

360 Degree Assessment & Certification

Q2 2019



Effitas is a world-leading, independent IT security efficacy testing & assurance company. We are trusted by antimalware vendors across the world

TEL:
+44 (0)20 3239 9289

EMAIL:
contact@mrgeffitas.com

TWITTER:
[@mrgeffitas](https://twitter.com/mrgeffitas)

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Introduction

MRG Effitas has a core focus on efficacy assessments both in the anti-financial fraud space and also in the traditional “Real World” detection tests.

The methodology employed in this test maps closely to Real World use.

This Programme is called a “360 Assessment” since it deals with the full spectrum of malware instead of just financial malware. In the 360 Assessments, trojans, backdoors, financial malware, ransomware and “other” malicious applications are used.

Besides the “Real world test”, we performed tests to check PUA/Adware protection, Exploit/Fileless protection, measured the False positive detection rates and also the Performance impacts of the security products.



Executive Summary

This Certification Programme is designed to serve as a reflection of product efficacy based on what we have previously termed “metrics that matter”.

In many of our previous tests, particularly those that have focused on financial malware, we started with the assumption that the endpoint has already been compromised. Being one of the world's largest supplier of early-life malicious binaries and malicious URLs, and from our own simulator development, we know that all endpoints can be infected, regardless of the security solution employed.

For us, a product's ability to block initial infection (although critical in most cases) is not the only metric that matters. One also needs to measure the time taken for the security product to detect malware on a system and remediate it.

When conducting these tests, we tried to simulate normal user behaviour. We are aware that a “Real World” test cannot be conducted by a team of professionals inside a lab because we understand how certain types of malware work, how malware attacks and how such attacks could be prevented. Simulating normal user behaviour means that we paid special attention to all alerts given by security applications. A pass was given only when alerts were straightforward and clearly suggested that malicious action should be blocked.

With these, it is very important to note that the best choice for an average user is to keep things very simple and for the product not to present many pop-up alerts or questions.

Out of twelve products we tested, nine managed to meet the specification to attain our Q2 2019 360 certification award, these being:

- Avira Antivirus Pro
- Bitdefender Endpoint Security
- CrowdStrike Falcon Protect
- ESET Endpoint Security
- F-Secure Computer Protection Premium
- Kaspersky Small Office Security
- Microsoft Windows Defender
- Sophos Intercept X
- Symantec Endpoint Protection

In this quarter, the following applications failed the test in that it was not able to block at least 98% of the ITW samples.

- Avast Business Antivirus
- McAfee Endpoint Security
- Trend Micro Worry-Free Business Security

Certification

In order to attain a quarterly MRG Effitas 360 Degree certification award, a security application must either protect the system from initial infection (autoblock or behaviour protection - Level 1 pass) or detect at least 98% of all cases any malware and fully remediate the system on the first retest (Level 2 pass), while the time-to-detect test cases (where the sample was initially missed) are less than 10%. Applications that meet this specification are given certification for that quarter. PUA/Adware, Exploit/Fileless, False positive and Performance tests are not part of the certification.

Under the MRG Effitas 360 Degree Assessment & Certification, the following products were certified for Q2 2019:

Certified (Level 1):

- Avira Antivirus Pro
- Bitdefender Endpoint Security
- CrowdStrike Falcon Protect
- ESET Endpoint Security
- F-Secure Computer Protection Premium
- Kaspersky Small Office Security
- Microsoft Windows Defender
- Sophos Intercept X
- Symantec Endpoint Protection



The Purpose of this Report

Since its inception in 2009, MRG Effitas has strived to differentiate itself from traditional testing houses by having its primary focus on providing “efficacy assessments” and not just performing “tests”.

Traditionally, testing of security software has centred on measuring a product’s ability to detect malware. Testing has evolved rapidly over the last two to three years as most labs, under the direction of AMTSO (of which MRG Effitas is a member) strived to conduct “Real World” testing following these guidelines. More information about the compliance status of this test can be found on the AMTSO website:

<https://www.amtso.org/amtso-ls1-tp010>

Although there is no absolute definition of this kind of testing, loosely speaking, it involves the introduction of malware to an endpoint through a realistic vector, such as a browser or USB memory stick. Real World testing mostly involves “dynamic testing” (i.e. the malware is executed and then the ability of the security product to block the malware is measured).

