

The Air University

JMCT

Journal of Military Conflict Transformation

The Official Journal of The Air Force Negotiation Center



Volume 1, Number 2 | September 2020 | ISSN 2643-4547
www.airuniversity.af.edu/AFNC

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Military Conflict
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Director’s Welcome.....3

Featured Articles

Transformational Negotiation: Establishing a Novel Approach to Workplace Conflict
 Col Daniel S. Coutts, Royal Canadian Air Force.....5

Engaged Leadership – Why Leaders Should Practice Self Reflection
 Jason W. Womack, MEd, MA..... 11

Air University Student Studies

Transformational Negotiation in Workplace Change Initiatives
 Col Daniel S. Coutts, Royal Canadian Air Force.....16

The Active Duty to Civilian Reintegration Dilemma: A Case Study on Veteran Reintegration
 LTC Bradley Dean, United States Army.....30

Dispute and Conflict Transformation Basics
 LtCol Brendan C. Burks, United States Marine Corps.....40

Negotiation Stories: Today's Military in Action

Joint Task Force Katrina
 Lt Col Kliff Mosley, PhD.....53

Negotiating Advanced Cyber Capabilities
 Col Justin Mokrovich.....57

Book Reviews

Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action
 Reviewed by CMSgt John G. Boyles, USAF (Ret).....59

Save Your Ammo: Working Across Cultures for National Security
 Reviewed by Col David C. O'Meara, USAF (Ret).....61

The Bartering Mindset: A Mostly Forgotten Framework for Mastering Your Next Negotiation
 Reviewed by SMSgt William F. McClurg, USAF (Ret).....63



Note from the Director

Welcome back, we hope you enjoyed the inaugural issue of the *Journal of Military Conflict Transformation* (JMCT), the Official Journal of the Air Force Negotiation Center (AFNC). As many of you will recall, the goal of the journal is to provide individuals with a space to share research and best practices regarding conflict transformation, negotiation, mediation, and facilitation within a military environment.

There are currently numerous programs around the world that discuss different aspects of conflict transformation. However, not all of these programs adequately address the specific issues associated with the military community. More importantly, only a small amount of people have had the privilege of working closely with our civilian and military service members and therefore, have not truly gained an understanding to what programs and skills are necessary to address issues commonly found in a military environment. It is AFNC's hope the articles contained within the JMCT aid in developing potential solutions to numerous issues or questions more commonly found within our military community.

The inaugural issue featured research papers, book reviews, and articles centered around military conflict transformation. These types of writings are what this and future publications will be built upon. We at AFNC understand not all conflict can and will be resolved through the negotiation process, nor do we believe we have the answers to every situation. We do, however, believe providing people an open platform, and the tools to discuss, will have lasting benefits throughout the entire force.

Thank you for your support of AFNC. We look forward to continuing to serve you.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. M. Lacey".

Christopher M. Lacey
Director, Air Force Negotiation Center



Note from the Editor-in-Chief

Thank you for taking the time to check out our fall publication. You may notice some new additions to the journal, including our newest section, Negotiation Stories: Today's Military in Action.

It is our goal to continue to provide scholars an outlet to advance the field of conflict transformation. This includes the ability to share real-life experiences so that others may be able to study or build upon the military's complex issues.

In addition to our new section, JMCT has expanded beyond the confines of negotiation, mediation, and facilitation. We now welcome submissions with complementary competencies and skills necessary to be an engaged leader in today's all domain environment, which includes topics such as leadership reflection and workplace cultural changes.

You will find this issue's contents also include thought-provoking writings on interpersonal and social struggles, which have the potential to create conflict both internally and externally to the individual, group, or organization.

JMCT's future publications will continue to focus on conflict transformation, negotiation, mediation, and facilitation, but our hope is that the broader expansion of complementary topics will bring greater diversity to the content within, as well as expand our understandings of conflict in a multitude of other areas of practice and fields.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michelle A. Osborne'.

Michelle A. Osborne, PhD
Director of Institutional Effectiveness
Editor-in-Chief, JMCT

Transformational Negotiation: Establishing a Novel Approach to Workplace Conflict

Col Daniel S. Coutts, Royal Canadian Air Force

Abstract

In the throes of conflict, it is easy to forget conflict's Janus face: any conflict has both destructive and creative potential. Building on the U.S. Air Force Negotiation Center's nascent conception of transformational negotiation, and a core assumption that conflict is never fully resolved but rather transformed over time, this article explores the structure and boundaries of this value-creation approach to negotiation. The review suggests the existence of a new approach, beyond distributive and integrative negotiation approaches, which seeks to transform and build convergence in parties' interpretation of the context surrounding points of contention. While this article is limited to discussing the highlights of what transformational negotiation is, it also provides the foundational work necessary for building a theoretical framework of transformational negotiation necessary for future research in this area.

There are many different definitions of negotiation, but most of them will generally agree that it is a process which takes place when two or more parties are in conflict, “at least one of them is motivated to resolve the conflict,”¹ and takes place in “the context of established relationships” or “established social structures.”² These terms conjure images of politicians solving intractable problems in faraway lands, or CEOs in resplendent board rooms hammering out complex agreements for vast sums. However, negotiation also takes place in humble settings such as everyday workplaces undergoing change. This article explores the nascent concept of transformational negotiation, and expounds on broad observations regarding how practitioners

and leaders could use this approach to transform workplace conflict.

While the body of literature linked to transformational negotiation is thin, enough exists from negotiation, peace studies, and conflict transformation literature to inform the interplay between conflict and negotiation. While conflict is never fully resolved, only transformed over time, the literature offers insights regarding the benefits of conscientization—the utility of complexification in the negotiation process—and the importance of depolarization in getting conflicted parties to an aspirational future. The literature also offers broad strategies for engaging in negotiation. At its core, transformational negotiation is an intentional

¹ USAF Negotiation Centre of Excellence. “Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military,” (2011), 2.

² Jayne S. Docherty, *Little Book of Strategic Negotiation: Negotiating During Turbulent Times* (New York: Good Books, 2005), 7.

approach to facilitating ongoing conflict transformation, distinct from distributive and integrative approaches, which focuses on depolarization and complexification to shift parties' interpretations of their conflict contexts towards an aspirational future.

The basis behind this analysis is rooted in the phenomena of how culture shifts during the course of a deliberate workplace initiative.³ During my dissertational research involving the Canadian Armed Forces' efforts to eradicate inappropriate sexual behaviors, one of the research outputs was a hypothetical model for a just and inclusive workplace. In this model, there were three detractors which undermined change: equality and reasonableness narratives; resistance, intransigence and disempowerment; and, degree of change anxiety.⁴ While equality and reasonableness narratives may not be applicable to all change contexts, and techniques exist to address change anxiety—such as increased communication, and involvement of the persons affected in decision-making—there is little culture change literature regarding how to directly engage with those who either actively or passively resist a workplace change initiative. The following analysis sets the stage for a later examination of transformational negotiation's utility for addressing resistance. Useful tools in this realm could benefit any contested workplace change.

Why negotiation? The answer is simple: those workplace members who are already “on board” with a change initiative do not need any further convincing, while those

who adamantly refuse to alter their workplace conduct will leave of their own accord, will be fired, or will need to be isolated from the workplace. The one remaining demographic are those resisters who could be enticed to change their conduct.⁵ Tautologously, leadership is in a conflict with this demographic; aside from outright micro-management or coercion,⁶ the only alternative for the parties involved is to engage in some form of negotiation.

Transformational negotiation is a nascent concept presented by the Air Force Negotiation Center;⁷ however, ideas from conflict transformation are especially useful for constructing a working definition. John Paul Lederach points out that “conflicts happen for a reason” and that they are never really resolved, only transformed.⁸ Indeed, participants may perceive the pursuit of “conflict resolution” as “another way to cover up the changes that are really needed.”⁹ Conflict occurs on three levels: the “interpersonal,” “inter-group,” and “social structural”; “conflict transformation suggests that a fundamental way to promote constructive change on all these levels is dialogue.”¹⁰ Furthermore, transformation “sees conflict as embedded in the web and system of relational patterns.”¹¹ Johan Galtung points out that a significant goal is not just transformation itself, but building peoples’ “transformative capacity,” “the ability to handle transformations in an acceptable and sustainable way.”¹² In this sense, transformation is about “transcendence, going beyond the goals of parties, creating a new reality.”¹³ Even in peace studies, where

³ This research project's epistemological position is a blend of moderate constructivism and pragmatism, an outlook which shapes this literature review's search for simple concepts and approaches useable by leaders/practitioners.

⁴ While detractors are part of a hypothetical model that has yet to be fully validated, there is enough literature from critical feminism, organizational development, and in change management to safely accept their existence as forces impacting workplace culture.

⁵ Ho-Won Jeong points out that there is “no incentive for cooperation” if there is no value to be obtained in a negotiation; as negotiation is fundamentally oriented on conflict contexts, the existence of conflict implies two or more agentic parties are somehow tied to one another in a way that brings their own needs and/or opportunities into opposition. Ho-Won Jeong, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 128.

⁶ In distributive terms, if leadership still requires the services of resisters, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is micro-management and coercion, possible outcomes that most military professionals will view as offering less overall benefit than any solution which enlists group members' voluntary cooperation. Most Western militaries leadership doctrines emphasize the benefits of transformational, over transactional, approaches to leadership.

⁷ This course was offered to members of the USAF's Air War College and Air Command and Staff College Academic Year 2020 during the fall of 2019 by Dr. T. Matyok; Dr. Matyok presented transformational negotiation as an alternative to distributive and integrative negotiation.

⁸ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (New York: Good Books, Kindle e-version, 2014).

⁹ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

¹⁰ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. Note the inclusion of “constructive” in this discussion; this can be interpreted as both a positive aspiration and a philosophical position that people's reality is socially constructed.

¹¹ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

¹² Galtung Johan, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 90.

reconciliation is a stated goal, transformation of relationships is seen as the most desired outcome.¹⁴

While transformation includes elements like temporal endurance, dialogue, changes to systems and relational patterns, and transcending to build transformational capacity, how can transformation “fit” with negotiation? The two main typologies of negotiation are distributive and integrative.¹⁵ While a myriad of definitions exist for each type, they essentially represent two positions: zero-sum and win-win, respectively. To use the well-known orange analogy, the first form sees each party getting more or less of the orange depending on their power and negotiating ability; the second examines interests to discover that one party only needs the juice while the other needs zest from the peel.¹⁶ Notably, in much of the literature reviewed, transformative concepts are lumped in with the integrative approach to conflict resolution. However, win-win is still anchored in a competitive or antagonistic philosophical position;¹⁷ transformational, constructive approaches do not directly align with a win-win mindset. To this end, the conception of negotiation may benefit from a third position, that of mutual-gain. Galtung’s extension of the orange metaphor thus pulls transformation out of the integrative to form its own typology: each party cooperates to plant the seeds from the orange in order to create a tree which will produce enough fruit

for their continuing needs.¹⁸ By modifying the meta-framework, negotiation becomes an activity for engaging with conflict that spans a spectrum from distributive, to integrative, to transformational engagement, representing three respective positions of win-lose, win-win, and mutual gain. Transformational negotiation in its simplest sense, then, is an approach characterized by the many descriptions offered at the opening of this section, and which aspires to mutual gain.

Beyond defining transformational negotiation, how the literature unpacks conflict further informs an understanding of what transformational negotiation is intended to accomplish, and therefore how it can be used. Conflict has a Janus face: it is both creative and destructive, having the ability to degrade or transform human relations.¹⁹ In engaging with conflict, a normal human tendency is to seek simplification in order to establish one or a few levers to push on in order to “resolve” the conflict.²⁰ There may be utility in simplification for some contexts, however a reductionist approach will tend towards framing a conflict as one or a couple of main contentious issues. This tendency results in polarization; while polarization may not always result in conflict, Galtung asserts that “polarization is probably a necessary condition for escalation.”²¹ A transformational negotiation practice may seek to use both escalation and de-escalation in a deliberate fashion to achieve transformational

¹³ Johan Galtung, “Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation - The TRANSCEND Approach,” in *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, eds. Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (New York: Routledge, 2007), 14.

¹⁴ Mark Anstey highlights that there are three main forms of reconciliation: reluctant reconciliation characterized by compliance; regulatory reconciliation where “actors share a commitment to preserving a system of rules,” and reconciliation where “parties reconcile with one another in a transformed relationship.” This last form is seen as the most stable form, and implies an ongoing relationship between agentic parties; reconciliation in this framework, then, is seen as a starting point for conflict transformation. Mark Anstey, “Power, Negotiation and Reconciliation,” in *Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking*, eds. Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey (Cham, Springer International Publishing, 2017) 7, 52.

¹⁵ Deborah Kolb and Jessica Porter, *Negotiating at Work: Turn Small Wins Into Big Gains* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Kindle e-version, 2015), 199.

¹⁶ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 98; Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 50.

¹⁷ This observation was highlighted by Dr. Matyok in a 16 Aug class, as was the subsequent proposal linking mutual gain to transformational negotiation.

¹⁸ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 98.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 71.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 90-92.

²¹ *Ibid*, 91.

aims,²² but polarization creates further distance between negotiating parties, which is antithetical to transformation. Ultimately, “if you negotiate over a single issue, you are by definition in [a] distributive, or win-lose, situation.”²³

At the core of conflict are identity and goals. How agents interpret their identities provides an important contextual frame for a conflict and are “often at the root of most conflicts.”²⁴ To understand the relevance of identity to a conflict, “we need to be attentive... [to] how identity is linked to power and to the systems and structures that organize and govern their relationships.”²⁵ Goals, in the context of identity, power, and structures, can cause frustration when they are blocked, leading to “untransformed” conflict; “transcendence” or transformation, then, is about “going beyond the goals” and creating a “new reality.”²⁶

Given the above conception of conflict, transformational negotiation focuses on this transcendence of goals, planting the metaphorical orange trees. The main antidotes offered for the polarization arising from frustrated goals are conscientization and complexification. Conscientization “lifts” attitudes and assumptions, and contradictions (e.g. contradictions between assumptions and behaviors) “up from the subconscious.”²⁷ In bringing attitudes and contradictions “into the light,” they can be made abstract, which serves the dual purpose of allowing for closer examination while reducing the emotional

component of a conflict.²⁸

Complexification is the reversal of the reductionist tendency that leads to polarization. In brief, it involves “splitting up actors and goals into sub-actors and sub-goals and bringing in other actors and goals, transforming here and there, hoping for some roll-up effect.”²⁹ Complexification serves to “enlarge the conversation,”³⁰ while also reversing the biased “mental shortcuts” which lead to “cognitive rigidity.”³¹ Notably, “dialoguing” is seen by several researchers as critical in helping conflicting parties on “their way to shared understandings.”³² Dialogue can effect transformation at the “interpersonal, inter-group, and social-structural” levels.³³ There is an interesting bridge to be made here between transformational negotiation and Bush and Marshak’s dialogic mindset in organizational development. Change in their framework occurs through “three core underlying change processes”: “disruption” to the “ongoing social construction of reality... in a way that leads to more complex reorganization”; “a change to one or more core narratives”; and, “a generative image is introduced or surfaces that provides new and compelling alternatives for thinking and acting.”³⁴ These striking parallels between how change happens in the workplace and the concepts surrounding conflict suggests transformational negotiation has a role to play in organizational culture change, and that dialogue is a key mechanism, alongside complexification, for de-polarizing conflicts.

While complexification and dialogue

²² Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

²³ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 53.

²⁴ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Johan Galtung, “Introduction,” 15.

²⁷ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 74.

²⁸ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 156.

²⁹ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 78.

³⁰ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 53.

³¹ Jeong, *International Negotiation*, 174.

³² Weisbord, Marvin, and Sandra Janoff, *Future Search: An Action Guide to Finding Common Ground in Organizations and Communities* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000), xi-xii. Dialogue’s curative important is highlighted in multiple references reviewed, including Ho-Wong Jeong, Galtung (both pieces), Mark Anstey, and John P. Lederach.

³³ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

³⁴ Gervaise Bushe and Robert Marshak, “Introduction,” in Bushe, Gervaise, and Robert Marshak, eds. *Dialogic Organizational Development: The Theory and Practice of Transformational Change* (Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2015), 13, 20-23.

offer the keys to de-polarizing conflicts so that they can be transformed, the literature reviewed also offers four broad strategies that explain how a practitioner or leader can operationalize transformational negotiation. Ultimately, these strategies focus on context transformation. While leaders and practitioners cannot change people per se, or force resolution between groups, shaping and re-framing context is entirely feasible.

The broadest prescription is complexification, and Johan Galtung offers a framework for determining an appropriate range of complexity. In short, “psychology sets the upper limited of complexity at 7.”³⁵ So, with more than 7 elements of complexity practitioners should simplify, and if a conflict has only two or maybe three elements, practitioners should seek to complexify. Calculating the elements in a conflict is simple: a practitioner counts the number of issues and number of parties in the negotiation. For example, if there are two “sides,” and only one issue, the total would be 3. In this case, a practitioner may seek to add 1-2 more issues, or bring an additional party into the negotiation.

Another strategy discussed in the literature is shaping context through pre-negotiation. Pre-negotiation is “an unofficial initial phase” from which “negotiation positions emerge.”³⁶ The leader should focus on understanding the narratives and the frames parties are using to describe the conflict, as the pre-negotiation phase represents one of the best opportunities to reframe discussion and narratives. This “initial stage sets the overall tone for the remainder of negotiation.”³⁷ It is also during this stage that a practitioner can determine the value that parties bring to the table, while also determining resisters’ Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) and Worst Alternative

to a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA). In understanding the frames, narratives, and range of interests of different parties, a leader can seek to increase the cost of a BATNA/WATNA before negotiations even begin. In some cases, one or more parties may not even be aware of a need to negotiate; after all, what they were doing in the workplace until that point was working.³⁸ Pre-negotiation can both shape the frames used for dialogue and define the need for negotiation.

The use of a power lens can also broadly assist in unpacking parties’ narratives and frames, while highlighting points of leverage for negotiations. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is useful to this end: habitus is a dispositional concept, a “structuring structure” that derives from experiences of “socialization in family and peer groups,” and which “tends to shape individual action so that existing opportunity structures are perpetuated.”³⁹ What people do in the workplace, then, occurs in “structured arenas of conflict called fields... [which connect] the action of habitus to the stratifying structures of power in modern society.”⁴⁰ Simply put, habitus represents the way people become empowered in a given social context (or not). Understanding habitus, then, gives a leader an understanding of why a given group might resist a change, and what that group potentially stands to lose as the result of a change initiative. This detailed understanding provides the leader with an opportunity to reframe the negotiation and narratives (ideally during pre-negotiation) in a way that parties’ empowerment is either retained or transformed. As an example, Mark Anstey offers the idea of “positive power,” and advocates for an approach he titles the “Mandela option”: “systems of oppression rob both the oppressed and the oppressor of their humanity,” and liberation, then depends on also “liberating the

³⁵ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 92.

³⁶ Jeong, *International Negotiation*, 128.

³⁷ Ibid, 129.

³⁸ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 2916.

