China's Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems edited by James M. Smith and Paul J. Bolt. Georgetown University Press, 2021, 280 pp.

American leadership and doctrine also point to China as the primary military threat going forward, so it is essential that the United States better understand China's point of view. How do they view themselves, and how do they view Western military threats? In this context, *China's Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems* dives deep into China's strategic views, practices, and capabilities so that the United States may better understand them. The West cannot treat China like it did Russia during the Cold War, as China's nuclear doctrine and capabilities drastically differ, so this book aims to paint an accurate picture of China as a strategic power.

As the title suggests, this book is essentially a collection of nine papers on a variety of topics exploring China's strategic worldview, doctrine, and systems. James M. Smith and Paul J. Bolt, both professors at the United States Air Force Academy, selected the subject matter experts and ensured that they represented multiple viewpoints and interpretations of the facts.

While the authors come from the United States, Australia, and Japan, many of them speak, read, and research in Chinese and travel there frequently to engage with their Chinese counterparts. There was not a clear bias or uniform point of view among the collection, and each chapter was extensively researched and cited. Overall, the book is not trying to convince the reader of any one view. Instead, it lays out the facts and provides the context to understand them.

The book starts with the editors outlining the historical context for the US-Chinese relationship. This chapter walks through the events from before the Cold War until the Trump administration that summarize the US perspective toward China as a military power. This chapter could stand alone as a primer on the topic and is the most widely relevant section of the book.

From there, each chapter details a particular focus area. Andrew Scobell starts by examining Chinese strategic doctrine, including their No First Use policy, and how China sees the concept of deterrence differently from the West. Christopher Twomey continues that thread by describing how the Chinese deterrence concept has evolved to where it is now. Sugio Takahashi then provides a Japanese perspective to discuss the stability-instability paradox and how China's regional strategic stability should be considered.

The fifth chapter provides an overview of China's current nuclear systems and programs. Hans Kristensen uses tables and graphs to survey China's current stockpiles and future projections and goes on to describe their offensive and defensive capabilities in detail.

In the next chapter, Phillip Saunders and David Logan expand on China's nuclear capabilities by outlining their nonstrategic nuclear arsenal and their strategic, nonnuclear arsenal. They cover bomber and submarine-delivered systems, hypersonic technologies, counterspace options, offensive cyberattacks, and the future for artificial intelligence. While nuclear weapons are generally the focus of strategic power, China has many nonnuclear options to create strategic effects. This chapter did an excellent job summarizing China's military options.

In chapter 7, Bates Gill details the evolution of China's military organizational structure and how it has improved in recent years. He also introduces the concept of organizational entanglement and how the entanglement of nuclear and nonnuclear forces creates challenges for the United States.

China's current arms control and deterrence policies differ from the West's, and Nancy Gallagher describes how they have changed with recent American administrations in the eighth chapter. She outlines China's perspectives and assumptions about nonproliferation, strategic stability, and arms control and contrasts them to how the United States thinks about those topics.

The final chapter wraps up with an outlook for the future. Brad Roberts makes some predictions while acknowledging important uncertainties that make predictions difficult. Along with the introduction, the last chapter is the most generally applicable to readers. After reading eight sepa-

rate papers on China's strategic arsenal, the final chapter ties it all up nicely and summarizes the key takeaways from the different focus areas.

Be warned, this book is not a casual read. It reads like a collection of well-researched papers and is best read a chapter at a time to digest the details. Furthermore, if the reader is primarily interested in a particular focus area, there is no penalty for just reading the relevant chapter. The chapters occasionally reference others in the book, but they can easily stand alone.

China's Strategic Arsenal is worth reading for government and military leaders who need to better understand China's military capabilities and students in an academic setting, but it might be overkill for readers with a general interest in China. Overall, it was an extremely well-researched collection that painted a modern picture of China's strategic arsenal.

Captain Sean R. Kelly, USSF

Pearl: December 7, 1941, by Daniel Allen Butler. Casemate Publishers, 2020, 354 pp.

The attack on Pearl Harbor, a familiar story, can be clouded with myths and generalizations. *Pearl: December 7, 1941*, by Daniel Allen Butler, seeks to cut through these problems of history and ask "What happened at Pearl Harbor? What really happened?" Butler, the author of several published books on maritime history, engagingly tells the story and details the buildup to the infamous day the Empire of Japan attacked the United States, pulling the latter into World War II.

The story arc focuses on the great power struggle between Japan and the United States in the Pacific Ocean. The attack on Pearl Harbor is at the apex of this conflict. The author utilizes historical and strategic perspectives, with some limited tactical aspects, to dispel myths of the US-Japanese competition in the Pacific and the attack on Pearl Harbor. He also highlights little-known narratives and accounts of the buildup to December 1941, the attack itself, and the months that immediately followed. Butler provides a comprehensive overview of the historical setting with an exploration of centuries worth of Japanese and US history, briskly walking through the impactful events to set the foundation for a confrontation between Japan and the United States.

Pearl also explores the rise of militarism in Japan before World War II. The author contextualizes Japan's domestic and international policies through events where the Japanese felt cheated by Western nations. Butler also showcases how the Japanese experienced international alienation, both perceived and real, which influenced their cultural myth of invincibility and drove them to seek vengeance on Western powers. Through rapid industrialization and a drive to match Western military capabilities, the Japanese sought to achieve decisive victories against their adversaries. This dynamic was in the same vein as their remarkable feat at the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.

In *Pearl*, interservice rivalry and bureaucratic wrangling within the military and national leadership of the Japanese and the United States were fomenters of action in this era. For Japan, the rise of a militaristic culture and the political dynamic were underpinned by partisan fealty to a military service and political party. According to Butler, the divisions within Japanese leadership drove aggressive foreign policy and championed domestic and foreign deception. The author also highlighted political machinations within US leadership circles. The derivative bureaucratic competition and interservice feuding all factored into US preparedness and response to the Japanese and impacted military readiness.

The author calls the larger Japanese military offensive in the Pacific during December 1941, the most audacious military campaign in history. While Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the author noted the multipronged Japanese attack across the expanse of the Pacific Ocean sought to secure territory, resources, and prestige for Japan. Butler juxtaposed this strategic picture with first-person accounts to accentuate the dynamics of the era. The author relied heavily on a personal account of one of the architects of Japanese naval strategy and the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. The

use of Admiral Yamamoto's story in the book helped to highlight the opportunities and issues Japan encountered through its rise as a power and decision to confront the United States.

