

Democracy Support through the United Nations

Report 10/2010 - Evaluation

Malawi Case Report

COUNTRY CASE STUDY REPORTS

This country case study is one of several such reports that are part of an assessment of Norwegian support to democratic development through the United Nations system.

These case reports are not independent evaluations of the programmes or projects discussed, but rather studies of both the decisions taken by Norway and the UN to support the particular democratic development process, and the key factors that may explain the results. These studies should thus be seen as working documents for the general evaluation of the Norwegian support.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCP	Democracy Consolidation Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoM	Government of Malawi
GTZ	German Technical Assistance agency
HDR	Human Development Report
HRCC	Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation
IMCHRD	Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights and Democracy
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MPRSP	Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
NDCP	National Democracy Consolidation Programme
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PAC	Public Affairs Committee
RBA	Rights-Based Approach
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VRC	Village Rights Committee

1 Background and Introduction

Scanteam, in partnership with the Overseas Development Institute of the UK, the Stockholm Policy Group of Sweden, and Nord/Sør Konsulentene of Norway, were contracted by Norad's Evaluation Department to carry out the "Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Democratic Development through the United Nations", covering the period 1999-2009. This country case report is one of the foreseen results of this task.

Norway has provided about NOK 2 billion through the United Nations to the areas covered by the concept of Democratic Development. This is to be understood largely in terms of the UN usage: *increased possibilities to participate in the society and in decision-making processes that have impacts on citizens' lives*. The *Objectives* are:

1. **Document the results** of Norwegian multi-bilateral contributions to democratic development;
2. **Undertake an analysis** of how support to different types of activities (elections/ media, etc) has worked in different contexts (i.e. institutional set-up, socio-political context, degree of conflict and level of economic development);
3. **Assess how decisions are made** in relation to allocations and disbursements through the multi-bilateral channel and how this influences development results;
4. **Assess strengths and weaknesses** of different UN organisations and programmes in different contexts; and
5. Provide **recommendations** for future programming for democracy support and for Norwegian positions in relation to the relevant multilateral organisations.

1.1 The Malawi Case Report

In Malawi, the team reviewed the support to the Democracy Consolidation Programme (DCP) in Malawi, with emphasis on support to civil society. The DCP aimed at creating a critical mass at all levels of society that demands good governance and fulfilment of human rights, with a special focus on the right to development, from appropriate duty bearers. The beneficiaries are provided with knowledge, skills and structures to demand quality basic social services from various public/District Assembly officials and structures in their localities. Through its interventions, the programme contributes to an improvement in the quality of life of vulnerable citizens as envisaged in the country's Vision 2020 and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 2006-2011.

The Programme is implemented through projects developed and implemented by Civil Society Organisations and Public Institutions that are selected through an open and competitive process.

The DCP was selected for review because it has received Norwegian funding for 13 years (1998-2010) and because it was an attempt by the Government and UNDP to implement a comprehensive programme for democracy consolidation, encompassing all central democracy dimensions. That the programme over the years has been steered towards a more narrow focus on empowerment of civil society is described and discussed in the report.

2 Country Context

Malawi is a landlocked country situated in central Africa sharing borders with Mozambique in the Southeast, Tanzania in the Northeast and Zambia in the Western part. The population counts about 13 million and Malawi is one of the most densely populated and one of the ten poorest countries in the world. The global Human Development Report (HDR) indicates that close to 2/3 of the people live below the poverty line of one US dollar per day while 28.7% live in absolute poverty.

Only 10% of the total work force is in formal employment and close to 85% employed in the agricultural sector. HIV/AIDS remains the one single most important health problem with a prevalence rate of 14.8% amongst the most active age group, (15 to 49). The pandemic is exerting a heavy strain on the country's productive group, affecting skilled labour. It has also reduced the life expectancy from 48 years in 1990 to 39 years in 2002.

Malawi is highly dependent on international development cooperation, which represents roughly 10% of GDP and covers 40% of government expenditures. The main funding agencies are the United Kingdom, the USA, the EU, Norway, Japan, UN agencies, IMF and the World Bank.

UNDP and the donor community have been actively involved in supporting the Government of Malawi in the transition to democracy since 1992, in particular with the referendum on multi-party democracy in 1993, the electoral processes in 1994 and 1999. DANIDA, GTZ and USAID were heavily involved in the processes early on together with UNDP.

Malawi gained its independence in 1961 with Kamuzu Hastings Banda as Prime Minister. In 1964 Malawi became a Republic with Mr Banda as the first Malawian President. Malawi experienced 30 years of dictatorial rule, until Bakili Muluzi was elected President with the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1994. During the Banda era, governance was by political decrees often made by the President and there was no opposition. Chiefs and all other non-state actors had to tow the political line of the day; local governance structures including the local government systems were all designed to support the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Today there are 12 political parties in the country.

During the first years of multiparty democracy, Malawi made considerable progress with consolidating its democratic system. Political conflicts were in general solved by peaceful means and in accordance with the rule of law. Institutions essential to good governance and the protection of human rights had been speedily established and were at that stage seen to be effectively implemented. Parliament was gradually asserting its authority, and the independence of the courts was assured. Preparations were underway for decentralisation and transfer to local authorities of responsibility for the delivery of public services. Though corruption was widespread it was seen that the Government took proactive measures through prosecution and establishing more stringent control measures (Norad 2001).

During the Banda era, local assemblies and the local government system had reinforced and supported the MCP party structures and most of the leaders in the local government structures were appointed by the MCP Government. Government abolished existing local government authorities in 1995 in order to prepare for a decentralised local government structure and designated decentralisation as one of its principal objectives. A National

Decentralisation policy was approved by Cabinet in October 1998. The policy provided the basis for the Local Government Act which came into force in April 1999. The Local Government Act contained provisions for the delivery of public services and for several functions which were to be transferred to democratically elected district assemblies. The new district assemblies were elected in November 2000. The voter turnout was extremely low, only 14 percent of eligible voters casting their votes. The high abstention rate was seen to be mainly due to low-key campaigning and inadequate voter-education programmes.

Local government elections have not been held since 2000 due to a number of reasons ranging from lack of funds to not having policies in place. The last postponement was in August 2010 and elections are planned for spring 2011. Meanwhile the decentralization process had been going on with massive support from the UNDP and GTZ under the Malawi Germany Programme on Decentralization.

The non-functioning of the local governance system, and thus unclear roles and responsibilities of duty bearers at local level is one of the key challenges to the DCP programme.

2.1 Civil Society and the Role of the Church

Under the Banda regime, freedoms of association and press were heavily suppressed and basic human rights were not enshrined in the Republican Constitution until in 1994. It was not possible to set up Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and there was no space for CSO policy dialogue. The only existing CSOs were service delivery NGOs, the UN organizations and one local faith based NGO, the Christian Service Committee (CSC) doing charity work. With the change of government in 1994, the country saw a booming of NGOs ranging from policy advocacy to service delivery organisations. The same era also witnessed the Government of Malawi instituting an NGO Law to regulate and control NGOs in the country. The NGO law has been a source of conflict between the Government and CSOs as the Government has used the law to close down some NGOs and also control operations of NGOs to some degree.¹

Malawi is officially a God fearing nation (Section 33 of the Republican Constitution). The main faith groups in the country are the Christians (ca 80% of the population), the Moslems (ca 13 %) and others. Faith groups in Malawi have run schools, clinics, hospitals and tertiary colleges especially in vocational training, teaching and nursing professions. They offer over 40% of all public education services in the country and also close to the same share in the health sector. As such they are an asset that the Government cannot do without.

During Banda's era missionaries only offered social services in the education and health sectors but for the first time in 1992, the Roman Catholic Bishops issued a Lenten Pastoral letter, "**Living our Faith**," which set the course for political changes in the country. Just before the Referendum, the catholic Bishops issued another pastoral letter, "**Choosing our Future**" in which the bishops called upon the people of Malawi to participate in the

¹ Transform Malawi, a DFID funded NGO, was closed down by the Malawi Government in the early 2000 for being suspected to have political agenda

referendum to determine their own future. The Presbyterian churches under the Malawi Council of Churches wrote a communiqué to Dr Banda and the MCP led government. They asked the President to set up a commission to address issues that the Catholic Bishops had hinted to in the pastoral letters. This was also to show the MCP government that the Malawi Council of Churches was in support of what the catholic Bishops had written regarding problems of the one party governance system.

Following the pastoral letters were a series of industrial actions, serious urban riots, student demonstrations but also the emergence of political groupings and parties and most importantly; government's acceptance to hold a national referendum to determine the future of the country.

To further entrench its role in the democratic change process in the country, the churches and the Moslem community came together in 1993 and set up the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) to be a mouth piece of the faith community on democratization process and also to teach Malawians on constitutional and democratic principles, civic and voter education and also to monitor elections.

The churches have thus been very instrumental in the democratic processes in the country besides offering social services. They were also beneficiaries of Norwegian Funding either directly or through the UNDP and the government's Inter-ministerial Committee on Human Rights and Democracy (IMCHRD). The church was part of the Church/NGO consortium that was supported by UNDP, DANIDA as well as the Norwegian Embassy under the first phase of the Democracy Consolidation Programme (DCP 1). The Church/NGO consortium was quite a powerful civil society network (for a short period of time), established as a result of donor recommendations for efficient channelling of funds. During the runner up to the 2000 General and Presidential Elections, the organizations had come up with civic and education voter education proposals that were quite similar, so to avoid duplication, UNDP and the Norwegian Embassy suggested they join forces.