Whilst these types of tests are useful and yield valid and meaningful data, MRG Effitas wanted to merge these tests and also go one step further by measuring the time security products take to detect infections and remediate the endpoint.

To make testing more akin to Real World scenarios, no manual scanning was conducted. Instead, the system was retested exactly 24 hours after the system was compromised, thereby giving security applications the opportunity to detect infections on restart.

As we have stated in our previous test reports, most malware has one primary objective, and that is to make money for the cybercriminals.

Measuring initial detection rates and the time taken to detect active malware is important, particularly in today’s threat landscape with the mix of malware that is prevalent.

As we have repeated in our previous financial malware test reports, the longer a cybercriminal can have their malware on a system, the greater the opportunity for them to be able to capture private user information including banking passwords and social media credentials, etc.

There has been an increase in the prevalence of targeted ransomware, which once active on the system, holds the user at ransom to decrypt system data or unlock the system in some other.

For these types of malware, it is initial detection that is of the greatest importance, since the vast majority of security solutions will be unable to remediate an encrypted system.

In providing these quarterly certifications, the MRG Effitas 360 Assessment & Certification Programme is the de facto standard by which security vendors, financial institutions and other corporations can attain the most rigorous and accurate determination of a product’s efficacy against the full spectrum of malware that is prevalent during the period.

Tests Employed

In this assessment (Q2 2019), we ran the following tests:

In the Wild 360 / Full Spectrum Test

Most of the malicious URLs used in this test were compromised legitimate websites which served malware. We believe that such URLs pose the greatest danger to users as this is the place where they least expect to get infected. Some URLs come from our regular honeypots or in case of ransomware and financial malware in particular, we used URLs from newly-discovered distribution sites.

Malware delivered by URLs used in this test can be considered as Zero Day in the true meaning of that phrase. This posed a challenge to the participant products.

~10% of the threats used in this test were introduced to the system via internal webmail sites. We have witnessed many SMBs being infected through internal webmails and lack of spam filtering. Downloading malware attachments from internal webmail sites bypass the URL blocking features of the products, and this happens in-the-wild.

During the In the Wild 360 / Full Spectrum test, 383 live ITW samples were used. The stimulus load comprised the following: 148 trojans, 72 backdoors, 79 financial malware samples, 5 ransomware samples, and 56 spyware, 8 malicious scripts, 1 spam email and 14 others.

PUA / Adware Test

The PUA samples used in this test are deceptors or potentially unwanted applications (PUA) that aren't malicious but are generally considered unsuitable for most home or business networks. It contains adware, installs toolbars or has other unclear objectives. It may also contribute to consuming computing resource. PUAs can be deceptive, harmful, HOAX, show aggressive popups and misleading or scaring the user. They may provide unconventional ways of uninstalling the application, maybe retain some of their components on the device without the user's consent. We use a filtered AppEsteem's feed as they developed deceptor requirements as part of a cross-industry effort between many of the world's leading security companies and represent a minimum bar that all apps and services must meet to avoid being titled deceptive.

AppEsteem as a member of the AMTSO group is dedicated to help protecting consumers from harassing and objectionable material, and to help to enable security companies to restrict access to such actions. MRG Effitas as part of the AMTSO group also dedicated to protecting these thoughts.

In the PUA / Adware section we tested the products against 11 PUAs as well.

Exploit/Fileless Test

The main purpose of this test is to see how security products protect against a specific exploitation technique. In order to measure this, we developed test cases that simulate the corresponding exploit and post-exploitation techniques only. By this method we were able to see which products protect against which techniques.

Drive-by download exploits are one of the biggest threats and concerns in an enterprise environment because no user interaction is needed to start the malware on the victim machine. Outdated browser and Office environments are very “popular” in enterprise environments because of compatibility issues, lack of proper patch-management, etc.

We were not looking to test the products' ability to avoid exposure to adversaries, to interrupt malware delivery before it reaches the device or to identify malicious files. We wanted to focus explicitly on each product's ability to mitigate each attack technique. The results are not intended to evaluate the complete efficacy of the products, but rather the products' anti-exploit and anti-post-exploit features in isolation.

During this test we used 10 different exploitation techniques. The detailed description can be found in the [Appendix](#)

False Positive Test

Malicious content blocking from a security product is not necessary achieved by 100% correct detection rate. In many cases all malware blocking is a result of a very aggressive filter which can block non-malicious legit applications as well prohibiting everyday work by blocking legit, perhaps newly developed in-house software.