The Pearl Harbor attack itself is at the core of this book. The author built the intensity and suspense of the attack, despite the reader's knowledge of the events to unfold. Through detailed paragraphs about the attack plans, the context behind individual choices and strategic decisions was profound. The reader could feel the anxiousness of the Japanese crewmen through the author's dramatic conveyance of the story. Vivid descriptions and minutiae of the attack itself, such as a US Naval Academy class ring found embedded in the bulkhead of one struck ship, truly emphasized a deeper more intense connection to the book.

Another topic the author highlighted to complete the narrative was the recovery of US service member remains. This aspect brought the heroics and horrors to the forefront through graphic descriptions of service members fighting to survive in near darkness in overturned ships and swimming through flaming oil slicks during the chaos of the attack. Some of the personal accounts were from the survivors themselves. In other cases, only the remains recovered in the following weeks and months could provide some semblance of understanding their story.

Throughout the book, the author also infused unique tales to tell a more complete story. The development of unique US and Japanese intelligence collection techniques, the planned use of Japanese midget submarines, and the nuances of diplomatic communications, all contributed toward a richer comprehension of what happened at Pearl Harbor. *Pearl* is an engrossing read on a well-tread but important subject. *Pearl* will interest readers new to this history and satiate military historians.

Captain Robert Marshall, USAFR

Power after Carbon: Building a Clean, Resilient Grid by Peter Fox-Penner. Harvard University Press, 2020, 430 pp.

Ten years after his popular work *Smart Power*, Peter Fox-Penner returns with an updated and companion piece, *Power after Carbon: Building a Clean, Resilient Grid,* on the country's transition from fossil-fuel-powered electricity generation to carbon-neutral sources. Substantial technological progress has been made in the areas of power generation and energy efficiency.

Fox-Penner's new research focuses on the challenges both to the electric grid to compensate for the inherent inconsistency in power output from renewable sources and to the electric utilities to make this transition while remaining profitable. Fox-Penner does a commendable job of providing insight into the inner workings of an industry most take for granted. He astutely avoids forecasting the precise details of the transition but thoroughly investigates and then recommends pathways to achieve zero carbon emissions from electricity generation by 2050.

While *Power after Carbon* tackles technical subject matter, it builds an understanding of the electric power industry from the bottom up. Fox-Penner's finesse in enabling the reader to understand this specialized subject matter likely comes from years of experience educating students and industry professionals. He is a professor of Practice at the Boston University Questrom School of Business and the founder and director of the school's Institute for Sustainable Energy. He is also a partner and the chief strategy officer of Energy Impact Partners and maintains ties with the Brattle Group, where he worked as principal and chairman for 20 years.

The first chapters of *Power after Carbon* focus on the existing and emerging technologies that will transform the production and consumption of electricity. As more vehicles and appliances run on electricity instead of fossil fuels, energy efficiency will need to increase to prevent ballooning electricity consumption.

US electricity consumption peaked in 2007 and has since declined 8 percent. Fox-Penner notes that "this trend is even more remarkable because it has occurred during a time when real electric-

ity prices have been going down, not up," and he suggests that innovations such as net-zero buildings are likely to continue this trend (16). California, for example, has required all new homes to be net-zero as of 2020 and will widen this requirement to include commercial buildings in 2030. A decrease in the cost of photovoltaics and an increase in the efficiency of household appliances such as air conditioners and water heaters has made this mandate possible.

These developments, coupled with local battery storage, could lead to a "local power" trend, but Fox-Penner points out that the "Big Grid" will still benefit from economies of scale and will still be required to temper the swings in energy production from renewable sources. An investigation of how balancing authority areas (BAA) currently operate to satisfy supply and demand and what will imminently be expected of the BAAs reveals forces that favor a geographic expansion. Parts of the United States, for example, have much more potential for renewable energy production than others. Large-scale storage projects, such as pumped-storage hydroelectricity or heat storage, will be far less expensive than multiple lithium-ion batteries for meeting peaking energy needs.

Given recent high-profile hacking events, Fox-Penner presciently considers the small versus large debate through a cybersecurity lens. He notes that essential users, including US military bases, have embraced a "cyber-secured microgrid" concept to external vulnerabilities. He warns, however, that "microgrids can function on their own only because they have extensive sensing control and communication networks that work without long latency or interruption" (87).

These networks create vulnerability to all associated microgrids even though the grids are physically isolated. Moreover, the small governments or organizations that tend to run microgrids likely do not have the resources to invest sufficiently in security or to deal with the repercussions of a hack. Fox-Penner concludes that the United States will see a trend toward smaller grids over the long term, But in the coming decades, the safe transition to carbon neutrality will largely depend on the preservation of the Big Grid.

Utility companies now find themselves in a challenging situation. Fox-Penner asks, "What do you do when the only way to earn the profits that are built into prices is selling a product whose sales are flat to down" (176)? Utility companies have recently done quite well by investing in renewables and smart-grid technology, creating additional revenue streams. Fox-Penner revisits the concepts of Smart Integrator (SI) and Energy Service Utility from *Smart Power* as emerging business models and expands them into a spectrum of customer engagement. He considers several examples of electric utilities along this spectrum and examines the unique regulatory challenges and the potential to facilitate a transition to clean energy. The SI model combined with separate energy service companies that interact directly with the consumer seems to show the most potential to leverage cutting-edge technology. This model would thrive in an environment where "prosumers" generate much of their electricity and where artificially intelligent algorithms can provide individualized services.

Fox-Penner concludes *Power after Carbon* with an appendix of policy recommendations, all focused on a goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050. Many of the recommendations are not clear-cut mandates. On the topic of utility business and regulatory models, he states that nations, states, and utility companies must consciously choose a model but does not prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution. The transition to a clean power grid will not be simple, but *Power after Carbon* will help consumers, regulators, and business professionals alike to make educated decisions.

