

CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS

WALDO CANYON FIRE

INITIAL AFTER ACTION REPORT

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ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
8CAT	ESF 8 Coordination Advisory Team
AAC	After Action Conference
AAR	After Action Report
AAR/IP	After Action Report and Improvement Plan
AFN	Access and Functional Needs
AMR	American Medical Response
ARC	American Red Cross
CAPS	Community Advancing Public Safety
CART	Colorado Springs Animal Response Team
CERT	Community Emergency Response Training
COEM	Colorado Office of Emergency Management
COML	Communications Unit Leader
CSEOC	Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Center
CSFD	Colorado Springs Fire Department
CSOEM	Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management
CSPD	Colorado Springs Police Department
CVM	Colorado Volunteer Mobilizer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DTRS	Digital Trunked Radio System
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EMResource	Web-based system that tracks hospital bed availability/medical resources (formerly EMSsystem)
ENS	Emergency Notification System
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
EPC	El Paso County
EPCPH	El Paso County Public Health
EPSO	El Paso Sheriff's Office
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FD	Fire Department

Acronym	Meaning
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMAG	Fire Management Assistance Grant
FOUO	For Official Use Only
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HSPPR	Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Command
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IDLH	Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
IMT	Incident Management Team
IP	Improvement Plan
JIC	Joint Information Center
MAC	Multi-agency Coordination
MHz	Megahertz
MMRS	Metropolitan Medical Response System
MRCEPC	Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
PD	Police Department
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PPRCN	Pikes Peak Regional Communications Network
SA	Situational Awareness
SCR	South Central All-Hazards Region
SME	Subject Matter Expert
UCCS	University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy
WebEOC	Web-Enabled Crisis Information Management System
WUI	Wildland Urban Interface
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Waldo Canyon Fire was first reported at approximately noon on Saturday, 23 June 2012 in the Pike National Forest, approximately three miles west of the City of Colorado Springs (City), and to the north of Highway 24 in El Paso County. The fire burned 18,247 acres¹ over 19 days and was reported as fully contained on 10 July 2012. The Waldo Canyon Fire is the most destructive wildfire in Colorado history, destroying 345² homes and damaging many others.

The Waldo Canyon Fire was a complex Type I Incident that spanned two counties and multiple municipalities. This After Action Report (AAR) focuses on the actions directly related to the response to the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) within the City of Colorado Springs.

This AAR focuses on initial findings that were gleaned from several after action meetings held with City departments, state and local government, private and non-profit agencies during the month of August, 2012. Additionally, preliminary reviews of related incident documentation and first responder radio transmissions were conducted.

This AAR will provide a broad overview of the incident, resulting strengths of the response, and recommendations for change that were noted as consistent themes throughout the meetings. This document is considered preliminary as an in-depth analysis will occur over the next several months to fully explore the City's response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. The comprehensive AAR will include a detailed timeline of the incident, where this document provides a high-level summary³.

MAJOR STRENGTHS

The major strengths identified during the City of Colorado Springs Waldo Canyon Fire response are as follows:

- **Public Safety Collaboration:** Post 9/11, public safety agencies within Colorado Springs began a concerted effort to build collaboration among and between the City's public safety agencies. CSFD and CSPD have since developed strong working relationships through planning, training, exercise, and have proven collaboration on real-world events. This strength in collaboration was instrumental in the response to the complex Waldo Canyon Fire response.
- **Personnel:** Dedicated personnel from the City of Colorado Springs, state and local governmental partners, and local non-profit agencies demonstrated unprecedented dedication to the incident response, as well as to the residents of Colorado Springs.
- **Training and Exercise:** The Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD), the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD), and the Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management (CSOEM) have a demonstrated history of coordinating and conducting multi-agency, complex emergency response training and exercises. Additionally, CSFD and CSPD have completed comprehensive

¹ <http://inciweb.org/incident/2929/>

² Determining the accurate count of the number of homes that were lost in the Waldo Canyon Fire is an on-going process that has many intricacies involved. On Thursday, 28 June 2012, City authorities announced that 346 homes were destroyed. When announced, this number was reported as preliminary and it was noted that the figure may rise. Since then, the Pikes Peak Regional Building Department (PPRBD) has embarked on an in-depth analysis of the homes in the area. This analysis continues on a daily basis and the number of destroyed homes may increase.

³ Exception is that a more detailed timeline for 26 June 2012 is provided in Appendix D.

tactical training and exercises that directly relate to this type of a response. The City has also participated in the South Central All-Hazards Region⁴ training and exercise program for the past nine years. This extensive training and exercise experience played an important role in the successful response by the City's first responders and support personnel. Exercises such as the "Up in Smoke" WUI exercise series included emergency evacuation drills with residents and first responders, as well as components of a larger full scale exercise with emergency response agencies.

- **Relationships:** Pre-existing relationships among local government and non-profit agencies was instrumental in ensuring a well-coordinated response. These relationships provided the structure for an effective response to all aspects of the Waldo Canyon Fire.
- **Public Safety Response:** Safely evacuated approximately 26,000 residents on 26 June 2012, while effectively fighting a fast-moving conflagration fire in the WUI, protecting and saving 82% of the homes in the direct impact area.
- **Planning:** The CSFD, the CSPD, and the CSOEM have worked collaboratively with all City Departments for several years to develop policies, plans and procedures for a WUI fire. These plans have been trained on and tested through emergency response exercises.
 - **Wildfire Mitigation Plan:** In 2001, the CSFD developed a comprehensive Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). This Plan included an extensive, interactive risk assessment of the WUI and an establishment of a strong community education program. In 2011, the Colorado Springs Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) was finalized as an update to the WMP with detailed emphasis on future planning and program features.
 - **WUI Fire Evacuation Appendix:** A WUI Fire Evacuation Appendix was initially created in 2008, and updated in 2012, that provides detailed information for the City on the wildfire risk in the WUI as well as resources and plans for first responders to utilize during a WUI evacuation. This plans was further tested during the "Up in Smoke" WUI exercise series.

PRIMARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

The primary recommendations for change are as follows:

- **Internal/Partner Agency Communications:** Decisions were made rapidly at key points in time throughout the incident. A system/process needs to be designed and implemented to provide immediate notification to first responders and key agency representatives as decisions are made throughout the event.
- **Real-Time Documentation:** Documenting dates, times, and decisions during each day of the incident was an overwhelming task. Moving forward, a process will be developed to train existing staff and/or public safety volunteers to work as "scribes" throughout the various geographically-dispersed locations associated with the incident. Scribes will track real-time

⁴ The South Central All-Hazards Region is a multi-county emergency management and homeland security region that consists of the City, El Paso, Teller, Lake, Chaffee, and Park counties.

information for record keeping and can serve as a communications link between locations when primary staff is busy with their duties.