UNDP also funded the Public Affairs Committee on the understanding that they would work closely with the Church/NGO Consortium especially with Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) who were partially members of PAC via the Roman Catholic Church.

The Church/NGO Consortium was made up of 3 NGOs and the church based organization, CCJP. The arrangement was thought to be good since the NGOs did not have an elaborate structure and were not present in the remote and rural areas, and could thus use the structures of CCJP and the Catholic Church to disseminate information and reach out to more people. However, the coming together of the NGOs and the CCJP did not have full blessings and approval from the Roman Catholic Church. There were many fears especially from the Catholic Bishops about how their social and political wing, which was supposed to be directed by the catholic doctrine and the biblical teachings, could work with NGOs that are humanistic in their approach to Human Rights, civic education and political governance. Other quarters of the Catholic Church thought and believed that the CCJP would have been better placed to be part of the PAC grouping where the Catholic Church was also a member.

By agreement in the consortium, CCJP was given the mandate to manage elections in four districts though CCJP through the Catholic Church had the mandate to care for all Catholic Christians in Malawi and hence to work throughout the country. Confining CCJP to a few

districts meant that its presence and work was squeezed and this did not go well with the Catholic Bishops and other church leaders.

Amongst the NGOs, there were misgivings around financial management and code of conduct which irked many people in the country and especially the Catholic Church. These fears were proved right through audit reports and media coverage at the end of the project. Because the NGOs received a lot of funding, there was a problem of capacity to account for the funds not just to donors and the GoM but also to people on the ground in terms of delivery of activities as per budget lines. To improve financial accountability, the UNDP brought in the Development Centre, an independent financial and management consultant group to manage the finances of the Church/NGO Consortium. To a great degree, the firm managed to keep the organizations on track but did not manage to curb all the mismanagement and corruption hence the closure of one of the institutions, MIDEA².

The above summary shows what challenges UNDP and Norway faced during this early phase, when assessing how best to fund civil society, and how they even, with their request for “efficient mechanisms” affected the power balance in civil society. To this day, the Church/NGO Consortium is remembered by several of the respondents as a donor-induced mechanism which flopped.

2.2 Government and UN Policy Frameworks

A new *constitution* was adopted in 1995 following the transition to multi-party democracy in Malawi. The 1995 Constitution specifically identifies the State as duty-bearer with an obligation to ensure that every person enjoys civil, political, social and economic rights. Welfare and development should therefore not be the product of charity, but the constitutional entitlement of citizens of Malawi.

Government's commitment to poverty reduction was first formulated in the *Poverty Alleviation Programme of 1994*. From 1996, Government carried out nation-wide civil society consultations in order to reach consensus on national goals in relation to a wide range of sectors encompassing governance; sustainable economic growth and development; culture; food security; social services; and the management of natural resources. This resulted in the *Vision 2020* document which was completed in March 1998.

The Malawi Vision 2020 identified good governance as one of the core challenges facing Malawi. The Vision emphasized the need to promote and sustain a democratic culture with equal political participation and devoid of corruption, regionalism and nepotism.

In 2002, the *Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP)* was developed, and within this, good governance was one of four pillars to address poverty in the country. Good governance in this MPRSP is defined as consisting of three elements: political will and mind-set, security and justice and responsive and effective public institutions. The MPRSP goal is *sustainable poverty reduction through socio-economic and political empowerment of the poor*. (MPRSP, April 2002)

² Interviews with Mr. Gerald Grant, Former Development Centre Technical and Financial advisor to the Church/NGO Consortium, Lilongwe, Malawi May 2010

Subsequent to the MPRSP GoM formulated a *Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) {2006 – 2011}*, to further realise the aspiration enshrined in the Vision 2020. The MGDS is Malawi's overarching strategy that provides a policy framework for both economic growth and development. Theme five of the MGDS focuses on good governance and specifically intends to enhance good public sector management, ensure the absence of corruption and fraud, stimulate decentralization, enforce justice and the rule of law, ensure security, stimulate good corporate governance, democratisation and enhance dissemination of information communication and technology.³

Following previous *UN Country Cooperation Frameworks*, a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (*UNDAF 2007 – 2011*) was developed as the UN policy framework for supporting the implementation of the Malawi Government's MGDS. The main purpose of the UNDAF is to help Malawi achieve the Millennium Development Goals as locally articulated through the MGDS. The UNDAF also identified governance as an area where the UN will work with Government to build national capacity for poverty alleviation. Outcome 5 of the UNDAF is "Good governance, gender equality and rights based approach to development enhanced by 2011." The intended result under this outcome is "An informed public actively claiming good governance and human rights". This is also the goal of the DCP programme.

2.3 Norwegian and UN Roles and Decisions

It was the Malawi Government that had requested UNDP support to implement the Democracy Consolidation Programme (Chidammodzi F, Nandini Patel, Rugumayo R, 2000). There were two alternatives; either to engage the National Council for NGOs, Congoma, or one of the development partners, the UNDP. The former was not preferred for the following reasons:

- Lack of capacity in terms of personnel, system and procedures
- Political influence in that most political parties and the GoM had interests in Congoma and if it had been engaged for channelling funds, neutrality might have been compromised and jeopardised the programme

UNDP was asked to facilitate support of interested donors and to act as manager and custodian of the Norwegian/Finnish/Dutch basket fund to be used for democratization and ensuring free and fair elections in Malawi for the following reasons:

- Its neutrality to politics which made it acceptable to all the stakeholders.
- Its ability to access expertise from UN agencies and other sources.
- Its able facilitative role in governance issues in Malawi which it had demonstrated in the past five years.
- Its ability to access financial support.

³ DCP III Programme Document 2008.

For these reasons, UNDP has facilitated the process and also managed finances, while matters of coordination of the project remained with the GoM via the Inter-ministerial Committee on Human Rights and Democracy (IMCHRD).

In Norway, a Parliament decree had included Malawi as one of the priority cooperating partners in 1995, and the Norwegian Embassy officially opened in 2000. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Malawi and Norway in 1997 on cooperation within four sectors; good governance, health, HIV/Aids prevention, and macro-economic reform. There had been close cooperation between Malawi and the Norwegian Labour Union (LO), and it was seen as a natural choice, given the developments in Malawi and former cooperation and political bonds, to support Democratic Development and Governance. Malawi had transformed from one of the most totalitarian regimes in Africa in the mid-nineties, and the new Government was seen by Norway to be committed to the democratic transformation. The population was supportive, and there was a lot of goodwill among donors.

There were three main reasons why Norway chose UNDP as a partner:

- There was in general a Norwegian political determination to support the UN as a key actor in this field.
- UNDP had a strong role within Governance and Democracy, chairing Heads of Mission meetings weekly together with the World Bank, and was therefore considered a strong and central partner at the time.
- The GoM and UNDP had already developed a comprehensive Democracy Consolidation Programme prior to Norwegian engagement in Malawi and solicited support from other donors. It was anticipated that the DCP would be a sector programme on governance with broad participation from the donor group in Malawi.

The first phase of the DCP was funded by Finland, the Netherlands, UNDP and Norway. Norway's intention had been to channel all governance support through the broad based DCP, but due to delays in preparing the plan for the second phase, Norway opted for project support to a number of institutions in parallel with the DCP, such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission, the NGO umbrella organisation Congoma, and the Civil society network organisation and Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (HRCC).

For the second phase of DCP, funding was only secured from Norway and Sweden, where Norway administered Swedish funds, in addition to UNDP. For the third phase, Norway and UNDP were the only donors, co-financing the programme. The Government has also contributed with mostly in-kind support.

Norway was thus the main bilateral donor of this programme for 14 years (1998-2011) and would have some influence on the programme focus, though not involved in the original design of programme management and scope. In the first communication between UNDP and Norway, the Norwegian concerns were mostly related to the realism of the programme theory and the quality of strategic planning.

Norwegian total funding for the period 1998–2011 was NOK 101 million (USD 17 mill). For phase II and III of the DCP (2002-2010), UNDP has contributed about USD 5.5 million.

3 Programme Background and organisation

The Government of Malawi established the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights and Democracy (IMCHRD) in 1994 to be responsible for the national co-ordination and leadership of the *National Democracy Consolidation Programme (NDCP)*. The Committee comprised of representatives of government ministries and departments and was chaired by the Deputy Secretary to the President and Cabinet. The NDCP was from inception envisaged to build national capacity for good governance in all key areas in a coordinated manner and using a process approach⁴. The main partners in the NDCP were the EU, UNDP, USAID and the UK.

By 1996, GoM / IMCHRD had identified nine strategic areas for Democracy Consolidation of which UNDP was requested to facilitate the first five (listed below) in a comprehensive Programme, which was to be called the *Democracy Consolidation Programme (DCP)*⁵.