First Lieutenant Frederick Metzger, USAF

War at the Speed of Light: Directed Energy Weapons and the Future of Twenty-First-Century Warfare by Louis A. Del Monte. Potomac Books, 2021, 269 pp.

Modern warfare can be characterized by the compression of battlefield time and space resulting in rapid resource attrition and the need to react faster to adversary actions. *War at the Speed of*

Light by Louis Del Monte provides a top-level survey of strategic options incorporating faster weapons, the technical capabilities for directed energy weapons, and what future wars may look like if these weapons are fielded.

The book first examines US offset strategies and progress toward implementing fourth offset goals. Each weapon category, from laser to cyberspace, appears with a detailed technical description as well as US and adversary progress toward fielding battle-ready options. The final section examines the potential of autonomous weapons and considers what directed-energy fights across the ultimate high ground of space may entail. Del Monte's book is an easily read overview for those interested in future technologies and should be on the read list for those studying the art of war, potentially making a good mandatory read for those in some Space Force basic technical schools.

The central theme behind *War at the Speed of Light* is that electromagnetic spectrum weapons rather than physical projectiles should be a core component of any forward-looking US strategy. The book does not advance a thesis or tested point but instead presents the strengths and weaknesses of these weapons. The core discussions consider means rather than ends, leaving out any potential operations employing speed-of-light weapons. While various scenarios are discussed, most are on a personal basis versus a military use case. There is no direct comparison between US and adversary systems. Therefore, the book is a primer on potential possibilities rather than a full evaluation of which systems are preferential for future military success.

The first section addresses the four US offset strategies from a chronological perspective. The first offset strategy was deterrence as characterized by nuclear Cold War options, including mutually assured destruction and other nuclear strategies. The second offset strategy emphasized precision when laser and GPS targeted weapons appeared in the first and second Gulf Wars. Transitioning to the third offset began under President Barack Obama with the Strategic Capabilities Office and increased funding for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. This strategy sought technical advances by reaching out to commercial partners to field the most modern technology.

The fourth offset started with President Donald Trump and included three changes to the previous offset. It recognized China and Russia as the greatest threats to US national security, emphasized directed-energy weapons as essential, and secured alliances as an asymmetric strategic advantage. Each offset had an advantage when it was proposed. It remains to be seen whether the US will remain committed to the newest change or seek a different offset.

After establishing a strategic framework, Del Monte looks at four directed-energy weapon categories: laser, microwave, electromagnetic pulse, and cyberspace. In the laser category, the author primarily examines blinders but also touches on the US Navy's antidrone capability. Not mentioned are the US Army's recent acquisitions, including the Multi-Mission High Energy Laser and the Stryker-mounted air defense systems.

The author next introduces microwave weapons–especially their use for crowd control through the neurological impacts possible. An excellent example appears with the Cuban use of these weapons against the US embassy in Havana that caused physical illness, vertigo, and some sensory damage. Electromagnetic pulse weapons, the third category, use an intense burst of energy to nullify electronics. These effects are referenced as created from a secondary effect of nuclear explosion vis-à-vis an independently fielded weapon.

The final weapon category, cyberspace, encompasses a broader field although the author mentions more traditional electronic attacks like the jammers employed by the EA-6B Prowler. I consider cyberspace weapons too diverse to adequately cover in a single chapter as a subcomponent of directed energy weapons due to the many options with directed effects, hunting systems, and intelligence options. Del Monte spends a paltry 23 pages in two chapters examining defensive options as standard electronic countermeasures before mentioning active defense systems to protect from either kinetic projectiles or electromagnetic radiation. Each element of the technical capabilities is sufficiently referenced to allow readers to seek out more detailed data from other sources.

The final section explores the technological near future by characterizing the challenges posed by autonomous weapons and killer satellites. Del Monte mentions the ethical dilemmas associated with weapons picking their targets and what could happen when weapons can strike faster than the longer, human-driven kill chain required by today's autonomous weapons, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile.

Left out is the discussion of whether a fire-and-forget weapon is an autonomous option or simply improved aiming. Space weaponization suggests the potential for satellites to maneuver to physically destroy an adversary or perhaps for particle beam employment. High velocity in orbit means that any object capable of navigation could be used as a kinetic weapon. Particle beams use high-energy directed weapons with increased effectiveness because of the absence of any atmospheric interference. Del Monte concludes with three guidelines for future war: (1) nuclear weapons should be eliminated, (2) autonomous weapons should be used solely under close human supervision, and (3) all autonomous weapons should employ only conventional warheads.

War at the Speed of Light offers a generic look at future capabilities. The biggest limitation is the concentration on isolated tactical employment versus a strategic or combined arms perspective. Each section introduces the topic but lacks depth on how the weapons might be employed or where they would instead serve as a force multiplier.

Overall, *War at the Speed of Light* offers a good introduction to those whose background in the area is lacking. The summary of the US strategic offsets is excellent. The technical capabilities, offensive and defensive, provide enough detail for the reader to find other sources to seek more detailed knowledge. Lacking any comparison of how the different weapons might be employed in a combined arms strategy, the final section fails to muster sufficient emphasis to serve as a true guideline for a way ahead when considering the proposed weapon systems. The book provides an excellent starting point, and I would recommend it for those new to the study of war or looking to begin researching directed-energy capabilities.

Dr. Mark T. Peters II, USAF, Retired

War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War by Antulio J. Echevarria II. Cambridge University Press, 2021, 308 pp.

War's Logic proceeds from the basic premise that war has a logic and that by learning the "grammar" of past conflicts, one is better armed for the future. This publication is a rare resource to military professionals offering not only valuable context for military strategy but also enjoyable reading on US history. For 10 chapters, the author argues that war's nature can be viewed in distinct paradigms proposed by successive twentieth-century strategists. Paying equal tribute to luminaries' personal lives and professional accomplishments, the book gives readers a vocabulary to appreciate American strategic thought and speak more intelligently about war.

Antulio J. Echevarria II is uniquely qualified to write a book that makes such lofty promises to the reader. He is a professor at the US Army War College, former Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies, and editor in chief of the US Army War College Press. His publication is evidently the culmination of a career of research and extensive teaching experience.

