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The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East: Exodus in Reverse Illustrated Edition, Kindle Edition
Despite the importance of the Suez conflict, almost no comprehensive military history of it exists. This book changes this by presenting a clear, comprehensive narrative of the conflict with a special emphasis on the military decisions and the short- and long-term results of the conflict, both tactical and strategic, military and political.
- ISBN-13978-1498516723
- EditionIllustrated
- PublisherLexington Books
- Publication dateOctober 22, 2015
- LanguageEnglish
- File size39640 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
Despite the importance of the Suez conflict, no comprehensive military history study of this magnitude has ever been published. This book contributes a methodical military review, along with a thorough description of the battles, wrapped in a description of an additional extensive layer of the various diplomatic and political circles. The book describes the diplomatic thinking and the military execution of each of the participating parties – Egypt, Israel, France and Britain, and even the USSR and the USA. The book does not confine itself to a description of the war but delves into its results in the diplomatic layers as well as in the military strategic and even tactical layers. ― Israel Book Review
The author of this book has written a very readable and thorough narrative. . . . Henkin is at his best describing the military moves during the conflict, but he is at ease unraveling the tangled web of multilateral interests and actions. . . Ultimately, the author does a nice job of outlining the overall lack of Israeli readiness for war and demonstrates well how the Western powers brought Israel into the conflict. Henkin's book is a good regional military and diplomatic history that properly situates the conflict and helps dispel some long-held misconceptions about the Arab-Israeli crisis.
― HistorianThe story of the Suez War has been told many times, by the principals and by historians. But Yagil Henkin’s account stands out. He has finally given the military moves their full due alongside the more famous diplomatic maneuvering. But this is not only military history. Henkin presents events from every possible vantage point—Israeli, British, French, Egyptian, and American—and he integrates this into a seamless narrative, distinguished by its easy readability. No serious shelf on the 1956 war, however full, can do without Yagil Henkin’s indispensable work. -- Martin Kramer, President, Shalem College
A real gem. The most recent, as well as much the best, history of the 1956 Suez Campaign ever written.
-- Martin van Creveld, Hebrew University
About the Author
Product details
- ASIN : B01ALUXKSW
- Publisher : Lexington Books; Illustrated edition (October 22, 2015)
- Publication date : October 22, 2015
- Language : English
- File size : 39640 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 529 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,548,811 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #228 in History of Egypt
- #1,021 in Egyptian History (Books)
- #1,099 in History of Israel & Palestine
- Customer Reviews:
About the author
Dr. Yagil Henkin teaches military history at the Israeli army Command and General Staff College. He regularly leads battlefield tours, both in Israel and in western Europe.
Dr Henkin is also an avid hiker, and co-authored (with Jaacob Saar) guides to the Israel National Trail and other long-distance trails in Israel.
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It also, as Dr. Henkin points out, rips away much of the myth of Israeli invincibility, but with the result that the reader cannot help but come away with an increased respect for the IDF of the period and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Also explored are the actions of the Soviets and how they impacted the conflict.
The book reads with the smoothness of a novel and with a sense of excitement and passion. But Dr, Henkin is careful to note where he is offering his own opinion, allowing the reader to form his own conclusions. He also refuses to present opinion as fact, much to his credit. His analysis makes this book a must read for anyone interested in the Middle East or military history.
The book covers the period leading up to Egypt’s Gamal Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal, in part because the United States withdrew its financial support for the Aswan Dam project, and probes other background issues generally ignored or glossed over. He recites how Britain and France decided to seize the canal, invade Egypt and topple the Nasser government. In the last of several scenarios considered by the Allies, France convinced Israel to invade Egypt, giving the allies a pretext to “intervene” as peace keepers. Dr. Henkin shows the pretext failed to deceive just about anyone. The myth that Israel was duped into invading Egypt is dispelled.
Though unprepared for a major military action, the Israeli leadership seized the opportunity to strike Egypt and depose a dictator who was a thorn in Israel’s side, but was then held in limbo by Allied indecision and unnecessary secrecy. He illuminates why the political goals changed and how those changes impacted frontline commanders.
Some of the most important documents on the war are written in either Hebrew or Egyptian and consequently unavailable to most western historians, so Dr. Henkin’s use of these primary sources is unique and makes the book an invaluable addition to the study of this period in the Middle East. It is hoped Dr. Henkin will continue to translate and interpret these documents in the future.
With stories of individual participants on all sides, Dr. Henkin reminds the reader that wars are fought by people of flesh and blood, not faceless pawns moving about a sterile chess board.
The Suez War is woefully ignored in both academic and military circles. Dr. Henkin’s book should be mandatory reading for military officers, future officers, students and any politician who needs to understand today’s Middle East and its complicated web of competing interests.