1. *Civic Education and Human Rights*
2. *Conduct Free and Fair Elections*
3. *Legal Reforms and Administration of Justice*
4. *Parliamentary Mechanism*
5. *Programme Management Capacity*
6. Local Governance and Development Management
7. Industrial Relations
8. Promotion of Public Sector Transparency and Accountability
9. The Media

There were four main programmes planned under the NDCP in 1996-1997 in addition to the UNDP/GoM Democracy Consolidation Programme:

- i. Support of Democratisation of Human Rights in Malawi (funded by EU)
- ii. Police and Legal Reform (funded by the UK)
- iii. Consolidation of the Democratic Process (funded by UNHCR)
- iv. Democratic and Civic Institutions for Development DECIDE (funded by USAID)

The DCP programme was developed by UNDP and GoM in partnership in 1996-1997. A Programme Support Document (PSD) described the challenges related to the nine strategic directions, emphasizing the interrelation between them and the need for close coordination of activities. The Assistant Resident Representative, head of Governance Section in UNDP in 1997 was responsible for programme design in collaboration with GoM. He was a Malawi

⁴ Meaning that the programme would be developed incrementally, adding components according to developments in the overall context and progress of the programme.

⁵ While the NDCP comprised all activities in this area, the DCP, which is the focus of this evaluation was specifically developed by UNDP/GoM. Norway was the main donor for this programme in addition to UNDP.

national with extensive experience from- and network in the Malawi Government. The overall programme management structure has been the same for 12 years with only some minor adjustments.

DCP is implemented by a Programme Steering Committee under IMCHRD, through projects designed and developed by CBOs and public entities. A Programme Office was established to manage coordination and implementation. The Programme Manager in the Programme Office has been with the programme since 1999. The Deputy Programme Manager has been in office since 2004.

The Programme Office reports to the programme Steering Committee/IMCHRD. Implementation is thus nationally executed and following UNDP National Execution (NEX) Guidelines. While UNDP was very closely involved in the beginning, DCP has over the years developed into a professional programme management organisation. As shown above, *programme management capacity* was one of the five components of the programme, giving equal focus to building capacity of the IMCHRD, the Steering Committee and the Programme Office to manage the overall programme. The role of IMCHRD has been that of overseer, and a consultative partner to the Programme Office, but has not exercised political influence on selection of partners.

The Programme that was presented by UNDP to the Norwegian Embassy for funding (following consultations) covered four areas of operations; i) Elections, ii) Civic Education and Human Rights, iii) Parliamentary Mechanisms and iv) Programme Management Capacity (strengthen capacity of IMCHRD). The Norwegian Embassy originally asked for more specific proposals, in order to assess operational aspects, but accepted the UNDP call for flexibility in order to develop the programme (process) approach.

In a Norwegian Desk Appraisal document from July 1998, The Norwegian Embassy makes the following observations/comments (summarised):

- The programme is well founded in the Malawi national priority at the highest level.
- A Norwegian fact finding mission to Malawi had concluded that the areas of civic education, Parliament, Election support, Support to IMCHRD and support to the UNDP Gender programme should be prioritised. The DCP proposal responded directly to these Norwegian priorities.
- The Embassy did not see a need to search beyond the GoM/UNDP Project Support Document for rationalisation of the programme.
- The Embassy had asked UNDP to present a breakdown of the overall objectives and had received an overview of objectives (expected outcomes) and outputs for each category. The embassy prepared a logical tree, based on this (see annex A) and questioned the magnitude of the project. Their concern was whether it would be possible to follow up such a massive number of outputs in the reporting set-up. The sheer volume of monitoring and reporting needed was questioned in the Appraisal document.
- The Embassy advised that the programme design be revisited and that the ambition reduced. It was pointed out that the Embassy and the UNDP would have to agree on reporting requirements and that these should be realistic. Furthermore, the Embassy advised to develop indicators at output level, since most of these were formulated too vaguely to be measured directly.

- On the question of sustainability, the Embassy noted that the main thrust of the programme is concerned with various forms of training and public education, and that infrastructure of a more permanent kind (offices, distribution networks) should not be part of the programme unless they can be sustained at the end of the programme, which was foreseen to be in 1999.
- The Embassy strongly recommends that an evaluation be made of the programme towards the end of 1999.

Following an evaluation of the DCP programme in 2000, a second phase of the programme; DCP II was planned and implemented. DCP II was evaluated in 2005 (Mid-Term Evaluation) and in 2007 (Final Evaluation). The programme is now in its third phase; DCP III (2008-2011). The scale and focus of the programme has been reduced and focused over the years, and programme design for monitoring of results has been improved, though they are still problematic from an M&E perspective. A comprehensive baseline study on civic education in Malawi was commissioned by DCP and conducted by COWI/MCG in 2005. DCP III design and indicator development was influenced by this baseline.

3.1 Programme Objectives

DCP I:

The **overall objectives** of the DCP I were:

- *To enhance the capacity of the Government of Malawi to plan and manage the consolidation process by building an open society governed by democratic rules and institutions; and*
- *To encourage effective participation of individuals, groups and communities in the political, economic, and human development of the country.*

The **immediate objectives** were:

- *To enhance national capacity in planning and conducting free and fair elections;*
- *To strengthen the national capacity to develop, manage, and deliver an effective and broad based national civic education and human rights programme;*
- *To improve the effectiveness of Parliament and strengthen the ability to interact with branches of Government and Civil Society;*
- *To promote the Rule of Law by creating an efficient legal and judicial sector capable of protecting and promoting human rights in conformity to international norms; and*
- *To build the capacity of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights and Democracy (IMCHRD) to ensure efficient management of programme resources and timely delivery of outputs.*

DCP II:

The **goal** of DCP II was *a demonstrated increase in civil society empowerment and the facilitation of democratic development processes through institutional capacity building.*

The **purpose** was: *People have been empowered to promote, protect and defend human rights.*

Outcome indicators were identified for each component of the programme:

- *Civic Education: Malawians are capable of exercising their rights and responsibilities, and making informed choices.*
- *Legal Reform and Administration of Justice: Access to Justice has been rationalised.*
- *Parliamentary and Political Institutional Strengthening: Mutual trust has been achieved between Government and civil society organisations.*
- *Programme Management Capacity Building: the Programme Office is in a position to perform in accordance with its mandate.*

For each of these components, 3-7 outputs were identified. In general these were *too broad* to be realistic outputs, given the scope of the programme. They were formulated “at goal level”. Some examples are:

- *Malawians are aware of the principles and requirements of transparency and accountability and are able to demand compliance.*
- *User friendly and effective legal system in place for the expeditious disposal of court cases.*
- *Freedom and professionalism of the Electronic and Print Media has been achieved.*

Other outputs were *too vague* to give commitment, e.g.

- *Malawians have been sensitised on the rule of law.*
- *Members of Parliament more familiar with their roles in and outside Parliament.*

Some outputs were concrete and achievable. Examples:

- *The civil society is included in governance and consolidation of democracy initiatives.*
- *Legal reforms put in place in conformity with international human rights norms.*
- *A formal Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism established.*

DCP III

Outcome: *Increased and more effective participation of communities in decision-making and in advocating changes to and implementation of policies, laws, and practices which affect their livelihoods and rights and holding public bodies accountable.*

Outputs:

- *At least half of the population demanding the realisation of the right to development at all societal levels.*
- *At least half of the population demanding fair trade, labour and consumer protection.*
- *At least 40% of the population demanding public services and good governance from District Assemblies and other public functionaries.*
- *Effective and efficient management, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme*

Though objectives formulations have become more concrete, and now include indicators (see Annex B), they are still not very realistic or even measurable in practise. A Monitoring and Evaluation System prepared by the DCP Programme Office serves as a useful content

guideline and does include some relevant indicators, but is not a methodologically viable tool for measuring results of the programme systematically over time.

It should be noted that the DCP conglomerate of implementing partners' outputs and outcomes are difficult to measure and summarise in a stringent manner. A challenge is the fact that all implementing partners in the programme are granted the independence and flexibility necessary to implement projects according to their capacity, competence and organisational mandate (within the programme framework). There is still a need for more pragmatism, realism and simplification in overall programme design to synthesise the most essential results. The COWI Baseline Survey (2006) includes a number of relevant indicators at outcome level, which could have been better utilised in the M&E framework for assessing overall outcomes in the geographical areas where DCP partners operate.

The internal logic of the programme theory / objectives hierarchy (programmatic relevance) was questioned in the evaluation report on DCP II (Kamchedzera, G and Kanyongolo, F.E. 2007). For DCP III, it can also be seen that the relationship between the outputs and the outcomes has not been formulated optimally. Participation and advocacy entails more than just 'making demands'. This is seen, however, as a technical weakness in the programme document, and may in part be due to the design process, which is based on broad stakeholder participation.

The output formulations do not reflect the programme as it is being implemented. The key deliverables of the programme have been better formulated elsewhere in the M&E System Document: *"The programme aims at promoting good governance and respect for human rights, especially the right to development, at grassroots level. This will be achieved through the **creation of local structures that will facilitate the dissemination of knowledge on governance and human rights, access to redress in cases of human rights violations, consensus building on community priorities and dialogue between rights holders and duty bearers to enforce transparency**"* (UNDP 2008, p. 2, bold added here).

Indicators and reporting could thus, for example, focus on 'local structures' established and functional, 'consensus built on community priorities', 'cases redressed', and 'number and quality of dialogues for transparency'.

3.2 Programme Theory and approach

There were five main challenges identified in the MPRS to which the Programme's objectives were to respond:

- A fragile and fragmented civil society
- Inadequate transparency and accountability
- A slow democratisation process
- Limited observance and enforcement of human rights
- Inadequate adherence to the rule of law

The organisational structure of DCP includes an independent advisory and consultative Stakeholder Forum, which meets bi-annually. Members have been identified by the IMCHRD. In the 2007 Evaluation it was found that the Forum was a useful mechanism for ensuring participation and insight from actors who are aware of challenges and opportunities that affect the programme in practice (Kamchedzera, G and Kanyongolo, F.E. 2007).