³⁹ David Swartz, *Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 101-108.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 9.

oppressor from the shackles of prejudice and hatred.”⁴¹ In adjusting the habitus by which people are empowered in the workplace, the context around which the conflict is occurring can be shifted. By looking at conflict through the lens of power, practitioners can identify and address empowerment issues and social distances between different strata of people, thereby gaining a deeper understanding of the “human distance” working against conflict transformation.⁴²

The final strategic approach appearing in the literature is the imperative to build a plan. John Lederach offers a comprehensive model and prescriptions in his description of a transformational platform. This platform is “an ongoing and adaptive base at the epicentre of the conflict” and “includes an understanding of the various levels of the conflict (the ‘big picture’), processes for addressing the immediate problems... a vision for the future, and a plan for the change processes that will move in that direction.”⁴³ A platform allows a practitioner to work simultaneously through transforming the near- and long-term aspects of a conflict. While Lederach offers detailed prescriptions, in its most basic form a transformational platform is about building a plan for how to get from the present to an aspirational future; the platform for negotiation, then, must “1) provide adaptive responses... and 2) address the deeper and longer-term relational and systematic patterns that produce violent, destructive expressions of conflict.”⁴⁴ The import of these observations is that plans must be more than just roadmaps showing how to get from “a” to “b”; practitioners and leaders must structure their transformational negotiation so as to accommodate setbacks and capitalize on unforeseen opportunities throughout a protracted process of conflict transformation.

Beyond these four broad strategies, the literature provides many different tactics that practitioners and leaders can employ to operationalize a transformational negotiation platform. However, many of these tactics are context dependent. Furthermore, they are not unique to transformational negotiation; many could also be used for distributive or integrative negotiation, and therefore do not provide unique insight into what transformational negotiation is and how to de-polarize conflict. Accordingly, tactics are not discussed here, but certainly, will play a role in operationalizing strategies, and thus will also be vital to ongoing context and conflict transformation.

Although it is still emerging as an approach, transformational negotiation offers intentional strategies and forms a useful lens for shifting a conflict’s context over time by helping the affected parties depolarize points of contention and work together towards an aspirational future. While this article offers a definition for transformational negotiation, characteristics, a central mechanism within this approach (i.e. de polarization), and broad strategies, a more in-depth analytical discussion needs to be undertaken in order to construct transformational negotiation into a cohesive, hypothetical framework. This framework must a) inform practitioner efforts to address resistance to change initiatives, especially resistance to the cultural-shift aspects of change initiatives, and b) be sufficiently robust to be subjected to further empirical study and validation. To this end, the framework will be further developed through deductive reasoning regarding how transformational negotiation can be applied to the challenge of resistance in workplace culture-shift initiatives.

For biography, see page 29.

⁴¹ Mark Anstey, “Power, Negotiation and Reconciliation,” 51, 56-58.

⁴² Johan Galtung, “Introduction,” 18.

⁴³ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Engaged Leadership – Why Leaders Should Practice Self Reflection

Jason W. Womack, MEd, MA

Abstract

Reflection is the careful consideration of experience to gain insight.¹ One objection to practicing self-reflection is that focusing on an adverse incident or ordeal can make one feel anxious.² Those who do reflect may not have a way to measure the value of the information they collect.³ Furthermore, leaders who fail to practice self-reflection may not develop the leadership skills expected in work settings.⁴ This problem is critical to address because self-reflection is an integral way for leaders to translate experience into knowledge and skills.⁵

Why Do Leaders Avoid Self-Reflective Practice?

Not all leaders are taught to engage in self-reflective practice and therefore struggle to build and incorporate a habit of regular and deliberate consideration of their actions and experience. Often, military service members promote to a position of leadership and authority without formal training in self-reflective practice.⁶ Odem, Boyd, and Williams found that 77 out of 84 participants, in a self-reflection leadership study, said any reflective thinking through journaling or introspection was a new practice they had to learn. They also found that leaders feel pressured to create a productive workplace, while effectively and efficiently managing their workflow

expectations, and that this tension competes with dedicating time to working, or pausing to reflect on past actions and experiences.⁷ Senior leaders must make the most of the time they have, and the effort spent reflecting on what has already been done seems like a waste of effort.⁸ According to this research, leaders are less likely to reflect on the past, instead choosing to focus their energy on incomplete projects to finish. Leaders necessarily have a bias for taking positive, proactive action. If they are going to stop, or even slow down to reflect, they need to know what to do to make the most productive use of the time spent considering and contemplating the results of their actions. Leadership coach and author Jennifer Porter described an experience working with a client.

¹ John Dewey, *How We Think* (Lexington: Heath and Company, 1910), <https://doi.org/10.1037/10903-000>.

² Julie J. Park and Melissa L. Millora, "The Relevance of Reflection: An Empirical Examination of the Role of Reflection in Ethic of Caring, Leadership, and Psychological Well-Being," *Journal of College Student Development* 53, no. 2 (2012): 221-242.

³ Paul L. Nesbit, "The Role of Self-Reflection, Emotional Management of Feedback, and Self-Regulation Process in Self-Directed Leadership Development," *Human Resource Development Review* 11, no. 2 (2012): 203-226, doi:10.1177/1534484312439196.

⁴ Marilyn L. Grady, "Community College Students: Social Capital and the Soft Skills of Leadership," *Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education* 14, no. 1 (2018): 11-14.

⁵ Johnathan K. Jefferson, Ira I. H. Martin, and Jake Owens, "Leader Development Through Reading and Reflection," *Journal of Leadership Studies* 8, no. 2 (2014): 67-75, doi:10.1002/jls.21327.

⁶ Summer F. Odom, Barry L. Boyd, and Jennifer Williams, "Impact of Personal Growth Projects on Leadership Identity Development," *Journal of Leadership Education* 11, no. 1 (2012): 49-63, doi.org/10.12806/V11/I1/RF3.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Patricia A. Castelli, "Reflective Leadership Review: A Framework for Improving Organizational Performance," *Journal of Management Development* 35, no. 2 (2016): 217-236, doi:10.1108/JMD-08-2015-0112.

During a one-on-one coaching session, she asked her client to reflect on his work, after he spent 5 minutes in silence, he admitted that he did not actually know what to do.⁹ This example shows the challenge successful leaders have incorporating self-reflection, as they might not know how to do it, especially if they have no formal training in these practices.

When some leaders reflect on what they did or did not do during the day, they can feel negative emotions that they would rather avoid. Olsen and Burk published a study of 62 students in a leadership course and their findings suggest it is common for people to formulate a negative reaction to reflection.¹⁰ Research by Gondo and Amis also indicates that some reflection can surface negative emotional responses, so it may seem easier to move on to the next thing instead of going back to ruminate on what has already happened.¹¹ Furthermore, their research suggests there is a relationship between reflecting on past experience and a leader building their self-confidence. Leaders who reflect on negative experiences might feel strong emotions such as anxiety and stress.¹² In their Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ) study of 995 university students, the authors found many of the respondents tended to dwell on their experiences for an extended period of time. Successful leaders are already busy and when they do have time to think, they focus on projects that need their attention, choosing to avoid thinking about incomplete work projects. Leaders may recognize self-reflective practices such as journaling, discussing the days'

experiences with a colleague at work or partner at home, or quiet, even meditative, mental visualization.¹³ However, the researchers found when leaders reflect on their effort or results, they can feel anxiety reflecting on negative experiences and unresolved problems. For example, after experiencing a failure, such as not attaining a goal, one might refrain from reflection to avoid feeling wrong or inadequate.¹⁴ Their research suggests that preoccupation with negative experiences puts people in a position to focus and perhaps even dwell on personal and professional problems. Effective self-reflection requires leaders go beyond thinking about negative experiences. Furthermore, Stelle and Day wrote leaders who deliberately think about unfortunate or unfavorable experiences felt an increased negative emotional response to their failures.¹⁵

Leaders avoid self-reflection to distance themselves from experiencing negative emotional feelings. It is not easy or natural to purposefully think about something one has said or done that they would rather keep private and concealed.¹⁶ More important, to avoid feeling embarrassment, leaders often subdue reflection because doing so can result in negative emotional thought.¹⁷ Research shows that even if leaders have specific examples of success, it is still common to ruminate on negative outcomes or experiences of the day.¹⁸ In a study, asking 78 participants to reflect on goal setting and failure to achieve a successful outcome, researchers found a strong correlation between negative rumination and emotional distress.¹⁹ As shown in research by Gilbert et

⁹ Jennifer Porter, "Why you Should Make Time for Self-Reflection Even if you Hate Doing it," *Harvard Business Review*, November 2, 2019, <https://hbr.org/2017/03/why-you-should-make-time-for-self-reflection-even-if-you-hate-doing-it>

¹⁰ Heather M. Olsen and Brooke Burk, "Using Reflection to Assess Students' Ability to Learn and Develop Leadership Skills," *SCHOLE: A Journal of Leisure Studies and Recreation Education* 29, no.1 (2014): 75-90, doi:10.1080/1937156X.2014.11949713.

¹¹ Maria B. Gondo and John M. Amis, "Variations in Practice Adoption: The Roles of Conscious Reflection and Discourse," *Academy of Management Review* 38, no. 2 (2013): 229-247, doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0312.

¹² Paul D. Trapnell and Jennifer D. Campbell, "Private Self-Consciousness and the Five-Factor Model of Personality: Distinguishing Rumination from Reflection," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76, no. 2 (1999): 284-304.

¹³ Park and Millora, "The Relevance of Reflection."

¹⁴ Andrea A. Steele and David V. Day, "The Role of Self-Attention in Leader Development," *Journal of Leadership Studies* 12 (2018), 17-31.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Akihiko Masuda et al., "Psychological Flexibility Mediates the Relations Between Self-Concealment and Negative Psychological Outcomes," *Personality and Individual Differences* 50, no. 2 (2011): 243-247, doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.09.037.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Niel P. Jones et al., "Over and Over Again: Rumination, Reflection, and Promotion Goal Failure and Their Interactive Effects on Depressive Symptoms," *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 47, no. 3 (2009): 254-259, doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2008.12.007.

¹⁹ Ibid.

al., leaders admit that deliberate reflection on experiences with adverse outcomes can lead to feeling shame and even regret.²⁰ Watson, et al. wrote that feelings of shame resulting from self-criticism can act as an inhibitor to implementing regular self-reflection.²¹ By avoiding self-reflective practices, leaders do not have to admit their faults, even to themselves.²² According to their seminal research, leaders who fail to process and learn from failure or mistakes do not gain valuable insight by simply listing what happened during work hours or accounting for the outcomes of activities; keeping a resume of the day is not the same as thinking reflectively about that day. Šaric and Šteh proposed that data collected through self-reflective practice is subjective and therefore an incomplete way to gain leadership insights.²³ For example, after reviewing 1,778 self-reflection journal entries, 93% of the reflections that leaders wrote were coded as recollecting events of the day.²⁴ Without formalized training in self-reflective practice, most leaders will often only write down what happened during day, if they reflect at all.

Research indicates when leaders formalize a self-reflection practice, such as journaling, they may censor the thoughts or feelings they collect in writing. Donaldson and Grant-Vallone argue that information collected through self-reflection is inherently biased; leaders want to highlight positive experiences, while under-reporting or avoiding thinking,

writing, or talking about negative ones.²⁵ In their study of more than 400 employees, approximately 83% of self-reports reflect the employees' desire to only write down reflections that they interpret as indicative of socially acceptable behavior. When a leader is overwhelmed by too much to do and avoids thinking about negative experiences to not feel emotionally drained, they might actively avoid deliberate reflection. Even when collected, self-reported data is often incomplete and lacks the depth of information available to a leader.²⁶ In this research, it was found that self-ratings were lower than observer scores in unique leadership skills such as: modeling desired behavior, inspiring a vision of the future, challenging processes and procedures, and encouraging people to work with passion.²⁷ Each dimension can stir reflection that is both positive, such as achieve a successful outcome, or negative, such as missing an opportunity. According to Cameron et al., such rumination can distract one from focusing on the present.²⁸ Jones et al. found it takes extra time for some leaders to recover after they focus on negative outcomes, such as not completing a task or feeling like they are performing poorly at work.²⁹ Leaders who avoid self-reflective practice, like journaling, can instead focus on work to do instead of writing about something they did not do well.

²⁰ Paul Gilbert et al., "Fears of Compassion and Happiness in Relation to Alexithymia, Mindfulness, and Self-Criticism," *Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice* 85, no. 4 (2012), 374–390, doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8341.2011.02046.x.

²¹ P.J. Watson et al. "Further Contrasts Between Self-Reflectiveness and Internal State Awareness Factors of Private Self-Consciousness," *The Journal of Psychology* 130 (1996): 183–192.

²² Ibid.

²³ Marjeta Šaric and Barbara Šteh, "Critical Reflection in the Professional Development of Teachers: Challenges and Possibilities," *Center for Educational Policy Studies Journal* 7, no. 3 (2017): 67–85.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Stewart I. Donaldson and Elisa Grant Vallone, "Understanding Self-Report Bias in Organizational Behaviors Research," *Journal of Business and Psychology* 17, no. 2 (2002): 245.

²⁶ Stephanie T. Solansky, "The Evaluation of Two Key Leadership Development Program Components: Leadership Skills Assessment and Leadership Mentoring," *The Leadership Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (2010) 675–681.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Daryl Cameron et al., "Empathy is Hard Work: People Choose to Avoid Empathy Because of its Cognitive Costs," *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 148, no. 6 (2019): 962–976, doi:10.1037/xge0000595.


²⁹ Jones et al., "Over and Over Again."

Importance of the Problem

Research shows that leaders who practice deliberate self-reflection can gain awareness of their leadership strengths and weaknesses that makes them more productive. Park and Millora write that engaging in self-reflection is a strong indicator of the commitment level of a leader helping and leading others,³⁰ while Steele and Day write that implementing a self-reflective practice is a way for leaders to develop their self-concept and step into leader roles.³¹ In a self-reflection study, 52% of participants described an increase of self-confidence.³² Moreover, Nesbit writes that it is possible to build leadership skills by planning for goal achievement and monitoring progress through time.³³ Research indicates that leaders who avoid self-reflective practice may miss growth opportunities.³⁴ Implementing a self-reflective practice is a way for one to become aware of their actions and results,³⁵ and this self-study can result in insight that can help leaders become more effective at work.

Effective leaders practice self-reflection. Pausing to think about what happened, wondering why it happened, and contemplating what might happen as a result is a good leadership practice to becoming a better, more engaged leader. Practicing reflection is a way to put distance between thought, response, and action. Leaders who implement a self-reflective practice are leaders who are better listeners. And, the more one listens, the better decisions one can make.

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courtesy photo | DVIDS



³⁰ Park and Millora, "The Relevance of Reflection."

³¹ Steele and Day, "The Role of Self-Attention in Leader Development."

³² Odom, Boyd, and Williams, "Impact of Personal Growth."

³³ Nesbit, "The Role of Self-Reflection."

³⁴ Castelli, "Reflective Leadership Review."

³⁵ Gondo and Amis, "Variations in Practice Adoption."

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Transformational Negotiation in Workplace Change Initiatives

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Abstract

Literature regarding workplace change initiatives suggests failure rates can be as high as 70%, a shortcoming often laid at the feet of workplace culture. Building on doctoral research seeking to understand how culture shifts during the Canadian Armed Forces' efforts to eliminate inappropriate sexual behaviour and sexual misconduct, this paper seeks to unpack how transformational negotiation can assist in addressing three detracting forces facing most workplace culture changes: change apathy due to significant change anxiety, and the deleterious effects of active or passive resistance to a change initiative. Building on an earlier literature review, this paper sees transformational negotiation as a point along the negotiation spectrum separate from distributive and integrative approaches, one which leans extensively on insights from peace-building and conflict-transformation literature. The core mechanism of transformational negotiation is depolarization, and it is through depolarization's two subordinate mechanisms, complexification and conscientization, that a change champion or negotiation practitioner can help parties build convergence in their conflicting interpretations of their shared conflict contexts. Using a simplified case example, this paper demonstrates that a practitioner can use transformational negotiation's four main strategies of planning, adjusting power, pre-negotiation, and complexification to counter detracting forces undermining change efforts. Importantly, while a compelling case for the theoretical utility of transformational negotiation can be made, empirical support regarding its efficacy is still needed; future research should seek real-world engagements in order to move transformational negotiation's theoretical promise towards practical application.

Though the final figure is debatable, contemporary literature regarding workplace change initiatives suggests failure rates can be as high as 70%, and these failures are largely due to culture.¹ This phenomenon has bedeviled my career, driving me to research why organizational change is so hard when, sometimes, the solutions seem so clear. This doctoral research dove into the deep end of understanding inappropriate sexual behaviour, harassment, and assault in the Canadian Armed

Forces, aspiring to enhance the capacity of workplace members to build their own vision of what "good" looks like and to champion the implementation of this desired future. One of the unresolved challenges of the dissertational project is how to address the deleterious effect of those workplace members who experience significant anxiety about a cultural-shift initiative, and of those who either passively or actively resist change. These represent two of the three main forces or "detractors"

¹ Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria, "Cracking the Code of Change," *Harvard Business Review* 78, no. 3 (May 2000): 133–134.

working against change champions' efforts to take culture in an inclusive direction²; these detractors operate to undercut dimensions of change efforts such as communication, agency, and engagement.³ In a search for tools relevant to this challenge, transformational negotiation has serendipitously⁴ emerged as a theoretically-promising approach.

In accepting social systems act as complex adaptive systems, it follows that human conflict regarding what "good" looks like cannot be resolved through binary transactions. Instead, trying to encourage convergence between competing viewpoints necessitates shifting those viewpoints, which in turn pulls on the different strings tying humans to their various identities, roles, and habitus. Transformational negotiation, which fits well with appreciative and dialogic approaches to building positive change, offers four main strategies for addressing detractors: planning, shifting power, pre-negotiation and complexification. Coupled with negotiation tactics, the transformational approach can build convergence in viewpoints, moving people towards a shared understanding of a conflict's context. Building on an earlier literature review,^{*} analysis in this paper seeks to understand how transformational negotiation can be used to address the two detractors. To answer this question, a hypothetical case is useful: building a harassment-free and inclusive workplace is a case familiar to many. Such an example can assist in explaining application of the four strategies

and tactics supporting those strategies. In a workplace change initiative, leaders and change champions can address the culture-shift detractors of change anxiety, active resistance, and passive resistance, by applying transformational negotiation's four strategies of planning, adjusting power, pre-negotiation, and complexification, along with associated tactics.

What is Transformational Negotiation?

There are many different definitions of negotiation, but most will generally agree it is a process which takes place when two or more parties are in conflict, "at least one of them is motivated to resolve the conflict,"⁵ and takes place in "the context of established relationships" or "established social structures."⁶ Transformational negotiation represents one end of a negotiation spectrum. The far left of this spectrum is the negotiation approach familiar to most people: distributive, transactional, or win-lose negotiation. Further right is the integrative, win-win, or mutual gain approach, which seeks to find or build additional value for the parties involved.⁷ Literature regarding this approach has included transformational approaches, but there is a notable difference. Integrative approaches try to find additional value regarding an issue or point of contention, whereas transformational approaches seek to transform parties' interpretation of the context surrounding an issue or challenge; while the gains from a win-win approach are still limited, transformational approaches hold the potential to create new value.⁸

^{*} Featured article, JMCT, pg 5-10.