In order to test this feature, we tested the security applications against completely clean, recently created applications.

False positive assessment consisted of 1032 clean and legitimate application samples. The samples are focused on samples one can find in enterprise environments, like drivers, media editors, developer tools, etc.

Performance Test

A security product's usefulness does not depend on protection level solely, but the footprint and the effect of the operating system is also an important measure.


- To assess the products' influence on the operating system we tested several performance factors on physical machine and combined the results based on a scoring approach. Detailed information can be found in the [Appendix](#).

- In every test case, (except for the performance test) our testing environment supports the use of VM aware malware, this is the reason why we were able to use more sophisticated threats which wouldn't run on Virtual Machines.

Security Applications Tested

- Avast Business Antivirus 19.5.2563
- Avira Antivirus Pro 15.0.1906.1432
- Bitdefender Endpoint Security 6.6.11.162
- CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor 5.12.9302.0
- ESET Endpoint Security 7.0.2091.0
- F-Secure Computer Protection Premium 19.5
- Kaspersky Small Office Security 19.0.0.1088(f)
- McAfee Endpoint Security 10.6.0.542
- Microsoft Windows Defender 1.1.16100.4
- Sophos Intercept X 2.0.14
- Symantec Endpoint Protection Cloud 22.17.2.47
- Trend Micro Security 6.6.2457/14.1.1516

Malware sample types used to conduct the tests




Test Results

The tables below show the results of testing under the MRG Effitas 360 Q2 2019 Assessment Programme.


Q2 2019 In the Wild 360 / Full Spectrum test results

The table below shows the initial detection rates of the security products for 398 ITW samples. This table is sorted by smallest amount of failures.




Ransomware samples test results

The table below shows the initial detection rates of the security products for 5 ransomware samples. This table is sorted by smallest amount of failures.




Financial malware samples test results

The table below shows the initial detection rates of the security products for 79 financial malware. This table is sorted by smallest amount of failures.




PUA/Adware samples test results

The table below shows the initial detection rates of the security products for 11 PUA/Adware applications. This table is sorted by smallest amount of failures.




Exploit/Fileless samples test results

The table below shows the initial detection rates of the security products for 10 Exploit / Fileless test. This table is sorted by smallest amount of failures.




False positive samples test results

The table below shows the initial detection rates of the security products for 1032 false positive samples. This table is sorted by smallest amount of failures.



Performance test results

This table is sorted from highest to lowest score where the highest score denotes the lowest impact on the system.



[Scoring details can be found in the Appendix.](#)

Detailed results of the Performance test

The table below shows the detailed results of the performance test of the security products. This table is sorted alphabetically.