Despite a high score on overall relevance of the programme to existing needs and challenges, the relevance of the results chain was not assessed until 2007, where it was concluded that the overall programme design was not logically consistent. The component on civic education / participation was found to be most effective in producing results relevant to the overall objective. This component was thus brought into DCP III as the main component, though it does encompass elements of the other democratic development dimensions.

From the first design of the DCP in 1996, one of the main assumptions underlying the programme has been that if people in the villages are provided with knowledge about political processes, human rights and democratic principles, they would be enabled to make demands and hold politicians and public officials to account and thereby affect local development, which again would lead to poverty reduction. As the programme matured, more weight has been put on facilitation of dialogue and organisation at village level as it was realised that awareness raising and sensitisation alone was not enough to bring about changes in the actual communication between rights holders and duty bearers.

The programme theory has been based on national policies, in that it has seen democratic development and governance as a means to development and poverty reduction. The entry point to the programme has thus been “the right to development” within a framework of human rights and voice-accountability. The new constitution of 1995 included a Bill of Rights. It was and still is difficult for people to demand such rights because the concept itself is very new. It is also alien to many of the public functionaries that they should have downward accountability.

The programme theory and approach is influenced by project applications from partners. The Programme Office has developed guidelines based on the programme objectives, but has depended on partners available “in the market” with capacity to deliver “the programme services”. Programme logic has thus in practise depended on available capacity among implementing partners to contribute to the programme objectives. Following the evaluation in 2007, where it was found that public entities were less efficient in delivering on results, a shift took place to favouring the more ‘effective’ NGOs and as a consequence – shifting the focus of implementation even more to ‘rights-holders’ and less to ‘duty-bearers’ (public officials).

This, more narrow approach, has since been constantly improved through a learning process. In the early phases, reporting was done at activity/output level. Today, the focus is on outcomes, i.e. what are the changes coming about as a result of rights holders claiming their right to development? An important role of the Programme Office has been to contribute with capacity development for partners, through networking and close follow up on financial accountability as well as through active participation in project activities⁶. Partners meet regularly to report on progress as per programme objectives. Implementing Partners report on “success stories” in progress reports and they say that the constant focus on outcome/impact has made them competitive in a positive way. When they meet to share experiences they compete to show the best results.

⁶ Staff from the Programme Office are actively involved in producing materials and conducting training of and with Implementing partners. Once partners have been trained, the PO staff still participated in IPs training in the communities as resource persons. This also has a monitoring purpose.

In DCP III the *rights-based approach (RBA)* is applied more systematically with focus on outcomes and this has also influenced programme implementation. RBA represents a shift in development cooperation away from a needs-based perspective. Instead of a focus on inputs and (immediate) results (i.e. outputs), the RBA aims at *achievement of human rights* for all – and is thus more outcome-oriented. RBA is meant to work in two directions; first it holds duty-bearers accountable through monitoring and development of capacities to fulfil their obligations. Secondly, rights-holders awareness or and ability to claim their human rights is strengthened.

While activities in the early phases of the programme would mainly be ‘knowledge transfer’ activities (awareness raising, training), in DCP III more attention is given to building structures such as Village Rights Committees in order to assist people in the *process* of addressing duty bearers.

Village Rights Committees (VRCs) are one of the innovations of the DCP programme, and they were first initiated under DCP III which has been labelled “the Right to Development Programme” in 2008-2009. The VRCs are committees formed at the village level with the aim of animating demand for rights at the lowest level. They are village forums where people and Chiefs can talk about their rights and mobilize villages to take action where necessary in matters of development and governance. With the current non-functioning local government structures, VRCs are playing a vital role and many villages have changed as a result of the work of the VRCs, as documented in project reports and confirmed by key stakeholders of the programme. Through documentation in popular and well-known radio programmes examples of VRC influence is spread to all parts of the country.

A key challenge to the rights based approach applied by implementing partners is the lack of responsiveness among duty bearers which in practice means public officials at local level. The programme response to this challenge has been threefold;

- 1) *Persistence*: people are encouraged not to give up, but keep pressuring the duty-bearers through different channels
- 2) *Alternatives*: people are encouraged to seek alternative solutions, i.e. to ask NGOs in the area for assistance if they realise that the duty bearer does not have the capacity to respond
- 3) *Self-help*: people are encouraged to contribute what they can to solve the issue. For example, if they need a new school bloc, they are encouraged to gather materials and provide manpower.

The DCP with a focus on ‘collective voices’ has been complementary to other Democracy Programmes that targeted accountability of public authorities more directly; such as a Police Reform Programme aided by DFID, a Public Sector Reform Programme, a USAID-supported Strengthening of Parliament Project, a EU Rule of Law Programme, a Decentralisation Programme and projects undertaken by the Judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and others. The evaluation from 2007 points out that although the DCP was broadly based on the MPRS it could have been designed more specifically to address gaps left by other governance programmes. There is no evidence of specific synergies taking place between the DCP and other interventions that target the supply side of ‘voice and accountability’ that would address the key risk to DCP success.

4 Programme Results

4.1 The evidence base

The development of results-based management and systematic monitoring took many years from the inception of the programme, and the early formulation of objectives and indicators were not conducive to *documentation* of results. Another key challenge is that the results of such a comprehensive programme at society level may not have been planned for (directly), and is not attributable to the project alone. An example is the battle against the Presidential third term bill which was won by the church and civil society at large, but also through donor pressure. Some of the organisations that received DCP support over a long period of time were the most vocal in the third term debate, but it has not been written down as a “result” of the DCP programme, this major achievement is not documented as an outcome in any programme report.

Similarly, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which DCP has contributed to changing the *fabric* of civil society; making it more pluralistic and with influence on policy at a national level.

Until DCP III (2008) there was no requirement for partners to measure outcomes. UNDP has not, until recently had a focus on outcomes in their reporting requirements.

Four external mid-term reviews / evaluations have been conducted; in 2000, 2001, 2005 and 2007. Assessment of effectiveness has been based on a considerable amount of case-story evidence of the improvements in the protection of certain rights, better accountability by public officials at some levels and involvement of women in some development activities. For DCP III, such anecdotal evidence is gathered more systematically. An M&E system has been established and implementing partners report on the “best case” outcomes in each progress report.

In 2005-2006, a comprehensive baseline survey was conducted by Cowi/Millennium Consulting Group under the DCP programme. This allows for a more systematic follow up on key national indicators for civic education that DCP, together with other programmes, contribute to.

Programme effectiveness is in general given a high score in all evaluation reports, though it is difficult to compile a systematic and comprehensive overview of the main outcomes.

4.2 Election Support

DCP was one among many actors to support activities related to the 1999 elections. A programme undertaken by the Law Commission (technical review of the constitution), which made some vital observations on some of the sensitive aspects of the electoral process was funded through DCP. In addition DCP contributed in areas of Voter ID Cards, Computerisation of Voter Registration, Election Observation and Voter/Civic Education. In the Mid Term Evaluation of DCP from 2000, it was pointed out that more attention should have been given the Electoral Commissions’ Secretariat, which was weak and lacked independence and impartiality. There was a lack of appropriate mechanisms for co-

ordination and consultation between the donor community, the Electoral Commission and the NGOs. UNDP and DCP had thus not managed, at this stage, to take on the coordinating function, which had been envisaged in the original PSD (Programme Support Document). It was recommended in the Mid Term Evaluation that DCP should strengthen the secretariat of the Electoral Commission and could call for a national dialogue on the independent composition and functioning of the Commission.

In DCP II and DCP III, support for elections was no longer included in the programme as a component. An appraisal report for DCP II advised that the main focus area should be democratic empowerment of the civil society, including civic education. DCP should be the main programme in Malawi for a bottom-up approach in the building of democracy. Nevertheless, in 2004, Norway contributed about NOK 5 million to elections, and in 2007-2011 NOK 20 million, all through UNDP. These contributions were made as separate agreements, seemingly without any further link to the DCP.

4.3 Parliament training

DCP I included a comprehensive 18 session (3 week) training course for Parliamentarians. The training was mainly conducted by professors at the Chancellors College in Zomba and covered areas such as Finance, Development studies, Gender issues, language and Communication and Institutional Management. Two different Parliaments were trained (In the Mid Term Evaluation from 2000 the programme was deemed “extremely beneficial in providing the MPs with an opportunity to update themselves in a number of areas and thereby raise the standard of deliberations”. Further it was stated that: *In the years 1995, 1996 bills of important nature were passed without adequate deliberations due to lack of information and capacity of the parliamentarians. Since 1997 a change in this trend could be detected in terms of better deliberations on important bills. Some of them are the Human Rights Commission Act, the Ombudsman Act and the Local Government Act. Also on issues of finances and budget expenditure, electoral process and gender there are effective discussions among parliamentarians. [...] Within the parties lines of functioning there is little scope for inter-party deliberations. And parliaments in a democracy generally serve as such a forum. The training programme brings different parliamentary parties together and thereby facilitates communications and contact.* (Chidammodzi F, Nandini Patel, Rugumayo R. 2000, p12-13)

Issues of concern were that resource persons for the training were largely from the Academic community and that not enough interaction and linkage was ensured between the training programme, other branches of government, public institutions, and prominent persons from civil society, pressure groups and media. There was a need for more emphasis on the fact that the executive was not as accountable to the parliament as it should be.