² The third detractor, equality and reasonableness narratives, is specific to change efforts targeting inclusion of minority identities and the elimination of sexualized behavior, harassment and sexual assault from the workplace. Given its relation to specific contexts, discussion of this detractor is excluded from this paper. However, I posit that transformational negotiation could also play a role in addressing this detractor, especially in pointing out to different workplace constituencies the harm that arises from white-washing structural inequities with equality-of-opportunity and reasonableness narratives.

³ Daniel Coultts, "Honour, Culture & Valuing Change: Research on Local Culture Shift," (Royal Roads University, 2019) 22-23.

⁴ While familiar with various forms of conflict resolution and with the basics of negotiation, it is pure happenstance that brought me into contact with the United States Air Force Negotiation Center's elective Adaptive Negotiation Techniques, and Dr. Matyók's work on transformational negotiation. Interestingly, however, the assumptions and frameworks underpinning this emergent sub-discipline align closely with the epistemological underpinnings of my own dissertation research, and with the ethic underpinning broader, contemporary movements for diversity and inclusion such as the #MeToo movement.

⁵ USAF Negotiation Center of Excellence, "Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military," (2011), 2.

⁶ Jayne Docherty, *Little Book of Strategic Negotiation: Negotiating During Turbulent Times* (New York: Good Books, 2005), 7.

⁷ See JMCT article, 5-10.

⁸ The popularized orange metaphor is useful for explaining the negotiation spectrum. In a distributive approach, each party gets a limited part of the orange. In an integrative approach, the negotiator finds that one party desires the juice and the other the peel; both can attain the value they need from an innovative agreement. With a transformational approach, the parties plant an orange tree; while the solution may take longer, their new relationship and transformed context has the potential to create more value for them and other future parties. Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: *Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 50.




Figure 1. Visual representation of transformational negotiation

Transformational negotiation builds out from the mutual-gains approach by borrowing from peace-building and conflict-transformation literature. The base assumption of this approach sees conflict as never fully resolved, only transformed over time. Beyond this paper’s pragmatic and moderate-constructivist stance, transformational negotiation can be linked to human needs theory, relational theory, and transformational theory. In this approach, conflict is exacerbated by the tension between demand for change and the resistance of social structures, habitus, and norms to change. The transformational approach fits well with appreciative and dialogic approaches to organizational change management.⁹ Ultimately, “dialoguing” offers a “way to shared understanding;”¹⁰ constructing a common understanding of shared context is the keystone to the whole

transformational negotiation framework.¹¹ This form of negotiation assumes it is not any given contentious issue, per se, that is negotiated. Rather, interpretations of issues’ contexts are negotiated for reinterpretation and re-construction. In this way, the stories people tell themselves singly and in groups are social facts and artefacts to which they attribute value and importance. Contention exists precisely because shifting interpretations of a given context demands a reordering of people’s value preferences, roles, and identities. Value preferences will depend on what roles/ identities are activated by narratives and context, making it very important to carefully map out a difficult negotiation ahead of time, as the negotiation will invariably affect identity and relations of power.

The core mechanism for transformational negotiation is depolarization.

⁹ Many experts see dialogue as critical to helping different constituencies build shared understanding, and Dialogic Organizational Design sees this happening through three change processes: disruption of constructed reality that leads to increasingly complex reorganization, changing core narratives, and the emergence of generative ideas that shift how people think and act. For more, JMCT article, 5-10.

¹⁰ Marvin Weisbord and Sandra Janoff, *Future Search: An Action Guide to Finding Common Ground in Organizations and Communities*, (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000), xi-xii.

¹¹ For military practitioners, common understanding of shared context is analogous to understanding Commander’s Intent – a key prescription for a mission command approach to navigating complex, chaotic and uncertain context is for a team to build a shared understanding of the problem space and the mission/tasks to be accomplished. Trent R. Carpenter, “Command and Control of Joint Air Operations through Mission Command,” *Air and Space Power Journal* 30, no. 2 (2016): 52-53; Stephen Townsend, Douglas Crissman, and Kelly McCoy, “Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Mission Command,” *Military Review*, June (2019): 4–5.

Within depolarization are two subordinate mechanisms, conscientization and complexification. These mechanisms are discussed in greater length in the section on complexification, but it is instructive to highlight the importance of depolarization here. Contemporary social-media dynamics offer an example. As an issue becomes hotly debated, dialogue can trend towards framing the issue as binary, as having only two opposing sides. The resulting back-and-forth creates a polarized echo chamber. The people on side A become more entrenched, leading side B to also becoming more entrenched, resulting in a self-reinforcing, polarized dynamic. Transformational negotiation seeks to break down polarization using its four strategies, and to alter narratives of roles and identities with a view to achieving future collaborative dialogue and convergence in viewpoints. Viewed from a slightly different angle, this approach to negotiation not only constructs new group meaning, but seeks to leverage shifting social structure and emerging norms to modify the conduct of resisters.

Problem Space and Hypothetical Example

In examining how to apply transformational negotiation, there are countless issues and contexts available for analysis. To appropriately scope discussion, it is useful to more narrowly frame the problem space, and to use a case example as a foil for unpacking transformational negotiation's application. The dissertational research on culture shift provides a problem frame familiar to most organizations: the desire to eliminate inappropriate sexualized behaviour, sexual

harassment, and sexual assault, and to build a just and inclusive workplace.¹² The two main challenges facing leaders and change champions in this space are to a) ensure the workplace's new vision of what "good" looks like fits the goals of the change initiative, and b) ensuring this vision is embodied in people's conduct.

Transformational negotiation is useful to the latter challenge. While there will be some who embrace a change initiative wholeheartedly, potential spoilers¹³ with change anxiety, and/or those who are pre-disposed to actively or passively resist the change initiative, either need to be expelled from the workplace or brought around to a new way of doing things. While a popular hypothesis suggests that once 30% of a population has shifted, culture will follow,[†] reliance on mass to co-opt resisters' conduct is a passive strategy, leaving the influence of detractors to chance. If leaders are unable to terminate resisters' employment, the two remaining options are to coerce through a rigid compliance regime, or, acknowledging the change initiative has created a conflict, negotiate a solution. Research suggests the former option will meet with low probability of success.¹⁴ As not much is available to leaders and change champions for engaging in resistance beyond individualized mediation programs, the latter option deserves closer study.

A fictional case example is instructive for this detailed examination. Imagine a scenario where a leader within an organization is leading implementation of a just and inclusive change vision. While what "good"

† This hypothesis is advanced by the 30% Club, which advocates for companies' boards and top executive ranks to be comprised of a minimum 30% females. Anecdotal evidence suggests increased diversity at executive and board levels results in better decision-making and greater profitability. While I am convinced of the theoretical argument, and support its intention, a conclusive body of empirical evidence demonstrating the argument's validity has yet to be fully established.

¹²In the context of the Canadian Armed Forces, this initiative has been titled Operation Honour. Coutts, "Honour, Culture & Valuing Change," 10-11.

¹³Stakeholders and constituents who have the potential to derail a change effort can also be called spoilers. For more fulsome discussion, see Daniel Shapiro, *Negotiating the Nonnegotiable: How to Resolve Your Most Emotionally Charged Conflicts*, (New York: Viking, 2016), 118-119.

¹⁴MGen C.W. Orme, "Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms," (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2011) 4-5; Gary R. Weaver, and Linda Klebe Treviño, "Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees' Attitudes and Behavior," *Business Ethics Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (April 1999): 327, 329.

looks like has not yet been fully articulated or modeled, the leadership and a substantial minority of the organization recognizes the imperative to eliminate sexualized banter, joking, and profanity.¹⁵ The organization has also adopted a policy of mandatory administrative investigation of any possible cases of sexual harassment, while criminal prosecution for any alleged sexual assault will be pursued vigorously. Furthermore, where sexual harassment or assault has been proven, perpetrators will face employment termination.¹⁶

This change in vision and policy will create anxiety for some: until recently, they understood their formal and social footing within an organization. They also intuitively understood what was required to get ahead, both in terms of work performance and acceptable social behavior.¹⁷ Now, those who until recently felt secure in their position and status need to reconsider whether they will maintain their stature, or whether they need to undertake new pathways to success.[‡] The resulting anxiety, active, and passive resistance is manifested in both large-group training sessions and in smaller meetings where the topic of the change initiative is deliberately discussed, or arises as a matter of course. Two detracting narratives are strikingly evident. In the first, a mid-level female manager repeatedly

indicates sexualized swearing does not offend her, and sexual jokes, so long as they do not “cross the line,” are fine with her; as her male colleagues often nod in assent, junior female team members subsequently disengage from group conversations. For the second, a senior male line employee, not a manager but one who is respected as a technically proficient expert and known to be “old school,” asks the leader, “how do we defend against false accusations? How are these changes fair to us?” He then goes on to make a case that the new policies ignore the presumption of innocence, run the risk of ruining careers and lives before any allegation has been proven, and are therefore unjust.

In a real scenario, there would be several more narratives and actors involved. However, this basic problem space and case offers a recognizable scenario change champions can consider before engaging with the population. My own past reaction as a practitioner to these familiar scenarios would have followed one of three options: argue against spoilers’ narratives, bypass the narratives and continue a separate conversation, or remain silent and hope the conversation turns in a favourable direction. None of these options delivered satisfactory results. I did not recognize such scenarios as opportunities for a culture-shifting negotiation.

‡ Bourdieu divides people within a system into three main populations: those already in power, those capable of following the habitus of their superiors to become empowered, and those who are excluded from following the pathways to empowerment. For the third group, change can open up new opportunities for advancement within a social system.

¹⁵ The link between language and conduct should not be underestimated. See Daniel Coutts, “What Does ‘Good’ Look Like? Steps toward Constructing Local Gender Inclusion Outcomes,” in eds. J. Wright and F. Fonesca, *Making Sense of Diversity and Inclusion in the Profession of Arms*, (Ottawa: Canadian Academy Press, in press 2020), Ch 13; and, Elizabeth A. Thomson, “Battling with Words: A Study of Language, Diversity and Social Inclusion in the Australian Department of Defence,” (Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence Research, 2014), summary.

¹⁶ This case example is fictional, though is largely based on my own experience leading such conversations as both a senior leader and commander, observing other commanders, and from my extensive research on the topic. While largely mirroring current CAF policy, this case is also representative of approaches taken by many corporations. Beyond an imperative to do the right thing, corporations cannot afford the financial and possibly criminal liability of failing to address toxic workplaces, harassment and/or assault; transparent consequences for reprehensible behavior assist in establishing resisters’ worst alternative to a negotiated agreement (WATNA), which is discussed in a later section.

¹⁷ While all organizations have formal power structures (e.g. who gets to make what decisions), all organizations also have a social fabric. Critical theorists, notably Pierre Bourdieu, have demonstrated that the social ordering within any system is about who gets to be empowered. Feminists like Joan Scott highlight that gender is a “primary way of signifying power”; changing what “good” looks like therefore affects previously understood norms of conduct and how one gets ahead in a workplace, and some of these changes will have a gendered component. David Swartz, *Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 82-83; Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1069.

Planning & Transformational Platform

The above two narratives could easily blindside a change champion failing to adequately prepare for negotiation. The value of planning prior to engaging in a communication plan or group discussions/training is self-evident, but how to go about planning? Planning approaches are myriad, but in keeping with the pragmatic underpinnings of this paper, change practitioners should select a planning methodology familiar to the organization's executive team. Additionally, the concept of a transformational platform may be useful, along with two simple tools for mapping players' and stakeholders' roles, and the relationships between these people.

All organizations have approaches to solving problems, whether such approaches are formal or normative. While there are certainly many valuable planning methodologies available to assist with negotiation or developing a change initiative, adoption of a new methodology requires group learning, and such learning takes time, money, and effort. Considering these challenges pragmatically, leaders and change champions may find it useful to use their organization's established methodology(ies) as a baseline in preparing for transformational negotiation. Further, leaders can modify existing methodologies with techniques from negotiation literature, or with process approaches offered in organizational change literature.[§] Naturally, if a workplace change vision faces specific challenges that are well-researched, with existing planning methods designed for a specific challenge, an organization may find the expense and time of re-education beneficial. However, change

initiatives demanding shifts in culture may be accompanied by a sense of urgency. Unless the introduction of alternative methods has a high probability of success, leaders should give consideration to planning transformational negotiation using existing organizational tools.¹⁸ Such timely planning will "identify the dilemmas" creating conflict "energy," while building a deeper understanding of players' different identities and associated interests.¹⁹

John Lederach's recommendation to build a transformational platform offers a way to modify a pre-existing methodology to both help define the challenge space and to develop an approach to negotiations. This platform bridges the present and future, with the core effort being a) developing "adaptive responses," and b) building responses for addressing "the deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns that produce... expressions of conflict."²⁰ The platform takes what planners develop during analysis and planning to give leaders and change champions "an understanding of the various levels of the conflict... the processes for addressing the immediate problems and conflicts, a vision for the future, and a plan for change processes moving in that direction."²¹ The platform must consider potential setbacks and identify ways to capitalize on unforeseen opportunities throughout repeated iterations of negotiations.

In translating the resulting insights into a platform, leaders would think ahead regarding how to engage with these narratives, using the strategies and tactics discussed throughout this paper. They would also plan how to capitalize on positive risk.^{**} For example, if leaders are able to create a safe

§ For example, a much-cited process model in change management literature is Kotter's 8 steps; the advantage of using an existing process model is that it can be adopted to existing planning methodologies.

** Most western militaries have doctrine regarding risk management. In my opinion, one of the unfortunate gaps is planning for positive risk – ensuring that, when a serendipitous opportunity arises, the organization is prepared to exploit those opportunities. Disciplines like project management do have tools and frameworks that can aid leaders in assessing and preparing to exploit positive risk. See resources available through PMBOK, <https://www.pmi.org/>.

¹⁸ For this paper's military audience, operational design has utility and can be used as a framework to guide negotiation planning. The initiation stage, especially developing an understanding of the problem space and context, is particularly valuable, as is identifying the delta between the present and aspirational future. Indeed, even U.S. joint doctrine's tools for systems analysis are useful, and mirror the mapping tools discussed in this section. Similarly, developing an understanding of the "tendencies," "potentials," and "tensions," along with unpacking the conditions contributing to success, is equally important to planning a negotiation as it is to operational design. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design," (Suffolk, Virginia: Joint Staff, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, 2011): IV-2, V-7 to V-10, and V-15.

¹⁹ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (New York: Good Books, Kindle e-version, 2014), 614.

²⁰ Ibid.

space for critical discussion, junior members of the organization could feel sufficiently empowered to criticize detracting narratives; with an effective transformational platform, leaders would be prepared to exploit any spontaneous critique of detracting narratives. This engagement can be further accomplished through conscientization, a close partner to complexification in efforts to depolarization conflict: the practitioner helps participants to identify inconsistencies between attitudes, assumptions, implicit biases, norms and stated values, and even role identities. In highlighting such inconsistencies, discussion surrounding these contradictions can be made abstract, allowing for reduced emotion while the group unpacks and addresses the anxieties associated with a change initiative.²² The transformational platform thus acts as both a conscientization tool and a shared playbook the change team uses throughout the ongoing process of building convergence in participants' shared understanding of context.

Building the transformational platform also demands identifying groups of players, or constituencies, and the relationships between those players. Doing so expands understanding of different perspectives and facilitates building plans for shifting those perspectives. Shapiro offers the ENCI method as a useful tool for grouping parties to a negotiation. In brief, people are categorized into those who must be excluded "from the decision-making process," be consulted "before making the decision," negotiated with "to reach a decision," and, informed "after a decision has been made."²³ Within each category, different groupings may also be developed, such as the executive, middle managers, the experienced experts or journeymen, the junior members or apprentices, etc. This analysis is useful for identifying spoilers, those who

may have the ability and desire to "undermine your efforts to resolve a conflict—and identity politics is a key tool in their arsenal...."²⁴ In mapping the relations between players, it may be useful to also identify key influencers and their groups. The practitioner can then determine whether it is useful to either isolate influencers, or co-opt them to the change initiative and expand their power over others in the workplace.²⁵ Ronald Short's book on learning in relationships offers a particularly useful tool for mapping relations. He provides visual codes that can be placed between groups or players to identify appropriate relationships (—), conflicted relationships (-x-), coalitioned relationships (≡), and broken relationships (⊥ ⊢).²⁶ By identifying categories and relations, the change team can start to understand who should be engaged at what stage of a change initiative, while also building an understanding of the organization's political environment. One way of viewing social relationships is through a power lens. Mapping relationships thus identifies opportunities for reducing or increasing power distance,²⁷ building coalitions, empowering certain parties, or isolating others. In the transformational platform, informal power structures can work for and against the change initiative.

Shifting Power Relations: Empowerment and Disempowerment

While developing an understanding of an organization's informal power structures is an important part of planning for transformational negotiation and for building a transformational platform, modification of power structures is also a key consideration and strategy in its own right. Sociology, critical feminism, and institutional ethnography have long recognized the ability of social structures to replicate patterns of power,

²² Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 74; and Deborah Kolb and Jessica Porter, *Negotiating at Work: Turn Small Wins Into Big Gains* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Kindle e-version, 2015), 156.

²³ Shapiro, *Negotiating the Nonnegotiable*, 123-124.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 118.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 126-128.

²⁶ Ronald R. Short, *Learning in Relationships: Foundation for Personal and Professional Success* (Seattle: Learning in Action Technologies, 1998), 99.

²⁷ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 106.

with the thinking of Pierre Bourdieu being particularly insightful. In simple terms, an organization is like a competitive “field,” and there are pre-established pathways to advance relative to other players on the field of possible opportunities.²⁸ A pathway is more than just a way, it is habitus—a “structuring structure” shaping who gets to be empowered (or not), and in doing so replicates patterns of empowerment.²⁹ To revisit the earlier discussion on change anxiety, this anxiety can be understood in power terms: “The dispositions of habitus predispose actors to select forms of conduct that are most likely to succeed in light of their resources and past experience,” but workplace change means the rules of the game are changing.³⁰ Not only are the rules for who gets to be empowered changing, but there is a real risk to long-standing members’ social statures. Notably, for those whom habitus previously excluded from advancement—classically those experiencing prejudice due to gender, ethnicity, religion or otherwise just not “fitting in”—changes to power structures can offer “subversive” opportunities, opening new pathways for advancement.³¹ For some demographics, workplace change may represent a welcome opportunity to advance based on their own merits.

Seen through a power lens, the two detracting narratives offer different insights regarding what is going on, and regarding the utility of shifting power as a strategy in transformational negotiation. The middle manager has adapted and succeeded in a system traditionally promoting cisgender males; she understands how the system works, and she has managed to make it work for

her. Whether she truly believes sexualized rhetoric and symbology is okay, or if she is merely conforming because she recognizes that to do otherwise risks ostracization, she is participating in the replication of an existing social power structure. In the case of the technical expert, change represents new habitus he will have to navigate; failure to navigate the new work landscape, to conform to shifting norms, could quite legitimately result in loss of stature or even employment termination.