War's Logic flows chronologically in four parts from the early principles of war to modern operational art. Each part focuses on two to four key intellectuals who left their imprint on US strategic doctrine. Interwoven with a discussion of the evolution of US strategy is an approachable overview of general American history to provide context. After all, the book is US-centric, so a presentation of American developments in each era is key to understanding the background of strategic thought.

The following is just one small example from Echevarria: "1957 was the year in which . . . Kissinger's *Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons* appeared, the Soviets launched Sputnik I and II into

orbit, and Elvis's 'Jail House Rock' energized a generation" (144). Current events in the United States add a splash of color to an otherwise dense read focused on the military aspect above all.

War's Logic pays substantial attention to innovative thinkers in the Navy and Army. Part of this is no doubt because, before 1947, the Air Force as such did not exist. Still, it is most likely healthy for Air Force professionals to read from a viewpoint that is not overly deferential to icons of Air Force history. Joint operations are the current reality, so Air Force professionals will be better off having a background on key historical figures of the battlefield and sea. Furthermore, Echevarria does not hold any punches with a few icons of Air Force history. Billy Mitchell, for example, is equally lauded for his idea to establish a unified air service and dismissed as a vainglorious, pig-headed personality whose court-martial was a tabloid fixture for months (33). In many Air Force curricula, heroes of airpower are depicted through a rose-colored lens; it is refreshing to find a portrayal that shows airpower legends, warts and all.

Unsurprisingly, Carl von Clausewitz—military theorist, oft-cited luminary, and forbearer to modern discussions on war—looms large in most chapters. Clausewitz's principles of war are, after all, the archetype for modern discourse, and few conversations evade his ample contributions to the field. Interweaving Clausewitzian observations, the author thoughtfully organizes his book around chronological contributors to military thought and their ideas and publications. A typical chapter summarizes an individual's contributions, presents their life from upbringing to military career, and digests their publications and key contributions to war's logic.

Echevarria is skillful at connecting the dots in each chapter and among the evolving theories of war in the twentieth century. With each chapter standing alone, one can jump in at any point in the book, starting where one is most interested. Additionally, the text is approachable, written for laypersons, and with several foundational terms that practitioners will recognize from any professional military education course. For example, most Air Force professionals will recognize the concept of "DIME": diplomatic, information, military, and economic power as tools of state power in the chapter on Henry Eccles (116). Additionally, most any Air Force professional already knows the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, one of numerous contributions from Colonel John Boyd (169).

War's Logic is an important read for Air Force professionals because it illustrates the development of airpower from its earliest days to the present. It also takes a step back to describe how political, economic, and diplomatic dimensions complement military offensives. What better way to do so than through the views and shifting doctrine of past prominent thinkers in the armed forces? The author emphasizes the thought that future practitioners "will surely develop other models of war's nature" (227). In so doing, he invites readers to consider the next potential strategic models.

One has the distinct impression that with his doctorate from Princeton University and more than 20 years of teaching experience, Echevarria could speak to an audience about military history or the development of airpower with little or no preparation. But that is not to detract from the accomplishment of writing this book, which serves as an excellent jumping-off point for advanced study. Further, while *War's Logic* is backward-looking rather than predictive, this too is not necessarily a weakness. *War's Logic* limits its scope to the past and adequately delivers on what it promises. It is a historical analysis and not necessarily a roadmap for the future. Any complaint that it does not presage the future would be unfair.

Echevarria brings his book full circle with a colorful quote: "If war is a continuation of politics by other means so, too, is thinking about war" (227). While this quote is praiseworthy, it is hard to square it with the opening quote from Clausewitz: "Is war not just another form of expression employed by peoples and governments? Indeed, war has its own grammar but not its own logic." Thus, for Echevarria to title his book *War's Logic* is to expressly accept Clausewitz's challenge: to write out war's grammar in furtherance of finding its logic. This goal may be a fool's errand since

many have observed that the act of war is inherently illogical. Still, the lessons and experiences from past theorists bring us closer to something resembling logic in wartime.

Captain Matthew H. Ormsbee, USAF

Planning to Fail: The US Wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan by James H. Lebovic. Oxford University Press, 2019, 315 pp.

The recent collapse of the Afghan National Army and subsequent flight of US personnel from Kabul signifies the frustrating end to a once popular, even honorable, endeavor. The ensuing media firestorm over American blunders in Afghanistan and the greater Middle East articulated many compelling points, but a deeper analysis is needed to fully comprehend the essence of this tragedy. Fortunately, professor and author James Lebovic provides that with his new book *Planning to Fail: The U.S. Wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan*. The author convincingly demonstrates the hidden biases and nonrational tendencies that hinder American policy makers from making pragmatic decisions.

Lebovic is uniquely well-equipped to write on the subject. In addition to teaching political science and international affairs at George Washington University, the author served as chair of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association for several years. He is also the author of five additional books on national security topics.

His most recent contribution, *Planning to Fail*, is ambitious in scope, addressing three conflicts—Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—now ingrained in the American psyche due to their complexity, duration, and disappointing results. This book is not the only one to draw on these conflicts to better understand national security pitfalls. Donald Stoker's *Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present* and Brendan Gallagher's *The Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace* also reflect on the failures of recent US endeavors. *Planning to Fail* is unique, though, for its focus on decision-making theories and a synthesis of lessons for future policy makers.

Lebovic's overarching thesis is succinct: policy makers are myopic. Instead of carefully considering long-term policy goals, governmental actors succumb to the tyranny of the urgent. Lebovic establishes four stages of decision-making found in all three conflicts to support his thesis.

Stage I includes the planning and initial commitment of military forces. This initial commitment is then extended and expanded in Stage II. Eventually, policy makers reach their limit and restrict the flow of resources in Stage III. By Stage IV, withdrawing from the conflict has become the objective. Lebovic argues that in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, nonrational influences dominated the four-stage process, resulting in a shortsighted policy.

The bulk of the book, contained in three chapters, is dedicated to a detailed analysis of each conflict. Lebovic methodically constructs his arguments through these case studies. The author's careful consideration and ultimate refutation of opposing viewpoints is a testament to his thoroughness, and his dispassionate and impartial approach to politically or emotionally charged topics and individuals was refreshingly professional. The choice of the conflicts themselves was also wise; the four stages of wartime decision-making were readily apparent in each, strengthening the intellectual framework through which to consider the arguments. In sum, the author's meticulous and unbiased approach lends a credibility not easily found in other works.