This component has not been specifically assessed since 2000, apart from in the 2007 evaluation where the evaluators (themselves professors at Chancellors College) pointed to a number of weaknesses in the training. The component is not included in DCP III. The findings from 2000 were confirmed in interviews in 2010 with respondents who have followed the situation over the years. The deputy Clerk to Parliament stated that the original Parliamentary training programme had “fantastic results”, bringing MPs up to speed on their role and function. He would see a “tremendous change in their confidence” and the remarks they would make during deliberation of bills. The role of DCP was that of continuous monitoring. They would come every Friday to observe and discuss. There was a

very good working relationship between the DCP P.O and the Parliament. UNDP was not seen to be directly involved.

The contrast with the current MPs who have only had ad hoc training like 1-2 days workshops on various issues is striking (Under other programmes, not DCP). Today (2010), bills are passed almost without debate, with the dubious record being six bills in two hours. Currently, speed is seen as a sign of effectiveness. The authority of the executive over the National Assembly is even stronger than it was ten years ago, since bills are passed with little debate. Civil society does not seem to be very vocal.

One reason for not continuing the successful MP training programme was the shift in the focus of the DCP, due to inadequate funding and need for reduced scope.

Another important reason was the political environment in the National Assembly. The training was, by some, seen as a political tool for the opposition, gathering a large number of MPs for an extended period of time in Zomba. The training was not 'owned' by the Parliament. Another unlucky reason for the failure to keep the programme going was the issue of allowances. MPs have the highest allowances in the country (they approve the budget themselves) – and donors do not accept the rates they demand to participate in training. A few times, the National Assembly has topped up the difference.

An unintended effect of the training programme has been that a few MPs have been able to get jobs with NGOs based on their training certificate.

The deputy Clerk of Parliament is well aware of the current DCP programme, even though they are no longer directly engaged in it. He and his colleagues listen to the radio programmes and say that they are an "Eye-opener". It is a useful source of information in Parliament about people's concerns at village level.

4.4 Legal Reform and access to justice

DCP I coordinated the establishment of the Constitutional Bodies Forum to facilitate identification of common needs and also facilitated development of Strategic Plans for a number of Constitutional and legal Institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Law Commission. In DCP III the main focus in this area has been on the training of paralegal officers in the Districts. A functional alternative dispute resolution system has been established.

Examples of results from 2009 are that a total of 503 cases (ca) were registered by the paralegal offices in the seven target districts. Out of these, 250 were reported to have been resolved, 94 were referred to other case handling institutions, while 159 were pending resolution at the time of reporting.

4.5 Civic Education and Human Rights

This component has been the most successful in terms of documented results and the DCP has improved the programming as well as the administration of this component based on a number of stakeholder meetings, appraisals and evaluations. Evaluation reports have put most emphasis on this component and advised that it be the main focus of the programme. To what extent this is due to the continuous decline in funding is difficult to ascertain.

Awareness has been raised at a national level of the roles and responsibilities of public officials versus the population. There are numerous examples in all evaluation reports of changes taking place, both at policy level and in service provision that has occurred due to public pressure. The most important mechanisms for these changes seem to have been the various radio listening clubs and radio programmes that have been broadcasted nationally. Dialogues between rights holders and duty bearers on concrete issues have been broadcasted and follow-up has been reported on.

A vast number of community based educators, traditional authorities, volunteer paralegal officers, councillors, police officers and health workers, district commissioners and civic educators have been trained. Materials, posters, brochures and modules for outreach activities by the many implementing partners for DCP have been developed. Drama groups, human rights groups, Village rights committees, youth clubs and democracy clubs have been formed. For example: in 2009 it was reported that a total of 921 Village Rights Committees had been established and/or trained during the year. In the same year, 223 Community Based Educators (linked to the VRCs) were identified, out of which 70 were female.

To what extent all of these lead to changes in the indicators that were measured in the 2005 baseline survey on civic education remains to be seen, but the anecdotal evidence in reports give a picture of activities that have important multiplier effects and that innovative solutions are developed in the projects and at village level. The 2007 evaluation *“found ample, in some areas very strong, evidence of civil society participation in democratic processes. While the promotion of human rights may have been led by civil society organisations, there was significant quality in participation, leadership, vigilance and the zeal to teach each other about human rights and democratization among community members in areas where there were clubs or committees related to human rights.”* (Kamchedzera, G and Kanyongolo, F.E. 2007) The evaluation also state that there has been some re-distribution of power at community level with redefinition of roles and accountability of public functionaries and that there is now more consultation and participation of civil society organisations in governance structures such as court user committees. Gender roles have changed and traditional leaders accept new forms of authority as represented by radio listening clubs and the role of the community-based educator. A number of battles against rights-incompatible customary practices were quoted, and changes in attitudes among traditional chiefs on issues such as widow inheritance were confirmed. Also there was evidence that certain government bodies were beginning to refer appropriate cases to CSOs such as Women Lawyers Association and other legal and human rights organisations. This picture was confirmed in interviews for this evaluation. The methods used for networking and exchange visits between partners, committees and clubs for sharing of experiences are also reported to be much appreciated. Still, it should be noted that by 2007, most of the radio recorded dialogues (60 %) were with NGOs (charity based service providers) while 35 % were with District Commissioners. Only 1% or the dialogues on right to development were held with politicians.

Examples of notable achievements in this component, in addition to the list above:

- The Draft National Plan of Action for Human Rights was developed by the Human Rights Commission with DCP support.
- Media Monitoring of Article 19 included periodic reports that were detailed and evaluative. The impact of these reports towards freedom of expression was enormous according to the 2000 Mid Term Evaluation.

- A scam in the Ministry of Health that corruptly diverted medicines from public hospitals onto the private market was exposed and the availability of drugs in most districts improved as a result.

Some of these projects have been run in collaboration with public institutions such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Information and the Anti-Corruption Bureau as part of their own campaigns. There has also been collaboration with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and with the National television station. There is thus the additional effect of the networking and the cross-organisational learning taking place in the programme.

4.6 Examples of Village Outcome Success Stories under DCP III:

In order to get a better understanding of the diverse type of outcomes that DCP is aiming at, the following stories are quoted from the 2009 DCP Annual Report:

Popular participation in elections radio quiz:

During the year, Centre for Development Communications produced and broadcast 46 episodes of Mbaliyanga. The episodes, among other things, defined the right to development in the context of people's daily lives, encouraged the citizenry to take an active role in ensuring that the May 2009 General Elections were free and accessible (including encouraging all registered voters to cast their votes and discouraging negative practices e.g. political violence), and contextualised fair trade, labour and consumer rights within the framework of the right to development. The episodes also addressed cross-cutting themes of gender and HIV/AIDS. The project continued to run a monthly quiz competition. During the year, the quiz attracted 4,115 responses from across the country out of which 1,000 were successful and were given Mbaliyanga Promotional T/Shirts as prizes. Feedback through letters revealed that listeners, out of their own initiative, continued to form Mbaliyanga Radio Listening Clubs with a view to sensitizing community members on issues covered in the programme.

Conflict Resolution among media actors (competitors):

A National Radio Listening Club Conference involving 84 representatives from all RLC's was held in July, 2009. The Conference provided an opportunity to end the wrangle between the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) and DCT over ownership of RLC's through a vote. Out of the 30 RLCs, 26 chose to work with DCT while 2 opted for MBC and 2 abstained. The Conference also agreed on new names for the DCT radio programmes as the old names were to be retained by MBC.

Community discovers faulty records on boreholes and officials respond:

People in GVH Yadama, TA Kanyenda, had no access to safe water for domestic use since they settled in the area. They used to get water from an unprotected well which was also frequented by domestic animals. As a result, diarrhoea diseases were very common in the area. Under the leadership of Chivumu VRC, the community discussed their need for safe water with their Member of Parliament. A check in the District Assembly records indicated that a borehole had earlier been sunk in the area. The community advised the officials that there was no borehole in the area and challenged them to come to the area and identify the borehole.

Consequently, a borehole was sunk in the area and people are now drinking safe water. Cases of diarrhoea have since substantially reduced.