In accepting transformational negotiation is about moving towards common understanding of a shared context, adjusting workplace power structures therefore does mean shifting what traits and forms of conduct are privileged. In considering what the new vision of “good” looks like, leaders need to determine, quite literally, what and who will be promoted in the workplace. This means recognizing certain voices over others, and advancing the careers of those who subscribe to the new norms. Such shifts do not need to be hidden from view; clear and shared understanding of expectations can be developed through ongoing communication and dialogue, dialogue likely to also reduce anxiety regarding shifting expectations.³² One particularly useful tactic is found in explaining Mandela’s concept of “positive power” to group members: oppressive systems “rob both the oppressed and the oppressor.”³³ For example, in efforts to build a just and inclusive workplace the status quo can be framed as unjust. Those who benefit from the status quo therefore have an obligation to lift both others and themselves out of this condition. Addressing this concept directly with passive or active resisters opens the possibility of

²⁸ Swartz, *The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, 117-120.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 106.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

³² Dialogic organizational development supports this approach, arguing that “transformational change is not possible without the emergence of new, socially-agreed-upon narratives that explain and support the new reality and possibilities, endorsed by those presently or historically in power and authority.” Gervaise Bushe and Robert Marshak, “Introduction,” in *Dialogic Organizational Development: The Theory and Practice of Transformational Change*, eds. Gervaise Bushe and Robert Marshak (Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler), 23.

³³ Mark Anstey, “Power, Negotiation and Reconciliation,” in *Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking*, eds. Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2017) 56-57.

transforming their role in the change initiative.

Of course, it may also be useful to discuss the ultimate consequences of non-compliance or resistance, including the classic negotiation technique of raising costs of the status quo. Planners can examine what are members' best and worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA/WATNA), and develop ways to make those outcomes even worse for those refusing to participate in constructing new workplace norms. For a passive mid-level manager, this could be as simple as removal from supervisory duties or slow de-privileging the individual over time. For the recalcitrant technical expert, BATNA/WATNA could range from social isolation within the workplace to administrative or disciplinary sanctions, or any other solution appropriate to that organization's context. The power lens highlights workplace outcomes are embedded within "social relations of power."³⁴ Workplace change affecting culture necessarily affects power relationships within the workplace, and leaders should give careful consideration to what new social power relationships, and consequences, are needed to achieve success.

Pre-Negotiation

Experts widely recognize pre-negotiation as a valuable phase for any form of negotiation, and it should therefore be included in transformational negotiation. With the transformational approach's focus on constructing convergence in understanding of a shared context, pre-negotiation offers an opportunity for further exploring the change start state, and to set pre-conditions for negotiation. Pre-negotiation is an "unofficial initial phase" where "positions emerge," and the "tone" of the negotiation is set.³⁵

The main activity is testing assumptions and hypotheses—i.e. what actions will achieve the desired change outcomes—developed during the planning and analysis of power phases. Pre-negotiation is akin to conducting a detailed reconnaissance of participants' perceptions regarding the change initiative's context. The output should be an increase in the change champion's understanding of the different parties' cognitive frames and referent ideas, while setting "the overall tone for the remainder of the negotiation."³⁶ Throughout, tactics such as small-group engagements, unpacking narratives, identifying generative ideas, and building commitment to the negotiation process help to frame organizational discourse. This discourse builds a fulsome understanding of where different constituencies diverge in their interpretations of what "good" looks like.

Several tactics are useful for maturing an "abstract" understanding of parties' narratives, and the underlying "root cause" behind conflicting perspectives.³⁷ The value of informal "schmoozing" cannot be underrated.³⁸ One-on-one and small-group interactions help leaders and change champions build rapport and gauge what value the change initiative brings to the table. This is an important assessment: those with anxiety or who are resisting change want something that is present in the status quo. Change champions must understand what this something is that is valued and find ways to leverage these desires towards the change vision.³⁹

Storytelling and testing out narratives about what "good" will look like out of the change initiative is another useful activity. The intent with narratives is not developing one shared narrative, but rather to "avoid contradictory or incompatible views or

³⁴ Swartz, *Culture & Power*, 74.

³⁵ Ho-Won Jeong, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 128.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 129.

³⁷ Deborah Kolb, and Jessica Porter, *Negotiating at Work: Turn Small Wins Into Big Gains* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Kindle e-version, 2015), 155-156.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 102.

³⁹ Kolb and Porter point out that people negotiate with us because we have something that they want, or we influence an outcome that is desirable to them; if there was no value to be had, there is no reason why someone would negotiate with us. Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 33.

to create understanding of one another's narratives."⁴⁰ If there are already some small internal or external "win" stories motivating the change initiative, the change team can use these to build momentum while seeking generative ideas. A generative idea is a concept used in change methodologies such as Appreciative Inquiry and Dialogic Organizational Development. Such ideas are stories, narratives, or even short phrases or single words embodying a change idea and which align people's thinking on a topic.⁴¹ The global #MeToo movement is a clear example. Along similar lines, the U.S. Military's "red dot" training provides another example: when someone makes an inappropriate utterance, sexualized joke, or potentially-offensive innuendo, other colleagues may state "red dot," reinforcing expected workplace norms in a manner that is still collegial and avoids direct power challenges.⁴² Pre-negotiation conversations represent an excellent opportunity to collect of generative ideas useful for later deployment.

Beyond uncovering root-causes, verifying hypotheses, developing narratives, and identifying generative ideas, practitioners can also use pre-negotiations to build commitment to negotiate.⁴² Take the hypothetical example of the mid-level manager: as an influencer, there is utility in talking to her ahead of any group discussion sessions to gauge her understanding of the change initiative and how it will affect the workplace. Initial conversations can help identify her interpretation of a conflict's root causes, presenting an opportunity to shift her interpretation of what value the change initiative offers, along with her potential role in achieving future successes. If change champions can turn key individuals into allies prior to wider dialogue, these key individuals,

armed with generative ideas and key narratives, can advance the intentions of a change initiative independent of the core change team.

Looking to the example of the technical expert, pre-negotiation conversations allow a change champion to test hypotheses about why this individual might actively or passively resist the change initiative. Importantly, early conversations can identify potent counter-narratives and deleterious generative ideas, like the idea that increased sensitivity to inappropriate sexual behavior will lead to malicious false reporting and pre-emptive sanctioning of alleged perpetrators, without fair and due process. Identifying such contagions affords the change champion time to build counterfactual evidence and to consider how such narratives can be reframed (as discussed in the following section). Even if early conversations with resisters cannot co-opt them to the change initiative, change champions can gauge what such people value, valuable information planners can then use to update planning, shape social power relations, and construct a success vision inclusive of those things resisters value, so long as what is valued is consistent with the change initiative's intent. While pre-negotiations may have only limited ability to build convergence in understanding of the initiative, it is nevertheless a critical step for setting the conditions for success in wider group discussions.

While exploration of transformational negotiation to this point has highlighted how planning and shifting power flow naturally into pre-negotiation to engage with resisters, it can be legitimately argued that transformational negotiation has not yet offered a way to address anxiety. Consideration of anxiety in any change initiative is critical, with experts like Edgar Schein highlighting the crucial effect the

⁴⁰ As a Canadian, I was fascinated by this phenomenon upon arrival at the USAF's Air War College; uttering "red dot" affected not only the course of a conversation, but provided a cue that also modified tone, timber and even body language. The genesis of this phrase is found in the U.S. Military's mandated annual training regarding harassment and inappropriate sexual behavior.

⁴¹ Valerie Rosoux, "Lessons for Theory: Reconciliation as a Constant Negotiation," in *Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking*, eds. Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017) 333.

⁴² Gervase R. Bushe and J. Storch, "Generative Image," in *Dialogic Organization Development: The Theory and Practice of Transformational Change*, eds. Gervase R. Bushe and Robert J. Marshak (Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2015).

⁴² Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 75.

interplay between an organisation's survival and learning anxiety has on any initiative's outcome. While anxiety can cause paralysis, it can also be beneficial as a motivator, so long as the anxiety associated with new ways of working are lower than the survival anxiety driving the imperative for change.⁴³ While some of the tactics discussed in the next section, such as reframing, can serve to reduce some constituencies' anxieties, change champions should carefully consider what balance of anxieties is useful as motivation for participant engagement. Accordingly, pre-negotiation becomes a critical stage, as it must consider aspirational power structures alongside the balance of anxieties involved in implementing shifts to a social system. To address this criticism and summarize, transformational negotiation provides strategies and tools to build a desirable balance between constructive and destructive anxieties. Building on pre-negotiation, the final strategy, complexification, offers ways to build convergence in understanding of shared context while also achieving this requisite balance.

Complexification

The earlier power discussion provided insight into why change can be such an anxiety-causing challenge for certain constituencies. Beyond developing plans, doing detailed analysis, building deeper understanding, and framing dialogue through pre-negotiation, complexification remains the main strategy for depolarizing conflict and encouraging parties to explore alternative

interpretations of the change initiative's context, and, indeed, their own identities. This exploration can be facilitated by introducing more elements or parties to a discussion, and by using tactics such as reframing through interruption, naming, correcting and diverting. Encouraging a future orientation in dialogue can also facilitate constructing shared understanding, while judicious use of questioning can help the group take ownership of a shared vision for what "good" looks like going forward.

In negotiating interpretations of a change initiatives' context, parties are also negotiating roles, identities, and associated goals. Identities provide one of the most important contextual frames, and are "often at the root" of conflict.⁴⁴ Self-categorization theory suggests peoples' different identities^{††} become salient according to a given context.⁴⁵ Thus, shifting interpretations of context necessarily demands re-constructing what "good" looks like for various roles/identities. In scenarios where a conflict has been fully polarized between two sides, compromise or capitulation may mean sacrificing an identity or role completely—"losing" a full habitus framework and established behavioral norms. The solution to this conundrum is in reframing identity goals and power structures, "going beyond the goals" to create a "new reality."⁴⁶ The aspiration to transform, vice discard, is where complexification comes in.

John Galatung highlights how to calculate the range of complexity in a conflict by counting the issues and parties in

^{††} The notion that we hold several identities is common to several theories of identity, such as social identity theory and self-categorization theory (SCT). Moreover, many readers will see this as a common-sense assertion: how we act in parenting situations is different from how we've learned to conduct ourselves around friends at a club or around colleagues in formal work settings. SCT highlights that people do not pick and chose their conduct consciously; rather, how they have learned to act within a given role is activated by the context they find themselves in.

⁴³ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 302-305.

⁴⁴ Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

⁴⁵ Self-categorization theory posits that people embody multiple roles or identities (i.e. from nationality or ethnicity, to work identities, to family identities, to political identities). These "stable self-representations... facilitate information processing"; thus self-concept is fluid, as people's different roles/identities are activated by a given context/narrative. Rina S. Onorato and John C. Turner, "Fluidity in the Self-Concept: The Shift from Personal to Social Identity," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 34, no. 3 (May 2004): 258; Matthew J. Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2 (2008): 208-209.

⁴⁶ Johan Galtung, "Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation - The Transcend Approach," in *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, eds. Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (New York: Routledge, 2007), 15.

a negotiation. For example, if there are two parties and one polarizing issue, the count of elements is three. As “psychology sets the upper limit of complexity of 7,”⁴⁷ there is room to introduce more issues or parties. This introduction is the act of complexification.⁴⁸ Increasing the number of elements forces parties to consider different concepts and viewpoints, providing an opportunity to “conscientize,” or “lift” attitudes, assumptions, and contradictions between assumptions and behaviors “up from the subconscious.”⁴⁹ By increasing the number of elements and encouraging the dialogue to become increasingly abstract, new ways to conceive of different roles/identities in a given context can be explored, facilitating both closer examination of anxieties and a reduction in the emotional component of a conflict.⁴⁹ Conversely, if there are too many elements, the number of issues can be reduced by bridging multiple issues together, and parties can be reduced through the creation of coalitions.⁵⁰

Where framing is essential to pre-negotiation, reframing underpins complexification, and there are several reframing tactics useful for complexification and conscientization. Negotiations often occur in a series of moves, and when a move challenges “a negotiator’s own presentation of self,” the immediate reaction may be defensive; the critical error in a defensive reaction is that such responses automatically accept how the instigator has framed the discourse.⁵¹ Planning

and pre-negotiation can assist in anticipating such moves, along with pre-planned reframing countermoves. Kolb and Porter offer six tactics for interrupting the instigator’s frame and opening an opportunity for reframing: interruption, naming, questioning, correcting, diverting, and focusing on the future.⁵² Take the false-accusation narrative as an example. A change champion could interrupt the technical expert’s instigating comments with a question about how he would want female family members treated in their workplaces. Doing so opens a door to name the existing concern and identify false-accusation anxiety as a means to maintain the status quo. A correction could be offered by highlighting rates of false accusation are actually very low,⁵³ while emphasizing the harms accompanying inappropriate sexual behaviors, harassment and/or assault for both the target and the wider workplace. Points about minimizing harm and due process may also be useful in reducing anxiety. A skilful practitioner would seek to engage other parties to the discussion with questions, steering dialogue towards what just and inclusive outcomes could look like in the future. By reframing instead of reacting, the change champion can focus dialogue on pre-determined elements and assist in converging parties’ interpretations of what the change vision will mean in practical terms.

A myriad of other tactics are useful to reframing. As shared identity is constructed, new symbols, key phrases, habits and traditions

⁴⁸ A corollary is reducing the number of parties (e.g. through combination, elimination, or structuring negotiations to occur in sequence); a negotiation that attempts to move beyond seven elements may become too challenging.

⁴⁷ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, 92.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁹ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 156.

⁵⁰ Jeong Ho-Won, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 143, 219.

⁵¹ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 119, 126.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 129-136.

⁵³ Recent Canadian research suggests false accusation rates are between 2-4%; this means 96-98% of complaints are legitimate. Taken in concert with lower rates of administrative or disciplinary action being implemented when sexual harassment and/or assault has been alleged, it is clear that many complainants are subjected to the additional stress and scrutiny of placing a complaint and complying with an investigation but have no resolution for what are often highly traumatic experiences. The 2-4% figure is used by the CAF’s own CSRT-SM, while the Canadian Forces Provost Marshall stated a 2016-2017 unfounded rate for sexual misconduct overall of 7.29%. A Globe and Mail article subsequently posited that unfounded rates reported in several western nations are between 2-8%. CSRT-SM, *The Operation HONOUR Manual*, (Ottawa: National Defence, 2019) 37, quoting <https://www.sexassault.ca/statistics.htm>; Chief of Military Personnel, “Canadian Armed Forces Third Progress Report on Addressing Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour,” (Ottawa, 2017) 12; Robyn Doolittle, “Unfounded: Police Dismiss 1 in 5 Sexual Assault Claims as Baseless, Globe Investigation Reveals,” *Globe and Mail*, February 3, 2017.

can be developed, along with selecting new heroes or examples representing what “good” looks like.⁵⁴ Double binds can also be identified or exploited: sometimes females are put in a constructed dilemma of having to choose between societal gender stereotypes and their professional identities, creating a no-win dilemma.⁵⁵ This phenomena can be inverted as a subtle form of coercion for those like the male technical expert by coupling resistance narratives to mesogenic characterizations, and linking technical expertise to a collegial environment free of sexualized sentiment, thereby forcing an identity choice. Not choosing what is preferred in the change initiative creates a difficult dilemma for the individual.

Other tactics include bridging solutions, where the practitioner avoids agreement on a single issue by combining it with other issues in the shared context, and anchoring on solutions (vice grievances).⁵⁶ Kolb and Porter highlight one more promising tactic, the “yes, and...” tool. In short, the practitioner acknowledges an element of truth in a preceding statement, but reframes discussion by linking in other elements or seeking additional desired outcomes.⁵⁷

Finally, questioning is a key tactic practitioners can use in concert with all the above tactics, and as a general approach to fostering convergence in the construction of shared meaning. Instead of making statements or proclamations regarding the change initiative, a change practitioner can guide dialogue using open-ended questions. Often termed a Socratic approach, guiding dialogue

through questioning can help to get a group to root cause diagnosis⁵⁸ and help them identify where constituents’ interpretations of context differ. Practitioners can use hypothetical questions to test planning assumptions and build shared understanding of what “good” will look like, while “if-then” questions can be used to establish potential trade-offs.⁵⁹ To use the hypothetical example of the technical expert and the false accusation narrative, a practitioner can ask a series of “why” questions to unpack what is at the root of anxiety and resistance. Hypothetical questions like, “how would you like us to treat complaints if the complainant was a family member” can reframe the dialogue. Reciprocal questions could be planned ahead of time, such as, “if we continue with the status quo, will we not continue to perpetuate an unjust workplace? And, shouldn’t an expert like yourself have the responsibility of facilitating an environment where everyone has the opportunity to reach your level of expertise, instead of shutting people down?” Most importantly, however, by leading with questions and active listening, the change champion is not driving the ship, so to speak. In encouraging different workplace constituencies to negotiate and construct what “good” will look like, the group starts to own the change initiative, rather than the initiative being perceived as something being forced on the group by higher leadership.^{***} Leaders and change champions thus become guides in depolarizing the conflict and transforming parties’ understanding of the change challenges, rather than solely functioning as enforcers of some externally-generated policy.

*** Collective ownership of a change initiative avoids an instrumental compliance mentality (i.e. complying only while others are watching to avoid sanction). While the outcomes of collective ownership cannot be strictly controlled by organizational leadership, such ownership has the added benefit of enlisting multiple players’ efforts in conceiving of what future conduct should look like and in reinforcing new norms, regardless of who is or is not watching.

⁵⁴ Mark Anstey, “Lessons for Practice.” in *Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking*, eds Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2017) Ch. 18.

⁵⁵ Kolb and Porter, *Negotiating at Work*, 27-30.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 53-59.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 60-63.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 155-156.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 151-153.

Conclusion

Coupled with the three preceding strategies, complexification offers pragmatic solutions for addressing culture-shift detractors. Many of the tactics and techniques grouped under each strategy can be found in both distributive and integrative approaches to negotiation. What differs for transformational negotiation is the mindset: application of the strategies is intended to foster convergence in parties' different interpretations of what the change, and associated conflict, means for them. Building on best practices from peace studies and conflict transformation, transformational negotiation promises to help groups move past active/passive resistance and change anxiety to common understanding of shared context. This paper has intentionally not discussed detailed steps for implementing this approach to negotiation; just as tactics can be borrowed from distributive or integrative

approaches, so too can different models and group negotiation exercises be used in concert with a transformational mindset. In closing, this paper's discussion has been entirely theoretical in nature, using hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate how this negotiation approach can be applied. Accordingly, future research should seek real-world engagements in order to move transformational negotiation's theoretical promise towards practical application, along with collecting the empirical evidence needed to validate this approach.

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The Active Duty to Civilian Reintegration Dilemma: A Case Study on Veteran Reintegration

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to discuss the problems with reintegration from active duty to civilian life. The future intent is to conduct a prospective randomized level one study of veterans that are actively participating in a novel civilian-based sustainable and scalable solution to build a business skill that will help them in all walks of life. Scars and Stripes Coffee (SSC) is a company on a unique mission to empower veterans to start their own e-commerce business. The author believes that this company's purpose is much bigger than selling a bag of coffee.

The companies purpose stems from my belief that veterans have substantial reintegration needs, which our society is not meeting. Our young veterans are returning with images and voices that never leave their thoughts. These images are caused by a unique combat zone experience where the enemy is at times unknown. Like veterans from other wars, they return from war, but the war never leaves them. They find themselves to be strangers in their own country, even in a room full of familiar faces.