- **Logistics:** The nature of the Waldo Canyon Fire incident (i.e. duration, number of personnel assigned, multiple geographic incident locations) created an unprecedented need for logistics support. Training will occur for staff and volunteers who can immediately be placed in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to form a more robust Logistics Section to assist with providing support to all aspects of the incident.
- **Incident Management:** The Incident Command System (ICS) is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident management concept that allows its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure that matches the complexities of the incident. While ICS training has been delivered over the past several years, a need has been identified to practice (i.e. exercise) advanced ICS skills. Additional training and exercise will occur on ICS job aides, organization charts, and checklists that have previously been developed.
- **Public Information and Warning:** An immediate need has been identified to evaluate the capacity/capability to provide mass notification through the El Paso Teller E911 Authority's Emergency Notification System (ENS). To accomplish this, an independent, in-depth study is being conducted to determine the capacity limitations of the current system.

These primary strengths and recommendations for change, as stated previously, are preliminary and City officials and staff will continue to review and analyze the events that occurred surrounding the Waldo Canyon Fire. In order to truly understand the incident, it is necessary to take the time to review and analyze the many facets of this exceedingly complicated, multi-jurisdictional event.

SECTION 1: INCIDENT OVERVIEW

Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper issued an open-burn ban on 14 June 2012 citing extremely dry conditions and high fire danger. At that time, the High Park Fire was burning strong in Larimer County and Colorado had experienced 344 wildfires⁵. Eight days later, on 22 June 2012, initial calls were made to the Manitou Springs Fire Department reporting smoke in the area of Waldo Canyon. First responders were dispatched and looked until dark for the source of the smoke, but were unable to locate any fire. Responders began looking again, on foot, at 0700 on 23 June 2012. At approximately noon on 23 June 2012, numerous residents from throughout the Pikes Peak Region were calling to report seeing smoke in the area of Waldo Canyon. This was about the same time that on-scene fire crews verified a quick-burning fire located in the Pike National Forest.

23 JUNE 2012 (SATURDAY)

As initial attack efforts were underway, the Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Center (CSEOC) was activated and a mandatory evacuation was ordered for the Cedar Heights neighborhood. Further voluntary evacuations were ordered for neighborhoods along the westernmost edge of Colorado Springs and by El Paso County (EPC) for the towns along Highway 24. The Colorado Springs Fire and Police Departments, along with the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), developed Evacuation Zones and management action points, based on fire behavior.

The first American Red Cross (ARC) shelter was opened at Cheyenne Mountain High School, in coordination with the Colorado Springs Community Animal Response Team (CART) and the Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County (MRCEPC). This collaboration resulted in a fully-functioning all-populations shelter accommodating individuals with Access and Functional Needs (AFN) and sheltering for companion animals. Penrose Equestrian Center was established as the large animal shelter and was managed by the El Paso County CART. Both companion and large animals were accepted for sheltering at the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (HSPPR).

The weather conditions were hot and dry with erratic winds causing the fire to spread rapidly to the northwest and south. The initial Incident Command structure made decision to delegate the authority of this fire to a Type I Incident Management Team (IMT). Shortly after, during mid-afternoon, southern Mountain Shadows was issued a mandatory evacuation order; bringing the total number of Colorado Springs evacuees to approximately 2,300. The Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) established a perimeter with traffic control points and a security patrol for both Cedar Heights and southern Mountain Shadows.

24 JUNE 2012 (SUNDAY)

A Red Flag Warning remained in effect. Record high temperature and erratic winds continued throughout the day. The fire spread mostly to the north, west, and south. The Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) continued to monitor fire activity and adjust evacuation zones and management action points accordingly. Although no further mandatory evacuations were ordered in the City, two CSPD evacuations teams went back through southern Mountain Shadows (Zone 2), and re-checked the neighborhood going door to door to ensure residents had been notified of the mandatory evacuation

⁵Colorado Governor's Executive Order D2012-015

order. The Type I IMT arrived and formally took control of the incident in the evening.

Due to the fire behavior on the southern and western end of the fire, EPC ordered Highway 24 to be closed and remained so until 1 July 2012. Mandatory evacuations were also enacted for the towns along Highway 24 from Colorado Springs to Woodland Park.

25 JUNE 2012 (MONDAY)

A Red Flag Warning remained in effect and record high temperature and erratic winds continued throughout the day. The erratic weather continued to cause concern in the Cedar Heights neighborhood and the Highway 24 corridor. The fire made a major run to the north and west toward the area of Woodland Park and Rampart Reservoir. The total acres involved in the Waldo Canyon Fire were estimated to be approximately 4,500.

26 JUNE 2012 (TUESDAY)⁶

Temperatures remained at a record high for the fourth day in a row. Fire modeling indicated that the fire would move at an approximate rate of one-quarter mile per hour. The fire maintained its southern and western border and continued to grow toward the north. A pre-evacuation order was given just after 1:30 p.m. for the northern Mountain Shadows/Oak Valley/Peregrine area. CSPD began working 12 hour shifts.

Shortly after 4:00 p.m., the fire reached the top of Queen's Canyon. This fire activity was the management action point for mandatory evacuation and therefore a mandatory evacuation of northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine was issued by Mayor Bach at 4:21 p.m. At this time, the weather was becoming more problematic as a large thunderstorm column was developing to the west of northern Mountain Shadows. Winds were becoming strong and gusting hard. Between 5:07 p.m. and 5:11 p.m.⁷, the thunderstorm column collapsed and 65 mile per hour winds drove the fire rapidly east and downhill into Colorado Springs.

Active fire within the northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine area led to additional mandatory evacuations of several adjacent neighborhoods during the evening hours, including: north Rockrimmon; southeast Rockrimmon; south Pope's Valley; and Kissing Camels. Two additional shelters were opened in the Colorado Springs vicinity at the Southeast YMCA and Lewis Palmer High School. Colorado Department of Corrections officers deployed and assisted with evacuations and traffic control. CSPD maintained security patrols inside the evacuate area and changed the security perimeter and traffic control points to contain the entire evacuated perimeter.

The fire grew on this date from 4,500 acres to 15,622 acres, with 1,516 acres within the Colorado Springs City limits.

27 JUNE 2012 (WEDNESDAY)

Temperatures remained high for a fifth day. Some cooler weather and rain was predicted, but only light rain fell in some areas. The fire grew only about 1,000 acres on this date, but flare ups continued along

⁶ A more detailed timeline for 26 June 2012 can be found in Appendix D.

⁷ This time range is based on numerous accounts from CSFD firefighters on the ground and in the air who reported the collapse.

all edges on the fire and on “islands” that were created within the active fire zone. A thunderstorm column, similar to the day before, began to develop and weather conditions became more erratic west of Peregrine and the United State Air Force Academy (USAFA). This prompted additional pre-evacuation notices within the City limits for Holland Park and Pleasant Valley. El Paso County also issued pre-evacuation notices for the areas north of USAFA and south of the Douglas County Line Road and west of I-25. USAFA ordered evacuations for all families and dormitory residents. The fire behavior on the southwestern border continued to grow, prompting further mandatory evacuations in El Paso and Teller counties.