Through joint efforts, communities influence pigeon pea prices and scale accuracy:

*In Mwanza district, the community in TA Kanduku were, for some time, not satisfied with prices offered by buyers of agricultural produce, especially pigeon peas. The farmers also felt cheated because most of the private buyers were using scales that were not functioning properly. Under the leadership of all CBEs and VRCs in the area, **the community dialogued with traditional leaders, District Trade Officer and private buyers on the price of pigeon peas** which resulted in the stakeholders agreeing to a fixed price of MWK 100 per kilogram as opposed to the previous price range of MWK 60 to MWK 70. The agreed price was even higher than that offered by Agriculture Development and Marketing Cooperation which was buying the product at MWK 80 per kilogram. **The stakeholders also resolved that the District Trade Office should confiscate scales that were not functioning properly.***

Persistence by community and District Health Officer ensures accountability of private health care services:

*In Nsanje district, Chididi Health Centre, which is the only health facility in the area and is owned by Evangelical Lutheran church, ceased to operate due to lack of health workers. The community noted that it was not enjoying the right to health as sick people had to walk a long distance to get treatment. Under the leadership of their VRC and CBE, the community discussed the problem with the owners of the facility. When this did not yield positive results, they brought the issue to the attention of the DHO and asked for his intervention. The DHO ordered the church to identify staff and reopen the facility. This was done. Unfortunately, the church recruited nurses who had just graduated from nursing school. As a result, the community noted that there were many child deaths during delivery. **A research conducted by the VRC revealed that this was as a result of the incompetence of the nurses.** They took up the issue with the DHO who ordered the church to post away the nurses and replace them with experienced ones. This was done and the community is happy as they are now enjoying their right to health.*

Traditional customs must accede to constitutional property rights:

*A widow who settled in GVH Daud Jere, TA Mzikubola, with her late husband was dispossessed of a garden by her village headman following the death of her husband. She reported the matter to Thoza CBRC. The CBRC discussed the matter with the village headman and other senior traditional leaders but to no avail. **The CBRC referred the matter to Police where, after mediation by the victim support unit, the village headman was ordered to return the land to its rightful owner.** This was done and the widow continued to enjoy her right to property.*

The community takes on role of watchdog for support to orphans:

In September, 2008 the District Social Welfare Office launched a project to support ten orphans under Kambadzo Community Based Organisation in T.A. Chikho with cash disbursements of MWK 10.000 each. The money was meant to be used by the guardian to run a small business and use the profits to provide for the needs of the orphaned child. However, the money was not disbursed up to August, 2009. Following community awareness on principles of good governance, the community sought the assistance of the CBE to recover

the money. Community representatives, under the leadership of their CBE, confronted the District Assembly where it transpired that the money had been used on other activities. The assembly agreed to and actually disbursed the money within two weeks from the date of the meeting.

4.7 DCP and Democratic Development Dimensions

As described earlier, the programme was originally designed to address five out of nine Government-defined strategic directions for Democratic Consolidation in Malawi. Outcomes of the programmes have been achieved in all of the seven dimensions covered by this evaluation.

Access to Justice and Judicial Development: Implementing Partners in the programme have established para-legal clinics with regular opportunities for consultations with legal professionals. A formal Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism has been established as well as a Mediation Centre for the Courts with training of mediators. Support has also been given to an alternative dispute resolution programme in the Church and Society Programme in Blantyre and the Conflict Resolution and management Centre at Chancellor College of the University of Malawi.

Implementing partners report on the number of cases addressed by paralegal officers (who have been trained under the programme) and the number of cases resolved.

Strengthening Civil Society; Voice and Accountability: While focus is on the demand side, various approaches to ensure accountability have been tried over the years, some more successful than others. Currently, the DCP programme is implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development in a separate Local Government Strengthening Programme which is also supported by UNDP. While, the Programme works with the citizenry to empower them to demand good governance and fulfilment of human rights in selected Districts, the Ministry works with the formal local government structures to build their capacity to respond to this demand through improved and effective service delivery.

Human Rights, Women's Participation and Gender Equity: The aim of the programme is to create a critical mass that is vigilant in identifying violations of good governance and human rights principles in their localities and taking the appropriate steps to address the problems. The strategy prioritises interests of vulnerable groups e.g. the ultra-poor, women, children, people infected or affected by HIV/AIDS and people with disabilities. The implementation strategy ensures that the vulnerable groups are empowered to be active participants in the process of addressing their challenges.

Electoral Processes and Institutions: During the first phases of the Programme, a separate component was implemented in this field, but with a more concentrated focus, this area is being addressed in other, specialised programmes. Currently, the civic education component is the programme link to this Democratic Development Dimension.

Public Sector Oversight Functions: A successful training programme for Parliamentarians was implemented during the first two phases of the Programme, but is no longer part of the programme. Within governance, the main thrust of Norwegian support today is in this field.

Norway has supported the Parliament, the Human Rights Commission, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Office of the Ombudsman.

Media: Radio programmes and radio listening clubs at village level are some of the strongest components of the programme. The media projects complement the district based projects by acting as a channel for disseminating knowledge on governance and human rights, as well as providing an opportunity to vulnerable groups to express their views on various governance and human rights issues that affect them. They also facilitate dialogue between rights holders and duty bearers on various challenges encountered by the citizenry.

5 Findings and Conclusions

5.1 Assessing programme results and processes

The Malawi DCP has for 13 years been housed in the Office of the President and Cabinet (Implementing Partner) and seen the continued and stable work of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Human Rights and Democracy with the Programme Steering Committee, the Consultative Stakeholder Forum and the Programme Management Office. The Programme Steering Committee is comprised of Government, Constitutional Bodies of Governance and Civil society Organisations. During this period a number of public, semi-public and civil society organisations have also been long-term partners.

DCP has thus been an important national structure/actor in the Democratic Development process for 13 years and contributed implicitly- or explicitly in all of the Democratic Development dimensions, though not in such a systematic and integrated manner as was envisaged at inception. Among key actors in the democratic debate in Malawi, DCP is well known, mainly because most of them have at some point been involved in the programme in different capacities. It can be said that the mere existence of the programme with the organisational structure has kept the issue of civil society voice and participation on the regular inter-ministerial agenda throughout this period, with information constantly “trickling up” from the Implementing partners in the field.

The Government and UNDP have not succeeded in giving IMCHR and the DCP programme the coordinating role for National Democracy Consolidation that was envisaged in the design phase. The DCP has little visibility among donors and there is little proof of synergies taking place between the Norwegian/UNDP/Government funded DCP and the other large-scale donor funded programmes within Democratic Governance in Malawi. Similarly, there is little evidence that Norwegian funding for other organisations and programmes have had mutually strengthening effects. The impression of the evaluation team is rather one of competition for funds between different actors and overlapping roles, for example between the Human Rights Commission and civic education actors such as DCP partners and EU funded NICE programme. Similarly, the Anti-corruption Bureau received funding both directly from the Norwegian Embassy as well as from DCP for similar activities. There are many and complex reasons for this low level of cooperation, but one very obvious challenge that is being raised by many respondents to explain lack of concerted effort in this field, is the challenge of organisational independence and human resources, in terms of competence, integrity and stability;

- Donors come with their own agendas/strategies/priorities and want to build their own “flagship projects”.
- There is high turnover in donor staff (as well as down-sizing), including in the Norwegian embassy in later years
- UNDP has not been able to keep the central position on the governance agenda it was said to have in the late nineties. Compared to other donors, UNDP has one of the most dispersed portfolios in the country with programmes in most sectors.

- The various constitutional bodies in Malawi do not yet have the necessary independence from government to play their roles as “watch-dogs” effectively, most notably is this for the Human Rights Commission.
- In civil society, several network- and umbrella organisations have been established, some of them “protected” through regulation, but they have not been able to play the role of independent civil society brokers or for channelling funds in an efficient manner.
- “Leadership issues” is often quoted by respondents in interviews to explain why a certain organisation does not fulfil its autonomous role and contribute to the joint Human Rights and democratisation objectives, but also to explain why donors and authorities do not play a more pro-active and constructive role for joint efforts. It is a challenge that is almost too obvious, and very difficult to include in evaluation analysis.

The Government and UNDP with donors in the Governance field are currently addressing some of these challenges through two means: a study is being conducted on donor coordination in Malawi and, based on the success of the SWAP (sector wide approach) in the health sector; work is underway to establish joint efforts (possibly a SWAP) in the Governance / Justice sector.

The programme was not found to have had any direct, verifiable influence on Government policy, which was one of the key issues raised by the evaluation team. It was expected that civil society and human rights actors would be able to address policy issues through the unique structures of communication set up for the DCP; that implementing partners would be able to raise concerns about framework conditions through the Programme Steering Committee, such as the need for a bill on access to public information, changes to the local Government Act and freedom of association. The role of the Steering Committee is that of discussing and giving advice on programme activities and the channel of communication between civil society and the IMCHRD is not utilised for advocacy on policy issues. The programme was never designed to influence political decisions directly, and this may be seen as a weakness – or opportunity lost – but it may also be that this has been a pre-requisite for continued government ownership and backing. It should be recalled in this vein that the government adopted an NGO law in 2000, which specifically prohibits “politicking and electioneering” as part of NGO work. At some point, the DCP attempted to commission monitoring-related activities for partners and an attempt to produce an annual assessment of governance in the country. Lack of consensus got in the way of this potentially useful result (Kamchedzera and Kanyongolo 2007). The intention of DCP, however, is not to be *representing* civil society – but to strengthen civil society so that civil society can influence policies and governance – for the purpose of “right to development”. The programme can thus be described as “top-down support for bottom-up empowerment” and in this regard it is unique and successful.

The programme has grown into an effective mechanism for channelling funds and providing capacity development to professional, national NGOs and to ensure networking and learning between these. The DCP Programme Office is held in high esteem by Implementing Partners and seen as a legitimate actor with integrity to support civil society. Evaluations have shown which partners were the most effective to deliver on outputs and outcomes, which were typically the ‘activist’ CSOs working in the rural areas with civic education and facilitation of citizens ‘voice’. Effect on civil society: some of the most vocal NGOs have developed their capacity and strength through DCP support. Many also have funding from

other sources. The strict focus on accountability for results has ensured that only viable NGOs have remained partners of DCP.