Based on the authors' literature review, the common theme surrounding the veteran reintegration dilemma is emotional or physical trauma. Research has stated that a lack of formal education, a sense of purpose, and understanding their new mission in life leads to anger and confusion. The veteran reports that they are having difficulty applying their military skills to a civilian job or business culture¹. Reported levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are increasing. Scars and Stripes believe that this increase is caused by the lack of understanding from the veteran on how to navigate in an individualistic society versus a military community-based environment.

As a veteran only business model, SSC is employing a novel approach to develop a successful company. The mission is to continue to build a for-profit company that will be sustainable through the sale of coffee. The military structure is what makes the company scalable because each member can continue to increase in rank. SSC will be built through a known military rank structure, starting with the primary Team member to Squad Leader to Platoon Sergeant then on to 1ST Sergeant. With this structure, the company will be able to build communities of veterans with a shared mission, purpose, team, and accountability. Eventually, there will be an SSC team to join in every town in America. SSC will reignite the camaraderie that makes the U.S. Military so successful and adapt that type of culture into a civilian-based company. In turn, veteran "transition coaches" will be developed throughout the members joining the company to training and advance other veterans through the rank structure. Being a part of this structure creates a team environment so that the joining veteran has a group of other veterans to help them navigate the reintegration process. Also, an empirically designed study will be discussed in order to test the efficacy of this model.

¹ Under Secretary of Benefits, US Department of Veteran Affairs, Military to Civilian Transition, (2018), 1.

Currently, an estimated 200,000 service members are discharging from the military every year.² One of the positive things about the military is that veterans are disciplined and well trained in their specific field of expertise. However, the negative aspect of separation from military life is that 44% report reintegration from active duty to civilian life as a significant problem.³ Gerald E. Larson, Ph.D., stated that the factors that had the most negative impact on reintegration were the veteran's involvement in emotional or physical combat trauma. Conversely, the factors that predicted the most significant positive impact for reintegration were level of education, understanding their mission in life, a sense of purpose, and a higher frequency of religious connections. In his report, he notes that although service members are highly trained, much of their training is not directly adaptable for use in the civilian world.⁴

Veterans are transitioning to an environment that uses a different workplace language and, in many instances, has a different sense of urgency. According to the Rand Corporation, "Veterans have a great deal to offer to potential civilian employers, including valuable nontechnical skills, such as leadership, decision-making, being dependable, and attention to detail."⁵ However, for veterans, communicating with civilian employers about the nontechnical skills they have developed in the military can be challenging, because military and civilian workplace cultures and languages can seem radically different from one another.⁶ Veterans are coming from an environment that was structured and had a

mission with team and purpose, to a civilian one that has different expectations.⁷ Service members have reported that they feel lost because they leave their team, which gave them mission and purpose, and then they transition to an individualistic community with no cohesion.⁸ Veterans will then turn to what they know best for help, that is, the government and other structured entities.

The VA provides veterans with services to help them with resume and job development, such as the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which provides training, information, and transition advice to help veterans and their families move into civilian life after the military. The goal of the program is to help service members bridge their military experiences and skills with their post-military goals by planning for transition throughout their Military Life Cycle (MLC).⁹ There is still a gap in that instruction since the VA staff is operating within a government structure and not an actual civilian environment. Many nonprofit organizations assist struggling veterans, but again, they demonstrate a temporary relief for veteran issues and not a full-time fix that holds the veteran accountable or takes time to check back in on the service members' progress to reintegration.

Today there is a significant number of soldiers reporting Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which may lead to panic attacks that can be life-altering. However, there are some interesting facts about PTSD regarding different wars. WWII was one of the highest casualty wars in history, and the Vietnam War was also very high in casualties

² Ibid., vi.

³ Gerald E. Larson and Sonya B. Norman, "Prospective prediction of functional difficulties among recently separated Veterans," *Journal of Rehabilitation Research and Development* 51, no. 3 (2014), Introduction.

⁴ Ibid., 415.

⁵ "What Veterans Bring to Civilian Workplaces," RAND, accessed January 29, 2020, <https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/employing-veterans.html>.

⁶ Sarah Kintzle et al., *Exploring the Economic and Employment Challenges Facing US Veterans: A Qualitative Study of Volunteers of America Service Providers & Veteran Clients*. Los Angeles: USC Center for Innovation and Research on Veterans & Military Families, 2015, https://www.voa.org/pdf_files/a-study-of-volunteers-of-america-service-providers-and-veteran-clients.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Patricia Kime, "Military Suicide Rates Hit Record High in 2018," *Military Times*, January 30, 2019, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/01/30/active-duty-military-suicides-near-record-highs-2018.html>.

⁹ "Military Life Cycle (MLC) VA Benefits 101," *U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs*, <https://www.benefits.va.gov/TAP/docs/mlc-va-benefits-101.pdf>.

(in addition to the psychological traumas related to treatment upon return from service). Two of the lowest in casualties are the recent wars of Afghanistan and Iraq when compared to the prior two conflicts. Though there were more casualties and traumatic events in the earlier wars of WWII and Vietnam, the reports of PTSD are higher in recent wars like Iraq.¹⁰ One explanation is following WWII, those soldiers came home to an industrial boom. They immediately went back to their communities and started working. The current veteran experiences something very different when they return home. Because our wars are so remote and our enemy is obscure, U.S. civilians are more detached from what combat looks like; therefore, as a veteran, it can be challenging to relate to civilian friends. They come home to a society that they do not understand. They see civilians whom they grew up with acting in an individualistic society. The veteran does not understand how their friends do not act as a team or have the bonds that they experienced in the military, simply put, they miss their tribe.¹¹

The lack of a community that understands the veteran is a possible reason the reported levels of PTSD are so high in the modern warrior. When the soldier finds out that there is no team back home. They feel no one understands them. Thus, depression sets in, and the soldier may fight these symptoms by becoming angry. This anger can affect their home and work life, and if not dealt with, can cause significant damage to their life satisfaction following service.

In contrast to American veterans are Israeli veterans—Israel reports a PTSD rate of 1% in their soldiers, and many of the cases resolve themselves in a year. There are two possible answers to this. One is the fact that every Israeli citizen is required to join the military for two years. Thus, when a veteran returns home, they come home to their tribe.¹²

Everyone understands what the person has gone through, and everyone has a sense of community. The other possible reason is that they are surrounded by political turmoil and perpetual violence; therefore, they must rely on the group to survive.

Conversely, only 1% of the United States population joins the military. Most veterans come home to people that do not understand them. Based on the data from Israel, if the United States veteran had a team to join when they got home, the rates of PTSD might drop significantly, and reintegration would be more successful. Therefore, the author hypothesizes that a civilian-based network of former military personnel is the better program to serve as "transition coaches" for current struggling veterans and recently discharged service members. This research will explore several organizations that are utilizing a unique team-based platform to get veterans back engaged in civilian life and compare these programs to the proposed novel business structure.

Thesis

Thousands of active duty service members are discharged from the military annually. While well-trained and disciplined, traits that civilian employers recruit, an estimated 44% of the post-9/11 veterans report reintegration problems transitioning into civilian life and workforce.¹³ There exists a distinct communication barrier between civilian and military lifestyles with minimal transition and life-coaching services once discharged from the military. The Scars and Stripes company experiences are successful in aiding veteran transition because it provides the skills and support system needed to bridge the military-to-civilian gap, namely the continued provision of a team, mission, purpose, and accountability throughout this phase of life. The proposed model provides a network of

¹⁰ Sebastian Junger, *Tribes: On Homecoming and Belonging* (Cornwall: Twelve, 2016), 88.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹² *Ibid.*, 90.

¹³ Larson and Norman, "Prospective prediction of functional difficulties," 415.

veterans able and willing to serve as transition coaches for fellow service members while also providing real-world training and business opportunities. The results of this model will minimize the reported reintegration problems experienced by service members.

Veteran Empowerment

"Freedom is never more than one generation from extinction." -Ronald Reagan. Our veterans are the most precious people to this great country, performing a vital role in preserving our freedoms. While the younger veterans today are not experiencing the social backlash when they arrive home that our Vietnam veterans did, as a nation, we still struggle with providing appropriate physiological and social support. The current Veteran Affairs programs are not adequately providing the tools needed for success, placing most of their focus on pharmacological solutions. Based on conversations that the author has had with recovering veterans, in many cases, pharmaceuticals are masking symptoms of depression. Scars and Stripes believe that the more sustainable solution to these veteran issues is cognitive engagement.

These ideas and thoughts come from many conversations with our Afghanistan and Iraq veterans coming home. Moreover, reported daily rate of 16-20 veterans committing suicide is an unacceptably high rate of occurrence.¹⁴ Suicide is exceptionally high with our Vietnam veterans. The question is, why is this happening 45 plus years after service? If we do not do something now, then the same fate may happen to our Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Iraq veterans at potentially a much higher rate! Many well-intended organizations are committed to helping our veterans heal and transition into the civilian workforce, but few have a source of revenue that would maintain those efforts over time while simultaneously offering skills training and a revenue stream. This research paper will explore and evaluate several organizations that

have a mission to support veterans and look at what is working and what can be improved, then compare them to the Scars and Stripes model.

The author believes that, in combating the reintegration dilemma, there needs to be a unified team effort that is striving for a common goal of team, mission, purpose, and accountability. Importantly, mentoring and guidance need to be delivered by a veteran who has developed a stream of revenue through a business model addressing veterans' financial, social, and emotional needs all at once and who understands the veteran's psychological and social struggles. The key points that the literature review uncovered will be remedied through the provision of an additional source of income, surrounding them with positive mentors that are their peers, and this will lead to an empowering inspirational experience.

Current Private Veteran Companies

The literature review included those organizations that developed a life coaching system and taught civilian-based skills with a focus on sustainability and scalability. The following are the search key terms: Veteran, Life Coach, Civilian Business Skills, Sustainability, Scalability, Team, and Reintegration.

Mission Continues is a team-based nonprofit organization uniting veterans in a shared cause to deploy to areas of under-resourced communities that need refurbishing in their common areas such as parks, green spaces, and playgrounds. According to their website, the organization is, "a national, nonpartisan nonprofit that empowers veterans to continue their service, and empowers communities with veteran talent, skills and preparedness to generate visible impact."¹⁵ This organization shares much of the same views of Scars and Stripes Coffee concerning veterans, such as "Veterans possess the drive to serve others, and our vision is for all veterans with a desire to continue their service to be part of a

¹⁴ Patricia Kime, "Military Suicide Rates Hit Record High in 2018."

¹⁵ "Mission Continues," Mission Continues, last modified December 9, 2013, <https://www.missioncontinues.org>.

movement to transform communities." Mission Continues is unique in that it utilizes a rank structure of leadership that is like the military with two separate leadership positions. To find the right veteran candidates, they verify that if you are a veteran that you were discharged honorably. As team members gain more responsibility, they can become the leader of a service platoon:

"In 2013, The Mission Continues introduced a new way for veterans to continue serving at home—the service platoon. A service platoon is a team of veteran and non-veteran volunteers that mobilize together to solve a specific challenge in their community. United by the common bond of service, platoons offer veterans the opportunity to make an impact in their community and connect with others through regular social and networking events. It is an opportunity to serve alongside a motivated team and tackle a tough and meaningful mission. It is an opportunity to make a difference."¹⁶

From service platoon, a team member can gain the leadership of the Service Leadership Corps:

"A multidisciplinary six-month program, the Service Leadership Corps (SLC), is an opportunity for veterans to build new skills and further develop their leadership. The experience includes four in-person weekend-long sessions, local team-based work, and a virtual curriculum. Corps members work individually and in small groups, collaborating with local organizations to drive positive change within their communities."¹⁷

Also, the Mission Connect is data-driven with what impact they have on their local areas, and the level of a sense of purpose the veteran/team member experienced during their deployments to under-resourced communities. The following is an account of a veteran's experience:

"I can adjust and move forward with

confidence that my readjustment is on track. With other volunteer service organizations, I show up, work, and go home. This introspection and interpersonal awareness are unique to The Mission Continues and, in my opinion, necessary for successful readjustment into society."¹⁸

The data on satisfaction is impressive, "for example, 96% believe that they made an impact on the local community through their efforts, and 94% believe that Operation Westside Surge helped them to understand better the connection between community service and a sense of purpose."¹⁹

ReGroup Foundation is a nonprofit organization that was designed by a veteran and a civilian that was deeply concerned about veterans' suicide statistics. According to the founders, Army Ranger Antonio Ruiz and Stephanie Solton, the mother of an Air Force A10 crew chief, "they aimed to stop the suicide rates and homelessness, so they went to work researching the problems and interviewing homeless veterans."²⁰ They discovered that many smaller issues lead to more significant problems. They also learned that many great veteran nonprofits are providing support through group activities such as golf, fishing, hunting; however, there are apparent gaps in solving the reintegration dilemma with veterans. One of the most significant gaps is providing the transitioning veterans a place to live while they take the time to explore their options and develop and deploy a sound transition plan. The ReGroup Ranches are built one at a time by transitioning veterans and their families. This design aims to prevent the hardships that often lead to homelessness and suicides. Also, high at-risk veterans can be selected for onsite housing services while they complete their 18-month, 3 Phase Program. A crucial part of their program is designing sustainable ranches following the initial acquisition and development phase

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "About Us," ReGroup4Vets, accessed January 29, 2020, <https://regroup4vets.com/index.php/about-us>.

of each of the properties. Following the initial construction, a variety of agriculture/aquaculture enterprises will operate to provide funding to cover the ranch expenses as well as generate additional funding for future ranch developments across the nation. The Foundation has its first ranch under construction in New Braunfels, Texas, and it plans to have 16 veterans housed on this smaller property during each 18-month cycle. Data on veterans' psychosocial improvements will be evaluated and released over time.

Veteran Roasters is a nonprofit roaster located in Chicago, and its goal is to provide employment opportunities to prevent homelessness for veterans. According to the founders, "Veteran Roasters Coffee was established with the mission to combat chronic unemployment in the veteran community. We started a company that could provide growth, and most importantly, provide skill and opportunity in the growing coffee industry. We pay a living wage, help our veteran employees with housing, childcare, and daily living expenses so they can concentrate on bettering themselves, and roasting great coffee."²¹ A goal of Veteran Roasters is to collaborate with other nonprofits and companies to help bring awareness to their mission. Recently, they participated in the Polar Plunge in support of Special Olympics Chicago. Also, they teamed up with Fireball Whisky to blend their coffee with the whiskey. There appears to be no data concerning their impact of curbing unemployment with their program.

Old Army Coffee is a 100% service-connected disabled veteran-owned coffee company from Spokane Valley, Washington. The website states that the company aims to provide a team environment that is experienced in the military. According to the company's website, "we wanted to create a company that promoted a team atmosphere like that which the Veterans missed from their time in the service. This would also provide meaningful employment with like-minded people. The

focus is to hire Veterans through the sale of our premium coffee."²² The information is limited to how the company is creating a team of veterans and how the company is structured to develop a team. There is mention of the company giving back to nonprofit organizations, but no percentage is detailed.

The above programs have many strengths and have a real passion for helping veterans in the business environment. However, to significantly combat the reintegration dilemma, there needs to be a unified team effort that is striving for a common goal of team, mission, purpose, and accountability. Based on the literature review, there is a clear gap in creating a system that would continue to meet the needs of recent and past discharged service members. As a product of an organization that establishes sustainable systems and a culture that fosters growth, the veterans interviewed state that they have experienced holistic growth in every aspect of their lives. The author contends that through further empirically designed study, this model will show significant positive changes in the veterans' current employment and their personal lives.

Scars and Stripes Business Model

The business structure of Scars and Stripes Coffee is as follows—we are "empowering" veterans to start their own business, and our core pillar is that only veterans can sell our products. Utilizing a single-level direct marketing sales model, we use military rank structure to provide team, mission, purpose, and accountability. When veterans join the sales team, the new team members are assigned a unique code for tracking their sales. Most importantly, they are assigned to a Squad Leader, and that leader is now accountable to his or her new team member. The Squad Leader conducts "Monday Morning Muster," which is a conversation with each of their ten team members to ascertain the team's mental status and help them with his or

²¹ "Veteran Roasters," Veteran Roasters, accessed January 29, 2020, <https://veteranroasters.com/>

²² "Old Army," U.S. Army, accessed March 26, 2020, <https://oldarmy.us>

her business development.

The Squad Leader also has leadership above them in the role of a Platoon Sergeant, and the Platoon Sergeant conducts Monday Morning Muster with each of their 4 Squad Leaders. Finally, then there is a First Sergeant, and the First Sergeant is the leadership for the Platoon Sergeant. The First Sergeant, like all the leaders in their command, also conducts a Monday Morning Muster with each of their 4 Platoon Sergeants. Each position has a specific detailed rank structure of duties to meet consistently in order to advance in rank from a team member, Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and First Sergeant. Each team member is compensated at 20% commission on the gross sale of his or her sales. No leader or team member gets a commission from any other member.

There are several sales outlets that the new member is trained on, but the most impactful outlets for cognitive engagement are the events. These are various events from hunting and fishing shows to pancake breakfast fundraisers, which the Squad Leaders or the team members can choose. Typical events have new team members preparing their assets for the event, setting up, interacting with customers, and selling coffee. The primary goal is to empower the transitioning veteran with merging their military skills with civilian skills. Although nonprofits like the "Mission Continues" have utilized a military rank structure, this is the first civilian company to take what makes the military so strong (the brotherhood and sisterhood) and adapt it to a civilian salesforce. This company is not intended to be a primary job replacement (although there may be many that can replace their primary income). Due to the transition coach aspect, a veteran could improve their family life, relationships with co-workers, and advancements in the workplace.

Much of what the company provides is business training, such as building a

business plan, developing an operating agreement, setting up an LLC, understanding tax laws, developing and maintaining a business proforma, and evaluating business opportunities. The mentoring and guidance need to be delivered by a veteran that has developed a stream of revenue through the sale of products and understands the veteran's psychological and social struggles. With the sale of a product, the mission is self-sustaining as well as it meets a vital part of providing employment/income opportunities for the veteran team members. One of the primary goals of this program is to instill a "hand-up" program, not a "hand-out."

Initial Case Study and Evidence

Scars and Stripes leadership collected testimonials among its members during their National Leadership Conference (NLC) held in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 17-19 January 2020. Employees progressing through the Scars and Stripes chain of command attended the NLC and participated in annual business training over three days. As an employee, each sales representative received sales training, marketing skills, and business acumen with a 2020 strategy for the company. NLC experiences benefit each individual as they manage the complex world beyond military service. Skills attained transfer to real-world resume experience and help bridge the gap between military and civilian career fields. The following five testimonials were collected from Scars and Stripes Coffee team members having served anywhere between a traditional military contract obligation and twenty years of honorable service. Each member has been with the company between one and six months. These testimonies assist with achieving the strategic goals of the company, such as marketing and continued recruitment and growth. These testimonies also serve as an assessment of the personal, emotional, and spiritual journey for each member.