28 JUNE 2012 (THURSDAY)

Weather conditions were a little more favorable on this date and containment of the fire within the City burn area was maintained. Mayor Bach announced at the 4:00 p.m. press conference that initial reports indicated that 346⁸ homes were destroyed on 26 June in the northern Mountain Shadows neighborhood. A meeting was held at 8:00 p.m. at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) for those residents that lived on streets where a house was severely damaged or destroyed. Approximately 4,000 individuals attended this meeting and received the news about their homes.

Later in the evening, pre-evacuation notices were lifted for Holland Park and Pleasant Valley and mandatory evacuation orders were lifted for southeast Rockrimmon, Pine Cliff, and Kissing Camels.

29 JUNE 2012 (FRIDAY)

The fire containment remained steady. CSPD confirmed that there were two fatalities in the evacuated area. The mandatory evacuation for the first affected neighborhood, Cedar Heights, was lifted later in the evening.

30 JUNE 2012 (SATURDAY)

There was limited growth in the fire for a fourth day. Mandatory evacuation of the Woodman Valley neighborhood was lifted in the evening. Colorado National Guard deployed and began assisting with traffic control and security in the evacuated areas.

1 JULY 2012 (SUNDAY)

Residents of the hardest hit northern Mountain Shadows neighborhood were allowed to return for the day to visit their homes. Electricity and natural gas were turned off during the firestorm on 26 June and homeowners were encouraged to remove all food from their refrigerators and dispose of it. First responders, City and County Officials, Salvation Army Mobile canteens, and behavioral health workers conducted roving patrols within the impacted area to provide support to the more than 4,000 individuals who entered the area.

Additional evacuation orders were lifted later in the evening for Oak Valley Ranch, Pinon Valley, Peregrine, and the Grand Centennial Apartments.

⁸ This was the initial number reported to the public, and as noted previously, continues to change.

2 JULY 2012 – 8 JULY 2012 (MONDAY – SUNDAY)

Containment of the fire continued and weather conditions became more favorable. Restoration of vital utility services became a key priority. As critical utility service was restored in the affected neighborhoods, residents were allowed to re-enter their neighborhoods and homes. The re-entry was announced on a street by street basis throughout the affected neighborhoods, until all streets were released from the mandatory evacuation on Sunday, 8 July 2012.

SECTION 2: INITIAL CAPABILITY REVIEW

This section provides preliminary findings related to the City of Colorado Springs' response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. As noted in the Executive Summary, an in-depth analysis of this capability review will be conducted over the next several months in order for the City of Colorado Springs to become better prepared should another disaster, big or small, strike our community in the future.

The section is categorized utilizing the Target and Core Capability frameworks that are described in the Department of Homeland Security's National Preparedness Guidelines⁹. Where practical, the agency with primary responsibility will be listed. There are numerous cases when multiple agencies are affected and this will be noted as such.

⁹ <http://www.dhs.gov/national-preparedness-guidelines>

CAPABILITY 1: COMMUNICATIONS

Definition: Communications interoperability is the ability of public safety agencies (police, fire, EMS) and service agencies (public works, transportation, hospitals) to talk within and across agencies and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems, exchanging voice, data and/or video with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and when authorized.

The City of Colorado Springs is a member of the Pikes Peak Regional Communications Network (PPRCN) which maintains the key infrastructure of the 800 MHz radio system throughout the City. PPRCN recently integrated into the Colorado Statewide Digital Trunked Radio System (DTRS), enabling PPRCN radios to operate on the Statewide DTRS network. This integration enables first responders and other agencies traveling from outside of the PPRCN to bring their radios to the PPRCN area and communicate instantly. Cellular phones are also commonly used by public safety and service agencies to communicate throughout the incident.

Key Strengths: Communications

Item	Agency	Strength
1.1	Multiple	Radio training, workshops and exercises related to interoperable communications have been conducted in a focused manner over the past two years furthering the knowledge and abilities of first responders in the city.
1.2	Multiple	One hundred (100) 800 MHz Portable Radios were requested, received, programmed, and distributed to mutual aid first responders during the early stages of the incident, allowing for immediate interoperability.
1.3	PPRCN	The PPRCN infrastructure did not suffer a significant loss of integrity during the incident, even with a significant increase in radio traffic.
1.4	CSFD	VHF Radio Caches were available for use and proved beneficial in communicating with the IMT.

Key Recommendations for Change: Communications

Item	Agency	Recommendation
1.5	CSFD (lead)	A Communications Unit Leader (COML) should be assigned under the Incident Command System to ensure that an incident-wide Communications Plan is developed distributed, and maintained throughout the incident.
1.6	CS IT	Cellular service and coverage in the WUI area is problematic. Work with cellular providers to improve long-term service along the WUI.
1.7	CSFD (lead)	Develop a large incident, multi-agency communication plan incorporating VHF and 800 MHz radio systems that can be easily adapted during a future incident.

CAPABILITY 2: PLANNING

Definition: Planning is the mechanism through which federal, state, local and tribal governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures describing how they will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events.

The City of Colorado Springs has invested significant time and effort in developing a variety of emergency response plans. These plans include:

1. Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
2. Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Activation Plan
3. Colorado Springs Wildland Urban Interface Evacuation (WUI) Appendix
4. Colorado Springs Catastrophic Incident Annex
5. Colorado Springs Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
6. Colorado Springs Resource Management Plan

Key Strengths: Planning

Item	Agency	Strength
2.1	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	A comprehensive WUI Appendix to the Colorado Springs EOP was developed in 2008 and revised in June 2012.
2.2	CSOEM	Training and exercise opportunities have been provided when plans are developed and/or significantly revised.
2.3	CSOEM	Contracted Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) have worked closely with the City on the development of several plans and facilitated training and exercises on the plans. The addition of external expertise assisted in the creation of very comprehensive plans.

Key Recommendations for Change: Planning

Item	Agency	Recommendation
2.4	CSOEM	The above-mentioned plans need to be revised to reflect the significant lessons learned from this incident.
2.5	CSOEM	Once plans are revised, training and exercises need to occur to validate the revised plans.
2.6	CSOEM	Create job checklists/aides to be used in conjunction to the plans.
2.7	CSOEM	Ensure that all plans are developed and exercised in conjunction with key community and governmental partner agencies.

CAPABILITY 3: COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION

Definition: The Community Preparedness and Participation is the capability that ensures community members are aware, trained, and practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards.

The City of Colorado Springs has actively engaged in community preparedness activities by:

1. Engaging community members in training and education (i.e. public speaking events, preparedness training, and wildfire safety and mitigation);
2. Partnering with residents to conduct wildfire mitigation work on their properties;
3. Developing and distributing written education materials;
4. Engaging the media with preparedness messaging; and
5. Involving residents in emergency response evacuation drills and exercises.

