of the insurance contract.

**(JBIC)**

- In considering loan, etc., exporters are required to take an oath or get confirmation about the following matters:
  - Exporters and the exporters' representatives, executives, agents, employees and other workers ("**export relevant parties**") have not previously been and will not be involved in the bribery of foreign public officials against the Unfair Competition Prevention Act with regard to this agreement such as export agreements or sales agreements.
  - Exporters and export relevant parties are required to provide relevant information if they have been indicted as suspects of the bribery involved in their domestic and foreign business, if they have been subject to investigation as far as they know, if they have been convicted or been subject to equivalent measures (including punishment based on confession/self-declaration and plea bargaining) within a five-year period preceding the application or if they have been found as part of a publicly-available arbitral award to have engaged in bribery.
- In case the relevant information is provided, appropriate measures are taken, for example, more strict due diligence than usual, which is defined as Enhanced Due Diligence by New OECD recommendation, is conducted because the risk associated bribery which is involved in the transaction on the agreement need to be confirmed more carefully.
- If it is recognized that they have been involved in the bribery concerning the



agreements, take the following action:

(Before execution of loan) Appropriate measures such as provision of information to law enforcement authorities, the refusal of loan, suspension of loan and cancellation of the undrawn loan amounts are taken.

(After execution of loan) Appropriate measures like provision of information to law enforcement authorities and mandatory payment before maturity are taken.

## **(2) Actions in relation to ODA (Official Development Assistance)**

The "Development Cooperation Charter" which was decided by the Cabinet in February, 2015, also refers to "Prevention of fraud and corruption" as one of the general rules for development cooperation, as shown below. Bribery of foreign public officials is one of the key items in that policy.

### **(1) Implementation Principles**

B. Principles for securing the appropriateness of development cooperation

(g) Preventing fraud and corruption

It is necessary to prevent fraud and corruption in implementing development cooperation. While taking measures to encourage establishment of a compliance system by bid winners, Japan will work with recipient countries to create an environment conducive to preventing fraud and corruption, including the strengthening of governance in these countries. In this context, Japan will ensure adherence to appropriate procedures and strive to ensure transparency in the implementation process.

The government and relevant governmental agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are committed to taking disciplinary actions against persons involved in bribery of foreign public officials in relation with development cooperation, on a case-by-case basis within a predetermined scope.

With the implementation of these measures, attention is paid so that no bribery of foreign public officials should take place in connection with development cooperation by the Japanese government.

### **[Reference 1]**

"Toward Preventing a Recurrence of Corruption Related to Official Development Assistance (ODA)" (September 2009)

As a result of the occurrence of cases of giving improper benefits in relation with a yen-loan-financed project<sup>86</sup>, the following main proposals were made by the "Study Panel for Preventing a Recurrence of ODA-Related Corruption"<sup>87</sup> comprised of outside specialists, set up by the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

<sup>86</sup> See Chapter 3.4, Section (2)

<sup>87</sup> [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/f\\_boushi.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/f_boushi.html)

1. Efforts that have been taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and JICA
  - (i) Strengthening rules on punitive measures for businesses
  - (ii) Making good use of points of contact for information on corruption
  - (iii) More involvement of JICA in the selection and contract processes
  - (iv) Closer monitoring of ODA projects
2. Measures for firms
  - (i) Recommendations for enhancing compliance
  - (ii) Recommendations for familiarizing firms with international competition standards
3. Measures for recipient countries
  - (i) ODA policy for recipient countries where a corruption case has occurred
  - (ii) Recommendations for enhancing governance
  - (iii) Recommendations for capacity building
4. Efforts towards an International Framework
5. Follow-up on Recommendations

**[Reference 2]**

"Guidelines/Rules on measures in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA and bribery of foreign public officials"

MOFA and JICA have taken measures against fraudulent persons or entities to be excluded from approval of the contracts or bid participation, which is based on "Guidelines on measures against Persons, etc. Engaged in Fraudulent Practices in Japan's ODA Projects", "Rules on Measures against Fraudulent Practices, etc. in Projects of ODA loan and Grant Aid" and "Rules on Measures against Fraudulent Practices in Contracts Awarded by JICA".

In February 2011, MOFA extended the upper limit of the period of measures involved in the bribery of foreign public officials in the Guidelines from 12 months to 36 months as a part of actions with aim of strengthening rules on punitive measures for businesses in response to the recommendations by the Study Panel mentioned in the above Reference 1.