Testimonies from Team Members of SSC

Veteran Team Member: Steve Littlefield Years of Military Service: 20 Scars and Stripes Tenure: 3 months

"My name is Steve Littlefield,²³ and I am from southeastern Massachusetts. I am currently still serving in the United States Army as an active duty Soldier, for just about 20 years. I saw Scars and Stripes on Fox and Friends in October 2019, and I thought it was a good mission. I have been personally involved with the mental health issues of service members and have seen firsthand how mental health can lead to suicide and other personal life struggles. The Scars and Stripes mission brings back the camaraderie and a sense of purpose I feel in the military. After trying out the coffee, I decided to get involved. I signed up in October 2019 and am one of the very few people in the New England and Northeastern region. As a squad leader for my area, I am in the process of building a team, and I think we are going to have much interest. We are pretty big coffee drinkers in New England, so I do not think I will going to have any problem finding people, and I am looking forward to building a big successful team in New England hopefully, changing people's lives for the better."

Veteran Team Member: Brian Gonzalez Years of Military Service: 5 Scars and Stripes Tenure: 8 Months

"My name is Brian Gonzalez.²⁴ I have been with Scars and Stripes Coffee for eight months. I am a Navy veteran and served my country for five years. When I heard about this opportunity and the mission through one of my buddies on Instagram, I decided to join. I love this company due to its passion and commitment to veterans, Scars and Stripes empowers them to start their own eCommerce business. I am

passionate about veteran outreach, which is why I joined Scars and Stripes Coffee. I am currently the Platoon Sergeant for part of the West Coast, directly located in Arizona. I am looking to expand and grow the community in both Arizona and out west. The key to success is a focus on people. People come first in this company before the business. We regularly check in on our people to make sure they are doing okay. For those having challenges in the transition process, Scars and Stripes leaders put in the time and investment into their personal and professional success."

Veteran Team Member: Daniel Latiolais Years of Military Service: 4 Scars and Stripes Tenure: 6 months

"My name is Daniel Latiolais.²⁵ I joined the Marine Corps back in 1998 for the opportunity to serve my country, find myself. After discharge from the Marines 2002, I did not have anybody to help me with the transition to civilian life. After graduating from college, my wife and I moved to Oklahoma and found Scars and Stripes. I met other veterans, shared a lot about our military experiences, and even rekindled some friendships. Scars and Stripes has been phenomenal. The opportunity to hang out with other veterans, sell coffee, and share stories about the good and bad military experiences with those who truly understand; this has changed my life."

Veteran Team Member: Everett Robins Years of Military Service: 5 Scars and Stripes Tenure: 8 Months

"My name is Everett Robbins.²⁶ I have been with Scars and Stripes since July of 2019. In a roundabout way, I was separated from both the military and from my civilian job, both for medical reasons. In a stroke of luck, Scars and Stripes found me. I was reluctant at first

²³ Steve Littlefield, in discussion with Bradley Dean, 2019.

²⁴ Brian Gonzalez, in discussion with Bradley Dean, 2019.

²⁵ Daniel Latiolais, in discussion with Bradley Dean, 2019.

²⁶ Everett Robbins, in discussion with Bradley Dean, 2019.

because I lacked any subject matter expertise on running a coffee business, but over a concise period and thanks to the camaraderie, mentorship, the connection, a feeling of belonging that I did not realize I was missing, I achieve in only sixty days. I consistently scored in the top tier of sales, achieving sales bonuses several times since starting up with the company. This company is not just about sales. It was the connection between team members, squad leaders, the leadership above them, and everything that came with it. It challenged me to grow. It encouraged me to do better than I had done the day before. I am doing well enough that I am confident, in the next five years, this opportunity will change my family's life and at least two other veterans' lives as well. I am not sure what else I would be doing right now, besides sitting on a couch with my medical issues just eating away at me. Scars and Stripes challenged me to get mobile again, be motivated in everything I do, a move with a purpose again. My health has improved, as has my attitude."

Veteran Team Member: Allen Baker
Years of Military Service: 19
Scars and Stripes Tenure: 12 months

"My name is Alan Baker.²⁷ I found out about Scars and Stripes Coffee about the end of February of 2019, and I bought two bags and gave one to my son-in-law. He put it on Facebook. My wife asked me why I was not involved in it yet. So, I am in. It has been a remarkable journey so far and going to get better. I enjoy participating in events and working with people face-to-face. The comradery is excellent. My wife made a comment when I retired from the military that structured group was not there anymore. When I got involved with Scars and Stripes, that team came back together and it has given me a closer relationship with my family, with the people that I am working with, everything. Furthermore, it is just awesome."

Impact Statement

In the SSC model, the company has tried to remedy veterans' needs through a new community-based sense of belonging, recognition for their team efforts, an additional source of income, and surrounding them with positive mentors that are their peers. This type of company model has led to an empowering and inspirational experience. Also, as a by-product of an organization that establishes sustainable systems and a culture that fosters advancement, the veterans interviewed state they have experienced holistic growth in every aspect of their lives. The author contends that through a further empirically designed study, this model will show significant positive changes in the veterans' current employment and in their personal lives.

Future Research

There have been many research programs and attention over the past five years concerning the issues that veterans report with the reintegration dilemma. These studies are survey oriented, and they try to understand the specific factors that predict a negative and positive reintegration process. To date, there has not been a single study designed to determine a solution for the reported reintegration problems.

The following is a proposal of an exploratory study that would evaluate the efficacy/effect of the Scars and Stripes Coffee business model on veterans' reintegration issues empirically. For example, twenty participants that are being discharged from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City would be asked to be enrolled in the study. Ten participants would be the control group. This group will go through the traditional discharge procedures and followed during the experimental phase. Ten participants would be identified as the experimental group. This group will go through the traditional discharge procedures, and they will be asked to join a Scars and Stripes Coffee

²⁷ Allen Baker, in discussion with Bradley Dean, 2019.

Squad. The experimental group will be asked to maintain the rank structure of a veteran team member that is established by Scars and Stripes Coffee during the test period.

This study is a volunteer study, and if a participant decides they do not want to maintain the rank structure, then they will be considered dropped out of the study. During the one-year test period, the group will be asked to undergo standardized psychological examinations administered pre, during and post to the control and experimental group. Demographics will be controlled for to determine if race, family, education, or other factors that make a statistical difference in outcomes. Additional research would have to be done to understand the author's previous assertion.

Conclusion

Although it is not well known what the solution is for reintegration from active duty to civilian life, it seems that some factors

attribute to a higher degree of difficulty for reintegration. It was found that pre-9/11 war there were 27% of retiring military that had reintegration issues, but post-9/11, that number increased to 44%. As stated previously, Dr. Gerald E. Larson, stated that the factors that had the most negative impact on reintegration were the veteran's involvement in emotional or physical combat trauma. The factors that predicted the most significant positive impact for reintegration were: level of education, understanding their mission in life, a sense of purpose, and a higher frequency of religious connections.²⁸ The author has proposed a novel civilian-based solution and presented the case studies to determine if current efforts with this approach are anecdotally achieving the desired results. At the center of the Scars and Stripes Coffee mission is the will to reignite the comradery that is so badly missed in the veteran community. The reintegration process needs to be addressed, and the SSC approach is one that can meet that challenge.

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Bradley Carl Dean is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. LTC Dean serves as the Deputy State Aviation Officer for the Oklahoma Army National Guard. LTC Dean started his career in the United States Army as an enlisted infantry rifleman. After graduating from the Oklahoma State University ROTC program, he commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant into the U.S. Army Aviation Branch. Upon completion of aviation flight training, 9/11 occurred, and Lieutenant Dean deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Brad returned home from deployment and started a civilian career in medical sales. In 2004, Captain Dean deployed to Iraq on a 12-month tour as the Company Commander of an Air Traffic Control Unit. Major Dean served as the Service and Support commander for the Oklahoma Army National Guard tasked to support local law enforcement with aviation assets. He commanded aviation assets during Hurricane Harvey and the annual Oklahoma Wildfires. Lieutenant Colonel Dean served as the General Support Aviation Battalion Commander for the State of Oklahoma and is currently the Deputy State Aviation Officer. In his civilian life, Brad is one of the top medical sales reps for the Stryker Medical Company and has started multiple veteran support businesses. Brad is the partner of a veteran coffee business that empowers veterans to start their own e-commerce business, help with reintegration into the civilian professional market and give them purpose and accountability in order to improve their personal and professional lifestyles.

²⁸ Larson and Norman, "Prospective prediction of functional difficulties," 415.

Dispute and Conflict Transformation Basics

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Abstract

Understanding the basics of dispute and conflict transformation is essential for military leaders in the current and future strategic, operational, and tactical environments to achieve context clarity and assist in problem framing. Although military leaders do not receive targeted training to understand the context of competition and human needs, disputes and conflicts are present in daily military operations across all levels of the institution. Disputes and conflicts cause military intervention, actions, and frustrations within the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the organization. Additionally, disputes and conflicts exist at varying levels and take different forms both internal and external to the military institution and include the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

Have military leaders been trained in the basics of dispute and conflict transformation to maximize military efforts below the level of armed conflict in the pursuit of achieving the overarching political objectives? The answer is no, they have not. With minimal investment, this can be changed and influence the entire military culture within ten years or less. If nothing changes, then expect the status quo; however, without exploiting this competitive space, this space is left open for adversaries to gain the competitive edge. Making smarter and more aware service members will provide a competitive advantage for the United States in a whole of government approach to achieve its political objectives.

“Presently, only 20 percent of military activities involve combat operations; 80 percent of operations are now focused on working in the political sphere.” - V. Gezari¹

Do military leaders possess the basic understanding of dispute and conflict transformation necessary to maximize military efforts below the level of armed conflict in the pursuit of achieving overarching political objectives? Although military leaders do not receive targeted training to understand the context of these two areas, disputes and conflicts are present in daily military operations

across all levels of the institution. This paper explains these concepts for those who have no formal negotiations training and provides the basics that will assist with developing a deeper understanding of disputes and conflicts context.

Without formal training and education on these topics, military leaders are left to their own accord to develop independent understandings using civilian based literature. Searching the internet for books on disputes and conflicts leads to thousands of hits on negotiations and how to handle conflict. With all the literature written on this topic, it can be extremely overwhelming for someone that is

¹ Vanessa M. Gezari, *The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).

new to the subject of negotiations to translate civilian concepts into military application. Most of the books concerning negotiations cover in-depth “how to” guides for handling situations in buying a new car or getting the best price on the purchase of a home. These situations, while practical in civilian life, do not translate into the depth and breadth of military application in the complex global operating environment.

With the majority of military activities being conducted below the level of war, it is important for military leaders to focus attention and training on understanding the context of disputes and conflicts transformation.

Disputes and conflicts cause military intervention, actions, and frustrations within the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the organization. Additionally, disputes and conflicts exist at varying levels and take different forms both internal and external to the military institution and includes the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment. When disputes and conflicts arise requiring large scale interventions, the military is the element of national power that is used to implement policy by other means.² Although the State Department, as the diplomatic element of national power, is responsible for conducting negotiations as a plenipotentiary for the United States government, military leaders can find themselves tasked with conducting these actions in less than ideal conditions and with little time to prepare. Concurrently, military leaders also face a constant competition for limited resources with internal and external organizations for more of the national defense budget.

Although the terms “dispute” and “conflict” are synonymous within the field of negotiations, and get used interchangeably as having the same meaning, each one is distinctly different from the other and has different implications for military leaders. Likewise, the terms “resolution” and “transformation”

get used interchangeably as well, but their contexts are quite different. Understanding the basics of dispute and conflict transformation is essential for military leaders in the current and future strategic, operational, and tactical environments to achieve context clarity and assist in problem framing.

This paper will cover the basics of disputes and conflicts, resolution and transformation, questions to apply for context clarity and assist in problem framing, provide case studies for both categories, and the proposal of a new model for graphical depiction.

Thesis

Understanding the basics of dispute and conflict transformation is essential for military leaders in the current and future strategic, operational, and tactical environments to achieve context clarity and assist in problem framing.

Dispute and Conflict Transformation Basics

In his book, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, John Burton makes the distinction between disputes and conflict as follows: “On the one hand, disputes which are a feature of normal and frequently collaborative and creative relationships, endemic in all social relationships, and an integral part of competitive systems, and, on the other, conflicts which are deeply-rooted in human needs, and which frequently require major environmental and policy restricting for their resolution.”³

Disputes

What are disputes and what are their characteristics? Disputes are “those situations in which the issues are negotiable, in which there can be compromise, and which, therefore, do not involve consideration of altered institutions and structures.”⁴ Simply put, disputes are complicated problems with defined boundaries that contain the issues. It

² Carl von Clausewitz, Peter Paret and Michael Howard, eds., *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 89.

³ John Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2

is important to remember that complicated problems have solutions, whereas complex problems do not. In a competitive system, military leaders compete for limited resources to ensure they have what is needed to achieve their assigned missions. These resources typically involve people, equipment, and money, especially for Title 10 organizations that man, train, and equip forces in their force provider roles. Competition for limited resources can be seen at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels within the military institution.

Some of the strategies that are applied to competitive resource allocations are positional or transactional bargaining.⁵ These strategies focus on obtaining resources in a “you versus them” scenario where whoever gets the most wins.⁶ Since these issues have solutions and are contained within the boundaries defined by the resources available as solutions, disputes become a function of management. Management of the bargaining range, the aspiration point, and the dividing of the resources available.⁷ Think of disputes as a one-dimensional line of resources available that gets divided. How the available resources are divided, determines where on the line the solution is plotted. The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or “BATNA” is basically what courses of action remain and

their associated risks if a negotiated agreement cannot be reached.⁸ What options are available if an agreement cannot be reached? Are other options available with different parties? Parties are not expected to accept a deal that will make them worse off than when they started a negotiation. If parties are unable to reach an agreement or the agreement makes them worse off than when they started, BATNA can serve as a red line to reject negotiations, go elsewhere for assistance, or accept the status quo.

Conflict

What are conflicts and what are their characteristics? In contrast to disputes, conflicts involve complex issues where solutions do not exist without significant change. There may not be room for compromise due to “deeply-rooted human needs, which frequently require major environmental and policy restricting for their resolution.”⁹ Simply put, conflicts are complex problems with no boundaries containing them. Conflicts can “lead to behaviors that seriously prejudice the physical and psychological security, and the future development of the individuals, groups, societies, or nations concerned.”¹⁰

When comparing Burton’s definition of conflict to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (see fig. 1), it becomes clear why conflicts arise and



Figure 1. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs¹¹

⁵ Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 8-10.

⁶ Ho-Won Jeong, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 116.

⁷ Stefan Eisen Jr., *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, 2nd ed. (Montgomery: Air Force Negotiation Center), 4-6.

⁸ Jayne Docherty, *The Little Book of Strategic Negotiation* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2005), 38.

⁹ Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, 2.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs,” Saul McLeod, *Simply Psychology*, 2018, <https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html>

how they differ from disputes. The military's wheelhouse for conflict employment resides within the first two levels of basic human physiological and safety needs. Sometimes in conflicts, the best that can be achieved is to maintain the current level of stabilization and prevent further destabilization.

Conflict issues are typically divergent amongst the parties involved.¹² Unlike disputes, conflicts require leadership in their handling, not management. With conflicts being complex problems, issues change and morph as actions are taken to move them in a more convergent direction to achieve acceptable terms. Leadership is needed to study, monitor, mentor, and adjust actions towards achieving the goal or mission. In contrast to BATNA, The Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or "WATNA" exists in conflicts. WATNA is basically what would happen if a negotiated agreement is not reached. Since military involvement in conflict rests in the bottom two categories of Maslow's hierarchy, not reaching a negotiated agreement can lead to the continued atrocities within a conflict and denial of the right to safety and physiological needs. Nuclear warfare, death, starvation, and occupation serve as a few examples. In conflicts, parties may end up worse off than when they started, but the results of a negotiated agreement are better than the WATNA.

Resolution and Transformation

The complement to the term "dispute" is "resolution." The majority of civilian literature on negotiations covers this topic in detail. The term "resolution" implies a solution or way forward to solve a problem. In disputes over resources, a solution can be reached by means of simple allocation management, but someone may win and someone may lose. Although the dispute is considered resolved with the distribution of resources, underling

issues of how the resources were divided may create new issues and fester mistrust or ill will.¹³ There is another option to resolution, but it requires more work and effort than managing an issue. It is transformation, and it requires leadership to achieve.¹⁴ Transformation involves integrative bargain or mutual gain where value is created in the agreement for both parties vice obtaining value through positional bargaining.¹⁵ Although disputes are management issues, they change to leadership issues when someone works to create value for all parties. Creating value helps all parties to feel satisfied with the negotiated solution and works to reduce the presence of underling issues that could resurface or continue tensions and ill will. Resolutions involve management of finite resources, only addressing the immediate issue and not issues outside of the initial purview. Transformation, on the other hand, requires leadership.¹⁶ Leadership is needed to gain a deeper understanding of the issues and how they connect. With a deeper understanding of the context, negotiated agreements may be reached that take into account more of the underlying issues that can leave both parties satisfied with the current outcome, thus achieving more in the end by the creation of value.

For conflicts, resolutions are only band-aids to stop the bleeding or the symptoms and do not get after the root cause of the issues. Conflict transformation efforts work towards interests that converge vice diverge, cooperation between parties, and the creation of space that seems non-existent between the issues.

Dispute and Conflict Context Clarity

"The best negotiators ask the best questions...negotiations are intelligence gathering"

Dr. Thomas Matyok, 2019

¹² Ho-Won Jeong, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies*, 6.

¹³ Ibid., 141.

¹⁴ Thomas G. Matyók, "Military Negotiation as Meta-Leadership: Engage-and-Align for Mission," *METCAT* 1 (2019): 4.

¹⁵ Eisen, *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, 3.

¹⁶ Matyók, "Military Negotiation as Meta-Leadership," 2-5.

How do you find context clarity to achieve a deeper understanding of the issues involved? The following questions are proposed as an initial list to assist in achieving dispute and context clarity and assist in problem framing. More questions and information will arise as time goes on, but this initial list will help with early formulation and understanding of the issues and their complexity.

1. What is the goal or mission? This question is the foundation for problem framing. What are you trying to achieve? What are the policy objectives? What efforts are the other instruments of national power contributing to achieve the objectives or goals?

2. What are the issues? Do the issues involve competition for resources or basic human needs? This question will help determine if the issue is a dispute or conflict for problem framing. What other issues exist outside the periphery or on a smaller scale? Are the issues linked?

3. Who are the parties involved? This question involves not only those parties directly involved or at the front table, but also those parties in the background influencing the outcome or positions.¹⁷ This includes second tier or back table parties and interest groups. Is the media involved and how are they influencing the narrative? What is your role in the issues—directly involved or third party trying to intervene between two parties?

4. What are their positions and interests? Every party has a position and interests. Whether it's for the betterment of their people or for personal gain, knowing the positions are important and the motives that are driving them. Parties may not be personally affected

by the dispute or conflict, and may have little interest in the collective betterment or creation of value in negotiations. A useful visual tool to help make sense of all the parties involved and their interests is to create an interest map.¹⁸ Interest maps help graphically depict Miles' Law of "where you sit is where you stand" to help build a deeper understanding of where parties align on issues. Examples of interest maps will be shown in the case studies to follow.