	Windows 10 Base	Avast	Avira	Bitdefender	CrowdStrike	Defender	ESET	F-Secure	Kaspersky	McAfee	Sophos	Symantec	TrendMicro	Webroot
Install time (s)	n/a	189,0	72,0	192,0	47,0	n/a	28,0	87,7	110,0	155,0	320,0	52,0	215,0	38,5
Bootup time (s)	20,3	25,5	27,9	26,9	24,9	22,6	22,2	24,4	23,8	29,1	35,7	22,4	34,6	21,6
Firefox startup time (s)	1,1	1,3	1,2	1,5	1,4	1,2	1,3	1,2	1,5	1,5	1,5	1,3	1,9	1,2
10 minutes of idling														
CPU usage (%)	0,2	0,8	0,6	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,5	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,8	0,4	1,8	0,3
Memory usage (Mb)	0 (Reference)	342,4	307,5	627,2	81,6	147,8	126,7	351,8	303,1	496,6	635,2	268,8	433,1	32,9
Physical disk usage (%)	0,8	1,8	1,0	0,7	0,8	0,6	1,1	0,9	0,8	0,9	1,1	0,7	1,0	0,7
Network interface usage (B/s)	350,5	861,6	470,9	708,2	834,9	561,1	265,9	397,5	548,0	381,8	703,0	528,2	534,8	541,1
Security software update														
Time (s)	n/a	53,3	69,0	150,7	n/a	52,3	33,0	37,0	43,3	91,3	89,7	23,7	28,0	n/a
CPU usage (%)	n/a	23,9	20,2	23,6	n/a	12,0	29,8	31,3	27,2	21,3	19,7	22,0	26,3	n/a
Memory usage (Mb)	n/a	509,2	506,2	662,0	n/a	277,1	218,0	551,1	417,4	635,2	721,5	434,2	541,1	n/a
Physical disk usage (%)	n/a	25,5	11,0	9,5	n/a	9,4	59,5	18,8	9,7	4,0	14,4	8,0	12,6	n/a
Network interface usage (B/s)	n/a	37913,8	48265,5	39042,6	n/a	379294,4	99156,1	31115,9	31351,0	46882,9	10296,3	341392,7	28606,3	n/a
Security software scanning - C:\														
Time (s)	n/a	514,0	329,3	205,3	n/a	395,0	174,7	64,0	123,0	1078,0	360,7	208,0	624,0	465,7
CPU usage (%)	n/a	24,3	23,6	41,5	n/a	46,6	22,6	74,8	78,4	94,5	25,5	58,5	30,4	46,5
Memory usage (Mb)	n/a	969,6	671,8	856,4	n/a	507,5	354,5	830,9	504,7	1138,3	1051,4	434,4	773,8	452,1
Physical disk usage (%)	n/a	85,2	33,1	37,4	n/a	35,9	51,7	121,7	115,6	12,3	48,7	27,8	19,2	33,4
Network interface usage (B/s)	n/a	1691,5	985,3	1514,4	n/a	911,0	1974,4	2404,0	661,3	726,3	2203,2	1603,5	695,4	32438,6
Security software size on disk														
Just after install (Mb)	n/a	1712,8	759,9	878,0	28,9	n/a	1048,6	574,7	533,5	377,0	1521,2	605,9	687,7	13,0
After usage (at least: 30 mins idling, 3 scans, 3 updates)	n/a	1603,7	591,1	919,7	29,0	331,3	1030,4	799,2	930,4	381,1	1532,3	602,4	902,1	28,9

Understanding Grade of Pass

Level 1

All threats detected on first exposure or via behaviour protection.

- Avira Antivirus Pro
- Bitdefender Endpoint Security
- CrowdStrike Falcon Protect
- ESET Endpoint Security
- F-Secure Computer Protection Premium
- Kaspersky Small Office Security
- Microsoft Windows Defender
- Sophos Intercept X
- Symantec Endpoint Protection

Level 2

At least 98% of the threats detected and neutralised / system remediated before or on the first rescan.

Failed

Security product failed to detect all infections or at least 98% of them and remediate the system during the test procedure

- Avast Business Antivirus
- McAfee Endpoint Security
- Trend Micro Worry-Free Business Security

Appendix 1

Methodology used in the “In the Wild 360 / Full Spectrum”, PUA tests

1. Windows 10 64-bit operating system was installed on a hardened virtual machine, all updates are applied and third-party applications installed and updated.
2. An image of the operating system was be created.
3. A clone of the imaged systems was made for each of the security applications used in the test.
4. An individual security application was installed using default settings on each of the systems created in (3) and then, where applicable, updated. If the vendor provided a non-default setting, this setting was checked whether it was realistic. If yes, the changes were documented, applied, and added in the report in an appendix (if any).
5. A clone of the system as at the end of (4) was created.
6. Each live URL test was conducted by the following procedure.
 - a. Downloading a single binary executable (or document, script, etc.) from its native URL using Google Chrome to the Downloads folder and then executing the binary.
 - b. Either the security application blocked the URL where the malicious binary was located.
 - i. Or the security application detected and blocked the malicious binary whilst it was being downloaded to the desktop.
 - ii. Or the security application detected the malicious binary when it was executed according to the following criteria: It identified the binary as being malicious and either automatically blocked it or postponed its execution and warned the user that the file was malicious and awaited user input.
7. The system under test was deemed to have been infected if the security application failed to detect or block the binary at any stage in (6) and allowed it to be executed.
8. The test case was retested 24 hours after the initial test if the security application failed to detect or block the malicious binary.
9. Tests are conducted with all systems having internet access.
10. As no user-initiated scans was involved in this test, applications rely on various technologies to detect, block and remediate threats. Some of these technologies were: URL blacklist, reputation, signature, machine learning, heuristics, behaviour etc.

