Argument from inconsistent revelations

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The argument from inconsistent revelations is an argument that aims to show that one cannot choose one religion over another since their revelations are inconsistent with each other and that any two religions cannot be true.[1]

Appearances[edit]

The argument appears, among other places, in Voltaire's Candide and Philosophical Dictionary. It is also manifested in Denis Diderot's statement in response to Pascal's Wager that, whatever proofs are offered for the existence of God in Christianity or any other religion, "an Imam can reason the same way".[2][3]

Also in response to Pascal's Wager, J.L Mackie said “the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the Anabaptists or the Mormons or the Muslim Sunnis or the worshippers of Kali or of Odin”.[4]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Dawkins, Richard (16 January 2008). The God Delusion. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 25. ISBN 978-0-547-34866-7. Retrieved 28 March 2021.
  2. ^ Diderot, Denis (1875–77) [1746]. J. Assézar (ed.). Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1 (in French). p. 167.
  3. ^ "Objections to Pascal's Wager". Stanford University.
  4. ^ Mackie, J. L., 1982. The Miracle of Theism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 203