Public entities were found to be less effective partners in a programme perspective, not delivering on implementation. Consequently, one of the main challenges to the overall success of the programme; i.e. that of duty bearer responsiveness has been externalised and remains a critical factor, which is to a less extent directly addressed in the programme. An example to illustrate was the finding in the 2007 evaluation that duty bearer's response to demands by citizens was in some instances more driven by their fear to be exposed in a radio programme than a fundamental re-orientation in their role as duty bearer. (Kamchedzera and Kanyongolo 2007)

Programme Theory and programme design has changed over the years, based on evaluation recommendations (results based management as driving force) and due to funding constraints. The programme manager says that the programme addresses a niche, not covered by other programmes, and his opinion is that where they are today is where they should have started 13 years ago. Today, the programme is thus an efficient mechanism for channelling funds to (mainly) NGOs who "deliver" the programme outputs which enable people in the villages to demand their development rights. What is lost is the integrated approach where the supply side of accountability is addressed at the same time – and it is precisely the unresponsiveness of duty bearers that is seen as the main constraint to the programme. Norway and UNDP have not managed to "sell" the programme to other donors in order to address this "risk factor" in the programme theory. It is, for example, unfortunate that the programme has not been given more support to address the political challenges to the Parliamentary training programme to strengthen it and keep it going.

Norway has investigated various models for support to civil society in Malawi, but the DCP programme seems to have been the most successful one. Norwegian Support has been given to several of the Constitutional bodies, to civil society umbrella organisations. "Leadership issues", organisations' legitimacy and lack of results have been the main reasons for discontinuing support, as documented in the archive at the embassy.

UNDP has not been able to raise additional funds for DCP or promote DCP synergy with other Governance programmes. For DCP III there was, in 2008, a resource gap of approximately USD 5.8 million. UNDP, with the support of the Malawi Government, should be responsible for developing a resource mobilisation strategy to raise funds and technical assistance for the Programme and ensure that such resources to the various components were well coordinated. Part of the strategy would involve drawing up a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to create a strategic partnership between government, donors and civil society that allowed for cost sharing and or basket funding of the components and, for joint Programme review and discussions on Government plans. Donors would be asked to subscribe to the MoU on the basis of which mechanisms for project coordination under the Programme, would be worked out and maintained. GoM requested UNDP to take a lead in working out the partnership mechanism. This has not yet been successful. Norway is still (2010) the only cost-sharing partner with UNDP and GoM.

5.2 Factors explaining programme results

	Positive	Constraints
Project internal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project design improved over time with broad participation of all relevant stakeholders. • Project team highly qualified, hard-working, committed, remained in post. • Sustained funding, providing predictability and stability for partners. • Project management with the necessary independence to manage the programme for results and develop an outcome focus. • Working methods are catalytic and facilitative with strict focus on outcomes, and networking / exchanging experiences. • The Rights Based Approach has over the years become <i>the main</i> mode of the programme and is seen to work well. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project design unrealistic and too ambitious. • UNDP/DCP have not been able to synthesise the strengths / achievements of DCP for donor buy-in. • Low visibility of programme among donors. • RBM and strict financial accountability regulations favour professional NGOs, preclude grassroots-based CSOs. • UNDP delays in disbursement and procurement.
External to project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stable, though slow democratisation process, no dramatic set-backs. • Government ownership – without political intervention in activities – unique. • Norway and UNDP stable and “hands-off” partners – supporting national / local ownership. • Project partners – local communities, engaged, and with a strong voluntary aspect to participation (not based on allowances). • Villagers willing to participate and volunteer to work together. They take responsibility for their own development and find innovative solutions. • Traditional leaders positive, take active part. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decentralisation process delayed, no councillors at local level. • Donors seemingly more interested in stand-alone flagship projects with high visibility. • Some policies and legal frameworks not conducive to DCP outcomes. • Accountability from public functionaries low. • Lower level duty bearers often unable to perform their duties due to higher level duty bearers.

Government role: The Government has backed the programme from inception, and this could not be taken for granted, given the slow decentralisation process and the unfavourable NGO regulatory framework in the country. Also, the Government has not displayed undue political interference in programme activities, but ensured independence of the programme office to implement the programme plan. The DCP Programme Office sees the Government ownership and long-term backing as one of the critical success factors.

General Democratic Development: There are a number of serious challenges to Human Rights and democratic development in Malawi, and there have been set-backs. NGOs have been expelled from the country and recently a gay couple was sentenced to 14 years in prison without any objection from the Human Rights Committee (they were later pardoned by the President). It is the low understanding among politicians and public functionaries concerning downward accountability, however, which has most seriously affected the programme results, in addition to the non-functioning of decentralisation. Public functionaries at the local level do not have the budgetary capacity to meet the new “demands for right to development”, and lower level duty bearers may often be unable to perform their duties due to higher level functionaries and politicians.

UN as channel: Complaints about the UNDP inability for quick response has been continuous and documented in evaluation reports as well as in tri-partite meeting minutes. At times, this has seriously hampered programme progress. Partners are not readily able to describe in what ways UNDP has added value to the programme. To the programme office, the high turnover of staff (in UNDP) has been a challenge, as it hampers the strategic

dialogue. Through the life-span of the programme, the DCP Programme Manager has had seven different Junior Professional Officers as UNDP counterparts. The fact that UNDP has not managed to raise alternative funding is also seen as a major weakness. It is unfortunate that it is lack of funding, not programme capacity that has limited the geographic outreach of the programme. Programme management capacity was included as a separate component, and the results are good, both for the programme institutional structure, organisation and management, but also for the programme office and its ability to build capacity of partners. Norway has, since 1998 demanded better design for M&E and more systematic reporting on results, and though there have been marked improvements in the technical quality of the programming over the years, UNDP and DCP have still not developed the necessary capacity in this field.

Norway as donor: It is the consistent accompaniment of Norway and UNDP for a long enough period that can be seen as the single most important contribution to the success of the programme. The national programme partners have been given independence to establish networks of implementing partners that all “pull in the same direction”. In addition Norway has constantly requested improvements in focus on strategy and reporting on results. There is not so much evidence, however, that Norway has actively participated in a debate on the strategic direction of the programme.

Programme set-up and management: The organisation of DCP with channelling of funds to civil society organisations through a government mechanism is quite unique, and may have been questioned by some, but this, together with a broad participatory process has turned out to be one of the strengths of the programme. The intellectual elite in Malawi has had an important influence in the DCP, both as partners in different capacities, in the stakeholder forums and as managers of Implementing partners and as resource persons for material development. It is also the national experts that have conducted the evaluations, though some of them with international counterparts. It is an interesting finding that the DCP seems to have high visibility on the national civil society and democratic development agenda, though low visibility among donors.

Programme approach: The programme is the sum of all implementing partners’ own approaches, but over the years, these have been moulded into a joint rights based approach with focus on outcomes, and there are today a number of guidelines for project management and reporting that partners apply. The statement made by one of the implementing NGOs, that there is now competition between them to report on the best results when they meet to share experiences is testimony to a good relationship between the programme office and the partners.

Initial selection of Implementing Partners: UNDP and DCP did a good job in the initial selection of civil society partners, thereby giving the programme credibility and legitimacy in civil society from the very start. Soon after the Referendum (1993), multiparty government (1994) and the formulation of the 1995 Constitution, the six selected NGOs had played the following crucial roles:

- Sensitized educated and trained Malawians on their fundamental Rights enshrined in the new constitution under section 4: The Bill of Rights.
- Advocated for the promotion of good governance especially multiparty democracy.
- Participated in public policy formulation and in political processes.

- Acted as watch dogs to the political transition process in the country.
- Acted as a link with the international civil society.

The CSO groups had qualified leadership and officers:

- Most of the leaders had been in exile for having advocated for human rights during the Banda Era
- They had been trained in HR outside Malawi where they also had experienced life in democratic societies where HRs observance was more entrenched
- The CSOs had well established institutions with clear structures of delivery as well as governance structures
- Others such as the CCJP were well respected by both the Malawi government and the society for their work and structures reaching out to all parts of Malawi even to the remotest areas.

Civil Society: The knowledge base and attitudes in the villages concerning human rights and participation in democratic processes following years of dictatorship was described chapter 2. Evaluation reports and interviews for this evaluation show that traditional leaders, women and men in the villages are willing to work together on a voluntary basis, establish groups and apply techniques and methods they learn to address injustice and village development needs. If DCP is to fulfil the aim of “empowering a critical mass”, there is need for continued support, not “donor fatigue” or establishment of new mechanisms for this type of support.

5.3 Summing up: DAC Criteria

Programme effectiveness is in general given a high score in all evaluation reports, but this is mainly for the two components of ‘civic education on governance’ and ‘programme management’. These were the two components brought forth into phase III. There is no systematic and comprehensive overview of the main outcomes, but many examples as shown above. Those interviewed for this report confirm the positive impression of a strong programme that makes a change, especially at grassroots level.

In terms of *efficiency*, the main weakness of the programme has been the UNDP delays in disbursement of funds and procurement. This has been a bottleneck for the programme throughout all three phases. The DCP mechanism for channelling funds to a large number of very diverse Civil Society organisations with wide outreach seems to be both efficient and effective. The programme office has been quite strict and not renewed contracts for partners that did not deliver on time. When ‘activist organisations’ (CSOs) were found to be more efficient and effective than public institutions, DCP gave priority to these more results-oriented IPs. The programme office with low turnover and dedicated, professional staff is given praise in all reviews and evaluations. It is clear from the annual reports that they know their partners well and that all implementing partners are contributing to overall objectives of the programme, while being complementary to each other.