Lebovic addresses the Vietnam War first, and in doing so presents perhaps his strongest arguments on nonrational decision-making. One by one, he debunks common misconceptions, showing that the Johnson administration had every chance to stop involvement but willingly—and unwisely—chose to stay the course. The author claims that "what makes rationality suspect here is, not what option the administration selected but how it selected it." The arguments between John-

son and his advisors always centered on how many troops to send or how many targets to bomb, with little consideration for how these efforts helped achieve end goals.

The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts present unique challenges to a researcher due to their recency, but Lebovic's efforts are nonetheless credible. Undue optimism and an aversion to nation-building within the Bush administration handicapped early efforts. Later, both the Bush and Obama administrations placed excessive focus on troop levels and departure timelines, clouding strategic thinking and limiting available options.

Here it becomes painfully obvious that political leaders could have avoided the four stages of wartime decision-making "by pursuing goals that suited US capabilities or avoiding no-win wars in the first place," but they chose not to. Lebovic thus shows that the condition of myopic bias at the highest levels of government remains a painful issue into the twenty-first century.

There are, however, modern conflicts indicating some level of foresight and restraint in American leadership. US operations in Somalia, for example, were abbreviated in 1993 after the bloody Battle of Mogadishu. The NATO air campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, spearheaded by the United States, also remained limited and intentional.

The most famous example is undoubtedly the first Gulf War when coalition forces liberated Kuwait and battered Saddam Hussein's military without succumbing to mission creep. Lebovic does not necessarily discount these examples—the first Gulf War is mentioned briefly—but a thorough analysis of these conflicts might reveal compelling instances of government actors overcoming myopic biases.

This is not to say that Lebovic fails to provide policy prescriptions. On the contrary, the final chapter is dedicated to learning from the failures chronicled throughout the book. Here, Lebovic is at his best. "War is *always* a matter of choice," he claims, and US interests "always reduce to matters of quantity, not fundamental quality."

The fact that each policy maker examined here resisted questioning and debate, instead moving quickly or unthinkingly toward action, reveals the dangerous pull and ultimate consequences of myopic bias. Fortunately, Lebovic leaves readers with lessons to be learned from each of the four stages of decision-making. He also provides eight additional lessons for policy makers to help mitigate the effects of bias.

Planning to Fail remains an excellent critique of US decision-making in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Lebovic's contribution to the debate is sorely needed, not only for the criticism it offers but also the guidance it gives to present and future national security leaders. Recent events show that the dangers of myopic biases did not end with Vietnam. Sadly, unless more attention is paid to the lessons presented by Lebovic, they likely will not end with Afghanistan either.

Second Lieutenant Mark Schell, USAF

On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare edited by Timothy Heck and B. A. Friedman. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, 395 pp.

With the threat of near-peer warfare becoming closer and closer, there has never been a better time to reexamine the importance and nature of amphibious warfare. Timothy Heck and B. A. Friedman answered the call, editing inputs from 20 authors to the anthology: *On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare*.

Heck brings the practitioner's experience as a former artillery officer and Friedman the theorist steeped in research. Friedman holds a master's in security and strategic studies from the US Naval War College. Together, the editors' detailed collection is accessible to the war fighter.

The book leads the reader through amphibious operations from sixteenth-century Tuscany to the Information Age and even future amphibious operations. Similar recent publications include *Strategic Water: Iraq and Security Planning in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin* and *Raging Waters: China,*

India, Bangladesh, and *Brahmaputra River Politics*. While these works address amphibious operations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, respectively, the text in this review focuses on the role of amphibious warfare from a Western perspective.

Heck and Friedman posit that the nature of amphibious warfare has changed throughout history, yet its importance has persisted. Despite some critics' claim that amphibious operations are facing imminent death, the authors argue that these operations are approaching a period of heightened significance.

Where most historical texts focus on landmark battles such as Normandy and Gallipoli, this book seeks to illuminate often overlooked events. Each chapter is written by a different author, a strategy that allows efforts to be highly concentrated. Illustrations throughout the book are given to orient the reader to the tactical-level movement in the context of the strategic and operational environment.

Dividing the text into distinct time periods supports both elements of the thesis. It shows the reader the extent to which amphibious warfare changes by creating clear separations between operations in a different time period. This organization also shows that amphibious operations have been crucial throughout the majority Western history.

The reader can make a host of profound implications by pairing this book with other works in the field. First is the changing nature of the Marine Corps. The *Force Design 2030* depicts an experimental future Marine Corps. The author challenges the force to gather intelligence, adjust resources and execute simultaneously. As shown in the book, amphibious victories predominantly came as a result of the victor outwitting the enemy. *Force Design 2030* is the Marine's methodology for maintaining this advantage in the twenty-first century.

Second is the changing nature of military operations in general. Heck and Friedman explain that amphibious operations are inherently joint. Thus, it stands that all services will adopt methodologies to make them nimbler while staying connected. The Air Force has championed this goal, as evidenced by the coveted Joint All-Domain Command and Control and new mission command structure: centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution.

The third implication is a rise in the frequency of amphibious operations. The authors cite increased sea lines of communications as a result of climate change. This is occurring in concert with the increased threat of Russian and/or Chinese aggression. Since both adversaries are unlikely to attempt a conventional war, skirmishes will most likely occur on third-party islands. The United States increased funding and mobilization to arctic areas in preparation for this contingency.

The authors support the thesis in a detailed manner, yet the book could be more impactful if the battles included amphibious warfare in Eastern countries. The intent is stated to "give historians, theorists and practitioners an opportunity to . . . find out what it takes to win on contested shores."

China is potentially the highest contested shore the United States may face. The diverse author corps does not seem to include many specializing in Western versus Eastern warfare. A historic Sino-Western naval battle would lend the reader to understand China's amphibious operations in the context of their different culture. For example, the Battle of Lake Poyang in China shows how a significantly outnumbered rebel force succeeded by burning the incumbent emperor's ships filled with gunpowder. China's Belt and Road Initiative is analogous to the ancient Silk Road. It is feasible that future Sino military tactics may mimic historical naval victories.