Key Strengths: Community Preparedness and Participation

Item	Agency	Strength
3.1	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	WUI evacuation drills were conducted in Cedar Heights (2009), Discovery/Comstock, Mountain Shadows, and Broadmoor Bluffs neighborhoods during calendar year 2011.
3.2	CSFD	Wildfire education and mitigation efforts have been conducted for several years with residents along the WUI.
3.3	CSOEM	Training is conducted approximately four times per year for community members, providing information related to preparedness education for incidents such as wildfire.
3.4	CSOEM	Colorado Springs designed and distributed approximately 33,000 copies of a comprehensive Emergency Preparedness and Safety Guide. This guide can also be found online at: http://www.springsgov.com/Files/Preparedness%20Guide10_web.pdf to provide further access for residents.

Key Recommendations for Change: Community Preparedness and Participation

Item	Agency	Recommendation
3.5	CSOEM	Develop additional methods to deliver community preparedness training/messaging throughout the community to reach a broad and diverse audience.
3.6	CSOEM	Utilize community volunteers to develop and conduct community preparedness activities.

CAPABILITY 4: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MANAGEMENT

Definition: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, state, and federal EOCs; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

The Colorado Springs EOC was activated at approximately noon on Saturday, 23 June 2012 after the fire was first reported. The multi-agency personnel in the EOC began to immediately organize and support response activities such as developing the evacuation zones, coordinating incident logistics, developing public information messages, tracking finances, etc. The EOC remained operational throughout the duration of the wildfire incident, scaling services as necessary to accommodate the support requests.

Key Strengths: Emergency Operations Center Management

Item	Agency	Strength
4.1	CSOEM	The EOC was activated during the onset of the fire and existing policies and procedures were followed; to include: calling in key positions, determining the need for evacuations, developing maps of the fire/evacuation areas; providing logistical support to first responders, coding time and labor for finance.
4.2	CS IT	Geographic Information Systems (GIS) staff in the EOC provided excellent, up-to-date mapping services throughout the entire incident.
4.3	Multiple	The EOC provided staffing, albeit limited in depth, from each key city organization and non-profit and/or local government agency and successfully provided a “one stop shop” resource for those who were working the incident.

Key Recommendations for Change: Emergency Operations Center Management

Item	Agency	Recommendation
4.4	CSOEM	Develop a comprehensive organization chart and staff depth in positions early in the incident.
4.5	Multiple	Develop an immediate staffing rotation plan to ensure rest times for staff during extended incidents.
4.6	CSOEM	Provide further comprehensive training to staff on their respective roles in the EOC and on the interface with the Incident Command Post (ICP).
4.7	CSOEM/ CS IT	Equipment in the EOC is outdated and slow, which resulted in a degradation/delay of service.
4.8	Multiple	Ensure that the EOC has liaisons for all geographically disparate areas of the incident (partner agency EOCs, IMT, ICP, etc.) and conduct regular liaison briefings to ensure that EOC staff has the most recent information from the field.

CAPABILITY 5: CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

Definition: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, and demobilize, and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases.

The EOC handled the majority of resource and logistics requests for Colorado Springs' response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. Logistic requests were made by, and through, a variety of field locations. The bulk of the logistics requested during the incident was related to feeding operations and resource supply requests for first responders and EOC staff members.

Key Strengths: Critical Logistics and Distribution

Item	Agency	Strength
5.1	CSOEM	The Logistics Section of the EOC was able to successfully provide critical resource logistic support, as requested by responders, by utilizing existing contracts, developing new contracts/relationships, and leveraging donations.
5.2	CS Finance	The City has capacity to use P-Cards (Visa) to make large purchases, as necessary, and can make changes to credit limits, in order to manage the ever-changing financial aspect of logistics.

Key Recommendations for Change: Critical Logistics and Distribution

Item	Agency	Recommendation
5.3	CSOEM	The Logistics Section in the EOC should be staffed robustly, and organized from the beginning of the incident to ensure that all requests can be met promptly.
5.4	CSOEM CAPS	Community Advancing Public Safety (CAPS) volunteers should be organized and trained to provide logistics support for future events.
5.5	CSOEM	The Food Unit is responsible for providing feeding to all mutual aid and first responders working this incident. Plans need to be developed to ensure that food with adequate caloric content is provided to first responders at all hours and can be delivered to those working on fire lines, at traffic control points, and conducting roving security patrols.

CAPABILITY 6: VOLUNTEER AND DONATIONS MANAGEMENT

Definition: Volunteer and Donations Management is the capability to effectively coordinate the use of volunteers and donations in support of incident management.

The community was very generous in their response to the Waldo Canyon Fire and began to donate items such as water and food to first responders on Saturday. Further support was provided immediately at the Cheyenne Mountain High School Shelter. Volunteer and donations management is a critical component of an incident of this size. The bulk of volunteer and donations management for the Waldo Canyon Fire was handled by Discover Goodwill and www.helpcoloradonow.org (donations), Salvation Army, and Care and Share (feeding and volunteers). While attempts were made to effectively organize volunteer and donations management, spontaneous volunteers and donations appeared at a variety of locations throughout the city and these were managed as effectively as possible.

Key Strengths: Volunteer and Donations Management¹⁰

Item	Agency	Strength
6.1	Goodwill	Discover Goodwill accepted donations at multiple locations throughout Colorado Springs and provided vouchers for affected residents to shop at any Goodwill store. As of 18 August 2012, \$50,000 in vouchers was provided.
6.2	Multiple	Interagency relationships and coordination among local non-profits and governmental agencies proved to be extremely beneficial in the activation and response efforts of this incident.
6.3	Multiple	Local, regional, statewide and national community support with donations and offers to volunteer provided incredible support to those affected by the incident.
6.4	Goodwill/ Care & Share	Discover Goodwill and Care and Share secured additional pantry and warehouse space to accommodate the large increase in donations, to include furniture.
6.5	Salvation Army	Salvation Army Canteens were located at each shelter, first responder feeding area(s), and mobile canteens provided much-needed feeding/rehydration during resident re-entry.

Key Recommendations for Change: Volunteer and Donations Management

Item	Agency	Recommendation
6.6	Multiple	Establish regional Coordinating Group focused on Volunteer and Donations Management, in coordination with Mass Care (Emergency Support Function {ESF} #6), to streamline the coordination of volunteer and donations management in the future.
6.7	CSOEM	Provide NIMS, ICS, and EOC training for non-profits agency personnel so that there is a shared understanding of how the incident is being managed.
6.8	Multiple	Meet with state agencies and organizations to effectively coordinate volunteer and donations management services during disasters.

¹⁰ The information provided in this section was the result of a multi-agency El Paso/Teller County Mass Care After Action meeting that was held on 23 August 2012.