The *relevance* of DCP to Government policies and priorities is ensured by the Government ownership of the programme through IMCHRD. The programme has been designed to contribute to an improvement in the quality of life of vulnerable citizens as envisaged in the

country's Vision 2020 and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (2006-2011). *The relevance of the programme to challenges on the democratic agenda* has been further ensured by broad stakeholder consultation and the involvement of national experts in the field of democratic development, from Government, academia and civil society. Civil Society and UNDP are also represented with observers in the Programme Steering Committee. DCP (phase III) represents a niche programme which is complementary to other interventions in Democratic Governance. The long term partnerships that have existed between DCP and some of the Implementing Partners are also a testimony to the relevance of the programme. Some of these CSOs have been very active in the national debate on human rights and democratic development. *Relevance to peoples' interests and needs* can be seen through the good results documented at village level, where people volunteer and build on what they learn to find new ways of demanding public accountability on issues that are close to their hearts.

The DCP Programme Office and the support to Implementing Partners' projects depend on donor funding and is thus not a *sustainable mechanism*, despite a Government contribution to cost-sharing. But Implementing Partners have had their capacity built and may solicit funds from other sources. Civil society organisations have been strengthened through the Norwegian/UNDP/DCP strict focus on financial- and results accountability and the strong element of networking and knowledge sharing. The outcomes of DCP are, to a large extent, sustainable. Examples were quoted above, of concrete contributions to the democratisation process related to policies and regulatory frameworks. At village level, abolishment of harmful traditional practices, for example, would also be sustainable changes.

It is deemed likely that the many examples of concrete behaviour change at village level will in the long run have *impact* on local governance and popular participation, but a follow-up of the 2006 baseline survey is necessary to assess broader impact along the key indicators in those geographic areas where DCP has been implemented. The 2007 evaluation concludes that *"direct wider sector benefits have included greater participation by civil societies and communities in governance. In addition, there has been changing gender roles due to women's rights awareness. Power has been redistributed at the community level with traditional leaders accepting new forms of authority as represented by radio listening clubs and the increasing acceptance of the role of the community-based educator."* (Kamchedzera, G and Kanyongolo, F.E. 2007) The key challenge, as mentioned earlier, is the knowledge, capacity and will of duty bearers (politicians and public functionaries) to respond to the increased demand by citizens for accountability and transparency. The evaluation report from 2007 even pointed out that some of the 'success stories' could be explained more by duty bearers not wanting to be exposed on radio, than a real change in their perception of their roles.

The positive view of DCP held by national opinion leaders (human rights activists, academics and NGO leaders) interviewed for this report is another indication that DCP has had an impact on public discourse. The radio programmes and radio listening clubs are well known, and DCP is seen as an important "actor" within democratic development. Another interesting indication of impact will be the participation in the next local elections, now postponed till spring 2011.

Attachment A: Persons Interviewed

UNDP Officials

Mr. Richard Dictus, Resident Representative
Mr. Fred Mwanthengere, Governance Programme
Mr. Marius Walker, Junior Professional Officer since
Mr. Clemence Alfazema, Programme Officer, Governance
Mr. Jockley Mbeye, former Deputy Resident Representative and Governance

DCP Programme Staff

Mr. Ammani Mussa, Programme Manager
Ms. Grace Valera, Deputy Programme Manager

Donor Officials

Ms. Bianca Vandeputte, Programme Officer, Economic and Public Affairs Section, European Union
Mr. Adrian Fitzgerald, Irish Embassy,
Mr. Asbjørn Eidhammer, former Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy, (2000-2005)
Mr. Bjorn Johannessen, Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy,
Mr. Unni Poulsson, Chargé d'Affaires, Royal Norwegian Embassy,
Ms. Solrun Maria Olafsdottir, Royal Norwegian Embassy

Other Informants

Dr. Gerard Chigona, Norwegian Church Aid (former GTZ)
Mr. MacBain Mkandawire, Youth Net Counseling
Dr. Edge Kanyongolo Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Malawi (Chancellor College)
Mr. Ted Nandolo, Council for Non Governmental Organizations in Malawi
Ms. Lusungu Dzinkambani, Development Communication Trust
Ms. Fiona Mwale, Law Commission
Mr. Ollen Mwalubunju, Centre for Human Rights & Rehabilitation
Dr Aubrey Mvula, Malawi Human Rights Commission
Mr. Mwafulirwa, Malawi Human Rights Commission
Mr. Konzakapansi, Malawi Human Rights Commission
Dr Fletcher Tembo, ODI/MEJN
Mr. Jeffrey Mwenyeheri, National Assembly
Mr. Desmond Kaunda, MHRRC

Mr. Gerald Grant, Former Development Centre Technical and Financial advisor to the Church / NGO Consortium

Ndindi Community (10 people) CHRR Village Rights Committee

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
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Attachment C: Results Frameworks

This chart was prepared by the Norwegian Embassy on the basis of the Programme Support Document.

Goal: Promote a sustainable process of democratization and human rights in Malawi



Programme Logic DCP III (from 2008)

Number	Key Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	MOV	Coverage	Risks and Assumptions
4.1	DCP Outcome: Increased and more effective participation of communities in decision-making and in advocating changes to policies, laws, practices which affect their livelihoods and rights and holding public bodies accountable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • %s of rural and urban females and males understanding key democratic principles • %s of rural and urban females and males able to understand human rights • %s of people indicating improvements for specific groups having improved access to public services • %s of rural and urban females and males doing something to demand better services 	<p>Females: 29%; Male: 46.5%; Urban: 50.5%; Rural: 35%</p> <p>Female: 16%; Male: 19%; Urban: 20%; Rural: 17%</p> <p>Women: 27%; Men: 27%; Children: 24%; The elderly: 14%; Rural people: 13%; Urban: 39%; PLWHA: 17%; Disabled people: 14%; the unemployed: 5%; The mentally ill: 7%;</p> <p>Female: 27%; Male: 32%; Urban: 22%; Rural: 31%</p>	<p>Respectively 50%, 60%, 60%, 50%</p> <p>50% for each</p> <p>50% for each</p> <p>50% for each</p>	Survey on Civic Education	Malawi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Increasing compliance with the law and decreasing levels of corruption ➤ Increased relevance, effectiveness, and accessibility of institutions of democracy ➤ Negligible misinformation ➤ No natural or other widespread activities
4.1.1	Output 1: At least half of the population demanding the realisation of the right to development at all societal levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • %s of rural and urban females and males satisfied with service delivery 	Access to basic services (Female: 23%; Male: 24%; Urban: 29%; Rural: 23%; Education (Female: 33%; Male: 32%; Urban: 34%; Rural: 32%)	Respectively: 50%; 60%, 60%, 50%	Survey on Civic Education	All districts for civic education Initial 7 with additional 7 each of the remaining four years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Effective partnerships for a human rights-based approach to development programming ➤ Community members' willingness to participate without allowances
4.1.1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Growing critical mass to animate and facilitate the demanding of the right to development and justice 		Health services (Female: 33%; Male: 32%; Urban: 33%; Rural: 32%); Food (Female: 8%; Male: 9%; Urban: 13%; Rural 7%)	50% for each			
4.1.1.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Demand-driven scaled-up and deepened education and training on the realisation of the right to development, Government policies, processes, and programmes 		Shelter (Female: 32%; Male: 32%; Urban: 32%; Rural: 30%); Infrastructure (Female: 54%; Male: 55%; Urban: 51%; Rural: 55%).	60% on infrastructure and 50% on each of the rest			
4.1.1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Transfer of skills on HRBAP, including RBM, to implementers and policy makers 						
4.1.1.4							
4.1.2	Output 2: At least half of the population demanding fair trade, labour and consumer protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • %s of rural and urban females and males demanding fair trade, labour and consumer protection 	No baseline data	At least 50%	Survey on Civic Education	Same as in Output 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Improved monitoring of human rights by national human rights systems at all levels ➤ Government and private sector commitment for equitable markets
4.1.2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Interactive education on fair trade, labour and consumer protection 						
4.1.2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Community and movement-championed dialogue and implementation of action points and plans on equitable market systems 						

4.1.3	Output 3: At least 40% of the population demanding public services and good governance from district assemblies and other public functionaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • %s of rural and urban females and males turning to service providers, public functionaries and CSOs and other functionaries 	District Assembly:11; District Commissioner:10%; social welfare officer: 6%; church leader: 13%; traditional leader: 22%; community health worker: 13%; health surveillance assistant: 17%; agricultural extension officer: 9%; teacher: 10%	40% for District Assemblies	Survey on Civic Education	3 pilot districts for 2008 and at least 6 districts over the 3 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effective decentralised structures Strengthened policy linkages Functioning elected councillors
4.1.3.1	Implemented community-driven-and-centred village, area, and district plans						
4.1.3.2	Implemented local government community-owned rules and regulations						
4.1.3.3							
4.1.4	Output 4: Effective and efficient management, monitoring and evaluation of DCP III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A more efficient and effective DCO compared to DCP III • Annual amount of funds pooled • Human rights and democracy database • % of required audits 	UD\$9 Million	USD 15 Million	Progress reports	Annual review reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Steady flow of financial resources from GoM, RNE and UNDP Other donors additional contributions UNDP's increased efficiency No donor pull-out Stakeholders are supportive of report process Readily accessible public information
4.1.4.1	Developed capacity for DCP and stakeholders		0	1			
4.1.4.2	Oversight and inputs from PSC and Stakeholder Forum			100			
4.1.4.3	DCP Web-based database for existing data on governance						
4.1.4.4	Support of stakeholder-initiated activities						
4.1.4.5	Monitoring and evaluation						
4.1.4.6							