Methodology used in the False positive test

1. Windows 10 64-bit operating system was installed on a hardened virtual machine, all updates are applied and third-party applications installed and updated.
2. An image of the operating system was be created.
3. A clone of the imaged systems was made for each of the security applications used in the test.
4. An individual security application was installed using default settings on each of the systems created in (3) and then, where applicable, updated. If the vendor provided a non-default setting, this setting was checked whether it was realistic. If yes, the changes were documented, applied, and added in the report in an appendix (if any).
5. A clone of the system as at the end of (4) was created.
6. Each False positive test case was conducted by the following procedure.
 - a. Copying the binary executable from a USB drive to the Desktop
 - b. Executing the binary.
7. The test case is marked as a False Positive block if the security application detects or blocks the binary at any stage in (6).
8. The test case was retested 24 hours after the initial test if the security application blocked the binary.
9. Tests are conducted with all systems having internet access.

Methodology used in the Exploit/Fileless test – in-the-wild exploits

1. One default install Windows 7 hardened virtual machine endpoint is created. The default HTTP/HTTPS proxy is configured to point to a proxy running on a different machine. SSL/TLS traffic is not intercepted on the proxy, and optionally AV's have been configured to skip the proxy.
2. The security of the OS is weakened by the following actions:
 - a. Microsoft Defender is disabled (except in case of Microsoft Defender)
 - b. Internet Explorer SmartScreen is disabled (except in case of Microsoft Defender)
3. The following vulnerable software is installed:
 - a. Java 1.7.0.17
 - b. Adobe Reader 9.3.0
 - c. Flash Player 15.0.0.152 or Flash Player 16.0.0.287 in a small number of cases
 - d. Silverlight 5.1.10411.0
 - e. Internet Explorer 11
 - f. Firefox 31.0

g. Chrome 38.0.2125.101

These version numbers were specified with the following two requirements:

- The highest number of in-the-wild exploits should be able to exploit this specific version, thus increasing the coverage of the tests.
 - The version must currently be popular among users.
 - Windows Update is disabled.
4. From this point, a number of different snapshots are created from the virtual machine, each with different endpoint protection products and one with none. This procedure ensures that the base system is exactly the same in all test systems. The following endpoint security suites, with the following configuration, are defined for this test:
- a. No additional protection, this snapshot is used to infect the OS and to verify the exploit replay.
 - b. Vendor A
 - c. Vendor B
 - d. ...

The endpoint systems are installed with default configuration, potentially unwanted software removal is enabled, and if it was an option during install, cloud/community participation is enabled. The management servers (if needed) are installed onto a different server. The purpose of management servers is to centrally administer, update and analyse logs in an enterprise environment. Installing the management server on a different server is highly recommended by vendors, so it does not interfere with the testing, machine resources are not used by the management server, etc.

5. Two sources of exploits are used during the test. One in-the-wild exploit kits, and one from publicly available open-source exploit frameworks (e.g. Metasploit). In spite of other "real world protection tests", no binary downloads (e.g. exe) were tested. ActiveX, VBscript based downloaders are out of scope in the exploit test section.
6. The virtual machine is reverted to a clean state and traffic was replayed by the proxy server. The replay meant that the browser is used as before, but instead of the original webservers, the proxy server answers the requests based on the recorded traffic. In this replay, other traffic is allowed, which means that unmatched requests (previously not recorded) are answered as without the proxy. When the "replayed exploit" is able to infect the OS, the exploit traffic is marked as a source for the tests. This method guarantees that exactly the same traffic will be seen by the endpoint protection systems, even if the original exploit kit goes down during the tests. Although this might be axiomatic, it is important to note that no exploit traffic test case was deleted after this step of the test. All tests are included in the final results. In the case of HTTPS traffic, the original site is contacted, without replaying.
7. After new exploit traffic is approved, the endpoint protection systems are tested, in a random order. Before the exploit site is tested, it is verified that the endpoint protection had been updated to the latest version with the latest signatures and that every cloud connection is working. If there is a need to restart the system, it is restarted. In the proxy setup, unmatched requests are allowed to pass through. No VPN is used during the test. When user interaction is needed from the endpoint protection (e.g. site visit not recommended, etc.), the block/deny action is chosen. When user interaction is needed from Windows, we chose the run/allow options, except for UAC. No other processes are running on the system, except the Process Monitor from Sysinternals and Wireshark (both installed to non-default directories and modified not to be detected by default tools).
8. After navigating to the exploit site, the system is monitored to check for new processes, loaded DLLs or C&C traffic.