This book is crucial for historians, theorists, and practitioners. It should be mandatory reading for all service members participating in Joint intermediate developmental education assignment. Personally, it is the clearest depiction of how strategic and political goals led to tactics I have seen. Many of the illustrations are organized in a manner not unlike a conventional mission planning cell.

The authors do an excellent job translating the host of acronyms involved with amphibious warfare. There is a dedicated acronym page before the introduction. This text would be invaluable for any field grade officer looking to participate in, or along with, amphibious operations. It may

serve as an excellent historical textbook to help students see that amphibious warfare transcends singular time periods.

Captain Gregory Search, USAF

Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order by Xiaoyu Pu. Stanford University Press, 2019, 152 pp.

Author Xiaoyu Pu is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nevada-Reno. This book is part of a series addressing diverse contemporary security challenges in Asia. In *Rebranding China*, the author claims that China has a duality status struggle—resulting from its rapid growth and development—that receives little attention by scholars and practitioners. Is it a developing country, a benign regional leader, an aspiring global leader, an unwilling global leader, or an emerging superpower? Is it playing a zero-sum game with the international community or growing within the existing global order?

The author asserts that China projects mixed messages to its domestic and international audiences and needs to better articulate its preferred status. Pu believes that how a country crafts its preferred image is vitally important. Sending mixed or confusing status signals can lead to geopolitical friction, distrust, and deep suspicions of China's real intent by its own people and the global community at large.

The author meticulously builds a case for China's poor status signaling by presenting many examples of how China exhibited confusing and sometimes contradictory foreign policy practices. He notes that China has a multiple audience dilemma, which gives incentives to maintain several identities with conflicting roles. China wants to be loved and feared at the same time. The challenge facing China is that all its audiences receive China's status signaling at the same time.

China presents a rapidly rising and emerging power image to its domestic audience but a developing country image to international audiences. It demands accommodation on geopolitical interests such as the Spratly Islands and South China Sea claims yet wants to be considered a developing country on economic matters. When seeking opportunities from international institutions, China uses emerging-power status (its strengths in resources, population, and economy) while at the same time shirking social/welfare responsibility to the global community when convenient, thus emphasizing its weaknesses as a developing country.

Pu explains that China wants depth of interconnectedness with its neighbors, thereby creating reliance on and interdependence with China. China sends two messages within East Asia. The first is "don't fear us," and the second is that China's rise mutually benefits its neighbors. China professes to bring peaceful order to the region through multilateral economic and security institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

China claims it does not seek to overthrow the existing world order. After all, it is a primary beneficiary of the international system. However, the author notes that China is becoming more politically aggressive in regional/global posturing. It frequently leverages self-serving statecraft on national interest in an assertive and coercive manner with its neighbors. China is fearful of a US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and wants Asian security left to Asians. A problematic by-product of China's haphazard status signaling is evidenced by how the United States interprets it. The United States sees China wanting to displace a US presence in the Asia-Pacific by expanding its global economic/security influence and being the regional hegemon. This is leading the United States to rethink its strategy toward China.

Pu ultimately views China as a rising power with minimal threat to the global community. China sees its domestic image as more important than its international status. The author suggests that a rising power's domestic audience is more important than its international audience. China's

status signaling is contested because the country's population and leadership do not have consensus on China's position on the world's stage. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promotes the idea that it is the only legitimate political force that can defend China's honor and the only entity capable of holding China together.

The author believes that for China to compete as a rising power with the United States, the CCP/China should be a better leader in the international normative order. Being a better leader entails a well-communicated grand strategy supported by policies that reflect the strategy in both action and intent. China's dilemma is how it must project an international image of conflicting roles in ways that promote its national interests without antagonizing or sending misperceptions that result in mistrust and fear by its own people, neighbors, and the world at large.

Pu superbly supports his thesis through countless well-articulated examples drawn from the literature and thought-provoking analysis. Arguably, the most notable contribution the author makes to the body of knowledge is in introducing status signaling into the international relations literature. His signaling model, supported by his rigorous examination and application, helps frame how foreign policy behaviors are shaped by rising powers. It can also be seen as a means for information communication to appropriate political figures to either change or continue various status beliefs they may claim.

This book is best read by international relations/affairs, political science, and Chinese scholars as well as applicable governmental entities, including military leaders and Asia-Pacific specialists. It is also a relevant read for those interested in learning how rising powers struggle to shape their domestic and international identity and grow from their mistakes.

Dr. David A. Anderson

Russia Abroad: Driving Regional Fracture in Post-Communist Eurasia and Beyond edited by Anna Ohanyan. Georgetown University Press, 2018, 200 pp.

When I was in high school, during the long-ago 1990s, my geography teacher had the class color a map of Europe using different hues to delineate regions. He specifically instructed us to color a portion of Eastern Europe dark red and label it the "shatter belt region," a geographic area defined by the cultural and political clash of Western Europe, Russia, and the Arabic/Ottoman Middle East.

A decade later, numerous reports and articles announced the dangers of "failed states," ungoverned or lightly governed spaces that lacked the ability to police themselves, often harbored terrorists, and spread chaos throughout the regions in which they festered. Then, just a couple of years ago, we heard the warning of "frozen conflicts," internal warfare or proxy combat that delegitimized any attempts a given state takes toward maintaining a central government, typically in the context of Russian actions in former Soviet states.

The generational irony undergirding each of these labels is the seeming inevitability of globalization and increased regional interconnectedness that defined the era. These failures of governance, no matter the label, seemed an anachronistic outlier. After a generation in which the reality of state and regional fracture has not lessened, however, one has to wonder: Will the global community always be bedeviled by the specter of failed governance projects?

Anna Ohanyan, editor of this collection of essays titled *Russia Abroad*, argues yes. Failed or fractured states have existed for as long as we have sought to define the nation-state, a type of photo negative of those qualities we assess "successful" states in the international order to possess.

Ohanyan, a distinguished professor of political science at Stonehill College, believes that we should concern ourselves less with how fractured states buck global trends toward interconnectedness and more with understanding the factors that drive fracture within the state.