You would expect the Staff Historian of the Israeli Army’s Command and General Staff College to whitewash Israel’s actions, but you’d be mistaken. While clearly a patriot, Dr. Henkin takes a hard, critical look at what Israeli forces did well and what they didn’t. The role of reserve Israeli units is touched on, along with some of their failures through a lack of training and preparedness.
The text is a clear lesson to politicians who would reduce combat capability to save money, both by the Israelis, as well as France and Britain. The Allied failure to be prepared nearly crippled their ability to respond militarily and the delays in mounting an expedition allowed popular support to deteriorate to unacceptable levels. The nearly year-long delay also negated the argument that Egypt could not manage the canal without Western help.
Off the battlefield the political war waged was at least as important as the actions of the frontline troops. Dr. Henkin untangles the web of competing interests and uses the war to warn against dabbling in the affairs of other countries without adequate understanding and knowledge. America’s political backroom maneuvering reveals the United States as the new bully in the international neighborhood. Dr. Henkin demonstrates how President Eisenhower failed to recognize the bias against Israel by members of his administration.
There are some things either ignored or only lightly treated. The book only touches on the problems Britain encountered when bringing troop transports out of mothballs and the challenges created by calling up reservists, including World War II veterans, to man the ships. But Dr. Henkin does go into how the delays adversely impacted reservists.
Perhaps the most important aspect Dr. Henkin explores is the fallout from the war and how its outcome impacts the Middle East to his day. Not only was Nasser not removed from power, but after the war his popularity and influence in other Arab nations was greatly enhanced. Israel perhaps gained the most by the creation of the myth of IDF invincibility and should be challenged at an aggressor’s peril. But the way the war ended also made future military conflict inevitable.
“The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East: Exodus in Reverse” is a must read for anyone interested in military history or international politics. It should be on the mandatory reading list for military officers and military academies should use it as a text in any one of several classes.
Taken as a whole the book deserves a five star rating.
James Craig, JD
Dr. Yagil Henkin does an admirable job of rectifying the picture, telling the story from all perspectives - Israeli, British, Russian, French, English, American, and Egyptian - in a way that avoids caricature or whitewashing of anyone. With his close and detailed focus on the military aspects of the war, he also reminds us that this was first and foremost an armed conflict, and that the tempo of the diplomatic conflict was often set by the pace of progress on the battlefield - or lack thereof.
In Henkin's telling, the conspiracy between Israel, Britain, and France against Nasser in 1956 was indeed the culmination of hostility towards Egypt, each for their own (often legitimate) reasons, but the conspiracy itself was so improvised and lacking in concrete and realistic objectives, it feels more like a comedy of errors than the nefarious imperialistic plot of later imagination.
Alongside the description of the ham-fisted British and French efforts, Henkin's description of the Israel-Egyptian war is a nice corrective to the usual stereotypical depictions of easy and intentional Israeli wins against hapless Egyptian soldiers who were outnumbered anyway. While the IDF, just eight years in existence, had made impressive strides towards becoming the juggernaut it would reveal itself to be in 1967, commanders made plenty of sometimes nearly fatal errors, while Egyptian commanders demonstrated no small amount of resourcefulness in the face of serious odds.
This is a book also covering the historiography of the war as well as being based in part on original (Israeli) archival research, including addressing the claims that Israel was chomping at the bit for a war (a claim belied by actual IDF preparations and effective plans, as opposed to theoretical contingency ones), an argument which caused some controversy in Israel when made in its time. The book's summary nicely ties up the "winners" and "losers" of the war, though as 1967 would reveal: Victory and defeat can often be fleeting.
While I generally recommend it, the book desperately needed a tighter editor. This is true not only regarding typos, but also general style and sentence structure. In addition, it is a shame that Henkin's admirable attention to detail in military matters is not supported with enough visual aids - pictures of the defiles, roads, and terrain the armies fought over, as well as maps focused on specific battlefields rather than just general maps of the whole campaign (e.g., Abu Agheila, an urban map of Port Said, the Mitla Pass). These would have helped the reader greatly in orienting themselves while following his description of the battle.
These criticisms aside, matters which can be easily remedied in a second edition, Henkin's work is a very serviceable and readable summary of an important conflict and milestone in the history of Israel and the Middle East as a whole.
The one detail I liked best is as follows. The vast majority of authors do not shrink from using other people's footnotes, especially archival ones, as their own. Let him who has never, never done so cast the first stone! Henkin, as he says, is careful to point the reader to the author from whom he took references he did not see himself. As he says in the afterword, he can only hope others will do the same with his work. That is what I call integrity.
The only serious problem is the editing, which is as bad as anything I have ever seen. While I look forward to read more books by this author, I very much hope that this particular problem will not be repeated.