CAPABILITY 7: RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH

Definition: Responder Safety and Health is the capability that ensures adequate trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on scene first responders, first receivers¹¹, and skilled support personnel. This capability is a critical component of safe overall emergency management.

Responder Safety and Health is a capability that transcends many areas of a wildfire response. This capability is applicable to all personnel who are working to support efforts related to the fire response. Key to the success of this capability is ensuring that personnel are trained and equipped to work in the environment that they will be operating in. Additionally, there are the aspects that include behavioral health of the personnel who are most often working extraordinary hours to complete required tasks to support the emergency.

Key Strengths: Responder Safety and Health

Item	Agency	Strength
7.1	All	No major injuries were sustained by first responders, first receivers, and support personnel throughout the duration of the incident.
7.2	CSPD AMR	Law enforcement officers were medically checked at the conclusion of each shift when working directly in the active fire/evacuation zone.
7.3	CSPD	Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) specifically masks, for first responders were cached and immediately available for use.
7.4	Multiple	A long history of training, with an emphasis on safety, helped ensure personnel recognized hazards and prevented significant injury or death.

Key Recommendations for Change: Responder Safety and Health

Item	Agency	Recommendation
7.5	Multiple	Update information regarding PPE caches and ensure that the caches are readily available in a time of need.
7.6	Multiple	Develop a plan to ensure that emergency response personnel receive adequate rest, work consistent shifts, and receive breaks and rehabilitation (food and supplies).
7.7	Multiple	Evaluate the need for post-incident critical stress debrief and/or peer support for first responders and support personnel.
7.8	Multiple	An ICS Organization Chart needs to be developed and staffed for the incident to ensure that there is a Safety Officer assigned as well as an Accountability Officer. These two positions will account for all safety needs for personnel who are working the incident.

¹¹ Acute care providers, including surgeons, anesthesiologists, emergency medicine physicians, prehospital providers, and nurses with emergency, operating room, critical care, and trauma backgrounds possess the skills and experiences best suited to serve as first receivers who provide the initial care to disaster victims.

CAPABILITY 8: EMERGENCY PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

Definition: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery.

The Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) led all law enforcement and public safety and security response aspects of the Waldo Canyon Fire within the Colorado Springs city limits. CSPD provided security at traffic check points for all evacuated areas, roving security patrols within evacuated areas, crime scene investigation, and provided security during re-entry.

Key Strengths: Emergency Public Safety and Security

Item	Agency	Strength
8.1	CSPD	Moving to 12-hours shifts and using the online special event sign-up proved to be extremely beneficial in organizing personnel.
8.2	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	The WUI Appendix was beneficial in that it provided information on areas of concerns, evacuation decision points, traffic management, messaging, available resources, legal authorizations, etc.
8.3	Multiple	Law enforcement received Mutual Aid (MA) resources from a variety of agencies and this provided support and surge capacity.

Key Recommendations for Change: Emergency Public Safety and Security

Item	Agency	Recommendation
8.4	CSPD JIC	Advise the public that CSPD is providing security in the evacuated and pre-evacuated areas 24 hours a day.
8.5	CSPD	Ensure that consistency in personnel can be maintained throughout the incident as this builds event-specific institutional knowledge that assists with moving to each operational period.
8.6	CSPD (lead)	Explore the possibility of training and utilizing additional City staff to provide support to law enforcement officers working on the safety and security aspects (i.e. Streets Division assisting with road blocks, traffic direction).
8.7	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	Develop a comprehensive organization chart early during the incident to ensure that span of control in positions is appropriate for the incident and will ensure effective management.
8.8	(also noted under Fire)	Conduct advanced ICS training for first responders and Command and General staff.

CAPABILITY 9: FIRE INCIDENT RESPONSE SUPPORT

Definition: The Fire Incident Response Support capability provides coordination and implementation of fire suppression operations, which include the following tasks: assessing the scene, assigning resources, establishing ICS, communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, evacuating persons in danger, rescuing trapped victims, conducting fire suppression, determining the cause of the fire(s), and ensuring the area is left in a safe condition.

The Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) was the lead agency for Fire Incident Response in the Waldo Canyon Fire. While the CSFD provided resources to the Type I IMT, the CSFD Structure Protection Branch resources remained under the CSFD Structure Protection Branch Director. Numerous agencies assisted CSFD by providing mutual aid through backfilling fire stations and or in fire suppression efforts.

Key Strengths: Fire Incident Response Support

Item	Agency	Strength
9.1	CSFD	Personnel operated in adverse conditions amidst an urban conflagration for many hours/days, saving many homes, and no serious injuries occurred.
9.2	CSFD	While there was a large loss of structures, the aggressive firefighting resulting from the CSFD's culture, training, experience, and equipment prevented the loss of many more.
9.3	CSFD	The urban conflagration covered a vast geographic area which posed a tremendous challenge for resources during the initial attack phase. Despite this unique and previously un-experienced situation, all fire companies aggressively engaged the fire throughout the Mountain Shadows neighborhood without the usual resource support available at a typical structure fire.
9.4	CSFD	Recently the CSFD re-aligned the reporting relationships for the two fire stations that are primarily responsible for the Wildfire Suppression Program. This resulted in a single chain of command, reporting to one District Chief, and accountability for all aspects of the program.

Key Recommendations for Change: Fire Incident Response Support

Item	Agency	Recommendation
9.5	CSFD	Coordination of arriving resources through an established staging area with the on-scene IC was often ineffective or non-existent which prevented accurate accountability of all crews/personnel operating in the area that was Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).
9.6	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	Develop a comprehensive organization chart early during the incident to ensure that span of control in positions is appropriate for the incident and will ensure effective management.
9.7	(also noted under Public Safety)	Conduct advanced ICS training for first responders and Command and General staff.

CAPABILITY 10: EVACUATION AND RE-ENTRY

Definition: Evacuation is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe re-entry of the population.

Colorado Springs developed a WUI Evacuation Appendix to the Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) in 2008. This plan was reviewed and revised in June 2012.

Key Strengths: Evacuation and Re-Entry

Item	Agency	Strength
10.1	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	Evacuation zones and management action points were identified early in the incident based on fire behavior and subsequently modified throughout the incident.
10.2	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	Resident evacuation drills provided a beneficial opportunity for response personnel and residents to test their response to an evacuation prior to this incident.
10.3	Multiple	Flexibility and dedication of all personnel conducting, and assisting with, evacuations were pivotal in executing the orders and successfully controlling the movement of evacuees.
10.4	CSPD HSPPR	Allowing the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (HSPPR) into the evacuated zone to retrieve animals relieved stress for evacuees and potentially saved the lives of companion animals.
10.5	Multiple	Allowing residents to return to the northern Mountain Shadows area quickly and spend the day with their homes, neighbors, and first responder personnel was much appreciated and served many purposes for those who were affected.