At their core, fractured states lack the intergovernmental reach, resiliency, and respect to execute full governance within their borders, thus preventing the establishment of a future foundation for regional connections that reach beyond, and through, borders. While Ohanyan advances a holistic theory that, she believes, one can apply globally to understand troubled regions, the focus of her current work, as the title suggests, is on the "new" concept of regional fracture or frozen conflicts in Russia's near-abroad. The actions taken by Putin's Russia to destabilize its neighbors, while significant in the moment, are indicative of a set of centuries-long Russian/Soviet imperial policies that look to incorporate these borderlands into a greater Russian empire, contributor Robert Nalbandov states.

Although these policies intended to capture these regions in Russia's imperial sphere, they also weakened local governance to preclude any revolutionary or separatist movements. This internal weakness persisted in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and set the conditions for Russia's reentry, desired or otherwise, into the region during the 2000s and 2010s.

While most contributors outline the role that recent Russian actions have played in destabilizing Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, they also highlight other trends that contribute to state and regional fracture. They point to the outsized role played by nongovernmental organizations, moneyed and cultural elites, refashioned or recast histories, and persistent cultural norms in maintaining or exacerbating state weakness and regional fracture.

Contributors all extended this model beyond Russia's near-abroad, examining how Russia's continued neo-imperial reach emphasizes long-simmering feuds and political instability. Dimitar Bechev (Western Balkans) and Mark Katz (Syria and the Levant) overlay Ohanyan's theory of regional fracture with the other contributors' Russo-focused theory of the legacy of Russian overreach, giving legitimacy to Ohanyan's framework in areas beyond the post-Soviet hinterlands.

At times, the authors unwittingly also illuminate areas where the reality of state fragility and regional fracture draw similarities across seemingly unlike groups. In one of the most striking examples, David Lewis charts how the rise of illiberal regionalism provides a means for the states of Central Asia to create an identity in the chaos of post-Soviet fracture and neoliberalism (119).

"Illiberal regionalism" is defined as how the "focus on the role of shared ideas, norms, and beliefs provides a framework for some limited regional cooperation with a common discourse that is sharply at odds with the liberal norms that underpin most of Western theories of regionalism." As Lewis notes, this regionalism often comes with the ascension of authoritarian "strongmen" who rely on a masculine, ethnographic sense of cultural unity in the face of uneven economic and social change. The perceptual rise of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy across the globe would seem an extension of what Lewis describes. Plumbing the depth of this thinking would add to a growing research field.

Ohanyan's current work, beyond a thoughtful collection of intellectually rich essays, also provides a striking (and needed) counterpoint to a narrative of globalization that, while tested in the past, still holds sway today. *Russia Abroad* provides an interesting context to assess state fragility and regional fracture relative to Russia's current machinations in its near-abroad.

But the ability to take the book's theory of regional fracture and "mean-test" it globally is critical to understanding how states are, and are not, incorporated into an assumed global order. Further, it is critical to diagnose the seams and fractures in internal governance and identify those trends or vulnerabilities that may force them to widen. Finally, knowing how powerful interlocutors can pluck these fissures like harp strings, playing chaotic tunes of state collapse, will become a central part of building state and international resiliency toward illiberal agents—something likely to define the twenty-first century.

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Forney, USA

The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace by Oscar Jonsson. Georgetown University Press, 2019, 260 pp.

This doctoral dissertation turned paperback written by Oscar Jonsson is unlike most texts in the literature of this field. Dr. Jonsson holds a doctorate from King's College London's Department of War Studies and is the director of the Stockholm Free World Forum—a foreign and security policy think tank based in Sweden.

While many geopolitical works superimpose (albeit often subconsciously) the assumptions of the analyst upon that which is being analyzed (mirror imaging), *The Russian Understanding of War* seeks to pierce Moscow's strategic calculus and the "nuances of the Russian language" to answer the question, "Has the Russian understanding of the nature of war changed, and if so, how?" (ix, 4).

Jonsson frames the problem in the introduction by ensuring the audience understands the distinction between Clausewitz's "character of war" (something that perpetually evolves with technology) and the "nature of war" (something generally regarded as immutable). With the lexicon established in support of the thesis question, the author then divides his treatise into four main sections.

Section 1 ("The Soviet Understanding of War") examines the view of the collective USSR as the intellectual foundation for the Russian Federation's initial cadre of political and military leadership—with particular emphasis on the uniformity of Soviet political and military thought as an extension of Marxism-Leninism, Hegelian dialectics, and the Communist Party.

Like Clausewitz, Lenin regarded violence and armed conflict as requisites for war. However, Lenin's understanding of "politics by other means" differed on the basis that the Soviets believed war to be a paradoxical evil that could only be eliminated by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat worldwide. Section 2 ("The Russian Understanding of War after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union") subsequently outlines how the Russian Federation's views regarding the nature of war evolved.

It stresses the gradual yet notable departure from the traditional understanding of Clausewitz as incorporated by Lenin, Stalin, and others into Communism as the official worldview of the party and the state. Finally, section 3 ("Information Warfare") and section 4 ("Color Revolutions") leverage the philosophical foundation of the first two sections to examine Russia's understanding of war relative to what it perceives as two of its greatest external/internal security threats. Ultimately, "Russian threat perception is the backdrop to Russian offensive action" (121).

This book is a remarkable and timely work of scholastic achievement with key insights for a geopolitical period of great power competition. Jonsson concludes that, as the title suggests, the Russian strategic calculus blurs the lines between war and peace. He articulately and definitively demonstrates that the principal political and military elites of Russia today believe that either the nature of war has completely changed to include "nonviolent" actions or that the fundamental definition of "violence" must be expanded to include the nontangible and nonlethal.

In either case, the net effect remains that Moscow is corporately shifting its focus toward the political goals of war rather than focusing solely on its means ("armed violence"). Moreover, Jonsson adeptly balances what the Russian inner circle believes and what it states publicly, noting that formally acknowledging its perceived change in war's nature would go against concepts that inform both international law and Russian federal law "On Defense." (Both rely on "armed violence" as the defining element of war, and organically declaring a change in war's nature would be tantamount to unilaterally declaring a worldwide state of war.)