9. After an endpoint protection suite is tested, a new endpoint protection is randomly selected for the test until all endpoint protection products had been tested.
10. The process goes back to step 7. until all exploit site test cases are reached.
11. If the exploitation had been successful and considered 'Missed', the following actions could had been taken.
 - Download a file from victim machine
 - Upload a file to the victim machine
 - Execute a command on the victim machine

Detailed description of the Exploit / Fileless cases.

Test case 001

Winamp Playlist UNC Path Computer Name Overflow + Meterpreter

In this test case, we use the Winamp 5.11 and 5.12 exploit (winamp_playlist_unc) to start the exploit chain. After successfully exploiting the vulnerability a Meterpreter stager is executed.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of that working session has been established these actions has been taken:

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

Test case is marked as MISSED if exploitation was successful and test machine was successfully controlled via the new session.

Exploited application: Winamp 5.11 and 5.12 OS version: Windows 7

CVE: CVE-2006-0476

Test case 002

PUPY/.BAT

In this test case, a Pupy connectback payload is instantiated using a standard .bat file running a Powershell command.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of that working session has been established these actions has been taken:

- A directory list is queried
- A file is uploaded to the victim
- A file is downloaded
- A shell command is executed

Test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

References:

<https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy>

Test case 003

Sharpshooter BAT/Pupy

In this test case, we issue a Windows Management Instrumentalization (WMI) command via a malicious Windows batch file (BAT), which eventually plants a Pupy payload. The batch file is generated with the SharpShooter tool.

- Stage 1. A bat file executing a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command.
- Stage 2. The WMI command downloads the code for Stage 3 using an XSL transformation from our remote server endpoint.
- Stage 3. The downloaded binary payload creates a new process, downloading the code for Stage 4.
- Stage 4. A PowerShell command that downloads further the final PowerShell code for Stage 5.
- Stage 5. The actual Pupy implant, written in PowerShell.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of that a working session has been established, the following steps are taken.

- a command is executed
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

Test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful, and the test machine has been successfully controlled via the remote session.

References:

<https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/SharpShooter>

<https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy>

Test case 004

Firefox version 31.0 exploit with Empire

In this test case, we target Firefox 31.0 with an exploit (CVE-2014-8636, CVE-2015-0802) starting the exploit chain. After successfully exploiting the vulnerability an Empire (PowerShell) stager is executed.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of a working session, the following steps are taken.

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

The test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and the test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

The exploit

This exploit gains remote code execution on Firefox 31-34 by abusing a bug in the XPConnect component and gaining a reference to the privileged chrome:// window. This exploit requires the user to click anywhere on the page to trigger the vulnerability.

CVE:

CVE-2014-8636

CVE-2015-0802

References:

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/browser/firefox_proxy_prototype

<https://www.powershell-empire.com/>

<https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire>

Test case 005

Firefox version 31.0 exploit with IRONSQUIRREL and Covenant

In this test case, we target Firefox 31.0 with an exploit (CVE-2014-8636, CVE-2015-0802) starting the exploit chain. After successfully exploiting the vulnerability a Covenant Elite (PowerShell) stager is executed.

In this test case, the Elite component of the Covenant framework has been used to get encrypted connection to a Command and Control server. Covenant is a .NET framework that aims to highlight the attack surface of .NET, make the use of offensive .NET tradecraft easier, and serve as a collaborative command and control platform for red teamers.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of a working session, the following steps are taken.

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

The test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and the test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

The exploit

This exploit gains remote code execution on Firefox 31-34 by abusing a bug in the XPConnect component and gaining a reference to the privileged chrome:// window.

This exploit requires the user to click anywhere on the page to trigger the vulnerability.

CVE:

CVE-2014-8636

CVE-2015-0802

IRONSQUIRREL

This project aims at delivering browser exploits to the victim browser in an encrypted fashion. Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (secp256k1) is used for key agreement and AES is used for encryption. By delivering the exploit code (and shellcode) to the victim in an encrypted way, the attack cannot be replayed. Meanwhile the HTML/JS source is encrypted thus reverse engineering the exploit is significantly harder.