Key Recommendations for Change: Evacuation and Re-Entry

Item	Agency	Recommendation
10.6	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	Evacuation boundaries were not always clear. Consider using street names as borders as well as using the names of neighborhoods.
10.7	CSOEM EOC Logistics	Ensure that first responders have immediate access to maps and decisions made regarding evacuations.
10.8	CSOEM CSFD CSPD	Establish a re-entry task force early in the incident, after the initial evacuations are ordered. This task force would be the single point of contact to assess the need for anyone wishing to gain entry during the mandatory evacuation, and once the evacuation has been lifted.
10.9	Policy	When separating individuals for large meetings and/or announcements (such as the UCCS community meeting on 28 June), divide the attendees by geographical neighborhood.

CAPABILITY 11: EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION

*Definition: The Emergency **Public Information** and Warning capability includes public information¹², alert¹³/warning¹⁴ and notification¹⁵. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.*

EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION: At the onset of the Waldo Canyon Fire, a Joint Information System (JIS) of agency Public Information Officers (PIOs) was established to work together to deliver accurate and timely information to the public. The JIS was located at a Joint Information Center (JIC) that was housed at the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (EPSO). As the fire moved into Colorado Springs, the City Communications Office took the lead in the JIC and for dissemination of information to the public.

Key Strengths: Emergency Public Information¹⁶

Item	Agency	Strength
11.1	Multiple	Conducting the press conferences at consistent times each day provided a reliable source of information.
11.2	JIC	The public information phone numbers that were answered in the JIC provided a good opportunity for immediate response and customer service to community members.
11.3	JIC	Twitter was effective in providing immediate information to the public and, through monitoring the Public Information Officer(s) (PIOs) in the JIC could easily correct any misinformation.

Key Recommendations for Change: Emergency Public Information

Item	Agency	Recommendation
11.4	CS Communication	Develop a City Crisis Communications Team that will work with the regional Crisis Communications Network (CCN) to refine public information plans and procedures.
11.5	CSOEM	Coordinate the provision of PIO training with city staff to ensure that there is depth in positions.
11.6	CS Communication	Develop pre-scripted messages for evacuation and provide more detail in the messages (i.e. whether the evacuation is emergent or not and, if so, reiterate pertinent information such as: 1) Traffic plan information such as contra flow out of a neighborhood or on main arteries; or 2) Utilize text messaging instead of cell phones to allow for emergency calls).
11.7	CS Communication	Work with local media to provide closed captioning during emergency incidents. Not all individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing understand American Sign Language.

¹² “public information” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official and includes both general information and crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) activities.

¹³ “alert” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to **provide situational awareness** to the public about a potential or ongoing emergency situation. An alert does not necessarily require immediate actions and is typically issued in connection with immediate danger.

¹⁴ “warning” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to **provide direction** to the public about an ongoing emergency situation that requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property. A warning requires immediate actions and is typically issued when there is a confirmed threat posing an immediate danger to the public.

¹⁵ “notification” refers to any process where Federal, State, local, tribal, and nongovernmental organization, department, and/or agency employees and/or associates are informed of an emergency situation that **may require a response from those notified**.

¹⁶ The information provided in this section is reflective of the City PIOs only, and is not reflective of the views of the many other agencies in the JIC.

CAPABILITY 12: EMERGENCY PUBLIC WARNING

*Definition: The Emergency Public Information and **Warning** capability includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.*

EMERGENCY PUBLIC WARNING: The El Paso Teller E911 Authority manages the Emergency Notification System (ENS) which is used to notify residents of any situation that may threaten to harm life and/or property. Public safety dispatch uses the ENS system to send emergency messages to residents who have registered their cell phones in the E911 database or who have commercially provided data already available.

Key Strengths: Emergency Public Warning

Item	Agency	Strength
12.1	E911 Authority	Registered 42,000 people in the Emergency Notification System (ENS) during the week of the fire.
12.2	Multiple	Numerous individuals registered to receive emergency notifications in advance of the start of the Waldo Canyon Fire. The large summer wildfires in Colorado, specifically the Lower North Fork and High Park Fires, brought to light the need to register phones to receive emergency notifications.
12.3	E911 Authority	218,000 ENS notifications were sent during the fire.

Key Recommendations for Change: Emergency Public Warning

Item	Agency	Recommendation
12.4	E911 Authority	Study the capability and capacity of the current reverse 911/ENS and implement recommendations to improve/fix the service.
12.5	E911 Authority	Determine a single POC for reviewing and releasing all ENS messages for El Paso and Teller counties to ensure that the system capacity is not stretched with competing messages.
12.6	CSFD/PD Dispatch	Conduct additional training with staff on the ENS software, equipment, etc. (whether it is the existing system or a new one) to expand the number of users familiar with the software.
12.7	CSFD/PD Dispatch	Develop a procedure to ensure that all evacuation orders are tracked with detailed information as to time, who ordered the evacuation, time that notification is sent out, etc.

CAPABILITY 13: MEDICAL SURGE

Definition: Medical Surge is the capability to rapidly expand the capacity of the existing healthcare system (longterm care facilities, community health agencies, acute care facilities, alternate care facilities and public health departments) in order to provide triage and subsequent medical care.

The Waldo Canyon Fire caused a medical surge event due to the re-location of a large nursing home with residents who are seriously ill and/or disabled. These residents/patients were moved to a local hospital, thus taxing medical transport services and the medical system as a whole. Additionally, some area hospitals experienced problems related to smoke within their facilities. Medical and behavioral health care was provided at each shelter location which helped to diminish the impact on local health care facilities.

Key Strengths: Medical Surge¹⁷

Item	Agency	Strength
13.1	MRCEPC	Medical and behavioral health care was provided at all shelters.
13.2	Multiple	Facilities have pre-planned and practiced for evacuation of residents. A great example of this was Mount Saint Francis Nursing Home.
13.3	Multiple	Staff in the EOC began working with nursing and health care facilities once pre-evacuations were ordered to ensure that there was sufficient capability to re-locate patients.
13.4	AMR	American Medical Response (AMR) was proactive in participating in the EOC, as well as assisting with evacuation of healthcare facility residents.

Key Recommendations for Change: Medical Surge

Item	Agency	Recommendation
13.5	Multiple	Integrate planning and staff evacuation training which includes physician orders, administration role, and regional plans. Discuss the value of client evacuation training.
13.6	Multiple	Provide regional medical situation reports using EMResource ¹⁸ or the ESF8 Coordination Advisory Team (8CAT) with the primary purpose to keep health and medical agencies informed, even if not directly affected (such as the adjacent counties).

¹⁷ The information provided in this section was the result of a multi-agency El Paso/Teller County Healthcare Debrief meeting that was held on 17 August 2012.

¹⁸ Formerly EMSsystem.

CAPABILITY 14: MEDICAL SUPPLIES MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

Definition: Medical Supplies Management and Distribution is the capability to procure and maintain pharmaceuticals and medical materials prior to an incident and to transport, distribute, and track these materials during an incident.