The thesis question and its answer are supported not through an examination of Western experts writing about Russia (i.e., from an outsider's perspective) but through an exhaustive examination of documents and speeches produced by Russian politicians, strategists, tacticians, and oligarchs. Thus, Jonsson effectively uses primary source materials to generate insights about the Russian understanding of war while simultaneously minimizing the risk for analytical bias by allowing the Kremlin et al., to speak for themselves.

Ultimately, this book is a must for anyone seeking to navigate the strategic competition environment or those attempting to understand why Russia behaves in the manner it does. It may be tempting to examine Russia through several centuries of Czarist and Communist history.

But it is paramount for military strategists and analysts to remember that the Russian Federation is less than 30 years old and, particularly since the ascendance of Vladimir Putin, still finding its identity in the post–Cold War era. The author focuses on the findings of his research rather than the tangible implications for US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy makers. This is perhaps the only area where the book could be improved, while in fairness such a weight of effort is common practice for a dissertation contributing to the body of knowledge in support of field practitioners.

Woven throughout this book is a singularly profound sentiment that must be understood by those in the US national security apparatus. Specifically, the following fallacious assumption must be purged from US/NATO policy development: "Western states believe it is up to them to choose whether they enter a war with Russia or not" (157).

Simply put, the Russian government is actively engaged in what it considers a "war" against the West, albeit one fought via nonmilitary means. As such, the West must change the way it thinks about deterrence, competition, and conflict when engaging Moscow and when seeking to cooperate with nations in Russia's near abroad. In other words, "when Western states are taking actions that they perceive as being short of war—sanctions, democracy promotion, and information operations—but that are understood by Russia as amounting to war, there is a risk of unconscious and/or unintentional escalation" (2).

Regardless of whether one accepts that the nature of war has changed, the semantic aspects of that philosophical and academic debate must not overshadow the real and potentially dire consequences of ignoring how Russia thinks and conducts operations. As articulated by Sun Tzu, those seeking to overcome must first "know thy enemy."

Captain Jayson M. Warren, USAF

Breaching the Summit: Leadership Lessons from the U.S. Military's Best by Kenneth O. Preston, Micheal P. Barrett, Rick D. West, James A. Roy, Denise M. Jelinski-Hall, and Charles W. "Skip" Bowen. Casemate, 2020, 278 pp.

Only 1 percent of the enlisted force in the US military can make E-9. Reaching E-9 in one of the six branches of the uniformed military services is an imposing task. *Breaching the Summit: Leadership Lessons from the US Military's Best* is a book about how six enlisted members reached the summit and what they gained from that experience. Any person who has served in the military remembers the E-9s with whom they served and the authority they exercised.

The book includes the military careers of former Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth Preston; Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps Michael Barrett; Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Rick West; Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force James Roy; Chief Master Sergeant Denise Jelinski-Hall, the senior enlisted advisor to the National Guard Bureau; and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Charles "Skip" Bowen. All served within the past 10 years, and their lessons learned are pertinent to the challenges currently facing the military.

Each writer is a European-American, which may reflect the challenges people of color face in reaching the most senior ranks. One of the six writers is a female, Chief Master Sergeant Jelinski-Hall. One of her valuable insights is about her success in "a man's world." Jelinski-Hall is also a member of the reserve components, another strength of the book. One of the 9/11 lessons is the importance of the reserve components and the unique challenges citizen warriors face. In the book's forward, we are told the book was designed for junior service members, senior enlisted leaders, officers, family members, and anyone who wants to know more about the military (x).

Breaching the Summit provides a biographical sketch of each contributor, along with an overview of their life focused on their military career. The authors also addressed issues such as values, character, learning from failure, and the importance of taking care of people. They also discussed leadership, what good leaders look like, and the importance of mentoring. Barrett wrote this about mentoring: "Is there such a thing as a 'self-made' person? If there is, I haven't met them yet. In my case, too many to count had a hand in getting me where I am today" (53).

Readers discover each contributor was keenly aware of the importance of their example to others. Similarly, they talked about the importance of leading from the front in sections with headings such as "Growing Leaders," "Embrace Challenges and Take Risks," and "Lead Boldly." Every military member and their organization could benefit from their views on leadership. One of the things they advise again and again is not to be afraid of failure as a person or as a leader but rather to embrace failure and learn from it (193).

Each author examined the challenges of transitioning to civilian life after a three-decade military career. The authors advised readers to begin thinking about the transition process now. Many veterans have found the health care and disability services provided by the US Department of Veterans Affairs to be uneven. Only Jelinski-Hall addressed this concern.

Understandably, the book's primary focus was on the tactical and operational aspects of the military rather than the strategic domain. In one case, Barrett wrote that when the nation needs something to be done, "or they aren't exactly sure what needs to be done, they send in the Marines. They know the Marines always figure it out and carry the day" (54).

Barrett's fervor and mission focus are extremely admirable as is the ability of the Marine Corps to get things done. But from a strategic perspective, we should carefully weigh which troops we need in a theater before we send them in. That way, we can tailor the force accordingly and ensure we are sending the skill sets needed in complex, asymmetrical battlespaces where there might be civilians and unforeseen contingencies.

The writers' faith stance is a fascinating feature of the book. Each person alluded to the importance of their faith and how it sustained and guided them. Their faith also provided the foundation for the values they embraced. We live in a society that tends to avoid discussing one's personal faith. This was not the case in *Breaching the Summit*. The leaders did not attempt to evangelize in their reading but shared how their faith enabled and empowered them.

One of the valuable tools the book provided readers was a treasure chest full of inspiring quotes. A sampling of those quotes included these:

- Albert Einstein: "Try not to become a person of success, but rather try to become a person of value" (12).
- Ralph Nader: "The function of leadership is to produce more leaders not more followers" (23).
- Ronald Reagan: "Some people spend an entire lifetime wondering if they've made a difference. The Marines don't have that problem" (53).
- Theodore Roosevelt: "The only man who never makes a mistake is the man who never does anything" (195).
- Abraham Lincoln: "Most people are as happy as they make up their minds to be" (197).

The book is a welcome addition. It would be an invaluable read for anyone engaged in professional development. I wish I had the book when I started my career as an enlisted soldier. It tells us how servant leaders reached the pinnacle of the military profession. A major strength of the US military is its noncommissioned officer corps, and that success is on full-view in *Breaching the Summit*.

Colonel Larry O. Toney, USA, Retired

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