**[Reference 3]**

"Anti-Corruption in Official Development Assistance (ODA) Projects (Strengthening of Preventive Measures)" (October 2014)<sup>88</sup>

As a result of revelation of cases of giving improper benefits surrounding ODA projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and Uzbekistan<sup>89</sup>, it has been decided to take the following actions with an aim to further strengthening the foregoing preventive measures in order to inhibit similar cases from happening in the future:

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<sup>88</sup> [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/kaikaku/f\\_boshi/201410\\_kyouka.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/kaikaku/f_boshi/201410_kyouka.html)

<sup>89</sup> See Chapter 3.4, Section (4)

1. Improvement of the Consultation Desk on Anti-Corruption
  - (i) Improvement of "consultation" function and online receipt of reports in English and in the local language;
  - (ii) Introduction of a system whereby companies that voluntarily report fraudulent practices can benefit from a reduction in or exemption from the measures of exclusion from bidding for a certain period
2. Further strengthening of the Measures against companies engaged in fraudulent practices;
3. "JICA Anti-Corruption Guidance"<sup>90</sup>;
4. Measures for strengthening compliance by companies;
5. Further encouragement to the government of partner countries; and
6. Strengthening of partner countries' system of governance and support for the improvement of their capabilities to prevent fraud and corruption

### **(3) The Agreement Procedure (Article 350-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)**

The Agreement Procedure was introduced by the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in May 2016, which came into force in June 2018.

An offense under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act is an offense subject to the Agreement Procedure. Under the Agreement Procedure, a public prosecutor may enter an agreement with the suspect/defendant upon consent of his/her counsel with regard to offenses under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. The Agreement Procedure stipulates that the suspect/defendant cooperates the prosecutor with regard to the criminal case against the third person by making statements, in return for the favorable treatment by the prosecutor such as non-prosecution, seeking lighter sentence to the court with regard to the criminal case against the suspect/defendant.

## **4.3 Trends of Legal Systems and Applications in Foreign Countries**

### **(1) Overview of Legal Systems and Applications in Foreign Countries**

As legal systems of and the state of applications in signatory countries to the Convention are followed up on by the OECD as required, information on countries of interest can be obtained via the OECD<sup>91</sup>.

Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan conducted an investigation on the relevant legal systems of several countries in June 2003. As a result, it was found that indictments had been reported in five countries, namely, the United States, Korea, Poland,

<sup>90</sup> <https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/odainfo/pdf/guidance.pdf>

<sup>91</sup> For information on the evaluations by the OECD, refer to:

<https://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/phase1countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm> (Phase 1 evaluation)

<https://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/phase2countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm> (Phase 2 evaluation)

<https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/phase3countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm> (Phase 3 evaluation)

Canada and Sweden<sup>92</sup>.

**(2) OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises<sup>93</sup>**

In May 2011, the "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" was adopted by the governments of the 42 member countries that participate in the "OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises" at the 2011 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting. The OECD Guidelines also refer to seven items of action that multinational enterprises should take to prevent bribery.

For example, the OECD Guidelines set out the following matters as recommendations which can serve as reference for enterprises in their attempt to combat bribery:

- Not offer, promise or give undue pecuniary or other advantage to public officials or the employees of business partners. Likewise, enterprises should not request, agree to or accept undue pecuniary or other advantage from public officials or the employees of business partners. Enterprises should not use third parties such as agents and other intermediaries, consultants, representatives, distributors, consortia, contractors and suppliers and joint venture partners for channelling undue pecuniary or other advantages to public officials, or to employees of their business partners or to their relatives or business associates.
- Develop and adopt adequate internal controls, ethics and compliance programmes or measures for preventing and detecting bribery, developed on the basis of a risk assessment addressing the individual circumstances of an enterprise, in particular the bribery risks facing the enterprise (such as its geographical and industrial sector of operation). These internal controls, ethics and compliance programmes or measures should include a system of financial and accounting procedures, including a system of internal controls, reasonably designed to ensure the maintenance of fair and accurate books, records, and accounts, to ensure that they cannot be used for the purpose of bribing or hiding bribery. Such individual circumstances and bribery risks should be regularly monitored and re-assessed as necessary to ensure the enterprise's internal controls, ethics and compliance programme or measures are adapted and continue to be effective, and to mitigate the risk of enterprises becoming complicit in bribery, bribe solicitation and extortion.

*END OF THE DOCUMENT.*

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<sup>92</sup> According to this study, they include 45 indictments in the United States, two in Korea, one in Sweden and one in Canada (as of March 2003 for Korea and January 2002 for the rest).

<sup>93</sup> <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/csr/housin.html>. The provisional translation of the said policy is available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/csr/pdfs/takoku\\_ho.pdf](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/csr/pdfs/takoku_ho.pdf).