Medical supplies were requested and provided to each of the three shelters that were directly supporting the evacuations in Colorado Springs. These medical supplies were available in caches that have been assembled specifically for this type of incident and supplies were also donated by commercial vendors.

Key Strengths: Medical Supplies Management and Distribution¹⁹

Item	Agency	Strength
14.1	Multiple	Ultimately provided all shelters with required medical supplies and equipment, including specialty beds available through EMResource.
14.2	MMRS	A list of medical caches with key information was in place and deployed for use in shelters (even though not all shelter medical staff knew of medical cache listing availability).
14.3	Multiple	Selected commercial vendors delivered needed supplies to shelters on their own initiative.

Key Recommendations for Change: Medical Supplies Management and Distribution

Item	Agency	Recommendation
14.4	MMRS	Make medical caches more accessible and deployment friendly. Include pictures and illustrations with caches (to ensure correct type of cot, i.e. medical vs. bariatric, along with assembly instructions).
14.5	PPARC MRCEPC	Ensure that medical staff have the resources to provide security of controlled medications; this includes verifying staff identification/credentialing and periodic (once per manager shift) and identification checks of shelter staff to ensure absence of impersonators.
14.6	MMRS	Ensure process is established/documented for recovery of medical supplies and equipment when any given shelter is closed; to include marking and tracking of supplies and equipment.

¹⁹ The information provided in this section was the result of a multi-agency El Paso/Teller County Healthcare Debrief meeting that was held on 17 August 2012.

CAPABILITY 15: MASS CARE

Definition: Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident. The capability also provides for companion animal care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. This capability further covers those individuals who have disabilities that can be accommodated in general population shelters.

Three Pikes Peak American Red Cross (PPARC) shelters were opened in the Colorado Springs vicinity to support the Waldo Canyon Fire evacuees. These shelters provided medical care and had the capability to support the needs of individuals with Access and Functional Needs (AFN). Companion animals were sheltered at the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (HSPPR), Freedom Financial Services Expo Center (run by HSPPR), and two of the PPARC shelters. Large animals were sheltered at the Penrose Equestrian Center.

Key Strengths: Mass Care

Item	Agency	Strength
15.1	Multiple	Local agencies/vendors provided computers, landline phones, and internet access at each shelter for evacuees.
15.2	PPARC MRCEPC	PPARC and the Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County (MRCEP) have trained and exercised together in the past on several occasions preparing them to respond to this type of incident.
15.3	PPARC	PPARC was able to staff and operate three shelters in the Colorado Springs area, along with several others in neighboring jurisdictions.
15.4	CART	The large animal shelter and companion animal shelters were heavily utilized by evacuees, whether staying in an ARC shelter or not.

Key Recommendations for Change: Mass Care

Item	Agency	Recommendation
15.5	Multiple	Establish regional Coordinating Group focused on Volunteer and Donations Management, in coordination with Mass Care (Emergency Support Function {ESF} #6), to streamline the coordination of volunteer and donations management in the future.
15.6	JIC	Ensure that messaging to all evacuees/affected residents is clear explaining that feeding and support services are available for them at the shelter locations.
15.7	PPARC CSOEM	Ensure that there are up-to-date maps and information at all shelter locations and that the shelter manager is clearly identifiable and has a single mobile phone that is transferred on each shift (continuity of communication with the shelter).

SECTION 3: CONCLUSION

The Waldo Canyon Fire was a historic incident of epic proportions that taxed every aspect of the City of Colorado Springs' response personnel. Personnel from within the City, along with the hundreds of individuals from assisting agencies, reacted in an incredibly professional and heroic manner throughout the duration of this incident. Numerous strengths were demonstrated during this incident and it is imperative that we capture these strengths and build upon them for future responses. The development of this document is the first step in a lengthy process to fully analyze Colorado Springs' response to this event. As the analysis continues, Colorado Springs is committed to work toward implementing the recommendations that are contained within this AAR.

Although this report does not address Recovery efforts related to the Waldo Canyon Fire, several initiatives are in place. Colorado Springs Together, a 501(c)3 was immediately established and has been successful in working with residents on recovery needs. The City is evaluating their current Recovery Plan and will adjust it as needed based upon lessons learned.

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Name: Bret Waters

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
Street Address: 375 Printers Parkway

Colorado Springs, CO 80910


719-385-7229 (office)

e-mail: bwaters@springsgov.com

APPENDIX A: FIRE PROGRESSION MAP



APPENDIX B: FINAL COLORADO SPRINGS EVACUATION MAP



Date: 6/27/2012 Time: 12:16:52 PM MXD Name: Waldo_Fire_6_27_12_PreEvac5_9_MAN_11x17

Department of Information Technology
GIS Services Division



Waldo Canyon Fire Mandatory Evacuation Areas

- Legend
- Evac Areas
- AREA
- Pre-Evac Area 9
- Pre-Evac Area 5
- Mandatory Evacuation Areas
- Colorado Springs City Limits



APPENDIX C: RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

The organizations listed in the table below are representative of the preliminary assessment of organizations that supported the City of Colorado Springs' response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. Further assessment will likely find that there are additional agencies that should be added to this list.

Community Organizations	
American Red Cross	Goodwill
Care and Share	Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region
Catholic Charities	Pikes Peak United Way
Colorado Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (COVOAD)	Salvation Army
Community Advancing Public Safety	Samaritan's Purse
Community Animal Response Team	The Navigators
Governmental Organizations	
Air Force Academy	El Paso Teller E-911 Authority
Civil Air Patrol	Fort Carson
Colorado Army and Air National Guard	Mountain Metropolitan Transit Bus Service
Colorado Department of Transportation	National Weather Service
Colorado National Guard	Natural Resource Conservation Service
Colorado Springs Utilities	Pikes Peak Community College
Colorado Water Conservation Board	Pueblo Chemical Depot
District 11 Transportation	Pikes Peak Regional Building Department
El Paso County Assessor's Office	Small Business Association
El Paso County GIS	United States Forest Service
El Paso County Public Health	United States Geological Society
Facilities	
Cheyenne Mountain High School	Lewis Palmer High School
Chipeta Elementary School	Penrose Equestrian Center
Coronado High School	Southeast YMCA
Eagleview Middle School	The Springs Church
Freedom Financial Services Expo Center	University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS)
Holmes Middle School	Verizon Wireless, Garden of the Gods
Emergency Management	
Colorado Department of Local Affairs	
Colorado Division of Emergency Management	
Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management	
Colorado Office of Emergency Management	
Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management	
El Paso County Emergency Services Division	
Federal Emergency Management Agency	
Great Basin Type I Incident Management Team	