References:

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/browser/firefox_proxy_prototype

<https://github.com/MRGEffitas/Ironsquirrel>

<https://cobbr.io/Covenant.html>

<https://github.com/cobbr/Elite>

Test case 006

Foxit reader Use After Free + Empire

In this test case, we use the Foxit Reader v9.0.1.1049 exploit (foxit_reader_uaf) to start the exploit chain. After successfully exploiting the vulnerability an Empire (PowerShell) stager is executed.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of a working session, the following steps are taken:

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

The test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and the test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

Exploited application: Foxit Reader v9.0.1.1049 OS version: Windows 7

CVE:

CVE-2018-9948

CVE-2018-9958

The exploit

Foxit Reader v9.0.1.1049 and earlier are affected by use-after-free and uninitialized memory vulnerabilities that can be used to gain code execution. This module uses Uint32Array uninitialized memory and text annotation use-after-free vulnerabilities to call WinExec with a share file path to download and execute the specified exe. The module has been tested against Foxit Reader v9.0.1.1049 running on Windows 7 x64 and Windows 10 Pro x64 Build 17134. Windows 10 Enterprise needs to have insecure logons enabled for the exploit to work as expected.

References:

<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-9948>

<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-9958>

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/fileformat/foxit_reader_uaf

<https://www.powershell-empire.com/>

<https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire>

Test case 007

EMPIRE/HTA

In this test case, we use the Empire PowerShell framework to create a crafted Windows HTML help file (HTA) document to spawn an Empire connectback shell.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of a working session, the following steps are taken.

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

The test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and the test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

References:

<https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/>

Test case 008

EMPIRE/BAT

In this test case, we use the Empire PowerShell framework to create an executable PowerShell payload to connect back to the server endpoint.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of that working session has been established these actions has been taken:

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

Test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

References:

<https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/>

Test case 009

Covenant

In this test case, the Elite component of the Covenant framework has been used to get encrypted connection to a Command and Control server. Covenant is a .NET framework that aims to highlight the attack surface of .NET, make the use of offensive .NET tradecraft easier, and serve as a collaborative command and control platform for red teamers.

The test starts with a PowerShell launcher which uses powershell.exe to launch a Grunt using `[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load()`.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of a working session, the following steps are taken.

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

The test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and the test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

References:

<https://cobbr.io/about/>

<https://github.com/cobbr/Elite>

Test case 010

BAT - WMI subscription (PowerLurk) + empire

In this test case, we use PowerLurk, which is a PowerShell toolset for building malicious WMI Event Subscriptions. After this action each time the notepad.exe is opened, the SYSTEM user launches a PowerShell command calling an Empire stager.

In case the exploitation was successful, as a proof of a working session, the following steps are taken.

- screenshot has been made
- downloading a file
- uploading a file

The test case is flagged as MISSED if exploitation was successful and the test machine had been successfully controlled via the new session.

References:

<https://github.com/Sw4mpf0x/PowerLurk>

<https://learn-powershell.net/2013/08/14/powershell-and-events-permanent-wmi-event-subscriptions/>

Virtual machine specification:

- OS: Windows 10 x64 / Windows 7 x64
- CPU: 2 core processor
- Memory: 4GB
- Storage: 100GB SSD

Methodology used in Performance test

1. Windows 10 64-bit operating system was installed on a physical machine, all updates are applied, and third-party applications installed and updated.
2. A backup image of the operating system was created.
3. A security application was installed into the OS. Same configuration is used as in the other tests.
4. The following performance metrics were measured:
 - Install time, starting from downloading the installer binary, finished when the security application is installed, started, and the GUI is working.
 - Size of the files installed and created by the security application. The size is measured both after the installation, update, scan and after some time passed with normal computer usage.
 - CPU overhead of the processes and services belonging to the security applications are summed.
 - Memory footprint (private and shared working set) of the processes and services belonging to the security applications are summed.
 - Performance impact on the browser load time is measured. The browser should fully load a complex website, from a local network URL or replay proxy.
 - Average network loading was measured on the interface while the device was idling, during AV update and during system drive scan as well.
 - Physical Disk usage was measured while the device was idling, during AV update and during system drive scan as well
 - Every performance result is the average of three times measurement except for the Firefox start-up time as it was measured twenty times for each vendor.
5. Performance chart was calculated based on:
 - The security product reaching the best result in the category was rewarded with the highest score, the second received 1 less and so on.
 - Once every performance category was measured a final performance score was given to each product as an average of each test conducted.
 - In case a product's result could not have been measured in "update category" it was given a maximum score as it has basically 0 impact on the system.
 - In case a product's result could not have been measured in "scanning category" it was given a medium score.