5. What are the shared interests? This is an important question that directly ties to transformation. Identifying areas of shared interest, no matter how small, can serve as a starting point for creating space for collective value building. Creating value through small issues may lead to more consideration by reluctant parties in negotiating larger issues.¹⁹ Look for areas where collective value can be created through shared interests.

6. What is your information operations plan? How do you plan to communicate with the parties—directly or through a third party? Is there a common language or are interpreters needed? How will the media likely portray the issues? What influence will media coverage have on backrow, third party, or interest groups—positive or negative?²⁰ Without a good information operations plan, the media or external sources to the negotiations can control the narrative and keep issues divergent vice convergent.

7. Are the results conducive for long term dialog? It is important to keep the lines of communication open as "negotiations are an ongoing dialog in joint problem solving."²¹ Communication does not stop with the resolution or transformation of the current issues. These lines of communication are essential to assist in addressing future disputes

¹⁷ Ho-Won Jeong, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies*, 138.

¹⁸ Steven Cohen, *Negotiating Skills for Managers and Everyone Else* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 72-73.

¹⁹ Ho-Won Jeong, *International Negotiation: Process and Strategies*, 141-142.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 138.

²¹ Matyók, "Military Negotiation as Meta-Leadership," 1.

or conflicts that may arise. If the outcome of the negotiations create ill will and discontent because of a lopsided outcome, or a party has been taken advantage of, communications amongst parties will be severed. Value creation outcomes through leadership produce more willingness to address future issues peacefully vice through the use of violence.

8. What enforcement methods are needed?

This question needs to be thought through before any negotiation so it can be agreed upon during discussion. How are you going to enforce or is a third party needed? Enforcement by “honor system” will lead to less adherence over time or none at all. If the outcome does not benefit the party levied against, then they will be reluctant to enforce the requirement against themselves.²²

Dispute Case Study (The A-10 Divestiture)^{23,24,25,26,27,28}

In 2012, congress directed reductions in the military services due to the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq with subsequent fiscal cutbacks. The United States Air Force (USAF) had to prioritize programs to ensure the service could achieve their future Strategic Force Planning guidance directives. After much consideration, the USAF decided to retire the A-10 “Warthog,” a Close Air Support (CAS) single-role aircraft, in order to fund the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is a fifth-generation multi-role aircraft. The divestiture of the A-10 ignited an internal “grass roots CAS” movement amongst service members and constituents of the A-10 community who reached out to Congress for assistance to keep the aircraft from being retired. In 2013, thirteen senators and twenty congressmen opposed the A-10 retirement and wrote letters to the

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In April 2015, the House Arms Service Committee voted to prevent the USAF from retiring the A-10.

To achieve a deeper understanding of this dispute, the initial questions to build context clarity and assist in problem framing will be used:

1. What is the goal or mission? The USAF’s mission was to achieve their future Strategic Force Planning Guidance directives within the approved fiscal budget.

2. What are the issues? The USAF had to prioritize programs against the future Strategic Force Planning Guidance as their budget was not large enough to enable both modernization and maintaining all current programs. Prioritization went to programs that serviced multi-role functions (F-35) versus a single-role function (A-10).

3. Who are the parties involved? The interest map on the next page graphically depicts the major parties involved within this dispute (fig. 2). The main parties at the table were the USAF and Congress. The back-table parties consisted of both A-10 and F-35 companies, constituents, and home states that supported each specific aircraft plus the USAF A-10 community. These back-table parties played a significant role in engaging and influencing Congress’ viewpoints. The media and other services (U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army) were interested parties. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was an interest group for the legislative branch.

4. What are their positions and interests? The USAF’s position was to retire the A-10

²² Ibid., 38.

²³ Kidar, *Saving Iraq*, 186

²⁴ Barakat, “Postwar Reconstruction and the Recovery of Cultural Heritage,” 29.

²⁵ Ibid., 38.

²⁶ Kidar, *Saving Iraq*, 186

²⁷ Barakat, “Postwar Reconstruction and the Recovery of Cultural Heritage,” 29.

²⁸ Barakat, “Postwar Reconstruction and the Recovery of Cultural Heritage,” 29.




Figure 2. A-10 Case Study Interest Map²⁹

and use 4.2 billion dollars in A-10 funds and manpower to resource the F-35 program. Their interests included: (1) prioritization of fifth generation multi-role aircraft to match near-peer competitors to achieve future Strategic Force Planning Guidance directives, (2) resource reallocation by divestment of single-role aircraft, unless more funding could be made available, and (3) maintain the CAS mission of the A-10 in Afghanistan if Congress designates extra funds to support it. Congress’s position, lead by Senator McCain and Congresswoman McSally, was to keep the A-10 for its unique role as a CAS platform. Their interests included: (1) political positioning to appease the A-10 companies,

constituents, and home states, (2) discrediting the USAF’s plan for A-10 divestment by using GAO reports and studies, and (3) cut the fiscal budget. Back table positions and interests for A-10 and F-35 companies, constituents, and home states were for keeping their respective aircraft over the other to support jobs and revenue. The A-10 community’s position was to keep the A-10 for self-interest and identity reasons.

5. What are the shared interests?

The shared interest in this dispute was twofold: (1) support for the CAS missions in Afghanistan and (2) the budget (fig. 3).

Figure 3. A-10 Case Study Shared Interests³⁰



²⁹. Ibid.

³⁰. Ibid.

6. What is your information operations plan? This dispute showcased the importance of a thought-out information operations plan. By not addressing the internal organizational concerns of the A-10 community during initial phases of divestiture planning, the A-10 community contacted Congress directly to illicit assistance. External to the organization, the USAF needed to concentrate its narrative and talking points on achieving future Strategic Force Planning Guidance directives, the risk accepted by delaying modernization, and the cost of continuing A-10 program while removing emotion for the conversation. Congress on the other hand, sparked emotion by their “grand standing” on the issue and backing their constituents’ interests vice following the USAF’s best military advice.

7. Are the results conducive for long term dialog? The way this dispute was handled by Congress was not conducive for maintaining long term dialog as the interactions were adversarial, emotion driven, and unbalanced with little consideration for value creation. Due to the power position of Congress and their ability to force dialog on issues at the time and place of their choosing, this question did not factor into their actions or resolution of the dispute.

8. What enforcement methods are needed? In this case, the House Arms Service Committee prohibited the USAF from expending funds in 2017 for retirement of the A-10 aircraft and demanded a A-10 versus F-35 flyoff for capability comparison in CAS missions support.

In June 2016, Congress approved 100

million dollars from Overseas Contingency Operations funding to support continued operations of the A-10. Although additional resources were distributed in this case, the temporary resolution by congress has not solved this dispute. Underling issues and ill will still exist today.

Conflict Case Study (The Gulf War Cease Fire)^{31,32,33,34,35,36}

In August 1990, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq over territorial claims and excessive debt owed to Kuwait for loans that Iraq took to finance their war with Iran in the 1980s.³⁷ Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait, so on 17 January 1991, the United Nations (UN) coalition forces started the Air Campaign of Operation Desert Storm. Ninety hours after the initiation of the UN coalition ground offensive on 27 February 1991, General Schwarzkopf, commander of the UN coalition forces, received orders to conduct a “cessation of hostilities” at the 100-hour mark in the war and conduct a meeting with Iraqi Generals to work out the agreement.³⁸ On 3 March 1991, General Schwarzkopf and other UN coalition commanders met with Iraqi commanders at Safwan Airfield to discuss the terms of “cessation of hostilities”.

1. What is the goal or mission? The goal was to set the conditions for ceasing the armed conflict hostilities to reduce unnecessary loses of life amongst both sides.

2. What are the issues? The issue to achieve the goal were: (1) arrange for the release of Prisoners of War (POWs) on both sides, (2)

³¹ Philip Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 184.

³² Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm: The life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991), 302-310.

³³ Richard Lowry, *The Gulf War Chronicles: A Military History of the First War with Iraq* (New York: iUniverse, Inc, 2003), 210-217.


³⁴ Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 1-10 & 449-487.

³⁵ Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero: The Autobiography of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf* (New York: Bantam Book, 1992), 468-495.

³⁶ Docherty, *The Little Book of Strategic Negotiation*, 38-46.

³⁷ Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War*, 183.

³⁸ Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, 472.

Figure 4. A-10 Case Study Shared Interests³⁹

establish a buffer zone between the parties, (3) exchange information about missing in action personnel, and (4) identify locations of Iraqi minefields laid in and around Kuwait and its coastal waters.

3. Who are the parties involved? The interest map above (fig. 4) graphically depicts the major parties involved in the conflict. The main parties at the table were the UN coalition representatives (General Schwarzkopf and LtGen Khalid) and Iraqi military representatives (LtGen Mahmud and LtGen Ahmad). The back-table parties consisted of the Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chief of Staff, the White House, and the UN for the coalition and Saddam Hussein on the Iraqi side. These back-table parties for the coalition played a significant role in shaping and approving the agenda and discussion items. Russia also played a role in initial meeting coordination as a third-party conduit between the White House and Saddam Hussein.

4. What are their positions and interests? The UN coalition's interest included: ensuring Iraq's military would not return to Kuwait, all POWs were released, establish a 10-kilometer buffer zone (each side back up 5-kilometers) to ensure no accidental skirmished reignited, exchange information on missing in action

personnel, and obtain locations and maps of Iraqi minefields for marking and clearing. The UN coalition wanted to ensure unnecessary loss of life was minimized on both sides with a successful cessation of hostilities agreement, at which point, further negotiations would be the responsibility of the diplomats/UN to complete. Also, maintaining the UN coalition relationships were important and contributed to not driving forces deeper into Iraq to take down Saddam Hussein, which was not the objective, and if pursued would have fractured the UN coalition. The Iraqis' interests included: ensuring the land occupied by the UN coalition would not determine new borders for Iraq and be able to use helicopters to move around the country due to the damaged infrastructure.

5. What are the shared interests? There were several shared interests between both parties that centered on basic human needs. The first shared interest was the release of POWs for both sides. It was mutually agreed upon to release all POWs to the Red Cross. The second shared interest was to stop the continued loss of life. Because of the WATNA in this conflict, the agreement for each side to move back 5-kilometers from their present positions created value. The third shared interest was to get the country of Iraq back up and running as fast as possible. In this interest, the Iraqi representatives requested that they be allowed

³⁹ Brendan Burks and Colleen Foster, "The Gulf War Cease Fire: Case Files Project," (Adaptive Conflict Management Class Assignment, Fall 2019).

to use their military helicopters to move people around the country due to the destruction of roads and bridges. This request seemed reasonable to General Schwarzkopf as long as the Iraqis did not fly over the UN coalition forces.

6. What is your information operations plan?

The media coverage of the “Highway of Death” leading from Kuwait to Iraq drove the cessation of hostilities early in the armed conflict due to the images that portrayed “wanton killing” and cast the UN coalition in a negative light. For the cessation of hostilities meeting, a media plan was executed by UN coalition forces to control access and narratives with a designated press area at Safwan and designated times for pictures and a press conference after the meeting concluded. Also, audio tapes and transcripts of the meeting were given to both parties before it concluded to ensure each party had a record of the agreed upon terms.

7. Are the results conducive for long term dialog?

Although the UN coalition was in a position of power over the Iraqis, General Schwarzkopf went to great lengths to ensure the Iraqis were not embarrassed or demoralized during the meeting. Value was created by General Schwarzkopf by building consensus early on issues of human needs. The approval for the Iraqis to use their military helicopters to move around their country in efforts to provide assistance gave the Iraqis more than they deserved, but seemed reasonable at the time. Later on, it was determined that the Iraqis used their helicopters to suppress civil uprisings supporting regime change. General Schwarzkopf later regretted allowing this concession.

8. What enforcement methods are needed?

In this case, the UN coalition and designated international organizations ensured enforcement of the terms of the meeting until the UN passed Resolution 687 on 3 April, 1991 that specified the terms for ending the war.

Wrapping it all Together

Now that the basics of disputes and conflicts have been introduced and examples of each have been presented in the case studies, wrapping it all together through a military leadership lens helps build the situational awareness of how these topics are present in daily military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Figure 5 is a graphical depiction of disputes and conflicts at the different levels of the military organization and some of the other parties that are likely to be involved. The left side of the exhibit displays the Department of Defense in its Title 10 roles of manning, training, and equipping forces for employment, and the right side displays the by Combatant Commands in their force employment roles. As shown on the left side of the exhibit, disputes over resource allocations are typically experienced at all three levels driven by competition amongst the different organizations. These represent complicated problems with solutions. At the operational and strategic levels, or General Officer commands, another layer is added on top of disputes. It is conflict, which brings complexity and depth to issues that require leadership for transformation vice resolution. The complexity grows for strategic leaders as the number of parties or organizations that shape decision making and influence the strategic environment exponentially increase. The right side of the exhibit shows that all levels will be immersed in conflict down to the tactical level. The critical element to success and deeper understanding of conflicts on the right side is information flow from the JIIM organizations down to the lowest levels.

The question that we must answer is: Have military leaders been trained in the basics of dispute and conflict transformation to maximize military efforts below the level of armed conflict in the pursuit of achieving overarching political objectives?

Recommendations

To maximize military efforts below the level of armed conflict in the pursuit of achieving the overarching political objectives,




Figure 5. Dispute and Conflict Military Model⁴⁰

the following recommendations are provided.

First, a focus on negotiation and human interaction education is needed. A building block approach should be taken. Selected books and case studies should be assigned for reading in the Service Chiefs' reading list for each grade. Entry level personnel should read selected books and case studies on disputes and resolution techniques such as basic principles of bargaining. As service members progress through the ranks, more concepts should be added to build basic understanding of the concepts and how it applies to their jobs. Formal schools should add curriculum above and beyond entry level introductions to build upon the grade readings. At the intermediate and top-level schools, formal courses should be added to the curriculum as the majority of career minded services members that will serve until retirement will be attending. The USAF Negotiation Center should be the lead agency for the Air Force curriculum development and be resourced accordingly.

Second, targeted information sharing amongst the JIIM partners needs to expand. Targeted information on the key parties, issues, interests, positions for areas of operations at an

unclassified level should be shared in a single source data base that all organizations can access. The sharing of information will help in connecting the interest maps in regional areas that can assist with deeper understandings of issues and assist in problem framing. Ultimately, this deeper understanding will add an additional layer for operation art and design for strategic leaders.

Third, targeted resourcing should be considered for operations at all levels. Within the tenants of centralized command and decentralized control, military leaders should have resources that they can allocate amongst populations in their efforts to create value in disputes. Typically, these resources are dispersed by the Judge Advocate Generals when property is destroyed by the United States military, but having assets that are targeted to dispute prone issues may assist in resolving minor issue before they fester into larger disputes or conflicts. Resourcing examples include, extra meals ready to eat, bottled water, farm animals, equipment, etc. At the different levels, these resources should increase in value and left to the military leaders to use at the time and place of their choosing

⁴⁰. Brendan Burks, "Dispute and Conflict Military Model," (Adaptive Conflict Management Class Graphic, Fall 2019).

to address disputes and conflicts. Funding levels should be included in pre-deployment planning.

Fourth, resourcing more Department of State (DoS) representatives at lower levels in military organizations. The fusion of DoS and military leaders at lower levels will allow more analytical information collection and analysis of issues in geographic regions. It will also help prepare military leaders with a deeper understanding of issues that they can expect to encounter. Information collected and synthesized should be stored in the common information system discussed in recommendation three above. Initially, DoS representatives should be placed in service negotiation centers to help build integrated curriculum that will be used to train our nation's leaders.

Conclusion

Understanding the basics of dispute and conflict transformation is essential for military leaders in the current and future strategic, operational, and tactical environments to achieve context clarity and assist in problem framing. Although military leaders do not receive targeted training to

understand the context of competition and human needs, disputes and conflicts are present in daily military operations across all levels of the institution. Disputes and conflicts cause military intervention, actions, and frustrations within the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the organization. Additionally, disputes and conflicts exist at varying levels and take different forms both internal and external to the military institution and include the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

Have military leaders been trained in the basics of dispute and conflict transformation to maximize military efforts below the level of armed conflict in the pursuit of achieving the overarching political objectives? The answer is no, they have not. With minimal investment, this can be changed and influence the entire military culture within ten years or less. If nothing changed, then expect the status quo; however, without exploiting this competitive space, this space is left open for adversaries to gain the competitive edge. Making smarter and more aware service members will provide a competitive advantage for the United States in a whole of government approach to achieve its political objectives.

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Negotiation Stories: Today's Military in Action

Joint Task Force Katrina

by Lt Col Kliff Mosley, PhD



pc: David Mark


In the many documented accounts of active-duty participation in Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina hurricane-disaster recovery, the Air Force's 712th Air Support Operations Squadron serves as but a footnote to a footnote¹ in the larger operational account. For the 712th, approximately 60 Airmen, in 15 maintenance, operations, and communications specialties deployed to Hammond, LA, to support the 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav) for humanitarian-assistance operations. This story begins in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's impact on the Mississippi and Louisiana coasts, when the 712th's parent group was issued verbal orders to support our Army-aligned units, however possible. History refers to this as the Department of Defense's "blank check" to the United States Northern Command. Based on the verbal direction passed along to us, our squadron immediately began internal preparations, while simultaneously engaging in external planning with the Army's 1st Cav's G6 communications staff. At that moment, we had little information on our mission's directive, other than we knew we were to deploy in support of the 1st Cav to Louisiana.



returning from our last OIF deployment, and less than two months away from our next round of scheduled, pre-deployment preparation exercises. Upon assessment, the 1st Cav determined they only had enough airborne resources and personnel to perform a limited search, rescue, and recovery operation; however, the 712th had C4, maintenance support, and electrical-power generating capabilities to not only support a C4 mission, but also a small contingent of about 500 users, which the 1st Cav decided they could utilize in their mission to support JTF Katrina.

The traditional mission of the 712th was to provide command and control of air and space power for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) in support of ground operations. The capabilities of the 712th included the ability to establish and maintain tactical command, control, communications, and computers (C4) to plan and coordinate execution of interdiction, close air support, airlift, and reconnaissance missions. When fully equipped, a unit like the 712th could maintain C4 in a primary location and leap to a secondary location while never losing C4 for the JFACC. While a humanitarian operation, like JTF Katrina, was slightly out of the norm for our unit, it was definitely within our capabilities. However, with half of the 712th's communications gear deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we would only have access and use of the equipment that remained, which was intended for training, to form a complete communications package for the unknown mission the 1st Cav and 712th would eventually be assigned.

In addition to our limited supplies, both the 1st Cav and the 712th were only slightly over six months since



¹ Lynn Davis et al., "The Military Response to Hurricane Katrina," in *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, eds. Lynn Davis et al. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 19-46.

At the Negotiation Table

Planning began with the 1st Cav G6, his deputy and chief communications technician, and me, as the communications officer, and my all-purpose communications technician. We sat at a small conference table to discuss our requirements and capabilities.

This inter-service meeting of communicators was very cordial, but we quickly realized that while the tapes over the left breast pocket of our uniforms both started with “U.S.,” that was essentially where our similarities ended. We were from different Service cultures and spoke completely different languages. Thankfully, we all spoke some form of American English—so we spent the first hour of the meeting defining and describing our vocabulary, jargon, acronyms, equipment, requirements, and capabilities. Somehow, this newfound partnership needed a concrete communications and support plan that would ultimately support 1st Cav headquarter’s command and essential-staff elements for command and control, as well as brigade-level search and recovery operations. Time was not on our side. Since the situation in Louisiana was growing worse by the hour,

and the realization that our fellow Americans needed us, those valued elements of any relationship, like trust and rapport, were set aside.