Fire	
Air Force Academy Fire Dept.	Fountain Fire Dept.
Arvada Fire Protection District	Golden Fire Dept.
Aurora Fire Dept.	Green Mountain Falls Chipita Park Fire Dept.
Beulah Valley Volunteer Fire Dept.	Hanover Fire Protection District
Black Forest Fire/Rescue	Manitou Springs Fire Dept.
Boone County Fire Dept.	National Fire Protection Association
Broadmoor Fire Protection District	Northeast Teller County Fire Protection District
Calhan Fire Protection District	Palmer Lake Volunteer Fire Dept.
Cascade Volunteer Fire Dept.	United States Army Pueblo Chemical Depot
Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station Fire Dept.	Pueblo County Sheriff's Office
Cimarron Hills Fire Dept.	Pueblo West Fire Dept.
Colorado Center Metro District	Rye Fire Protection District
Colorado Springs Fire Department Explorers	Security Fire Dept.
Crystal Park Volunteer Fire Dept.	South Metro Fire Rescue Authority
Colorado Springs Utilities Wildland Fire Team	Stratmoor Hills Fire Dept.
Denver Fire Dept.	Tri-Lakes Monument Fire Protection District
Donald Westcott Fire Protection District	West Metro Fire Protection District
El Paso County Wildfire Suppression Team	West Park Fire Dept.
Falcon Fire Protection District	Wheat Ridge Fire Protection District
Fort Carson Fire and Emergency Services	
Law Enforcement	
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)	Federal Bureau of Investigation
Colorado Department of Corrections	Fountain Police Department
Colorado State Patrol	Pueblo County Sheriff's Office
Department of Homeland Security Federal Police	Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
El Paso County District Attorney's Office	Pueblo Police Department
El Paso County Sheriff's Office	University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) Police Dept.
Medical/Behavioral	
Air Life Denver Ambulance	Memorial Hospital Transport Team
American Medical Response-Canon City	Mount St. Francis Nursing Center
American Medical Response-El Paso County	Rocky Mountain Mobile Medical
American Medical Response-Denver	Rural Metro Ambulance
American Medical Response-Pueblo	Silver Key Transportation
Aspen Pointe	Spanish Peaks
Calhan Ambulance Service	Mount St. Francis Transportation
Fountain Fire Department Ambulance	Stratmoor Hills Fire Department Ambulance
Hanover Fire Department Ambulance	Ute Pass Regional Ambulance District (UPRAD)
Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County	Memorial Hospital Transport Team

APPENDIX D: 26 JUNE 2012 DETAILED TIMELINE

Time	Activity
7:00PM 25 June	The IMT Meteorologist issued the weather forecast for Tuesday, 26 June 2012: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mostly sunny with late morning cumulus forming. A slight chance of high-based thunderstorms in the afternoon with little rain and gusty outflow winds up to 40 mph. • Northwest half of fire - west 5-8 mph with gusts to 12 until 0900, becoming southwest 9-12 mph with gusts to 20 mph until 1800, some gusts as high as 25 mph.
8:00AM	Morning press conference was held at Coronado High School.
9:00AM	Based on the National Weather Service (NWS) weather forecast, the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC) created fire behavior modeling showing the fire moving at an approximate rate of ¼ mile per hour.
10:52AM	CSPD began allowing evacuees from Mountain Shadows to return to their homes for 30 minutes, after checking in with an officer at a checkpoint, to retrieve essential emergency items.
11:32AM	CSPD suspended the escorted returns into southern Mountain Shadows and Cedar Heights for emergency items due to fire behavior.
1:39PM	Pre-evacuation notice was issued for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Oak Valley, and Peregrine).
2:26PM	CSFD weather spotter in the Cedar Heights area provided the following weather report: relative humidity 10.2%, wind speed of 5-6 mph with gusts up to 15mph, coming out of the S/SE.
2:29PM	Crystal Park Lookout reported seeing flare ups on the west side of Williams Canyon.
3:45PM	Air Attack reported spotting the fire approximately 350 feet from the bottom of Queens Canyon.
3:52PM	Crystal Park Lookout reported seeing fire on the northern ridge of Queens Canyon's western side.
4:04PM	Afternoon press conference began at Coronado High School.
4:05PM	CSFD weather spotter in the Cedar Heights area provided the following weather report: 96 degrees, relative humidity of 11.8, wind speed of 8 mph with gusts up to 18 mph, coming out of the S/SE.
4:08PM	Fire was reported on the east side of the most east facing ridge of Queen's Canyon. Captain Steve Riker was located east of Wilson Tank and called Battalion Chief (BC) Collas to confirm the evacuation order for Zone 3. BC Collas acknowledged and stated that he would confirm.
4:10PM	BC Collas requested the mandatory evacuation of Zone 3.
4:11PM	CSFD's FDOC began to request additional outside resources for northern Mountain Shadows and assigned additional CSFD personnel to work in northern Mountain Shadows and Peregrine.
4:20PM	CSFD radio transmissions from personnel west of the Wilson Tank in northern Mountain Shadows noted that fire had moved approximately 1/3 of the way down the eastern ridge of Queen's Canyon.
4:21PM	Mayor Bach interrupted the afternoon press conference to announce the mandatory evacuation of Zone 3.

Time	Activity
4:23PM	CSFD radio transmissions from personnel west of the Wilson Tank in northern Mountain Shadows noted that the fire had jumped to the top of the next ridge over (two peaks over and starting to run to the northeast).
4:24PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows and Oak Valley, Peregrine) via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).
4:36PM	Task Force 1 requested confirmation that the evacuation had been ordered and stated that there were still a lot of homeowners in Peregrine. Chief Dubay confirmed that the evacuation order went out approximately 15 minutes prior.
5:00PM	Evacuation Zones 6, 7, 8, and 9 were developed and mapped.
5:07PM	Air Attack made its final water drop on the area west of northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine.
5:08PM	CSFD personnel located near the Wilson Water Tank moved to hard pavement near the Wilson Tank.
5:11PM	Air Attack reported that the column had collapsed.
5:23PM	CSFD ordered all personnel to retreat to Chipeta Elementary School due to the aggressive fire entering the area.
5:38PM	CSFD ordered all personnel at Chipeta Elementary School to retreat to the MCI building on Garden of the Gods and Centennial due to the fire front that was raging through the neighborhood.
6:00PM	CSFD resources reentered the northern Mountain Shadows neighborhood to commence firefighting efforts.
6:22PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 4 (north Rockrimmon) via the ENS.
6:53PM	Pikes Peak American Red Cross (PPARC) opened a second shelter in Colorado Springs at the Southeast YMCA.
7:09PM	Freedom Financial opened to shelter pets.
7:37PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 7 (southeast Rockrimmon) via the ENS.
7:50PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 6 (south Pope's Valley, Woodman Valley, Pinon Valley, Pine Cliff) via the ENS.
8:02PM	PPARC opened a third shelter in Monument at Lewis Palmer High School.
8:30PM	An evening press conference was held at UCCS to provide information regarding the recent events of the column collapse and subsequent firestorm in northern Mountain Shadows.
9:46PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 8 (Kissing Camels) via the ENS.