Physical machine specification:


- OS: Windows 10 x64
- CPU: Intel Core i5
- Memory: 8GB
- Storage: 100GB SSD

Appendix 2

Non-default endpoint protection configurations

Endpoint protection software was running on custom configuration if suggested by the vendor.

- **Avast Business Antivirus**
Detailed logging was enabled via configuration file
- **Avira Antivirus Pro**
Log level was set to 'Complete' instead of 'Default' in 'System Scanner' and in 'Real-Time Protection'



- **CrowdStrike Falcon Protect**

Cloud Anti-Malware, Sensor Machine Learning Anti-Malware and Adware & PUA detection and prevention levels are set to Extra Aggressive.

The screenshot displays the 'Default (Windows) (Enabled)' configuration page for CrowdStrike Falcon Protect. It features a sidebar with navigation icons and a main table of policies. Each policy row includes a 'TYPE', 'CATEGORY', 'ENABLED' count, 'DISABLED' count, 'UNAVAILABLE' count, and an 'Enable All' toggle switch.

TYPE	CATEGORY	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
Sensor Visibility	Enhanced Visibility	3	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Next-Gen Antivirus	Cloud Machine Learning	CLOUD ANTI-MALWARE Detection: Extra Aggressive Prevention: Extra Aggressive		ADWARE & PUP Detection: Extra Aggressive Prevention: Extra Aggressive	
Next-Gen Antivirus	Sensor Machine Learning	SENSOR ANTI-MALWARE Detection: Extra Aggressive Prevention: Extra Aggressive			
Next-Gen Antivirus	Quarantine	1	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Malware Protection	Execution Blocking	4	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Behavior-Based Prevention	Exploit Mitigation	5	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Behavior-Based Prevention	Ransomware	5	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Behavior-Based Prevention	Exploitation Behavior	5	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Behavior-Based Prevention	Lateral Movement and Credential Access	2	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

<https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/configuration/prevention/policies>

← All Policies | Default (Windows) (Enabled) | ▶

TYPE	CATEGORY	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
Sensor Visibility	Enhanced Visibility	3	0	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TYPE	CATEGORY	CLOUD ANTI-MALWARE	ADWARE & PUP
Next-Gen Antivirus	Cloud Machine Learning	Detection: Extra Aggressive Prevention: Extra Aggressive	Detection: Extra Aggressive Prevention: Extra Aggressive

Cloud Anti-malware

Use cloud-based machine learning informed by global analysis of executables to detect and prevent known malware for your online hosts. [Levels info](#)

	DISABLED	CAUTIOUS	MODERATE	AGGRESSIVE	EXTRA AGGRESSIVE
Detection					
Prevention					

Adware & PUP

Use cloud-based machine learning informed by global analysis of executables to detect and prevent adware and potentially unwanted programs (PUP) for your online hosts. [Levels info](#)

	DISABLED	CAUTIOUS	MODERATE	AGGRESSIVE	EXTRA AGGRESSIVE
Detection					
Prevention					

← All Policies | Default (Windows) (Enabled) | ▶

TYPE	CATEGORY	SENSOR ANTI-MALWARE
Next-Gen Antivirus	Sensor Machine Learning	Detection: Extra Aggressive Prevention: Extra Aggressive



Sensor Anti-malware

For offline and online hosts, use sensor-based machine learning to identify and analyze unknown executables as they run to detect and prevent malware. [Levels info](#)

	DISABLED	CAUTIOUS	MODERATE	AGGRESSIVE	EXTRA AGGRESSIVE
Detection					
Prevention					


- **ESET Endpoint Security**

Detection of 'Potentially unwanted applications' and 'Potentially unsafe applications' were turned on among with 'SSL/TLS protocol filtering'.




- **Kaspersky Small Office Security**

'Check the URL against the database of URLs containing legitimate applications that can be used by criminals to damage your computer or personal data' and 'enable traces' were turned on.



- **Symantec Endpoint Protection**
Firewall level was set to 'More secure' from 'Secure'.



Default endpoint protection configurations

- **Bitdefender Endpoint Security**
- **F-Secure Computer Protection Premium**
- **McAfee Endpoint Security**
- **Microsoft Windows Defender**
- **Sophos Intercept X**
- **Trend Micro**

Version History

Nr.	Modify date	Comment
1.0	20.08.2019	Published
1.1	27.08.2019	Exploit / Fileless results updated
1.2	05.09.2019	Performance test methodology and results updated