We entered the planning session willing to support the larger mission, however possible, even if it meant temporarily halting all training and pre-deployment preparations for an indefinite amount of time.



Expectations vs. Reality

We did not learn until days later how highly our commanders had spoken of the 712th’s capabilities—our personnel and C4 abilities—to all levels of the 1st Cav’s command, from the commanding general, down to the supporting staffs. The 1st Cav’s expectations were high. As aviators doing “ground duty,” our own commanders did not understand all the nuances of what it took to provide flawless 24/7 C4. This miscommunication, and lack of understanding, greatly influenced the Army’s

expectations and extraordinary demands on us in the field.

Upon the 712th's arrival, we learned that the only component needed from the 1st Cav was the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), which was to operate out of Naval Air Station - Joint Reserve Base - New Orleans (NAS JRB NO). However, when the 1st Cav headquarters element arrived at the Hammond Airport, the G3 (operations) wanted the 712th to establish its highly acclaimed C4 at the airport prior to entering New Orleans. This is when things came to a head.

The expectations of the 712th, based on our commander's praise, versus the reality of what we could actually do, were in stark contrast to each other. Initially establishing C4 services was, in a word, finicky, and unfortunately, it could take 3-to-5 days of around-the-clock troubleshooting, by multiple skilled technicians, to establish all necessary C4 services. Regardless of that reality, the Army was expecting immediate C4 connections with the ability to rapidly redeploy. I began to understand where the misunderstanding resided and attempted to re-explain our capabilities, as well as our limitations—limitations, a topic we should have discussed more thoroughly five days ago at the negotiation table. In everyone's fervor to support this mission, we were all too focused on capabilities. As a captain, I was surrounded by four Army majors and on the receiving end of comments such as, "Well, I thought you guys had some awesome communication capabilities." I reasoned that no amount of antagonism or goading was going to change how our system performed. While I realized that meeting their expectations may not be possible, I was dedicated to the mission.

I tried thinking critically and creatively about bringing solutions that would provide any available immediate-communications capabilities to our site.

This was when I found out we would not be getting any additional support from our Air Force MAJCOM headquarters. From that point forward, I looked for ways to minimize frustration for my troops from our unimpressed Army partners and no longer supporting headquarters.

Over the week, New Orleans was quickly saturated with active-duty units and many other organizations performing all manner of humanitarian operations. After 1st Cav's commanding general for operations decided only a small headquarters contingent was now necessary and assistance from the 712th, with our 'very large footprint' of 60 troops and 30 vehicles, was no longer necessary. The small area was already overrun with first responders from all over the country and a continually growing presence of active-duty units.

The 712th spent our final days in Hammond, LA, assisting the local communities, loading our M-series vehicles on to flatbed tractor trailers and saying our goodbyes, before traveling back to Fort Hood on chartered buses compliments of the 1st Cav.

In conclusion, this was real life. Rarely does anything go as planned or even close to what you want, especially when no one really knows what is being negotiated. Although this was far from a perfect negotiation situation, and there was plenty that could have been done better or gone better at all levels, our commitment to amicably resolve the disputes and conflicts allowed us to both preserve the relationships and serve the mission."

Negotiating Advanced Cyber Capabilities

by Col Justin Mokrovich

Squadron Command offers a variety of operational, personnel, acquisition, and strategic challenges. Across the array of challenges, Squadron Commanders will find themselves fully involved in negotiations at some point throughout their tenure. This was clear in the three previous opportunities I was fortunate enough to Command. While each challenge mentioned could be tied to an example of negotiations, one of the most complete personal negotiations I led as a Squadron Commander dealt with the acquisition of a new cyber capability for the Air Force network enterprise. The following is a very brief summary and highlights a few valuable lessons learned.

Comply to Connect (C2C) is a current technology that bolsters the defense of an enterprise network. The capability identifies, and then scans, all devices throughout a network. Additionally, it automatically patches vulnerable systems before allowing those devices to connect to the network. C2C delivers advanced network security with in-depth analysis on the defensive strength of a network. My previous Squadron, the 26th Network Operations Squadron, was responsible for the operation, maintenance, and defense of the AF network enterprise. To combat a continuous and evolving cyber threat, we were in search of a capability to better secure and defend the network. C2C met our requirement and thus began a year and a half negotiation at various levels to acquire and implement C2C.

To acquire and implement C2C, negotiations had to happen with several interested parties including Squadron technicians and information security personnel, the C2C vendor, group leadership, wing leadership, Numbered AF staff and leadership, customers of services provided, and other outside organizations such as the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Program Management Office for the AF enterprise weapon system, offices throughout the Pentagon—Headquarters Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense—and a host of senior leaders scattered throughout numerous organizations. With the vast array of interested parties, the challenge became educating each separate organization of the C2C capability and then creating “buy-in” and advocacy to move forward.

Advocacy throughout the C2C acquisition process, across so many organizations, for example, led to bureaucratic and enduring challenges. At any level within the process, a single person in any of the organizations

listed could have disapproved the acquisition or implementation that would have effectively ended negotiations. It was paramount to learn what each organization valued—funding, capability, impact, integration, governance—and negotiate operating within their specific constraints and restraints. Additionally, when met with opposition, it was critical to use those organizations already in support to apply correct pressure and change opinions. The enduring nature of the project likewise became a challenge. It was paramount to ensure negotiations were conducted in a way that would guarantee survivability by negotiating to the next state of negotiation, which mostly dealt with funding and governance of C2C.

The year and a half of negotiating the acquisition and implementation of C2C was challenging, yet gratifying once purchased and implemented. The process was key and generated many lessons learned from a wide array of considerations one could not have predicted from the very beginning.

Strategy and building partnerships were critical to success as well as learning and knowing all aspects of the project.



Amy Lovgren | DVIDS

In the end, because of the negotiation process, C2C was implemented correctly and remains on the network today, resulting in a more defensible and secure AF enterprise network.

Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action

by Simon Sinek

reviewed by CMSgt John G. Boyles, USAF (Ret), Air Force Negotiation Center

"Why is just a belief, *hows* are the actions we take to realize that belief, and *whats* are the results of those actions."

Simon focuses on The Golden Circle when engaged in developing something you are passionate about. Having clarity of why you do something will impact the discipline of how you do it and will produce consistency of what you do. It's a very simple concept to help everyone remember why they do what they do. The book is full of examples of those who started with why and stuck with it, and those who started with why and drifted away from it. The difference is remarkable.

In a world that doesn't start with why, people tend to make assumptions about why they are doing what they do. Although based on sound research, those assumptions can lead them astray. Simon says, "Be careful with what you think or assume you know." Also, in a why-less world, some use the carrot and the stick to convince others to think one way or another, or to buy one thing or another. Manipulations, aspiration attempts, and novelty ads are just three of the many ways those with no clue as to why they are doing what they do, do business.

Why focus on why? It's the only way to maintain a lasting success and have a greater blend of innovation and flexibility. People do not buy what you do, they buy why you do it. This statement is not an opinion; it's biology. A very basic human need, is the need to belong. We tend to gather with those whom we


perceive to have common beliefs and values. The why connects us and drives our behavior. Steve Wozniak was not motivated by money

when he built the first Apple computer; he had a much nobler purpose for the technology. He saw it as a way for the little man to take it to corporations who were very powerful; his why. Those who felt they had been overlooked or discounted by the powers that be bought into Wozniak's vision, and Apple sales took off. Apple continues to be successful because they continue to remember why they do what they do, help

people.

When you associate with people who believe in your why, trust emerges. Trust is a feeling, not a rational experience. Wozniak says, "Trust emerges when we have a sense that another person or organization is driven by things other than self-gain." With trust comes a sense of value, and it allows us to rely on others. Historically, trust has played a bigger role in a company's success than skill. When we trust companies, we tend to develop loyalty and only buy from that company. Car enthusiasts tend to be brand loyal. I drove a Ford for years because my dad drove a Ford. He trusted Ford, so I trusted Ford.

What happens when why goes fuzzy? Losing focus on why you do what you do will cause people to lose focus on why you do what





Why We Do What We Do- AFWERX 2019
 Photo by Staff Sgt. Jordyn Fetter
 Las Vegas, NV.

you do. In the course of building a business or a career, some become more confident in what they do and become greater experts in how they do it. However, they lose focus on why they do it. Businesses tend to shift their focus from why to what in pursuit of meeting financial goals, instead of remembering why they started doing what they are doing. The clarity of why starts to be diluted. America Online (AOL), for instance, inspired a nation to get online. They had a clear why. Their goal was to get more people online. Their pursuit of that goal wreaked havoc on their business in the short term, but AOL pulled ahead of their competitors. However, a decision to change from hourly pricing for online access to unlimited monthly pricing created so much traffic, it shut down their servers and they never recovered. Having an AOL.com email address went from being a source of pride to being a symbol of being left behind. In the end, AOL lost their why in pursuit of more money.

This book should drive us to always remember why we do what we do. It will help

guide us in the development of our processes and procedures of how we do what we do and make what we do better.

**Start with Why: How Great Leaders
 Inspire Everyone to Take Action.**

London, England: Portfolio/Penguin 2013
 258 pages. \$8.79

John is an Instructional Systems Designer at the Air Force Negotiations Center (AFNC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. John has over 10 years of experience in the training and education arena. John served as an instructor and Director of Curriculum at the Air Force Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy. He also assisted in the development of three Leadership Skills Courses and taught over 150 classes for the State of Alabama's Department of Commerce.

Save Your Ammo: Working Across Cultures for National Security

by Louise Rasmussen and Winston Sieck


reviewed by Col David C. O'Meara, USAF (Ret), Air Force Negotiation Center

Senior military leaders rely on each and every military professional to achieve their mission, sometimes within extremely chaotic environments. The individuals and teams tasked with accomplishing these missions must balance a number of critical factors, such as the application of technology and understanding unique cultures, all while operating in the human domain. To better prepare today's military for these challenges, those same senior leaders have clearly and specifically tasked traditional education and training institutions and organizations, such as Air Education and Training Command and Air University, to teach and train our various forces. Organizations, such as the Air Force Negotiation Center, search daily for the best resources to prepare our people and teams for the success their leaders demand.

One new promising resource for teaching negotiation and culture in the military environment is *Save Your Ammo: Working Across Cultures for National Security*, by Louise Rasmussen and Winston Sieck. These authors, who are both physiologists, co-founded Global Cognition to bring a more disciplined research approach and foundation to cultural studies within the military conflict environment. *Save Your Ammo* focuses on the success, and sometimes failures, by our operational security and military forces during global human

engagement. Using the vehicle of military storytelling, Rasmussen and Sieck created an extremely applicable and easy to absorb guide of best practices for U.S. military personnel to operate within the external global community. *Save Your Ammo* has great potential as part of future intercultural and negotiation education curriculum when blended into self-study, distance learning, or in-residence military and civilian education curriculum.

There are multiple aspects of intercultural engagement and negotiation, such as maintaining mission focus, asking questions, actively listening, building rapport, maintaining relationships, evaluating trust, measuring security, etc. These, and so many more, are important to intercultural success. The authors build on these fundamental concepts in thirteen chapters by sharing the stories and observations of over 200 "seasoned professionals who have worked all over the world." All this to answer the question of what "skills and strategies [do] highly experienced national-security professionals draw on to adapt quickly and work effectively in new cultures?" Importantly for the military audience, for both leaders and followers, is they start and end with a mission focus. The first story highlights a serious, and potentially deadly, encounter between Marines and a rebel group in a remote African compound.



However, not every story is life or death, and some even deal with mundane aspects of daily life, but they all are relevant to intercultural engagement.

The authors organize their chapters around classic intercultural engagement and negotiation concepts, such as knowing yourself, learning best practices, building trust, cultural realities, etc. One of *Save Your Ammo*'s strengths is how the authors present multiple well researched stories. These stories cover a lot of ground and take place everywhere. They take us from a female Army Foreign Area Officer teaching English in a Jordanian University, to a Marine Special Forces Major training United Arab Emirates Special Forces soldiers how to ski at Lake Tahoe. We also read about interactions teaching combat skills in Afghanistan to building schools in Kyrgyzstan. There are so many more, some funny, and some deadly. Another strength is these stories come from both senior leaders, including General Officers, to noncommissioned officers and junior enlisted from all services. These vehicles help the authors stress the broad need for cultural education across all services and at all ranks. They also stress cultural education cannot be a one and done, but is part of a military leader's lifelong learning process. The authors employ a classic military education storytelling tradition to bring tactics and strategy to life. Many military educators work very hard to make their teaching alive and realistic. *Save Your Ammo* would be a great addition to any military educator's tool kit.

Academically, *Save Your Ammo* is not a standalone intercultural source. It is a quick read and identifies many basic intercultural concepts and challenges. Its value comes in two important parts, first as a foundational military teaching tool and second, as a launching pad for moving beyond the knowledge level. It is also a solid resource for preparing yourself, or students, for in class or field intercultural exercises. It would reinforce the concept of the plan, execute, and debrief teaching and is a must read for military or security pre-deployment readiness, especially for less experienced personnel.

Hopefully, however, the authors are working on the next edition or book, which discusses the intercultural aspects of the internal U.S. military, security, and political culture. The stories of down range engagements could be supplemented with a work on inter-service rivalries, while working with the State Department or briefing Congressional staffers, to name just a few.

Save Your Ammo: Working Across Cultures for National Security
Yellow Springs, OH: Global Cognition, 2019
253 pages. \$16.95

Col David C. O'Meara, USAF (Ret), is an Air Force Negotiation Center curriculum developer and educator with multiple cross cultural experiences who served as the U.S. Defense Attaché to Israel from 2006 to 2009. He has also served in Japan and Kuwait.

Mr. O'Meara, long time member of the AFNC staff, has taught negotiations and intercultural issues at the Air University for over ten years. He is currently developing new curriculum, working to capture the balance between mission and relationship in tackling unsolvable intercultural problems and negotiations.

The Bartering Mindset: A Mostly Forgotten Framework for Mastering Your Next Negotiation

by Brian C. Gunia Toronto

reviewed by SMSgt William F. McClurg, USAF (Ret), Air Force Negotiation Center


Almost four decades ago, Roger Fisher and William Ury published their groundbreaking book, *Getting to Yes*, which revolutionized how to approach negotiations. It showed negotiators, they must move beyond focusing on what they want, and instead, dig below the surface and aim for the why; otherwise known as their interests. Twenty-five years later, in his 2013 *Forbes* article, *Why Negotiators Still Aren't Getting to Yes*, Keld Jensen argued that despite the revolutionary ideas of *Getting to Yes*, negotiators were still failing to reach interest-based negotiations because of a lack of trust, being guided by emotions, and the overall unpleasantness of the negotiation process. These failures often times lead negotiators to fall back into a distributive approach—a fixed-value negotiation where an “I win, you lose” mindset dominates.

In his book, *The Bartering Mindset*, Brian Gunia argues distributive approaches to negotiations are facilitated by a monetary mindset; money drives us to believe our needs are in competition with others' needs. While this mindset might work for smaller issues we are trying to transform, it will not work for our more complex ones. The purpose of Gunia's book is to transform our approach to negotiation using a bartering mindset. He explains that a pure bartering environment

is trading what you have and don't need, for something you need but don't have. The trade is balanced in that what you give is as valuable to you as what you receive. Gunia does

explain, while we can never have a pure bartering environment, we can apply this same principle to interest-based negotiations. He offers a five-step process to help negotiators veer away from distributive approaches and focus on the interests in a negotiation, examine those potential partners who can help you meet your needs, and how you can also help them meet their needs, and then look at ways those partners can also help each other.

Negotiations require two or more parties. You are negotiating because you are trying to transform your situation to a better condition. Your counterpart has something you need, or you need to work together to solve a problem or transform a conflict. If you approach the negotiation adversarially, or competitively, you will end up leaving value on the table because the other party will be less willing to work with you. These distributive approaches could also potentially drive your negotiation partner away from the table, leading to failure to transform the situation. To avoid this calamity, Gunia tells us to begin by understanding what you need from the other party and also analyze what you



can offer. Our needs are not as fully defined as our initial perception of them. To fully understand our interests, we must look at them deeply. The most effective way to understand our interests is to continuously ask ourselves, “why do we have this need?” In addition to understanding our needs deeply, we must also understand our needs broadly. After taking a deep and broad look at your interests, Gunia tells us you must look at all of the possible partners available who could potentially meet your needs, and also deeply and broadly look at what you can do to potentially meet their needs and satisfy their interests. Out of those potential partners, the negotiator must explore all opportunities among those partners to reach mutually beneficial solutions. Lastly, we must begin engaging our partners and cultivate relationships to create the best value for all involved. This engagement does not set out to reach a deal, but to communicate with your potential partners and exchange information to fully understand their situations, while also conveying your position and interests. Gunia does not advocate for moving to a pure bartering mindset, but presents an approach to reach mutually beneficial solutions. He also does not argue against Fisher and Ury, but adds to their interest-based negotiations by looking deeper, below the surface, at our interests and reaching out to other potential partners.

Gunia's bartering mindset approach meshes neatly with the Air Force Negotiation Center's concept of a military negotiation as a joint problem-solving and joint decision making endeavor. Each wing in the United States Air Force has a mission that ultimately fulfills the National Defense Strategy's role in our nation's defense. The organizations within the wing each have their own role in accomplishing that respective wing's mission. Those units must work together to meet the wing's goals and understand how every decision the organization makes impacts every other organization on the base. When negotiating between units, those negotiation partners must take into consideration the others' interest to jointly transform the situation into a better condition. Gunia's approach

also robustly aligns with the first step of a military negotiation—the pre-negotiation. Preparing yourself is the most important part of a negotiation, and examining yours and your negotiation partner's interests is a critical step to complete before entering into a negotiation. His approaches further strengthen your negotiation by taking the time, while sitting at the table, to communicate with, not at, your partner to jointly investigate what he or she truly needs. Through this communication, the parties can determine how to work together to reach mutually beneficial solutions.

Gunia's book does not offer any new concepts but expands on the ideas presented by Fisher and Ury. Using *The Bartering Mindset* approach could help negotiators minimize apprehension they have about negotiating. Additionally, his approach adds to the complaint military negotiators already have—it takes much more time out of our already task-saturated day. Many in a military negotiation who are unaware of interest-based negotiations will try to work out a deal quickly and will have difficulty carving out time to concern themselves with your interests. You will have to work extra hard to reach mutually beneficial solutions, but in the long run, how can you afford not to?

The Bartering Mindset: A Mostly Forgotten Framework for Mastering Your Next Negotiation

Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, Rotman-UTP Publishing, 2019. 238 pages. \$32.95

William “Bill” McClurg, MAEd, MBA, is an Instructional Designer at Maxwell AFB, Alabama with over three years in culture and negotiation curriculum. He has developed and managed multiple Community College of the Air Force courses supporting 70,000 students annually. Bill also has 11 years of leadership curriculum instructional design and facilitation at the NCO, SNCO, and officer levels.

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Send submissions to
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